The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical

Methods 1st Edition Conny Rhode

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-burden-of-proof-upon-metaphysical-methods-1st-
edition-conny-rhode/
The Burden of Proof upon
Metaphysical Methods
Conny Rhode
The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical
Methods
 Conny Rhode

The Burden of Proof

upon Metaphysical
Methods
Conny Rhode
Stirling, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-27776-4    ISBN 978-3-031-27777-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27777-1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and trans-
mission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.
—David Hume
 To anyone looking in amazement at metaphysical debates1

1
Cf. Stich (1990: 3).
 The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical
Methods

Who carries the burden of proof in analytic philosophical debates, and

how can this burden be satisfied? As it turns out, the answer to this joint
question yields a fundamental challenge to the very conduct of meta-
physics in analytic philosophy.
Empirical research presented in this book indicates that the vastly pre-
dominant goal pursued in analytic philosophical dialogues lies not in
discovering truths or generating knowledge, but merely in prevailing over
one’s opponents. Given this goal, the book examines how most effectively
to allocate and discharge the burden of proof. It focuses on premises that
must prudently be avoided because a burden of proof on them could
never be satisfied, and in particular discusses unsupportable bridge prem-
ises across inference barriers, like Hume’s barrier between ‘is’ and ‘ought’,
or the barrier between the content of our talk or thought, and the world
beyond such content.
Employing this content/world barrier for a critical assessment of main-
stream analytic philosophical methods, this book argues that we must
prudently avoid invoking intuitions or other content of thought or talk
in support of claims about the world beyond content, that is, metaphysi-
cally significant claims. Yet as content-located evidence is practically
indispensable to metaphysical debates throughout analytic philosophy,
from ethics to the philosophy of mathematics, this book reaches the

ix
x The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods

startling conclusion that all such metaphysical debates must, prudently,

be terminated.
Conny Rhode’s research has focused on philosophical methodology
and argumentation theory, with forays into the philosophy of science,
post-Kantian philosophy, and political and moral philosophy, often
employing a feminist perspective. In light of the conclusion derived in
this book, Conny has left academic philosophy and now insists on appro-
priate evidence in accountancy instead.
 Acknowledgements

The present work would almost certainly never have been undertaken
without both my sheer luck of living in societies where very many aspects
of my identity are privileged, and my sheer luck of being born in a society
that is itself globally privileged. Without the latter, I would likely not
have had the benefit of high levels of safety and stability, nor of a well-­
funded healthcare system that was able to save my life, or of an education
and student funding system that made it possible for me to pursue higher
education abroad. And without my various privileges in the societies I
have called home, I would likely have had markedly less opportunity for
and perhaps interest in devoting over 10% of my expected lifespan to
something as comparatively trivial and practically irrelevant as the study
of analytic philosophy (or let alone of its methodology). It must therefore
be acknowledged that the present work would almost certainly not have
been undertaken without the immense luck of inter- and intra-societal
privilege that I have had in my life—though the manifold violences of
oppression accompanying these privileges could not possibly be cause for
gratitude.
This work would also almost certainly never have been undertaken
without the inspiration, support, and encouragement that I received
from several people before even embarking upon the project presented
here. It was my mother, Sabine Rhode, who taught me the joy of learn-
ing, and it is rather unlikely that I would ever have gone to university had
xi
xii Acknowledgements

it not been for the way in which she had fundamentally shaped my inter-
ests. My desire to move to Scotland for university was ultimately due to
my reading the now famous literary works of Joanne Rowling (1997ff).
And I would never have studied philosophy without much encourage-
ment to try it from Ruby Chan, then an ardent admirer of Plato. Yet I
eventually grew deeply frustrated with analytic philosophy’s significant
and systemic methodological deficiencies (arguably inherited, ironically,
from Plato), and I would have left philosophy even in spite of the fact
that these profound reservations were thankfully echoed by some other
philosophers, particularly Robert Cummins (1998), David Papineau
(2006), and James Ladyman et al. (2007) (and similarly, earlier, Jürgen
Hartmann 1997).
Over many discussions and many more cups of coffee, however, Sonja
Erikainen and I instead developed our shared metaphilosophical con-
cerns into an explicit methodological critique, distilling the status-quo-­
favouring allocation of the burden of proof upon philosophical methods
as the apparent root of analytic philosophy’s copious methodological
deficiencies. Soon after, this critique acquired a particular shape and tra-
jectory when inference barriers became equally central to this project,
inspired by the outstanding collection Hume on Is and Ought
(Pigden 2010b).
Between this inception and the present realisation of these two ideas,
many more people have contributed to the development of the surround-
ing considerations. Most significant among them were my doctoral
supervisors, Keith Allen and Mary Leng, whose unwavering constructive
criticism both saved this work from many an error or overly concise
explanation and gave rise to numerous considerations in these pages. A
variety of solutions throughout this book further owe their quality, and
often their very existence, to the brilliant thinking and incisive critiques
contributed by Emmanouela Kritikaki. The project also benefited from
very valuable commentary and advice by Michael Beaney, Alexander
Bird, Jessica Brown, Ruby Chan, James Clarke, Catarina Dutilh Novaes,
Sonja Erikainen, Brendan George, Christopher Jay, Finn Spicer,
Alessandra Tanesini, Giulia Terzian, Sara Uckelman, Douglas Walton,
and Dagmar Wilhelm. Important improvements to the project equally
 Acknowledgements xiii

