Locke on Persons and Personal Identity

Ruth Boeker
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Locke on Persons and Personal Identity
Locke on Persons and
Personal Identity
RU T H B O E K E R
Assistant Professor in Philosophy
University College Dublin, Ireland

1
 1
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For my mother
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/01/21, SPi

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements  ix
Preface  xiii
Abbreviations  xvii

1. Introduction  1
1.1 Locke’s Innovative Approach to Debates about Persons and
Personal Identity  1
1.2 Aims and Scope of the Book  7
1.3 Summary of Chapters  8
2. Locke’s Kind-­dependent Approach to Identity  13
2.1 The Principium Individuationis  14
2.2 Identity  18
2.2.1 Names and Ideas of Kind F  22
2.2.2 Specifying Persistence Conditions for Members of Kind F  25
2.3 Identity and Individuation  28
3. Problems with Other Interpretations of Locke’s Account of Identity  29
3.1 Relative Identity, Coincidence, and Absolute Identity  30
3.2 Human Beings, Persons, and Locke’s Metaphysical Agnosticism  38
3.3 Different Senses of Distinctness  40
3.4 Lessons from the Controversy  46
3.5 Other Interpretive Options  48
4. Moral Personhood and Personal Identity  54
4.1 Locke’s Moral Account of Personhood  54
4.2 From Personhood to Personal Identity  70
4.3 Further Reflections on the Moral Dimension  75
5. Consciousness and Same Consciousness  77
5.1 Locke on Consciousness  78
5.2 Locke on Sameness of Consciousness  87
5.2.1 Revival of Past Experiences through Memory  88
5.2.2 Mineness and Appropriation  92
5.2.3 Unity  103
5.2.4 Temporality  111
5.2.5 Locke’s Multiple Aspects Account of Same Consciousness  121
6. Circularity and Insufficiency Worries  124
6.1 Different Versions of Circularity  124
6.2 Butler’s Circularity Objection  126
6.3 Insufficiency Worries  128
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 17/01/21, SPi

viii Table of Contents

7. Locke’s Response to the Problems of his Predecessors  147

7.1 Locke’s Predecessors  148
7.2 Epistemological Problems  150
7.3 Materialism and the Afterlife  152
7.4 Cartesian Views of the Soul  160
7.5 Non-­Cartesian Immaterial Views of the Soul  163
7.6 Human Beings as Unions of Immaterial Souls and
Material Bodies  165
7.7 Locke’s Response  167
8. Personal Identity, Transitivity, and Divine Justice  172
8.1 The Traditional Transitivity Objection  173
8.2 Non-­transitive Interpretations  175
8.3 The Religious Context  182
8.4 Consciousness and Transitivity  188
8.5 Divine Justice and Repentance  195
9. Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs  201
10. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Metaphysical and
Epistemic Differences  207
10.1 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on Perpetually
Thinking Souls  211
10.1.1 Disagreement about Innate Ideas  215
10.1.2 Different Accounts of Consciousness  217
10.1.3 Worry about Individuation  221
10.2 Locke’s Early Critics and Defenders on the Thinking Matter
Hypothesis  224
10.2.1 Disagreement about Essences  226
10.2.2 Disagreement Whether Matter Can Be Active  231
10.2.3 Disagreement about Unity, Simplicity, and Composition  235
10.3 Final Reflections on Metaphysical and Epistemic Differences  244
11. Locke and his Early Critics and Defenders: Moral and Religious
Differences  246
11.1 Criticism of Locke’s Psychological Approach to Personal Identity  249
11.1.1 Shaftesbury’s Criticism  249
11.1.2 Hume’s Criticism  253
11.2 Moral Personhood  259
11.2.1 Shaftesbury on Virtue and Character Development  259
11.2.2 Hume on Selves, Passions, and Sociability  268
11.2.3 Alternatives to Divine Law  277
Concluding Remarks  279

Bibliography  281
Index  297
 Acknowledgements

My research on Locke on persons and personal identity started at the University

of St Andrews where I wrote my PhD dissertation on this topic and since then has
accompanied me as I continued my work on three different continents. I would
not have been able to complete this book project without the support and encour-
agement of my teachers, mentors, colleagues, friends, and family. I owe special
thanks to my PhD supervisors Sarah Broadie and James Harris for their guidance,
support, and feedback on multiple drafts, which helped me to sharpen my philo­
soph­ic­al and historical views. Kenneth Winkler has been a wonderful mentor and
interlocutor ever since I first met him during a research visit at Yale in 2010.
I have learned much from his detailed knowledge of Locke and the early modern
period. I am deeply grateful for all his support and encouragement. I have also
greatly benefited from conversations with Michael Della Rocca at Yale. Martha
Bolton has been very generous with her time and given me many in-­depth com-
ments on drafts of my work during a research visit at Rutgers in 2011 and I am
enormously grateful for all her support since then.
My PhD research was supported by a Carnegie Scholarship from the Carnegie
Trust for the Universities of Scotland, which I gratefully acknowledge.
Additionally, I wish to thank the Thomas and Margaret Roddan Trust for sup-
porting my research visit at Yale in the spring of 2010. I am also grateful to the
Journal of the History of Philosophy for supporting library and manuscript
research at the University of Oxford with a Kristeller-­Popkin Travel Fellowship
in 2015.
I held positions at Bowling Green State University, SUNY Albany, the
University of Melbourne, and University College Dublin while I worked on this
book project. The collegiality of my colleagues has been enormously valuable and
I wish to thank my students and colleagues for many insightful discussions. I owe
special thanks to my department chairs Greg Restall and Francois Schroeter at
the University of Melbourne and my Heads of School Jim O’Shea, Maria
Baghramian, and Brian O’Connor at University College Dublin for supporting
my career development and for enabling me to pursue my research activities in
recent years.
Kathryn Tabb deserves particular mention. She has not only given me very
valuable feedback on my work on several occasions, but also she has helped
organize a workshop at Columbia University where we discussed an earlier ver-
sion of this book project. Her wonderful hospitality greatly contributed to the
success of the event. I am deeply grateful to the participants Patrick Connolly,
x Acknowledgements

Matthew Leisinger, Jorge Morales, Kathryn Tabb, Kenneth Winkler, Joshua Wood,
and Phil Yaure for very stimulating discussions and for their in-­depth feedback
that enormously helped me advance my interpretation of Locke. I have also
greatly benefited from conversations with Patrick Connolly and Matthew
Leisinger at various other early modern conferences and workshops.
Earlier versions of my work have been presented at seminars, workshops, and
conferences hosted at Brown University, CUNY John Jay College, Deakin University,
Eötvös Loránd University, Fordham University, Ghent University, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, King’s College London, Monash University, Radboud
University, Skidmore College, SUNY Albany, Texas A&M University, University
College Dublin, University of Aberdeen, University of Cambridge, University of
East Anglia, University of Exeter, University of Graz, University of Groningen,
University of Massachusetts Amherst, University of Melbourne, University of
Otago, University of Oxford, University of Sheffield, University of Sydney,
University of the West of England, and Yale University. I wish to thank all my
audience members for helpful comments.
Many have helped and encouraged me to develop and advance my philo­soph­
ic­al views over the last couple of years. I especially like to thank Peter Anstey,
Bihotz Barrenechea, Jacqueline Broad, Julia Borcherding, Artem Bourov, Yoon
Choi, Rachel Cohon, Samuel Fleischacker, Jessica Gordon-­Roth, Karen Green,
Katherine Hawley, Julia Jorati, Larry Jorgensen, Jia Kefang, Patricia Kitcher,
Cheryl Koh, Allison Kuklok, Vili Lähteenmäki, Bruce Langtry, Michael LeBuffe,
Martin Lenz, Antonia LoLordo, Christopher Macleod, Marzia Marconi, Edwin
McCann, Daniel Moerner, Victor Nuovo, Katherine O’Donnell, Kenneth Pearce,
Matthew Priselac, Ursula Renz, Samuel Rickless, Marleen Rozemond, Anat
Schechtman, Kelley Schiffman, Ariane Schneck, Lisa Shapiro, Patricia Sheridan,
Alex Silverman, Craig Smith, M. A. Stewart, Patrick Stokes, Galen Strawson,
Matthew Stuart, Udo Thiel, Radka Tomeckova, Anik Waldow, Julie Walsh, Shelley
Weinberg, Peter West, and Gideon Yaffe.
I am also tremendously grateful to OUP’s anonymous readers for reading earl­
ier drafts of my book with great attention to detail and for making many very
helpful and intelligent suggestions for revisions. The book is much better thanks
to their feedback, but, of course, I do not expect all controversies in Locke schol-
arship to be settled and the views expressed in this final version are my own.
Working with Peter Momtchiloff, April Peake, and Rachel Goldsworthy at OUP
has been delightful and I thank them for their support and guidance.
My work in this book builds on previously published journal articles. I am
grateful for permission to reuse material from the following articles: ‘The Moral
Dimension in Locke’s Account of Persons and Personal Identity’, History of
Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014): 229–47; ‘Locke and Hume on Personal Identity:
Moral and Religious Differences’, Hume Studies 41 (2015): 105–35; ‘The Role of
Appropriation in Locke’s Account of Persons and Personal Identity’, Locke Studies
 Acknowledgements xi

16 (2016): 3–39; ‘Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to the Problems of his

Predecessors’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2017): 407–34 (copyright ©
2017 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc., reprinted with permission by
Johns Hopkins University Press); ‘Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and
Character Development’, Philosophy Compass 13 (2018): e12471. Additionally,
I am reusing some material from the following book chapter: ‘Locke on Being Self
to my Self ’, in The Self: A History, Oxford Philosophical Concepts Series, edited by
Patricia Kitcher. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Dublin,
May 2020
 Preface

For a long time Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität [Locke’s Theory of Personal
Identity] by Udo Thiel, published in 1983,1 was the only book-­length study on the
subject. In recent years there has been growing interest in Locke scholarship in
general, and in Locke’s views on persons and personal identity in particular.
Galen Strawson’s Locke on Personal Identity (2011)2 revived the interest in the
topic. Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject (2011)3 covers the early modern
debates about self-­consciousness and personal identity from Descartes to Hume.
It is an invaluable book for scholars, because it covers an impressive range of
­primary and secondary sources. Additional new book publications that make
important contributions to the interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and
personal identity followed, and include Antonia LoLordo’s Locke’s Moral Man
(2012),4 Matthew Stuart’s Locke’s Metaphysics (2013),5 Nicholas Jolley’s Locke’s
Touchy Subjects (2015),6 and Shelley Weinberg’s Consciousness in Locke (2016).7
All of these books have been important sources that helped me develop my own
interpretation and have set high standards for Locke scholarship.
What contributions can a new book on Locke on persons and personal identity
make? My book will be significantly different from the existing book-­length stud-
ies on the topic. By understanding Locke’s account of persons and personal iden-
tity within the framework of his kind-­dependent approach to identity, I am in a
position to distance my interpretation from other approaches to Locke’s account
of personal identity that immediately turn to Locke’s account of personal identity
without examining first his account of personhood. Neither Jolley, LoLordo,
Thiel, nor Weinberg carefully distinguish Locke’s account of personhood from his
account of personal identity over time. By distinguishing Locke’s account of per-
sonhood from his account of personal identity I can locate the moral dimension
of Locke’s view in his account of personhood and take seriously both his claim

