Angat DRAFT EAP-3rdRevision

Consulting Services for the Study of Angat Dam
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2 DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET
Amendment Effective Subject Pages Signed

Number Date
1 12.02.2012 Revision 1st Draft
2 30.04.2012 Revision 2nd draft
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Engineering and Development
Corporation of the Philippines T&T
PhilippinesT & T
Philippines
CONTROLLED COPY DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. National Power Corporation (NPC)

2. Power Sector Assets & Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM)
3. National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
4. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
5. Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
(PAGASA)
6. Maynilad Water Services Inc (MWSI)
7. Manila Water Company Inc (MWCI)
8. Flood Forecasting Warning System for Dam Operation (FFWSDO) – Angat Dam
9. Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
10. Office of Civil Defense (OCD)
11. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS)
12. Provincial Government of Bulacan
13. Engineering Development Corporation of the Philippines (EDCOP)
14. Tonkin & Taylor International (Phils.), Inc (T&T Phils.)
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DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1.0 NOTIFICATION 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Notification Flowchart 1
2.0 INTRODUCTION 6
2.1 Purpose of Emergency Action Plan 6

2.2 EAP Outline 6
2.3 Dam Ownership & Management 6
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP 8
3.1 General Responsibilities 8

3.1.1 National Power Corporation 8
3.1.2 National Government 9
3.1.3 Local Government 9
3.1.4 Community Leaders 10
3.2 Responsibility for Notification 11
3.2.1 National Power Corporation 11
3.3 Responsibility for Evacuation 11
3.3.1 Outside and Downstream of the Angat Dam 11
3.3.2 Within the Facility 11
3.4 Responsibility for Termination and Follow-Up 11
3.4.1 Duration of Emergency 11
3.4.2 Security 12
3.4.3 Termination of Emergency 12
3.4.4 Follow-up 12
3.5 EAP Coordinator Responsibility 12
3.5.1 EAP Revisions and Updates 13
3.5.2 EAP Training & Frequency 13
3.5.3 EAP Exercises 13
4.0 EMERGENCY IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 15
4.1 Notification of Potential Emergency Situations 15

4.2 Definitions of Emergency Situations 15
4.3 Definitions of Unusual Occurrences 15
4.4 Emergency Evaluation & Classification 16
5.0 PREPAREDNESS 18
5.1 Preventive and Warning Systems 18

5.2 Emergency Preparedness 18
5.3 Site Access 19
5.4 Response during periods of darkness 19
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5.5 Response during periods of adverse weather 19

5.6 Response during weekends and holidays 20
5.7 Communication Systems 20
5.8 Emergency Supplies and Information 20
5.8.1 Special Equipment 20
5.8.2 Supplies and Materials 21
5.8.3 Emergency Power Supply 21
6.0 INUNDATION MAPS 22
6.1 Introduction 22
6.2 Flood Hazard Classification 22
6.3 Use of Inundation Maps 22
Disclaimer 23
7.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 25
7.1 Dam Details 25

7.1.1 Downstream Dams 25
7.2 Operation Standards 25
7.3 Major Risks – General 26
7.4 Heavy Rainfall Monitoring & Flood Forecasting 26
7.5 Earthquake Risk 26
Appendix A: INUNDATION MAPPING

Appendix B: TRAINING, UPDATING, REPORTING AND POSTING EAP
Appendix C: DAM BREAK STUDY SUMMARY
Appendix D: EAP Approval
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1.0 NOTIFICATION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In the event of an emergency, as classified by Section 4.4 of this document, all

possible measures outlined in this document must be taken to protect the integrity
of the dam, life and property downstream. All parties must be aware of their
individual role in ensuring that the correct mitigation and communication measures
are taken.
1.2 NOTIFICATION FLOWCHART
The notification flow chart in Figure 1.2-1 is an effective tool to be used for timely
notification applicable to all emergency classification levels considered in Section
4.4 and clearly summarizes:
 Who is responsible for notifying the Angat Dam, Ipo Dam, and Bustos dam
representative(s) and emergency management official(s) or the Bulacan
Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (Bulacan –
PDRRMO).
 Who is to be notified, and by whom.
 What the order of notification priority is.
The Plant Manager is designated the role of Emergency Action Plan (EAP)
Coordinator. Upon detection of an emergency, the EAP Coordinator will
immediately follow the Notification Flowchart presented in this section to initiate the
emergency response procedures.
In line with the notification flowchart shown in Figure 1.2-1, the contact details for
all involved are provided in Table 1.2-1.
The Notification Form included in this section is to be completed during an

emergency.
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Corporation of the Philippines T & T Philippines
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Table 1.2-1 Contact Numbers
ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE
Angat HEP San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Rodolfo E. German 02 921 2189 02 921 2189 0908 181 8217
Bulacan 02 924 5458
DRFFD, NPC Head Office Diliman, Quezon City Romualdo T. Beltran 02 924 5236 02 924 5236 0916 236 1300
FFWSDO Angat Dam, Norzagaray, Alexander A. Palada 02 921 3328 02 921 3328 0916 236 1433
Bul.
Ipo Dam (CPF- MWSS) Norzagaray, Bulacan Hermie Medrano none none 0929 399 8608
Bustos Dam (NIA) San Rafael, Bulacan Felix Y. Robles 044 766 3888 044 766 3888 0918 340 9497
044 766 3524
PAGASA Diliman, QC Dr. Susan Espinueva 02 929 4065 02 920 4052 0939 511 3916
National Grid Corp. of the Phil. Diliman, QC Sr. Superintendent on 02 920 0073 02 922 0487 n/a
Duty
PSALM Makati City VP Conrad S. 02 840 3896 02 840 3896 0908 860 6049
Tolentino
Office of Civil Defense – Region San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Defence Officer) 045 455 0564
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Office of the Bulacan Governor Malolos, Bulacan Governor Alvarado
Bulacan - PDRRMO Malolos, Bulacan Liz Mungcal 044 796 2651 044 791 1861 0917 804 0206
Norzagaray -MDRRMO Norzagaray, Bulacan Edilberto Castillo 044 694 1715 044 694 0626 0917 345 0076
Angat - MDRRMO Angat, Bulacan Dr. Alex Saligao 044 671 7950 * 0921 471 9352 **
Bustos -MDRRMO Bustos, Bulacan Insp. Arnel Cañosa 044 617 1035 044 617 7996 0906 805 9544
044 617 7996
Baliuag - MDRRMO Baliuag, Bulacan Josephine L. 044 892 0745 044 766 3246 0932 516 5808
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Labasbas 044 766 2538
San Rafael -MDRRMO San Rafael, Bulacan Luisito Rodriguez 044 761 5561 044 761 5556 0905 416 2744
Plaridel - MDRRMO Plaridel, Bulacan Reynaldo dela Cruz 044 670 2673 044 795 0366 0920 945 2641
Pulilan -MDRRMO Pulilan, Bulacan Cymbeline C. Maño 044 795 0128 044 795 0128 0922 816 2967
044 676 1234
Calumpit - MDRRMO Calumpit, Bulacan Engr. Abel Cabrera 044 675 1271 * 0917 826 0856 **
Hagunoy -MDRRMO Hagunoy, Bulacan Rodolfo J. Santos 044 793 5811 044 793 2619 0939 922 6391
Paombong - MDRRMO Paombong, Bulacan Emerito Sacdalan 044 760 5044 044 760 5044 0918 925 1293
044 760 7783
Note : * - No-one is answering ** - Not available.
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EMERGENCY CONDITION
EXISTS AT ANGAT DAM
OBSERVER
PLANT MANAGER
(EAP COORDINATOR)
G
NPC DAM MERGENCY FFWSDO
ORGANIZATION AND E
1 PANEL OF EXPERTS
N
2 IPO DAM BUSTOS DAM PAGASA R