arose from comments by referees for Argumentation,1 the Australasian

Journal of Philosophy, and Palgrave Macmillan, and by audience members
at the Universities of Bochum, Bristol, Dublin, Glasgow, Granada, Leeds,
Sussex, and York.
I am immensely grateful to each and every one of the people just men-
tioned for their genuinely invaluable inspiration, advice, feedback,
encouragement, and support—and most particularly so to Emmanouela
Kritikaki and Sonja Erikainen, and to Keith Allen and Mary Leng.
Emmanouela, Keith, Mary, and Sonja each played a crucial role in the
development of this project, and I cannot thank them enough for the
innumerable ways in which they have shaped the present
considerations.2
Yet I owe my deepest gratitude to my family—including my mother,
Sabine Rhode, my father, Jörg Rhode, and my sister, Justeen Rhode, and
including my very dear friends, Ruby Chan, Sonja Erikainen, Emmanouela
Kritikaki, Nicola McCallum, Lubna Nowak, and Naomi Phillips.3 I am
immeasurably rich to have each one of them as part of my family. My
love is theirs.

1
Chapters 1 and 2 of this book contain revised material previously published in Argumentation
(Rhode 2017), which is reused here without permission (since none is required under its open
access license; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). I gratefully acknowledge the support
of the University of York, who paid Springer Nature’s remarkable open access fee.
2
Authorship note: In the absence of generally accepted criteria for authorship in academic philoso-
phy, corresponding criteria proposed by David Resnik and Zubin Master (2011) for conceptual
work in bioethics have been employed instead. According to Resnik and Master, authorship credit
requires substantial contribution to at least two of the following tasks (2011: 17): ‘(1) identifying a
topic, problem, or issue to study; (2) reviewing and interpreting the relevant literature; (3) formu-
lating, analyzing, and evaluating arguments that support one or more theses; (4) responding to
objections and counterarguments; and (5) drafting the manuscript and approving the final version.’
Keith Allen and Mary Leng have each contributed substantially to (4) and partially to (2) and (3).
Emmanouela Kritikaki has contributed substantially to (3) and partially to (4). Sonja Erikainen has
contributed substantially to (1) and (3) and partially to (2) and (4). My own contribution has been
substantial to (1)-(4) and exclusive to (5). Thus, both Sonja Erikainen and I qualify for authorship
credit. Sonja, however, maintains that their contribution to (3) was partial rather than substantial,
and they have therefore declined co-authorship.
3
In the acknowledgements to my 2017 article in Argumentation, Naomi’s surname missed one ‘l’.
This is entirely my fault, and I sincerely apologise for this error!
xiv Acknowledgements

References

Cummins, R. 1998. Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium. In Rethinking

Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical
Inquiry, eds. M.R. DePaul and W. Ramsey, 113–127. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield.
Hartmann, J. 1997. Wozu politische Theorie? Eine kritische Einführung für
Studierende und Lehrende der Politikwissenschaft. Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Ladyman, J., and D. Ross with D. Spurrett and J. Collier. 2007. Every
Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Papineau, D. 2006. The Tyranny of Common Sense. The Philosophers’
Magazine 34: 19–25.
Pigden, C.R. ed. 2010b. Hume on Is and Ought. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Resnik, D.B., and Z. Master. 2011. Criteria for Authorship in Bioethics.
The American Journal of Bioethics 11(10): 17–21.
Rhode, C. 2017. The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion
Dialogue. Argumentation 31(3): 535–554.
Rowling, J.K. 1997. Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone. London:
Bloomsbury.
Stich, S.P. 1990. The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic
Theory of Cognitive Evaluation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 Contents

1 D
 ialogue and Persuasion  1
1.1 The Problem of Methodological Conservatism   1
1.2 Commitments in Attitude and Dialogue   4
1.3 An Analysis of Philosophical Dialogues   7
1.4 Looking Ahead  27
References 32

2 The
 Burden of Proof 35
2.1 Egalitarianism versus Foundationalism  35
2.2 Allocating the Burden of Proof  38
2.3 The Prudence of Dialogical Egalitarianism in Philosophy  47
References 50