1 Udo Thiel, Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1983).
2 Galen Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011).
3 Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-­Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to
Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
4 Antonia LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5 Matthew Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2013).
6 Nicholas Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
7 Shelley Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
xiv Preface

that ‘person’ is a forensic term and his claim that personal identity consists in
same consciousness.8
LoLordo’s two major contributions to the interpretation of Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity are, first, her proposal that Lockean persons are
modes rather than substances, and, second her appropriation interpretation of
Locke’s account of personal identity.9 I have reservations about both proposals.
The proposal that Lockean persons are modes was first made by Edmund Law in
his Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion concerning Personal Identity,10 but has been
challenged by interpreters who claim that Lockean persons are, or must be,
­substances.11 I will not take this route to distance my view from LoLordo’s mode
interpretation. Rather I believe that Locke’s own silence about the question
whether persons are modes or substances in his chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’
(II.xxvii) intimates that he did not regard it as relevant to decide whether persons
are modes or substances in the context of this chapter where his main task is to
specify persistence conditions for persons. LoLordo’s appropriation in­ter­pret­
ation is the proposal that the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal
identity are to be understood in terms of appropriation. Appropriation certainly
plays a role in Locke’s account of persons and personal identity. However, since
Locke never claims that personal identity consists in appropriation, but rather
argues repeatedly that personal identity consists in same consciousness, I am not
convinced that LoLordo’s interpretation is well supported by Locke’s text.12
Strawson has done good work in emphasizing the forensic aspect of Locke’s
account of personhood. However, my work differs from Strawson’s insofar as he
does not consider Locke’s account of persons and personal identity within the
framework of the kind-­dependent account of identity. Moreover, Strawson and I
differ about the role that the religious context plays in Locke’s theory. This dis­
agree­ment finds expression in our different interpretations of the problem of

8 For instance, Thiel argues that ‘consciousness has priority’ (The Early Modern Subject, 128) over
self-­concern and moral and legal notions. Thiel’s claim is vague and my framework offers resources for
a more fine-­grained understanding of the relationship between morality and metaphysics or morality
and a psychological account of personal identity. See Ruth Boeker, ‘The Moral Dimension in Locke’s
Account of Persons and Personal Identity,’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014): 241–3.
9 See LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man, ch. 2.
10 See Edmund Law, A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity; in Answer to
the First Part of a Late Essay on That Subject (Cambridge: Printed by J. Archdeacon, 1769).
11 See Jessica Gordon-­Roth, ‘Locke on the Ontology of Persons,’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 53
(2015); Samuel C. Rickless, ‘Are Locke’s Persons Modes or Substances?’ in Locke and Leibniz on
Substance, ed. Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2015);
Kenneth P. Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991).
Matthew A. Leisinger, ‘Locke on Persons and Other Kinds of Substances,’ Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 100 (2019), argues for an intermediate position, according to which the idea of a person is a
substance idea that contains a mode idea. A third option is that Lockean persons are relations, as is
argued by Marko Simendic, ‘Locke’s Person Is a Relation,’ Locke Studies 15 (2015). Simendic does not
carefully distinguish between a person at a time and personal identity over time.
12 I offer a critical response to appropriation interpretations in Ruth Boeker, ‘The Role of
Appropriation in Locke’s Account of Persons and Personal Identity,’ Locke Studies 16 (2016).
 Preface xv

transitivity. While Strawson argues that Locke’s account of personal identity is

non-­transitive, I argue that the religious context of the afterlife and a last judge-
ment makes it more likely that Locke would give preference to a hybrid view that
combines insights of transitive and non-­transitive interpretations.
Stuart’s contributions are twofold: first, he defends a Relative Identity in­ter­pret­
ation of Locke’s account of identity;13 second, he argues that Locke endorses a
simple memory theory of personal identity.14 If the simple memory theory offers
a correct interpretation of Locke, it entails that his account of personal identity is
non-­transitive, which Stuart believes is supported by his text. I believe that both
proposals deserve serious consideration, but I am not convinced that Locke is
committed to either of them. Due to Locke’s metaphysical agnosticism about the
materiality or immateriality of thinking substances, he would be reluctant to
endorse a Relative Identity interpretation. Although memory is certainly an
important aspect of Locke’s same consciousness account, I believe that Stuart
does not give sufficient consideration to other aspects of Locke’s same conscious-
ness account such as unity and temporality. Moreover, I emphasize the im­port­
ance of the religious context of Locke’s theory more than Stuart.
Nicholas Jolley discusses Locke’s account of personal identity in the context of
metaphysical and religious views held by Locke, his contemporaries, and prede-
cessors. I agree with Jolley that this context is significant. Jolley’s book defends the
thesis that ‘[a] major concern of Locke’s philosophy is to show that at least a weak
form of materialism is a reasonable position in the philosophy of mind.’15 I take
Locke at his word when he claims that ‘the more probable Opinion is, that this
consciousness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial
Substance’ (II.xxvii.25)16 and distance my interpretation from Jolley’s, because
Jolley’s discussion of immaterial views of the mind focuses almost exclusively on
Cartesian immaterial views and neglects non-­Cartesian immaterial views of the
mind such as Platonist views.
Shelley Weinberg has done important work to advance the interpretation of
Locke’s notion of consciousness and its role throughout Locke’s Essay. I build on
her insights, but distance my view from various details of her interpretation. For
instance, I do not follow Weinberg in identifying Lockean consciousness with
self-­consciousness.17 On my view, a subject that has a perception is not only con-
scious of oneself as perceiving subject, but also of the content of the perception.
This reading, I believe, can better accommodate Locke’s view that persons are
conscious of their thoughts and actions.

13 See Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, ch. 7. 14 See Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, ch. 8.
15 Jolley, Locke’s Touchy Subjects, 8.
16 See also Locke, Works, 4:33–7. This reading, namely that it is more likely that thinking sub-
stances are immaterial, is also defended by Michael Jacovides, Locke’s Image of the World (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 129–34.
17 See Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, xi–xiii, 27, 33, 45–7, 51.
xvi Preface

My book offers a new perspective on Locke’s account of persons and personal

identity by considering it within the context of his broader philosophical project
and the philosophical debates of his day. I draw on a wider range of texts from
Locke’s philosophical corpus than any other previous study on the topic. This
enables me to argue that his account of personal identity is not psychological per
se, but rather his particular moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic back-
ground beliefs explain why he links a moral account of personhood with a psy-
chological account of personal identity. Moreover, my approach makes it possible
both to show how Locke advances the debates of his predecessors and to explain
why his early critics questioned or rejected his view.
 Abbreviations

References to seventeenth- and eighteenth-­century works follow common refer-

encing conventions and are abbreviated and cited in the following formats.

Works by John Locke

In-­text references with three numerals (Roman numeral, small Roman numeral,
Arabic numeral) such as ‘II.xxvii.9’ are to Book, chapter, section number of
Locke’s Essay.
Correspondence The Correspondence of John Locke, edited by E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976–1989, cited by letter number, followed by vol-
ume and page number.
Drafts A and B Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and Other
Philosophical Writings, edited by Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers,
vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, cited by draft, paragraph,
page number.
Early Draft An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, Together with Excerpts from His Journals,
edited by R. I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
Education Some Thoughts concerning Education, edited by John W. Yolton and
Jean S. Yolton. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 [1693].
Essay An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1690], cited by book, chapter, section
number. Where rele­vant edition number is added in bold.
Law of Nature Essays on the Law of Nature and Associated Writings, edited by W. von
Leyden. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
Paraphrase A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, 1 and
and Notes 2 Corinthians, Ephesians, edited by Arthur William Wainwright, 2 vols.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, cited by volume and page number.
Political Essays Political Essays, edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997.
Reasonableness The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures, in
Writings on Religion, edited by Victor Nuovo. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2002 [1695].
Two Treatises Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1690], cited by Book, para-
graph number.
Works The Works of John Locke, new, corrected ed., 10 vols. London: Thomas
Tegg, 1823, cited by volume and page number.
xviii Abbreviations

Writings on Religion Writings on Religion, edited by Victor Nuovo. Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 2002.

Works by René Descartes

AT René Descartes, Ouvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery, 12 vols. Paris: Vrin, 1996.
CSM René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vols. 1 and 2
(out of 3 vols). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–85, cited
by volume and page number.
CSMK René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: The
Correspondence, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,
Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, vol. 3 (out of 3 vols). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991, cited by volume and page number.

Works by Thomas Hobbes

English Works Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury,
edited by William Molesworth, 11 vols. London: J. Bohn, 1839–45, cited
by volume and page number.
Leviathan Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin
Edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994
[1651], cited by part, chapter, section number, followed by and
page number.

Anonymously published works

Remarks Anon., Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding in a

Letter Address’d to the Author. London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1697.
Second Remarks Anon., Second Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane
Understanding in a Letter Address’d to the Author, Being a Vindication of
the First Remarks against the Answer of Mr. Lock, at the End of His Reply
to the Lord Bishop of Worcester. London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1697.
Third Remarks Anon., Third Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding
in a Letter Address’d to the Author. London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1699.

Works by Catharine Trotter Cockburn

Defence Catharine Trotter Cockburn, A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human

Understanding, wherein its Principles, with Reference to Morality,
 Abbreviations xix

Revealed Religion, and the Immortality of the Soul, are considered and
justified: In answer to some Remarks on that Essay. In Catharine Trotter
Cockburn, Philosophical Writings, edited by Patricia Sheridan.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006 [1702].

Works by Mary Astell

Christian Mary Astell, The Christian Religion, as Professed by a Daughter of the
Religion Church of England, edited by Jacqueline Broad. Toronto: Centre for
Reformation and Renaissance Studies and Iter Publishing, 2013 [1705],
cited by paragraph number.

Clarke-­Collins Correspondence

References to the Clarke-­Collins Correspondences are to the following edition of 1731:

A Letter to Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins, A Letter to Mr. Dodwell; Wherein
Mr. Dodwell; all the Arguments in his Epistolary Discourse against the Immortality of
Together with the Soul are particularly answered, and the Judgment of the Fathers con-
Defences cerning Matter truly represented. Together with A Defence of an Argument
and Replies made use of in the above-­mentioned Letter to Mr. Dodwell, to prove the
Immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul. In Four Letters to the
Author of Some Remarks, &c. To which is added, Some Reflections on that
Part of a Book called Amyntor, which relates to the Writings of the
Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Testament. The Sixth
Edition. In this Edition are inserted The Remarks on Dr. Clarke’s Letter to
Mr. Dodwell, and the several Replies to the Doctor’s Defences thereof.
Printed for James and John Knapton, at the Crown in St. Paul’s Church-
yard: London, 1731 [1706–08]. Individual works in the collection will
be abbreviated as follows:

LD Clarke, A Letter to Mr. Dodwell (1706)

LLD Collins, A Letter to the Learned Mr. Henry Dodwell (1707)
D Clarke, A Defence of an Argument (1707)
RD Collins, A Reply to Mr Clarke’s Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell (1707)
SD Clarke, A Second Defence of an Argument (1707)
RSD Collins, Reflections on Mr. Clarke’s Second Defence (1707)
TD Clarke, A Third Defence of an Argument (1708)
ATD Collins, An Answer to Mr. Clarke’s Third Defence (1708)
FD Clarke, A Fourth Defence of an Argument (1708)

Additionally, references are given to The Correspondence of Samuel Clarke and Anthony
Collins, 1707–08, edited by William L. Uzgalis. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2011,
cited as ‘U,’ followed by page number.
xx Abbreviations

Works by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

New Essays Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding,

edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996, cited by Book, chapter, section number, followed
by page number.

Works by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury

Characteristicks Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of
Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, edited by Douglas J. den Uyl, 3 vols.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001 [1711]. Individual works in the collec-
tion will be abbreviated as follows:

LE A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)

SC Sensus Communis, and Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a
Friend (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)
S Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author (in vol. 1 of the 1711 ed.)
I An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit (in vol. 2 of the 1711 ed.)
M The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody (in vol. 2 of the 1711 ed.)
MR Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other critical Subjects (in vol. 3 of
the 1711 ed.)

Additionally, references are given to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury,
Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, edited by Lawrence E. Klein. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999, cited as ‘C,’ followed by page number.

Works by Joseph Butler

Analogy of Joseph Butler, The Analogy of Religion. In vol. 1 of The Works of Joseph
Religion Butler, edited by W. E. Gladstone. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897 [1736].
‘Of Personal Joseph Butler, ‘Of Personal Identity’, in vol. 1 of The Works of Joseph
Identity’ Butler, edited by W. E. Gladstone, 1:317–25. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1897 [1736].

