G.R. No. 202847 People v.

Gamez October 23, 2013

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Antero Gamez y Baltazar, was convicted of parricide for killing his own
father, Apolinario Gamez. The incident occurred on August 21, 2004, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Leyte, Philippines. The accused-appellant was accused of attacking and hacking his
father with a long-bladed weapon and sickle, resulting in multiple hacking and incised wounds
that caused his father's death.
During the trial, the accused-appellant claimed self-defense, stating that his father had initially
attacked him with a bolo. However, the prosecution presented witnesses, including the accused-
appellant's sister, who testified that the accused-appellant pursued and killed their father after he
had already fled. The autopsy report also showed that the victim sustained fatal wounds,
including a nearly decapitating wound on his neck.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused-appellant can invoke self-defense despite the fact that he continued to chase
and attack his already disarmed father.

RULING:
The court based its decision on Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines parricide as
the killing of a person by the accused, where the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse
of the accused. In this case, it was established that Apolinario was the accused-appellant's father.
The court also noted that the presence of a mitigating circumstance, as declared by the trial court,
was not supported by any allegation or evidence on record. However, due to the prohibition of
the imposition of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 9346, the accused-appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
The court awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to the heirs of the
victim. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused. The court also recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death
brings emotional pain and anguish, justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages
were also awarded due to the qualifying circumstance of relationship in the crime of parricide.
G.R. No. 17865 People vs. Bucsit March 15, 1922

FACTS:
The defendants in this case are Cipriana Bucsit and Placido Licudine, who were charged with the
crime of parricide. It was alleged that Bucsit and Licudine conspired to poison Bucsit's husband
in order to marry each other. Licudine prepared the poison and mixed it with the husband's food.
The husband unknowingly consumed the poisoned food and died as a result. The family dog also
ate some of the poisoned food and died. Licudine then attempted to cover up the crime by
reporting the husband's death to the authorities. The body of the deceased was recovered and
examined by Dr. Querol, who determined that the cause of death was poisoning. Bucsit and
Licudine eventually confessed to their involvement in the crime, which was corroborated by
witnesses and evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether Bucsit and Licudine are guilty of the crimes of parricide and murder, respectively.

RULING:
The court ruled that Bucsit, the widow of the deceased, is guilty of the crime of parricide, while
Licudine, her paramour, is guilty of the crime of murder. Bucsit was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) for parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of poisoning
compensated by the mitigating circumstance provided by article 11 of the Penal Code. Licudine
was sentenced to cadena perpetua (life imprisonment) for murder, as he killed another person by
means of poisoning. The court modified the trial court's sentence for Licudine from seventeen
years, four months, and one day of cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
The court based its decision on the confessions of Bucsit and Licudine, which were signed in the
presence of witnesses and sworn to before a notary public. The confessions, along with the
testimony of reliable witnesses, including the father of Bucsit, provided sufficient evidence of
their guilt. Bucsit's crime was considered parricide due to her relationship with the deceased,
while Licudine's crime was considered murder as he killed another person. The court also
considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining the appropriate
penalties for each defendant. The court emphasized that Licudine's position as an assistant
lieutenant of the barrio did not warrant the application of article 11 of the Penal Code, which
provides for mitigating circumstances. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment with the
modification of Licudine's sentence to cadena perpetua.
G.R. No. 135981 People vs Genosa January 15, 2004

FACTS:
The case involves appellant Marivic Genosa who was charged with parricide for killing her
spouse. During the trial, Genosa raised the defense of battered woman syndrome, claiming that
she acted out of self-defense due to the repeated physical and emotional abuse she suffered from
her spouse. However, the trial court denied her request for a psychological or psychiatric
examination to support her defense. The trial court proceeded with the trial and eventually
convicted Genosa of parricide.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in denying Genosa's request for a psychological or psychiatric
examination to support her defense of battered woman syndrome.

RULING:
The Supreme Court partially granted Genosa's motion and remanded the case to the trial court
for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman
syndrome" plea. The trial court was given 90 days to conduct the examination and report the
proceedings to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in denying Genosa's request for a psychological
or psychiatric examination. It emphasized that the trial judge is not an expert in determining a
person's mental health and that denying Genosa an examination by a competent medical expert
violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial. The Court also noted that proof of insanity could
have exempted Genosa from criminal liability, as criminal liability is based on human free will
and a person cannot be held criminally liable if they did not perform the act voluntarily. The
Court further explained that in order to properly evaluate Genosa's defense of battered woman
syndrome, expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing is
necessary. The reopening of the case was deemed necessary to allow the defense to present expert
evidence and the prosecution to cross-examine and refute the same.
G.R. No. 188320 People vs. Tibon June 29, 2010

FACTS:
This case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Honorio Tibon who was found guilty of two
counts of parricide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and sentenced to death. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Tibon
argues that he should be exempted from criminal liability due to insanity.
The facts of the case are as follows: Tibon was charged with two counts of parricide for stabbing
his two young sons, Keen Gist and Reguel Albert, to death. Tibon's common-law wife, Gina
Sumingit, had gone to work in Hong Kong, leaving Tibon with custody of their children. Tibon
heard from his sister that Gina was having an affair, which led to him drinking heavily and hitting
his children. On the night of December 12, 1998, Tibon's mother and siblings found him with his
two lifeless children, and Tibon stabbed himself in the chest with a kitchen knife. Tibon and his
children were rushed to the hospital, but the children could not be revived.
During the trial, Tibon pleaded not guilty and raised insanity as a defense. He claimed that he
could not recall what happened on the night of the incident and that he was only informed by his
siblings that he had killed his children. The prosecution presented witnesses and evidence to
establish Tibon's guilt, including Tibon's confession to the police and his wife's testimony that he
confessed to her and asked for forgiveness.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the exempting circumstance of insanity
in favor of Tibon.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Tibon's defense of insanity was not proven. While the Revised
Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, the
burden of proving insanity lies with the accused. Tibon's medical records from the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) only pertained to his ability to stand trial and not his mental
state at the time of the crimes. The Court also noted that Tibon's jealousy and anger, which
triggered his actions, did not equate to insanity. The Court emphasized that only a complete
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the crime would warrant the exempting circumstance of
insanity.

The Court affirmed Tibon's conviction for two counts of parricide and upheld the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The Court also reduced the civil indemnity from PhP75,000 to PhP50,000, as
recommended by the Solicitor General. The Court concluded by stating that parricide is a heinous
crime that deserves the harshest penalty, considering the unnatural and tragic act of killing one's
own flesh and blood.
In this case, Tibon failed to present sufficient evidence to prove his insanity at the time of the
crimes. The Court also emphasized that mere jealousy and anger do not equate to insanity, and
only a complete deprivation of intelligence would warrant the exempting circumstance of
insanity.
G.R. No. 172370 People vs. Castro October 6, 2008

FACTS:
Christopher Talita contracted the services of Elpidio and Alfredo Castrofor the installation of
window grills at an unspecified location in Santol, Balagtas, Bulacan. They received instruction
to find a person named Betty who was supposed to show them where the job was to be done but
they failed to find Betty. That same night Christopher re-emerged to the household of Castro and
volunteered to accompany them to the job site the next morning. Christopher, Jaime Carrazcal
(welder) and Alfredo waited on the street while Elpidioget his service jeepney. When Alfredo is
about to board the Jeepney, Christopher drew caliber 38 and shot Alfredo in the head twice
causing his death. Then, he also shoots Elpidio twice causing his death. He waited at the crime
scene until a Nissan sentra came. Aboard the car is Florenda Castro.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Florenda Castro is guilty of the crime of parricide and murder.

RULING:
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC finding Florenda guilty of parricide and murder. Because
the records bear out that Florenda conspired and confederated with Christopher in carrying out
the killing of Alfredo and Elpidio. While Christopher acted as the gunman, Florenda sowed the
seeds of violence by masterminding the reprehensible deed. Undeniably, their concerted actions
showed a community of purpose and design that formed a chain of evidence that established a
conspiracy to commit parricide and murder.
The SC affirmed with medication the ruling: The cases against appellant Florenda Castro are
dismissed, as her criminal and civil liabilities are EXTINGUISHED by reason of her death;
Appellant Christopher Talita is sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect Since the killings were
committed in 1998, the trial court, as well as the CA, were correct in imposing upon appellant
Christopher the supreme penalty of death. In view, however, of the passage and effectivity of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006, proscribing the imposition of the capital
punishment, the proper imposable penalty on appellant is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility
for parole, in line with Sections 2 and 3 of the said law.
G.R. No. 180496 People vs. San Gaspar April 2, 2014

FACTS:

At around 11:30 p.m. of the same day and while Imelda and her two children Joramel and Cherme
were already fast asleep, appellant returned home and pounded on their front door. The
thudding sound roused the whole household. Apparently, appellant was mad because nobody
immediately opened the door for him. He got even more furious when he entered the house and
saw Imelda sleeping side-by-side with her grown-up children. Appellant thus kicked Imelda on
the leg while she was still lying on the floor and this started a heated altercation between them.
Appellant exclaimed, "What kind of wife [are you?]," to which Imelda retorted, "what kind of a
husband is a person who just leaves his family behind without asking permission or informing
his wife of his whereabouts"? Imelda also told appellant that her sleeping with Joramel and
Cherme is without any malice as they are her children.
Still enraged, appellant went upstairs and returned with a .12-gauge shotgun. He loaded it and
lit a kerosene lamp which he placed near the door of their room. He then aimed the .12-gauge
shotgun at his wife and in front of Joramel and Cherme, shot Imelda on the head. Appellant
thereafter immediately ran away. Imelda was brought to Sultan Kudarat Provincial Hospital
where she passed away.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable of the crime parricide.

RULING:

Elements of Parricide obtaining in this case; Factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, cannot be disturbed. "Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused."
In this case the prosecution was able to satisfactorily establish that Imelda was shot and killed by
appellant based on the eyewitnesses’ account.
Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one who shot and
killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material details. Moreover, there is
no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to testify against appellant.
It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of the witnesses, their testimonies
are worthy of full faith and credit. On the other hand, appellant only offered his bare denial of
the offense. However, "[t]he Court had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak
defense that becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by
prosecution witnesses." The Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the
trial court. "It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility
of witnesses are accorded respect since trial courts have first-hand account on the witnesses’
manner of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own
interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
determine the issue of credibility." Furthermore, "in the absence of misapprehension of facts or
grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge have
been adopted and affirmed by the CA, the factual findings of the trial court shall not be
disturbed."
People vs Berang
G.R. Nos. L-46526 and L-46527
October 31, 1939

Facts:
 The appellant was charged in three different cases with parricide. He was acquitted in one
of them and found guilty in the other two.
 In the morning of November 4, 1938, Beling, the wife of the accused, and his children,
four-year-old X and six-month-old Y, were boloed to death in the appellant's house.
 The first Government agents who arrived at the house were Constabulary Sergeant
Ignacio Bersamina and the health inspector of Tugboc, Agustin Candia.
 The accused told the sergeant that he killed his wife and children because he was made
with rage.
 In the afternoon of the same day the accused, who showed some wounds, was taken to
the Davao Public Hospital, and on the following day, November 5th, answering the
questions of the fiscal in the presence of Lieutenant Villares, deputy clerk of court Mr.
Frias, and Sergeant Bersamina, he admitted killed his wife and children and having
wounded himself on the neck and head.

Issue:
Whether accused-appellant is deemed guilty of both parricide and homicide.

Held:
Yes. Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing his daughter X and wife
Beling, with whom he lived maritally, in the absence of clear evidence of the marriage, the court
considered the crime committed by Berang in killing Mora Beling as homicide only, and acquitted
the accused in one of the three cases, sentencing him in the other, for the crime of homicide, to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to twelve
(12) years and (1) day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of Beling in the amount of
P2,000, and in the third case, for the crime of parricide for the death of his daughter X, it sentenced
the accused to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs in both cases, without pronouncement as
to the indemnity for the death of said X, considering that the accused, as the father, is the
presumptive heir of the deceased.

In the present appeal the accused contends that his guilt has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt; that the testimony of Bayna, his mother, is contradictory; that he could not read
well his declaration before the Fiscal when it was read to him, and that he had not spoken to
Sergeant Bersamina. He testified that on November 4, 1938, while he was sleeping, he was
wounded by Beling, and when he woke up he saw his daughter X dead by his side, and upon
noting that Beling was holding a bolo, he grabbed it from her and gave her bolo blows, because
according to him he took pity on his children. Wherefore, the court affirms the appealed
judgment, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
People vs. Paycana, Jr.
G.R. No. 179035
April 16, 2008

Facts:
 The appellant, Jesus Paycana, Jr., was charged with complex crime of parricide with
unintemtional abortion. The incident took place on November 26, 2002, in Iriga City,
Camarines Sur. During the arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed
self-defense as his defense.
 The prosecution presented several witnesses, including the victim’s father, the appellant’s
eldest daughter who witnessed the incident, a barangay tanod, a doctor who conducted
the autopsy, and an embalmer who removed the fetus from the victim’s body.

 The evidence established that the appellant, a butcher, came home from work carrying his
tools and stabbed his wife 14 times. The victim’s father heard her shouting for help and
saw her lying near the door, while the appellant was armed with a weapon.
 The appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from his wife after she stabbed him
first.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in favor of the appellant.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that self-defense is a factual matter best addressed by the trial court, and
there was no showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances that would
have altered its conclusion. The court also found that the appellant failed to discharge the burden
of proving self-defense.
The court explained that the unlawful aggression is a necessary condition for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, and the appellant’s claim of self-defense was contradicted by the
eyewitness testimony of his daughter and the medical findings. The court noted that the number
of wounds inflicted by the appellant indicated a determined effort to kill the victim, rather than
an act of self-defense.
People vs Airol Aling
G.R. No. L-38833
March 12, 1980

Facts:
 This is a parricide case. Norija T. Mohamad, 30, was stabbed in the chest and diaphragm
on January 28, 1972 at Calarian, Zamboanga City. She died at the Brent Hospital two days
later.
 Girlie Aling a relative of Airol Aling stated in her affidavit of February 21, 1972 that she
and Darla Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the victim to the hospital. They learned from
the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband.
 On March 24, 1972, Airol Aling, 35, was investigated by the police. He declared in the
Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife
(whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his
relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men.
 On April 19, 1972, Airol Aling was charged with parricide in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City. It was alleged in the information that Airol was a convict serving
sentence at the penal colony for robbery with frustrated homicide. The case was first called
for arraignment on March 15, 1974.
 The accused signified his willingness to plead guilty although he had no lawyer. A
counsel de oficio was appointed for him. The trial court granted counsel's motion to
transfer the arraignment to March 18.
 On that date, by agreement of the parties, the arraignment was transferred to March 29,
then to April 5, and later to April 30, 1974. On that last date, the information was translated
into the Tausug dialect which is spoken by the accused. With the assistance of his counsel,
he pleaded guilty.
 Then, the accused was placed on the witness stand and examined by his counsel. He
admitted that he killed his wife. He declared that after he was informed by his counsel
that the penalty for parricide is death or life imprisonment, he, nevertheless, admitted the
killing of his wife because that was the truth. In answer to the question of the fiscal, the
accused said that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death or
reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict.

Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of the crime of parricide under Art 246 of the RPC by
claiming mitigating circumstances through his admission of the guilt, however, he was a quasi-
recidivist

Ruling:
Yes. The trial court sentenced Airol Aling to death and to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand
pesos to the heirs of Norija Mohamad. It noted that he pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of his plea.
The contention that the accused did not understand fully he nature and effect of Ms plea of guilty
is belied by the record. The trial judge, a Muslim, took pans to follow the rule that in case a plea
of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge
of the meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty.

The contention that the crime was mitigated by the plea of guilty lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and the circumstance that the accused is a non-Christian is not well taken because
he is a quasi-recidivist. The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cannot be offset
by generic investigating circumstances.

The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of
perversity and incorrigibility His being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness
of his offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education.
He reached first year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that, for lack of one vote, the accused
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua Costs de oficio.
People vs Cruz
109 Phil 288 (1960)
August 31, 1960

Facts:
 Remigio Cruz was married to Natividad Concepcion in 1953. In 1954 Natividad separated
from Cruz allegedly because he used to beat her up. Eventually, they reconciled.
 After learning that they left him, Cruz followed his wife and daughter to Cabanatuan City
where her parents lived. Cruz and his wife were talking but eventually, he started hacking
her with the bolo.
 Cruz contends that, assuming that he was mentally fit at the time of the killing, he should
not have been convicted of the crime of parricide because his marriage to Natividad was
not provided in accordance with the best evidence rule.

Issue:
Whether an oral evidence to prove the fact of marriage be admissible

Ruling:
Yes. In a case of parricide, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased
is the marriage certificate. If, however, the oral evidence presented to prove the fact of marriage
is not objected to, the said evidence may be considered by the court.
People v. Elias Borromeo
GR No. L-61873
October 31, 1984

Facts:
 At high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo
reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for
help because Elias was killing her.
 The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the child to... go to Geronimo Taborada, her son,
who was then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child,
Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's hut.
 The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the
bamboo slats... at the wall where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead
beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana
still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.
 Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officer
Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and ordered
Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would
open the door.
 When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled
out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.
 Necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was "stab
wounds, multiple, chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There
were five (5) incised wounds and six (6)... stab wounds on the deceased.

Issues:
Whether the crime committed is parricide, not homicide.

Ruling:
Yes. Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The mere fact that no record of
the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present.
ARTICLE 2 OF THE FAMILY CODE states the: A Marriage certificate is not an essential/ formal
requisite of marriage:" but just an evidence of marriage. No record of it does not invalidate it as
long as all requisites of validity are present. In holding as it did that appellant and Susana
Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when
the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the
occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide;
People of The Philippines vs. Edgar Jumawan G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18,1975 and have 4 children. On
February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the Accused-
Appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998.On December 12, 1998, the accused-
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him. According to KKK, conjugal
intimacy did not really cause marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. However,
in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her clothing and, sans any
foreplay, penetrate her. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. On October 16, 1998,
in the spouse’s bedroom, accused-appellant got angry when KKK refused to lie in bed with him
because of headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did
not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot KKK was lying on and
threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where
she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. Accused-appellant then forced KKK into
sexual intercourse with him.
On October 17, 1998, KKK decided to sleep on the children’s room. The Accused-appellant
attempted to carry her out of the room and transfer KKK to their bedroom. MMM and OOO, their
daughters, who saw this happen, pleaded their father to let KKK stay. Accused-appellant ordered
his daughters to leave them, and proceeded to rape KKK in the children’s bedroom.

Issue:
Whether or not there can be marital rape.

Held:
YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. Accused-
appellant violated RA 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997). Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered
to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape.
. People vs. Abarca (G.R. No. 74433) September 14, 1987
Facts:
The case involves Francisco Abarca, who was accused of the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder. The incident occurred on July 15, 1984, in Tacloban City, Philippines.
Abarca discovered his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Paul Koh engaging in sexual intercourse.
Abarca became enraged and left to find a firearm. He returned with an M-16 rifle and found Koh
playing mahjong. Abarca shot Koh three times, resulting in his death. However, the shots also hit
Arnold and Lina Amparado, who were in a nearby room. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized
and underwent surgery to remove a bullet, while Lina Amparado suffered from bullet fragments.
Abarca pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Issue:
1. Whether Abarca should be convicted of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder or under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Whether the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of Abarca and modified the decision of the trial court. Abarca was found
guilty of less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence for the injuries
sustained by the Amparado spouses. He was sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months
of arresto mayor. The court also ordered Abarca to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado. The
court applied Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which grants a privilege or benefit to a legally
married person who kills his spouse and her paramour under exceptional circumstances. The
court found that Abarca met the elements of Article 247, as he surprised his wife and Koh in the
act of illicit copulation and killed Koh in a fit of passionate outburst. The court clarified that
Article 247 does not define a specific crime but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused.
Therefore, Abarca should not be convicted of murder but should be sentenced to destierro.
The court also determined that treachery could not be appreciated in this case since inflicting
death under exceptional circumstances is not a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. The court explained that treachery requires the deliberate adoption of
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that would ensure the safety of the
offender from any defense or retaliation from the victim. In this case, Abarca's act of shooting
Koh was a result of his passionate outburst upon discovering his wife's infidelity, and there was
no evidence to suggest that he deliberately adopted means to ensure his safety during the act.
In summary, the court ruled that Abarca should not be convicted of the complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder but should be found guilty of less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence. The court applied Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code, which grants a privilege or benefit to a legally married person who kills his spouse and her
paramour under exceptional circumstances. The court also clarified that treachery could not be
appreciated in this case as it requires the deliberate adoption of means to ensure the safety of the
offender, which was not present in Abarca's act of shooting Koh.
People vs. Talisic GR No. 97961, September 5, 1997

Facts:
The accused was charged of parricide for killing his wife with 10 stab wounds. The accused
claimed that he killed his wife because he saw a man on top of his wife and on the process of
performing sexual intercourse. He then claimed that he chased the unknown man with a bolo but
the man runaway. Upon his return in their home, the victim tried to stab him with a chisel but
was able to parry it and grabbed the chisel from her. He then used the chisel to stab the victim
that caused her death.

Issue:
WON, the act of the accused that led to the death of the victim is considered under exceptional
circumstances.

Ruling:
NO. In order for an act to be qualified under Article 247 of the RPC, the burden of proof to show
the concurrence of all three elements rests on the defense. These elements are:
1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years
of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical
injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or
she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. In the given case, the accused was not
able to prove that he caught his wife in flagrante delicto; that he killed her while she was in the
very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another man or immediately thereafter. On the other
hand, the records of the case showed that the accused did not catch his wife with another man
that fateful morning. The accused deep-seated suspicion of his wife's infidelity and his
resentment of her maltreatment of their children, coupled with his erratic and turbulent temper,
could explain why he killed her.
People vs. Puedan (G.R. No. 139576) September 02, 2002
Facts:
The case involves the appellant, Roger Puedan, who was charged with the murder of Florencio
Ilar. The incident occurred on May 15, 1995, in the Philippines. The lower court found Puedan
guilty of the crime and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Puedan appealed the decision.
Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether Puedan can invoke the defense of "defense of a
relative caught in flagrante delicto" to justify the killing of Florencio Ilar.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Puedan's appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision. Puedan's
defense of "defense of a relative caught in flagrante delicto" was not accepted by the court. To
successfully invoke the defense of "defense of a relative caught in flagrante delicto," the appellant
must prove three elements: 1) that a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or
his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; 2) that he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or
both of them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter; and 3) that he has
not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
In this case, Puedan failed to satisfy the burden of proof for this defense. He was unable to prove
that he actually surprised his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed Florencio
during or immediately after the act. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses contradicted
Puedan's version of the events. The trial court found the prosecution witnesses to be credible and
convincing, and their accounts were consistent with the physical evidence.
Furthermore, Puedan's flight from the crime scene immediately after the stabbing incident
undermined his defense. His failure to inform the authorities of the incident and his hiding for
three years demonstrated guilt rather than the defense of a relative caught in flagrante delicto.
US vs Versola, G.R. No. L-10759 January 25, 1916

Facts:
The accused and Sixta Layoc, his wife, were married twenty years ago, during the Spanish
domination. There wasn’t any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-
called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes. While they knew that they had not been
married according to the requirements of the church, they believed that they had been legally
married, and, in that belief, lived together for more than 20 years as man and wife, having one
child, Julian Verzola, as the result of such cohabitation. They were living together at the time the
event occurred which led to this prosecution. The wife and the paramour were caught in the act
and the punishment was inflicted by the husband on the instant.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused may be charged under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:
No, the accused may not be charged under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The
only question raised on the trial or here was the legality of the marriage between the accused and
the woman whom he called his wife. It is admitted by the court and by all the parties that, if there
was a legal marriage, the article is applicable. It is evident, however, that the provisions of this
article are intended to apply only in cases where the husband is lawful and married to the
offending wife. There is no authority in law for their extension to include cases wherein the
relations between the parties are other than those contemplated by the legislator.
People of the Philippines vs Charlie Flores, et al., G.R. No. 22888 August 8, 2018

Facts:
That on December 25, 2002, the accused armed with bladed weapons, with intent to kill and
qualified by abuse of superior strength, conspired, confederated together and mutually helped
one another, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked and assaulted Larry Parcon and
stabbed him several times with the use of said bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple fatal stabbed wounds on the different vital parts of his body which directly caused his
death.