3 Evidence,
 Inference, and Empiricism 53
3.1 Meeting the Burden of Proof  53
3.2 Evidence  54
3.3 Implication Barriers  58
3.4 Addressing Counter-Examples  63
3.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Barriers  67
3.6 Empiricism  71
References 74

xv
xvi Contents

4 Philosophical
 Methods between Content and the World 77
4.1 Consequences of Dialogical Empiricism  77
4.2 The Content/World Separation  78
4.3 Hypotheses in Philosophy  84
4.4 Evidence in Philosophy  89
4.5 Against the Content/World Separation 104
References113

5 M
 etaphysical Hypotheses117
5.1 Substantive Consequences 117
5.2 Normativity 118
5.3 Necessity 130
5.4 Epistemology 136
5.5 Ontology 140
5.6 Quietism 147
References152

6 E
 scaping Dialogical Empiricism157
6.1 Looking Behind 157
6.2 A Way Around? 160
6.3 A Way Out? 164
References173

Appendix A Reputational Journal Ranking175

Appendix B Population Size177

Appendix C Example Analyses179

Appendix D Analysis Results189

I ndex203
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Types of dialogue 8

Table 1.2 Frequency of types of dialogue 23
Table A.1 Combined Reputational Journal Ranking175
Table B.1 Number of Original Articles per Journal177
Table D.1 Types of Non-Embedded Dialogues in Sampled Journal Articles189

xvii
 1
Dialogue and Persuasion

1.1 The Problem of Methodological

Conservatism
Take any apparent staple among analytic philosophical methods, and you
find debates about the nature, philosophical role, and evidential value of
the same sprinkled generously across the methodological literature of the
last few decades. In the critique and defence of such commonplace philo-
sophical devices as intuitions, thought experiments, or reflective equilib-
ria, perspectives as disparate as the scientism of James Ladyman et al.
(2007) or the rationalism of Elijah Chudnoff (2013) have been pursued,
among many others, leaving hardly any methodological stone unturned
in the process.1 As the methodological foundation stones of contempo-
rary analytic philosophy are thus by and large all up in the air, one might
think that analytic philosophers beyond metaphilosophy would turn at
least partially from their various substantive investigations and attend to
these methodological issues as a matter of priority: Surely philosophers

1
For a very useful overview of recent work in these methodological debates, see Daly (2015).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 1

C. Rhode, The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27777-1_1
2 C. Rhode

would want to make sure that their tools are useful before trying to use
these tools again?
What can be observed, though, is quite the contrary, as the vast major-
ity of analytic philosophers evince no such desire. It is business-as-usual
in virtually all substantive sub-disciplines of analytic philosophy, where
the various challenges to and critiques of the methods employed in these
same substantive investigations are, in effect, being ignored. Reflective
equilibria continue to be pursued; thought experiments continue to be
wrought; and things that look a lot like intuitions continue to be
invoked.2 Quite regardless of the serious concerns raised about common
philosophical methods, substantive philosophical debates simply con-
tinue unperturbed.
The attitude that appears to be at the root of this indifference is per-
haps best illustrated in a remark by George Bealer, made with regard to
analytic philosophers’ employment of intuitions as evidence. Bealer
claimed that ‘[i]t is standard justificatory practice to use intuitions evi-
dentially. Unless and until a reason for departing from this standard prac-
tice is produced, we are entitled—indeed, obligated—to continue using
intuitions as evidence’ (1996: 30 n. 15). This sentiment, which may ade-
quately be characterised as methodological conservatism (cf. Papineau
2006), appears to hold sway with regard to other standard philosophical
methods as well, to the effect that analytic philosophers’ employment of
these methods may supposedly continue ‘[u]nless and until a reason for
departing from this standard practice is produced’. This conservative
default position has the effect of placing the burden of proof firmly upon
anyone challenging the methodological status quo, that is to say, upon
the critics of standard philosophical methods, to the benefit of the defend-
ers of these methods.
The present work originated as a response to this conservative alloca-
tion of the burden of proof, in order to show that the burden of proof
must in fact lie upon the defenders of standard philosophical methods,

2
To underline this ignorance, it suffices to note the following: In a representative sample of 110
articles recently published in leading Anglophone analytic philosophy journals, only five articles
engaged with these methodological debates at least peripherally. (The details of this sample will be
given in Sect. 1.3. The foregoing five articles were the 98th, 101st, 102nd, 108th and 109th article, as
listed in Appendix D.)
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 3

