A PROJECT ON

“Noscitur A Sociis”

Prasanna Swaminathan

7th Sem, Roll: 201020

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT...........................................................................03

2. LIST OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................04

3. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS – An Introduction.............................................06

4. CASE LAWS.............................................................................................06

5. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................26
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mr. R Bharat Kumar, Faculty,

Interpretation of Statutes, for his guidance in completing this project on the Latin
principle “Noscitur a Sociis.”

This project has helped me broaden my academic horizon, with regards to the theory
and practical application of the principle, in judicial decision spanning constitutional
law, Labour Law and administrative law.

I would also like to thank my friends and parents for their support and assistance
throughout the completion of this project.
 LIST OF AUTHORITIES

1. Table of cases:
 Bageshwari v. Jagannath AIR 1932 PC 55

 Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Employees AIR 1960 SC 675

 DN Banerji v. P.R.Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58.

 Dy. Chief Controller v. KT kosalram (1970) 3 SCC 82.

 Gammon India Ltd v. UOI (1974) 1 SCC 596.
 Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 2 SCC 942.
 Keats v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd (1911) AC 641.
 Madhav Rao Scindia v. UOI(1971) 1 SCC 85
 Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 871.
 Minet v. Leman 24 LJ Ch 545
 MK Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras AIR 1955 SC 604
 National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson 1952) 2 QB 648.
 Netherseal Colliery Co. v. Bourne (1889) 14 AC 228.
 Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE

 Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand (1978) 2 SCC 144.

 Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of UP AIR 1967 SC 465
 Ram Narain v. State of UP AIR 1957 SC 18
 State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad AIR 1967 SC 903.
 State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610
 State of Rajasthan v. Sripal jain AIR 1963 SC 1323
 Vacuum Oil Co. v. Secy. of State, AIR 1932 PC 168

2. LIST OF STATUTES:
 Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (carried by Public Service Motor
Vehicles) Act, 1961.
 Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
 Companies Act, 1913.
 Constitution of India, 1950.
 Contract Labour ( Prevention and Abolition ) Act, 1970.
 General Enclosure Act, 1801.
 Import Control Order, 1953
 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
 Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
 National Assistance Act, 1948.
 Rajasthan Service Rules, 1958.
 Registration Act, 1908.
 U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916.

3. BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. Dr. A.B. Kafaltiya (New Delhi : Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt Ltd, 2008)
2. Prof. T. Bhattacharya ( Allahabad: Central Law Agency, 2012)
3. M.P. Tandon (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency,2008)
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS – An Introduction.

The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by a reference to the meaning of words
associated with it.

The rule that a word is known by the company it keeps, is not an ineluctable rule. It is applied
wisely only where a word is capable of many meanings so that giving an unintended breadth
to a statute may be avoided. When, however, the meanings of words, even wide words are
clear and unambiguous, this rule cannot be pressed into service.

Bageshwari v. Jagannath1

FACTS:

The respondent filed a petition by acknowledging a right in another in relation to immovable

property and this is sought to be used as an acknowledgement of liability under Sec.19 of the
Limitation Act, 1908, by the appellant. It was contended by the respondent, that it could not
be so used because it “operated to declare a right in immovable property”, within the meaning
of Sec.17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, 1908, that therefore, required registration and that it
was not admissible without such registration.

PROVISION:

17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.-

(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate
in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No.
1864 (XVI of 1864 ), or the Indian Registration Act, 1866 (20 of 1866 ), or the Indian
Registration Act, 1871 (8 of 1871 ), or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 (3 of 1877 ), or this
Act came or comes into force, namely:--

(b) other non- testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign,
limit or extinguish

HELD:
1
AIR 1932 PC 55
The document is not itself one which declares a right in immovable property, in the sense
intended by Section 17. There ‘declare’ is placed along with ‘create’, ‘limit’, or ‘extinguish’ a
‘right, title or interest’ and these words imply a definite change of legal relation to the
property by an expression of will embodied in the document referred to. This is equally the
case with the word “declare”. It implies declaration of will not a mere statement of fact. In
the present case, the statement in the petition of the respondent did not create any right and
was only a recital of a fact and, therefore, there was mo necessity for registration 2.

Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE3

FACTS:

The appellants had filed an earlier appeal in this Court against a decision of CEGAT
regarding the classification of toilet soap for the purposes of excise duty.

ISSUE:

The determination of Sec 11 B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

PROVISION:

11B. Claim for refund of duty.

(1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of
such duty to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the expiry of six months 1[ from
the relevant date 4[ in such form as may be prescribed and the application shall be
accompanied by such documentary or other evidence (including the documents referred to in
section 12A) as the applicant may furnish to establish that the amount of duty of excise in
relation to which such refund is claimed was collected from, or paid by, him and the
incidence of such duty had not been passed on by him to any other person: Provided that
where an application for refund has been made before the commencement of the Central
Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 , such application shall be deemed to
have been made under this sub- section as amended by the said Act and the same shall be
dealt with in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) as substituted by that Act]:
4[ Provided further that] the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been
paid under protest

2
Vacuum Oil Co. v.Secy. of State, AIR 1932 PC 168
3
1993 Supp (3) SCC 716.
HELD:

The SC explained the meaning of Noscitur a sociis as follows: “In ascertaining the meaning
of the word or the clause or sentence in the statute in its interpretation, everything which is
logically relevant must be admissible. It is no doubt true that the doctrine of Noscitur a sociis,
namely ,that it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act or Parliament
with reference to words found in immediate connection with them i.e. when two or more
words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed together, they are understood
to be used in their cognate sense. They take , as it were, their colour from each other, the
meaning of the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. the
philosophy behind it is that the meaning of the doubtful words may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of words associated with it. This doctrine is broader than the
doctrine of ejusdem generis. This doctrine was accepted by the Court. This doctrine was
accepted by the Court in a catena of cases but this application is to be made to the context and
the setting in which the words came to be used or associated in the statute or the statutory
rule.

DN Banerji v. P.R.Mukherjee4

FACTS:

The chairman of a municipality dismissed two of its employees, namely, the Sanitary
Inspector and the Head Clerk, and the Municipal Workers' Union, of which these two
employees were members questioned the propriety of the dismissal and claimed that they
should be re-instated and the matter was referred by the Government to the Industrial
Tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, and an objection was raised by
the municipality that the dispute was not an industrial dispute.

PROVISION:

2 (k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and
employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is
connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour, of any person;

4
AIR 1953 SC 58.
ISSUE:

Whether the ID Act, 1947 was applicable to disputes with municipalities?

HELD:

The Court held that the definitions in the Act include also disputes that might arise between
municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to
the carrying on of a trade or business.

It is no doubt true that meaning should be be ascertained only from the words employed in
the definition, but the set up and context are also relevant for ascertaining what exactly was
meant to be conveyed by the terminology employed.

Though the definition may be more or less the same in two different statutes, still the objects
to be achieved not only as set out in the preamble but also as gatherable from the antecedent
history of the legislation may be widely different. the same words mean one thing in one
context and another in a different context.5

Ram Narain v. State of UP6

FACTS:

A tax was imposed under Sec. 14(1)(f), UP Town Areas Act, as a tax on circumstances and
property. It was contended that “circumstances” do not include “trade or business” because,
Sec. 128 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, excludes it.

PROVISION:

Section 128(1) (i) for revising the Government Notification No. 135 dated 13-1-1870 levying
tax on the buildings and lands in the Civil Lines Station of the Bareilly Municipality.
Resolution : Resolved that Draft Proposals be notified.

ISSUE:

5
Keats v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Ltd (1911) AC 641.
6
AIR 1957 SC 18
 Whether Sec.128 of the Act referred to ‘taxes on circumstances and property’ as a separate
head distinct from ‘taxes on trades, callings and vocations and employments”

HELD:

The imposition of such tax was held to be valid.

It is no sound principle of construction to interpret the expressions used in one Act with
reference to their use in another Act. The meaning of the words and expressions used in an
Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear.