OPERATOR OPERATOR
A
L
NGCP PSALM
(SYSTEM OPERATOR) (OWNER)

3 P
OFFICE OF THE OFFICES OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAINS U
GOVERNOR/PDRRMO MUNICIPAL MAYORS
B
L
OFFICE OF THE CIVIL MEDIA
DEFENSE III I
4
C
DOWNSTREAM BARANGAY CAPTAINS
MUNICIPALITIES
Figure 1.2-1 NOTIFICATION FLOWCHART
The EAP Coordinator is responsible for implementing the emergency notification in the order of priority indicated below. If the Primary contact is not available the EAP Coordinator shall immediately contact the Secondary
Contact. Order of Notification Priority for the EAP Coordinator is noted in top right corner of each box. In the absence of the Plant Manager, the Operation Superintendent shall be the automatic EAP Coordinator .
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EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM
1. NAME/Organization……………………………..
2. DATE……………
3. TIME……………..
4. DAM NAME: ANGAT
5. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:…………………..……………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
................................................................................................................................................
............................
6. UNUSUAL FLOW: Quantity:

…………………………………………………………………..
6.1 Quality & Colour:

…………………………………………………………………………….....
7.0 RESERVOIR WATER LEVEL:

…………………………………………………………………..
8.0 GENERAL COMMENTS:
8.1 Weather conditions:

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……
8.2 Situation – Improving/Stable/Worsening:

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………
8.3 Other Comments:

………………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
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9.0 NOTIFICATION CHECKLIST:
National Power Corporation (NPC), Diliman – Q.C. Time…………..
Flood Forecasrtng and Warning System for Dam Operation (FFWSDO) Time …………..
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) Time…………..
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Time…………..
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) Time…………..
Provincial Government of Bulacan Time…………..
Bulacan – PDRRMO Time………….
National Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) Time…………..
(Downstream Municipalities) Time…………..
Others???? Time…………..
Plant Manager/EAP Coordinator Signature: ..………………………………………….
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 PURPOSE OF EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
This Emergency Action Plan defines the responsibilities of all organizations
associated with identifying and assessing potential emergency situations or
unusual events which may endanger Angat Dam and Dyke and downstream
residents. Through early identification of an emergency situation, preventative
actions can be taken and the appropriate emergency management officials can be
notified of possible, impending, or actual failure of the dam. The plan may also be
used to provide notification when flood releases will create major flooding.
The Angat Dam and Dyke Emergency Action Plan (EAP) provides the Operator
(NPC) with a straight forward procedure to notify:
 The Government agencies of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) involved in
responding to “dam related” emergencies; and
 The downstream municipalities of the Dam that will be affected by such an
emergency.
2.2 EAP OUTLINE
This Emergency Action Plan includes a set of procedures for:

 Defining and identifying Emergency Situations and/or Unusual Events which
may threaten the integrity of the Dam;
 Ensuring effective and early actions are taken to prevent dam failure;
 Avoiding loss of life and minimizing property damage in the event of a failure by
implementing early and effective warnings to all involved; and
 Providing timely warning to appropriate emergency management agencies for
their implementation of protected measures for downstream communities.
This document remains in force throughout the operational life of the dam. It will be
updated annually with formal written notification of any amendments and distributed
to those who have a copy.
The dam is considered to be in operation while the structure is being used to

control flow from the Angat River.
2.3 DAM OWNERSHIP & MANAGEMENT
PSALM owns the Angat HEP Facility, as per Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA), which includes the Dam and Dykes and its instrumentations. NPC
operates and maintains the Angat HEP Facility as per Operation and Maintenance
Agreement executed with PSALM.
NPC as operator, through its Dams, Reservoir and Flood Forecasting Department
(DRFFD) shall administer, operate, rehabilitate, preserve and maintain the dam
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and dykes and shall utilize the reservoir water to provide the requirements for
drinking water, irrigation and power generation of MWSS, NIA and NPC,
respectively.
The Flood Forecasting and Warning System for Dam Operations Division
(FFWSDO) of DRFFD, as per Flood Forecasting Manual, is responsible for the
continuous flood monitoring and warning systems. During normal conditions, when
there is no weather disturbance and/or the reservoir elevation is below the Normal
High Water Level, the operator is solely responsible for water release activities.
During Extraordinary Conditions, identified through coordination with PAGASA, the
FFWSDO shall govern for advising the Angat HEP Operator on water release
activities, issuance of notices on flood operation of the dam to related agencies,
general public and local officials implementing disaster preparedness plan and
conducting post flood analysis after occurrence of extreme floods. For emergency
situations, this document will take precedence over anything else.
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3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP

3.1 GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3.1.1 National Power Corporation
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is the operator of the Angat Dam and Dyke.
NPC is responsible for maintaining the FFWSDO office and for executing flood
releases through the spillway under extraordinary conditions. PAGASA assists
NPC FFWSDO office by providing rainfall and weather alert information. NPC,
through the FFWSDO office is responsible for initiating and controlling the opening
and closing of the Angat Dam spillway gates.
The FFWSDO office is responsible for notifying the Ipo and Bustos dam Operators
of any potential hazard or scheduled releases at Angat Dam. The FFWSDO office
is responsible for the notification of flood warnings to the downstream residents.
NPC is responsible for the operations and maintenance of the Angat Dam and
Dyke to ensure their integrity and safety. It has the responsibility to operate the
dam in a manner that would under all circumstances meet sound engineering and
professional standards, and all guidelines associated with procedures in the Dam
Safety Program and Flood Forecasting Manuals. The procedures herein are based
on the New Zealand Society on Large Dams (NZSOLD).
Specifically, NPC’s overall responsibilities include:

 Development, testing, maintaining and implementing this plan.
 Complying with the detail of this emergency plan.
 Ensuring all staff involved in the operation of the Angat Dam and Dyke are
familiar with this plan, and the obligations it has.
 Retaining suitably trained staff and ensuring authorised staff are available to
competently assess potential emergency situations.
 Having facilities and procedures in place to give warnings to Provincial
Governor, the Directors of the Provincial Disaster and Risk Reduction
Management Council (PDRRMC), the National Disaster and Risk Reduction
Management Council (NDRRMC), and other agencies (such as PAGASA) in
the event of an emergency situation at the dam site.
 Monitoring the condition of the Dam, continuing with operation, maintenance
and corrective action as guided by the NPC Dam Safety Program Manual.
 Evaluating the significance of abnormal or dam related events and determining
if emergency conditions exist.
 Practicing caution while operating during abnormal and emergency conditions.
 Developing information sessions for downstream communities on how to
effectively follow the EAP without creating a fear of hazards.
 Creating working relationships with all involved with the emergency response.
 Responsible for designating an EAP coordinator who will implement all
activities related to an emergency.
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 Establish relationships with local communities and officials, ensuring they are
properly informed about Dam safety measures.
 Periodic updating of the EAP.
3.1.2 National Government
The National Government has the overall responsibility for organizing and
maintaining an adequate level of disaster preparedness for emergencies
throughout the Philippines. During the development phase of any major Philippines
project, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) reviews the environmental impacts
and establishes the initial requirements for the preparation of emergency action
plans. The principal agency involved in disaster coordination is the National
Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC). The NDRRMC
sets the guidelines for emergency preparedness and disaster operations that
involve rescue, relief, and rehabilitation. The NDRRMC provides the following:
 Guidelines to encourage and support local governments and industry and