Issue:
Whether or not all of the accused are liable for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Ruling:
Yes, the accused are liable for murder qualified with abuse of superior strength. The following
elements must be established: "(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of
the [RPC]; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. “This Court thus finds no error
in the affirmance by the appellate court of the trial court's finding of guilt of the accused-
appellants based on the sole testimony of the prosecution witness who positively identified
the perpetrators because no ill motive was also shown for the lone prosecution eyewitness to
testify against accused-appellants. Further, the murder was qualified by abuse of superior
strength because as established by the prosecution, the accused-appellants, took advantage of
their number, purposely resorted to holding Larry by the armpit so that all the knife-wielders
would be free to stab him.
People vs. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138, June 21, 2001
Facts:
The case involves Juan Babasa, who went to the house of Maria Antolin late at night on January
27, 1899. He called out to Maria's daughter, Fausta, asking her to come out. Fausta, Maria, and a
little boy came out to see who was calling. As soon as Fausta arrived at the door, she was stabbed
in the abdomen and later died from the wound. The death was discovered by a police officer
named Mamerto Gabot, who suspected foul play and called a doctor to examine the body. The
doctor confirmed that Fausta died from the wound. Maria Antolin testified that Babasa had been
making advances towards her daughter, but she did not respond as he was a married man. On
the night of the incident, Fausta asked Babasa what he wanted, and he stabbed her without saying
anything. The accused claimed that he was drunk and did not intend to harm Fausta.
Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the accused, Juan Babasa, is guilty of murder.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the accused, Juan Babasa, is guilty of murder.
Ratio:
The court found that the specific circumstance of treachery (alevosia) was present in the case. This
is because the defendant used a knife to suddenly and unexpectedly inflict a mortal wound on
the victim, which constitutes alevosia. The court cited a judgment from the Supreme Court of
Spain to support this finding. However, the court did not find evidence of premeditation, as there
was no indication of reflection on the commission of the crime. The court also did not find the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and nocturnity to be present. The circumstance
of the offense being committed in a dwelling house was not proven by the testimony. Therefore,
the court concluded that the accused should be punished for the specific crime of murder with
the medium degree of penalty, which is life imprisonment (cadena perpetua) with the legal
accessories. The accused was also ordered to pay 1,000 Mexican pesos to the nearest relatives of
the deceased and to pay the costs of both instances.
People vs. Manalad, G.R. No. 128593, August 14, 2002
Facts:
 Alvin Cupcupin y Manalang was convicted of drug-related charges.
 He was charged with the illegal sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) in Tarlac City, Philippines.
 The charges were based on a buy-bust operation conducted by the Provincial Intelligence
Branch of the Philippine National Police-Tarlac.
 Cupcupin allegedly sold a sachet of shabu to a police officer posing as a buyer.
 Cupcupin was arrested and additional sachets of shabu were seized from his car.
 The confiscated items were marked and photographed at the scene and later turned over
to the crime laboratory for examination.
Issue:
 Did the prosecution prove Cupcupin's guilt of illegal sale of prohibited drugs?
Ruling:
 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted Cupcupin
of the charges.
 The Court found serious breaches in the chain of custody of the seized drugs, which cast
doubt on their integrity and evidentiary value.
 Inconsistencies in the testimony of the arresting officer regarding the marking of the
seized sachet and the absence of a representative from the Department of Justice during
the inventory and marking of the seized items were noted.
 These breaches in the chain of custody created doubts as to whether the drugs presented
in court were the same ones seized from Cupcupin during the buy-bust operation.
 As a result, the Court concluded that there was not enough evidence to prove Cupcupin's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ratio:
 The Court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with the chain of custody rule
in drug cases.
 The rule requires proper handling procedures by anyone who comes in contact with the
seized drugs to prevent tampering or substitution.
 In this case, the failure to properly mark the seized sachet and the absence of a DOJ
representative during the inventory and marking of the seized items violated the chain of
custody rule.
 These breaches created doubts as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs, leading to Cupcupin's acquittal.
 The Court also highlighted the need for the presence of witnesses during post-operation
procedures to ensure the legitimacy and regularity of the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings.
People vs. Pidoy, G.R. No. 146696. July 3, 2003
Facts:
The case involves appellant Leonilo Pidoy y Langrio who was found guilty of the crime of Murder
by the Regional Trial Court of Silay City. The incident occurred when appellant and the victim,
Romeo Santia, got into a wrestling match. The fight was broken up by the crowd and appellant
was led away, while Santia stayed in the front yard. However, appellant returned and stabbed
Santia in the chest with a bolo. The trial court found that there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the wrestling incident and the stabbing, but concluded that the attack on Santia was
treacherous.
Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the trial court correctly appreciated the presence of
treachery in the attack on Santia.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding appellant guilty of Murder.
The Court held that the attack on Santia was treacherous, as it was a deliberate and sudden attack
that gave Santia no chance to defend himself or escape. The fact that Santia was sitting down and
presumably inebriated indicated that he had let his guard down. Therefore, the Court concluded
that appellant was guilty of Murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Ratio:
The Court explained that treachery can be appreciated even if the attack is frontal, as long as it is
sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or offer any defense. In this
case, there was an appreciable lapse of time between the wrestling incident and the stabbing, but
Santia was taken unaware by appellant's sudden appearance and was stabbed before he could
instinctively react. The Court also noted that the attack made it impossible for Santia to defend
himself or retaliate. Therefore, the Court concluded that the attack on Santia was treacherous.
People vs. Alfon, G.R. No. 126028. March 14, 2003
Facts:
 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Edwin Aguilar y Duron (Aguilar) against the
People of the Philippines.
 Case originated from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Capiz, Branch 16.
 Aguilar was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 Charges were based on two separate incidents where Aguilar was accused of selling and
delivering illegal drugs and possessing illegal drugs.
 Aguilar pleaded not guilty during arraignment but later expressed his intention to file a
motion for plea bargaining.
Issue:
 Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Aguilar's Proposal for
Plea Bargaining despite the objection of the prosecution.
Ruling:
 The Court of Appeals (CA) nullified and set aside the RTC's decision, ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
 The CA held that plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, the offended party,
and the prosecutor.
 Since the prosecution objected to Aguilar's plea bargaining proposal, the CA concluded
that the RTC should have disapproved the plea bargaining and continued with the trial.
Ratio:
 The Court cited the case of People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 232978, March 6, 2019)
which established guidelines for plea bargaining in drug cases.
 Guidelines state that plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by the accused, the lesser
offense must necessarily be included in the offense charged, and a drug dependency
assessment must be administered.
 Plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the
approval of the court.
 The court may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground
that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea
bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
 However, if the prosecution objects due to certain circumstances, such as the accused
being a recidivist or the evidence of guilt being strong, the trial court must hear the
objection and rule on its merits.
 In this case, the RTC failed to evaluate whether Aguilar's case falls within the
circumstances that would qualify or disqualify him from plea bargaining.
 Therefore, the case was remanded to the RTC for further evaluation.
People vs. Oandasan, G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016
Facts:
This case involves the appeal of accused Edison C. Magbitang, who was convicted for the
composite crime of rape with homicide. The case originated from an information filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, charging Magbitang with the crime of rape with homicide.
The information alleged that Magbitang, with lewd design and taking advantage of the tender
age of a seven-year-old girl, had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent, and subsequently strangled her to death.
The evidence presented by the prosecution showed that the victim asked permission from her
mother to go to a nearby store but did not return home. Her lifeless body was later found by the
riverbank, and the post-mortem examination revealed signs of asphyxiation and incidental
findings compatible with rape. The only witness to the incident was a six-year-old boy, who
testified that he saw Magbitang rape the victim and burn her face with a cigarette.
Magbitang denied the accusation and claimed that he was at a baptismal party during the time
of the incident. He argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
young witness, that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that his conviction
was based on circumstantial evidence.
Issue:
The main issues raised in the appeal were: (1) the credibility of the young witness, (2) the
sufficiency of the evidence to prove Magbitang's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and (3) the
reliance on circumstantial evidence to establish his criminal responsibility.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and affirmed the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. However, the Court modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The
Court also adjusted the civil damages awarded to the victim's heirs.
Ratio:
The Court held that the young witness was a competent witness, as he showed the capacity to
observe, recollect, and communicate what he had witnessed. The Court also rejected Magbitang's
argument that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the evidence presented, both
direct and circumstantial, pointed to him as the perpetrator. The Court emphasized that
circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker than direct evidence and can be used to
establish the commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.
People vs. Cañaveras, G.R. No. 193839, November 27, 2013
Facts:
 Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Edwin Aguilar y Duron (Aguilar) against the
People of the Philippines.
 Case originated from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Capiz, Branch 16.
 Aguilar was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 Charges were based on two separate incidents where Aguilar was accused of selling and
delivering illegal drugs and possessing illegal drugs.
 Aguilar pleaded not guilty during arraignment but later expressed his intention to file a
motion for plea bargaining.
Issue:
 Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting Aguilar's Proposal for
Plea Bargaining despite the objection of the prosecution.
Ruling:
 The Court of Appeals (CA) nullified and set aside the RTC's decision, ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
 The CA held that plea bargaining requires the consent of the accused, the offended party,
and the prosecutor.
 Since the prosecution objected to Aguilar's plea bargaining proposal, the CA concluded
that the RTC should have disapproved the plea bargaining and continued with the trial.
Ratio:
 The Court cited the case of People v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 232978, March 6, 2019)
which established guidelines for plea bargaining in drug cases.
 Guidelines state that plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by the accused, the lesser
offense must necessarily be included in the offense charged, and a drug dependency
assessment must be administered.
 Plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the
approval of the court.
 The court may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground
that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea
bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ).
 However, if the prosecution objects due to certain circumstances, such as the accused
being a recidivist or the evidence of guilt being strong, the trial court must hear the
objection and rule on its merits.
 In this case, the RTC failed to evaluate whether Aguilar's case falls within the
circumstances that would qualify or disqualify him from plea bargaining.
 Therefore, the case was remanded to the RTC for further evaluation.
People vs. Peran, G.R. No. 95259, October 26 1992 Facts
The case involves the conviction of three accused individuals, Bernardo Peran, Felix Piquero, and
Junior Narido, for the homicide of Jose Namoc. The incident occurred on May 10, 1988, in Sitio
Calabasa, Barangay Molugan, Municipality of Claveria, Misamis Oriental.
Eyewitness Roberto Cawasan testified that he saw the three accused-appellants take Jose to a
creek, where Bernardo hit him on the forehead with a piece of wood. Junior then hit him with a
stone, and Felix delivered the final blow with his fist. Roberto ran away and kept silent about the
crime out of fear for his life. The victim's body was found near the Calabasa Waterfalls 47 days
later, with a broken forehead and three missing teeth.
Issue/s
Whether the testimony of Roberto Cawasan is credible.
Whether the testimony of Bernardo Peran and his corroborative witnesses is credible.
Whether the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the crime committed is murder or homicide.
Whether the penalty imposed is correct.
Ruling
The court upheld the credibility of Roberto Cawasan's testimony, considering his fear for his life
as a valid reason for his initial silence. The court found no substantial inconsistencies in his
testimony that would affect the result of the case. The court rejected the version of Bernardo
Peran, as it was inconsistent with the evidence presented. The court ruled that the trial court erred
in appreciating conspiracy as a qualifying circumstance. While there was conspiracy among the
accused, it could not elevate the crime to murder. The court held that treachery was not present
in the case, as it was neither alleged nor proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court
recognized the abuse of superior strength as a generic aggravating circumstance but noted that it
was not sufficiently alleged in the information to qualify the killing as murder. Based on the
findings, the court set aside the conviction for murder and instead found the accused guilty of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The court sentenced
the accused appellants to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years one (1) day of prison mayor to 17
years and four months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal. The court ordered the accused-
appellants to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Jose Namoc in the amount of
P50,000.00.
US vs. Baluyot, G.R. No. L-14476, November 6, 1919 Facts
On August 3, 1918, Jose I. Baluyot shot Conrado Lerma, the Governor of Bataan, in his office. This
occurred after Baluyot had developed a feeling of personal rancor towards Lerma due to a
previous election. Baluyot had been asked to resign from his position as a captain in the National
Guard, which he attributed to Lerma's persecution. On the day of the incident, Baluyot went to
Lerma's office, where he discovered Lerma was unarmed. Baluyot then drew his own revolver
and fired, knowing Lerma to be unarmed and defenseless. The first bullet hit Lerma's right
shoulder blade and passed through the back of his chair and the wall. Baluyot was later convicted
of the crime of murder.
Issue/s
Whether Baluyot's actions constitute the crime of murder.
Ruling
In this case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled to uphold the decision of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Bataan, which convicted Jose I. Baluyot of the crime of murder.
The Court found that Baluyot had intentionally caused the death of Conrado Lerma, the
Governor of Bataan, by shooting him in his office on August 3, 1918. The Court held that Baluyot's
actions were not
justified and that he had acted with malice and premeditation. As a result, Baluyot was sentenced
to death, ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the
costs.
People vs. Alban, G.R. No. L-15203. March 29, 1961
Facts
The case of People v. Alban is a criminal case that was decided by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on July 26, 1956. The case involved the killing of Teofilo Boado, who was shot dead
in his home in Agoo, La Union on July 16, 1956. The
prosecution presented evidence that two men, one of whom was identified as Alfredo Alban,
entered the Boado residence and shot Teofilo Boado.
The prosecution's evidence included the testimony of Teofilo Boado's wife, Marcela Dacanay,
who recognized one of the intruders as Alfredo Alban, even though he was wearing a mask. Mrs.
Boado testified that she saw the two men enter the house, and that one of them shot her husband.
She also identified the voice of the other man as that of Alfredo Alban's brother, Feliciano.
The defense presented an alibi for Alfredo Alban, claiming that he was at a cockfight in a nearby
town at the time of the murder. However, the court found this alibi to be weak and unconvincing.
The court also considered the outcry of the deceased naming his assailant immediately after being
shot as part of the res gestae, which is a Latin term that refers to statements made by a person
while they are in the midst of a traumatic event.
Based on the evidence presented, the court found Alfredo Alban guilty of the murder of Teofilo
Boado. The court noted that the testimony of Mrs. Boado, combined with the physical evidence
and the outcry of the deceased, was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court also found that the defendant's alibi was not credible and did not raise a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Issue/s
1. Whether the outcry of the deceased naming his assailant immediately after he was shot can be
considered as part of the res gestae.
2. Whether the appellant's alibi is weak and unconvincing.
3. Whether the victim's wife's identification of the appellant as the person who shot the deceased
is sufficient to overcome the appellant's alibi.
Ruling
The court's ruling in this case is to dismiss the appeal and uphold the decision of the Court of
First Instance of La Union, Branch 1, which found the accused, Alfredo Alban, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. This means that the court has affirmed the guilty verdict and the sentence imposed by
the lower court. The court's ruling is based on the evidence presented during the trial, which
showed that the accused was identified by the victim's wife as the person who shot her husband,
and that the accused had a motive to commit the crime. The court also found that the accused's
alibi was not credible and that his defense was not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In dismissing the appeal, the court has determined that the decision of the lower court was
correct and that there is no reason to overturn it. The court's ruling is final and binding, and the
accused must serve the sentence imposed by the court.
People vs. Hugo, G.R. No. 134604. August 28, 2003 Facts
On August 21, 1997, at around 7:00 p.m., Remegio Talon was killed in Barangay Narra, San
Manuel, Pangasinan. The accused, Ernesto Hugo, Lorenzo Hugo, and Rudy Hugo, were present
at the scene of the crime. Joel Talon, a cousin of Remegio, witnessed the killing and testified that
Ernesto hacked Remegio with a bolo, while Lorenzo and Rudy also participated in the attack.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Asuncion Tuvera revealed that Remegio suffered multiple incised
wounds, including a head wound and a neck wound that could have caused his instantaneous
death. The accused entered a plea of not guilty during their arraignment.
The prosecution presented several witnesses, including Joel Talon, SPO3 Dominador Urbiztondo
Jr., Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, Helen Talon, and Marina de Guzman. The accused testified on their
own behalf and called upon several witnesses to defend themselves.
Issue/s
whether the crime committed by Ernesto was murder or homicide. The information alleges the
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength. The trial court
appreciated treachery to qualify the killing to murder.
Ruling
The court found the accused guilty of murder based on the evidence presented during the trial.
The prosecution was able to establish the elements of the crime, including the identity of the
accused, their intent to kill, and the act of hacking and stabbing the victim. The medical evidence
also supported the fact that the victim died as a result of the injuries inflicted by the accused. The
court also considered the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution and the
defense. After evaluating all the evidence, the court found the accused guilty and imposed the
penalty of death.
People vs. Fieldad, et al. G.R. No. 196005, October 1, 2014 Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista, and Edgar Pimentel were charged with the murder
of two jail guards and for carnapping. The incident happened on March 9, 1999, inside the BJMP
Compound in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. The accused, who were detention prisoners, armed
themselves with an unlicensed firearm and conspired to kill the jail guards and escape from
detention. They shot and killed JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa and JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. After the killings,
the accused escaped from the detention facility and stole a Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin
Bauzon.
Issue/s
Whether the accused are guilty of murder and carnapping.
Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, with modifications in the penalties
imposed on Ryan Cornista. Charlie Fieldad and Edgar Pimentel were found guilty of murder and
carnapping. Ryan Cornista's penalty for murder was reduced due to his minority at the time of
the crime. The accused were ordered to pay damages to the heirs of the victims.
The accused's identity was established through the positive identification of a witness and
corroborating circumstantial evidence. The presence of treachery was established in the killings
of the jail guards, as they were attacked without
warning and had no chance to defend themselves. The accused's claim of uncontrollable fear as
a defense for the carnapping was rejected, as they had ample opportunity to escape and were not
under imminent danger. The penalties imposed on the accused were in accordance with the law,
considering the presence of aggravating circumstances. The accused were ordered to pay
damages to the heirs of the victims, including civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, actual damages, and loss of earning capacity.
SIMANGAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 157984. JULY 8, 2004

Facts:
At 8:00 p.m. on February 10, 1980, the petitioner, Loreto Bergado, Bening Gumabong and two
other male persons arrived at the store of the spouses Ernesto Flores and Sofronia Saquing in
Barangay Maasin, Solana, Cagayan. The Flores Spouses, along with fifteen-year-old Lorna
Saquing, Sofronia’s niece, were then having dinner. The five men were in fatigue uniforms and
were armed with long firearms. When they knocked on the door, Lorna responded and inquired
what they wanted, and she was told that they wanted to buy cigarettes. Ernesto and Sofronia
entertained the men, two of whom were their neighbors, Loreto Bergado and Bening Gumabong.
Momentarily, the petitioner asked Ernesto to go with them to serve as a guide. In response,
Ernesto invited the men to sleep at their house, but the latter refused. Ernesto then agreed to
accompany the visitors. The petitioner warned Ernesto and Sofronia not to tell anyone that they
had been to the store. Romeo left the store at about 9:30 p.m. Ernesto did not return that evening.
The next morning, Romeo Balunggaya arrived at Sofronia’s house and told her that Ernesto was
dead, and that his body had been found about three hundred (300) meters away. Sofronia and
Lorna rushed to the place, and found Ernesto’s body near the creek. Ernesto was lying on the
ground, face down, with his hands tied behind his back. Police investigators Pagulayan and
Caronan arrived, along with a photographer. Pictures of the victim were taken.
Moises Simangan and Loreto Bergado were charged with murder for the killing of Ernesto
Flores in Solana, Cagayan. The prosecution's case involved testimonies from Sofronia Saquing,
Lorna Saquing, and Fernando Saquing. The defense asserted alibi and denial, presenting an
alternative version of events.

Issue:
Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of Moises
Simangan beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Court found the contention of the petitioner unmeritorious and affirmed the decision of the
trial court, convicting him of homicide. However, the Court modified the penalty imposed.
The positive and straightforward identification made by the witnesses, Sofronia and Lorna, that
the accused was one of the armed men who left with the victim, coupled with the accused's own
admission of his involvement in the killing, is sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The testimony of Fernando, that the accused admitted to being one of the victim's killers, is not
hearsay as it is an admission against personal interest and is admissible against the accused. The
delay in revealing the identities of the accused can be explained by the threats made by the
accused and the fear for their safety.
The aggravating circumstances of cruelty and nighttime were not alleged in the Information and
cannot be appreciated against the accused.
The penalty imposed on the accused is modified to an indeterminate penalty of from Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to Sixteen (16)
Years of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
32. PEOPLE VS. BUENSUCESO, 132 SCRA 143

Facts:
One afternoon, Patrolman Rodolfo Aguilar and Pariseo Tayag were seen walking towards the
municipal building. Pat. Aguilar was trying to take Tayag’s fan knife but the latter refused to give
it to him. Because of this, Pat Aguilar suggested they go to the office of the Chief of Police to
which Tayag agreed.
Once in the office, the two had a heated argument because of the latter’s refusal to give his knife.
Tayag hurriedly left the office after the argument. He was followed by Pat. Aguilar, together with
Pat. Mallari and Pat. Canlas who were also in the Office at the time of the argument. Aguilar fired
his gun upward which made Tayag turnabout. Tayag retreated backwards until he reached a
wooden fence. There, Pat. Aguilar shot him about the knee. Tayag ran towards his house.
However, Pat Mallari intercepted near the waiting shed where Pat. Aguilar joined him. Together,
they fired nine consecutive shots.
Tayag was found lying prostate on the streets near the municipal building. Afterwards, Pat. Dela
Cruz took the knife from Tayag and gave it to Pa. Buensuceso. Pat. Izon, Pat. Jose, and Pat. Joson
were also seen near the vicinity of the crime.
Sgt, Romualdo Espiritu noticed the commotion in the plaza and inquired what happened. He saw
the body of Tayag and immediately ordered to bring the body to the Municipal Health Center
where it was inspected. He then went to the municipal building where he learned that some police
officers were involved. He asked Pat. Aguilar and Pat. Buensuceso’s gun and found empty smells.
He also smelled the barrel and found that both had been recently fired.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of homicide.

Ruling:
No. The crime is Murder because it was qualified by treachery. The victim was already retreating
backwards until he reached the fence of the town plaza when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the
former hitting him above the right knee. Notwithstanding that he was already hit and wounded,
and possibly immobilized, he was still subjected to successive shots as shown by the wounds that
he had received, even at his back. Certainly, the means employed by the accused-appellants
tended directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves
arising from any defense which the victim might have made.
The killing of the victim was also aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the
number of assailants, which circumstance, however, is absorbed by treachery.
33. PEOPLE VS. PUGAY, 167 SCRA 439

Facts:
On or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose
to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of
fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
aforenamed Bayani Miranda.

Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy is present to ensure the murder?

Ruling:
No, there is no conspiracy. There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants
immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased
and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is
also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased.
Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts
directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for
the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil.
1371).
34. PEOPLE VS. BASAY, 219 SCRA 404 (1993)

Facts:
Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro Basay were accused of killing four (4) people and burned their house
after. Both accused signed a Joint waiver, but was disregarded by the court because when they
signed sain joint waiver, they were not represented by a counsel. Basay was Acquitted,however,
Jaime Ramirez was sentenced with life imprisonment because the court admitted in eveidence
the so-called extra-judicial confession of jaime Ramirez as part of the res gestate the alleged
statement of Bombie Toting (victim) to the police constabulary SGt. Tabanao. Jaime Ramirez is a
farmer, he only finished Grade II and that he doesn’t know how to read. He, however,
understands the Cebuano dialect. The referred sworn statement in English was taken on March
7, 1986 and subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge Teopisto Calumpang.

Issue:
Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to counsel and to remain silent during
custodial investigation were violated.