MK Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras7

FACTS:

The question was the interpretation of Section 232(1) of the Companies Act, 1913, as
amended in 1936. Before the amendment, a secured creditor stood outside the winding up and
could, if the mortgage deeed so provided, realise his security without the intervention of the
Court by effecting a sale either by private treaty or by public auction.

PROVISION:

In 1936, the amended section read as follows:

“Where any company is being wound up, by or subject to the supervision of a court, any
attachment, distress or execution put in force without the leave of the court against the estate,
or any sale held without leave of the court of any of the properties of the company after the
commencement of the winding up shall be void.”

ISSUE:

The interpretation of Sec. 232(1) of the Companies Act, 1913.

HELD:

The second respondent, who was the managing director of the company, agreed to sell the
third respondent, during the winding up of the company, the properties of the company, to
pay debenture holders who were secured creditors. The sale, was held without leave of court.
On the question of its validity

7
AIR 1955 SC 604
 “It is a well established rule of construction that ‘when two or more words which are
susceptible of analogous meanings are coupled together, ‘noscitur a sociis’, they are used to
be in their cognate sense.”

They take, as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a
sense analogous to the less general.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also expressed itself in similar in Angus
Robertson v. George Day8

“it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with

reference to words found in immediate connection with them.”

Having regard to the context in which these words ‘any sale held without leave of the court’
have been used in juxtaposition with ‘any attachment, distress or execution put into force
without leave of the court against the estate or effects’, it would be legitimate construction to
be put upon them that they refer only to sales held through the intervention of the court and
not to sales effected by the secured creditor outside the winding up and without the
intervention of the court.

There is also a presumption against implicit alteration of law and this is enunciated by
Maxwell9, in the following terms:

‘One of these presumptions is that the legislature does not intend to make nay sunstantial
alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, wither in express terms or by clear
implication, or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all
general matters, outside those limits the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree
improbable that the legislature would overthrow the fundamental principles, infringe rights,
or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible
clearness...’

National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson10

FACTS:

8
(1897) 5 AC 63.
9
10th Edn., p.81
10
(1952) 2 QB 648.
A wife who had refused to join her husband in accommodation found by him received
assistance under Part II of the National Assistance Act, 1948. The National Assistance Board
preferred complaints against the husband and applied for orders to be made upon him
under section 43 of the National Assistance Act, 1948, to repay the amount of assistance paid
to the wife and to pay such sum weekly or otherwise as the court might consider appropriate.
Before the justices it was contended on behalf of the board that by section 42 (1) a husband,
for the purposes of the Act, was absolutely liable to maintain his wife. The justices found that
the wife had deserted her husband and, holding that the husband's liability under section 42
(1) of the Act to maintain his wife was not absolute and that the words of section 43
(2) enabled them to have regard to the conduct of the wife, dismissed the complaints.

PROVISION:

42 Liability to maintain wife or husband and children.

(1)For the purposes of this Act—

(a)a man shall be liable to maintain his wife and his children, and

(b)a woman shall be liable to maintain her husband and her children.

The reference in paragraph (a) of the last foregoing subsection to a man’s children includes a
reference to children of whom he has been adjudged to be the putative father, and the
reference in paragraph (b) of that subsection to a woman’s children includes a reference to
her illegitimate children

(3)In the application of subsection (2) of this section to Scotland, for the reference to
children of whom a man has been adjudged to be the putative father there shall be substituted
a reference to children his paternity of whom has been admitted or otherwise established.

(3)Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to Scotland and, in the application thereto of
subsection (1) of this section, any reference to “children” includes a reference to children
whether or not their parents have ever been married to one another.

43 Recovery of cost of assistance from persons liable for maintenance.

(1)Where assistance is given or applied for by reference to the requirements of any person (in
this section referred to as a person assisted), . the local authority concerned may make a
complaint to the court against any other person who for the purposes of this Act is liable to
maintain the person assisted.
(2)On a complaint under this section the court shall have regard to all the cicrumstances and
in particular to the resources of the defendant, and may order the defendant to pay such sum,
weekly or otherwise, as the court may consider appropriate.