initiation of coordinated emergency action plans at the local level in industrial
and developed areas;
 Dissemination of information about emergency preparedness and disaster
operations;
 Promotion and sponsorship of workshops, training seminars, and courses on
emergency preparedness;
 Provision of resources for the local community to respond effectively and
expeditiously to any emergency at the local level.
The National Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC)

coordinates all disaster management programs on a regional level. As such the
NDRRMC has field officers designated to each province and in the event of any
disaster; the NDRRMC coordinates with the National Government for rescue and
relief operations.
PAGASA maintains a flood forecasting and warning system during the wet season
and issues weather advisories and bulletins on a regular basis to local radio and
TV stations and the internet.
The National Government establishes a working atmosphere conducive to

emergency action plans by providing the resources to ensure their successful
implementation.
3.1.3 Local Government Comment [spv1]: must have inputs/approval of

LGUs
The Bulacan Provincial Government is responsible for safety, public health, and
environmental protection within their area. The local government is responsible for
notifying and evacuating those people who live in areas that would be inundated by
failure of dam or flood releases. Functions relating to emergency preparedness
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and disaster operations are assigned specifically to the Regional Disaster and Risk
Reduction Management Council (RDRRMC), the Provincial Disaster and Risk
Reduction Management Council (PDRRMC) and the Municipal Disaster and Risk
Reduction Management Council (MDRRMC) at their respective regional, provincial
and municipal levels.
The Chairman of the RDRRMC is the Regional Director of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The Regional Director coordinates the disaster operations in the
region and implements the guidelines set by the NDRRMC.
The Chairman of the PDRRMC and MDRRMC are the Governor and Mayor,
respectively. They are counterparts of the RDRRMC Chairman in the province and
municipality.
As PDRRMC Chairman, the Governor of Bulacan is responsible for initiating

appropriate actions based on Emergency Notifications received from the Angat
Dam. This responsibility includes determining if and when an evacuation is
required, and time frame for the emergency termination. Comment [spv2]: This might require inputs
from the facility owner. LGU may not be able to
determine these
Within each Management Council, several committees exist to handle the various
tasks. The additional responsibilities of the Management Councils are:
 Public awareness and mobilization of public support to emergency action
programs as part of the overall disaster preparedness programs of the
Province/Municipality/Barangay
 Training of personnel in emergency response
 Acquisition and mobilization of needed resources
 Implementing off-site activities of this EAP.
3.1.4 Community Leaders Comment [spv3]: This portion must have

specifics and should include inputs
concurrence/approvals of LGUs
Community leaders include non-government organizations, groups and
associations, including religious, community service, health, academic and
business. These representative leaders are responsible for:
 Addressing concerns related to their constituency to the local authorities,

including plans and programs to protect their habitat and health
 Providing leadership to train people on this EAP
 Assisting local support and participating in this EAP
 Assisting in evacuation efforts under the direction of the EAP authorities.
3.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOTIFICATION
3.2.1 National Power Corporation
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As specified in the Notification Flowchart, Figure 1.2-1, the Plant Manager assumes
the role of the EAP Coordinator and will initiate Notification if an emergency is
declared. Similar to the Flood Warning Rule, notification shall be via the land line
telephones, mobile phone, fax and hand held radios. The major responsibility of
the EAP Coordinator is to contact and update the emergency response agencies
with information concerning the emergency.
NPC, through its FFWSDO office, will also notify the public downstream of the dam
through use of the Flood Forecasting Warning System. FFWS warnings during a
possible dam break emergency must be clearly distinguished from relatively routine
spillway release to avoid potential conflict and confusion. Comment [spv4]: Please define responsible
party for all possible dam failure scenarios (e.g. dam
breaching during earthquake, excessive inflows,
3.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVACUATION sabotage, etc)
Comment [RTB5]: This we need to discuss …
FFWSDO …. Is for spillway discharge warning, but
3.3.1 Outside and Downstream of the Angat Dam due to impending dam break, primary response is the
lowering of the reservoir thru the spillways ….
rtbeltran
The Chairman of the PDRRMC (the Governor of Bulacan) is primarily responsible Comment [spv6]: Thisa should have
for initiating the timely and safe evacuation of residents from the inundation-prone concurrence approval and inouts of LGUs
areas. The PDRRMC in coordination with the MDRRMC coordinators will

implement an evacuation.
3.3.2 Within the Facility
The EAP Coordinator shall initiate a safe and timely evacuation of all the Angat
Dam personnel and site visitors.
In the event of an evacuation, all personnel, security, and visitors on site will
proceed to the emergency meeting point where the Plant Manager will account for
all Dam personnel and visitors on site at the time of evacuation. The emergency
evacuation point will be at the Administration Building Area.
3.4 RESPONSIBILITY FOR DURATION, SECURITY, TERMINATION

AND POST REVIEW
3.4.1 Duration of Emergency
Over the duration of an emergency situation, the EAP Coordinator shall provide
emergency update reports to all concerned agencies as presented in the
notification flow chart.
3.4.2 Security
Security on site at Angat Dam shall be notified of the emergency situation and extra
precautions should be taken to protect the public and allow effective performance
of emergency response actions.
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3.4.3 Termination of Emergency
There are two conditions requiring a termination of the emergency. One has to do
with emergency conditions at the dam and the other is related to the evacuation
and disaster response. The dam operator, through coordination with PAGASA and
the FFWS office is responsible for making the decision that an emergency
condition no longer exists at the dam. The applicable Bulacan and ........... Comment [spv7]: The responsibility should not
be limited to determining emergency condition at the
Provincial Governor’s Offices and the local Mayors’ offices are responsible for dam only but also knowledge of emergency
termination of the evacuation or disaster response activities. The National Power condition downstream which should be
disseminated as basis of LGU actions
Corporation and Heads of Regional, Provincial and Municipal DRRMCs. along with
other concerned government officials shall agree on when it is appropriate to
terminate an emergency.
The National Power Corporation, Heads of Regional, Provincial and Municipal