Works by David Hume

Treatise David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton
and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1739–40],
cited by part, book, section, paragraph number; additionally, references
are given to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by
L. A. Selby-­Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1978 [1739–40], cited as ‘SBN’, followed by page number.
 Abbreviations xxi

EHU David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by

Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000 [1748], cited by sec-
tion, paragraph number; additionally, references are given to David Hume,
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles
of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-­Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, 3rd ed. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975, cited as ‘SBN’, followed by page number.

Works by Thomas Reid

EAP Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, edited by Knud
Haakonssen and James A. Harris. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2010 [1788], cited by essay, [part, if relevant,] chapter number,
followed by page number.
EIP Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, edited by
Derek R. Brookes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002 [1785],
cited by essay, chapter number, followed by page number.
Animate Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation: Papers Relating to the Life Sciences,
Creation edited by Paul Wood. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995.
 1
Introduction

1.1 Locke’s Innovative Approach to Debates

about Persons and Personal Identity

John Locke develops an innovative account of persons and personal identity.

Locke is interested in making sense of questions of moral accountability and
argues that we need to distinguish the idea of a person from that of a man (or
human being1 as we would say today) and that of a substance.2 For Locke, per-
sons—rather than human beings or substances—will be held accountable and
rewarded or punished for their actions in this life and in the life to come. Moral
accountability presupposes personal identity. However, what makes a person the
same over time? Locke not only aims to explain how a person continues to exist
in this life, but as a Christian believer it is important for him to take seriously the
possibility of an afterlife and thus he intends to offer an account of personal iden-
tity that can explain how a person can continue to exist in the afterlife. Locke
argues repeatedly that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness
and his point is that personal identity does not have to coincide with identity of
man or identity of substance.3 The significance of Locke’s distinction between the
ideas of person and man becomes clear when we consider an individual in a
coma. Locke would argue that a patient in a coma is the same man (or woman) as
before falling into the coma, but not the same person, and it would be unjust to
hold someone in a coma accountable for a past crime. Moreover, as we will see,
philosophers who identify persons with human beings face problems in explain-
ing the resurrection; these problems do not arise for Locke’s account of personal

1 Here and in the following I use Locke’s term ‘man’ interchangeably with ‘human being.’
2 For Locke, the idea of a person stands for ‘a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflec-
tion, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places’ (II.
xxvii.9). Moreover, he holds that ‘Person . . . is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit;
and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery.’ (II.xxvii.26)
Although Locke’s idea of man is often taken to stand for a human organism, this is only one way to
understand what is meant by ‘man’ and Locke considers alternative meanings in II.xxvii.21, which I
will discuss further in subsequent chapters. According to Locke, we use the idea of substance to
denote an underlying substratum from which our various ideas associated with the substance under
consideration result. We suppose the substratum to exist, since we cannot imagine how the various
simple ideas subsist by themselves (see II.xxiii.1). Locke’s claim that we have to distinguish the idea of
a person from that of a substance remains neutral on the further metaphysical question of whether a
person at a time is a substance.
3 See II.xxvii.9–26. Locke’s distinction between the ideas of person, man, and substance can already
be found in an early manuscript note. See John Locke, ‘Identy [sic] of Persons,’ (Bodleian Libraries MS
Locke f.7, 5 June 1683), 107.

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Ruth Boeker, Oxford University Press (2021). © Ruth Boeker.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846758.003.0001
2 Introduction

identity. However, can Locke explain the resurrection and life after death without
presupposing the continued existence of an immaterial substance? According to
Locke, God ‘will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in another World’ (IV.
iii.6) and the mere presence of an immaterial substance does not ensure that res-
urrected beings will be sensible beings that are capable of happiness or misery.4
Thus, Locke believes that ‘[a]ll the great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well
enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul’s Immateriality’ (IV.
iii.6). My study intends to show how Locke offers an account of persons and per-
sonal identity that is well suited for his moral and religious purposes.
His views about persons and personal identity were widely discussed soon
after their publication and continue to influence debates about personal identity.
In present-­day debates Locke’s view is often seen as an early version of psycho-
logical accounts of personal identity.5 Since Locke argues repeatedly that personal
identity consists in same consciousness, it is plausible to regard his account of
personal identity as psychological. However, his account of persons and personal
identity is richer. Locke not only argues that personal identity consists in same
consciousness, but he also claims that ‘person’ is a forensic term,6 meaning that
persons are moral and legal beings that are accountable for their actions. In the
following I argue that both claims are central for understanding Locke’s position
and show how they are intertwined. In order to understand how Locke links his
forensic account of personhood with his psychological account of personal iden-
tity, it is helpful to understand his approach to persons and personal identity
within the framework of his general approach to questions of identity, which I
call kind-­dependent. By taking the kind-­dependent framework seriously we will
see that it is important to consider Locke’s account of personhood separately from
his account of personal identity. A close examination of Locke’s account of per-
sonhood will establish that Lockean persons are moral and legal beings, or, in
other words, subjects of accountability. Moreover, I bring to light that he holds
particular—and controversial—moral background beliefs, which explain why he
regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity. I examine
how Locke understands sameness of consciousness and show how my reading

4 Similar considerations can already be found in a manuscript note on immortality dating back to
1682. See Locke, Early Draft, 121–3.
5 For instance, see Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, 2 vols. (London and New
York: Routledge, 1991), 2:278–92; Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity, 2nd ed. (London and New
York: Routledge, 2003), 9–11; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),
204–9; Jennifer Whiting, ‘Personal Identity: The Non-­Branching Form of “What Matters” ,’ in The
Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, ed. Richard M. Gale (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
2002). It is worth noting that neo-­Lockean accounts of personal identity are not the only way to
develop Locke’s view. For instance, Carol Rovane regards Locke’s view as a source of inspiration for
her own normative account of personal identity. See Carol Rovane, ‘From a Rational Point of View,’
Philosophical Topics 30 (2002); Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary
Metaphysics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
6 See II.xxvii.26.
 Locke’s Innovative Approach 3

provides resources to respond to problems commonly associated with Locke’s

account of personal identity such as the problems of circularity and transitivity.
Furthermore, I argue that we can reveal the strengths of Locke’s same conscious-
ness account if we consider it in the context of metaphysical and religious debates
of his predecessors. Considering Locke’s views about persons and personal iden-
tity within his broader philosophical project brings to light how his moral, reli-
gious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs shape his thinking about
persons and personal identity.
My interpretive approach is rooted in Locke’s position that human cognitive
capacities are limited. This means that many metaphysical propositions remain
unknown to us.7 The lesson for Locke is that we should use our capacities for
enquiries that they are suited for and focus on morality and religion:

From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our Faculties are not fitted to
penetrate into the internal Fabrick and real Essences of Bodies; but yet plainly
discover to us the Being of a GOD, and the Knowledge of our selves, enough to
lead us into a full and clear discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment, it
will become us, as rational Creatures, to imploy those Faculties we have about
what they are most adapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it
seems to point us out the way. For ’tis rational to conclude, that our proper
Imployment lies in those Enquiries, and in that sort of Knowledge, which is
most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.e.
the Condition of our eternal Estate. Hence I think I may conclude, that Morality
is the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general. (IV.xii.11)

In addition to showing how Locke’s views about persons and personal identity are
situated within his broader philosophical project, my work brings to light how
Locke advances the debates of his predecessors by bringing together moral
debates about personhood with metaphysical and religious debates about the
afterlife and the resurrection in a unique and novel way. Locke is not the first
philosopher to regard persons as moral and legal beings. He is familiar with the
natural law tradition—a tradition that regards persons (or in Latin personae) as
bearers of rights and duties.8 This moral and legal conception of a person can be

7 It is worth noting that Locke does not reject metaphysical knowledge entirely. For instance, he
accepts that we can know that God exists (see IV.x), or that substances exist (see Locke, Works,
4:32–3).
8 Locke wrote Essays on the Law of Nature around 1663–64 and delivered them as lectures at Christ
Church College, Oxford. Locke never published the essays during his lifetime, despite encouragement
to do so. For the role of persons in natural law theory see, for instance, Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law
of Nature and Nations, ed. Jean Barbeyrac, trans. Basil Kennett and George Carew, The fourth edition,
carefully corrected. (London: printed for J. Walthoe, R. Wilkin, J. and J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward,
and T. Osborne, 1729), especially I.i. For further discussion, see Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the
Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), chs. 1–3; Knud Haakonssen,
4 Introduction

further traced back to Roman law. Originally the Latin term ‘persona’ denoted a
mask, role, or guise, and later it acquired a moral and legal meaning and started
referring to bearers of rights and duties.9
Locke’s eighteenth-­century commentator Edmund Law emphasizes Locke’s
claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term and additionally Law argues for the view that
persons are modes rather than substances in his A Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion
concerning Personal Identity.10 In support of the latter he quotes Cicero, who in
Pro Sulla regards a person [persona] as a role or guise imposed [imposuit] on a
human being.11 This intimates that Law assumes that the original Latin meaning
of persona as ‘standing for a certain guise, character, quality’12 is still present in
Locke.13 Although a number of interpreters have revived Edmund Law’s in­ter­
pret­ation and argued that Locke’s conception of a person should be understood in
the Ciceronian and Pufendorfian tradition,14 I believe that we cannot assume that
Locke directly adopts a conception of a person as held by Roman authors or pro-
ponents of natural law theory, but rather he revises it so that it can be integrated
into his philosophical project as a whole. This is not surprising, because Locke, in
contrast to many of his predecessors, is more cautious to endorse metaphysical
claims that exceed the boundaries of human understanding and remains agnostic
about many metaphysical truths that we cannot know with certainty. Moreover,
Locke intends to offer an account of personal identity that can make sense of the
possibility of the afterlife, the resurrection, and a last judgement. His concern is to
show that persons, rather than human beings or substances, can continue to exist

Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 1; Knud Haakonssen, ‘Natural Law and Personhood: Samuel
Pufendorf on Social Explanation,’ Max Weber Lecture Series, no. 2010/06, http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/14934; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 77–81.
9 See Udo Thiel, ‘Personal Identity,’ in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-­Century Philosophy,
ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1:868–9; Thiel,
The Early Modern Subject, 26–30, 76–81. Thomas Hobbes comments on the etymology of the term
‘person’ in Hobbes, Leviathan, I.xvi.3, 101. See also Maximilian Forschner, ‘Der Begriff Der Person in
Der Stoa,’ in Person: Philosophiegeschichte, Theoretische Philosophie, Praktische Philosophie, ed. Dieter
Sturma (Paderborn: Mentis, 2001).
10 See Law, A Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity.
11 See Law, A Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity, 39.
12 Law, A Defence of Mr Locke’s Opinion Concerning Personal Identity, 39.
13 A critical response to this reading can be found in Winkler, ‘Locke on Personal Identity.’
14 See LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man; Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, 17–21; Kathryn Tabb,
‘Madness as Method: On Locke’s Thought Experiments about Personal Identity,’ British Journal for the
History of Philosophy 26 (2018): 4. Additionally, Thiel acknowledges that the natural law tradition pro-
vides important background for Locke’s account of personhood. According to Thiel, ‘Locke’s position
is that “man” and “person” denote different abstract ideas which may be applied to the human subject’
(The Early Modern Subject, 107). Thiel does not argue for the view that Lockean persons are modes,
but rather Thiel’s reading seems motivated by a Relative Identity interpretation of Locke’s general
approach to identity. I offer a critical discussion of Relative Identity interpretations in chapter 3. Since
Locke does not introduce the idea of a human subject in addition to the ideas of person, man, and
substance I do not adopt it either.
 Locke’s Innovative Approach 5

in the afterlife. His religious convictions show that he would be reluctant to accept
the Ciceronian meaning of persona as a role or quality imposed on a human
being. On this view a person is dependent on a human being. However, according
to Locke, we have to distinguish the ideas of person and man, and sameness of
man (or human being) is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity.
Although Edmund Law thought that Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term
is connected to the view that persons are modes rather than substances, these two
positions do not have to come as a package. Thus, we cannot assume without con-
vincing arguments that Lockean persons are modes. I offer an interpretation that
takes seriously Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term and ask how Locke
intertwines it with his religious beliefs and his agnostic attitudes towards meta-
physics in his account of persons and personal identity.
To further illustrate Locke’s ingenuity, it can be helpful to contrast Locke’s
approach to persons and personal identity with the views of Thomas Hobbes.
Hobbes introduces a distinction between natural and artificial persons in
Leviathan, Part I, chapter xvi:

