Cuevas vs achacoso

The case involves the probate of a will where the main issue is whether the signatures of the instrumental witnesses
were sufficient to attest to the due execution of the will, and the court ruled in favor of the validity of the will.

G.R. No. L-3497 May 18, 1951

THE MATTER OF THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF JOSE VENZON. VALENTINA CUEVAS, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
PILAR ACHACOSO, oppositor-appellant.

Facts:

 The case involves the probate of the last will and testament of Jose Venzon.
 Valentina Cuevas, the widow of Jose Venzon, filed a petition for the probate of the will.
 Pilar Achacoso, another potential heir, filed an alternative petition for the probate of a previous will executed by
Jose Venzon.
 Pilar Achacoso objected to the probate of the second will, claiming that it lacked an attestation clause or that
the attestation clause was not properly signed by the instrumental witnesses.
 The attestation clause in question stated that the will was signed by Jose Venzon in the presence of three
witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal.
 The clause appeared to be an attestation made by the testator himself rather than the witnesses.

Issue:

 Whether the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses under the testator's signature were sufficient to
attest to the due execution of the will.

Ruling:

 The court ruled that the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses under the testator's signature were
sufficient to attest to the due execution of the will.
 The court affirmed the validity of the will and ordered its admission to probate.
 An instrumental witness does not merely attest to the signature of the testator but also to the proper execution
of the will.
 The fact that the witnesses signed the will immediately under the testator's signature showed that they attested
to the genuineness of his signature and the due execution of the will as stated in the attestation clause.
 The court cited a similar case, Aldaba vs. Roque, where the attestation clause was signed by the testatrix herself.
In that case, the court held that the signatures of the witnesses along with the testatrix were sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the law on wills.
 The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to prevent fraud and ensure the truth and
authenticity of the will.
 The laws on wills should be interpreted in a way that attains these ends without unnecessarily curbing the right
to make a will.

Dischoso vs. Gorostiza

The case of Ticson v. Gorostiza revolves around the validity of a will's attestation clause, with the court ultimately
ruling that the clause is legally sufficient and upholding the will's probate, despite the absence of explicit mention of
the testatrix signing every page.

Estate of the deceased Caridad Alcantara de Gorostiza.

CONSORCIA DICHOSO DE TICSON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MARINO DE GOROSTIZA, oppositor-appellee.

Ramon Diokno for appellant.

Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellee.

Facts:

 The case involves the determination of whether an attestation clause in a will is fatally defective for failing to
state that the testatrix signed every page of the will.

 The attestation clause in question stated that the testatrix had signed the will consisting of two pages in the
presence of the witnesses, but did not explicitly mention that she signed every page.

 The trial court denied probate of the will based on this defect in the attestation clause.
Issue:

 Whether the attestation clause is fatally defective and therefore invalidates the will, or if it conforms to the law
and allows the court to uphold the will.

Ruling:

 The attestation clause is not fatally defective and the will is valid.

 Ratio:

 The interpretation put forth by the appellant, that "hereinabove" referred to the signatures on the margin of
each page, was rejected by the court.

 The court also rejected the appellant's interpretation that the word "same" in the attestation clause referred to
the pages of the will rather than the will itself.

 The court determined that the word "same" in the attestation clause referred to the foregoing will consisting of
two pages, implying that the testatrix signed both the will and every page thereof.

 The court found this interpretation to be neither forced nor illogical.

 While precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable, it is not necessary to strictly
adhere to the exact wording of the statute.

 As long as it can reasonably be deduced from the language employed that the attestation clause fulfills the
requirements of the law, it is considered legally sufficient.

 The court also considered the fact that the will itself showed that the testatrix and the witnesses signed on the
left-hand margin of each page, as well as at the end of the attestation clause.

 The attestation clause was deemed to be a part of the will and closely adhered to the law of wills.

 Legalistic formalities should not be allowed to frustrate the wishes of deceased persons expressed in their
testaments, especially when there is no hint of bad faith or fraud.

 In this case, the court found the attestation clause to be legally sufficient and ordered the admission of the will
to probate.

Gan vs. Yap

A husband opposes the probate of his deceased wife's holographic will, leading to a court ruling that testimonial
evidence alone is insufficient to prove the authenticity of a holographic will without the actual document.

