PIL Assignmet - Aditya Maheshwari - 1757

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NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

“CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SPINTEX PVT. LTD.


V. LOUIS DREYFUS COMPANY INDIA PVT.
LTD.”

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED AS PART OF THE ASSIGNMENT

FOR THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2023-2024.

Submitted To: Submitted By:

MS. VARSHA SINGH ADITYA MAHESHWARI

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR (LAW) SEMESTER X

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR ROLL NO: 1757


I. INTRODUCTION
The proposition of whether two Indian parties may choose a foreign law to govern the
arbitration and a foreign seat of arbitration has drawn much debate over the years. In November
2020, a flurry of decisions demonstrating the increasingly pro-arbitration approach of courts in
India were passed.

The Delhi High Court in Dholi Spintex Pvt. Ltd vs Louis Dreyfus Corporation India Pvt.
Ltd.1 answered this question in the affirmative and held that two Indian parties can choose a
foreign law as the law governing the arbitration. The Delhi High Court also reiterated the
principle of limited interference in international arbitrations by courts.

II. BACKGROUND

Dholi Spintex Pvt. Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) had entered into a contract with Louis Dreyfus Company
India Pvt. Ltd. (“Defendant”) for the supply of 600 metric tonnes of American imported raw
cotton. Clause 6 of the contract provided for the resolution of disputes through arbitration in
accordance with the International Cotton Association (“ICA”) rules and specified London as
the venue. Clause 7 of the contract provided that ‘only the courts in New Delhi would have
jurisdiction’. The relevant ICA rules and by-laws (by-laws 200, 300 and 306) provided that (i)
‘The law of England and Wales and the mandatory provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 (Act)
shall apply to every arbitration and/or appeal under these By-laws’; (ii) ‘The seat of our
arbitrations is in England. No one can decide or agree otherwise’; and (iii) ‘Disputes shall be
settled according to the law of England and Wales wherever domicile, residence, or place of
business of the parties to the contract may’.

Disputes arose between the parties and the Defendant invoked arbitration before the ICA and
filed its claim. The Plaintiff initiated legal proceedings before the Delhi High Court seeking:
(i) an anti-suit injunction; (ii) a declaration that Clause 6 of the contract was invalid, null &
void; and (iii) a declaration that the arbitration initiated by the Defendant was null and void.
The Defendant countered with an application for suit to be dismissed.

The Defendant argued, amongst other grounds, that: (i) the parties had agreed to the arbitration
being conducted in accordance with the ICA rules and seated in London, (ii) there is a foreign
element to the contract between the parties as it is a high seas sale agreement and it was agreed

1
Dholi Spintex Pvt. Ltd vs Louis Dreyfus Corporation India Pvt. Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1476.

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to be performed on high seas, i.e. outside the territorial jurisdiction of India; (iii) international
trade in American cotton is generally conducted under the ICA rules and procedures; (iv) the
arbitrators are empowered to consider and decide the existence and extent of their own
jurisdiction; and (v) two Indian parties can agree to arbitrate abroad and there is no legal bar
especially where transactions involve foreign elements.

III. ISSUES

i. Whether two Indian parties can choose a foreign law as the substantive law of the
contract?
ii. Whether the express designation of a court under Clause 7 of the contract providing
for exclusive jurisdiction at New Delhi is determinative of the seat of arbitration?
iii. Whether the petition is maintainable under Section 45 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”)?

JUDGEMENT
WITH RESPECT TO ISSUE (I), the court held that even though an agreement to refer disputes to
arbitration may be a part of the substantive contract, the said agreement is independent of the
substantive contract and survives despite termination or repudiation or frustration of the
substantive contract. The arbitration agreement/clause does not govern the rights and
obligations of the parties under the substantive contract and is only concerned with the manner
of settling disputes. Therefore, the arbitration agreement can be governed by a proper law of
its own, which is not the same as the law governing the substantive contract as it is an
independent agreement. The Court also stated that the general practice for trading in American
cotton is parties subjecting themselves to arbitration under the ICA byelaws and consequently,
two Indian parties cannot be barred from entering into an agreement for a foreign seated
arbitration. In the presence of a foreign element in the agreement, the parties could definitely
agree to international commercial arbitration governed by the laws of England. Therefore,
Clause 6 of the contract is not null and void.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in: (i) Centrotrade Minerals and Metal
Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd.,2 which stressed on party autonomy in arbitration and held that
it is a virtual backbone that allows parties to choose foreign law as proper law for arbitration;