and hence that no philosophical method should be employed again

‘unless and until’ its evidentiary pedigree has been tested and established.
In its current form, however, this work also considers how the burden of
proof in methodological and other analytic philosophical dialogues might
be satisfied. In addressing both the allocation and the satisfaction of the
burden of proof, I develop a form of empiricism that I call dialogical
empiricism, which states that the burden of proof for an asserted and
questioned proposition prudently (a) lies upon the asserting party and
(b) must be satisfied without crossing any inference barrier.
Consider, for instance, the proposition that S: The employment of stan-
dard philosophical methods is permissible, and assume that S has been
asserted by one party in a philosophical dialogue and questioned by
another party in that dialogue. In this scenario, dialogical empiricism
states that (a) the asserting party must prudently support or else retract S,
no matter how basic or obvious S may seem. And dialogical empiricism
furthermore states that, (b) in supporting S, the asserting party must
prudently not invoke evidence propositions that differ in kind from S,
such as descriptive propositions in support of the normative proposition
S, because that would entail the crossing of the corresponding inference
barrier between these two kinds (here: Hume’s is/ought barrier). The
present thesis thus adopts a core tenet of empiricism, viz. that inferences
beyond what is warranted by the evidence should be avoided, and applies
this core tenet to the conduct of dialogue in philosophy—whence the
name ‘dialogical empiricism’.
In this book, dialogical empiricism lies at the argumentative centre of
a series of considerations that, I believe, are notable for their metaphilo-
sophical consequences as well as their argumentation-theoretic starting
points. The first of these starting points is the logical separation between
commitments in dialogue and commitments in attitude: My assertion
that P, for instance, does not entail my belief that P, nor vice versa. The
second starting point is the goal pursued in philosophical dialogue: As I
will demonstrate empirically, it is the predominant goal of interlocutors
in analytic philosophical dialogues to persuade their opponents—rather
than, say, to prove or disprove a contested thesis. These two starting
points together give rise to dialogical empiricism, and dialogical empiri-
cism in turn yields as a metaphilosophical conclusion that metaphysical
4 C. Rhode

debates must prudently be excised from analytic philosophical dialogue:

For as I will discuss later in this book, analytic metaphysical debates can-
not be conducted without reliance on the crossing of inference barriers,
which is prudently prohibited by dialogical empiricism.
I introduce the foregoing two argumentation-theoretic starting points,
respectively, in the next two sections, first separating commitments in
attitude from commitments in dialogue, and then assessing the goal of
philosophical dialogues. In the final section of this chapter, I offer an
overview of the considerations resulting from these two starting points,
which will take us from the allocation of the burden of proof that gives
rise to dialogical empiricism through to the recommendation that ana-
lytic metaphysical dialogue must prudently be terminated.

1.2 Commitments in Attitude and Dialogue

For any proposition P, I can commit to either or neither of the potential
truth-values of P. I can, that is, commit to P, or to ¬P, or to neither P nor
¬P. This is exemplified when believing that P (thus committing to P),
disbelieving that P (and so committing to ¬P), or wondering whether P
(thereby committing to neither P nor ¬P). Each of the truth-value com-
mitments just exemplified is here made in, or ‘located’ in, attitudinal
states, such as beliefs. Call them, therefore, attitudinal commitments.
Apart from their attitudinal location, however, commitments regarding
the truth-value of P can also be made in dialogue. I can, for instance,
assert that P, deny that P, or ask/question whether P, thus committing dia-
logically to P, to ¬P, or to neither P nor ¬P.3 (It may be possible in principle
to commit to both P and ¬P, for example by dyserting that P, where ‘to
dysert’ is defined as ‘to simultaneously deny and assert’. My present con-
cern, however, is solely with commitments in practice. It will become
clear below that, for practical purposes, it is not possible to dysert.)

3
It is of course possible to assert that P (or deny that P or ask whether P) without engaging in a
dialogue, for example by assertively uttering P to oneself. That notwithstanding, I subsequently
employ ‘asserting that P’ and cognate expressions solely to denote ‘committing dialogically to the
truth of P’ and cognate expressions, and I employ the other foregoing examples likewise exclusively
to denote the other dialogical and attitudinal commitments.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 5

Commitments to either or neither of the possible truth-values of P can

thus be made in attitude and in dialogue.4
This separation between attitudinal and dialogical truth-value com-
mitments is itself founded in a distinction between targets, or recipients,
of such commitments. A dialogical truth-value commitment is directed
towards, or made to, someone else (lest it would not be located in a dia-
logue), whereas an attitudinal truth-value commitment is directed towards
or made to oneself (being itself inaccessible to others). Strictly, then, the
target of any of one’s own truth-value commitments either is or is not
identical with oneself, thus dividing truth-value commitments exclu-
sively and exhaustively into those made in attitude and those made in
dialogue. (At this point, it should perhaps be noted that the attitude/
dialogue separation is not co-extensive with any internal/external separa-
tion, not least because it is possible to engage in an internal, imaginary
dialogue with a fictional interlocutor.)
Given this separation, no attitudinal commitment necessitates any dia-
logical commitment, nor vice versa (Aijaz et al. 2013; see also Alston
1976: 176–9; Audi 1993: 118–23; Rescorla 2009a: 93–94, 2009b). I
can, as a matter of fact, deny in dialogue that Knowledge is an anthropo-
genic kind, yet wonder attitudinally whether this proposition might not
be true after all. Equally, I can believe that Implicit biases contribute sig-
nificantly to philosophy’s relative demographic homogeneity without assert-
ing the same to an interlocutor, most obviously when I am not in the
presence of any potential interlocutor. Dialogical and attitudinal com-
mitments are thus logically independent, in that a given truth-value com-
mitment to P in one location does not entail the same truth-value
commitment to P (or indeed any other commitment) in the other loca-
tion. (Identifying a truth-value commitment thus strictly requires some
degree of specification of its target, that is, of the party to whom the com-
mitment is made.) Of course, most people’s dialogical truth-value com-
mitments correspond to their attitudinal truth-value commitments in