DRRMCs and the concerned local government officials should determine if a news
release for the media for termination of the emergency condition is appropriate.
Such news releases are expected to be a supplement to other methods of notifying
the public that the emergency has been terminated.
3.4.4 Post Review of Emergency
Following an emergency, an evaluation and review should be conducted that

includes official representatives from all concerned agencies as presented in
Notification Flowchart. The following should be discussed and evaluated in the
after-action review:
 Events before, during, and following the emergency
 Significant actions taken by each participant, and improvements practicable for
future emergencies
 All strengths and deficiencies found in procedures, materials, equipment,
staffing levels, and leadership
The results of the after-action review should be documented in an evaluation report

chaired by the dam owner and used as a basis for revising the EAP.
3.5 EAP COORDINATOR RESPONSIBILITY
The EAP Coordinator is the primary contact between the Dam and the emergency
response agencies. The EAP Coordinator is responsible for records, initial
Notification, updates and relaying information to both Dam personnel and
emergency agencies. The EAP Coordinator is responsible for the follow-up and
reporting after the emergency has been terminated.
If time permits, the EAP Coordinator may also initiate communications with external
technical experts for further assessment.
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3.5.1 EAP Revisions and Updates
The EAP should be reviewed regularly by a committee from NPC, composed of

representatives from Angat HEP, Dams, Reservoir and Flood Forecasting
Department (DRFFD) and Environmental Management Department (EMD). The
Committee will conduct yearly reviews and exercise of the EAP and it’s
functionality, making updates as required.
When an amendment or update is made, the Committee shall issue notices of

changes to all EAP recipients, including a full hard copy of the revised edition.
When a revision is made, the revision table at the beginning of this document must
reflect exactly what changes were made. In addition to including the date, page
number of edits, the footer shall be changed to reflect the “Version No. X and
Revised dd/mm/yy”. This ensures all parties involved are clear about which version
is most current.
3.5.2 EAP Training & Frequency
The Plant Manager is in charge of and responsible for training all Operator’s
employees. The training will vary for different groups of employees, depended on
their role. Site security and any other regular visitors to the site shall be included.
The training should occur quarterly, or when there are changes to the roles of staff.
Appropriate training is to be provided by their immediate supervisor on their new
roles and responsibilities during an emergency.
During the EAP training sessions, a focus should be placed on:

 Employee roles and responsibilities
 Plans and procedures
 Evacuation procedures on site and downstream
 Response to particular scenarios and emergency levels.
3.5.3 EAP Exercises
The EAP shall be simulated regularly in part or whole to test the efficiency of the
process, from Operator’s employees to the emergency agencies. Regular drills will
improve knowledge, awareness, and emergency preparedness skills. The Plant
Manager determines the frequency of these exercises, often at unexpected times
to simulate a real situation.
Areas to be monitored which are of specific concern during a drill are:

 Proper working of alarms, satellite phones, portable radios, fax
 Adherence to EAP procedures
 Emergency agencies, their availability and their response time
 Timeliness of evacuation and accountability of personnel on site at time of drill.
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The exercises shall be documented, taking note of efficiency and areas of concern.
The Plant Manager shall relay this information on to the Committee to determine
whether recommendations shall be incorporated in the manual.
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4.0 EMERGENCY IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION

4.1 NOTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL EMERGENCY SITUATIONS Comment [spv8]: This should describe the
details of notification procedure
During the operation of the Angat Plant, NPC staff, specifically DRFFD staff, are
required to maintain surveillance and monitoring of the dam and dyke, including
reservoir level, as per the Dam Safety Program Manual. Upon recognition of a
potential problem with the dam, said staff shall, without delay, investigate the
cause, and proceed with the necessary actions and provide preliminary warning to
the Angat Plant Manager. It is the responsibility of the Plant Manager to declare
whether the situation is likely to lead to an Emergency Situation or not. Emergency
Situations and Unusual Occurrences are defined in Section 4.24.2 and 4.34.3 Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
(U.K.)
respectively.
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
(U.K.)
4.2 DEFINITIONS OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS Comment [spv9]: This should be first
An Emergency Situation is an unexpected and sudden event that may endanger

the integrity of the dam or downstream property and/or life, and requires immediate
action. Emergency situations can include, but are not limited to:
 Failure by breaching or impending failure of the dam is the most serious
emergency requiring immediate action.
 Overtopping of the dam
 Excessive seepage, or highly coloured seepage from any part of the dam and
it’s appurtenant structures.
 Failure or impending failure of the dam spillway.
 Earthquake.
 Sabotage.
4.3 DEFINITIONS OF UNUSUAL OCCURRENCES

An Unusual Occurrence is an event which takes place, or a condition that
develops, that is not normally encountered during routing operation of the Dam and
Dyke, and may endanger the structure. These include, but are not limited to:
 High inflows to the reservoir, or heavy rain in the catchment area.
 Reservoir level rising above RL.219 m
 Slumping, cracking or erosion of the dam or its abutments.
 New springs, boggy areas, or increased seepage.
 An increase in murky appearance of seepage flows from the dam or dyke.
 Damage to the upstream face due to unusually high winds and wave action.
 Inability to open the spillway gates.
 Blockage of the spillway.
 Total loss of power at the Angat Hydroelectric Facility.
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 Incident associated with the dam or dyke operation likely to impact the
downstream environment.
4.4 EMERGENCY EVALUATION & CLASSIFICATION Comment [spv10]: There might be a need to
review and synchronize the items below this
considering NPC spilling procedures under
Notification of emergency situations requires that a representative from DRFFD or extraordinary situation (Warning Level 1 to 3) which
also include heavy rains and rapid rise in reservoir
Angat HEP through closed coordination with DRFFD head office technical staff level (which is orange coded her in the EAP).
initiates the remedial action and decide if and when an emergency should be
declared and the EAP executed. As an emergency situation develops, if no actions
are taken to prevent or mitigate the problem, the situation will likely intensify. For
this reason, it is important for the Operation Superintendent to classify and declare
the emergency level based on the classifications below.
For the purposes of these EAP guidelines, site emergencies are separated into
three levels, depending on the severity of the event that has occurred, or is
predicted to occur. The level of site emergency may change as more information
becomes available. The level of site emergency, including a dam failure
emergency classification and non-failure emergency classifications are provided:
A Yellow Site Emergency will be declared after or during unusual events such as
Earthquakes, high winds, heavy rains or a rapid rise in reservoir level. After one of
these events occurs, a dam inspection shall take place as per Dam Safety Program
Manual ‘Inspection after Unusual Events’ criteria. During events which cause flood
discharge, the Flood Warning Manual shall be followed.
 Flood warnings are to be conducted as per the Flood Warning Manual and Dam
Discharge Protocol
Level ORANGE Site Emergency: Potential Failure Situation is Developing
An Orange Site Emergency will be declared when a situation develops where a

failure may eventually occur, but corrective actions taken during certain events
(such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of seepage through dam core) may
mitigate the problem. This situation can also be used when there is no danger for
dam failure, but extreme flooding may occur downstream.
 Emergency Response teams at various levels from government agencies as

presented in the Notification Flowchart and downstream residents to be placed
on alert; situation will be carefully monitored by DRFFD together with Angat
HEP technical personnel and all efforts will be made to mitigate the situation.
Level RED Site Emergency: Failure is Imminent or has occurred
A Red Site Emergency will be declared when a situation where a failure has either
occurred, is occurring, or is just about to occur. This level of emergency is for
situations when there is no time for dam owner to attempt corrective measures or
when mitigating measures implemented do not address the problem, the “failure is
imminent or has occurred”.
17
and Dyke Safety nd
 Emergency Response Teams at various levels from government agencies as

presented in the Notification Flowchart Initiate Evacuation. Rapid response is
required. Communication through a transition from Level ORANGE emergency
to a Level RED emergency shall be smooth and efficient.
18
and Dyke Safety nd
5.0 PREPAREDNESS
5.1 PREVENTIVE AND WARNING SYSTEMS
Preventing an emergency situation is the number one priority. Early mitigation of a

potential problem can save loss of life and property. Using best practices following
the Dam Safety Program and the Flood Forecasting Manuals could allow for early
detection and mitigation of a problem and avoid life loss and property damage. .
In accordance with the Dam Safety Program Manual, the Plant Manager or the
Maintenance Manager shall ensure periodical inspection and maintenance of the
following::
a) Spillway gates
b) Hoisting equipment and control equipment necessary for spillway gates
Operation
c) Auxiliary diesel generator for spillway gates operation
d) Lighting system of the spillway gate operation and staff gauge reading
e) Portable radio telephone sets
f) Other equipment and facilities required for effective emergency operations
FFWSDO office at the Angat Dam is constantly monitoring rainfall upstream of