Ruling:
The SC declared in People v Nicandro that one’s right to be informed of the right to remain silent
and to counsel contemplates the “Transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle”. Thus it is not
enough for the interrogatot to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article III of the 1987 Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such
provision in practical terms. The rights “to be informed” carries with it a correlative obligation
on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates effective communication which
results in the subjects understanding of what is conveyed.
35. PEOPLE VS. CORPUZ, G.R. NO. L-36234 FEBRUARY 10, 1981

Facts:
This is an automatic review of the sentences of the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, in
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-966 imposing the death penalty on all the accused.
Sometime in February 1972, Romeo Corpuz, Hernanie Soto, Danilo Chico, Pablito Abasula,
Rogelio Corpuz, Reynaldo Godoy, Ricardo Mabalot, Victor Bangayan, Felipe Alcera and Miguel
Coro, all prisoners at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa, Rizal, were charged with murder
and frustrated murder.
Upon being arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, on July 29, 1972, after the
prosecution had rested its case, the accused, Romeo Corpuz, Victor Bangayan and Hernanie Soto,
were permitted to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with a plea of
guilty after the trial court had apprised them of the consequences of their plea of guilty. They
were each sentenced to suffer the death penalty for the crime of murder, to indemnify the heirs
of the victims. The Court recommended to the Chief Executive, through the Board of Pardons
and Parole, that the death penalty imposed on them be commuted to life imprisonment.
The submission of the defendants Romeo Corpuz, Victor Bangayan, Felipe Alcera and Hernanie
Soto that they were sentenced to death without having been previously informed of the nature of
the charges against them and of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances recited in the
information is without merit. These defendants originally pleaded not guilty. They changed their
plea to guilty only after the prosecution had rested its case.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in applying Article 160.

Ruling:
Yes. Under the RPC Article 160, the elements of this offense are: 1. The offender was already
convicted by final judgment of one offense; 2. The committed a new felony before beginning to
serve such sentence or while serving the same.
In this case, the Supreme Court found that the trail court erred in applying article 160 on
the unfounded assumption that all defendants were serving sentence pursuant to judgments of
conviction which had become final and in the absence of competent evidence that these
defendants have been sentenced by final judgment. It is not proven that the accused in this case
are serving a sentence by final judgment which would suffice to quality the offense committed
with the special aggravating circumstances of Quasi-Recidivis
36. DADO VS. PEOPLE, 392 SCRA 46

Facts:
The petitioner is Geronimo Dado. The respondent is People of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
on the night of May 25, 1992, Sultan Kudarat Police station formed three teams to intercept cattle
rustlers. The team composed of the herein petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members
waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. At around 11:00 of the same evening,
the team saw somebody walking half-naked approaching at a distance of about 50 meters.
Suddenly, Eraso, a team member, fired hid M16 rifle at the man. Thereafter, the petitioner fired a
single shot from his pistol. The victim shouted “Tay Dolfo, ako ni.” The victim turned out to be
Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, who is not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. A certain
Dr. Antenor conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of Silvestre Balinas testified that
the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh.
Thus, Eraso and Dado were charged and found guilty of homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner liable for homicide.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court said that the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found
inside the fatal wound of the victim are particles of a pistol that was fired by the herein petitioner.
Also, he cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right outer lateral arm
for the same reason that there is no evidence proving it. The crime that the petitioner should be
liable of is Illegal Discharge of Firearm.
Cases number 37-42

Escalante vs. People (G.R. No. 192727)

Facts: Raul B. Escalante, the Municipal Mayor of Almagro, Samar, was convicted for violating the
election gun ban and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition during a fiesta celebration.
Two separate Information were filed against Escalante in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Calbayog City, Samar.
The first Information accused Escalante of possessing a .45 caliber pistol without the proper
license and permit from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) during the election period.
The second Information accused him of illegally possessing a .45 caliber pistol loaded with live
ammunition in a public place without the necessary permit.
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried by the RTC.
Witnesses testified that Escalante had a firearm during the fiesta celebration and fired a shot
upwards, causing panic among the crowd.
The defense claimed that it was a police officer who had the firearm and that Escalante only took
hold of it to prevent further harm.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
Escalante's conviction for violation of the election gun ban, despite the alleged absence of one of
the essential elements of the offense.

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The deadline to file a petition for review on
certiorari is 15 days from receiving notice of the decision or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner in this case received the CA's Resolution denying his second motion for
reconsideration on May 20, 2010, giving him until June 4, 2010, to file a petition for review.
However, he failed to do so. Not meeting the appeal requirements as prescribed by law makes
the judgment final and unappealable.

The petitioner's failure to file a petition for review under Rule 45 within the allotted time rendered
the CA's June 24, 2008 Decision, as modified by its March 4, 2009 Resolution, final and
unchangeable. Even if a petition for certiorari were the correct remedy, it would still be dismissed.
The finding that the petitioner possessed a firearm with live ammunition outside his residence
during the election gun ban without authorization is a factual determination by the RTC and the
CA, which cannot be altered in this original action for certiorari.

The trial court's and the CA's factual findings should be given the highest respect.
The Court found no compelling reason to depart from this rule and upheld the conviction of
Escalante for violation of the election gun ban.
Dungo & Sibal vs People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015

Facts: This case involves a petition for review on certiorari aiming to overturn the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which upheld the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) verdict finding the
petitioners, Dandy L. Dungo and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr., guilty of violating the Anti-Hazing Law.
The charges stemmed from their alleged assault on Marlon Villanueva during an initiation rite of
the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity, resulting in Villanueva's death. The prosecution presented
various witnesses, including medical professionals, who testified about Villanueva's injuries and
cause of death. The defense presented witnesses who supported the petitioners' alibi and their
claim of non-involvement in the initiation rite.

Dungo stated that on January 13, 2006, he was at his girlfriend's boarding house in the early
afternoon, went to inquire about master's degree requirements at UP Los Baños Graduate School,
had dinner, and returned to the boarding house. Later that night, Sibal called him for help at Villa
Novaliches Resort, where they found Villanueva unconscious and took him to the hospital.
Gopez testified that during the initiation rites, he noticed Villanueva with bruises on his face.
They went to Villa Novaliches Resort, where Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the
second floor. Gopez then decided to cancel the initiation rites and told Sibal to stay with
Villanueva and Castillo.
Sibal testified that he was present at the fraternity's tambayan for the initiation rites and saw
Villanueva with bruises on his face. They went to Villa Novaliches Resort, where Sibal
accompanied Villanueva upstairs. After the other neophytes left, Sibal checked on Villanueva's
condition, called Dungo for help, and they took Villanueva to the hospital.

The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of violating the Anti-Hazing Law based on the
testimonies of witnesses and medical professionals. The CA affirmed the decision, stating that
the defense's denial and alibi did not raise doubts about the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses.

Issue: The main issue in this case is whether the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of the Anti-Hazing Law.

Ruling: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC finding the petitioners guilty of
violation of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The SC ruled that Dungo and Sibal can be convicted of a violation of RA 8049 despite the lack of
evidence in their direct participation.
The crime of hazing RA 8049 is a mala prohibita. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral,
but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.
People vs. Fortich 281 SCRA 600

Facts: On the evening of March 31, 1983, after attending mass, sisters Marilou and Maritess
Nobleza, together with their friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang, proceeded to Alta Tierra
Hotel in Carmen Hill using an Isuzu pick-up owned by latter's mother. After a while, the group
decided to go home. Suddenly, two men armed with handguns who were later identified as
appellants emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left side
of the pick-up. They introduced themselves as members of the New People's Army (NPA) and
ordered the sisters to get inside the vehicle while Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38 caliber revolver causing him to fall down, while
Tumang was hit several times by Fortich in various parts of the body and momentarily lost
consciousness. Tumang was divested of his wallet containing one hundred sixty pesos (P160.00)
in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00), six Saudi Arabia Riyals P30.42), one 12K gold wristwatch worth
P500.00, pants valued at P140.00, and shoes worth P125.00. All of these items were not recovered.
Imperio, on the other hand, was stripped of his pants valued at P135.00, a wallet worth P45.00
containing P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt. Appellants drove the pick-up, with the
2 sisters in the back seat, and parked the vehicle in Malasag. They succeeded in consummating
his bestial act. Appellants switched victims twice before divesting them of their watches, a
handbag containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt, toilet tissue, and toothbrush, and the pick-up's stereo
and tools. They then drove down the highway and left the sisters at a gasoline station some three
kilometers from the city. Unable to contact the police, the victims proceeded to the Cagayan de
Oro Medical Center (CMC) and submitted themselves for medical examination. Meanwhile,
Imperio and Tumang ran to the City Hall and reported the robbery incident. Acting on this report,
the police immediately scoured the city for the suspects but this proved unavailing. The victims
proceeded to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City where
Imperio's injury was examined and treated.
The trial court convicted appellants in the following:
1. Forcible Abduction with Rape For Marilou and Maritess Nobleza.
2. Robbery with Frustrated Homicide - For Rudy Gaid who rob and carry away a polo shirt, pants
while being worn by Luis S. Tumang and cash worth P160.00, a wrist watch (Elgin) worth P500.00,
valued all in all in the total amount of P660. On the occasion of the robbery and to enable them to
facilitate the taking and robbing the offended party, and to carry out with ease the commission
of the offense, accused Permonette Joy Fortich with intent to kill, attacked and mauled the said
Luis S. Tumang, struck and hit him with a firearm, thereby inflicting injuries.
3. Robbery - For Gaid and Fortich, with intent of gain by means of violence and intimidation on
the person take, steal and carry away polo shirt and pants while being worn by one Rolly Imperio
and a wallet contained P85.00 in cash, who was at the same time attacked and beaten up by the
said accused, inflicting upon him physical injuries. From this judgment, appellants interposed
the instant appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the crimes charged are correct?

Ruling: The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime committed as robbery with
frustrated homicide. There is no such crime. There should have been two separate informations:
one for robbery and another for frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in
the information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the appellants' conviction for simple
robbery.
With regards to the injuries suffered by Tumang, we subscribe to the finding of the lower court
that Tumang's credible testimony bolstered by documentary evidence, such as progress
payments and professional fees for neurological management and craniotomy excision of
depressed fracture, proved that the latter suffered less serious physical injuries. For the charge of
frustrated homicide, the trial court correctly observed that the element of intent to kill was not
present. It must be stressed that while Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never shot Tumang
but merely hit him on the head with it.
People vs. Sales G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011

Facts: This case involves the appeal of Noel T. Sales (appellant) against his conviction for the
crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries. The appellant was accused of beating his two
sons, Noemar and Junior, with a piece of wood, resulting in the death of Noemar and injuries to
Junior. The incident occurred on September 20, 2002, in Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines.

The prosecution presented evidence that the appellant beat his sons as a form of discipline after
they left home without permission. The beating was described as sadistic, with the appellant
tying his sons to a coconut tree and continuing to beat them even after they were injured. Noemar
eventually lost consciousness and died. The defense argued that Noemar's death was not a result
of the beating, but rather due to his weak heart and epilepsy.

The trial court found the appellant guilty of parricide and slight physical injuries, considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution. The court did not consider the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation but appreciated the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and lack of intent to commit a grave wrong. The appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
for parricide and 20 days of Arresto Menor for slight physical injuries.

The appellant appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. The appellant then brought the case to the Supreme Court, raising two main issues:
the court's alleged error in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and the alleged failure to
give weight to the testimonies of defense witnesses.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the court failed to give weight to the testimonies of defense witnesses.

Ruling: The Supreme Court rejected the appellant's arguments and upheld his conviction for
parricide.
The court emphasized that while a parent has the right to discipline their children, it must be
done within reasonable limits and not in a sadistic manner. The court found that the appellant's
actions of tying his sons to a coconut tree and continuing to beat them even after they were injured
went beyond discipline and were motivated by anger. This violated the reasonable limits of
parental discipline.
The court emphasized that while a parent has the right to discipline their children, it must be
done within reasonable limits and not in a sadistic manner. The court found that the appellant's
actions went beyond discipline and were motivated by anger.
The court also rejected the appellant's claim that Noemar's death was due to his weak heart, as
there was no evidence to support this claim. The court relied on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, including the mother and brother of the deceased, as well as a death certificate, to
establish that the appellant was responsible for Noemar's death.

The court found that all the elements of parricide were present in the case, namely: (1) a person
was killed, (2) the deceased was killed by the accused, and (3) the deceased is the father, mother,
or child of the accused.

The court concluded that all the elements of parricide were present in the case and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The appellant's appeal was denied, and his
conviction for parricide and slight physical injuries was upheld. The court recognized the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused, as he went to the police
station a day after the incident was reported. However, the court did not appreciate the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, as the accused adopted means to
ensure the success of the attack on his sons.
Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014
Facts: Michael Ryan, a Grade 1 pupil at a public elementary school in Lambunao, Iloilo, was in a
hurry to enter his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, Felina, who
was then sleeping on a bamboo sofa. Instead of apologizing, Michael proceeded to his seat,
whereupon, Felina pinched him on his thigh, held him up by the armpits, and pushed him to the
floor. As he fell, Michael hit a desk, and he lost consciousness. Even so, Felina picked him up by
the ear and repeatedly slammed him on the floor.1Felina then proceeded to teach class. Michael
went home crying and reported the incident to his mother, who, accompanied by her sister
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain. A medical examination was conducted on
Michael, and a corresponding medical certificate was issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador.
Thereafter, Felina was charged with violation of Republic Act 7610.

Felina was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
7610, duly affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence she elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael
to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean, or degrade his dignity and
avers that her treatment is only an act of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably
do towards the development of the child.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of child abuse punishable under RA
7610.

Ruling: Petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610.

Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted
from the violence suffered at her hands.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse: xxxx (b) “Child abuse” refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1)
Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2)
Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity
of a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as
food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or his permanent incapacity or death. xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by
deeds or by words that debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The physical pain experienced by the victim had
been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out
of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael Ryan as a human being. Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse
punished under RA 7610.
Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013
Facts: George Bongalon, the petitioner, was charged with child abuse under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610.
The incident occurred on May 11, 2000, during a religious procession in Legazpi City, Philippines.
Bongalon's daughter threw stones at Jayson dela Cruz, a minor, and called him derogatory
names. Bongalon confronted Jayson and his brother, Roldan, and allegedly struck Jayson on the
back and slapped him on the face.
Bongalon then went to the brothers' house and challenged their father to a fight.
Jayson's father reported the incident to the police, and Jayson received medical treatment for his
injuries.

Issue: Is Bongalon guilty of child abuse?

Should Bongalon's liability be mitigated due to his intention to protect his daughters?

Ruling: Bongalon is not guilty of child abuse but is instead liable for slight physical injuries.Not
every instance of physical contact with a child constitutes child abuse.
To be considered child abuse, the laying of hands must be shown beyond reasonable doubt to be
intended to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child.
Bongalon's actions were driven by his concern for his daughters' safety and lacked the specific
intent required for child abuse.
The court found that Bongalon's actions did not meet the criteria for child abuse, as there was no
evidence that he intended to demean or degrade Jayson.
Bongalon's actions were driven by his concern for the safety of his daughters.
The court considered the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, as Bongalon acted in
the belief that Jayson and Roldan had harmed his daughters.
Bongalon was sentenced to 10 days of arresto menor and ordered to pay Jayson moral damages
in the amount of P5,000.
43. People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 06, 2011
Facts:
This case involves the appeal of Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) against his conviction for three counts of
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. The charges were filed against Ireno by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City based on the allegations made by his minor daughter, AAA.
AAA accused Ireno of inserting his tongue and finger into her genitals on multiple occasions.
During the trial, the prosecution presented testimonies from AAA, her mother, and Dr. Melissa
De Leon. The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Ireno. The prosecution's
evidence included AAA's detailed account of the incidents and the medical examination
conducted by Dr. De Leon, which revealed a healed superficial laceration on AAA's hymen.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Ireno guilty of four counts of rape and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua for each count. The RTC also ordered him to pay AAA Php50,000 for each
count as civil indemnity and moral damages. Ireno appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed the RTC's decision with modifications. The CA found Ireno guilty of acts
of lasciviousness in one count instead of rape due to the lack of evidence of finger insertion. The
CA also modified the penalties imposed by the RTC.
Ireno appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He claimed that AAA's testimony was inconsistent and unbelievable,
and that the medical findings were inconclusive. However, the Supreme
Court rejected Ireno's arguments, stating that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great weight and respect. The Court emphasized that the testimony of the
victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction. The Court also noted that the
medical findings supported AAA's claim of sexual abuse.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove Ireno's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the charges of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding Ireno guilty of three
counts of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. The Court upheld the penalties imposed by
the CA and ordered Ireno to pay the corresponding damages to AAA.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court rejected Ireno's arguments that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized that the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves great weight and respect. In this case, AAA's testimony was
found to be credible and consistent, providing detailed accounts of the incidents. The Court also
noted that the medical findings, specifically the healed superficial laceration on AAA's hymen,
supported AAA's claim of sexual abuse.
The Court further explained that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough
to sustain a conviction. The Court recognized the vulnerability of victims of sexual abuse,
especially minors, and the difficulty they face in recounting traumatic experiences. In this case,
AAA's testimony was found to be credible and consistent, providing sufficient evidence to
establish Ireno's guilt.
Regarding the charges of acts of lasciviousness, the Court agreed with the CA's modification,
finding that there was a lack of evidence to establish the insertion of a finger into AAA's vagina.
However, Ireno was still found guilty of acts of lasciviousness for touching AAA's breasts and
licking her vagina.
In terms of penalties, the Court upheld the penalties imposed by the CA. For the charges of
statutory rape, the Court affirmed the imposition of reclusion perpetua for each count. For the
charge of acts of lasciviousness, the Court applied the penalties under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610. The Court clarified that the reasoning in a previous case for imposing the higher penalty
under R.A. No. 7610 did not apply in this case.
44. People of the Philippines Vs. Leonardo Quiapo, G.R. No. 218804. August 6, 2018
Facts:
● Appellant Leonardo Quiapo was charged with six counts of rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code.
● The charges were based on separate incidents involving two victims, AAA and MMM.
● The incidents occurred in Zamboanga del Norte in 1996.
● The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and MMM, who both claimed that appellant
had sexually abused them.
● The defense of appellant was denial and alibi, claiming that he was not present at the time and
place of the incidents.
● The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found appellant guilty of one count of attempted rape and five
counts of consummated rape.
● The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision with modifications.
Issue:
● Whether the testimonies of AAA and MMM are credible and sufficient to establish appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
● The appeal is dismissed.
● The testimonies of AAA and MMM are credible and sufficient to establish appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
● The courts below correctly rejected appellant's defenses of denial and alibi. ● The delay in
reporting the incidents does not undermine the credibility of AAA and MMM.
● The discrepancies in the dates, place, and time of the incidents are not grounds for acquittal.
● The Court agrees with the CA that appellant should be held liable for statutory rape in Criminal
Case Nos. L-0098 and L-0099.
● The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the CA affirming that of
the trial court.
● The Court modifies the amount of damages awarded by the CA. ● The prison term for
attempted rape in Criminal Case No. L-0100 is sustained, but the award of damages is modified.
Ratio:
● The issue of credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the trial court, and the reviewing court
is generally bound by its findings, especially when no significant facts and circumstances are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
● The date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime, and
inconsistencies in details irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.
● Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken
against the victim and does not cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant.
● A mere denial, without strong evidence to support it, cannot overcome the positive declaration
of the victim regarding the identity and involvement of the accused.
● Motives such as resentment, hatred, or revenge do not affect the credibility of a minor rape
victim's testimony.
● The elements of statutory rape are carnal knowledge of a woman and the woman being under
12 years of age or demented.
● The penalty for statutory rape is reclusion perpetua, while the penalty for simple rape is also
reclusion perpetua.
● The amount of damages awarded should be modified in line with recent jurisprudence.
45. People vs. Pareja, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, is appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming his conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. Pareja was charged with two counts
of Rape and one count of Attempted Rape. The incidents allegedly occurred in December 2003,
February 2004, and March 27, 2004. The victim, AAA, was 13 years old at the time of the incidents.
AAA's parents had separated when she was 8 years old, and she was living with her mother and
Pareja, who was her mother's common-law spouse. AAA reported the incidents to the barangay
officials and underwent a medical examination, which confirmed the presence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma. Pareja denied the charges and claimed that AAA filed the charges out of
revenge for being the reason behind her parents' separation.
Issue:
1. Whether Pareja's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 2. Whether the trial court
erred in convicting Pareja based solely on AAA's testimony.
Ruling:
The Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja's conviction. The trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is given the highest respect, and absent any substantial reason to reverse
the trial court's findings, the appellate court is generally bound by the lower court's findings.
Inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony are generally expected, and the inconsistencies
mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential. The court also notes that the victim's
demeanor and conduct after the incidents do not negate the possibility that she was raped, as
victims of rape cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with society's
expectations. The court also finds that the medical examination, although not indispensable,
bolsters the victim's claim of being raped.
Ratio:
The court gives deference to the trial court's evaluation of witness credibility. Inconsistencies in
a rape victim's testimony are expected and do not necessarily undermine the victim's credibility.
The victim's demeanor and conduct after the incidents cannot be used to discredit her, as victims
of rape may not act within reason or in accordance with societal expectations. A medical
examination is not necessary to
prove the commission of rape, and expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not
essential to conviction.
46. People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013
Facts:
This case involves the appellant, Michael Espera, who was accused of committing the crimes of
rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual intercourse against the victim, Ana. The incidents
occurred on January 26, 1999, in the municipality of Ubay, Bohol, Philippines. Ana and her co-
worker, Susie, decided to share a ride home after work. They hailed a tricycle driven by the
appellant, whom Susie recognized as one of her husband's friends. Ana recognized the appellant
by face but did not know his name. When they reached Barangay Ekis, Susie disembarked first,
and Ana asked the appellant to stop the tricycle near her house. However, the appellant
continued driving, claiming that the tricycle's brakes were not working. Eventually, the tricycle
stopped at a quarry site, and the appellant asked Ana to get off, stating that the tricycle had run
out of gas. Ana offered to pay her fare, but the appellant refused. As Ana was walking home, she
heard someone following her. She turned around and saw the appellant, who was partially naked
and holding a gun. The appellant chased Ana, caught her, covered her mouth, and threatened to
kill her if she shouted. He then proceeded to sexually assault and rape her. The next day, Ana
reported the incident to her mother and later informed Susie. Ana underwent a medical
examination, which revealed injuries consistent with her account of the assault. The appellant
was eventually apprehended in Pampanga in August 2003.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the guilt of the appellant, Michael Espera, was proven
beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual intercourse.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding the
appellant guilty of the crimes charged. The appellant's appeal was denied, and the RTC's decision
was modified only in terms of the damages awarded to the victim.
Ratio:
The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant committed the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual intercourse against
the victim. The court relied on the victim's detailed and consistent testimony, which was
supported by the medical examination showing injuries consistent
with her account of the assault. The court also considered the positive identification of the
appellant by the victim and her co-worker, as well as the appellant's sudden flight from Ubay,
Bohol, which indicated guilt. The court rejected the appellant's alibi and denial, as well as his
claim that the victim's behavior during the incident undermined her credibility. The court
concluded that the appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
47. People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04, 2013
Facts:
This case involves an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding the accused, Christopher Rivera, guilty of
rape. On October 4, 2004, an Information for Rape was filed against Rivera, stating that on
September 29, 2004, in Manila, he forcibly undressed the victim, inserted his penis in her vagina,
and had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. The victim, referred
to as AAA, testified that she was a 20-year-old housemaid who met Rivera while working at the
same place. Rivera offered to help her find another job and on September 29, 2004, he brought her
to a motel instead of his parents' house as he had promised. Inside the motel room, Rivera forced
her to undress and raped her. She struggled and shouted for help, but no one heard her. After the
incident, they went to her cousin's house where she reported the incident to the police. Rivera
claimed that AAA was his girlfriend and that they went to the motel voluntarily. He argued that
AAA consented to the sexual act. A witness, Grace Due o, the cashier at the motel, supported
Rivera's version of events.
Issue:
The main issue raised in this case is whether or not the accused, Christopher Rivera, is guilty of
rape beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Christopher Rivera for rape. The court affirmed the
decision of the lower courts, finding Rivera guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The court rejected
Rivera's claim of consent and emphasized that even if AAA and Rivera were lovers, it did not
give him the right to sexually assault her. The court considered AAA's credible testimony, the
evidence presented, and the lack of proof of a romantic relationship between AAA and Rivera.
The court concluded that there was no reversible error in the lower courts' decisions and affirmed
the conviction of Rivera for rape. The court also upheld the damages imposed by the trial court.
Ratio:
The court emphasized that in rape cases, the credibility of the victim is crucial. In this case, AAA's
testimony was consistent and credible. The court also considered the size and strength difference
between AAA and Rivera, concluding that force was employed in the commission of the crime.
The court rejected Rivera's claim of consent, stating that
AAA's behavior after the assault should not be interpreted as consent. The court further explained
that resistance is not an element of rape and that the lack of physical evidence, such as vaginal
lacerations, does not negate sexual intercourse. The court emphasized that the victim's perception
and judgment at the time of the crime should be considered, and that not all victims react the
same way. The court also rejected Rivera's defense of the "sweetheart theory," as he failed to
provide convincing proof of a relationship with AAA. The court upheld the trial court's
assessment of witness credibility and stated that it should be respected unless there are facts or
circumstances that were overlooked and would materially affect the case.
48. People vs. Rubio, G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012
Facts:
● Accused Ben Rubio y Acosta was charged with qualified rape before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Pasig City.
● The victim, AAA, accused Rubio of raping her on January 8, 2000, when she was 15 years old.
● AAA testified that Rubio approached her while she was sleeping and forcibly had sexual
intercourse with her.
● AAA reported the incident to a neighbor and filed a complaint against her father. ● Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes, a medico-legal expert, examined AAA and found evidence of sexual assault.
Issue:
● Whether or not Rubio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
Ruling:
● The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding Rubio guilty of qualified
rape.
● The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the CA.
Ratio:
● In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is of utmost importance. ● The trial court's assessment
of credibility is given great weight, as they have the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses'
demeanor and manner of testifying.
● Inconsistencies in the victim's testimony are expected and do not necessarily impair the
credibility of the victim.
● Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, as youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth.
● The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, is sufficient to convict. ● The elements of
qualified rape were duly proved, as the victim's testimony established that Rubio had carnal
knowledge of her through force and intimidation.
● The aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were stipulated upon during pre-
trial, eliminating the need for further proof during trial.
● Medical findings corroborated the victim's testimony, supporting the conclusion that she had
been subjected to sexual assault.
People vs. Orita
G.R. No. 88724 | April 3, 1990

FACTS:

Accused Orita was charged with crime of rape in Criminal case No. 83-031 before the RTC Branch
II in Borongan, Eastern Samar.