4
The terminology for this separation, ‘attitudinal’ vs. ‘dialogical’, is adapted from Imran Aijaz,
Jonathan McKeown-Green and Aness Webster (2013). I use the terms ‘dialogue’ and ‘dialogical’
instead of the more commonly used terms ‘discourse’ and ‘dialectical’ due to the simplicity of cog-
nates and in order to preclude any resultant possibility of misinterpretation in light of twentieth
century French philosophy (‘discourse’) or nineteenth century German philosophy (‘dialectical’).
6 C. Rhode

most circumstances. That correspondence, however, is entirely contin-

gent: No logically necessary connection between dialogical and attitudi-
nal commitments arises from this statistical correlation.
It might be claimed that this independence of commitments in differ-
ent locations is curtailed by norms prescribing permissible combinations
of commitments. The social norm that One ought not to lie, for instance,
proscribes making a dialogical commitment without having the corre-
sponding attitudinal commitment. Equally, the so-called knowledge
norm of assertion requires that one ‘assert that P only if one knows that
P’ (Brown and Cappelen 2011: 1; cf. Williamson 2000: 11), thus just as
well proscribing the making of a dialogical commitment without the cor-
responding attitudinal commitment. I grant for present purposes that
there may well exist social, ethical, epistemic, linguistic, rational or other
norms regarding the appropriateness of, for instance, asserting that P
without believing that P, as well as that such norms may be employed as
premises in such inferences as from one’s assertion that P to one’s belief
that P. Of course, norms linking dialogical commitments to attitudinal
commitments may themselves be rejected. But this is not the place to
decide whether such a norm connecting the two commitment locations
should be accepted or rejected. (I will touch upon that question again
towards the end of the present chapter, and respond fully in Chap. 6,
Sect. 6.3 by effectively rejecting such norms.) At this point, I merely seek
to emphasise that such norms would be connecting two commitment
locations that are themselves logically independent, such that no truth-­
value commitment in one location by itself necessitates any truth-value
commitment in the other location.
I stress this perhaps uncontroversial logical independence in order to
concentrate solely upon dialogical commitments in my subsequent con-
siderations. These considerations will address commitments in the aca-
demic discipline of analytic philosophy; and that discipline is conducted
mostly (if not entirely) by way of dialogue between philosophers, rather
than via mere attitudinal musings. My considerations regarding commit-
ments in analytic philosophy must thus inevitably address commitments
in philosophical dialogue—and hence dialogical commitments.
This significant disregard for questions of attitudinal commitment,
particularly including epistemological questions, in favour of questions
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 7

of dialogical commitment is one respect in which the present work looks

to depart from much of the current literature in philosophical methodol-
ogy. The other key point of departure is my aim throughout this work,
not to establish some or another truth, but merely to advise on the most
prudent, or instrumentally rational5 conduct of analytic philosophy—
and specifically on the most prudent conduct of philosophical dialogue
with regard to dialogical commitments. In order to determine the instru-
mentally most rational conduct of such dialogue, it is of course necessary
to first determine the goal to the attainment of which a given conduct
would be so instrumental. That is to say, it is necessary for the advisory
purposes of this work to identify the goal of philosophical dialogue. This
is the purpose of the next section of this chapter, where I draw on Douglas
Walton’s typology of dialogues for a content analysis of a representative
sample of philosophical dialogues.

1.3 An Analysis of Philosophical Dialogues

Types of Dialogue

Through decades spent analysing the progression of observed dialogues

across numerous formats, Douglas Walton and colleagues have distin-
guished seven practically mutually exclusive but not necessarily exhaus-
tive ideal types of dialogue, abstracted from real-life dialogues imperfectly
instantiating one or more ideal types (Walton 2014: 33; cf. 2016: 65–6).
The ideal types, catalogued with key characteristics in Table 1.1,6 are dis-
tinguished according to both the goals pursued in a given type of dia-
logue and the rules of engagement accompanying these goals (Walton
and Krabbe 1995: 66). The relative significance of different goals, how-
ever, appears to diverge between adversarial and collaborative types of
dialogue. An adversarial type of dialogue can be delineated essentially by
the goal of each individual participant, while what Walton calls the goal

5
I employ the Machiavellian conception of prudence as mere instrumental rationality, rather than
its wider, classical conception as a civic virtue (cf. Hariman 2003).
6
Where necessary, I have adapted the description of characteristics to take account of the separation
between attitudinal and dialogical commitments.
8 C. Rhode