A person, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as
representing the words or actions of another man, or of any other thing to whom
they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction.
When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person: and
when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then
is he a feigned or artificial person. (I.xvi.1–2, 101)

Hobbes needs the notion of an artificial person in addition to a natural person to

establish his political project. Locke does not engage with questions of political
representation in the context of his discussion of persons and personal identity in
the Essay and this explains why Locke does not consider artificial persons as
Hobbes introduces them, but rather Locke’s notion of a person comes closer to
Hobbes’s conception of a natural person.15 Although the details of Hobbes’s pos­
ition need not concern us here, Hobbes’s discussion of natural and artificial per-
sons provides interesting background for the interpretation of Locke’s views
about persons and personal identity. First, Hobbes’s distinction shows that the
term ‘person’ can be defined in different ways and we can and should not take for
granted that it is simply used interchangeably with the notion of a human being.
Locke is well aware of the need to carefully spell out how we understand the idea

15 See Luc Foisneau, ‘Personal Identity and Human Mortality: Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz,’ in Studies
on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy, ed. Sarah Hutton and Paul Schuurman (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2008), 95; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 76–7.
6 Introduction

of a person before we can engage with questions of personal identity over time.16
This makes it plausible that Locke not only distances his position from views that
equate persons with human beings, but also from other definitions of the term
‘person’ of his day.
Second, it is worth noting that questions of personal identity over time are
absent in Hobbes’s discussion of persons in Leviathan. Nevertheless, Hobbes
engages with questions of individuation and identity over time in his work De
Corpore.17 In Part II of this treatise, Hobbes devotes a chapter to ‘Of Identity and
Difference’. In this chapter Hobbes asks what makes an individual at one time the
same as at another time: ‘For example, whether a man grown old be the same
man he was whilst he was young, or another man; or whether a city be in different
ages the same, or another city’ (English Works, II.xi.7, 1:135). These are exactly the
kind of questions that Locke addresses in ‘Of Identity and Diversity’. The parallels
between Hobbes’s and Locke’s general approach to questions of identity even go a
step further. Hobbes writes:

But we must consider by what name anything is called, when we inquire con-
cerning the identity of it. For it is one thing to ask concerning Socrates, whether
he be the same man, and another to ask whether he be the same body; for his
body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when he was an infant, by reason
of the difference of magnitude; for one body has always one and the same mag-
nitude; yet, nevertheless, he may be the same man. (English Works, II.xi.7, 1:137)

Locke agrees that we need to clarify under which sortal18 name we are consider-
ing a thing if we want to address the question of what makes something identical
over time. Like Hobbes, Locke distinguishes the term ‘mass of matter’ from the
term ‘man’ and argues that a man can continue to exist despite changes of ma­ter­
ial particles.19
A comparison with Hobbes reveals that Locke makes significant philosophical
advancements. Hobbes does not integrate his account of identity with his views
about persons. This is a gap in Hobbes’s corpus. Locke’s chapter ‘Of Identity and
Diversity’ can be seen as filling this gap by applying Locke’s general approach to
identity over time to persons and personal identity.20
Locke is indebted, first, to the natural law tradition and moral and legal con-
ceptions of personhood, second, to metaphysical debates about individuation and

16 See II.xxvii.7, 9, 15, 20.

17 See Hobbes, English Works, 1:132–8. De Corpore [Of Body], is volume 1 of English Works.
18 Locke introduces the term ‘sortal’ in III.iii.15 as the adjective deriving from ‘sort’ in analogy to
the adjective ‘general’ and the noun ‘genus.’ He uses ‘sort’ and ‘kind’ interchangeably. This means that a
sortal name is the name that we associate with a kind of being.
19 See II.xxvii.6–8, see also II.xxvii.1–4.
20 For further discussion see Foisneau, ‘Personal Identity and Human Mortality’.
 Aims and Scope of the Book 7

identity, and, third, to metaphysical and religious debates about the state of a
­person or soul between death and resurrection and in the afterlife. Locke not only
builds on the debates of his predecessors, but he also combines them in new and
systematic ways by carefully distinguishing the ideas of a person from the ideas of
a man and substance.

1.2 Aims and Scope of the Book

Let me add a few remarks about the aims and scope of this book. First and fore-
most, this book studies Locke’s thinking about persons and personal identity in
the philosophical and historical context of his day. My goal is to bring to light
Locke’s intentions. In particular, I examine how his thinking about persons and
personal identity is shaped by his underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and
epistemic views, and where relevant compare them with the views of other philo­
sophers of his day. In this sense my book is a work in the history of philosophy.
Although interesting questions can be asked regarding the usefulness of Locke’s
views for present-­day debates about personal identity, they exceed the scope of
this project and will not be my concern here. I hope that by considering Locke’s
account of persons and personal identity in its philosophical and historical con-
text we can better appreciate the ingenuity and strengths of his view. Furthermore,
I intend to offer a deeper explanation for why several of Locke’s early critics ques-
tion or reject his account.
It has become common to dismiss Locke’s account of personal identity on the
basis of a few standard objections such as the famous and widely repeated circu-
larity and transitivity objections. My approach makes it possible to show that
Locke’s account cannot be as easily dismissed as those who reiterate the common
objections tend to do. To illustrate this point, let me explain my approach to the
problem of transitivity. Since the objection was not raised during Locke’s lifetime
we have to speculate as to how he would respond. However, we have evidence that
it is of great importance to Locke that his account of persons and personal
identity takes seriously the possibility of the afterlife and a last judgement. Thus,
­I ­propose that Locke would most likely suggest that the problem of transitivity is
best understood in the religious context of an afterlife and a last judgement. Once
understood in this context, it is likely that Locke would give preference to a hybrid
account of personal identity that involves both transitive and non-­transitive rela-
tions. The problem with purely non-­transitive interpretations is that they conflict
with considerations of divine justice, because there is a risk that they involve mul-
tiple judgement for the same action, neglect actions, or neglect long-­term actions.
Purely transitive interpretations neglect the first-­ personal dimension that is
important for Locke. For these reasons, he may have been less worried about
the problem of transitivity than his critics who raised or reiterated it. My
8 Introduction

in­ter­pret­ation of the problem of transitivity is merely one example to show how

we can change the interpretation of Locke’s view by taking the philosophical and
his­tor­ic­al context seriously.
Although Locke’s chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (II.xxvii), which he added
to the second edition of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding in 1694, is
my most important source for this study, I draw on the Essay as a whole, as well as
his other works and manuscripts whenever they shed light on Locke’s views about
persons and personal identity. Since Locke contrasts his position with the views
of his predecessors, I follow Locke and discuss the views of his predecessors
where relevant. My aim is not to offer a comprehensive examination of their
views, but rather I approach their works through Locke’s perspective with the aim
of revealing the strengths of his position in its philosophical and historical con-
text. Udo Thiel has done important and extensive work on the debates about con-
sciousness and personal identity in the early modern period and I would like to
refer readers who are interested in further background to his works.21

1.3 Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 offers a close analysis of Locke’s approach to questions of individuation

and identity over time. I explain that Locke in his chapter ‘Of Identity and
Diversity’ is primarily interested in questions of identity over time in a metaphys-
ical sense. This means we can say that his main task is to specify persistence con-
ditions. I examine how Locke distinguishes individuation from identity, and
propose that Locke’s approach to identity is best understood as kind-­dependent.
This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of Locke’s
account of persons and personal identity. More precisely, when we apply the
kind-­dependent approach to persons, it becomes clear that we have to distinguish
Locke’s account of personhood from his account of personal identity, and exam-
ine his account of personhood first before we can specify the persistence condi-
tions for persons in a further step.
Chapter 3 offers further support for why Locke’s approach to questions of
identity is best interpreted as kind-­dependent. In this chapter I turn to the
debates that have dominated the secondary literature on Locke’s account of
identity. I show that alternative interpretations are often based on metaphysical

21 See Thiel, The Early Modern Subject. See also Thiel, Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität; Thiel,
‘Individuation’; Thiel, ‘Personal Identity’; Udo Thiel, ‘Religion and Materialist Metaphysics: Some
Aspects of the Debate about the Resurrection of the Body in Eighteenth-­ Century Britain,’ in
Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain: New Case Studies, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012); Udo Thiel, ‘Self-­Consciousness and Personal Identity,’ in The Cambridge
History of Eighteenth-­Century Philosophy, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
 Summary of Chapters 9

assumptions that Locke would be reluctant to endorse. I pay particularly close

attention to disputes between defenders of coincidence and Relative Identity
in­ter­pret­ations of Locke. The disputes are commonly traced back to a disagree-
ment about the question of how many things exist at a particular spatiotemporal
location. For instance, consider a cat and the material particles that compose
the cat. Do two distinct things—one a cat and the other a collection of material
particles—exist at the same spatiotemporal location, as suggested by defenders of
coincidence in­ter­pret­ations? Or is there just one thing that can be considered
both as a cat and a collection of material particles, as defenders of Relative Identity
interpretations propose? Rather than siding with one position, my strategy is to
identify problems that arise for both types of interpretations, and to show how my
kind-­dependent interpretation avoids them. Readers who are not interested in
the details of the scholarly debates can skip the chapter and move immediately to
chapter 4.
In chapter 4 I apply Locke’s kind-­dependent account of identity to persons. The
chapter begins by focusing on Locke’s account of personhood and I argue that
persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal kind of being: they are
subjects of accountability. I establish this claim by showing with reference to his
chapter ‘Of Power’ (II.xxi) and other writings that his moral and legal conception
of a person is present throughout his chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’. The
interpretation I offer gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic
term, but it also shows that Locke’s arguments presuppose a particular conception
of morality that is grounded in divine law and the power of a superior lawmaker
to enforce morality by rewards and punishment. Next, I ask how Locke’s moral
and legal account of personhood enables us to specify persistence conditions for
persons. I shed further light on why it is plausible to regard Lockean persons as
subjects of accountability and argue that examining Locke’s understanding of the
conditions of just accountability provides a clue for answering the question of
what makes a person, or subject of accountability, the same over time. I show that
for Locke sameness of consciousness is a necessary condition for moral account-
ability. This makes it possible to establish that sameness of consciousness is a
ne­ces­sary condition for personal identity. Moreover, I emphasize that Locke
thinks about moral accountability in a particular and controversial way. Critical
responses by his contemporaries William Molyneux and Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz illustrate that it is possible to think about moral accountability differently.
For instance, it is possible to agree with Locke that persons are subjects of moral
accountability, but due to an alternative understanding of moral accountability
one can reject Locke’s view that personal identity consists in same consciousness.
The considerations in this chapter provide resources for a fine-­grained under-
standing of the relation between morality and metaphysics in Locke’s account of
personal identity. I argue that moral considerations have explanatory priority,
but sameness of consciousness is ontologically prior to attributions of moral
10 Introduction