(3)For the purposes of the application of the last foregoing subsection to payments in respect
of assistance given before the complaint was made, a person shall not be treated as having at
the time when the complaint is heard any greater resources than he had at the time when the
assistance was given.

(4)In this section the expression “assistance” means the provision of accommodation under
Part III of this Act (hereinafter referred to as “assistance under Part III of this Act”); and the
expression “the court” means a court of summary jurisdiction, appointed for the commission
area where the assistance was given or applied for.

(5)Payments under subsection (2) of this section shall be made—

(a)to the local authority concerned, in respect of the cost of assistance, whether given before
or after the making of the order, or

(b)to the applicant for assistance or any other person being a person assisted, or

(c)to such other person as appears to the court expedient in the interests of the person
assisted,

or as to part in one such manner and as to part in another, as may be provided by the order.

(6)An order under this section shall be enforceable as a magistrates’ court maintenance order
within the meaning of section 150(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980.

(7). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(8)Subsections (6) and (7) of this section do not extend to Scotland

ISSUE:

Interpretation of Sec. 42 and 43 of the National Assistance Act, 1948.

HELD:

It was held that the statute is not to be taken as effecting a fundamental alteration in the
general law unless it uses words pointing unmistakably to that conclusion.
Minet v. Leman11

FACTS:

The Plaintiff, Mr. Minet, was tenant for life of a gavelkind estate, at Brasted, in Kent, with
remainder over, and he was seized in fee of a freehold estate at Hayes, in Middlesex. He had
taken proceedings to effect an exchange of these two estates, but before they had been
perfected, the Defendant, Mr. Leman, contracted to purchase from him the Kent estate for
£4000, subject to certain conditions of sale.

ISSUE:

The principle for construction of General Enclosure Act, 1801.

HELD:

The Master of Rolls stated as a principle of construction which could not be disputed that
‘the general words of the Act are not to be construed as to alter the previous policy of law,
unless no sense or meaning can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of
preserving the existing policy untouched.’

If the construction sought to be put upon the words added, namely, that even though the
secured creditor realised the security without the intervention of the court, such sale, if
effected by him without the leave of the winding up of the court, is void, then no such sale
could be effected by him after the amendment and that was certainly a fundamental
alteration in the law which could not be effected unless one found words used which pointed
unmistakably to that conclusion or unless such intention was expressed with irresistible
clearness12

State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha13

FACTS:

Respondents IQ and 3 were employed as Ward servants in the J. J. group of Hospitals. The
superintendent of this said group of Hospitals informed the said respondents by notices issued

11
24 LJ Ch 545
12
Mangoo Singh v. Election Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 871.
13
AIR 1960 SC 610
respectively against them that their services would be terminated with effect from the dates
mentioned in the said notices and in accordance with the said notices their services were in
fact terminated; subsequently in their place two State servants who were discharged from the
Civil Supplies Department were appointed.

PROVISION:
[(j) "industry" means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an
employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly
or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution
of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes
which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,--

(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or

(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit,

and includes--

(a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under section 5A of the Dock
Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948);

(b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by an

establishment.

but does not include--

(1) any agricultural operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on in an
integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is referred to in the
foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the predominant one.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub-clause, "agricultural operation" does not include
any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations
Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951); or

(2) hospitals or dispensaries; or

(3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or

(4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged in any

charitable, social or philanthropic service; or

(5) khadi or village industries; or

(6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the Government
including all the activities carried on by the departments of the Central Government dealing
with defence research, atomic energy and space; or

(7) any domestic service; or

(8) any activity, being a profession practised by an individual or body or individuals, if the
number of persons employed by the individual or body of individuals in relation to such
profession is less than ten; or

(9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-operative society or a club or any other
like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-operative society, club
or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity is less than ten;]

ISSUE:

Whether a group of hospitals was an industry within the meaning of the ID Act, 1947?

HELD:

Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of Noscitur a
Sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by
reference, to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the
maxim ejsudem generis.

It must be borne in mind that Noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot
prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to
make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of
the legislature in associating wider words of wider import is doubtful, or otherwise not clear
that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the
meanings of the words of wider import. It can also be applied where the object of the
legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule if construction cannot
be applied.