That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at Victoria
St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a Batangas knife he
conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with Cristina S. Abayan against her will and without her consent.

Upon the arraignment, accused plead not guilty to the offense charged. After the witnesses of the
plaintiff testified and exhibits were formally offered and admitted, prosecution rested its case.
Accused opted to present any exculpatory evidence and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss.

On August 5, 1985, the RTC rendered its decision in which the court held that accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby adjudged to ten years and one day imprisonment to
minimum of twelve years of imprisonment and to indemnify the complainant the amount of
4,000.00.

Not satisfied, the accused appealed to the CA. On December 29, 1988, the CA rendered its
decision with modification agreeing to the RTCs decision that the appellant found guilty of the
crime of rape and consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim in the amount of 30,000.00.

On January 11, 1989, the CA issued a resolution setting aside its December 29, 1988, decision
considering the provisions of Section 9, par. 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with
Sec.17, sub-par. 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses discredit their
testimonies.
2. Whether there is a crime of frustrated rape under Philippine law

RULING:

The Court held the discrepancies to be minor and, in fact, indicative of the testimonies’
truthfulness. They maintained that Abayan’s testimony complemented by medical findings and
the condition of her genital organ suggested sexual assault. On the second issue, the Court ruled
that the frustrated stage of rape does not exist under Philippine law since rape becomes
consummated at the moment of penetration, as further elucidated by jurisprudence and the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433 | March 20, 2000

FACTS:
In the afternoon of April 25, 1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan was preparing Milo chocolate
drinks for her two children on the ground floor of their house. Primo Campuhan, an employee of
Corazon’s brother, was in the house filling plastic bags with water. Upon hearing her daughter
Crysthel cry out, Corazon rushed upstairs to find Campuhan kneeling before Crysthel, whose
lower garments were removed, while his shorts were down to his knees.
Corazon claimed to have witnessed Campuhan forcing his penis into her daughter’s vagina and
reacted by hitting him several times. Campuhan escaped her blows, pushed her aside, and fled
the scene. He was captured by local residents who responded to Corazon’s calls for help. They
detained him at the compound until they were later advised to bring him to the barangay officials.
Medical examination of Crysthel revealed no evident sign of extragenital physical injury, intact
hymen, and a hymenal orifice of merely 0.5 cm in diameter. Campuhan, on his defense, contested
the credibility of Corazon’s testimony, providing an alternative story involving an innocent play
with the child that was misinterpreted by Corazon.
On May 27, 1997, the trial court found Campuhan guilty of statutory rape, sentencing him to the
death penalty and ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages. The case was brought to
the Supreme Court on automatic review under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by RA 7659.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Supreme Court should uphold the trial court’s ruling of Campuhan’s guilt for
statutory rape.
2. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove consummated rape.
3. Whether the actions of Campuhan constituted consummated rape or merely attempted rape.

RULING:
The Supreme Court, in a detailed analysis and considering the requisites for consummated rape,
found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Campuhan’s penis
penetrated or even touched the labias of Crysthel’s vagina. The Court determined that Campuhan
did not perform all the acts of execution necessary to accomplish the crime of rape, as elements
for consummated rape, such as penetration or at least touching of the labias of the female organ
by the male organ, were not substantiated.
Therefore, the Court modified the ruling of the trial court, finding Campuhan guilty of only
attempted rape. Campuhan was thus sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight years,
four months, and ten days of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, ten months, and
twenty days of reclusion temporal as maximum, replacing the death penalty initially imposed by
the trial court.
People vs. Bution
G.R. No. 168932 | October 19, 2011

FACTS:

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of
age, was a mental retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA, then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by
Butiong, her long-time neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something.
AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she had stepped inside his house, and then took off
his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had carnal knowledge of her.

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought
AAA to the police station and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AAA
underwent a series of Psychological Test with result showed that she had a mild level of mental
retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child aged from six to seven years.

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of Rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.

RULING:

Yes. Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will
of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a
female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. This understanding of the commission of
rape has been prevalent in both the common law and the statutory law systems.

There are four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied in his case, namely:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances first mentioned is present.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of
giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient
for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and, two,
the mental retardation of the victim. It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental
retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a
rape of a female “deprived of reason,” a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or
retardation.
People vs. Bonaagua
G.R. No. 188897 | June 6, 2011

FACTS:

In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las
Pinas City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended,
in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of his minor
daughter, AAA.

That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las Pinas and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of influence and moral
ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously insert his tongue and finger into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then
eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.

In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused appellant for the third time when he went to
Candelaria, Quezon.

In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with accused-appellant in
Pulanglupa, Las Pinas City. In a single day, AAA was raped for the fourth and fifth time. While
spending the afternoon inside her father's room at the car-wash station, he removed her shorts
and panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina. Accused-appellant
repeated the same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report these incidents for
fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum.

On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her mother to
take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon.

After being discharged from the hospital, AAA's mother took her to the Police Headquarters of
Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accused-appellant. AAA's mother also took
her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she executed a
sworn statement against accused-appellant.

On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding the evidence for the prosecution
overwhelming against the accused's defense of denial and alibi, rendered a
Decision [10] convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape.
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision [12] affirming the decision of the RTC with
modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, and
finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead of
Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0255.

ISSUES:
1.Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish that the
intentional touching of the victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct.
2. Whether the CA imposed the appropriate penalties.

RULING:
The court held that the Decisions of the CA dated March 31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H>C No. 03133
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each
count. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Qualified
Rape Through Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each count.

2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is meted to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he is likewise ordered to pay P20,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
People vs. Nuyok
G.R. No. 195424 | June 15, 2015

FACTS:
The accused, Rudy Nuyok, was charged with four counts of rape against his niece, AAA. The
incidents occurred in June, July, August, and September of 2005 when AAA was 13 years old.
AAA lived in the same house as the accused, her paternal uncle. The first incident happened on
June 25, 2005, when the accused laid down beside AAA as she was about to sleep. He physically
assaulted her, rendered her unconscious, and raped her. AAA reported the incident to her
grandmother and sister, but no action was taken.

The second incident occurred in July 2005 when AAA was sleeping in her grandmother's house.
The accused sexually assaulted her.

The third incident happened in August 2005 when the accused physically assaulted AAA before
raping her. AAA reported the incident to her grandmother and sister, but no action was taken.

The fourth incident occurred in September 2005 when the accused threatened AAA with a
weapon, removed her clothes, and raped her.

AAA finally reported the incidents to her mother in October 2005, who then brought her back to
their hometown. AAA filed rape charges against the accused with the help of a barangay official.
AAA underwent a medical examination, which showed evidence of sexual abuse.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the prosecution proved the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the information sufficiently alleged the qualifying circumstance of minority.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit. The accused's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and the information did not need to allege the qualifying circumstance of
minority.
The court emphasized that the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial in cases of sexual
abuse. In this case, AAA's testimony was found to be credible and consistent with the medical
findings. The court also explained that the failure to specify the exact dates of the rapes in the
information did not render them defective since the date and time of the commission of rape are
not material ingredients of the crime.

The court further ruled that the prosecution successfully proved the charges of rape beyond
reasonable doubt. AAA positively identified the accused as her rapist, and her testimony was
corroborated by the medical findings. The court rejected the accused's argument that the State
did not establish the carnal knowledge on June 25, 2005, despite AAA being rendered
unconscious. It explained that circumstantial evidence can be used to establish guilt, and in this
case, the circumstances pointed to the accused as the perpetrator.
People vs. Belgar
G.R. No. 182794 | September 8, 2014

FACTS:

On March 6, 2000, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur filed an information
charging Belgar with rape, thus:

That on or about the midnight of January 20, 2000 at Municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, with force and intimidation and after entering and pulling the victim
from her house, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have carnal
knowledge with AAA, a 15 year old lass, against her will and without her consent, to her damage
and prejudice in such amount as shall be proven in court.

Belgar pleaded not guilty to the charge. Testifying for the Prosecution were AAA, BBB (AAA's
mother), and Dr. Penafrancia N. Villanueva, while Belgar was the lone witness for the Defense.

On January 20, 2000, at about 8:00 p.m., AAA and her two sisters were sleeping in their house in
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she was awakened because someone was touching her feet. She
saw that it was Belgar, who was poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not
to shout or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house and brought her
to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown substance into her stomach. She fell unconscious
afterwards. Upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was aching
and soaked with white and red substance. She put on her clothes and returned to the house. She
attended school the next morning. She was thus brought to the Municipal Health Office of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva, who issued her medico-legal
report.

On June 17, 2003, in its decision, the RTC found that all the elements of rape under Article 266-A
(1) (a) of Republic Act No. 8353 had been duly established; that the State had shown that Belgar
had committed carnal knowledge of AAA by force, threat, and intimidation; that AAA was
candid and truthful as a witness; and that Belgar's alibi could not prevail because it was
uncorroborated, and he did not show the physical impossibility for him to be at the crime scene
at the time of the commission of the crime.

On appeal, Belgar contended that the rape had not been proven because no direct evidence of the
sexual intercourse was presented due to AAA having been unconscious during the rape; and that
the non-submission for laboratory examination of the red and white substance in AAA's vagina
casts doubt on the charge of rape.

On August 31, 2007, the CA affirmed the conviction, holding that the conviction for rape could
be based on the circumstantial evidence adduced through the testimony of AAA; that the absence
of spermatozoa from the vagina of the victim did not disprove rape because ejaculation was not
an element of the crime; and that the RTC properly rejected Belgar's alibi upon finding AAA's
testimony credible.

ISSUE:

Belgar's sole contention for reversal is that the Court a quo erred in finding the accused guilty of
the crime of rape when said victim was unconscious when the incident happened.

RULING:

The Court held that Belgar’s appeal lacks merit.

The information charged Belgar with rape committed through force, threat or intimidation as
defined under Article 266-A (1) (a), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,
to wit:

Article 266-A. Rape; Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed.

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

The elements of the crime charged are that the offender had carnal knowledge of a female, and
that the same was committed by using force, threat or intimidation.[16] The elements were proved
beyond reasonable doubt. According to AAA, Belgar poked a knife at her neck, forced her to get
up from her sleep, and dragged her outside of the house. She resisted and would have shouted
but he warned her against shouting and threatened to stab her and her sleeping sisters. Once they
were outside, he injected a substance into her belly, thereby causing her to lose consciousness.
Upon regaining her consciousness, she was already naked and had blood in her vagina.
WHEN IS IT RAPE?

55. PEOPLE VS. NUYOK, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015

Facts: The victim AAA was 13 years old when the accused committed the rapes in June, July,
August, and September of 2005. She resided in the house of her grandmother wherein the
accused, her paternal uncle, also lived with them. On June 25, 2005, as the victim was about to
sleep, the accused lay down beside her. She tried to escape, but he pulled her by the hair, slapped
her, and punched her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness,
she noticed that her panties had blood. She saw the accused putting on his pants. The accused
warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone, threatening to kill her and her family if she did
so. Despite her fear, she related the incident to BBB and her elder sister, CCC, but her report fell
on deaf ears. He raped her again in July 2005. On that occasion, she was sleeping in BBB’s house
when he crept up to her side, pulled her hair, took off her panties, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her. She resisted and tried to kick him away but missed. The accused committed
the third rape in August 2005. AAA again told BBB and CCC about the rape immediately
afterward, but BBB and CCC did not do anything except to promise AAA that they would be
more wary of him from then on. On her part, AAA just waited for them to help her, but that help
never came. The fourth rape took place one evening in September 2005. The victim finally
reported the four rapes to her mother in October 2005. ABC her mother reported the case to the
DSWD. On October 24, 2005, AAA was submitted to a medical examination by Dr. Milar. The
medical examination showed: (a) healed laceration of AAA's hymen at the 5:00 to 7:00 o'clock
positions; (b) AAA's vagina admitting two fingers with ease; and (c) her being in a non-virgin
state physically. During the trial, the accused denied having raped and imputed ill motives to the
victim insisting that the victim’s mother had wanted to get back at him after he had told his
brother, the victim’s father, that he had caught the victim’s mother with a paramour. The RTC
found and pronounced the accused guilty of four counts of rape. The CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. The accused appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. The Prosecution successfully proved
beyond reasonable doubt the charges of rape against the accused under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code.

AAA positively identified the accused as her rapist. Her account of his crimes was candid, and
her demeanor revealing. She could not control herself but cried in the course of her testimony
whenever she was made to recall her traumatic experiences at his hands. Moreover, her
recollections about the four rapes were corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Milar, who
identified the Medico-Legal Report of AAA.
The testimony of a rape victim that is consistent with the medical findings constitutes a sufficient
basis to conclude that carnal knowledge occurred. As a result, the accused can be convicted solely
on the testimony of the victim for as long as such testimony is credible, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.

Moreover, the accused asserts that the State did not establish the carnal knowledge on June 25,
2005. The assertion of the accused is unwarranted.

Despite the lack of testimony on how the accused had carnal knowledge of his victim on June 25,
2005, his guilt was nonetheless shown beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for rape may rest
on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Thus, an accused like him can be declared guilty of
rape even if the sole witness against him was the victim who had been rendered unconscious at
the time of the consummation of carnal knowledge provided sufficient circumstantial evidence
existed showing that the victim was violated, and that it was the accused and no other who had
committed the violation. To disallow such showing is to obstruct the successful prosecution of a
rapist who renders his victim unconscious before the consummation.

Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, consists of proof of

collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and simultaneously inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
56. PEOPLE VS. BELGAR, G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014

Facts: AAA and her two sisters were sleeping in their house in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, when she
was awakened because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who was
poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to shout or he would stab her
and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house and brought her to a nearby tree. Upon
regaining consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was aching and soaked with
white and red substances. During her class, she broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her
teacher came to her aid and had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to her
teacher. She was thus brought to the hospital and was examined there by Dr. Villanueva. Belgar
denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he was sleeping in his house; that he did
not leave the house in that period of time; and that it was his first time to see AAA when she
identified him. The RTC found that all the elements of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of Republic
Act No. 8353 had been duly established and was also affirmed by CA.

Issue: Whether or not there was no evidence showing that the accused had been the perpetrator.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. The commission of the rape was
competently established although AAA had been unconscious during the commission of the act.
Proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial
evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence. In this
connection, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions outlined in
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

A conviction for rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim cannot testify on
the actual commission of the rape as she was rendered unconscious when the act was committed,
provided that more than one circumstance is duly proved and that the totality of the unbroken
chain of the circumstances proven leads to no other logical conclusion than the appellant’s guilt
of the crime charged. Cristina’s positive identification of the appellant as the person who came to
the room where she slept one early morning towards the end of May 1994, and that he covered
her nose and mouth with a foul-smelling handkerchief until she lost consciousness, the blood and
white substance she found on her vagina which ached the following morning, her torn shorts and
her panty removed, all lead to one inescapable conclusion that the appellant raped her while she
was unconscious.
57. CRUZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014

Facts: The petitioner Norberto Cruz was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness
involving different victims. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found Cruz guilty
of both crimes charged, hence, this appeal. Norberto and his wife employed AAA and BBB to
help them sell their plastic wares and glass wares in La Union. Upon reaching the place, they set
up their tents to have a place to sleep. The petitioner’s wife and driver returned to Manila to get
more goods. While sleeping, AAA felt that somebody was on top of her mashing her breasts and
touching her private parts. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she would be killed. AAA
fought back and Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. AA left the tent to seek help.
When she returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. This
prompted Norberto to leave the tent. Norberto denies the commission of the crime alleging that
he could not possibly do the acts imputed out in the open as many people were preparing for the
“simbang gabi”. He further assails the credibility of AAA for the crime of rape, alleging that the
complaints were filed only to extort money from him.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of attempted rape against AAA.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness.
The basic element of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined
simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,” in other words,
rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches the external
genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits to an attempted
stage. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts
of execution without having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by
the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim and was already touching her genitalia with
his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended
his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his
intended felony would be highly unwarranted. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
“susceptible of double interpretation,” such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them
the intention to cause rape as the particular injury.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act of touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Petitioner’s embracing and
touching the victim’s vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The
lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on
top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her. The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the
petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts leading to
rape. Hence, Cruz is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.
58. PEOPLE VS. BANZUELA, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013

Facts: Banzuela was charged with Rape and Attempted Rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.

RAPE: Banzuela approached AAA (6 years old) and BBB and asked them to go with him to the
nearby cemetery. AAA and BBB refused, but Banzuela carried AAA away prompting BBB to
follow suit. Banzuela blindfolded BBB, who thereafter removed the blindfold and looked for
AAA and Banzuela. Meanwhile, Banzuela laid AAA on a dirty tomb, pulled up her dress, and
removed her underwear. He thereafter removed his shorts and briefs, mounted AAA, kissed her,
inserted his penis in her vagina, and moved his body up and down against the crying AAA.
Banzuela left. BBB saw AAA lying in a tomb. They wiped the blood with a banana leaf and went
home.

ATTEMPTED RAPE: Banzuela used the same method on BBB (7 years old), the daughter of his
mother’s half-brother. Banzuela asked BBB to go with him to the cemetery. When BBB refused,
Banzuela carried her out of the house and brought her to the cemetery. BBB cried, but Banzuela
proceeded to lay her down on the ground, pulled her dress up, removed her underwear, and
kissed her. However, before Banzuela could do anything more, a man passed by causing
Banzuela to flee the scene. The man thereafter instructed BBB to go home. The Initial Medico-
Legal Report stated that AAA was physically in a virgin state, and her hymen was "intact." RTC
- Convicted Banzuela of Rape (AAA) and Attempted Rape (BBB) CA – Convicted of Rape (AAA)
and Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB) CA said that "attempted rape is committed when the ‘touching’
of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be
acts of lasciviousness." Thus, the Court of Appeals declared, that because Banzuela’s intent to
rape BBB was not clearly established, he could only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.

Issue: Whether or not Banzuela is guilty of rape and attempted rape respectively.

Ruling:
1. RAPE – The Supreme Court ruled on the AFFIRMATIVE. In order to successfully convict an
accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove the following: 1. The age of the
complainant; 2. The identity of the accused; and 3. The carnal knowledge between the accused
and the complainant. The first element was established. The second element was clearly satisfied
when AAA positively and consistently identified Banzuela as her offender. THE THIRD
ELEMENT is instructive to define "carnal knowledge" in the context it is used in the Revised Penal
Code: ‘Carnal knowledge,’ unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not
necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of
rape is deemed consummated even when the man’s penis merely enters the labia or lips of the
female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the ‘mere touching of the external genitalia by a
penis capable of consummating the sexual act. This element was proven when AAA detailed in
open court how Banzuela forcefully inserted his sex organ into her genitalia in February 2003 and
how she felt pain during her ordeal.

2. ATTEMPTED RAPE – The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. Banzuela committed only
acts of lasciviousness. In an attempt to commit a felony, the offender commences the commission
of such felony directly by overt acts but does not perform all the acts of execution, which should
produce the felony because of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In other words, a crime is in its attempted stage when the offender has already performed the
acts preliminary to the consummation of the crime. However, because of some reason besides his
own spontaneous desistance, he is not able to perform all the acts necessary to consummate the
crime. In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight, is an essential act of execution that
produces such a felony. Thus, for Banzuela to be convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he
must have already commenced the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of BBB, but due
to some cause or accident, excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasn’t able to even
slightly penetrate BBB. "Attempted rape is committed when the ‘touching’ of the vagina by the
penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness."
In this case, Banzuela’s acts of laying BBB on the ground, undressing her, and kissing her, “do
not constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing that [Banzuela] actually
commenced forcing his penis into [BBB’s] sexual organ."
ATTEMPTED RAPE

59. PEOPLE VS. BANDRIL, G.R. No. 212205, July 06, 2015

Facts: On appeal is the September 24, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
appellant's conviction for three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. Appellant
was charged with raping his 14-year-old daughter, AAA, three times and attempting to rape her
at another time. The prosecution established that AAA was born on December 1 7, 1993. She is
the daughter of the appellant and BBB. They resided at Sitio XXX, Barangay XXX, Municipality
of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro.

Sometime in March 2007, at around 11:00 p.m., while AAA's mother BBB was not in the house,
the appellant removed AAA's clothes, took his own clothes off and ordered AAA to lie down.
Appellant mounted on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain. After
satisfying his lust, the appellant ordered AAA to wear her clothes and walk away. Out of fear of
her father's threats, she did not divulge the incident to anyone.
Sometime in June 2007, appellant and AAA were planting coconut seedlings in a coconut
plantation in Barangay XXX. Again, the appellant removed AAA's clothes and ordered her to lie
down on the banana leaf gathered by the appellant. Appellant inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina and fondled her breast.

Around October 2007, while at a lanzones plantation in Barangay XXX, appellant approached
AAA, ordered her to lie down on the grass and took her clothes off. Then appellant inserted his
penis into AAA' s vagina, fondled her breast and kissed her lips. Thereafter, appellant clothed
AAA and ordered her to collect the lanzones.
Sometime in 2008, the appellant attempted to rape AAA in their house. He was able to undress
her but failed to rape her.