Angat Dam, at the Dam and also the changes in the reservoir water level. Upon
prediction of extreme weather by either PAGASA or FFWSDO and reservoir level
reaches the maximum normal high water level, alarms will sound and action will be
taken based on the Flood Operation Rule Manual. Comment [spv11]: Pls include in this portion
more detailed discussion of the warning system to
highlight what needs to be done and to justify
5.2 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS additional equipment/personnel which would
strengthen NPC’s FFWSDO
Comment [spv12]: This should highlight what
The measures are in place for early detection, evaluation, classification and need to be done (procedures)
notification of an emergency situation under this EAP. Staff planning and training
provide pivotal knowledge and confidence during an emergency situation, ensuring
all plant employees and emergency agencies know their role as well as the role of
another in case of absence.
Preparedness includes all actions from the observation and recording of dam
conditions, monitoring the development of an emergency situation, and taking
actions to mitigate or control the further development of the situation through
identifying the cause and/or repairing the damage.
In order to limit the impacts and damage resulting from an emergency situation, the
key documents used for Emergency planning and prevention are:
- Flood Forecasting and Warning Documents
 Flood Operation Rule
 Flood Warning Manual
 Dam Discharge Warning Manual
19
and Dyke Safety nd
- Dam Discharge Protocol (Reservoir Operation Rule)

- Dam Safety Program Manual.
5.3 SITE ACCESS Comment [spv13]: This should highlight what

need to be done if there are any in relation to site
access particularly during extreme weather condition
The main access is from the Provincial Road passing Barangay Bigti in
Norzagaray, going up to the Angat HEP Administration Building, Barangay San
Lorenzo within the municipality of Norzagaray also. Access to the spillway or dam
crest can be from the main access road from the Administration Building going
down to the main dam right abutment which also gives access to the dyke crests.
5.4 RESPONSE DURING PERIODS OF DARKNESS
Actions are to be taken to illuminate the spillway operating platform, access to the
emergency generators, the dam crest and any other potentially stressed area of the
dam. The Angat Hydro Facility should be equipped with emergency lighting and
back-up generators for key components of the dam operations.
NPC will ensure there is adequate emergency lighting at the dam site to undertake
the listed emergency actions in this plan during periods of darkness.
In the event of a power failure, the emergency radio should be used to contact the
Flood Forecasting Center, and also local government officials as stated in Section
1.21.2. Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
(U.K.)
Wherever possible, two people should attend to an Emergency Situation or

Unusual Occurrence at the site during periods of darkness. For employee safety
and dam safety, contact must be maintained at a minimum hourly interval using
handheld radio providing situation updates. Flash lights are basic issue for such
situations.
5.5 RESPONSE DURING PERIODS OF ADVERSE WEATHER
The relative remoteness of the Angat Dam could make outside emergency access
difficult during adverse weather conditions such as heavy rains or high winds.
Although operating staff are positioned very close to the dam, caution must be
exercised and suitable vehicles utilized when moving on site or when notifying
downstream residents of an emergency or possible emergency situation.
Wherever possible, two people should attend to an Emergency Situation or

Unusual Occurrence at the site during periods of adverse weather. For employee
safety and dam safety, contact must be maintained at a minimum hourly interval
using handheld radio providing situation updates.
Communication from the site could be significantly more difficult during periods of
adverse weather, therefore it is important that all systems are regularly checked
20
and Dyke Safety nd
throughout any emergency situation or unusual occurrence and that care is taken
to ensure messages are correctly received.
5.6 RESPONSE DURING WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS
In the event of an emergency during the weekend or a holiday, the responsibilities

of the Angat Dam staff and Notification procedures remain the same. The available
staff on site will initiate preventative or mitigation actions, with the Operation
Superintendent taking on the role of the EAP Coordinator. As soon as possible
after identification of a potential emergency situation or abnormal condition, all on
call personnel and the Plant Manager will be notified along with responses
consistent with the notification chart and this report.
5.7 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Comment [spv14]: Discussion of this must
justify provision of handheld communication system
The following communication systems are available to be utilized throughout any to NPC personnel, LGU etc, if needed and agreed
Emergency Situation or Unusual Occurrence: among TWG members
 A fixed land line with a fax and phone at the site office, with mobile phone and
two-way radio as a back-up.
 Open channel radio telephone network which will be available for use during an
Emergency Situation or Unusual Occurrence.
NPC will ensure these communication systems are maintained and remain
operable as far as reasonably possible.
The relevant voice and fax communication telephone numbers are detailed in
Section 1.21.2. Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
(U.K.)
5.8 EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND INFORMATION
5.8.1 Special Equipment
Special Equipment in the form of earth moving machinery may be required under
certain Emergency Situations or Unusual Occurrences. This equipment is large
and will take time to mobilize, therefore an allowance must be made for the time it
will take to reach the site. Equipment located in the vicinity of the dam should be
utilized wherever possible.
Further equipment that may be required can be sourced from these local suppliers:
Bulldozers
XXX
Excavators
XXX
21
and Dyke Safety nd
Other Civil machines
XXX
5.8.2 Supplies and Materials
Rock Riprap, sandbags and other construction materials can be sourced from the
following locations:
Downstream of the dam site at:
Stockpile yard.
From the following local suppliers:

???
5.8.3 Emergency Power Supply
Power is supplied to the dam operating plant through the Angat Plant switchyard.
The switchyard lies downstream and on the right side of the dam. It is possible that
during some of the Emergency Situations and Unusual Occurrences envisaged,
power connections to the site will be lost.
In the event of a power failure, NPC will restore power supply to the site as quickly
as possible, however during certain emergency conditions this may result in a
considerable amount of time with no power. In this situation, NPC connect the
onsite generator or arrange for the rental and connection of a portable generator of
sufficient capacity to maintain the essential plant and monitoring equipment.
There are ........ generators available at Angat. In the unlikely event that all ........
generators are not operational at one time, an alternate generator can be sourced
from:
XX details of where generator can be sourced (company name, phone numbers,

fax)
22
and Dyke Safety nd
6.0 INUNDATION MAPS

6.1 INTRODUCTION
Inundation maps have been created as part of the Dam Break analysis completed
by EDCOP and Tonkin & Taylor International (Phils.), Inc. These maps identify
areas downstream of the Angat Dam and Dyke that are subject to flooding in the
event of a rapid dam failure. The dam break analysis report is a document
separate to this which was developed to simulate actual flooding downstream of
the facility.
Topographical information for the Angat River from the sea to Angat is limited to
the following:
 1:50,000 topography maps with 20m contours
 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The SRTM data sets are a subset
of those recorded by NASA, NIMA and the German and Italian space agencies
whose aim is to generate a near-global DEM of the Earth using radar
interferometry. The SRTM data has a grid resolution of approximately 90m by
90m in the area of interest.
The vertical and horizontal accuracy of the SRTM topographical data is largely
unknown since validation data is not available. The 1:50,000 topographical map
should have vertical accuracy better than ± 20 m.
The inundation maps are shown in Appendix A.
6.2 FLOOD HAZARD CLASSIFICATION
The potentially inundated area from a dam break, as shown in the inundation maps
in Appendix A, constitutes the flood hazard zone. All of flood hazard zone is
classified as high hazard floodway.
It must be noted that, as a result of the limited accuracy of the base topographical
data and mapping, there may be additional areas in the river valley not indicated on
the maps which are in the flood hazard zone. These are areas with ground
elevation below the peak flow depths (above the normal river level) indicated in
Table 6.3-1 in Section 6.36.3. Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
(U.K.)
6.3 Use of Inundation Maps
The inundation maps attached in Appendix A show the area of inundation