2
Centrotrade Minerals and Metal Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2017) 2 SCC 228.

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and (ii) Technip SA v. SMS Holding Pvt. Limited & Ors.,3 wherein it was held that
applicability of foreign law can be objected to only in cases where the law amounts to flagrant
or gross breach of morality and justice, and that foreign law cannot be discarded only because
it is contrary to Indian statute, as the same would defeat the basis of private international law.

WITH RESPECT TO ISSUE (II), The Court held that the express designation of the court having
jurisdiction under Clause 7 of the contract is not definitive of the seat of arbitration. Even
though the term “venue” has been used by the parties in Clause 6 of the contract, they have
agreed to conduct the arbitration in accordance with the ICA rules and agreed for the seat of
arbitration to be London and not New Delhi. The Court held that Clause 7 of the contract,
wherein the parties agreed that the substantive law governing the contract is Indian Law and
jurisdiction is with an Indian court, would be relevant only when the parties, through an
agreement, decide not to settle their disputes through arbitration but by approaching Indian
courts.

WITH RESPECT TO ISSUE (III), it was held that the Court can interfere in an international
arbitration only to the extent of determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists
between the parties and whether the agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed. The Court cannot enter into a full-fledged inquiry into the merits of the matter.
Therefore, the Court dismissed the suit as not being maintainable and refused to grant an anti-
arbitration injunction.

IV. CRITICAL REVIEW AND PERSONAL ANALYSIS

In the present case, the High Court of Delhi has allowed Indian parties to choose a foreign law
to govern an arbitration between them, inter alia, on the principles of party autonomy and
conflict of laws. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Reliance Industries & Anr. v. Union of India,4 wherein it was held that when there is a foreign
element involved in the contract, three sets of law may apply to the arbitration:

A. law governing the substantive contract;


B. law governing the arbitration agreement and performance of that agreement; and

3
Technip SA v. SMS Holding Pvt. Limited & Ors., (2005) 5 SCC 465.
4
Reliance Industries & Anr. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603.

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C. law governing the conduct of the arbitration.

The decision is in line with the pro-arbitration approach being adopted by Indian courts and
categorically rules out attempts at post-fact rewriting of contracts entered into with open eyes.

Further, a recent judgment by the Gujarat High Court in GE Power Conversion Pvt. Ltd. v.
PASL Wind Solution Pvt. Ltd.5 has now also issued a decision along similar lines, favouring
the autonomy of two Indian parties to choose a foreign seat of arbitration and holding that such
an agreement would not violate the public policy of India. The Gujarat High Court also held
that the nationality of the parties is irrelevant when considering the enforceability of foreign
awards. While the Gujarat High Court opined that an award that is passed in a foreign seat is a
foreign award and may be enforced under Part II of the Arbitration Act, the Court also held
that such parties may not seek interim relief in India.

However, the Bombay High Court in Seven Islands Shipping Ltd. v. Sah Petroleums
Ltd6 and Addhar Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Jagdamba Agrico Exports Pvt.
Ltd.,7 contradicted these views by disregarding the validity of an arbitration clause where two
Indian parties had opted for a foreign seat of arbitration.

As the decisions of High Courts are not binding precedents, therefore a Supreme Court ruling
may weigh in on this issue albeit the Arbitration Act itself does not expressly preclude two
Indian parties from choosing a foreign seat of arbitration.

5
GE Power Conversion Pvt. Ltd. v. PASL Wind Solution Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 331.
6
Seven Islands Shipping Ltd. v. Sah Petroleums Ltd, (2012) SCC Online Bom 910.
7
Addhar Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Shree Jagdamba Agrico Exports Pvt. Ltd., (2015) SCC Online Bom 7752.

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