Several months later, BBB noticed that AAA’s stomach was getting bigger. BBB took AAA to a
hilot who told BBB that AAA was eight months pregnant. It was at this time that AAA told BBB
that she was raped by her father. AAA gave birth to a baby boy whom they gave away for
adoption. AAA said that she wants her father to pay for his crime.
Appellant denied the charges and insisted that they were instigated by some persons unknown
to him to destroy his good reputation and character.

In its Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Oriental Mindoro, Branch
39, found appellant guilty of three counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the appellant for one count of acts of lasciviousness
instead of attempted rape.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. The CA did not err in affirming RTC’s
decision in convicting the appellant for one count of acts of lasciviousness, not for attempted rape.
The appellant's acts of undressing AAA and trying to sexually assault her a fourth time are
lascivious acts. These acts are clearly lewd, indecent, and inappropriate. Lewdness is defined as
an "obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous" act which signifies that form of immorality carried
on a wanton manner. Indeed, the appellant cannot be convicted of attempted rape since the
appellant's penis never touched any part of AAA's body. For there to be an attempted rape, the
accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim
but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration,
however, slight, is not completed.
STATUTORY RAPE

60. PEOPLE VS. DALAN, G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014

Facts: appellant, Jose Dalan, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of two counts of
statutory rape. The prosecution was able to prove that the appellant inserted his penis in the
victim's vagina on two occasions in December 2006 and March 3, 2007. The victim, referred to as
AAA, testified and her testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina
Florendo. AAA's mental retardation was not considered a disqualification for her as a witness
since she was able to narrate the details of the sexual abuses committed against her by the
appellant. The RTC sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of statutory
rape.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of statutory rape.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled on the NEGATIVE. For the charge of rape to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he
accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. What needs to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of the latter. In
the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person
who inserted his penis in her vagina in December 2006, and in March 2007; she never wavered in
this identification. Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the mental condition of the
victim. Dr. Ekid conducted a battery of tests to determine the mental age, social maturity, and
emotional condition of AAA.

In the present case, the Information alleged that the victim was a minor, being seventeen (17)
years of age, or below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of the crime, but
mentally retarded with a mental age that equates to a child of four (4) years and seven (7) months,"
and this circumstance had been proven during trial. In the present case, it is not disputed that
AAA was already 17 years old when she was raped. We are not unaware that there have been
cases where the Court stated that sexual intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes statutory
rape. Nonetheless, the Court in these cases affirmed the accused’s conviction for simple rape
despite a finding that the victim was a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than
12 years old.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term statutory rape should only be confined to
situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding
that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under 12.
Case Digests (61-66)

61. People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008
FACTS:
Appellant Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for ten counts of rape against his youngest
sister, AAA, spanning from 1995 to 2000. These incidents occurred in the Municipality of
Gattaran, Province of Cagayan. The charges were as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 08-1296: Rape of AAA, aged 10, in 1995.
2. In Criminal Case No. 08-1297: Rape of AAA, aged 10, in 1995.
3. In Criminal Case No. 08-1298: Rape of AAA, aged 10, in 1995.
4. In Criminal Case No. 08-1299: Rape of AAA, aged 10, in 1995.
5. In Criminal Case No. 08-1300: Rape of AAA, aged 10, in 1995.
6. In Criminal Case No. 08-1301: Rape of AAA, aged 11, in 1996.
7. In Criminal Case No. 08-1302: Rape of AAA, aged 11, in 1996.
8. In Criminal Case No. 08-1303: Rape of AAA, aged 13, in 1998.
9. In Criminal Case No. 08-1304: Rape of AAA, aged 13, in 1998.
10. In Criminal Case No. 08-1305: Rape of AAA, aged 15, in 2000.
The details of each rape involved appellant using force, intimidation, and threats with a knife to
subdue AAA before committing the acts. AAA remained silent about the assaults for years due
to fear of harm to herself and her family.
In September 2000, AAA finally revealed the abuse to her sister, friend, and teacher, leading to
police involvement. Appellant was confronted by AAA and admitted to the rapes during a
confrontation. He was subsequently convicted on all counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), with a sentence of death for each offense.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision but modified the damages to
be paid to AAA. Appellant was ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages for each count of rape. The case was then forwarded to the Supreme Court for review.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged based on an improvident plea of guilty;
2. Whether assuming further that the prosecution has sufficiently establish (sic) with
particularity the date of the commission of the offense, the trial court gravely erred in
imposing the death penalty on the accused as the qualifying circumstance that the accused
is the brother of the victim and, hence, a relative within the second degree of
consanguinity was not properly alleged.
RULING:
1. NO. The rule is where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is
enjoined to observe the following:
 It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
 The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
 The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper
"searching inquiry" as required by the aforecited rule. It is incumbent upon a trial judge to
ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its
consequences fully comprehended by the accused.
Records reveal that appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and
re-arraignment. In fact, it was his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant
desired to change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" on all ten charges of rape filed against him
by his younger sister.
Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-
arraigned, the charges were read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue. He cannot
now claim that he was unaware of the consequences of his change of plea.
More than that, appellant admitted raping private complainant AAA. When confronted by AAA,
their mother, sister DDD, and their uncle Raymundo Bumanglag, appellant readily admitted to
violating his sister AAA on at least three occasions. Sensing that AAA was only angered by his
fractional admission, and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him to admit the whole
truth, appellant confessed to the ten counts of rape.
When, as in this case, the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the same must be sustained for the simple reason that the
conviction is predicated not on the guilty plea of accused but on the convincing evidence proving
his commission of the offenses charged.
2. NO. The Court struck down appellant's argument in the following tenor:
We have held in People v. Ferolino, that:
"If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common
law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative
by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by
consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was
still necessary to further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree."
The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino
case, the victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister of the
offender. It was deemed necessary in the Ferolino case to require that it must be specifically
alleged in the Information that the offender is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case
may be) within the third civil degree" because we acknowledge the fact that there are niece-uncle
relationships which are beyond the third civil degree, in which case, death penalty cannot be
imposed on an accused found guilty of rape. However, a sister-brother relationship is obviously
in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship exists in civil law that falls
beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the Information
should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree of the victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.
62. People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013
FACTS:
Moises Caoile was convicted of two counts of Rape of a Demented Person against AAA, a
mentally disabled woman, in Rosario, La Union. The incidents occurred in April and May 2005.
AAA, with a mental age of around seven to nine years old due to moderate mental retardation,
was lured by Caoile, whom she called "uncle Moises," to secluded areas such as the mountains
and bamboo trees, where he sexually assaulted her.
During the assaults, Caoile would remove AAA's clothing and forcibly have sexual intercourse
with her. AAA, feeling pain and confusion, complied with his demands out of fear. On one
occasion, Caoile even gave AAA a red capsule with white casing, instructing her to take it
immediately upon returning home.
After the assaults, AAA, not fully understanding the gravity of the situation, continued to interact
with Caoile as a friend. However, when she heard about another girl's complaint of abuse by
Caoile, she disclosed her own abuse to her aunt.
This disclosure led to a police report, and AAA underwent a medical examination which
confirmed signs of sexual abuse. Psychological evaluations also revealed her mental condition,
indicating she had a mental age of a young child.
During the trial, Caoile claimed that he and AAA were in a romantic relationship, and that their
sexual encounters were consensual. However, the Court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt based on the evidence presented, including AAA's consistent testimony, medical findings,
and expert evaluations.
In 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RC's decision, ordering Caoile to pay damages to AAA
in addition to his conviction for two counts of Rape of a Demented Person. This case highlighted
the vulnerability of persons with mental disabilities and the need for their protection against
exploitation and abuse.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape.
RULING:
NO. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient
person is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs
to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the
victim’s mental retardation.31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate. Anent
the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecution’s own testimonial
and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he
has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being
sweethearts.
Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a female,
even when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her
consent.
63. People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014
FACTS:
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as
follows: That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong,
municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously . . . succeeded in having carnal knowledge of “AAA”, 1 a 12-year old mentally
retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said “AAA”. When arraigned on December
17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental
retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege that
appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the testimony of “AAA” deserves no credence because she was incapable of intelligently
making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
RULING:
NO. Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. — The following persons cannot
be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental
condition. As correctly observed by the trial court: During the continuation of AAA’s testimony
. . . she was able to recall what [appellant] did to her . . .
“AAA” recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him
because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought “AAA” to his house and while
inside, ‘he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife
and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.’
In the same vein, the appellate court found “AAA” qualified to take the witness stand.
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that “AAA” was shown to be able to perceive, to make
known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of the
incident of rape given in the following manner is worthy of note:
Private complainant “AAA” provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused-appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found
by the trial court, the testimony of “AAA” was replete with consistent details, negating the
probability of fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accused-appellant’s assertions, mental retardation per se does not
affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.
64. People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012
FACTS:
Alfredo Delabajan was convicted of three counts of rape of AAA in Sitio Maraga-as, Northern
Samar. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found him guilty based on AAA's testimony that
Delabajan, together with alias Kino Lascano, raped her. The victim, a blind Filipina, identified the
assailants through their voices. The RTC sentenced Delabajan to suffer reclusion perpetua for
each count, with corresponding damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the decision, convicting Delabajan of six counts
of qualified rape due to his active participation in the assaults. The CA found corroborating
evidence in the medical findings and upheld AAA's credibility.
ISSUE/S:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove Delabajan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
charges of rape.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal but modified the counts of rape committed and
the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: We view AAA’s testimony to be clear, convincing and
credible considering especially the corroboration it received from the medical certificate and
testimony of Dr. Simeon. Our examination of the records shows no indication that we should
view the victim’s testimony in a suspicious light. It bears stressing that identification of an
accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases where, as in this case, the victim has
known the perpetrator for a long time; for the blind voice recognition must be a special sense that
has been developed to a very high degree. Besides, it is inconceivable that a blind woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to
public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice
for the wrong done to her. Thus, to us, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape
required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant and Kino succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with the victim. AAA was steadfast in her assertion that both the
appellant and Kino had raped her, as a result of which, she felt pain. She also felt that something
"sticky" came out of the appellant’s and Kino’ private parts. Second, the assailants employed
force, threat and intimidation in satisfying their bestial desires. According to AAA, the appellant
and Kino threatened to kill her if she refused to obey them.
The Presence of Conspiracy: We agree with the CA that the appellant and Kino conspired in
sexually assaulting AAA. "Conspiracy exists when the acts of the accused demonstrate a common
design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose."8 In the present case, the acts
of Kino and of the appellant clearly indicate a unity of action: (1) Kino and the appellant entered
the victim’s house at around 9:00 p.m.; (2) Kino and the appellant ordered the victim to lie down,
and threatened to kill her if she refused to do so; (3) Kino undressed AAA, while the appellant
tied her hands; (4) the appellant held AAA’s feet, while Kino inserted his penis into the victim’s
private parts; and (5) the appellant raped AAA afterwards.
Clearly, the appellant and Kino performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
to indicate an unmistakably common purpose or design to commit the felony. Thus, they are
liable for two (2) counts of rape on account of a clear conspiracy between them, shown by their
obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the rapes. Each of them is responsible
not only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other
as well.

The Appellant’s Defenses: We reject the appellant’s claim that he was gathering coconuts in Sitio
Pasakayon on the date and time of the rapes. It is settled that the defense of alibi is inherently
weak and easily fabricated, particularly when it is corroborated only by the wife of the appellant,
as in this case. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
The Other Rapes Not Proven With Moral Certainty: AAA’s testimonies on two of the sexual
abuses were explicit, detailing the participations of the appellant and Kino, and clearly
illustrating all the elements of the crime. However, AAA’s statements that the appellant and Kino
each raped her three times were too general and clearly inadequate to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that each accused committed two other succeeding rapes. Her testimonies were
overly generalized and lacked specific details on how the other rapes were committed. We stress
that a witness is not permitted to make her own conclusion of law; whether the victim had been
raped is a conclusion for this Court to make based on the evidence presented.
The Proper Penalty: Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed whenever the rape is committed by two or more persons.
Since reclusion perpetua and death are two indivisible penalties, Article 6313 of the Revised Penal
Code applies; when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the deed, as in this case, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The lower courts were, therefore,
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant.
It bears noting that under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the death
penalty shall be imposed when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
However, the information in the present case merely stated that the victim was blind; it did not
specifically allege that the appellant knew of her blindness at the time of the commission of the
rape. Hence, we cannot impose the death penalty on the appellant.
The Civil Indemnities: The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the
finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape
victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
65. People vs. Flores G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010
FACTS:
AAA was then 15 y/o and the Flores was the guardian of AAA (in his care since AAA was 1 ½
y/o, with his wife BBB). BBB is married to Flores, who was working abroad for 6 years. Flores
came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor
from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for 6 days a week.
Rape started on 1999, when AAA was then 11 y/o, at around 9:30 p.m., when she was sleeping
inside the house. She felt and saw Flores touch her thighs. AAA could see Flores’ face as there
was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked Flores why the
latter did such a thing. Flores did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to anybody.
AAA then saw Flores went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went
back to sleep.
The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, Flores again touched
AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but Flores threatened that he will kill her
and BBB. Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up
and saw appellant holding a knife. (you know what’s next). Two days after, Flores again raped
her. AAA recounted that Flores raped her at least 3 times a weekat around the same time until 15
October 2002 (e.i, 1999-2002), when she was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did
not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin.
On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards,
AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that Flores would spank her for going home late.
Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that Flores might have done to her, aside from
spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped by Flores.
Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.
AAA stayed at her mother’s friend’s house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with
Marvin, went to Kagawad Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in
apprehending Flores, who at that time, was trying to escape.
Medic-legal examination affirmed the allegations of AAA (hymen is with presence of deep healed
laceration at 1 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 2 o’clock positions at the time of
examination; non-virgin state physically).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove Flores' guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
the charges of rape.
2. Whether the relationship of "adoptive father" qualifies as a circumstance to impose the
death penalty.
RULING:
1. YES. Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within
the span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full
accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree
with appellant’s conviction for two (2) counts of rape.
In rape cases, "the victim’s credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a
woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof."

Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAA’s testimony credible. The RTC considered
it "straightforward and consistent on material points," while the Court of Appeals described it as
"spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions." Well-entrenched is the legal
precept that when the "culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when
duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even
finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal." We see no reason in this case to
depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the trial court’s assessment of
AAA’s credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.

Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her
relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which
she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her."

Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to prove
two counts.

2. NO. The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation
or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of
his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain
in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of
a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the
exacting sanctions should he betray the trust.

In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit
of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the
category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since
his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate
that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death
penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
7659, since he does not fit into that category.
66. People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002
FACTS:
Gina and Helen, American exchange students in China, visited the Philippines during a break. In
the Philippines, they met Bryan and Giovani in Pampanga, who offered them a ride to Baguio
City. Upon reaching Baguio City, they checked into a hotel and went out for drinks at the Songs
Jazz Bar. Events diverge in the prosecution and defense versions:
Prosecution's Version:
 Gina felt something gritty in her drink at the bar, dumped it out, and later lost
consciousness.
 Helen went to bed feeling sick and later felt someone touching her inappropriately.
 Gina, in the boys' room, felt drugged and resisted Giovan's advances.
 Bryan then joined, they engaged in sexual acts without Gina's consent, who felt detached
from her body.
Defense's Version:
 Bryan and Giovan claim Gina and Helen drank heavily.
 They played cards, Gina felt hungry, Giovan left to buy food.
 Gina and Bryan kissed, undressed, but stopped when Giovan thought Gina had menstrual
fluid.
 They dressed, Bryan slept next to Gina, and in the morning, found Giovan and Rizal
asleep in the car.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether there was a valid arraignment when the accused were not furnished a copy of
the complaint or information and the contents of the complaint or information was not
read in a dialect or language known to the accused?
2. Whether the crime of acts of lasciviousness be absorbed by the crime of rape in this case.
3. Whether there was rape.
RULING:
1. YES. The accused themselves refused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the
reading of the complaint or information. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to
enter a plea and let the court enter a plea of “guilty” in their behalf.
Accused-appellants were substantially informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutor’s resolution maintaining the charge
for rape and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language
or dialect known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was deemed waived when
after the arraignment, the defense never brought up the supposed invalidity or defect
thereof. Rather, accused-appellants and their counsel vigorously and fully participated in the
trial of the case.
2. NO. It cannot be absorbed since in this case, there was conspiracy. There is no occasion
for the application in this case of the procedural rule that one crime whose elements are identical
with another crime is absorbed by the more serious crime. There being conspiracy, what is
applicable is the rule that the crime committed by one conspirator is added to the crime
committed by his co-conspirator and vice-versa. This is so because in conspiracy, the act of one
is considered as the act of the other co-conspirator.
3. YES.
There was Carnal Knowledge: Lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse. A
freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa
is immaterial in the prosecution of a rape case. It is well settled that penetration of the woman’s
vagina, however slight, and not ejaculation, constitutes rape.
For rape to be consummated, full penetration is not necessary. Penile invasion necessarily entails
contact with the labia. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ with the
labia of the pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the
vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape.
Accused-appellant Dy’s contention fails to persuade. The medical opinions he cites do not totally
rule out penetration or contact of penis with the vagina.
Victims Were Deprived of Reason or Otherwise Unconscious: If the ability to resist is taken
away by administering drugs, even though the woman may be conscious, sexual intercourse with
her is rape. If the woman’s will be affected by the anesthetic, though she may be conscious, the
act will be rape.
There Was Force or Intimidation: Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential
elements for the determination of the weight of a particular testimony. This principle could not
ring any truer where the prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the complainant,
corroborated by the medico-legal findings of a physician.
Findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts.
67.
People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014
Facts:
Appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar was accused of committing two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of statutory rape against a minor, "AAA," who was six years old at the time.
The incidents allegedly occurred on April 8, 1999, in Antipolo City, Philippines. "AAA" testified
that Crisostomo burned her genital and anal areas with a lighted cigarette and proceeded to have
illicit carnal knowledge of her. Medical examination confirmed burns and loss of virginity on
"AAA," consistent with her testimony. "AAA's" father presented her birth certificate, confirming
her age. Crisostomo denied the allegations and presented alibi witnesses, but the court found
"AAA's" testimony credible.
The trial court found Crisostomo guilty of three counts of rape, sentencing him to imprisonment
and ordering him to pay damages. Crisostomo appealed the decision, arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals dismissed
Crisostomo's appeal, affirming the trial court's decision with modifications to the penalties
imposed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding Crisostomo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on "AAA's" credible testimony and other evidence
presented
Issue:
Whether Crisostomo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him.
Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed and increased the number of damages awarded to "AAA" and
imposed interest on all damages awarded. Crisostomo's appeal was dismissed, and the decision
of the lower courts was affirmed with modifications to the damages awarded.
As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the
award of moral damages must be increased to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
As regards Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape by sexual assault),
the CA likewise properly awarded the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00
as moral damages, for each count. However, the award of exemplary damages for each count of
rape by sexual assault must be increased to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.37 In
addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.

68.
People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014

Antecedents:
Two separate criminal cases were filed against the accused-appellant, one for acts of
lasciviousness and another for rape. The incidents allegedly occurred in 2005 and 2006, involving
the victim, a minor referred to as AAA. The accused-appellant went into hiding but was later
arrested and arraigned. During the trial, the prosecution presented testimonies from AAA, her
mother, and a medical officer, while the accused-appellant testified in his defense. The RTC
convicted the accused-appellant of rape and acts of lasciviousness based on AAA's sincere and
truthful testimony, sentencing him to Reclusion Perpetua and imprisonment, respectively, along
with monetary damages to the victim.

Facts:
The accused-appellant challenged his conviction for rape and acts of lasciviousness before the
Court of Appeals (CA). AAA alleged she was raped on April 19, 2006, but medical examination
results showed no human spermatozoa and old hymenal lacerations. The accused-appellant
admitted to acts of lasciviousness but denied rape. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argued against the appeal, emphasizing AAA's testimony. The CA affirmed the RTC's judgment
but modified the penalties and damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the alleged rape.

Decision:
The Court affirmed the CA's verdict but reinstated the RTC's penalty and damages for lascivious
conduct in Criminal Case No. 12021. The interest on damages awarded to AAA was reduced from
12% to 6% per annum.

69. People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013
Facts:
Ferdinand Banzuela was convicted of rape and acts of lasciviousness by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The charges stemmed
from incidents involving two young girls, AAA (6-year-old) and BBB (7-year-old), who were
allegedly sexually assaulted by Banzuela in February 2003.
That sometime in February 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means
of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with AAA, minor (6 years old), against her will and consent, thus debasing and/or
demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, and on the acts, a girl
seven (7)years of age, by then and there bringing her to a grassy portion of Mandaluyong
Cemetery, made to lie down, undressed her, thus directly by overt acts but failed to perform all
acts of execution when a third party helped the victim to get away from the accused.
After losing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Ferdinand Banzuela appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, on August 31, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC's decision with some
modifications. In Criminal Case No. MC03-919-FC-H, Banzuela was sentenced to suffer Reclusion
Perpetua without parole for the rape of victim AAA and ordered to pay various amounts in
damages. In Criminal Case No. MC03-918-FC-H, Banzuela was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of acts of lasciviousness against victim BBB and was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 16 years of reclusion temporal, and ordered to pay
damages.
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding of guilt, stating that Banzuela failed to undermine the
credibility of the victims or discredit their testimonies. However, the CA disagreed with the RTC's
conclusion that Banzuela attempted to rape BBB. According to the CA, attempted rape requires
intent to penetrate, which was not clearly established in this case. Therefore, Banzuela could only
be convicted of acts of lasciviousness against BBB.

Issue:
Whether Ferdinand Banzuela is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and Acts of
lasciviousness.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found no reason to reverse the conviction of Banzuela. In essence, Banzuela’s
appeal is hinged on the proposition that the victims were not credible witnesses for having made
several inconsistent statements when they testified in court.
Banzuela was found guilty of rape and sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without parole for his
crime against AAA, and a penalty of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, and acts of
lasciviousness for his actions towards BBB. He is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of6
months of Arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of Prision Correccional, as
maximum, and to pay ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱10,000.00
as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment.
70. People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127904, December 05, 2002

Facts:
In May 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, Victor, the accused herein, by means of force and
intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress said Marilyn
Villanueva, a minor, 13 years old, step-daughter; and put himself on top of her, and thereafter
have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her
consent.
The Trial Court finds the accused, Esteban Victor y Penis, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, defined in and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of death.
Accused-appellant avers that the trial court erred in imposing on him the death penalty on its
finding that he was the stepfather of private complainant. He insists that the evidence on record
shows that he and Julieta Corpuz, the natural mother of private complainant were merely live-in
partners; they were not legally married. Accused-appellant points out that even the trial court
found that he was merely the common-law husband of Julieta Corpuz. Even if he were the
common-law husband of Julieta Corpuz, the death penalty could not have been lawfully imposed
on him because what was alleged in the criminal complaint for rape as a special qualifying
circumstance was that he was the stepfather of Marilyn Villanueva; however, the prosecution
proved that he was merely the common-law husband of Julieta.

Issue:
Whether or not a common-law step-father could be considered as special qualifying
circumstance.

Ruling:
The declaration of accused-appellant that he was married to Julieta, even if made in the course of
the proceedings in the trial court, is not conclusive proof that the two are legally married. Said
declaration did not dispense with the burden of the prosecution to adduce in evidence the
marriage contract of accused-appellant and Julieta. Neither may the prosecution rely on the
disputable presumption that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, they
are presumed to be married. The court highlighted that relationship is a qualifying circumstance
in rape and must not only be alleged. It must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt as the
crime itself. Hence, the appropriate penalty should be Reclusion Perpetua.
The Supreme Court, therefore, decided that In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67322, accused-appellant
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of simple rape defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is hereby meted
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay to Marilyn Villanueva the
amount of P50,000.00, by way of civil indemnity ex delicto, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages, in keeping with current jurisprudence and the amount of ₱25,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-67233, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the felony of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized in Article 366 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) months
and ten (10) days of Arresto mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of Prision Correccional, in its medium period, as maximum, and mandated to pay
Marilyn Villanueva the amount of P25,000.00 by way of moral damages, and costs.
71.
People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003
FACTS:
A consolidated decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10857, 10858 and 10859, finding appellant Florencio Abanilla y Rivera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape committed against his 17-year-old daughter, Lorena
Abanilla y Arellano, which resulted in the latter’s pregnancy.
The complainant Lorena testified on three alleged rape incidents. The first was said to have
occurred during the month of June 1999, where Abanilla touched Lorena’s private part and
rubbed his organ unto her until ejaculation. The second and the third rape incidents purportedly
occurred on the second and last weeks of October 1999, respectively where Abanilla was able to
insert his penis into Lorena’s vagina.
All three incidents were committed by means of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant denied
raping his daughter, but the sole evidence he presented was his own testimony denying the
complainant’s accusations against him. Considering that appellant’s conviction was chiefly due
to the complainant’s testimony, the Court is obliged to examine thoroughly the veracity of such
testimony to ensure that it meets the required quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt
necessary to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant Abanilla is guilty of attempted rape in the first rape incident.