accountability in particular instances when one intends to decide whether a per-

son is accountable for an action.
By the end of chapter 4, I establish that sameness of consciousness is necessary
for personal identity. It remains to ask whether it is also sufficient. This question
will be addressed in chapter 6. Before we are in a position to engage with it, it will
be important to carefully examine Locke’s understanding of sameness of con-
sciousness. This is the task of chapter 5.
Chapter 5 begins by acknowledging a difference between consciousness that is
built into individual mental states from a more complex notion of same con-
sciousness, which additionally involves relations among several mental states.
With regard to the former, I share the views of other interpreters that for Locke
consciousness is not a higher order mental state and cannot be identified with
reflection. However, in contrast to Weinberg, I believe that consciousness for
Locke is not restricted to self-­consciousness,22 but also includes consciousness of
the contents of one’s perceptions. In the existing secondary literature on Locke’s
account of same consciousness we find a variety of different interpretations: For
instance, it has been suggested that Locke understands same consciousness in
terms of memory, appropriation, duration, or a metaphysical fact. Often these
proposals are treated as exclusive rival views. I believe that it is a mistake to treat
the proposals as exclusive, but rather many of them offer important insights into
Locke’s understanding of same consciousness, yet they are incomplete on their
own. On the basis of a close reading of Locke’s text, I show that revival of past
thoughts and actions through memory, mineness, togetherness (or unity), and
temporality are all important aspects of his same consciousness account. I con-
clude that Locke’s account of same consciousness is richer than commonly
acknowledged and has multiple aspects.
Chapter 6 addresses circularity and insufficiency worries that have been raised
against Locke’s same consciousness account of personal identity. I begin by distin-
guishing different versions of circularity worries. Introducing these distinctions
enables me to advance the debates in the literature, because the different types of
circularity worries require different answers. I then show that Locke has resources
to respond to Joseph Butler’s circularity objection. However, the more pressing
worry concerns the question of whether sameness of consciousness is sufficient
for personal identity, which is the so-­called insufficiency worry. The insufficiency
worry can be presented as a circularity worry, but need not be. I show how Locke’s
multiple aspects account of same consciousness introduced in chapter 5 provides
resources for addressing the insufficiency worry. A response to the insufficiency
worry calls for an examination of whether sameness of consciousness is onto­
logic­al­ly suitable to ground personal identity. Although the limitations of human

22 See Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, xi–xiii, 27, 33, 45–7, 51.

 Summary of Chapters 11

understanding prevent us from knowing the exact metaphysical foundation of

sameness of consciousness, Locke believes that we should engage in probable
reason­ing in areas where we lack knowledge. I propose that Locke has resources
to accept, on the basis of probable reasoning, that same consciousness that has a
metaphysical foundation that most likely has relational structure. I believe that
the advantage of this reading is that it brings to light that he not merely criticizes
views that assume that persistence requires the continued existence of a sub-
stance, but also that he has resources for developing a plausible—though
­prob­able—alternative that avoids circularity and insufficiency.
Chapter 7 situates Locke’s account of personal identity in the context of meta-
physical and religious debates of his day, especially the debates concerning the
possibility of the afterlife and the resurrection. I adopt Locke’s classifications of
the views of his predecessors and examine metaphysical problems for material,
Cartesian and non-­Cartesian immaterial views of the soul, and views that regard
human beings as mind-­body unions. I show that Locke is well aware of these
problems and argue that the strength of his account of personal identity in terms
of sameness of consciousness is that it provides a response to the various prob-
lems that arise for the views of his predecessors. Furthermore, the advantage of
his theory is that it does not require him to prove the views of his predecessors to
be mistaken, and it is thereby consistent with their mutually exclusive views
regarding the materiality and immateriality of thinking substances.
In chapter 8 I offer a new look at the problem of transitivity by building on the
insight of chapter 7 that it is of great importance for Locke to take seriously the
possibility of the afterlife and a last judgement. My contributions are as follows:
first, I give credit to Galen Strawson’s and Matthew Stuart’s non-­ transitive
interpretations,23 who both emphasize that Locke’s account of personal identity
fundamentally concerns questions of moral accountability. Based on the insights
of their interpretations, I develop a list of constraints that any good interpretation
of Locke’s view should satisfy. However, there are also shortcomings of Strawson’s
and Stuart’s interpretations, which my own interpretation overcomes. I argue that
a genuine question of transitivity arises in the context of the afterlife and a last
judgement and that Locke would take the transitivity problem in this context
seriously. I develop a hybrid interpretation that takes insights of transitive and
non-­transitive interpretations seriously and show how it is grounded in Locke’s
account of sameness of consciousness as introduced in chapter 5, how it can bet-
ter accommodate the religious context than competing interpretations without
neglecting the insights of Strawson’s and Stuart’s interpretations. Moreover,
I show with reference to Locke’s writings on religion that my interpretation leaves
room for repentance.

23 See Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, 53–7, chs. 10–11; Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, ch. 8,
especially 353–9, 378–85.
12 Introduction

Chapter 9 brings together the results of the previous chapters and shows what
role Locke’s moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs play
in his thinking about persons and personal identity.
Instead of ending my study here, I believe it is important to ask why hardly any
of Locke’s early critics understood him in the way I interpret his view. It is not
uncommon that Locke’s distinctions between the ideas of person, man, and sub-
stance are neglected, or that his critics do not engage with the moral dimension of
his view, let alone acknowledge his claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term. How can
it be that considerations that are at the heart of my interpretation find little to no
consideration in the views of his critics? I offer a few case studies to show that the
disagreement between Locke and his early critics can be traced back to a dis­
agree­ment about underlying moral, religious, metaphysical, and/or epistemic
views. Hence, the initial challenges that arise for my interpretation ultimately
strengthen my thesis that Locke’s thinking about persons and personal identity is
shaped by his underlying background beliefs.
Many of Locke’s early critics reject Locke’s account of persons and personal
identity on metaphysical and/or religious grounds. Chapter 10 focuses on a selec-
tion of these objections and thereby reveals metaphysical, religious, and epistemic
differences between Locke’s view and the views of his early critics and defenders.
I pay particular attention to two debates that lead several critics to reject Locke’s
thinking about persons and personal identity, but also prompt others to defend
his view, namely debates whether the soul always thinks and debates whether
matter can think. With respect to each debate my aim is to identify factors why
Locke’s early critics endorse metaphysical and epistemic views that differ from
Locke’s view and how this leads them to reject Locke’s thinking about persons and
personal identity.
Chapter 11 focuses on Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s responses to Locke’s account
of persons and personal identity. Both philosophers generally share Locke’s
­metaphysically agnostic views, but disagree with Locke on moral and religious
grounds. By contrasting Locke’s, Shaftesbury’s, and Hume’s moral and religious
views we can see how their different moral and religious views shape their think-
ing about persons and personal identity and understand why Shaftesbury and
Hume develop views about persons and personal identity that differ not only
from Locke’s view, but also from each other. I pay particular attention to how
Shaftesbury and Hume each criticize psychological accounts of personal identity
and explain how their underlying moral and religious views help understand the
respective criticisms. Moreover, both philosophers reject moral theories grounded
in divine law. Since Locke’s account of moral personhood can be separated
from his psychological account of personal identity, it is interesting to ask how
philosophers who do not share Locke’s moral views, which are grounded in divine
law, approach or can approach moral personhood.
 2
Locke’s Kind-­dependent Approach
to Identity

Locke added chapter xxvii of Book II, titled ‘Of Identity and Diversity’, to the
­second edition of his Essay in 1694 upon the suggestion of his friend William
Molyneux to offer a more detailed treatment of the principium individuationis.1
Molyneux acknowledges that Locke already touched upon the principium indi-
viduationis in I.iv.4 and II.i.12. Both passages concern identity and reflect on how
personal identity is preserved if souls can transmigrate from one body to another.
It is worth noting that Locke in neither section explicitly uses the term ‘individu-
ation’. This suggests that both Molyneux and Locke regard individuation and
identity as closely connected.
What, if anything, is the difference between individuation and identity?
Traditionally, a principle of individuation provides a metaphysical condition of
what it takes for one thing to be an individual and to be distinct from other
things,2 while a principle of identity provides a condition of what it takes for a
thing to be the same at a time and over time. However, not all philosophers of
Locke’s day draw a distinction between individuation and identity.3 For example,
Thomas Hobbes understands individuation in terms of identity over time:

But the same body may at different times be compared with itself. And from
hence springs the great controversy about the beginning of individuation
[Principio individuationis], namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a
body is at one time the same, at another time not the same it was formerly.
(English Works, II.xi.7, 1:135)

The tendency to regard individuation and identity as closely connected, if not

equivalent, helps explain why Locke, upon Molyneux’s suggestion to expand his
discussion of the principle of individuation, writes a chapter that focuses on

1 See Locke, Correspondence, letter no 1609, 2 March 1693, 4:650.

2 For example, see Richard Burthogge, An Essay Upon Reason, and the Nature of Spirits (London:
Printed for J. Dunton, 1694), 269–70.
3 See Robert Boyle, ‘Some Physico-­ Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the
Resurrection,’ in Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, ed. M. A. Stewart (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1979), 194; John Dunton, ‘Quest. 1 What Is Individuation? Or, Wherein
Consits the Individuality of a Thing?,’ The Athenian Mercury 2 (1691); Hobbes, English Works, 1:132–8;
Thiel, ‘Individuation’, 1:233–44.

Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. Ruth Boeker, Oxford University Press (2021). © Ruth Boeker.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198846758.003.0002
14 Locke ’ s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

identity over time. Yet we have to look closer at Locke’s text to see how exactly he
conceives of individuation, identity, and diversity.
Locke’s chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ is part of a series of chapters on
ideas of relations. According to Locke, we form ideas of relations when we com-
pare two or more things under a particular respect.4 Turning to identity and
diversity, he maintains that we form the ideas of identity and diversity ‘when con-
sidering any thing as existing at any determin’d time and place, we compare it
with itself existing at another time’ (II.xxvii.1). While questions of identity and
diversity arise both at a time and over time, it is clear that questions of identity
over time are the focus of the chapter. Although Locke briefly mentions identity
at a time in II.xxvii.1, he sees no need to elaborate on it, because it is trivial that a
thing is identical with itself at every particular time of its existence. Rather ques-
tions of identity over time are genuine and interesting questions for Locke and
include the following: What does it take for a collection of material particles to
continue to exist over time? What does it take for a cat to continue to exist over
time? In virtue of what does an oak tree continue to be the same oak tree despite
its loss and gain of material particles? What does it take for a person to continue
to exist? Is it possible for a person to continue to exist in a different human body?
Is it possible that more than one person exists in the same substance over time? Is
it possible that a person survives a change of substance? Before we consider these
and similar questions that occupy major parts of II.xxvii more closely, it is worth
returning to individuation for a moment.

2.1 The Principium Individuationis

What, if any, role does individuation play in Locke’s account of identity? He

briefly mentions the principium individuationis in II.xxvii.3 immediately after
general reflections on identity in II.xxvii.1–2; it occurs just before he turns to
examples, which examine what it takes for one atom, a collection of atoms, living
organisms, artefacts, human beings, and persons to exist over time. Despite the
brevity with which Locke comments on the principle of individuation, it is
informative that he presents it at this stage. We can reflect at an abstract level
about identity over time, but as soon as we want to apply any general principles in
particular cases we need to have a means to uniquely pick out the individual
whose identity over time is under consideration. Understood in this way, a prin­
ciple of individuation enables us to pick out a particular individual as distinct
from various other individuals that exist. Once a particular individual a has been
uniquely picked out by a principle of individuation, we can then trace a’s identity
over time by means of the relevant principle of identity over time. This suggests

4 See II.xxv.
 The Principium Individuationis 15

that individuation and identity play different roles and individuation is important
in addition to principles of identity.
Let us examine how Locke introduces the principle of individuation to further
clarify its role in Locke’s account of identity:

From what has been said, ’tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after,
the principium Individuationis, and that ’tis plain is Existence it self, which
determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to
two Beings of the same kind.5 This though it seems easier to conceive in simple
Substances or Modes; yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded
ones, if care be taken to what it is applied. (II.xxvii.3)

How shall we interpret Locke’s version of the principium individuationis? At first

sight, Locke’s claim that existence individuates seems to support the following
reading:6

(PrI) A thing is distinct from other things by existing at a particular time

and place.