Table 1.1 Types of dialogue

Type of Relation of Goal of any Goal of the
dialogue Initial situation participants participant dialogue
Information Need for Collaborative Acquire or Exchange
information give information
information
Inquiry Need for Collaborative Find and verify Prove or disprove
conclusive evidence hypothesis
proof or
disproof of a
hypothesis
Discovery Need for Collaborative Find and Choose best
explanation assess explanation for
of a potential phenomenon
phenomenon explanation
Persuasion Conflict of Adversarial Get opponent Resolve or clarify
dialogical to adopt conflict of
commitments your commitments
dialogical
commitment
Deliberation Need for Collaborative Coordinate Agree a course of
action goals and action for
actions implementation
Negotiation Conflict of Adversarial Maximise your Reach a mutually
interests and and own benefit acceptable
expected collaborative settlement
benefit of
agreement
Eristic Personal Adversarial Verbally hit Reveal deeper
conflict out at basis of conflict
opponent
Adapted from Walton and Krabbe (1995: 66), Walton (2013: 200–2, 2014: 34),
Groarke (2017). Essential goals are italicised

of the dialogue overall is a side benefit not necessarily pursued by partici-

pants. By contrast, in a collaborative type of dialogue the overall goal of
the dialogue is essential to the dialogue and is shared by each participant,
while participants’ individual goals (aside from this shared goal) merely
contribute to the pursuit of the shared goal.7 Given the different

7
Collaborative types of dialogue are not adversarial, while adversarial types of dialogue are collab-
orative at least to such degree as is required for the very conduct of dialogue. It would thus be more
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 9

characteristics associated with each goal, it is possible to determine the

type of a given dialogue from its characteristics and thereby identify the
defining, underlying kind of goal of that dialogue. This is what I will do
shortly.
Yet before this typology can be employed for the analysis of the types
instantiated by philosophical dialogues, and hence of the goals pursued
in such dialogues, several further characteristics of various types must be
noted (cf. Walton 2014: 34–6, 42, 236–8). Both inquiry dialogues and
discovery dialogues aim at the production of evidentially supported
knowledge. However, an inquiry dialogue aims to conclusively establish
whether it is the case that P (or otherwise to show that this cannot cur-
rently be established), whereas a discovery dialogue aims to explain why it
is the case that P. Consequently, a hypothesis to be tested is already given
in an inquiry dialogue, while one or more hypotheses must first be arrived
at in a discovery dialogue before these are tested (McBurney and Parsons
2001: 417–8). Once identified, however, it is characteristic of both
inquiry and discovery dialogues that a hypothesis is submitted to testing
in order to gather supporting or detracting evidence. Yet the standard of
evidential support to be satisfied in order to successfully conclude an
inquiry dialogue is much higher than the corresponding standard in a
discovery dialogue, since achieving the goal of the former but not of the
latter requires that subsequent retraction of its conclusion is precluded.
In contrast to dialogues of these two types, deliberation dialogues and
negotiation dialogues are not aimed at acquiring knowledge but instead
at the consensual coordination of subsequent action. Between them-
selves, they differ centrally in the compatibility of participants’ prefer-
ences: Participants engage in deliberation dialogue with each other if
their individual preferences are jointly realisable, and in negotiation dia-
logue if they are not. Furthermore, achieving a deliberated consensus that
actually satisfies each participant’s preferences requires the full disclosure
of any such preferences, whereas maximising one’s preference satisfaction
as part of a negotiated consensus requires the strategic and likely limited
disclosure of one’s preferences.
Turning now to persuasion dialogue, it is the essential characteristic of

accurate to classify types of dialogue as either ‘adversarial’ or ‘non-adversarial’, though I retain

Walton’s original terminology here due to its obvious benefit of clarity.
10 C. Rhode

such dialogue that either one or each party to the dialogue attempts to get
her opponent to abandon his initial dialogical truth-value commitment
regarding some proposition P in favour of her own commitment.8 Such a
change of commitment is pursued in this ideal type by presenting a chain
of arguments culminating in one’s initial commitment regarding P, based
only on commitments made or assumed to be made by one’s opponent.
The goal of persuasion dialogue is commonly considered (including by
Walton) to be a change in the opponent’s attitudinal rather than dialogi-
cal truth-value commitment. Pursuit of an attitudinal change, however,
practically requires pursuit of a dialogical change: Any pursuit of an atti-
tudinal change in one’s interlocutor requires some speech act to the
potential effect of that attitudinal change;9 and such a speech act equally
has the potential to effect a dialogical change.10 The immediate and indis-
pensable goal of persuasion dialogue, then, is simply to lead one’s oppo-
nent to adopt one’s own dialogical commitment and/or to not be
influenced likewise oneself, though one’s mediate goal may of course still
be a change in one’s opponent’s attitudinal commitment.11
Persuasion dialogue can thus be located between the foregoing two
pairs of types of dialogue. Consistent with inquiry and discovery dia-
logue, the object of the conclusion of a persuasion dialogue is a proposi-
tion rather than a set of actions. (Note that a persuasion dialogue is not
itself action-guiding: Even when the proposition at issue concerns what
ought to be done, the dialogue differs from a deliberation or negotiation
dialogue, as the latter concern what will be done.) Further, in line with
deliberation and negotiation dialogue, the successful conclusion of a per-
suasion dialogue requires consensus rather than evidentially supported