Facts:

 The case involves the estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, who died in 1951.
 Fausto E. Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
 Ildefonso Yap, the surviving husband, opposed the petition, claiming that no will was left by the deceased.
 Witnesses testified that they saw and read the holographic will, and that the deceased had confided in them
about her desire to make a will and executed it in their presence.
 The trial judge refused to probate the alleged will, citing inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies, the
deceased's desire to keep the will a secret from her husband, and the lack of evidence to prove the authenticity
of the will.

Issue:

 Whether or not the holographic will should be probated.

Ruling:

 The holographic will should not be probated.

Ratio:

 The execution and contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will cannot be proved solely by the testimony of
witnesses.
 Holographic wills do not require witnesses, but they must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the testator.
  The law regards the holographic will itself as the primary evidence of authenticity.
 Testimonial evidence can be used to prove the authenticity of ordinary wills if the original document is lost or
destroyed.
 However, in the case of holographic wills, the handwriting and signature of the testator are the only guarantees
of authenticity.
 Without the actual holographic will, there is no way to prove its authenticity.
 The evidence presented by the petitioner was insufficient to meet the "clear and distinct" proof required for the
probate of a holographic will.
 The court expressed concerns about the feasibility of forgery and the lack of safeguards in proving the
authenticity of holographic wills.
 Therefore, the court affirmed the rejection of the alleged will and denied its probate.

Conclusion:

 The court emphasized the importance of presenting the holographic will itself as material proof of authenticity.
 Testimonial evidence alone is not sufficient to probate a holographic will without the actual document.
 The court's decision highlights the need for proper safeguards and evidence in proving the authenticity of
holographic wills.

Azoala vs. Singson

In the case of Azaola v. Singson, the Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of a holographic will is not mandatory, and ordered a new trial to determine the
authenticity of the will.

Facts:

The case of Azaola v. Singson involves the probate of a holographic will of Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance, who
passed away in Quezon City. The petitioner, Federico Azaola, submitted the holographic will, which named Maria
Milagros Azaola as the sole heir. Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will one month before the testatrix's death
and recognized all the signatures as the handwriting of the testatrix. However, the probate was denied because the lone
witness presented by Azaola did not sufficiently prove that the body of the will was written in the testatrix's handwriting.
The opposition to the probate claimed that the will was executed under undue influence and that the testatrix did not
seriously intend it to be her last will.

Issue:

whether the requirement of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will is
mandatory.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a
holographic will is not mandatory.

The Court based its decision on Article 811 of the Civil Code, which states that the proponent of a holographic
will is not required to produce more than one witness if the authenticity of the will is not contested. Even if the
authenticity is contested, the Court interpreted Article 811 as not mandatorily requiring the production of three
witnesses. The Court reasoned that since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, the
existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is beyond the control of the proponent. Therefore, it would
be unfair to impose a strict requirement of three witnesses.

The Court also noted that the resort to expert evidence is conditioned on the court deeming it necessary. The
duty of the court is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry to determine the authenticity of the will. In this case, the lone
witness presented by Azaola was not sufficient to prove the authenticity of the will, but the Court recognized that there
may be other means to establish its authenticity, such as expert witnesses. Therefore, the Court ordered a new trial to
allow the parties to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses, if deemed necessary by the court.

River vs IAC et al feb 15, 1990

In the case of Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the court ruled that Jose Rivera was not the legitimate son of
Venancio Rivera and that the holographic wills were valid and admitted to probate.

G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990

JOSE RIVERA petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.

Lorenzo O. Navarro, Jr. for petitioner.

Regalado P. Morales for private respondent.

Facts:

The case of Rivera v. Intermediate Appellate Court involves a dispute over the estate of Venancio Rivera, who
passed away in 1975. Jose Rivera claimed to be the only surviving legitimate son of the deceased and filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration over Venancio's estate. However, Adelaido J. Rivera opposed the petition and
asserted that he was the legitimate son of Venancio and that Venancio had left two holographic wills. The two cases
were consolidated and after a joint trial, the trial court found that Jose was not the son of the decedent and that the
holographic wills were valid. This decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Issue:

Whether Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera and therefore entitled to inherit his estate.