If the object and scope of the statute are considered there would be no difficulty in holding
that relevant words of wider import have been deliberately used by the legislature in defining
‘industry’, so as to include the employers in the present case.

Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Employees14

FACTS:

Disputes having arisen between the said Corporation and its employees in its various
departments, the State Government referred them for adjudication to the State Industrial
Court under s. 39 of the Act and that Court by its award held that the Corporation and all its
departments were covered by the said definition. Against that award the Corporation made an
application to the High Court under Art. 26 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected its
contention that the Corporation was not an industry within the meaning of the said section
and remanded the case to the Industrial Court for determination as to which of its
departments fell within the definition and making an award accordingly.

PROVISION:

Section 2(14) of the Act divides the definition into three parts, namely,

(a) any business, trade, manufacturing or mining undertaking or calling of employers,

(b) any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of

employees, and

(c) any branch of an industry or a group of industries.

ISSUE:

Whether and to what extent the municipal activities of the appellant corporation fell within
the term ‘industry’ as defined in 2(14) CP and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act,
1947.

HELD:

14
AIR 1960 SC 675
The words used in the section are clear and unambiguous and they prima facie are of widest
import the rule of construction Noscitur a sociis.

State of Rajasthan v. Sripal jain15

FACTS:

The respondent was compulsorily retired under Rule 244(2) of the Rajasthan Service Rules
under which the government had an absolute right to retire any government servant after he
had completed 25 years of service, without giving any reason. Rule 31(vii)(a) of the Rules of
Business provides that proposals for dismissing, removing or compulsorily retiring of any
officer should be submitted to the Governor by the Chief Minister. IN this case, it was
submitted.

ISSUE:

Whether the order for retirement of the respondent, valid?

HELD:

There is no doubt that the words mentioned in Rule 31(vii)(a) of the Business Rules are
general and are not qualified by the words ‘penalty’ and may be open to interpretation that all
the three kinds of compulsory retirement must be referred to the governor. But reading these
words in collocation in which they appear it seems to us that when that item talks of
‘compulsorily retiring an officer’ follow the words ‘dismissing and removing’. Therefore, in
the collocation in which the words appear in item (vii)(a) they must be read as a penalty like
dismissing and removing, and hence, it was not necessary to submit the papers with respect to
compulsory retirement under Rule 244(2) to the Governor.

Raghubans Narain v. Govt. of UP16

FACTS:

For the purpose of building a school hostel., a piece of grove land belonging to the appellant
and situated just outside the town of Nehtaur, in U.P., was notified for acquisition under s. 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in December 1945 and possession was taken from the
15
AIR 1963 SC 1323
16
AIR 1967 SC 465
appellant on July 4, 1947. The Collector in his award under s. II of the Act fixed the total
compensation-which included compensation for the trees on the land, for the land itself and
the 15 per cent solatium-at Rs. 2,218/-

PROVISION:

“If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as
compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the
award of the court may direct that the collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of
6% per annum.”

ISSUE:

The interpretation of Sec.28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

HELD:

In its plain language, the discretion that is conferred on the court is whether in the given
circumstances of a particular case the court should award interest or not. The words ‘may
direct’ mean that it is discretionary on the part of the court to grant or refuse to grant interest.
But the words following these words, namely ‘the Collector shall pay interest on such excess
at the rate of 6% per annum’ would mean that once the discretion to grant interest is
exercised there is no further discretion and the interest if awarded has to be at the rate of
6% ....This construction to a certain extent is supported by the same expression used in Sec.
34 which also deals with interest and which provides that when the amount of compensation
is neither interest nor deposited before taking possession, the Collector shall pay the amount
awarded with interest thereon at the rate of 6%’. It is a well established rule of construction
that where the legislature uses the same expression in the same statute at two places or more,
then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context requires
otherwise.