8
Given one’s initial commitment to P, one’s opponent may either dissent from P, by committing to
neither P nor ¬P, or he may dispute that P, by committing to ¬P and attempting to get one to com-
mit to ¬P as well. Any persuasion dialogue features one or the other initial situation (cf. van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1983: 82).
9
I do not assume that pursuit of something is necessarily intentional, thus understanding ‘pursuit
of ’ minimally as ‘action to the potential effect of ’.
10
This distinction is not to be confused with Michael Dummett’s (1978: 295–6) distinction
between suasive and explanatory arguments. An explanatory argument would be made, as
Dummett states, when one’s interlocutor has already committed to the truth of its conclusion; yet
the aim of persuasion dialogue is to bring about such commitment in the first instance.
11
The label of persuasion for this type of dialogue is therefore slightly misleading, though I retain it
for the sake of consistency with the literature.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 11

knowledge (though knowledge may of course contribute to reaching con-

sensus). As such, it is neither necessarily nor typically part of a persuasion
dialogue to submit a hypothesis to tests in order to gather supporting or
detracting evidence. Moreover, consistent with inquiry dialogue, the
proposition at issue in a persuasion dialogue is given from the start. In
line with discovery dialogue, achieving the essential goal of a persuasion
dialogue does not necessitate any exceedingly high standard of support
and so does not preclude retraction.
It is worth noting that the object of any dialogue of the above types
may be conditional or unconditional. In the case of types of dialogue
whose object is a proposition (i.e. inquiry, discovery, and persuasion dia-
logue), the proposition or hypothesis at issue may be conditional or
unconditional. An inquiry dialogue, for instance, may be aimed at prov-
ing the truth or falsity of a conditional hypothesis, such as the hypothesis
that If an armchair is burned, then greenhouse gases are released in the pro-
cess. Equally, an inquiry dialogue may be aimed at proving or disproving
an unconditional hypothesis, such as that The Earth is flat. The same
applies to, say, a persuasion dialogue, as indeed the foregoing hypotheses
may just as well be the objects of persuasion dialogues. In the case of
types of dialogue whose object is a set of actions for subsequent imple-
mentation (i.e. deliberation and negotiation dialogue), the agreed course
of action may similarly be conditional or unconditional. My friend and I
might conditionally decide to take a trip to Loch Ossian in the Scottish
Highlands on Saturday, or alternatively, to go shopping in Glasgow in the
event that Friday’s weather forecast predicts torrential rain for Loch
Ossian. After a couple of hours of window shopping on Saturday (as the
Scottish weather turned out true to form), we might decide uncondition-
ally to take a break in a coffee house. As these examples serve to illustrate,
none of the above types of dialogue are restricted in scope with regard to
whether their objects are conditional or unconditional. Consequently,
the analysis of philosophical dialogues that is to follow below will be
unaffected by the conditionality or otherwise of the objects at issue in
these dialogues.
Finally, it should be noted that the pursuit of the essential goal of a
dialogue of one type often requires a temporary shift to a separate dia-
logue of a different type, whereby this new dialogue is embedded within
12 C. Rhode

the original dialogue for the purpose of advancing the latter (Walton
2014: 37). In such a case, the conclusion of the embedded dialogue serves
as a contribution to the overarching dialogue, thus helping participants
achieve the essential goal of that overarching dialogue. Embedded within
a (long) deliberation dialogue, for instance, may be several persuasion
dialogues and information dialogues (Walton 2014: 212, 217). Crucial
to note, however, is that the type of an embedded dialogue has no bearing
on the type of the dialogue wherein it is embedded, nor vice versa. The
only impact between these dialogues lies in the embedded dialogue being
potentially curtailed by, having its rules of engagement altered by, or the
pursuit of its goal made conditional upon, the pursuit of the goal of the
non-embedded dialogue.