RULING:
No, the appellant Abanilla is not guilty of attempted rape in the first rape incident. Jurisprudence
dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for
the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated
rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape.
Without the penetration, the crime committed is either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Based on the complainant’s testimonies as regards the first incident, the Supreme Court opined
that nothing prevented appellant from consummating the act and it would seem that he was
already contended with rubbing his penis against the complainant without actually inserting it
into her private part. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of attempted rape but only of acts of
lasciviousness for the June 1999 incident under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 6 months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to 6
years of Prision Correccional, as maximum. Appellant is ordered to pay the complainant the
amount of P20,000 as moral damages plus costs of suit. The decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10858
and 10859 are affirmed, with the modification that the award of moral damages is increased to
P75,000 and additional awards are granted in the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity and
P25,000 as exemplary damages, the same being for each of the rapes, all in accordance with recent
jurisprudence.
72.
People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011
Facts:
A father, accused of raping and attempting to rape his daughter, appealed his conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Marikina City. The charges stemmed from incidents in January
1998, with the daughter alleging that her father threatened her with a bladed weapon and forcibly
had sexual intercourse with her on one occasion and attempted to do so on another. The father
denied the accusations, claiming that the daughter and her sister were not home during the
alleged incidents.

Issues:
1. Whether the accused was properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
2. Whether the accused should be convicted of attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK.
3. Whether the indeterminate penalty imposed by the RTC was correct.

Decision:
1. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but modified the penalties. It held that the
failure to allege the qualifying circumstance of the relationship between the accused and the
victim in the information for Criminal Case No. 98-2304-MK precluded a finding of qualified
rape. Therefore, the accused was properly convicted of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Similarly, the accused was found guilty of acts of lasciviousness, rather than attempted
rape, in Criminal Case No. 98-2305-MK.
2. The CA revised the indeterminate penalty for the acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No.
98-2305-MK, imposing a term of imprisonment ranging from six months of arresto mayor to four
years and two months of prision correccional, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
3. The CA also modified the civil liabilities, awarding ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the
rape and ₱10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the acts of lasciviousness. Despite the aggravating
circumstance of the relationship between the accused and the victim not being specifically alleged
in the information, the victim was still entitled to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant
Vs
Tiburcio Balbar, defendant-appellee
(G.R. No. L-20216 & L-20217)
November 29, 1967

Facts:
Defendant-appellee Tiburcio Balbar allegedly assaulted schoolteacher Ester Gonzalez in her
classroom on August 20, 1960.
Balbar entered the room while Gonzalez was conducting her classes and allegedly placed his
arms around her and kissed her on the eye.
Gonzalez pushed Balbar away and tried to flee, but he pursued her with a dagger.
They both fell to the floor, resulting in slight physical injuries to Gonzalez.
Two information’s were filed against Balbar: one for Direct Assault Upon A Person in Authority
and another for Acts of Lasciviousness.
Issue:
1. Whether the information for direct assault sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that
the complainant was a person in authority.
2. Whether the acts committed by the accused constitute acts of lasciviousness.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-appellant on the issue of direct assault and in favor of the
defendant-appellee on the issue of acts of lasciviousness.
Ratio:
1. Direct Assault:
The court held that the information for direct assault should not have been quashed.
The information sufficiently alleged that the accused knew that the complainant was a
schoolteacher and was in her classroom engaged in the performance of her duties when she was
assaulted.
The court emphasized that complainant's status as a person in authority is a matter of law and
not of fact, and ignorance of this fact could not excuse non-compliance on the part of the accused.
Therefore, the case should be remanded for trial on the merits.
2. Acts of Lasciviousness:
The court affirmed the dismissal of the information for acts of lasciviousness.
The court explained that the presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of
the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
In this case, considering the manner, place, and time of the acts, lewd designs cannot be attributed
to the accused.
The acts occurred in a schoolroom in the presence of the complainant's students and within
hearing distance of her co-teachers, ruling out a conclusion that the accused was actuated by a
lustful design or purpose.
Therefore, the offense of acts of lasciviousness does not appear to have been committed.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,
Vs
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, accused-appellant.
GR No. 202122
January 15, 2014

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, is appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming his conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. Pareja was charged with two counts
of Rape and one count of Attempted Rape. The incidents allegedly occurred in December 2003,
February 2004, and March 27, 2004. The victim, AAA, was 13 years old at the time of the incidents.
AAA's parents had separated when she was 8 years old, and she was living with her mother and
Pareja, who was her mother's common-law spouse. AAA reported the incidents to the barangay
officials and underwent a medical examination, which confirmed the presence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma. Pareja denied the charges and claimed that AAA filed the charges out of
revenge for being the reason behind her parents' separation.
Issue:
1. Whether Pareja's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the trial court erred in convicting Pareja based solely on AAA's testimony.
Ruling:
The Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja's conviction. The trial court's evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is given the highest respect, and absent any substantial reason to reverse
the trial court's findings, the appellate court is generally bound by the lower court's findings.
Inconsistencies in a rape victim's testimony are generally expected, and the inconsistencies
mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential. The court also notes that the victim's
demeanor and conduct after the incidents do not negate the possibility that she was raped, as
victims of rape cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with society's
expectations. The court also finds that the medical examination, although not indispensable,
bolsters the victim's claim of being raped.
Ratio:
The court gives deference to the trial court's evaluation of witness credibility. Inconsistencies in
a rape victim's testimony are expected and do not necessarily undermine the victim's credibility.
The victim's demeanor and conduct after the incidents cannot be used to discredit her, as victims
of rape may not act within reason or in accordance with societal expectations. A medical
examination is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, and expert testimony is merely
corroborative in character and not essential to conviction.

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee

Vs
Jade Cuaycong y Remonquillo, accused-appellant
G.R No. 196051
October 02, 2013

Facts:
The case involves appellant Jade Cuaycong y Remonquillo who was charged with two counts of
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The incidents occurred in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines.
The first incident happened on July 4, 2002, where the appellant allegedly had carnal knowledge
with a seven-year-old girl against her will and consent.
The second incident happened in June 2001, where the appellant allegedly had carnal knowledge
with the same seven-year-old girl against her will and consent.
The appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
The trial court found the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory rape, but the Court of Appeals
modified it to one count of statutory rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
Ruling:
The Court affirms the conviction of the appellant for one count of statutory rape and one count
of acts of lasciviousness.
People of the Philippines and AAA, petitioners
Vs
Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto,
and Moises Alquizola, respondents.
G.R No. 183652
February 25, 2015

Facts:
The case involves the petitioners, People of the Philippines and AAA, and the respondents, Court
of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, which found the respondents guilty of rape.
The respondents were charged with raping AAA, a 16-year-old minor, on March 25, 2004, at
Alson's Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte.
The RTC found the respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced them accordingly.
The Court of Appeals, however, acquitted the respondents due to the prosecution's failure to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private
respondents.
Ruling:
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the
private respondents.
The Court emphasizes that due process requires the consideration of the entire evidence
presented, regardless of the party who offered it.
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals disregarded the evidence presented by the prosecution
and relied solely on the evidence presented by the defense.
The Court also notes that the Court of Appeals made its own findings to justify its decision of
acquittal, disregarding the findings of the trial court.
The Court finds that the private respondents failed to sufficiently prove that AAA consented to
the sexual acts, considering that she was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
The Court also finds that the private respondents failed to prove that AAA had previous sexual
encounters, which could explain the presence of an old hymenal laceration.
The Court further notes that the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that AAA positively identified
the private respondents as her rapists and that she showed physical resistance and cried during
the assault.
The Court concludes that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the evidence presented by the prosecution and in adopting the private respondents'
version of the events.
The Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and finds the private respondents guilty
of rape.
The Court imposes the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua on Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto,
and Moises Alquizola for each count of rape.
The Court orders the private respondents to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages for each count of rape.
The case is remanded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Vs
Cajeto Cabilida Jr. y Candawan, accused-appellant
G.R No. 222964
July 11, 2018

DEL CASTILLO, J p:
"A woman will not expose herself to the humiliation of a trial, with its attendant publicity and
the morbid curiosity it would arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement
for her abuse." ICHDca
This is an appeal filed by appellant Cajeto Cabilida, Jr. y Candawan from the December 10,
2014 Decision and the November 19, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 01087-MIN, affirming the September 17, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Oroquieta City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case Nos. 986-14-433 and 988-14-435, finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.

Facts:
This case involves appellant Cajeto Cabilida, Jr. y Candawan who appealed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding him guilty of two counts of rape. The charges were filed
against appellant and his co-accused Toto Cabilida for raping the complainant, AAA, on
December 24, 2005. The incidents occurred in AAA's house in the presence of her minor children.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges, while his co-accused remains at large. During the
trial, AAA and her daughter BBB testified for the prosecution, providing detailed accounts of the
rape incidents. Appellant, on the other hand, claimed that he and AAA had a consensual
relationship and denied encouraging his co-accused to rape AAA.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt for the charges of rape.

Ruling:
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the appellant guilty of two
counts of rape. The CA rejected the defense's "sweetheart theory" and found no evidence to
support the claim that appellant and AAA had a consensual relationship. The court also ruled
that minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her daughter did not impair their
credibility. The court emphasized that having a relationship with the victim does not justify or
excuse the commission of rape. The failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate was
also deemed not fatal to the case, as the testimony of the victim, corroborated by her daughter's
testimony, was clear, positive, and convincing.
Ratio:
The court held that minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses do not necessarily impair
their credibility, especially when these inconsistencies do not touch upon the central fact of the
crime. The court also emphasized that the existence of a consensual relationship does not negate
the commission of rape. Furthermore, a medical certificate is not necessary to prove the
commission of rape when the testimony of the victim, supported by other evidence, is clear,
positive, and convincing.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Vs
Rogelio Baguion A.K.A “ROGEL”, defendant-appellant.
G.R No. 223553
July 04, 2018

Facts:
The case involves the appeal of Rogelio Baguion, also known as "Rogel," who was charged with
statutory rape. The incident allegedly occurred on October 8, 2009, in [XXX], Philippines. The
victim, referred to as AAA, was 10 years old at the time. The prosecution presented witnesses,
including AAA, her mother BBB, and Dr. Amelia C. Cam, to establish the following facts: AAA
was awakened by accused-appellant, who threatened her with a machete and forced her to go to
his house. There, accused-appellant undressed both himself and AAA and performed sexual acts
on her, although his penis did not fully penetrate her. AAA felt severe pain during the assault.
Accused-appellant later left AAA and she returned home. AAA did not immediately report the
incident out of fear. On October 14, 2009, during a drinking session, AAA's mother asked her who
molested her, and AAA identified accused-appellant. AAA and her mother reported the incident
to the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the police. AAA underwent a physical
examination, which revealed redness in the area surrounding her hymen. Accused-appellant
denied the allegations and claimed that he was at home on the day of the incident.
Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was without merit. It upheld the conviction of the
accused-appellant for statutory rape.
Ratio:
The Supreme Court explained that statutory rape is committed when there is sexual intercourse
with a woman below 12 years old, regardless of her consent. In this case, the prosecution
successfully proved AAA's age, the identity of accused-appellant, and the sexual intercourse
between them. AAA's testimony, along with the medical findings of redness in her genital area,
was sufficient to convict accused-appellant.
The court clarified that for the rape to be consummated, the penis must come into contact with
the lips of the pudendum. In this case, while there was no full penile penetration, the accused-
appellant's erect penis touched the victim's labia majora, as confirmed by medical findings. The
court ruled that the touching of the labia majora is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge and
therefore, consummated rape.
The court also dismissed the accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi. Denial was
considered an intrinsically weak defense that must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to be credible. Alibi, on the other hand, is the weakest of all defenses and is generally
rejected. The accused-appellant failed to establish the elements of alibi, as he only claimed to be
at his house suffering from arthritis, without any corroborating evidence. In contrast, the victim's
direct, positive, and categorical testimony was given more weight.
The court further rejected the accused-appellant's argument that the victim's lack of resistance
negates the commission of rape. It emphasized that the lack of resistance or failure to shout for
help does not imply consent, especially when the victim was intimidated into submission. In
statutory rape cases, proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary.
 G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

Facts:
This case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos who was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati for two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness. The victim, Rosilyn, was a minor below twelve years old at the time of the
incidents. The accused, a member of Congress, was accused of peddling Rosilyn for commercial
sex. The acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on separate occasions.

Issue:
The main issues raised in this case are whether the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
admissible as evidence to prove her age, and whether the acts committed by the accused
constitute statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are admissible as evidence to
prove her age. Even if they were inadmissible, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord
Dressing Book of the hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to establish her date
of birth. These documents are considered entries in official records and are admissible as prima
facie evidence of their contents.

The court also ruled that the acts committed by the accused constitute statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The court explained that for rape to be consummated, there must be penetration
of the labia majora, and not just touching of the external genitalia. In this case, there was sufficient
proof that the accused's acts went beyond mere touching and involved penetration of the victim's
vagina.

The court further ruled that the accused is liable for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610, or the Child Abuse Law, which prohibits lascivious conduct with a child below 18 years of
age. The court found that the accused's acts of kissing the victim on the lips, fondling her breast,
inserting his finger into her vagina, and placing his penis between her thighs constitute lascivious
conduct.
 G.R. No. 128777 October 7, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
ERNESTO LARIN y BONDAD, accused-appellant.

Facts:
The case involves the accused, Ernesto Larin, who was charged with violating Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), also known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The accused was a swimming instructor at the University
of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB). The victim, Carla Lenore Calumpang, who was 14 years old
at the time, accused Larin of committing lascivious conduct against her inside the ladies' shower
room at UPLB. The victim testified that Larin shaved her pubic hair, performed cunnilingus on
her, licked her breasts, touched her genitalia, and forced her to hold his sexual organ. The victim
reported the incident to her parents and filed a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation.

Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

Ruling:
The court held that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a witness, in this case the victim,
is entitled to the highest degree of respect. The victim's testimony was given in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and candid manner, and there was no proof of ill motive on her
part to falsely accuse and testify against the appellant. The court also explained that under RA
7610, a child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when they
engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money, profit, or any other consideration,
or under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group. The court found that the
accused's actions, such as shaving the victim's pubic hair, performing cunnilingus, and touching
her genitalia, constituted lascivious conduct and showed sexual perversity.

G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013

 CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
A 17-year-old girl is found guilty of having been sexually abused by 23-year-old Christian
Caballo, which led to her pregnancy. The 17-year-old girl named AAA and Caballo fell in love
when they met at her uncle's house in Surigao City. Caballo convinced AAA to engage in sexual
activity with him on various occasions, leading to AAA being pregnant in June 1998.
Although the prosecution maintained that Caballo had forced and tricked AAA into having sex
with him, Caballo maintained that AAA was not a virgin and that they were sweethearts.
Caballo was given an incarceration sentence after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found him
guilty of breaking Section 10(a) of Article VI of the Revised Penal Code. In response to Caballo's
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC's decision but changed the crime to a violation.

Issue:

Whether the phrase "due to the coercion or influence of any adult" in Section 5 (b), Article III of
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act requires some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute
child abuse.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court determines that in the legal framework, Caballo's activities of convincing
AAA, a minor, to have sex with him constituted influence and compulsion.
They stress that AAA was susceptible to adult trickery and manipulation since she was a
youngster and could not have fully understood the ramifications of her conduct.

According to the Court, the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act's Section 5(b) clause "due to the
coercion or influence of any adult" does not specifically call for coercion or intimidation; rather,
it refers to circumstances in which an adult manipulates or deceives a juvenile.
The Court further notes that while the law aims to protect children, consent is irrelevant in
circumstances of child abuse.
 G.R. No. 206513 October 20, 2015

MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA MARUHOM, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIILPPINES, Respondent

Facts:
On September 24, 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct upon the person of one AAA,
who was then a sixteen year old minor, by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and
private part against her will and without her consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to
the physical and psychological development of the complainant. After trial, the RTC promulgated
its Decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that even assuming
he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done
without the victim’s consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her. The CA
rendered a Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG. Petitioner received a copy of CA
Decision on July 6, 2012. Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the
CA a manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to
the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of Probation Law

Held:
No. Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal
from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused. In this case, petitioner
appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the
part of the trial court to have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7610. Accused already perfected his appeal and it is late in the day to avail the benefits
of probation.

G.R. No. 186469 June 13, 2012

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOVER MATIAS y DELA FUENTE, Accused-appellant.

Facts:
The case involves the appeal of Jover Matias y Dela Fuente (appellant) from his conviction for the
crime of rape under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. The appellant was accused
of raping a minor, AAA, who was his neighbor. On the evening of June 6, 2004, the appellant
forcefully took AAA to a house under construction, where he raped her. AAA reported the
incident to her mother and aunt, who then went to the barangay and filed a complaint with the
police. AAA underwent a physical examination, which confirmed the presence of injuries
consistent with sexual abuse. The appellant claimed that he was doing construction work at his
aunt's house at the time of the incident and was surprised when he was arrested by the police.

Issue:
The main issue raised in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals (CA) committed reversible
error in affirming the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) decision.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was an error in the conviction of the appellant for rape under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. The records showed that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the
incident, not below 12 years old as required by the law. Therefore, the appellant should have been
prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse or under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), except for rape under paragraph 1 (d). The
penalties under these two laws differ, with sexual abuse under RA 7610 carrying a penalty of
reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under the RPC is penalized with
reclusion perpetua.
 G.R. No. 182130 June 19, 2013

IRIS KRISTINE BALOIS ALBERTO and BENJAMIN D. BALOIS, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. RODRIGO A. REYNA, ARTURO S. CALIANGA,
GIL ANTHONY M. CALIANGA, JESSEBEL CALIANGA, and GRACE EVANGELISTA,
Respondents.

Facts:
Criminal complaints were filed by petitioners Iris Kristine Balois Alberto and Benjamin D. Balois
against respondents Gil Anthony M. Calianga, Attorney. Grace Evangelista, Jessebel Calianga,
and Rodrigo A. Reyna. The incidences on December 28, 2001, April 23 to 24, 2002, and June 23 to
November 9, 2003 were the subject of the complaints. The petitioners claimed that Gil had
repeatedly sexually assaulted Iris and that the respondents had kidnapped and imprisoned her
against her will.

The lawsuit was first dismissed by the Court of Appeals for lack of probable cause.

Issue:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charges of rape against the respondents.
Whether there is probable cause for the charges of serious illegal detention and forcible abduction
with rape.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the charges of rape
against the respondents. The Court relied on the testimony of Iris, the victim, who provided
detailed accounts of the incidents. The Court found that the elements of rape, including force or
intimidation, were present based on Iris's testimony. The Court also found that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Department of Justice Secretary in finding probable
cause for the crime of rape. The Court deferred to the Secretary's determination, as it is within the
Secretary's authority to evaluate the evidence and make a determination of probable cause.
However, the Court found that there was no probable cause for the charges of serious illegal
detention and forcible abduction with rape. The Court held that there was no evidence to support
the allegations of illegal detention and abduction. The charges were based on inconsistent and
unreliable testimony from Iris. The Court also found that there was no evidence to support the
finding of conspiracy among the respondents. In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the
finding of probable cause for the crime of rape against the respondents, but dismissed the charges
of serious illegal detention and forcible abduction with rape. The Court ordered the Department
of Justice to issue the proper resolution in accordance with its decision.
85. People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011
Facts: Armando Chingh is accused of raping a 10 year old minor child. Upon his arraignment,
Chingh pleaded not guilty. During trial the prosecution presented the victim, her father, one PO3
Ma. Theresa Solidarios, and Dr. Irene Baluyot, while the defense presented the lone testimony of
Chingh. Evidence for the prosecution shows that Chingh approached and pulled the victim while
she was going to a store to buy food. She was threatened not to shout for help or talk. Chingh
then brought her to a vacant lot where the alleged rape happened. Threatened with death of she
would tell anyone what happened, the victim kept mum about her traumatic experience when
she arrived home. Noticing her odd and uneasy demeanor as well as her blood-stained
underwear, however, her father pressed her for an explanation. The victim then confessed to her
father what happened, and they reported the matter to the police. Chingh was positively
identified by the victim in a police line-up. The genital examination of Dr. Baluyot showed clear
evidence of the allege incident. The RTC rendered a decision convicting Chingh of Statutory Rape,
upon appeal the CA rendered a decision finding him not only guilty of statutory rape, but also of
Rape Through Sexual Assault.
Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code in spite of the unrealistic
testimony of the private complainant.
Ruling: The RTC is correct in finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape. The victim clearly
narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the accused. Notwithstanding her innocence
and despite thorough cross-examination by Chingh’s counsel, she never faltered and gave a very
candid and truthful testimony of the traumatic events. The victim’s testimony was corroborated
and bolstered by the findings of Dr. Baluyot. Chingh admitted that he saw the victim on the date
of the incident and his defenses are unavailing. He tendered nothing but his bare denial and
contention that he was elsewhere when the crime happened.
86. People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011
Facts: Ireno Bonaagua was charged of four counts of raped committed against his minor
daughter. The incidents were reported to have happened on 4 separate occasions which started
when the victim was only eight years old, however the victim did not tell her mother that she
was raped because Ireno threatened to kill her mother by placing her body in a drum and have it
cemented if the victim should report the incidents. When the victim complained of severe
abdominal pain, her mother took her to the hospital, the result of the physical examination
revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration on the hymen of the victim. This medical
finding forced her to reveal to her mother all the incidents of rape committed by the accused. In
his defense, Ireno denied the charges of rape. He claimed that he was working in Las Piñas, while
the victim, her mother and siblings were in Sariaya, Quezon, at the time the alleged rapes
occurred. While he admitted that when the victim and her mother would visit him, they would
immediately leave on the same day they arrived after he gives them money. The RTC ruled in
favor of the victim and convicted the accused guilty of the four counts of rape. The CA found
Ireno’s defense of denial and alibi weak, and affirmed the RTC’s decision on the three of the four
counts of rape charged against him, but found only guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
on one of the information filed.
Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of rape despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Ireno’s arguments are untenable. After perusing the testimony of the victim, the
prosecution has indubitably established that Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted her. The
victim categorically narrated that the accused sexually abused her on several occasions and even
threatened that he would kill her mother if she would report the incidents. Contrary to the claims
of the accused, the medical findings did not refute the victim’s testimony of defilement, but
instead bolstered her claim. Thus the RTC and CA are correct in finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the charges filed against him.
87. People vs. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018
Facts: Two Informations for child abuse were filed against Udang before the RTC of Cagayan de
Oro City. The charges against Udang sprung from the alleged sexual abused committed by the
accused on two separate occasions against the victim which happened when she was thirteen and
fourteen years old. Udang pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. The doctor who physically
examined the victim found that the victim had hymenal lacerations as well as excoriations or
reddish superficial scratched marks between her thighs and genitalia, which according to the
doctor, "could have been caused by trauma, frictions, infections, and also sexual intercourse."
Although in the victim’s case, the hymenal lacerations were old and already healed. In his
defense, Udang denied ever raping the victim. He claimed that he was with his mother and other
siblings at home when the alleged incidents happened, and that he saw no reason for the victim
to falsely charge him with rape since no animosity existed between them. The RTC did not give
credence to Udang’s defense and found him guilty of rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC,
said decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of rape punished under the
first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: The appeal is affirmed with modification. Based on the Informations, Udang was charged
with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Hence,
he could only be convicted of sexual abuse under the Informations filed in this case and not for
rape under the Revised Penal Code. Furthermore, upon examination of the evidence presented,
this Court finds Udang guilty of two (2) counts of sexual abuse. Thus, the penalty erroneously
imposed on him “reclusion perpetua for each count of rape” should be reduced accordingly.
88. People vs. Amarela and Rancho, G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018
Facts: Two separate informations were filed against Amarela and Rancho for the crime of rape
allegedly committed against the victim. On her testimony, the victim alleged that she was
watching a beauty contest; she was urged to urinate so she went to the comfort room and on the
way there, Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day care center, where the accused
undressed her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger. e boxed her upper thigh and she felt
numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and made a push
and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue [so] Amarela
fled. The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions
with her. So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. When they were gone she proceeded on her
way home. She went to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the Racho
residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was not at home. Dumandan stayed behind So
Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead. The victim then
narrated that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie
down. When she refused, he boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him
but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of
her. Rancho the consummated the act of raping her and left, so went home alone. Both Amarela
and Rancho denied raping the victim. The RTC found that the testimony of the victim, positively
identifying both Amarela and Rancho, to be clear, positive and straightforward and did not give
much weight to the denial of the accused. Both accused were found guilty of rape. The RTC’s
decision was assailed in toto by the CA, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in ruling that the accused were guilty of the crime of rape.
Ruling: No. The prosecution failed to present a clear story of what has transpired. In the case of
Amarela, the version of the victim’s affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court
testimony. At the first instance, she claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage;
later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she was grabbed. By this
alone, we are hesitant to believe the victim’s retraction because it goes into whether it was even
possible for Amarela to abduct the victim against her will. The court also finds it dubious how
she was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident allegedly happened in a
dark place.
As to the case of Rancho, the victim claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's
house, but instead forced her to go inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho
supposedly boxed her abdomen, undressed himself, placed himself on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left her to go home by herself.
Whether the alleged victim’s ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime,
the prosecution must do its part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are
given ample resources of the government to present a logical and realistic account of every
alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a
conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of the
victim. It should have been the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence if it had
enough to convict Amarela or Racho.
89. People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012
Facts: Sabadlab was found guilty of forcible abduction with rape committed against AAA, a 16-
years old domestic helper by the RTC Makati City. Based on the factual incidents, while AAA
was proceeding towards fetching her employer’s son, a man grabbed her by the shoulder and
ordered her to go with him. She recognized him to be the same man who persistently greeted her
every time she had bought pandesal. When AAA refused to do his bidding, Sabadlab poked a
gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They
forced her into the backseat of a parked car, and one of Sabadlab’s cohorts blindfolded her with
a handkerchief. The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still
blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her clothes.
Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them tied her hands
behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck downwards. Although
blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling out his name as he
was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind
her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after
Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled
newspapers. The three ravished her again and again, that she could not remember the number of
times they did so. The accused than returned her to Dapitan Street with stern warning that they
would surely kill her if she told anyone about the rapes. Upon her arrival at the house, AAA’s
employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck. AAA at first lied about the kiss marks, but she
ultimately disclosed the rapes because her irritated employer slapped and boxed her on the
stomach to force her to disclose. In his defense, Sabadlab denied the charge and asserted alibi,
claiming that he was at work when the alleged incident happened. RTC’s decision was affirmed
with modification by the CA.
Issue: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving the weight and credence to the highly
incredible and inconsistent testimony of the private complainant.
Ruling: The supposed inconsistencies were inconsequential to the issue of guilt. For one, the
matter of who of the three rapists had blindfolded and undressed AAA was trifling, because her
confusion did not alter the fact that she had been really blindfolded and rendered naked. Nor did
the failure to produce any torn apparel of AAA disprove the crime charged, it being without
dispute that the tearing of the victim’s apparel was not necessary in the commission of the crime
charged. In fact, she did not even state that her clothes had been torn when Sabadlab had forcibly
undressed her. Verily, details and matters that did not detract from the commission of the crime
did not diminish her credibility. AAA’s recollection of the principal occurrence and her positive
identification of the rapists, particularly Sabadlab, were firm. It is reassuring, too, that her
trustworthiness in identifying Sabadlab as one of the rapists rested on her recognition of him as
the man who had frequently flirted with her at the store where she had usually bought pandesal
for her employer’s table. As such, the identification of him as one of the rapists became
impervious to doubt.
TITLE EIGHT: CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Chapter One DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
Section One. - Parricide, murder, homicide
Article 246. Parricide