developed for disaster preparedness for the Angat Dam.
Table 6.3-1 Angat Dam breach results - peak water level rise.
23
and Dyke Safety nd
Table 6.3-2 shows the travel time of the flood wave and Table 6.3-1 shows the
maximum water depths, both for Dam and Dyke scenarios.
Table 6.3-1 shows the modelled peak water level rise whilst Table 6.3-2 shows
travel time in the Angat River from Angat dam and dyke scenarios to the sea in the
event of a dry weather failure of Angat dam or dyke. Note that the travel time is the
time taken for a flow increase at Angat dam or dyke to be noticed at a given
downstream location. Typically, the total available warning time will be significantly
longer.
Maximum water level rise

above normal river level (m)
Chainage
Section Location Angat Dam Angat Dyke
(km)
Sunny Day Failure Sunny Day Failure
(Scenario 1) (Scenario 1)
0 Angat Dam 48 17
0
1
12.1 Bitbit Bridge 43 19
2
36.0 Angat DRT Bridge 21.3 11.2
3
48.0 Bustos Dam 21.1 5.8
Gen. Alejo Santos

51.0 14.8 11.7
4 Bridge
60.6 New Plaridel Bridge 10.6 9.1

5
69 NLEX Bridge 5.3 5.1

6
74 Labangan Bridge 2.3 1.8

7
8
78.2 Bridge to Ibay-Ibayo 3.2 2.6
Paombong-Hagonoy
81.2 2.4 2.9
9 Bridge
24
and Dyke Safety nd
Table 6.3-2 Angat Dam breach results – travel times.
Sunny day failure of Sunny day failure of

Angat Dam Angat Dyke
Chainage Elapsed time Elapsed Elapsed time Elapsed

Section Location for flood for flood
(km) time for time for
wave to first flood peak wave to first flood peak
arrive to occur arrive to occur Tp
Ts (hr) Tp (hr) Ts (hr) (hr)
0 0 Angat Dam 0 2.3 0 1.0

1 12.1 Bitbit Bridge 0.7 2.4 1.0 1.7
2 36.0 Angat DRT Bridge 1.8 3.0 1.9 2.8
3 48.0 Bustos Dam 2.4 3.5 2.5 3.7
4 51.0 Gen. Alejo Santos Br. 2.6 4.0 3.2 4.8
5.4
5 60.6 New Plaridel Bridge 2.7 4.2 7.0
(95%)*
5.8
6 69 NLEX Bridge 3.9 5.8 7.2
(95%)*
6.5
7 74 Labangan Bridge 5.2 7.0 8.2
(80%)*
8 78.2 Bridge to Ibay-Ibayo 12.5 14 (80%)* 14.7 16.8 (80%)
Paombong-Hagonoy 17.7
9 81.2 15 15 16.3 (80%)
Bridge (80%)*
Due to uncertainty regarding elevations in the topographical data, it is considered

that the water depth (from cross section invert level to peak water level) may be a
more pragmatic and accurate parameter for emergency planning than the water
surface elevation. To be safe, the maximum water level should be estimated by
adding the peak water depth in
Table 6.3-1 to the river level in a normal of low flow condition.
25
and Dyke Safety nd
The associated Dam break Analysis report should be read in conjunction with this
map. Upon further developments, more accurate/detailed topographical data and
aerial photographs, changes in catchment conditions and/or land development, the
inundation maps may need to be reassessed.
Any use, application or extension of this information should be done in coordination

with PSALM.
DISCLAIMER
As the flood wave from a dam breach scenario approaches the downstream
reservoir, the peak water depth is largely controlled by the operation of the
reservoir. The dam breach assessment has been based on conservative
assumptions of reservoir operation and therefore quoted water depths near the
downstream reservoirs would be less if the spillways are operational and/or the
water level in the reservoir is dropped before the flood wave arrives.
The travel times indicated in the results are the time from the start of the dam
breach to the time that water levels start to increase at downstream locations.
Please note that this is not a determination of warning time since warning time is
determined from the time at which the alarm can first be raised, which is likely to be
later than the start time of the dam breach.
There is uncertainty regarding the vertical and horizontal accuracy of the

topographical data and it is therefore recommended that water depth may be a
more important parameter for emergency planning. A more reliable indication of
water elevation would be possible if the Angat River model was updated with
detailed topographical information obtained from survey of the Angat River and its
floodplain.
The flood levels and water depths indicated in the Table 6.3.1 and 2 are indicative
of a dry weather dam break scenario of Angat dam and are not necessarily
representative of the peak flood levels that could theoretically occur.
7.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION

7.1 DAM DETAILS
Angat Hydroelectric scheme forms an impoundment on the Angat River and its
tributaries in the Bulacan Province, Republic of the Philippines. The nearest city,
Manila, is approximately 60 km or 1.5hrs drive away.
The main embankment is a central core rockfill dam and reaches a maximum
height of some 131 m above the bed of the Angat River and is 368 m in length. A
26
and Dyke Safety nd
gated ogee spillway is located at the left abutment ridge, with a steep chute and
bend discharging into the Angat River. The PMF reservoir routing is shown in
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, English
Angat Spillway - PMF Routing (U.K.)
14000 232
12000 Inflow 228

Main S/W
Level
10000 Dam Crest 224
Flow (cumecs)
Level (Rl m)
8000 220
6000 216
4000 212
2000 208
0 204
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (hours)
Figure 7.1-2Figure 7.1-1. The existing power station intake is located to the left of
the embankment and is connected via the power tunnel to a valve chamber and
surface power house. Further along the left abutment ridge are two dykes, also
central core rockfill with maximum height 52 m.
The Angat reservoir has a design live storage capacity of 850 MCM when full, but
due to siltation over the years, the 2008 live storage capacity has been reduced to
approximately 840 MCM (Watershed Erosion and Reservoir Sedimentation Study
of Angat Hydroelectric Power Plant, EDCOP). The Height vs. Storage relationship
is shown in Figure 7.1-1Figure 7.1-2. For the purposes of emergency planning it is
important for emergency services to know the volume that is retained by the dam at
each level of the reservoir.
Figure 7.1-1 Angat PMF Reservoir Routing
27
and Dyke Safety nd
Angat Spillway - PMF Routing