However, the problem with this reading is that it conflicts with Locke’s observa-
tions in II.xxvii.2, which is the section that immediately precedes the section
where he first introduces the principium individuationis. There he lists God, finite
intelligences, and bodies as three sorts of substances and argues that finite intelli-
gences and bodies exist at particular times and places. While it is impossible that
two different finite intelligences or two different bodies exist at the same place
and time, it is possible that a body and a finite spirit are co-­located. (PrI) does not
accommodate the possibility that more than one thing exists at the same place
and time such as a body and a finite spirit. Moreover, since Locke believes that his
observations in II.xxvii.1–2 make it ‘easy to discover’ the principium individua-
tionis, (PrI) needs refinement.7 If we return to his statement of the principium
individuationis we can see that it concerns individuation of members of a kind of
being. This makes it plausible to refine it as follows:

5 I follow Locke and use the terms ‘kind’, ‘sort’, and the Latin term ‘species’ interchangeably. See
II.xxxii.6, III.iii.12, 14 17, III.vi.1–2, 4, 6–7; Locke, Works, 4:83–91.
6 Such a reading can be found in John Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted, against the Fancies of the
Ideists, or, the Method to Science Farther Illustrated with Reflexions on Mr Locke’s Essay concerning
Human Understanding (London: Printed for Roger Clavil at the Peacock, Abel Roper at the Black Boy,
both in Fleetstreet, and Thomas Metcalf, over against Earl’s-­Court in Drury-­Lane, 1697), 255–70.
Thiel offers an interpretation close to this reading by stressing that, according to Locke, ‘Existence
itself ’ individuates. See Thiel, ‘Individuation’, 1:233–5; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 102–3.
7 See Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics, 299–300; Gideon Yaffe, ‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity,’
in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, ed. Lex Newman
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 197.
16 Locke ’ s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

(PrI*) A member of any kind is distinct from all other members of the same
kind by existing at a particular time and place.

There is, however, one further problem. According to (PrI*), it is not possible that
a member of kind F can be identical at different times, because at an earlier time it
exists at one spatiotemporal location and at a later time it exists at a different spa-
tiotemporal location. According to (PrI*) they would be distinct, but Locke wants
to leave open the possibility that they can be identical. Thus, (PrI*) conflicts with
Locke’s views in II.xxvii. In II.xxvii.1 Locke argues that two things of the same
kind cannot exist at the same place and time. This principle is often called
‘place-­time-­kind principle’.8 In light of the place-­time-­kind principle it is plausible
to refine Locke’s principium individuationis as follows:

(PrI**) A member of any kind existing at time t is distinct from all other ­members
of the same kind existing at time t by existing at a particular place at that time.

Principle (PrI**) follows from Locke’s place-­time-­kind principle. Furthermore,

the advantage of (PrI**) is that it leaves room for the possibility that a member of
one kind is the same with itself at a different time, while (PrI*) excludes it.
To assess (PrI**), let us turn to Locke’s comments on the principium individua-
tionis in his correspondence with Edward Stillingfleet. There Locke argues that
‘the “principium individuationis” is the same in all the several species of creatures’
(Works, 4:439) and criticizes Stillingfleet’s view that the union of soul and body
makes two human beings distinct, because it does not account for the distinctness
of other kinds of being, such as two cherries, or two atoms of matter.9 (PrI**) is
consistent with Locke’s remarks in the Stillingfleet correspondence, because
(PrI**) is not restricted to one particular species. This means that the principle of
individuation (PrI**) can be applied irrespective of whether one intends to indi-
viduate cherries, cats, or human beings. Furthermore, (PrI**) is consistent with
II.xxvii.2, because it does not rule out co-­location of members of different kinds.10
Being a member of a kind involves having the characteristic features associated
with the kind, which is the nominal essence of the kind. For a member of a kind F
to exist at a spatiotemporal location means that the features that belong to the
nominal essence of kind F are present at that location. (PrI**) does not rule out
the existence of other qualities at the same place and time that are not associated
with the kind under considerations. These other qualities can be part of the

8 For further discussion, see Jessica Gordon-­Roth, ‘Locke’s Place-­Time-­Kind Principle,’ Philosophy
Compass 10 (2015); Yaffe, ‘Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity’, 195–7.
9 See Locke, Works, 4:438–9.
10 Although Thiel acknowledges the importance of II.xxvii.2, he does not clearly revise his reading
of the principium individuationis (see Thiel, ‘Individuation’, 1:233–5; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject,
102–3). I believe that the advantage of my refined reading (PrI**) is that it is more precise and consist-
ent with all the relevant texts.
 The Principium Individuationis 17

characteristic features of another kind and for this reason (PrI**) is consistent
with the possibility of co-­location of members of different kinds.
However, one may worry that (PrI**) is restricted in another sense: it merely
offers a principle of what it takes for members of the same kind that exist at the
same time to be distinct, but it does not account for distinctness of members of
different kinds or for members that exist at different times. Is this a genuine limi-
tation of Locke’s principle? To address this question, I want to take a detour and
draw attention to the treatment of individuation in The Athenian Mercury, a
­bi-­weekly magazine of the Athenian Society. Although we do not know this cer-
tainly, it is likely that Locke was familiar with the article on individuation that was
published on 20 June 1691 in the Athenian Mercury and that it provided the
structure for Locke’s discussion in II.xxvii.11 The author of the article begins with
a general answer to the question of what individuation is:

Individuation is—The Unity of a thing with it self, or that whereby any thing is
what it is, which makes it little, if any thing clearer than ’twas before.

Since this answer is not very informative the article proceeds by explaining indi-
viduation for ‘different Orders of visible Being’:

To begin with those Species of Body, which are not properly Organiz’d, which
have neither Life nor Sence, or Stones, Metals, &c. In these Individuation seems
to consist in nothing but greater or lesser; take the less part of a Stone away, you
may still call it the same Stone; take an equal part with the remains, that
Individuation ceases, and they are two new Individuals. Divide a Stone, & c. as
long as you please, every part of it will be a Stone still, another individual Stone,
as much as any in the Mountain or Quarry ’twas first cut out of, even thô
reduced to the minutest Sand, or if possible a thousand times less . . . .
Plants—their Individuation consists in that singular Form, Contexture and Order
of their Parts, whereby they are disposed for those Uses to which Nature has
design’d ’em, and by which they receive and maintain their Beings . . .
meerly sensible Creatures . . . And here the Individuation consists in such a
­particular Contexture of their Essential Parts, and their relation one towards
another, as enables ’em to exert the Operations of the sensible or animal Life . . .
To ascend now to the highest Rank of visible Being, The Rational: The
Individuation of Man appears to us to consist in the Union of that thinking
Substance, which we call rational Soul, with any convenient Portion of fitly
Organiz’d Matter.

11 See Peter R. Anstey, ‘John Locke and the Philosophy of Mind,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy
53 (2015): 237; Dunton, ‘Quest. 1 What Is Individuation? Or, Wherein Consits the Individuality of
a Thing?’
18 Locke ’ s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

Although at first sight the view of individuation that is presented in the Athenian
Mercury appears similar to Locke’s view, there is an important difference. I take it
that Locke distinguishes questions of individuation from questions of identity
and thus believes that a principle of individuation is to be distinguished from
principles of identity, while the author of article in the Athenian Mercury uses
‘individuation’ to refer not only to individuation in Locke’s sense, but also to
questions of identity. As a result, the view defended in the Athenian Mercury is
that there are different principles of individuation for different kinds of being.
However, since Locke rejects such a view in his correspondence with Stillingfleet,
he cannot accept the view in the Athenian Mercury either. By distinguishing indi-
viduation from identity, Locke is able to offer a principle of individuation that
holds across kinds.
To return to the worry that (PrI**) is too restricted, Locke does not have to be
troubled by this worry, because his main focus in the chapter ‘Of Identity and
Diversity’ are questions of identity over time. Insofar as he aims to address ques-
tions of identity over time, he will always apply the principle of individuation in
combination with a principle of identity over time. (PrI**) is sufficient for Locke’s
purposes and it is plausible that it is restricted to members of a kind, because—as
will become clearer in the next section—Locke believes that we have to decide
what kind of being we are considering before we can engage with questions of
identity over time.12

2.2 Identity

It is time to examine the details of Locke’s approach to identity over time. Locke’s
main interest in the chapter is to understand what it takes for things to exist over
time. In present-­day metaphysical terminology we would say that his aim is to
specify persistence conditions. I have chosen metaphysical terms here in light of
the language Locke uses to present the issues: his discussion focuses on the ques-
tion of wherein identity ‘consists’,13 or what ‘preserves’14 identity, or—as he also

12 In the literature we find additional interpretations of Locke’s principium individuationis. An

alternative interpretation is offered by Christopher Hughes Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity,
Philosophical Studies Series (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003). According to Conn’s
interpretation of Locke’s principle of individuation, objects are individuated by the place and time
when they first came into existence. I am not convinced by this interpretation, because Locke does not
mention an object’s first beginning of existence when he introduces the principium individuationis in
II.xxvii.3. More importantly, I believe that it is a superfluous and unnecessary restriction to formulate
the principle of individuation in terms of the spatiotemporal location of an object’s first beginning of
existence, because the principle of individuation will be combined with principles of identity over
time. Once the principle of individuation and the relevant principle of identity are both applied, any
spatiotemporal location of an object of a certain kind will stand in a unique relation to the first begin-
ning of existence of the object of the relevant kind.
13 II.xxvii.6, 9, 19, 21. 14 II.xxvii.10, 12, 13, 25, 29.
 Identity 19

puts it—what ‘makes’15 something the same F, where F denotes members of a

kind such as birch tree, seal, cat, table, or person. Hence, it is plausible that Locke’s
task goes beyond the mere psychological task of explaining how we acquire ideas
of identity and diversity.16 Moreover, an alternative epistemic interpretation,
according to which he addresses questions of what evidence we have for judging
individuals to be identical, is not well supported by his terminology either.17
Therefore, I will argue that Locke’s aim in II.xxvii is to specify persistence condi-
tions, although—as we will see—his approach to questions of identity is sensitive
to his overall metaphysical caution not to transcend the boundaries of human
understanding.
Locke emphasizes the importance of carefully examining the ideas associated
with the names that we give to kinds of beings. He argues that a problem with
existing discussions of the relations of identity and diversity is lack of precise
analysis of the ideas in question:18

That which has made the Difficulty about this Relation, has been the little
care and attention used in having precise Notions19 of the things to which it is
attributed. (II.xxvii.1)

According to Locke, we cannot properly engage with the question whether one
thing is the same with itself at another time until we consider the thing under a
particular concept or abstract idea. For example, let us assume that there is some-
thing grey and furry on the chair next to me. Locke believes that it is important to
decide whether I consider the thing or stuff next to me as a cat or as a collection
of material particles before I can engage with questions of identity over time. If
I decide to focus on the idea of a cat, I can ask whether the cat sitting there today is