90. People vs. Armando Dalag y Custodio, G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003
Facts: PO3 Armando Dalag was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide for killing his
wife, Leah Nolido Dalag. Armando and Leah were married and had 3 three children. Leah was
admonishing Armando not to drink liquor, later on they quarreled. Their children sensed that
some object was being banged on the wall, thereafter they heard their mother cry. Francis and
Princess Joy rushed outside the house to see what was happening. They were horrified when
from a distance of three meters, they saw Armando pushing and kicking Leah on the left side of
her body. She fell to the ground. Even as Leah was already lying posthaste on the ground,
Armando continued to beat her up, punching her on the different parts of the body. Francis and
Princess Joy pleaded to their father to stop maltreating their mother. Armando angrily told them
not to interfere and that he will later beat them up as well. He grabbed Leah's hair and banged
her head on the wall. Leah's forehead directly hit the wall. In the process, Armando stepped on a
nail. Even as she was being assaulted by her husband, she told him "Toy, Toy, I will find some
medicine for your wound." Leah then fled to the house of their neighbor, Felisa Horilla or "Tia
Feli." Armando ran after Leah and pushed her to the house of Felisa. Francis went back to the
house. Princess Joy looked for her parents but could not find them. She decided to go back to
their house to sleep. In the meantime, Armando herded Leah back to the house. Princess Joy was
awakened when she heard her mother crying. When Princess Joy went outside of the house, she
saw her mother being pushed by her father. Leah fell to the ground and lost consciousness.
Armando placed the head of Leah on a stone and ordered Princess Joy to get some water. She
did. She poured water on the face of her mother but the latter did not move. Armando then tried
to revive Leah by applying mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to no avail. Leah no longer regained
consciousness and died. Dr. Cruel in his report testified that Leah suffered severe beatings and
traumatic physical violence resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death. Amado
denied vigorously killing his wife.
Issue: Whether Armando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for committing the crime of
parricide.
Ruling: Yes, the essential elements of parricide in this case are apparent. In this case, the trial
court declared that the children, Francis and Princess Joy, the principal prosecution witnesses,
testified "in a logical, candid, and straight-forward manner, describing in detail what they saw
and heard in a manner characteristic of witnesses who are telling the truth."12 The Court finds
no reason to deviate from these findings as the records fully support the same. The children
recalled the sordid events that happened in the evening of August 15, 1996 involving their parents
without any trace of bias, impelled by no other motive than to bring justice to their mother's
senseless death. The children's testimonies are buttressed by the findings of Dr. Canto, the
neurological surgeon who attended to Leah when she was confined in the hospital, and Dr. Cruel
of the Commission on Human Rights, who conducted the post-mortem examination on Leah's
body. Indeed, the appellant's claim that the death of Leah resulted from accident, i.e., she slipped
and hit her head on two stones, flies in the face of incriminating medical findings. As opined by
Dr. Canto, he found it difficult to believe that the injuries sustained by Leah resulted from a bad
fall.
91.
G.R. No. 182551 July 27, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., Plain.-Appellee, vs. ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Acc.-Appellant.
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts:
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN was charged with
the crime of double murder.
That on the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and... evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength feloniously attack FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and
RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang), which wounds
caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera.
On November 3, 2003, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime of double murder.
It ruled that the manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victims was a premeditated
decision and executed with treachery. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the RTC.
Issues:
I- The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of murder.
II- The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery, thus
qualifying the same to murder.
Ruling:
1. In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the quantum of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution must
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such
a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute... certainty. Only moral
certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the accused must
survive the test of reason for it is... only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of
the crime is the person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction. A finding of guilt must
rest on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or even... absence of
evidence for the defense.
2. In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe
and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill
another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of
treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall... within the provisions of
Article 246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without... risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even... if
the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to
repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to... retaliate.
The accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder
for the... deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
92.
G.R. No. 197807. April 16, 2012.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., plaint.-appellee, vs. CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING, acc.-appellant.
VELASCO, JR., J p:
Facts:
This case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Cecilia Lagman y Piring from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court convicting her of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The case
stemmed from two separate incidents that occurred on February 24, 2002, in Manila, Philippines.
The first incident involved the stabbing of Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago, resulting in his death,
while the second incident involved the stabbing of Violeta Sicor, which caused her injuries but
did not result in her death. The accused pleaded not guilty to both charges. During the trial, the
prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the events of the incidents, while the defense
relied on denial and alibi as their defense. The RTC found the accused guilty of Murder and Less
Serious Physical Injuries, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution's witness
despite patent inconsistencies.
3. Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery.

Ruling:
1. The court affirms the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the totality of the
prosecution's evidence.

2. The court also upholds the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

3. The court finds that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery.

The accused is found guilty of Murder and Slight Physical Injuries. The court modifies the
conviction for the second incident to Slight Physical Injuries instead of Less Serious Physical
Injuries due to the lack of evidence to support the latter charge.

The court finds that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of Murder, including the
killing of the victim, the accused as the perpetrator, the presence of treachery, and the absence of
parricide or infanticide. The court upholds the presence of treachery based on the eyewitness
testimony of the prosecution witness, which showed that the victim was caught off guard and
had no chance to defend himself. The court also affirms the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, as the trial court's findings on credibility are generally given conclusive effect. The
court rejects the defense of alibi, as it is not supported by credible corroboration or proof of
physical impossibility.
93.
G.R. No. 188979. September 5, 2012.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER PAREJA y VELASCO, appellant.
BRION, J p:

Facts:
This case involves the appellant, Christopher Pareja y Velasco, who was charged with the crime
of rape. The victim, referred to as AAA, testified that on the night of the incident, the appellant
forcibly undressed her, held her hands and parted her legs, and attempted to insert his penis into
her vagina. However, the appellant was unable to fully consummate the act due to AAA's loud
cries and resistance.

Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether the appellant should be convicted of rape or attempted
rape.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of the appellant and modified the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court held that the appellant should only be convicted of attempted rape since there was no
actual penetration.

The Court cited Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that there is an attempt when
the offender commences the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform
all the acts of execution. The Court also referred to previous jurisprudence that established the
requirement of penile penetration for the crime of rape to be consummated.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court found that while the appellant had the intent to
penetrate, he failed to fully execute the act due to AAA's resistance. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the appellant should only be convicted of attempted rape.

The Court also discussed previous cases where convictions for consummated rape were
overturned due to the lack of evidence of penile penetration. The Court emphasized that in rape
cases, the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of the crime, including
penetration.
94.
G.R. No. 227363. March 12, 2019.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR TULAGAN, accused-appellant.
PERALTA, J p:
Facts:
The case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Salvador Tulagan (Tulagan) from the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming his conviction for sexual assault and statutory rape.
Tulagan was charged in two separate cases for forcibly inserting his finger into the vagina of a 9-
year-old minor (referred to as AAA) and for having sexual intercourse with her against her will
and consent.

During the trial, AAA's aunt testified that she noticed a man looking at AAA outside their house
and when AAA asked permission to go to the bathroom, the man approached her. Suspicious,
AAA's aunt walked towards them and the man left suddenly. After AAA returned from the
bathroom, her aunt noticed that her genitalia was swollen and AAA confessed to her about the
wrong done to her by Tulagan. AAA testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger into her
private part and later had sexual intercourse with her. A medical examination confirmed the
presence of a laceration and a dilated vaginal opening in AAA.

Tulagan claimed that he did not know AAA well and denied the allegations against him. He
argued that AAA's testimony was inconsistent and unreliable. However, both the trial court and
the CA found AAA's testimony to be credible and consistent. They also found that the elements
of sexual assault and statutory rape were duly established. The trial court sentenced Tulagan to
reclusion perpetua for statutory rape and an indeterminate penalty of 6 to 12 years for sexual
assault. The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalties and damages awarded.

Issue:
The main issue raised in the case is whether the trial court and the CA erred in finding Tulagan
guilty of sexual assault and statutory rape based on AAA's testimony.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found no merit in Tulagan's appeal and affirmed his conviction for sexual
assault and statutory rape. The Court emphasized that the trial court's findings carry great weight
and respect, especially when affirmed by the CA. Inconsistencies in a witness's testimony do not
necessarily diminish their credibility, as long as the principal elements of the crime are
consistently narrated and the accused is positively identified as the perpetrator.
The Court rejected Tulagan's defense of denial and alibi, as AAA's positive identification of him
as the offender prevailed. Tulagan failed to establish physical impossibility for him to be at the
crime scene when the rape incidents took place. The Court further noted that the delay in
reporting the incidents does not affect the truthfulness of the charges.

The Court also emphasized that the trial court's findings were supported by the medical
examination, which confirmed the presence of a laceration and a dilated vaginal opening in AAA.
This corroborated AAA's testimony and further strengthened her credibility.

The Court clarified that inconsistencies in a witness's testimony do not necessarily render it
unreliable, especially when the principal elements of the crime are consistently narrated. In this
case, AAA consistently testified that Tulagan forcibly inserted his finger into her private part and
later had sexual intercourse with her. These principal elements were established beyond
reasonable doubt.
95.
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON", Accused-appellant.
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
The case involves the accused-appellant, Rodrigo Gutierrez, who was charged with statutory
rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The information filed against him stated that
on November 29, 2005, in Baguio City, Gutierrez had carnal knowledge of the victim, who was
under twelve years old. The victim, referred to as AAA, testified that Gutierrez brought her to his
room, raised her skirt, removed her panties, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA also
disclosed that Gutierrez had done the same thing to her about ten times on separate occasions.
Medical examinations confirmed the presence of blunt force penetrating trauma and hematoma
in AAA's legs.
Issue:
whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Gutierrez was guilty of
statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
The Court found Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape and affirmed the
conviction. The Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered Gutierrez to
indemnify the victim with P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages.
However, the Court modified the damages awarded, increasing the civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each.
The Court explained that statutory rape is committed when the victim is under twelve years old
and the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of the presence of force, threat,
intimidation, or fraud. In this case, the victim's age was proven, and her clear and categorical
testimony, supported by the testimonies of her teachers and medical examinations, established
that Gutierrez had carnal knowledge of her. The Court emphasized that the law presumes that a
victim of statutory rape, due to her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own.
Gutierrez's argument that the victim's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt was
dismissed, as the fear and moral ascendancy he had over the victim could have silenced her. The
Court also noted that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, as there were no
aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. However, the damages awarded were increased
to P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to ensure just
compensation for the victim.
96.
G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL., Plaintiff-Appellee vs.
JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR, Accused-Appellant.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts:
This case involves the appeal of Joel Crisostomo y Malliar, who was found guilty by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of
statutory rape. The appellant was accused of using a lighted cigarette to burn the genital and anal
orifices of a minor, and of having sexual intercourse with the minor. The RTC sentenced the
appellant to imprisonment and ordered him to pay civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages to the victim. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC
with modifications to the penalties imposed. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not credible and that there were
inconsistencies and contradictions in their testimonies.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. The Court held that the prosecution was able
to establish all the elements of statutory rape and rape by sexual assault. The testimonies of the
victim and the medical evidence corroborated each other and proved the guilt of the appellant.
The Court also held that the inconsistencies and contradictions in the victim's testimony were
inconsequential and did not affect her credibility. The Court emphasized that testimonies of child-
victims are given full weight and credit, and that inconsistencies in their testimonies do not
impair their credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter
the essential fact of the commission of rape.
The appellant's argument that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not credible was
not supported by sufficient evidence. The Court found no reason to doubt the credibility of the
victim and the other witnesses presented by the prosecution.
The penalties imposed by the CA were in accordance with the relevant laws. For the statutory
rape charge, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole was imposed. For the
rape by sexual assault charges, the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, was imposed
for each count.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO JASTIVA
G.R. No. 199268 February 12, 2014
FACTS: Aurelio Jastiva appealed from the decision of the RTC- Branch 9 Dipolog promulgated
on Se[t. 1 2009 and the CA’s decision promulgated on Aug. 31, 2011 for the crime of rape under
Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
That on Aug. 3, 2004, AAA a 67 years old was drying corn in their small barn (Kamalig) in a
farmland located at Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband BBB left her alone to spend the
night with their daughter in their residence because she has no companion.
At about 11 P.M. on the same day, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified
as accused-appellant Aurelio Justiva covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and told her
not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. A AA grabbed accused-
appellant’s hand and felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed
AAA’s underwear. However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not
yet erected (sic), accused-appellant therefore toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it.
Accused-appellant then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue. The latter evaded her
assaulter’s sexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same
through her teeth. Once done, accused-appellant held his penis and inserted it to (sic) AAA’s
vagina. After fulfilling his sexual desire and before AAA could stand up, accused-appellant
tapped AAA’s shoulder and said "Salamat" (Thank [y]ou).
AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed through
(sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the
moon, that it was their (sic) neighbor accused-appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear,
AAA immediately closed the door because she thought that accused-appellant might go (sic) back
and kill her. AAA later learned that accused-appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen
to enter the small barn. AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty for the crime of rape
RULING: Yes, appellant Aurelio Jastiva is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of simple rape and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Relative to the award of damages, the RTC correctly awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages, and is obligatory upon conviction of rape. As to moral damages, it is automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof, for it is assumed that they suffered moral
injuries entitling them to such award. Similarly, the Court of Appeals fittingly imposed interest
on all damages awarded to AAA, the private offended party, at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of the finality of this Court's decision in conformity with present
jurisprudence.
This Court notes, however, that both the RTC and Court of Appeals overlooked the award of
exemplary damages. Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages can be awarded even in the
absence of an aggravating circumstance if the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Thus, this Court deems it necessary to
modify the civil liability of appellant Jastiva to include exemplary damages for the vindication of
the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by AAA, a woman of advanced age, and to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the elderly, and to protect the latter from
sexual assaults.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICKY ARGUTA alias "JOEL" and WILSON CAHIPE
alias "SIWIT,"
G.R. No. 213216 April 20, 2015
FACTS: On December 5, 1996, around 8 o'clock in the evening, AAA was instructed by her father
to fetch her sister in school. However, AAA failed to find her sister and decided to go back home.
On her way home, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her with a bladed weapon,
dragged her to a cottage at a nearby beach resort, and bound her hands and feet. Thereafter, they
removed her clothes and placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped her. Thereafter,
accused-appellants left AAA at the cottage. An hour later, Cahipe returned and dragged AAA to
a store owned by a certain Lino Ostero7 (Ostero). There Cahipe undressed her again, mounted
her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, AAA was returned to the cottage. The
next day, AAA's father found her crying at the cottage.
Further, the prosecution offered the findings of the physical examination by a certain Dr. Eilleen
Colaba on AAA, stating, inter alia, that: (a) AAA's genitalia was grossly normal, which means no
abnormality; (b) AAA has complete healed hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock
positions and a partially healed hymenal laceration at the 12 o'clock position; and (c) AAA's
genitalia is negative for the presence of spermatozoa.
In their defense, accused-appellants both denied the accusations leveled against them, and
offered their respective alibis. Cahipe claimed that on the date and time of the alleged incident he
was minding Ostero's store. On the other hand, Arguta averred that he was at Ostero' s house
watching television during the time that the incident supposedly occurred. They both asserted
that they did not know why AAA would accuse them of raping her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Accused-appellants are guilty for the crime of rape
RULING: Yes, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the
victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve
(12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed either with
the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape,
necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty.
In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument
and tied her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds
that force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's
objective is accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not
becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and
judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that something will happen to her should she
resist her assailant's advances. In this regard, case law provides that the act of holding a bladed
instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the
victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by
the courts a quo that accused-appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use
of a deadly weapon, as the same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the
assessment and findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive
and binding to the Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence, as in this case. Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed
by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only
appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION,
MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, and MOISES
ALQUIZOLA
G.R. No. 183652 February 25, 2015
FACTS: On March 25, 2004, AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. That night, she
and friends, including the accused, went to Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, for
a celebration. The group engaged in a drinking session, during which AAA became heavily
intoxicated. She was later transported to Alquizola Lodging House, where Carampatana and
Oporto allegedly raped her, and Alquizola molested her. A medical examination confirmed
sexual assault. The accused, however, contended that the sexual activity was consensual and
brought witnesses to support their claim. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto for rape,
and Alquizola as an accomplice, but acquitted others involved. The CA reversed this decision,
acquitting the accused due to lack of evidence proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the accused based on the
premise of consensual sex despite AAA’s testimony?
RULING: Yes, The Supreme Court reversed the CA’s acquittal, finding the accused guilty of four
counts of rape. It was highlighted that the CA relied solely on the defense’s evidence,
disregarding AAA’s testimony and the RTC’s findings. The SC emphasized that the victim’s state
of intoxication rendered her incapable of consent, and her immediate report of the incident
negates the presumption of consensual sex. It further established the presence of a conspiracy
among the accused based on their coordinated actions. The SC sentenced Carampatana and
Alquizola to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, and Oporto, being a minor at the time,
received a lower sentence but with consideration for his minority status. The accused were also
ordered to pay damages to AAA.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN
G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011
FACTS: Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. Accused-appellant was armed with
lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal,
thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000. That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her
incurring serious physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless
situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused- appellant is guilty for the crime of murder and rape?
RULING: Yes, The March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal ₱75,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as actual damages and ₱30,000 as
exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of ₱50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO
G.R. No. 184926 April 11, 2012
FACTS: Marita a five-year-old minor was found in the abandoned house. Her body was covered
with blue and yellow sack. When she was found her body was black and blue and bloody. She
was tortured and strangled till death.
Marita was playing outside their house and it was noon when her mother realized that she wasn’t
around. Her mother Julia then called her husband who is then working in Pasig City. Her
husband came about 2 pm and they both searched for Marita until 11 pm inquiring from house
to house in the vicinity.
The following day his father made a report that she was missing and her mother out of
desperation sought out a clairvoyant’s help, according to the clairvoyant they could find her
daughter in an abandoned house about five structures away from their own house.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovy Solidum, who
indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped and killed Marita. The police thus
arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villaflores is guilty for the crime of rape with homicide.
RULING: Yes, We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista
and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on
July 2, 1999,28 leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house about
6 houses away from the victim’s house.29 Secondly, Marita went missing after that and remained
missing until the discovery of her lifeless body on the following day.30 Thirdly, Solidum passed
by Villaflores’ house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning
(umuungol) of a child coming from inside.31 Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum
saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and
going towards the abandoned house where the child’s lifeless body was later found. 32 Fifthly,
Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the
head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body;33 Manito also
mentioned that a blue sack covered her body. 34 Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the
abandoned house where Marita’s body was found and Villaflores’ house, because his house had
a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other
houses.35 This indicated Villaflores’ familiarity and access to the abandoned house. Seventhly,
several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the white rope around the
victim’s neck and the yellow sack, were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope
tied to the door of his house,36 and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.37 Eighthly,
the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation,
which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries
including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained
multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and
periurethral smears taken from her body tested positive for spermatozoa.38 And, tenthly, the body
of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver
at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed
that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us a moral
certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE BRONIOLA @ "ASOT"
G.R. No. 211027 June 29, 2015
FACTS: This case is an appeal on the decision rendered by the CA in its decision dated Sept. 24,
2013.
On February 28, 2000, at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Alfredo Abag (Abag), a resident of Sitio
Kabanatian, Bgy. Tumanding, was on his way home bringing some "Taiwan" fish to sell when he
met the appellant at a shortcut road passable only to people and animals. He noticed that
appellant had scratches on his face and his hand was holding a lagaraw (bolo) with blood on it.
Appellant asked for the price of the fish but he did not buy and just left. From what he had
observed, appellant was restless and uneasy.
Meanwhile, AAA’s father, BBB, reported to the barangay authorities that his daughter was
missing. In the morning of February 29, 2000, he, together with Abag and two barangay officials,
began to search for AAA. They found her already dead, lying on a grassy area near a farm hut
owned by Jhonefer Q. Darantianao. AAA’s body bore several hack wounds, blood oozed from
her mouth, her one hand and one finger were cut off. He knows appellant because they are
neighbors. Their families had a rift because appellant’s father was killed by his son-in-law, Lito
Miguel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and the CA was correct to find the accused guilty for the crime
of rape with homicide.
RULING: Yes, we concur with the CA and RTC.
The RTC and CA found the following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution as
sufficient for the conviction of appellant: First, witness Abag met the appellant on a shortcut road
near the place where AAA’s dead body was found, at about the same time (5:30 p.m.) AAA went
missing as she failed to return home that day, February 28, 2000; Second, appellant had scratches
on his face and he was holding a lagaraw a type of bolo used in the rural areas, which was stained
with blood, and he was restless and uneasy; Third, in the morning of the following day, February
29, 2000, AAA’s lifeless body was found with several hack wounds inflicted on her face, neck and
extremities, one hand and one finger were totally severed; Forth. The post-mortem examination
conducted by Dr. Edu confirmed that AAA died from loss of blood due to multiple hack wounds,
her underwear was blood-stained, she had hymenal lacerations and a whitish discharge was
found in her vagina; Fifth, appellant had the motive to commit the crime against AAA
considering that it was BBB’s son-in-law, Lito Miguel, who killed appellant’s father; and Sixth,
appellant was evasive when being questioned on his knowledge of the identity of his father’s
killer and the latter’s relationship to the family of AAA, and the amicable settlement executed by
his mother in behalf of appellant’s family.
Considering all the circumstances mentioned and in light of previous rulings, we are satisfied
that the evidence adduced against appellant constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the one fair
and reasonable conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime. It is doctrinal that the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. This was
adequately established in the case at bar.
103. People vs. Jojie Suansing; G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013
Facts:
Jojie Suansing stood accused of raping “AAA,” a woman suffering from mental
retardation. Prior to April 8, 2001, Suansing's sister, "GGG," tasked "FFF," a friend of the victim,
to retrieve an electric fan and a transformer from Suansing's boarding house. Accompanied by
her brother and "AAA," they complied with the request. Upon completion, Suansing directed
"FFF" and her brother to leave "AAA" behind. Concerned, "GGG" urged "FFF" to return for
"AAA." Upon their return to the boarding house, they found the door closed. "AAA" eventually
emerged, adjusting her clothing. When questioned, "AAA" disclosed that Suansing had forcibly
raped her after "FFF"and her brother had left. Subsequently, on August 3, 2001, "EEE," the victim's
guardian, discovered the assault and reported it to authorities. Medical examinations confirmed
old hymenal lacerations and revealed "AAA's" mental retardation, assessed as having a mental
age of a 9 to 12-year-old child. Suansing denied the allegations, asserting they stemmed from
familial disputes. Despite his defense, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found him guilty, noting
his awareness of "AAA's" condition and the absence of consent due to her mental state. However,
the RTC did not consider "AAA's" mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance for the death
penalty due to its absence in the Amended Information, sentencing Suansing to reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision, adjusting the
awards for civil indemnity and moral damages. Suansing subsequently appealed for exoneration.
Issues:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA gravely erred in convicting Suansing despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts, finding the evidence sufficient to
establish the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It emphasized that rape of a mentally
retarded person constitutes rape since such individuals are incapable of giving consent. Despite
the absence of fresh lacerations, "AAA’s" testimony of sexual intercourse was deemed credible.
The Court also upheld the aggravating circumstance that the appellant knew of "AAA’s" mental
disability, which qualified the crime as rape under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
However, due to the prohibition of the death penalty, the appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. The Court increased the amounts of civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded to "AAA" and ordered the appellant to pay exemplary damages. All
damages awarded would accrue interest at 6% per annum until fully paid.
104. People vs. Cataytay; G.R, No. 196315, October 22, 2014
Facts:
The case involves the appeal of accused-appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano against his
conviction for the crime of rape. The incident allegedly occurred on September 7, 2003, in
Mandaluyong City. The victim, AAA, a 19-year-old with a mental age of a 5-year-old, accused
Cataytay of raping her. During the trial, AAA's mother, BBB, testified that Cataytay was their
neighbor and a shoe repairman. BBB left AAA in their house to look for her youngest daughter
and when she returned, she was informed by a neighbor that there was a problem. AAA told BBB
that she was raped and pointed to Cataytay as the perpetrator. AAA later narrated the details of
the rape to barangay officials. Psychological evaluation reports confirmed AAA's mental capacity
and her birth certificate confirmed her age at the time of the incident. Cataytay presented his
testimony and that of his brother and a neighbor, denying the allegations and claiming he was
illegally arrested.