14000 232
12000 Inflow 228

Main S/W
Level
10000 Dam Crest 224
Flow (cumecs)
Level (Rl m)
8000 220
6000 216
4000 212
2000 208
0 204
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (hours)
Figure 7.1-2 Angat Reservoir Height vs Storage Curve
7.1.1 Downstream Dams
Including the Angat Dam and Dyke, there are currently 3 dams cascading the
Angat River. The Ipo Dam is located approximately 7.5 km downstream of Angat
28
and Dyke Safety nd
Dam, in Bulucan province. Ipo Dam has a reservoir capacity of 5.9 MCM which is
used to divert water to treatment plants.
The Bustos dam for irrigation and owned by NIA and is approximately 45km
downstream of Angat.
7.2 OPERATION STANDARDS
Angat HEP operates based from the Approved Reservoir Operation Rule of the
National Water Resources Board (NWRB). It is NWRB’s responsibility, in
coordination with the TWG composed of representatives from NPC, NIA, MWSS,
MWCI and MWSI, to allocate water releases for domestic water supply, irrigation
and power generation. During water shortage, domestic water supply has the
highest priority over irrigation and power generation.
NPC can generate power only based from the water requirement and irrigation
diversion requirement of MWSS and NIA, respectively. NWRB approves the water
allocation for MWSS and NIA on a trimonthly, bimonthly and monthly period and if
necessary on a semi-monthly or weekly period.
Additional power can be generated only by NPC, if a prior approval has been
issued by NWRB, this is when the reservoir level reaches above the Higher Rule
Curve and the occurrence of more heavy rainfalls are expected to come in the
coming weeks or months.
7.3 MAJOR RISKS - GENERAL
Flooding constitutes a serious natural hazard in the Luzon. Heavy tropical rains
and typhoons can cause very high flows in the rivers leading into the Angat.
There are active faults in the area, including but not limited to the Valley Fault
System, the Lubang Fault Zone, Manila Trench and the Philippine Fault Zone.
Three of the most active faults around the Philippines are the Philippine Fault Zone,
the Manila Trench, and the Philippine Trench, of which the Philippine Fault Zone
lies very close to the dam as shown in Formatted: Font: 11 pt, Not Bold, English
(U.K.)
Figure 7.5-1Figure 7.5-1.
Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, Not Bold, Not
Italic, English (U.K.)
7.4 HEAVY RAINFALL MONITORING & FLOOD FORECASTING
The northern Luzon region is known for heavy rainfall, typhoons, flooding and land
slides associated with heavy rain. Due to its steep sloped catchments, retention
time is very low. The dry season for this area extends from November to late June
and a wet season the remainder of the year.
The region around Angat is capable of and has experienced 76 mm/hr intensity
rainfall events. This intensity has the ability to cause flooding upstream and
29
and Dyke Safety nd
downstream of Angat as well as potential landslides blocking access roads to the

site.
7.5 EARTHQUAKE RISK
The Philippines is located in an area of active seismicity with significant earthquake

generating faults throughout the country. These areas are of significant risk as
they have produced repeated movements in the past.
Formatted: Normal, Justified, Indent: Left:
0.63", First line: 0"
Figure 7.5-1
Formatted: Font: 11 pt, Not Bold, English
Figure 7.5-1 shows the locations of major active faults in the region of the Angat (U.K.)
dam complex. Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, Not Bold, Not
Italic, English (U.K.)
This region around Angat Dam is capable and has experienced earthquakes with a
magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter Scale. This was demonstrated by the 1990
earthquake near Baguio which recorded 7.8 on the Richter Scale and caused no
damages to the dam structure. This magnitude has the ability to cause serious
damage to the Angat Dam and Dyke.
30
and Dyke Safety nd
Figure 7.5-1. Location of major active faults in the region of Angat Dam
(source - Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology,
http://www.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph).
31
Consulting Services for the Study of Angat Dam EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
and Dyke Safety Appendices
Appendix A:
INUNDATION MAPPING
1
Corporation of the Philippines
T & T Philippines
Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day failure of Angat Dam
2
T & T Philippines
Simulated maximum inundation depth during a hypothetical sunny day failure of Angat Dyke
3
T & T Philippines
Appendix B:
TRAINING, UPDATING, REPORTING

AND POSTING EAP
1
T & T Philippines
1. Training
Training of people involved in implementation of the EAP should be conducted to

ensure that they are thoroughly familiar with all elements of the plan, the availability
of equipment, and their responsibilities and duties under the plan.
Technically qualified personnel should be trained in problem detection and

evaluation and appropriate remedial (emergency and non-emergency) measures.
This training is essential for proper evaluation of developing situations at all levels
of responsibility which, initially, is usually based on on-site observations. A
sufficient number of people should be trained to ensure adequate coverage at all
times.
A training plan could be included in the appendix to the EAP. Exercises simulating
emergency conditions are excellent mechanisms for ensuring readiness. Cross-
training in more than one responsible position for each individual is advisable to
provide alternates. A careful record by roster should be kept of training completed
and refresher training conducted.
2. Updating
The EAP should be updated promptly after each change in involved personnel or
their telephone numbers, or after completion of a scheduled exercise.
A review of the adequacy of the EAP should be conducted at intervals not to
exceed 1 year. During the review, an evaluation of any changes in flood inundation
areas, downstream developments, or in the reservoir should be made to determine
whether any revisions to the current EAP (including inundation maps) are
necessary.
Reviews should be conducted on or about the same date each year. If no revision
is necessary, a statement that the review was made and no revision to the EAP
was necessary should be provided to each recipient of the original EAP.
Copies of any revisions that do result from updating the EAP or from periodic
exercises of the EAP should be furnished to all individuals to whom the original
EAP was distributed, as shown at the beginning of this document. Confirmation
should be provided by all parties involved that they have received the updated
EAP.
3. Posting of the Notification Flowchart.
An up-to-date copy of the notification flowchart should be posted in prominent

locations at the dam site and local emergency operations center (essential for
unattended dams), as appropriate.
The flowchart should be posted at each phone and radio transmitter at the dam,
powerhouse and at all other desirable locations.
2
T & T Philippines
A copy of the complete, up-to-date EAP should also be available to personnel at

the dam and to local officials. All personnel shall be made aware of the location of
each copy of the EAP onsite. Key personnel should obtain a copy of this EAP for
their residence.
4. Report on EAP Exercises.
The following is a suggested format for reporting on EAP exercises:
A. Purpose of Exercise
B. Initiated By:
C. Design of Exercise:
 Brief description of process, set-up and actions followed.
D. Exercise Efficiency:
 Summary of effectiveness. Debrief with staff.