15 II.xxvii.4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25.
16 Although Locke includes the chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ in the context of his discussion
how we form ideas of relations, and he begins II.xxvii.1 with introducing how we form ideas of iden-
tity and diversity, Locke soon turns from the ideas of relations to the relations themselves. This shift is
noticeable in II.xxvii.2 where he regards identity and diversity as relations.
17 Although individual passages such as II.xxvii.7 can be read in support of an epistemic reading,
many passages where Locke discusses identity in metaphysical terms are hard to reconcile with a
purely epistemic reading. It is worth noting that Locke uses the term ‘judge’ only once throughout the
entire chapter (see II.xxvii.7). Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid objected that Locke’s approach to iden-
tity is not suitable to provide metaphysical persistence conditions, but rather they claim that he offers
epistemic evidence for identity. See Butler, ‘Of Personal Identity’; Reid, EIP, III.6, 275–9. Butler and
Reid both assume that only immaterial substances can ground identity and, as we will see, Locke
rejects this assumption. Epistemic interpretations of Locke’s account of personal identity have been
given by Lex Newman, ‘Locke on Substance, Consciousness, and Personal Identity,’ in Locke and
Leibniz on Substance, ed. Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2015);
Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted, 265–6. Epistemic interpretations of Locke’s account of identity
have been rejected by among others Ruth Boeker, ‘Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and
Religious Differences,’ Hume Studies 41 (2015); Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity, 72; Weinberg,
Consciousness in Locke, 164; Shelley Weinberg, ‘The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke’s
Theory of Personal Identity,’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2012): 404.
18 See II.xxvii.1, 7, 28. 19 In I.i.8 Locke introduces ‘notion’ as a synonym for idea.
20 Locke ’ s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

the same as the cat that sat there yesterday. If instead I focus on the idea of ma­ter­
ial particles, I can ask whether the collection of material particles that is there
today is the same as yesterday. Since the number of hairs have changed, the col-
lection of material particles is different, but—or so Locke would argue—the cat
continued to exist. Locke’s point that we have to consider things under an abstract
idea or concept, which stands for a kind of being, becomes even clearer when we
turn to the following passages:20

’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity, or
will determine it in every Case: But to conceive, and judge of it aright, we must
consider what Idea the Word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be
the same Substance, another the same Man, and a third the same Person, if
Person, Man, and Substance, are three Names standing for three different Ideas;
for such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, such must be the Identity.
(II.xxvii.7)
But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same Spirit, Man, or Person, we
must fix the Ideas of Spirit, Man, or Person in our Minds; and having determined
what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the
like, when it is the same, and when not. (II.xxvii.15)

What do these passages reveal about Locke’s approach to questions of identity

over time? I want to propose that his approach involves the following steps:

(1a) Select a kind F to be considered. This can be done by picking out a name ‘F’
associated with the kind.21
(1b) Fix22 the abstract idea (or nominal essence) associated with kind F, which
means offering an account of the characteristic features of Fs.
(2) Specify the persistence conditions for members of kind F.

Steps (1a) and (1b) are closely related, but (1b) goes beyond (1a). Step (1b) is
needed additionally because it is possible that two people use the same name ‘F’,
but define the term differently and signify different ideas with it. Step (1a) focuses
on picking out the kind to be considered. For instance, one can decide to focus on

20 It is worth noting that Locke reiterates immediately after the passage from II.xxvii.7 quoted here
that great confusion could have been prevented had others acknowledged the importance of
approaching questions of identity under sortal concepts. Since II.xxvii.7 and 15 provide the remedy to
the problem introduced in II.xxvii.1, these passages are at the centre of Locke’s approach to identity
over time.
21 I assume here that language has already evolved and is so advanced that it includes names for
many kinds of being. However, this does not prevent us from inventing new names for additional
kinds. Whenever we invent new names, we first fix an abstract idea, or nominal essence, and then give
a name to it. In such cases step (1b) can precede step (1a).
22 I use this term because Locke uses it in II.xxvii.15.
 Identity 21

the kind that is referred to by the name ‘oak’, ‘horse’, ‘seagull’, ‘watch’, or ‘man’.
Since such names are names for a kind or sort, Locke also calls them sortal names
or terms.23 According to Locke, sortal terms are general terms signifying an
abstract idea or ‘a sort of Things’ (III.iii.12). It is worth noting that they neither
signify one particular thing, because then they would be a proper name and not a
general term, nor do they signify a plurality, because then, for instance, there
would be no difference between the abstract term ‘horse’ and the plural term
‘horses’.24
According to Locke, words have immediate significations, which are ideas in
the mind of the user:

Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the
Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly
those Ideas are collected from the Things, which they are supposed to represent.
(III.ii.2)

For Locke, it is possible that person A and person B both use a general term ‘F’,
but that the ideas in person A’s mind that are immediately signified by ‘F’ differ
from the ideas in person B’s mind. However, it would be too quick to infer from
this that A and B talk about two distinct kinds, one F and the other F*.25 Although
it is possible that A and B refer to two distinct kinds, this cannot be assumed
merely due to the fact that in the present case the immediate significations of the
name ‘F’ vary. For this reason, step (1b) is relevant, because it will offer a more
careful and detailed account of all the characteristic features associated with a
kind, namely the nominal essence of the kind, which for Locke is an abstract idea.26
The crucial step is the step from (1b) to (2) because, in this step, one turns from
considerations of the relevant kind in the abstract to persistence conditions for
individual members of the kind. In order to specify the persistence conditions,
Locke has to go beyond steps (1a) and (1b) because the name and the nominal
essence or abstract idea associated with it, namely the characteristic features of
the kind, will be shared by all members of the kind. Thus, the nominal essence
by itself will not be sufficient to explain why one member persists over time
and is distinct from all other members of the kind. I will elaborate on steps
(1a), (1b), and (2) shortly, but first a few more general considerations are
in order.
Most sections of II.xxvii are devoted to the discussion of particular examples of
persisting individuals, including the persistence of one atom, a collection of
atoms, living organisms, artefacts, men, and persons. In light of the restricted

23 See III.iii.15. 24 See III.iii.12.

25 I will explain below in section 2.2.1 what, according to Locke, it takes for two kinds to be distinct.
26 Locke introduces nominal essences in III.iii.12–16.
22 Locke ’ s Kind-dependent Approach to Identity

number of cases that Locke considers, the question arises whether Locke’s theory
is meant to extend beyond these examples to other sorts or kinds of being.
II.xxvii.28 suggests that it does:

For whatever makes the specifick Idea, to which the name is applied, if that Idea
be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers will
easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

It is worth noting that Locke here speaks of the ‘specifick Idea’, by which he means
‘the idea pertaining to a certain species’. Since Locke uses the terms ‘species’—
Latin for sort—interchangeably with ‘sort’ and ‘kind’, ‘specifick Idea’ is syn­onym­
ous with ‘sortal idea’. Thus, Locke’s approach to identity is not restricted to his
examples, but rather extends to other sorts or kinds of being.27
Sortal terms and nominal essences are the workmanship of the understand-
ing.28 However, are the members of all kinds candidates for persisting things? It is
worth noting that it does not follow that every kind will have members that per-
sist over time. In some cases, all members of a kind will have momentary exist-
ence. Locke maintains that in such cases there will be no identity over time, but
only diversity.29 This means that Locke operates with a broad understanding of
kinds and the names associated with them. Hence, we will have to ask in the step
from (1b) to (2) whether the kind under consideration is a candidate for
persistence.
I call Locke’s account of identity over time kind-­dependent. By this I mean that
the persistence conditions vary depending on the kind of being under con­sid­er­
ation. In other words, if the nominal essences of kind F and kind G are distinct,
then it is likely that the persistence conditions for members of kind F will differ
from the persistence conditions for members of kind G, and we have to examine
the characteristic features of Fs (or Gs) in order to specify the persistence condi-
tions for members of F (or G). Let us now examine the different steps of the
kind-­dependent approach more closely.

2.2.1 Names and Ideas of Kind F

Step (1a) focuses on selecting the kind to be considered. Commonly this can
be done by picking out the sortal name associated with the kind. However, it will
not be sufficient merely to pick a name among the many names for kinds such as
‘daffodil’, ‘apple tree’, ‘swan’, ‘rabbit’, ‘leopard’, or ‘watch’ and to decide that one
intends to consider the kind ‘swan’, because sortal names are the workmanship of

27 See also Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity, 82–3.

28 See III.iii.11–15. 29 See II.xxvii.2.
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of A history of art
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Title: A history of art in Chaldæa & Assyria, Vol. 2 (of 2)

Author: Charles Chipiez

Georges Perrot

Translator: Sir Walter Armstrong

Release date: October 9, 2023 [eBook #71842]

Language: English

Original publication: London: Chapman and Hall, Limited, 1884

Credits: Charlene Taylor, Karin Spence and the Online

Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY

OF ART IN CHALDÆA & ASSYRIA, VOL. 2 (OF 2) ***
 A HISTORY
OF

Art in Chaldæa & Assyria

FROM THE FRENCH
OF

GEORGES PERROT,
PROFESSOR IN THE FACULTY OF LETTERS, PARIS; MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE,
AND
CHARLES CHIPIEZ.

ILLUSTRATED WITH FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-TWO ENGRAVINGS IN THE TEXT

AND FIFTEEN STEEL AND COLOURED PLATES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—-VOL. II.

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

WALTER ARMSTRONG, B.A., Oxon., AUTHOR OF “ALFRED STEVENS,” ETC.

London: CHAPMAN AND HALL, Limited.

New York: A. C. ARMSTRONG AND SON.
1884.
 London:
R. Clay, Sons, and Taylor,
BREAD STREET HILL.
 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
CIVIL AND MILITARY ARCHITECTURE.
PAGE
§ 1. General Character of the Mesopotamian Palace and History of
the Excavations 1–8
§ 2. The Palace of Sargon 9–32
§ 3. Other Palaces of Mesopotamia 32–53
§ 4. Towns and their Defences 53–77

CHAPTER II.
SCULPTURE.
§ 1. The principal themes of Chaldæo-Assyrian Sculpture 78–109
§ 2. Materials 109–125
§ 3. The Principal Conventions of Chaldæo-Assyrian Sculpture 125–142
§ 4. On the Representations of Animals 142–173
§ 5. Chaldæan Sculpture 173–202
§ 6. Assyrian Sculpture 203–243
§ 7. Polychromy 243–250
§ 8. Gems 251–280
§ 9. The General Characteristics of Chaldæo-Assyrian Sculpture 281–291

CHAPTER III.
PAINTING 292–297

CHAPTER IV.
THE INDUSTRIAL ARTS.
§ 1. Ceramics 298–308
§ 2. Metallurgy 308–313
§ 3. Furniture 313–324
§ 4. Metal Dishes and Utensils 324–343
§ 5. Arms 343–349
§ 6. Instruments of the Toilet and Jewelry 349–363
§ 7. Textiles 363–372
§ 8. Commerce 372–374

CHAPTER V.
COMPARISON BETWEEN EGYPT AND CHALDÆA 375–400

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS 401–404

INDEX 407–420
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PLATES.
I. Royal statue, found by M. de Sarzec To face
page 126
II. Two Chaldæan heads, found by M. de Sarzec „ 128
III. Lion, from Nimroud „ 130
IV. Winged bull, from Khorsabad „ 136
V. Assurbanipal in his chariot „ 138
VI. Bronze lion, from the palace of Sargon „ 154
VII. Fragment from the Balawat gates „ 212
VIII. Enamelled brick, from Nimroud „ 294
Enamelled brick, from Nimroud „
IX. 294
Fragment of painting on stucco, from Nimroud
X. Decoration in enamelled brick, from the harem at „
Khorsabad 294