State of Assam v. Ranga Mohammad17

17
AIR 1967 SC 903.
FACTS:

The respondent questioned in a petition for the issue of a quo warranto, the right of the
appellant to transfer and post a District Judge. Under Art. 233 of the Constitution, the posting
of District Judges shall be made by the Governor and under Art. 235 the control over District
Courts is vested in the High Court.

PROVISION:

233. Appointment of district judges

(1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any
State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.
(2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be
appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader
and is recommended by the High Court for appointment

ISSUE:

Whether the State Government could transfer and post a District Judge?

HELD:

In Art. 233 of the Constitution, the word ‘ post’ bears the meaning of assigning someone to a
job, especially one to which one is appointed. This word occurs in association with the words
‘appointment’ and ‘promotion’ and takes its colour from them. These words indicate the
stage when a person gets a position, a job and ‘posting’ by association means the assignment
of a appointee or promotee to a position in the cadre of District Judges. If posting was
intended to mean ‘transfer’ the draftsman would have hardly placed it between ‘appointment’
and ‘promotion’ and could have easily used the word ‘transfer’ itself. Therefore, under Art.
233, the Governor is only concerned with the appointment, promotion and posting to the
cadre of District Judges, and the transfer of District Judges already appointed, promoted or
posted to the cadre is obviously a matter of control of District Judges which is vested in the
High Court.
Madhav Rao Scindia v. UOI18

FACTS:

The President of India passed an order under Art. 366(22) of the Constitution with respect to
each ruler of former Princely States that the Ruler ceased to be recognised as Ruler with
effect from the date of the order. The order resulted in the stoppage of their Privy Purses and
personal privileges. Under, Art. 363 of the Constitution , the court has no jurisdiction in any
dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any
of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any treaty, agreement, covenant etc. In a
petition under Art.32 challenging the orders the respondent contended that the expression
‘relating to’ in Art. 363 means ‘referring to’ and since Art.291, 362 and 366(22) refer to
covenants , the court has no jurisdiction to entertain a dispute with respect to rights arising
from those provisions.

PROVISIONS:

363. Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143,
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising
out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar
instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution
by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government was a party and which has or
has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any
right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this
Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other
similar instrument
(2) In this article
(a) Indian State means any territory recognised before the commencement of this Constitution
by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and
(b) Ruler includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognised before such commencement
by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State

18
(1971) 1 SCC 85
366. Definition In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following
expressions have l, the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say

(22) Ruler means the Prince, Chief or other person who, at any time before the
commencement of the Constitution (Twenty sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 , was recognised
by the President as the Ruler of an Indian State or any person who, at any time before such
commencement, was recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler;

ISSUE:

Whether the expression ‘relating to’ in Art. 368 means ‘referring to’ and since Art. 291, 362
and 366(22) refer to covenants?

HELD:

The expression ‘provisions of this constitution relating to’ in Art. 363 means ‘provisions
having a dominant and immediate connection with’: it does mean merely having a reference
to. A wide meaning of the expression may exclude disputes from the jurisdiction of the
Courts in respect of rights or obligations, however indirect or tenuous the connection between
the constitutional provision and the covenant may be.

Dy. Chief Controller v. KT kosalram19

FACTS:

The respondents were given an import license for importing two rotary presses. Under clause
(c) of the licence, the licence holder had to utilise the goods imported for consumption in his
own factory only and its sale or to or use by other parties was specifically prohibited. As they
sold one of their rotary presses imported they were prosecuted.

PROVISION:

19
(1970) 3 SCC 82.
 According to clause (c) of the licence issued to the respondents the licence-bolder had to
utilise the goods imported only for consumption as raw material or accessories in his own
factory and their sale to or use by other parties was specifically prohibited.

ISSUE:

Whether clause (c) covers printing- presses ?

HELD:

The words used in the licence have accordingly to be construed in the background of the
scheme of the Import Control Order, 1953, the relevant entry in the Order and the Import
Trade Control Policy. The word ‘consumption’ is used in clause (c) in the licence to convey
the idea of using up the goods by fixing them in the factory along with the components. This
is clear from the fact that the relevant entry in the Schedule to the Order does not contain any
single item denoting a complete printing press and from the fact that the various articles
mentioned in this itm seems as if to have been intended to constitute ‘raw material’. This
construction fits in with the scheme and policy of the Import Trade Control Policy. The
dictionary meaning of the three words in clause (c) on which the respondent relies would also
seem to harmonise with this view.