 Incorporate personnel comments on efficiency.
 Comment on timeliness during exercise, overall team capability to notify the
appropriate agencies and follow the procedures.
E. Results and Lessons Learnt
F. Follow-Up Actions
G. Summary and Recommendations
Appendices
 List of participants
 Narrative record of events
 Written critiques from personnel
3
T & T Philippines
Appendix C:
DAM BREAK STUDY SUMMARY
1
T & T Philippines
Tonkin & Taylor International (Phils), Inc (T&TI) in association with Engineering Development
Corporation of the Philippines (EDCOP) were commissioned in 2011 by Power Sector Assets and
Liability Management (PSALM) Corporation to complete a dam break study and prepare maps of the
resulting inundation for the Angat Dam and Dyke. The report which resulted presents the dam break
analysis and associated inundation mapping for the Angat Dam and Angat Dyke. This summary is
included in the EAP for information.
It is important to note that the dam break analysis is hypothetical and entirely divorced from the
chances of a dam failure ever occurring. The analysis was undertaken primarily to assess the
downstream hazard potential and for emergency response planning in case of significant risk of dam
break. It also provides a planning tool to allow the dam owners to understand the nature of the
hazard posed by the dams to downstream communities.
The main findings and key conclusions are summarised as follows:
 A fully developed breach at the tallest section of the Angat Dam embankment, which is over the original
3
river bed, can generate a peak flow of about 220,000 m /s in a sunny day failure.
 A separate dam break analysis has been carried out for the Angat Dyke. The likelihood of its failure is
considered to be greater than of Angat Dam because the Dyke lies over a fault splay of the West Valley
3
Fault. A peak breach outflow of 32,000 m /s has been estimated for a fully developed breach at Angat
Dyke in a sunny day failure.
 A Mike11 one-dimensional (1D) hydrodynamic model was developed for modelling the flood wave from
Angat Dam up to reservoir of the Bustos Dam. Downstream of Bustos Dam, a Mike21 two-dimensional
(2D) hydrodynamic model was developed for simulating the flood wave movement and lateral spread
across the very wide and flat floodplain all the way to Manila Bay.
 It is reasonable to assume that the Bustos Dam will not survive a dam break of the Angat Dam, thus a
cascade failure of both the Angat and Bustos dams has been modelled. A similar assumption has been
made in the case of the Angat Dyke dam break even though it is possible that the concrete dam portion
of the Bustos Dam may remain in place. Ipo Dam is also unlikely to survive in the flood wave from an
Angat Dam failure, particularly the superstructure above the level of the concrete dam spillcrest. It has
therefore been modelled as a weir in the failure analysis of both the Angat Dam and Angat Dyke.
 In terms of the sensitivity of the peak dambreak flow and downstream flood severity to the assumed
breach parameters, it was found that:
o the peak outflow from Angat Dam is moderately sensitive to the potential range of breach
3 3
parameters, with estimates ranging between 140,000 m /s and 220,000 m /s
o at the Angat Dyke, the peak outflow is not sensitive to the assumed breach development time;
3 3
the modelled peak outflows lie in a narrow range between 30,000 m /s and 33,000 m /s
o the precise shape and “peakiness” of the breach outflow hydrograph from the Angat Dam or
Angat Dyke is not critical because of the rapid attenuation (flattening) of the flood peak as the
flood wave propagates downstream; for example, the peak inflow to Bustos Dam from a sunny
3 3
day failure of the Angat Dam is between 88,000 m /s and 103,000 m /s compared with peak
3 3
dambreak flows of 140,000 m /s to 220,000 m /s respectively at the toe of the dam.
 The modelling shows a general trend of reducing flow and hydraulic effects from dam break with
increasing distance downstream from the dams through in-channel and floodplain storage attenuation.
For example, the peak water level rise from a sunny day failure of the Angat Dam at the New Plaridel
Bridge is about 10 m compared with a peak water level rise at the dam of about 48 m.
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 The elapsed time for the dam break flood wave to first arrive and for the peak flow/depth to occur at
specific downstream locations has been estimated. For example, the flood wave from a sunny day failure
of Angat Dam is predicted to take about 5.2 hours from breach initiation to first arrive at the Labangan
Bridge near Calumpit and a further 1.3 hours to reach its peak. This information provides an indication of
the available warning times, which should be included in the Emergency Action Plan for the Angat Dam.
 Maps of the maximum inundation depth for the Angat Dam and Angat Dyke sunny day failures, which
include the full extent of the flood path to the sea, have been produced using the 1:250,000 map series
by NAMRIA as a base map.
The modelling indicates that the dam break flood wave will not only affect the areas near the Angat
River, but spread and occupy vast areas well beyond the Angat River channel, and extend both
upstream and downstream into the floodplain of the Pampanga River. In a sunny day failure of
Angat Dam, the northernmost extent of the inundated area in the Pampanga River floodplain is
predicted to extend up to about 27 km north of Bustos Dam. Inundation from a sunny day failure of
Angat Dyke covers a significantly smaller area but would still extend up to about 13 km north of
Bustos Dam within the Pampanga River floodplain.
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Appendix D:
Comment [RTB15]: The approval page should

EAP Approval be at the start or beginning of the EAP
doc…rtbeltran
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Verification by Owner & Operator
The first draft issue of this document has been prepared by EDCOP/T&T Phils. for the
benefit of NPC. The undersigned have reviewed this Emergency Action Plan and state
that he/she has read and understand the contents herein and acknowledge that
information is true and correct to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.
Noted By:
RODOLFO E. GERMAN
Plant Manager, Angat HEP
XXX / XXX
PSALM Representatives
XXX / XXX
OTHER??? Representative
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T & T Philippines

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Consulting Services for the Study of Angat Dam

and Dyke Safety nd

AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET

Amendment Effective Subject Pages Signed

1 12.02.2012 Revision 1st Draft

2 30.04.2012 Revision 2nd draft

1. National Power Corporation (NPC)

DRAFT EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN

2.1 Purpose of Emergency Action Plan 6

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP 8

3.1 General Responsibilities 8

4.0 EMERGENCY IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 15

4.1 Notification of Potential Emergency Situations 15

5.1 Preventive and Warning Systems 18

5.5 Response during periods of adverse weather 19

6.0 INUNDATION MAPS 22

7.0 SUPPORTING INFORMATION 25

7.1 Dam Details 25

Appendix A: INUNDATION MAPPING

In the event of an emergency, as classified by Section 4.4 of this document, all

1.2 NOTIFICATION FLOWCHART

The Notification Form included in this section is to be completed during an

Table 1.2-1 Contact Numbers

ORGANIZATION LOCATION NAME OFFICE PHONE OFFICE FAX MOBILE

Labasbas 044 766 2538

2 IPO DAM BUSTOS DAM PAGASA R

(SYSTEM OPERATOR) (OWNER)

Figure 1.2-1 NOTIFICATION FLOWCHART

EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM

4. DAM NAME: ANGAT

6. UNUSUAL FLOW: Quantity:

6.1 Quality & Colour:

7.0 RESERVOIR WATER LEVEL:

8.0 GENERAL COMMENTS:

8.1 Weather conditions:

8.2 Situation – Improving/Stable/Worsening:

8.3 Other Comments:

9.0 NOTIFICATION CHECKLIST:

National Power Corporation (NPC), Diliman – Q.C. Time…………..

National Irrigation Administration (NIA) Time…………..

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) Time…………..

Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) Time…………..

Provincial Government of Bulacan Time…………..

Bulacan – PDRRMO Time………….

National Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC) Time…………..

(Downstream Municipalities) Time…………..

Plant Manager/EAP Coordinator Signature: ..………………………………………….

2.2 EAP OUTLINE

This Emergency Action Plan includes a set of procedures for:

The dam is considered to be in operation while the structure is being used to

2.3 DAM OWNERSHIP & MANAGEMENT

3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE EAP

Specifically, NPC’s overall responsibilities include:

3.1.2 National Government

 Guidelines to encourage and support local governments and industry and

The National Disaster and Risk Reduction Management Council (NDRRMC)

The National Government establishes a working atmosphere conducive to

3.1.3 Local Government Comment [spv1]: must have inputs/approval of

As PDRRMC Chairman, the Governor of Bulacan is responsible for initiating

3.1.4 Community Leaders Comment [spv3]: This portion must have

 Addressing concerns related to their constituency to the local authorities,

3.2 RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOTIFICATION

3.2.1 National Power Corporation

areas. The PDRRMC in coordination with the MDRRMC coordinators will