Ruling:

The court ruled that Jose Rivera was not the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera and therefore had no claim to his
estate. The holographic wills were found to be valid and admitted to probate.

The court based its decision on the evidence presented. Adelaido J. Rivera presented evidence that Venancio
was married to Maria Jocson and they lived together as husband and wife for many years, begetting seven children.
Adelaido relied on the presumption of marriage, as it was not denied that Venancio and Maria lived together as husband
and wife. On the other hand, Jose presented his parents' marriage certificate, but Venancio was described therein as the
son of Florencio Rivera, not Magno Rivera as indicated in his baptismal certificate. The court considered the baptismal
certificate as evidence to determine Venancio's real identity and found that Jose was not the legitimate son of Venancio.

The court also ruled on the validity of the holographic wills. Jose contested the existence and authenticity of the
holographic wills, but the court held that as a mere stranger to the deceased, he had no standing to contest the wills.
The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills as having been written and signed by
their father, was deemed sufficient. The court found that the holographic wills were valid and admitted them to probate.

The court ruled that Jose Rivera was not the legitimate son of Venancio Rivera and therefore had no claim to his
estate. The holographic wills were found to be valid and admitted to probate. The court based its decision on the
evidence presented, including the presumption of marriage and the baptismal certificate to determine Venancio's real
identity. The court also held that as a stranger to the deceased, Jose had no standing to contest the wills.

Gonzales vs CA 90 SCRA183

The Supreme Court affirms the decision to allow the probate of a will in the case of Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, ruling
that the will was properly executed and witnessed, and dismissing the alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the
witnesses.

Facts:

 Isabel Gabriel executed a5-page will two months prior to her death. Private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private respondent, with her husband
and children, lived with the deceased at the latter's residence prior and up to the time of her death. The will
named private respondent (LUTGARDA SANTIAGO) as universal heir and executor, and gave legacies in specified
amounts to certain persons including the petitioner herein.
 The petition for the probate of the will filed by private respondent was opposed by petitioner. The trial court
disallowed the will on the grounds that the will of the deceased was not executed and attested as required by
law and that the document presented for probate is not the purported will allegedly dictated by the deceased,
executed and signed by her, and attested by the three attesting witnesses.
 Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence, reversed the trial court's
decision and allowed the probate of the will. Hence this petition for review

Issue:

 Whether the three attesting witnesses to the will competent and credible, as required by Article 820 of the Civil
Code?

Ruling:

 YES. The rule that the instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications
under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to
be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first
established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and
upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is
established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies
must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.
  The respondent's omission to introduce prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were
"credible witnesses", that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable is not fatal. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they
merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. The
rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings
are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept
and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much
less has it been shown that anyone of them is below18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot
read or write.
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,

FACTS

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Respondent Lutgarda Santiago, niece of Isabel, filed a petition for
probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog (a
language known to decedent) and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel. The petition was opposed by petitioner
Rizalina Gonzales, also a niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to
her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court.
The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witnesses are first established, his testimony may not be favorably
considered.

Petitioner contends that the term “credible” is not synonymous with “competent” for a witness may be competent
under 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by 805 of the same code. It is further argued that the
term “credible” as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled well-known meaning it has under the Naturalization
Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provision on wills with respect to the qualifications of witnesses

ISSUE

Whether there is a need to introduce proof of the credibility of the witnesses.

RULING

No.

We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a
witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles
state:

Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able
to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The
following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:

1. Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,

2. Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to
his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in
order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his
answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to
the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject
petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.

We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be
given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization
must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are
character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).

In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution
of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the
rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not
applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the
respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has
not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18
years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.

FORMALITIES OF WILLS EXECUTED BY ALIENS IN THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918

In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,

Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.

Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.

Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as guardian,

and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.

FACTS

On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of
Manila, leaving a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as estimated by him,
was P231,800.

This document is an holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This will, therefore, was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
hence could not have been proved under section 618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America;
that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila
Daily Bulletin." Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916, witnesses were examined
relative to the execution of the will; and upon March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted
to probate. At the same time an order was made nominating Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of the
estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire not to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole
administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-
Pickett Rope Company; to his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of
P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster, P65 per
month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to the testator's five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor,
Eleonor and Alberto.