Gammon India Ltd v. UOI20

FACTS:

The petitioners were carrying on the business of contractors for construction of roads,
buildings, etc. The Contract Labour (Regulation &Abolition) Act, 1970, requires contractors
to take out licenses and impose duties and liabilities on contractors.

PROVISION:

2 (c) "contractor", in relation to an establishment, means a person who undertakes to

produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods of articles of
manufacture to such establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour
for any work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor;

20
(1974) 1 SCC 596.
ISSUE:

Whether the word “contractor” is defined in the Act, to mean a person who supplies contract
labour for any work of the establishment?

HELD:

The definitions of contractor , ‘workman’, ‘contract labour’, ‘establishment’, ‘principal

employer’, all indicate that the ‘work of an establishment’ means, the work site of the
establishment where a building is constructed for the establishment. The expression does not
mean that the operation assigned to the workmen must be a part or incidental to the work
performed by the principal employer.

Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar21

FACTS:

The fact in issue was that the court had to determine the meaning of the definition of the term
“owner” in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor
Vehicles) Act, 1961, includes the bailee of a public carrier vehicle or any manager acting on
behalf of the owner.

PROVISION:

Section 2(d) of the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods (carried by Public Service Motor
Vehicles) Act, 1961, defines "owner" as the owner of a public service motor vehicle and
includes the holder of a permit under the Motor Vehicles-Act, 1939, in respect of a public
service motor vehicle or any person for the time being in charge of such vehicle or
responsible for the management of the place of business of such owner.

ISSUE:

Whether the definition of the term “owner” is exhaustive and intended to include within
it the word “owner”?

21
(1976) 2 SCC 942.
HELD:

The general rule of construction is not to look at the words but to look at the context, the
collocation and the object of such words relating to such matters and interpret the meanings
according to what would appear to be the meanings to be conveyed by the use of words under
the circumstances. “If the object of its care might supplement or undo the work of legislature
by making a definition clause of its own. People cannot escape from the obligation of the
statute by putting a private interpretation on its language.”22

The Act provided that the owner should pay tax with respect to the passengers and goods
carried by his vehicle. The Court did not accept the permit holder’s (the owner) contention
that it was the hirer who was liable to pay the tax.

Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand23

FACTS:

The first respondent was a workman in the undertaking of the appellant. After holding an
enquiry into certain charges, the appellant found the first respondent guilty and dismissed
from the service. But since an Industrial Dispute was then pending the appellant approached
the Industrial Tribunal for approval of the action taken under Sec. 33 (2) (b), of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, but ultimately withdrew the application and the Industrial Tribunal
passed an order dismissing the application as withdrawn.

PROVISION:

33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during
pendency of proceedings.

(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the
employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in
such dispute 2*[or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of
the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman],

(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, that workman:

22
Lord Macnaughten, Netherseal Colliery Co. v. Bourne (1889) 14 AC 228.
23
(1978) 2 SCC 144.
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid
wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority
before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.

ISSUE:

The interpretation of Sec. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

HELD:

The Court held that it is not only necessary to study the language of Section 33(2) (b), but
also to the object and purpose of that provision, the context in which it occurs and other
provisions of the Act in order to determine what the legislature intended should be the effect
of contravention of Sec. 33 (2) (b) on the order of dismissal.

Here the Court stressed that Sec. 33 cannot be read in isolation, for the intention of the
legislature has to be gathered not from one provision of the statute or another , but from the
whole of the statute.

CONCLUSION:

Therefore, The latin maxim Noscitur a sociis contemplates that a statutory term is recognised
by its associated words. The Latin word ‘sociis’ means ‘society’. Therefore, when general
words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their
colour and their contents are to be derived from their context.

This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis because this rule puts the words
in context of the whole phrase and not just in relation to the nearby words.