Issue:
1. Whether BBB's testimony regarding AAA's narration of the rape is hearsay and lacks
probative value.
2. Whether AAA's mental condition makes her easily influenced.
3. Whether Cataytay's defense of alibi is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed Cataytay's conviction for rape but modified the damages awarded.
The Court agreed that BBB's testimony on the details of the rape was hearsay but found no reason
to disturb the trial court's findings. The Court emphasized that AAA's testimony, despite lacking
certain details, was credible and convincing, especially considering her mental incapacity. The
Court also noted the corroborating evidence, such as the report of the medico-legal officer and
the stipulation regarding AAA's mental capacity. The Court rejected Cataytay's defense of alibi,
as his presence in the immediate vicinity of the crime was established. The Court affirmed the
trial court's decision and imposed the penalty of imprisonment for 20 years and one day to 40
years, as well as ordering Cataytay to pay moral and exemplary damages. The Court ruled that
BBB's testimony regarding AAA's narration of the rape is hearsay and lacks probative value.
However, the Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's findings because AAA's
testimony, despite lacking certain details, was credible and convincing. The Court emphasized
that AAA's mental incapacity should be taken into consideration in evaluating her testimony. The
Court also considered the corroborating evidence, such as the report of the medico-legal officer
and the stipulation regarding AAA's mental capacity, which further supported her credibility.
The Court rejected Cataytay's defense of alibi, as his presence in the immediate vicinity of the
crime was established. The Court emphasized that denial and alibi are weak defenses compared
to the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness. The Court found no reason to
disturb the trial court's findings and affirmed Cataytay's conviction for rape.
105. People vs. Nerio; G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015
Facts:
AAA, a child with special needs, was born on April 15, 1990 and was adopted by Kathlene and
Rick. In the afternoon of February 26, 2003, Kathlene was working in the school canteen of Aplaya
Elementary School when she noticed that AAA, who was enrolled at the same school, was
missing. Thinking that AAA just went to her cousin’s house near school, Kathlene did not worry
until after school hours when AAA was still nowhere to be found. She then went to look for her
child, and when she was unsuccessful, she went to the police to have the incident placed in the
blotter. Rick likewise looked for AAA, and he was told that his daughter was seen boarding a
minibus with a group of people who just had a picnic at the beach. Together with their neighbor,
Rosaliah, Rick and Kathlene proceeded to Matanao, Davao del Sur, after learning that the minibus
was Matabao-bound. With the assistance of the police, they were able to find the owner of the
minibus who told them that he indeed saw AAA inside his bus. The charterer of the minibus,
Arthur Lucero, informed them that AAA went to the house of the Nerios in Blocon, Magsaysay,
Davao del Sur. When Lucero knocked, it was the mother of the accused-appellant, Violeta, who
opened the door. When Kathlene asked about her daughter, Violeta told her that AAA was
sleeping upstairs. But when Kathlene started climbing the stairs, Violeta immediately corrected
herself and said that AAA was, in fact, sleeping on the ground floor. Still, Kathlene proceeded
and upon seeing a room with the door left ajar, she went inside. To her dismay, she saw her
daughter scantily clad sleeping beside a half-naked Nerio, with her head resting on the latter’s
shoulder. They took AAA and proceeded to the Matanao Police Station to report the incident
before finally returning home to Digos. On February 28, Dr. Arthur Navidad examined AAA and
found a hymenal laceration at eleven (11) o’clock position, which appeared fresh and could not
have occurred more than three (3) days from the date he examined AAA.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. It is settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape as she is in
the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. The term “deprived of
reason” has been construed to encompass those who are suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency, or retardation. Carnal knowledge of a woman above twelve (12) years of age but with
the mental age of a child below twelve (12) years, even if she agrees to the same, is rape because
a mental retardate cannot give a valid and intelligent consent to such act. Contrary to the defense,
the prosecution was able to establish that AAA is indeed a special child. In fact, Nerio himself
said in his direct testimony that he and his family had known from the start that AAA is a special
child. At the time of the incident, AAA was already in her sixth year as a Grade 1 pupil. According
to Kathlene, she first noticed that her adopted child was mentally challenged when the latter was
merely six (6) years old. Dr. Navidad observed that when he was about to conduct the physical
examination, AAA, a thirteen-year-old, acted more like a small child. Lastly, the lower court
observed that while in court and seated next to Kathlene, AAA would bury her head on the lap
of her mother and would make unnecessary and imperceptible sounds. Here, AAA was not
presented to testify in court because she was declared unfit to fully discharge the functions of a
credible witness. The psychologist who examined her found that her answers reveal a low
intellectual sphere, poor insight, and lack of real capacity to deal with matters rationally. She
could hardly even understand simple instructions. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
who were not shown to have any malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively identified Nerio
as the person seen alone with AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003. AAA, who was
only in a sando and panties, had her head on the shoulder of Nerio, who was naked and only had
a blanket covering the lower portion of his body. Although Nerio denied this because he allegedly
slept downstairs, while AAA slept with his mother and sisters upstairs, his testimony is
inconsistent with that of his mother, who testified that AAA and Nerio actually slept in one (1)
room, but she lay between the two. Further, Dr. Navidad found a fresh hymenal laceration on
AAA’s genitals. He explained it could not have been inflicted more than three (3) days from the
date he examined AAA. There was likewise no showing that AAA met with another man during
that three-day-period. Hence, the courts below did not err when they held that these pertinent
circumstanced proven during the trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion
that Nerio had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent.
106. People vs. Jerry Obogne; G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
Facts:
The RTC and CA convicted accused of the crime of simple rape. AAA" recalled that while
she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him because he would give her a
sugar cane. Appellant brought AAA to his house and while inside, ‘he removed her panty, and
then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and
then he gave it to her and then she went home.Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the
crime of rape m an Information that reads as follows: That on or about the 29th day of July 2002,
in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of "AAA", a 12-year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the
said "AAA".
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of simple rape.
Ruling:
Yes. As held in People v. Limio: By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental
retardate does not call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender
of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution. For
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with the qualifying circumstance of ‘(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance,
which must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant
for qualified rape under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may
be held liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
107. People vs. Michael Joson, G.R. No. 206393
Facts:
AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the
morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellant’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant
undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After
undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into
her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA
crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what
happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same
date, AAA related to appellant’s wife the rape incident.6And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied
by her father, reported the incident to the police and she executed a sworn statement detailing
the rape Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to
prove that she was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape.
Ruling:
Yes. AAA’s testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively
identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and
intimidation to satisfy his lust. The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or
violence that is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or
irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties’
relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the
element of force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim
is an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender age. In the case at
bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape.
It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the
tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime
of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any form of
resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as it is
present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible
is beside the point.
108. People vs. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013
Facts:
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused Vicente Candellada and his deceased
first wife. AAA lived with accused-appellant and the latter’s second wife, while AAA’s two
sisters lived with accused-appellant’s mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-
appellant impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-appellant
brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Cadellada approached a certain Gemina and asked
permission if he could stay at Gemina’s old house with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as
his wife. Gemina and her husband agreed. While they were staying at Gemina’s old house,
accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA many times, but AAA could only remember eight
specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2, 2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004;
November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004; and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what
"intercourse" meant, AAA stated that Candellada inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA further
testified that she consistently resisted Candellada’s bestial acts but he threatened to stab her with
a knife. Lastly, AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Gemina’s help on September
24, 2004, but the baby died four days later. On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made
amorous advances on AAA. AAA refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He
mauled AAA and hit her head with a piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious. Gemina,
who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Captain and
civilian volunteers arrested the accused-appellant. Thus he was not able to consummate his
attempt to have intercourse with AAA.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC.

Ruling:
No. Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended: ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1)By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived
of reason or is otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements
of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to warrant
the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under eighteen
years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. In resolving rape cases, primordial
consideration is given to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The settled rule is that the trial
court's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great
weight and respect, and at times, even finality. What is important is that AAA had categorically
testified that on eight specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife,
successfully had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina. It is
noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats to AAA,
accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close kin, such
as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the
place of violence or intimidation. With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already
established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
109.
People v. Cial y Lorena
G.R. No. 191362 | October 9, 2013
FACTS:
"AAA" is one of the six children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC" died, "BBB" cohabited
with appellant. Appellant and "BBB" have two (2) children. In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13)
years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family and appellant in Quezon
Province.
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to the bedroom inside
their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAA's" shorts and panty and spread her legs.
Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girl's vagina.
"AAA" felt intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist.
After satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the
incident to anyone. At that time, "AAA's" maternal grandmother was in the house but was
unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But "AAA's" mother did
not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her maternal uncle's house. There, she
disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother's siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered
by appellant's wrongdoing. But nonetheless her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when
appellant fetched her. For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and went to the
house of her aunt. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan,
Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial issued a
Medico-Legal Report. The negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means that the
victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during
puberty. The easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer a
virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the private part
of a virgin as she would have suffered pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the victim's
genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost
four months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.
On April 7, 2003, "AAA" and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women at
Gumaca, Quezon. "AAA" was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside therein at
the time of her testimony. Appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated "AAA" as his
own daughter. He also claimed that "AAA's" aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called
her a thief.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape o Credence to the testimony
of "AAA" especially considering that the same is corroborated by the medical findings.
Qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be present.
CA: affirmed qualified rape but with modifications as to the damages.
Disregarded appellant's contention that he could not have raped "AAA" in the presence of
"AAA's" grandmother as "lust is no respecter of time and place."
Prosecution satisfactorily established "AAA's" minority as well as the qualifying circumstance of
relationship, appellant being the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother.
Appellant argues:
If he indeed raped "AAA" in the manner that she narrated, it would be improbable for "AAA's"
maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same.
It was illogical for "AAA's" uncle to allow "AAA" to return home after learning about the alleged
rape incident.
The examining physician was unsure as to what actually caused "AAA's" hymenal lacerations.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape.
2. Whether or not the trial court qualifying the charge of rape.

HELD:
1. NO.
Appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it lent to the testimony
of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great respect to the factual findings
of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA.
It would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age when she testified in
court.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story.
We are not persuaded by appellant's argument that if he indeed raped "AAA" inside their house,
then "AAA's" maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled jurisprudence that
rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. Thus, the presence of "AAA's"
grandmother would not negate the commission of the rape; neither would it prove appellant's
innocence.
An examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and
on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location
of the wounds. In any case, a medical examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a rape
charge. In fact, an accused's conviction for rape may be anchored solely on the testimony of the
victim. At best, the medical examination would only serve as corroborative evidence. Dr. Imperial
found, among others, that "AAA" suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and
nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish the
cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how these
hymenal lacerations were inflicted on "AAA."
2. YES.
Qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like the crime itself. In
this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of the
crime of simple rape. o The prosecution failed to prove the minority of "AAA"
In its Formal Offer of Evidence, the prosecution mentioned "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. Also
attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit "B" is "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth
showing that "AAA" was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that
the said Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of the case.
During the March 28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it will be
presenting "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order dated June 27, 2006,
the trial court reset the hearing of the case to allow the prosecution to present evidence with
respect to "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its case,
nobody was presented to testify on "AAA's" Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that the
prosecution presented only "AAA" and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never testified
on "AAA's" age. On the other hand, "AAA" even testified on the witness stand that she does not
know her age.
Prosecution likewise miserably failed to establish "AAA's" relationship with the appellant.
Although the Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother,
"AAA"' referred to appellant as her step-father.
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of "AAA's"
mother as well as the step-father of "AAA". Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its
reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it
reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of "AAA's" mother or that
"AAA" is his step-daughter.
The terms "common-law husband" and "step-father" have different legal connotations. For
appellant to be a step-father to "AAA," he must be legally married to "AAA's" mother.
110.
People vs. Lucena y Velasquez
G.R. No. 190632| February 26, 2014
FACTS:
The case involves the appellant, Manolito Lucena y Velasquez, also known as "Machete," who
was charged with three counts of rape against AAA. The incidents occurred on April 28, 2003,
when the appellant, who was a barangay tanod volunteer, along with another barangay tanod,
approached AAA and her friends, claiming they were violating curfew. AAA's friends managed
to escape, leaving her alone with the appellant. The appellant ordered AAA to board a tricycle
and took her to a bridge in San Dionisio, where he threatened her with a gun and raped her three
times. He also threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. The following day,
AAA sought assistance from a barangay kagawad and filed a complaint against the appellant.

ISSUE:
The main issue in the case is whether the appellant is guilty of three counts of rape.

HELD:
The court ruled that the appellant is guilty of three counts of rape.

The court held that the appellant's guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. It rejected the appellant's defenses of denial and alibi, considering them weak and
inconsistent with AAA's positive identification of the appellant as her rapist. The court also found
that the appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. The court noted that the appellant did not show any ill-motive
on the part of AAA to testify falsely against him. The court affirmed the appellant's conviction
for three counts of rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
111.
Garingarao v. People
G.R. No. 192760 | July 20, 2011
DOCTRINE:
In case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is sufficient
to establish the guilt of the accused. A child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the
child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. It is
inconsequential that sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3 (b) of RA 7610
provides that the abuse may be habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only
once is enough to hold the accused liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.

FACTS:
AAA, 16 years of age, was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center by her father BBB and
mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain. AAA was admitted at the hospital for further
observation. The next day, her father and mother left the hospital to process AAA’s Medicare
papers and to attend to their store, respectively, leaving AAA alone in her room. When her father
returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home. The doctor allowed them
due to AAA’s insistence but instructed her that she should continue her medications. At home,
AAA told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They went back to the hospital and
reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They inquired from the nurses’ station and learned that
Garingarao was the nurse on duty on that day.
An Information was filed against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610.
During the trial, AAA testified that, Garingarao, entered her room to check her medications and
if she was still experiencing pains. Garingarao lifted AAA’s bra and touched her left breast and
insisted that he was only examining her. Garingarao also slid his finger inside AAA’s private part
and only stopped when he saw that AAA really had her monthly period.
In his defense, the accused testified that he went inside AAA’s room to administer her medicines
and check her vital signs. Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case was motivated by the
argument he had with AAA’s father about the administering of medicines. He was supported by
the testimony of the nursing aide, Tamayo. Garingarao further alleged that, assuming the charges
were correct, there was only one incident when he allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should
have been convicted only of acts of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610. The RTC found
Garingarao guilty as charged and gave credence to the testimony of AAA over Garingarao’s
denial, which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the single incident of act of lasciviousness would suffice to hold the accused liable
under RA 7610,
HELD:
YES. The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended
party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is a settled rule that denial is
a weak defense as against the positive identification by the victim. Both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible witness.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, lascivious
conduct is defined as follows:
The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAA’s breasts and inserted his
finger into her private part for his sexual gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse
by pretending that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing. Garingarao
persisted on what he was doing despite AAA’s objections. AAA twice asked Garingarao what he
was doing and he answered that he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when the child is the
victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In lascivious conduct
under the coercion or influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion equivalent
to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free will. In this case,
Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was
examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were true, he
should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610 because the incident happened only once.
Garingarao alleges that the single incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610.
This argument has no legal basis. The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual
abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be
habitual or not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is enough to hold Garingarao
liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610. The Court finds Jojit Garingarao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
112.
People v. Dulay y Pascual
GR. No. 193854 | September 24, 2012
FACTS:
On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused during the wake of a relative of AAA.
Thereafter, the accused convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio,
Paranaque City. However, before they went to the wake, they went to look for the boyfriend of
the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were they found the boyfriend of the accused. They
proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the
accused suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man known only as “Speed” was waiting.
AAA saw “Speed” give the accused some money, then the latter left. “Speed” wielded a knife
and tied AAA’s hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she saw
the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the
rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would
get back at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and mother filed a complaint for Rape.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation for the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a co-principal for the crime of Rape.

HELD:
NO, in order to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate
in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
The Supreme Court held that the accused did not participate in the criminal resolution of the
crime of Rape but merely delivered AAA to “Speed.” Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant
convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped
AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and
offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even
AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end
up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of
rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was
delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
However, the accused is still liable for violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or the Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act or a) Those who
engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to,
the following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph
(a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution; 2. the act is done
through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution;
f. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
g. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
113.
Bongalon v. People of the Philippines
G.R. no. 169533 | March 20,2013
FACTS:
Dates
1. May 11, 2000 – Date when the crime happened.
2. June 26, 2000 – The Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the Petitioner, George
Bongalon in the Regional Trial Court with Child Abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610.
3. June 22, 2005 – The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for the
crime of Child Abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610

Place:
Evening Procession for Sto. Nino at Oro Site, Legazpi City

The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2000, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson), 12 years of age and
Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Sto. Nino at Oro Site
in Legazpi City. When the procession passed in front of the house of the petitioner, the petitioner’s
daughter, Mary Anne Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him sissy. The
petitioner confronted the two brothers and called them “strangers” and “animals” and struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped his face. He also went to the house of the two
brothers and challenged their father, Rolando Dela Cruz to a fight, but Rolando refused to engage
to a fight with the petitioner. Rolando brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident. Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training
and Teaching Hospital and the doctors who examined him testified that he suffered contusions.

George Bongalon on the other hand, denied that he physically abused and maltreated Jayson and
explained that he only confronted them after Mary Anne Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor
daughters had told him about Jayson and Roldan throwing stones at them and about Jayson
burning Cherrylyn’s hair. Mary Anne Rose corroborated his father’s testimony by testifying that
her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her
daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair.
Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it
was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the
petitioner as a loving and protective father.
The RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of child abuse, an act
in violation of R.A no. 7610. The Court of Appeals (CA) has affirmed the conviction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner be convicted for the crime of child abuse even if he only acted to
protect her two minor daughters.

HELD:
The Supreme Court at bar disagrees with the holding of the RTC and Court of Appeals that the
petitioner’s acts constituted child abuse. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that Bongalon’s laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to demean, debase, and degrade
the latters intrinsic worth and dignity as a child. It was shown through the records that the
petitioner’s laying of hands was out of outburst of anger, indicative of fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own two minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of
Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of self-control, he lacked specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. Thus, the Supreme Court enters new
judgment finding the petitioner George Bongalon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
slight physical injuries under Paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code.
114.
Felina Rosaldes v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988 | October 8, 2014
FACTS:
The petitioner Felina Rosaldes, a public schoolteacher, was charged and found guilty of child
abuse punished under RA 7610.
It appears from the records that seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil, was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knew of his teacher, herein
petitioner, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Petitioner asked Michael to apologize, the
latter, however, proceeded instead to his seat. Petitioner then pinched Michael on his thigh, held
him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor causing him to hit a desk and, consequently,
losing his consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor.
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael
to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity and
avers that her maltreatment is only an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher could
reasonably do towards the development of the child.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner guilty of the crime of child abuse punishable under RA 7610.

HELD:
YES, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610. Although the petitioner, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical
injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse:
xxxx
(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual
or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such
 as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by
deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The physical pain experienced by the victim had
been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out
of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again. Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity
of Michael Ryan as a human being.
Hence, petitioner Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse punished under RA 7610.