FIG. PAGE
1. Map of Nineveh and its neighbourhood 6
2. The mound and village of Khorsabad before the
commencement of the excavations 9
3. Plan of Sargon’s palace in its present state 12
4. Longitudinal section through the palace of Sargon 13
5. South-eastern gateway of Sargon’s palace at
Khorsabad 17
6. Plan of the harem in Sargon’s palace 21
7. Harem court in the palace of Sargon at Khorsabad 25
8. A hanging garden 30
9. Plan of a palace at Warka 33
10. Plan of chambers at Mugheir 34
11. Plan of chambers at Abou-Sharein 34
12. Plan of chambers at Abou-Sharein 34
13. General view of Nimroud 38
14. Plan of the north-western palace at Nimroud 39
15. Assurnazirpal offering a libation to the gods after his
victory over a wild bull 41
16. Plan of the south-western palace at Nimroud 43
17. Upper chambers excavated at Nimroud 44
18. Map of the site of Nineveh 45
19. Plan of the mound of Kouyundjik 46
 20. Part plan of the palace of Sennacherib 47
21. Sennacherib at the head of his army 49
22. Town besieged by Sennacherib 54
23. Siege of a city 60
24. Plan of one of the ordinary gates at Khorsabad 66
25. Restoration in perspective of one of the ordinary gates
of Khorsabad 67
26. State gateway at Khorsabad 68
27. Longitudinal section through the archway of one of the
city gates, Khorsabad 69
28. Fortified wall; from the Balawat gates 73
29. Siege of a fort 74
30. An attack by escalade 75
31. Chariot for three combatants; from the palace of
Assurbanipal 76
32. The demon of the south-west wind 81
33. Head of a winged bull of Assurbanipal 83
34. Cone of chalcedony 85
35. Izdubar and Lion 86
36. Winged genius 87
37. Carrying the gods; from the palace of Sennacherib 90
38. Istar and the sacrificing priest 90
39. Istar between two personages 90
40. Lapis-lazuli cylinder 91
41. 42. Fragments of an ivory statuette 92
43. Merodach- or Marduk-idin-akhi 95
44. Captives on the march; from the palace of
Sennacherib 97
45. Sargon before the sacred tree 99
46. Assyrian standard 102
47. Sennacherib before Lachish 105
48. Procession of captives 107
49. One face of the obelisk of Shalmaneser II. 111
50. Statuette of a priest 114
51. Dagon 114
52. Head of a lioness 115
53. Canephoros 117
54. Man driving goats and sheep; from the Balawat gates 118
55. Lion carved in wood 119
56. Ivory seal 119
57. Ivory tablet in the British Museum 120
58. Ivory fragment in the British Museum 121
59. Ivory tablet in the British Museum 122
 60. Statue of Assurnazirpal 123
61. Statue of Shalmaneser II. 127
62. Pair of warriors 129
63. Prisoners; from the palace of Sennacherib 130
64. Vassal bringing monkeys 133
65. Head of a eunuch 136
66. Assyrian soldier 137
67. Fragment of a Chaldæan bas-relief 141
68. Head of a cow 143
69. Terra-cotta tablet 144
70. Cylinder of black marble 145
71. Terra-cotta dog 146
72. The hounds of Assurbanipal 147
73. Chariot horses 150
74. Wild ass; from the hunt of Assurbanipal 151
75. Embroidery on the king’s robe 153
76. Fight between a man and an ostrich 153
77. Lion and lioness in a park 155
78. Lion coming out of his cage 156
79. Wounded lion 157
80. Wounded lioness 161
81. Niche decorated with two lions 163
82. Sword and scabbard 164
83. Combat between a lion and a unicorn 165
84. Lion’s head, in enamelled earthenware 165
85. Recumbent goat ditto 166
86. Dog, in terra-cotta 167
87. Fantastic animal 168
88. Man-lion 169
89. Winged horse 171
90. Griffins seizing a goat 171
91. Human-headed bird 172
92. Inscription engraved on one of the seated Chaldæan
statues 175
93. Fragment of a stele; from Tello 177
94. Fragment of a stele; from Tello 179
95. Fragment of a stele; from Tello 181
96. Statue; from Tello 182
97. The hands of a statue; from Tello 183
98. The large statue from Tello 185
99. Female statuette 187
100. Statuette; from Tello 188
101. Fragment of a relief; from Tello 189
102. Fragment of a relief; from Tello 191
103. Head; from Tello 191
104. Stone pedestal; from Tello 192
105. Chaldæan statuette 193
106. Statuette of a priest 195
107. Statuette of a woman 195
108. Terra-cotta statuette 196
109. Head; from Tello 197
110. The Caillou Michaux 199
111. The Caillou Michaux, obverse 200
112. The Caillou Michaux, reverse 201
113. Assurnazirpal offering a libation 205
114. Tree on a river-bank 207
115. Detail from the royal robe of Assurnazirpal 209
116. Stele of Samas-vul II. 211
117. Two fragments from the Balawat gates 215
118. Bas-relief; from Khorsabad 221
119. Marsh vegetation 223
120. The great bas-relief at Bavian 227
121. Fountain 230
122. Assyrian bas-relief in the Nahr-el-Kelb 231
123. The bas-reliefs of Malthaï 233
124. Chaldæan cylinder 237
125. Assyrian cylinder 237
126. Wild goats 239
127. The feast of Assurbanipal 241
128. Terra-cotta statuette 242
129. River pebble which has formed part of a necklace 252
130. River pebble engraved 252
131. Concave-faced cylinder 254
132. Cylinder with modern mount 254
133. Tablet with impression from a cylinder 256
134. Cylinder with ancient bronze mount 257
135. Cylinder and attachment in one 257
136. Chaldæan cylinder 257
137. Impression from the same cylinder 257
138. Engraved shell 260
139. Chalcedony cylinder 261
140. Cylinder of black jasper 261
141. Assyrian cylinder 262
142. Chaldæan cylinder; marble or porphyry 264
143. Chaldæan cylinder; green serpentine 266
144. Chaldæan cylinder; basalt 267
 145. Chaldæan cylinder; basalt 267
146. Chaldæan cylinder 268
147. Chaldæan cylinder; basalt 269
148. Chaldæan cylinder; black marble 270
149. Chaldæan cylinder of veined agate 271
150. Archaic Assyrian cylinder 272
151. Assyrian cylinder; serpentine 273
152. Assyrian cylinder; serpentine 273
153. Assyrian cylinder 273
154. Chaldæan cylinder dating from the second monarchy;
black jasper 275
155. Impression of a cylinder on a contract 275
156. Cylinder with Aramaic characters 276
157. Cone 277
158. Cone 277
159. Amethyst cone 279
160. Agate cone 279
161. Assurbanipal attacked by lions 283
162. Figure of a goddess 290
163–165. Chaldæan vases of the first period 299
166–168. Chaldæan vases of the second period 299
169. Chaldæan vase 300
170–173. Assyrian vases 301
174–176. Goblets 301
177. Ewer 301
178–180. Amphoræ 302
181. Alabastron 302
182. Fragment of a vase 302
183. Fragment of a vase 303
184, 185. Fragments of vases 303
186. Goblet 304
187. Fragment of a vase 304
188, 189. Fragments of vases 305
190. Glass vase or bottle 307
191. Glass tube 307
192. Iron mattock 310
193. Fragment of a throne 315
194. Fragment of a throne 316
195. Bronze foot of a piece of furniture 316
196. Capital and upper part of a small column 317
197, 198. Fragments of bronze furniture 317
199. Footstool; from a bas-relief 318
200. Stool 318
 201. Ivory panel 321
202. Dagger-hilt; ivory 322
203. Bronze tripod 324
204, 205. Metal vases 325
206. Metal bucket 325
207. Applied piece 326
208. Bronze platter 327
209. Bronze platter 330
210–214. Columns or standards figured upon a bronze cup 331
215. Bronze platter 332
216. Part of a bronze cup or platter 333
217. Bronze cup 334
218. Bronze cup 342
219. Border of a cup 343
220, 221. Chariot poles 344
222, 223. Sword scabbards 345
224. Bronze cube damascened with gold 346
225. Votive shield 347
226. Knife-handle 348
227. Comb 350
228. Comb 351
229. Comb 352
230, 231. Bronze fork and spoon 353
232, 233. Bracelets 354
234. Ear-drop 354
235–237. Necklace and ear-drops 355
238. Necklace 356
239. Royal necklace 356
240. Bracelet 357
241. Bracelets 358
242. Ear-drop 358
243, 244. Ear-drops 358
245. Necklace 359
246, 247. Moulds for trinkets 361
248, 249. Gold buttons 359
250. Part of the harness of a chariot-horse 361
251, 252. Ear-pendents 362
253. Embroidery on the upper part of the king’s mantle 365
254. Embroidery upon a royal mantle 367
255. Embroidered pectoral 369
256. Detail of embroidery 370
257. Detail of embroidery 370
258. Detail of embroidery 371
259. Detail of embroidery 372
260. Egyptian mirror 387
261. Egyptian mirror 391
TAIL-PIECES, &c.
Fore-quarters of a lion, glazed earthenware (Louvre) 77
Standard, from a relief 291
Flower, from a relief 297
Head of a ram, ivory (Louvre) 374
The sacred tree, from a relief 400
Ornament from a royal tiara 404
 A HISTORY OF ART
IN

CHALDÆA AND ASSYRIA

 CHAPTER I.
CIVIL AND MILITARY ARCHITECTURE.

§ I. General Character of the Mesopotamian Palace and History of

the Excavations.

As every student of Assyro-Chaldæan art has remarked, the best

preserved of its monuments are the palaces. They alone are
represented by ruins in such a condition that restorations may be
successfully attempted, not only so far as their general
arrangements are concerned but even in minor details. The
preponderant part played by the ruins of palaces in the history of
Assyrian architecture is thus acknowledged by all, but it has
sometimes been explained by reasons that will not bear
examination. “Less religious or more servile than the Egyptians and
the Greeks, they made their temples insignificant in comparison with
the dwellings of their kings, to which indeed the temple is most
commonly a sort of appendage. In the palace their art culminates—-
there every effort is made, every ornament lavished. If the
architecture of the Assyrian palaces be fully considered, very little
need be said on the subject of their other buildings.”[1]
History contradicts any such theory. The asserted inequality did
not exist. The piety of Chaldæans and Assyrians was no less lively
and profound than that of the Egyptians. A Seti or a Rameses, the
cherished son and visible image of Amen, the prince who became a
god after his life was done, was no less powerful and venerable at
Memphis and Thebes than were Sargon and Nebuchadnezzar at
Nineveh and Babylon.
The differences to which we have pointed are to be explained by
other and more simple reasons. In Egypt the temple has survived the
palace because it was a dwelling built for an immortal occupant, and
therefore the most durable materials, stone and granite, were used;
while the palace, being no more than the resting-place of a day, a
shelter raised among waving palms and flowing streams for the
passenger through this life to the next, had to be content with brick
and timber. In Mesopotamia, on the other hand, the same materials
were used for the dwellings both of gods and kings; and the same
system of construction, a system dictated by the climate, was
applied to both classes of buildings. It is not true that one group was
neglected for the other, that Mesopotamian civilization took less
trouble for Marduk, for Istar and Assur, than for its conquering
princes; it is inaccurate to say that her palace architecture was all
that Assyria had to show. The tomb was larger and more important in
Egypt than in Mesopotamia, but in the latter country the temple was
the object of as much care, both in construction and decoration, as
the palace. Its arrangement was more interesting and far more
original, and its outward decoration no less rich. In Babylon, at least,
the inscriptions in which the kings recount their exploits for the
admiration of posterity, speak oftener and with more pride of temples
than of palaces. The remains of the latter are more complete simply
because their chief development was over the surface of the ground,
while that of the temples was toward the sky. With materials such as
those of which both the one and the other were built it was inevitable
that tall buildings should come to ruin before low ones. Moreover,
their most interesting parts were on the exterior and more especially
about their summits. Ramps and sanctuaries with their surface
decorations must have begun to disappear as soon as daily care
ceased to be lavished upon them. The solid interior alone would be
preserved, and, before many years were over, the degradation of its
substance would make it a shapeless heap of clay. The palace, of
course, burnt-in the first place and then abandoned to the slow
action of time, can have met the forces of destruction with no better
effect than buildings of marble and granite did elsewhere; but it
inclosed great empty spaces, wide quadrangles, long galleries, and
spacious chambers. In their fall ceilings and the heads of walls filled
up these voids and buried their inclosing walls to a considerable
height in a deep bed of protecting rubbish. This had only to be taken
away to lay bare the whole plan of the building and much of its
ornamentation. We can thus become much more intimately
acquainted with the palace than with the temple, but we have no
right thence to conclude that the former was the favourite work of the