On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered
an appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same
attorneys moved the court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the case. On February 20, 1917,
this motion was denied, and from this action of the trial court the present appeal has been perfected.

ISSUE

The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State
of Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that State.

RULING

Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section reads as follows:

Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which
is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved
and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.

The most reasonable interpretation of the language used in the statute, the words "another state or country" include the
United States and the States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a
rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and
can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section,
being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the effect of limiting the operative
words contained in the body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Illinois, his will was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine Islands, provided the
instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.

It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate of this will does not assert that the testator was
not a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is he was "never a resident of
the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the
Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must be considered that the allegations of the petition on this
point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.

In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the allowance by the court of a will of real or personal
property shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the
testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument
by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. The proof of
all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each and all of them the probate is conclusive.

From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916, was
entirely insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will in question, whether said petition be
considered as an attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a
rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this latter aspect the
petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented within the time allowed by law.

It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed
with costs. So ordered.

Tabuda vs Rosal Nov 5, 1983

G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA
PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of
Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin), respondent. Erasmo M. Diola counsel for petition. Hon. Avelino S. Rosal in his own
behalf
OVERVIEW

This petition seeks a review of the orders issued by the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch III, in Special
Proceedings No. R-1713, regarding the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez, deceased. The court denied the probate of
the will, as well as subsequent motions for reconsideration and the appointment of a special administrator.

FACTS

 The petitioner, Apolonio Taboada, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of
Dorotea Perez with the respondent court. The will, written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect, consisted of two
pages, with testamentary dispositions on the first page and the attestation clause and acknowledgment on
the second page.

 The trial court, after petitioner's compliance with publication requirements and absence of opposition,
commissioned the branch clerk of court to receive evidence. Evidence, including testimony from one of the
subscribing witnesses, Vicente Timkang, was presented to attest to the genuineness and due execution of the
will.

 The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian issued the questioned order denying the probate
of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. The petitioner was also required to submit
names and addresses of intestate heirs.

 Instead of compliance, the petitioner filed a motion requesting time for deliberation and suspension of the
period to submit names and addresses of intestate heirs. He also asked that the ten-day period required by the
court to submit the names of intestate heirs with their addresses be held in abeyance.

 A motion for reconsideration of the probate denial was filed. However, the motion together with the previous
manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer
to his new station at Pasig, Rizal.

 Upon the new judge's assumption of duty, motions for reconsideration and appointment of a special
administrator were denied for failure to comply with the previous order.

ISSUE

For the validity of a formal notarial will, does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the testatrix and all the three
instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?

RULING

 The respondent Judge interprets the above-quoted provision of law to require that, for a notarial will to be valid,
it is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at
the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting witnesses
to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient compliance to
sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.

 On the other hand, the petitioner maintains that Article 805 of the Civil Code does not make it a condition
precedent or a matter of absolute necessity for the extrinsic validity of the wig that the signatures of the
subscribing witnesses should be specifically located at the end of the wig after the signature of the testatrix. He
contends that it would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular location wherein the
signatures are found is consistent with good faith and the honest frailties of human nature.

 We find the petition meritorious.

 Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be subscribed or signed at its end by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by another person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

 It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed Attestation consists in witnessing the
testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the
statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact.

 On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose
of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator.
  Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.

 While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should
be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.

 The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the
law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
will"

 Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the
place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the
will.

 The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary
dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be
the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned
order.

 We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is
discernible from the entire wig that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses.

 As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page
which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page".

 WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby granted. The orders of the respondent court which denied the
probate of tile will, the motion for reconsideration of the denial of probate, and the motion for appointment of a
special administrator are set aside. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to
conduct further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement on costs.

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS,
SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.

FACTS

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus
and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to
the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her
children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will
is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...

The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel
Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased
mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature.
They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is
written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported
holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed
through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix
acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the
time of its execution.

respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he found to
have been duly executed in accordance with law.
, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the
ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.

ISSUE

The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which required the testator to state in his
holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution

RULING

We agree with the petitioner.

The prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith
but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege If a Will has been executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is
sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form
followed by the testator.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills
executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed.There is no
such contingency in this case.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution
nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language
known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix
agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the
holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the
authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.