Philosophers’ Self-Conceptions

In light of this typology of dialogues, one might already suspect some or

another particular type to be prevalent in philosophical dialogue, poten-
tially due to one’s particular professional self-conception. It is worth
examining such professional self-conceptions for a moment, as they
might offer a preliminary indication of the type of dialogue prevalent in
philosophy. According to Walton (1992), two very broad groups of such
professional self-conceptions may be distinguished in philosophy, viz.
those conceiving of philosophy as a cognitive enterprise, and those con-
ceiving of philosophy as a critical enterprise.
On the former conception, philosophy is in some sense related to, and
perhaps continuous with, the natural and/or social sciences. Here, phi-
losophy increases our knowledge or understanding through the assess-
ment, explanation, or clarification of facts, truths, or meanings.
Originating with Plato, this picture of philosophy is, and has been since
the Enlightenment, integral to the professional self-conception of argu-
ably the majority of philosophers. Indeed, one might ask, what else could
philosophers possibly be doing when they examine the nature of mental
content, spell out the prescriptions of justice, or explicate the passage of
time? Surely, one may hold, philosophy must be in the business of advanc-
ing our knowledge—very broadly like any other cognitive, that is,
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 13

truth-­directed, enterprise. This cognitive conception would suggest that

the types of dialogue predominantly instantiated in philosophy are those
featuring a cognitive goal, viz. discovery dialogue and/or inquiry dialogue.
On the conception of philosophy as a critical enterprise, the disciplin-
ary goal is to interrogate beliefs, thus to unearth and challenge errors,
hidden assumptions and inconsistencies in them. This may indirectly
lead to greater personal insight, thereby laying the groundwork for other,
cognitive pursuits—as the avoidance of error and inconsistency, as well as
awareness of hidden assumptions, is of obvious benefit to any cognitive
pursuit. Notwithstanding these indirect fruits of such an enterprise,
much of philosophers’ work is negative on this Socratic and indeed
sophistic conception of philosophy.12 As Walton (1992: 137) explains
(citing Henry Johnstone 1978): ‘Unlike a scientific inquiry, philosophical
argumentation [thus conceived] is typically directed towards refuting
opposed views.’ On this critical conception, according to Walton, phi-
losophy both incubates and critically interrogates competing arguments
on the ‘marketplace of persuasion’ (Walton 1992: 126). Arguments are
developed and challenged in attempts to persuade one another of one of
a number of competing views (cf. Cohen 1986: 3). The predominant
type of dialogue in philosophy would thus be persuasion dialogue.13
If these two conceptions of philosophy reflect at least broadly the actu-
ally predominant professional self-conceptions of philosophers (which I
need not assume to be the case), and if such self-conceptions are further-
more indicative of the predominant types of dialogue in philosophy, then
we should expect that discovery and/or inquiry dialogue, or persuasion
dialogue, is prevalent in philosophy. It must be emphasised, however,
that one’s conception of the type of the dialogue one is participating in
need not be indicative of the actual type instantiated by that dialogue. It
is entirely possible, for instance, to believe oneself to be engaged in an
inquiry dialogue when the dialogue in question actually instantiates the
type of persuasion dialogue (cf. Walton 1992). As such, the foregoing
conceptions of philosophy can at most serve to facilitate the formulation

Note that Walton’s reference to sophism is non-pejorative.

12

Whether a particular philosophical programme (such as, say, the Canberra Plan) would belong to
13

one or the other conception is an interesting but presently irrelevant question.

14 C. Rhode

of hypotheses to be tested. The hypotheses thus suggested are:

Hid: Philosophical dialogues instantiate the type of inquiry dialogue and/

or the type of discovery dialogue significantly more frequently than
they instantiate any other type of dialogue.
Hp: Philosophical dialogues instantiate the type of persuasion dialogue
significantly more frequently than they instantiate any other type
of dialogue.

The corresponding null hypotheses are:

H0(id): Philosophical dialogues do not instantiate the type of inquiry dia-

logue and/or the type of discovery dialogue significantly more fre-
quently than they instantiate any other type of dialogue.
H0(p): Philosophical dialogues do not instantiate the type of persuasion
dialogue significantly more frequently than they instantiate any other
type of dialogue.

Of course, the assessment of the prevalence of different types of dialogue

in philosophy is not a correlational study, so the formulation of hypoth-
eses may seem somewhat contrived. Beyond their clarificatory value,
however, testing these hypotheses will not least reveal whether either of
the foregoing professional self-conceptions of philosophers happens to be
accurate. Nonetheless, my primary concern here is not with the assess-
ment of the professional self-conceptions described by Walton, but rather
with the identification of the goal of philosophical dialogue. The compet-
ing professional self-conceptions are each associated with certain types of
dialogue (as specified in the above hypotheses), and thus indirectly with
certain goals; but these professional self-conceptions still need not be
indicative of the actual goal of philosophical dialogue. That goal (or
goals) must be identified by directly examining philosophical dialogue
itself. For this purpose, I will now conduct an empirical analysis of philo-
sophical dialogues, in order to determine the relative prevalence of the
different types of dialogue in philosophy, and by extension the relative
prevalence of the different dialogical goals.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 15

Methodology

Philosophical dialogues are located variously, as Jonathan Cohen put it

(Cohen 1986: 3), ‘in informal conversation, or in formal debate, or
between imagined dramatis personae, or in successive publications, with
one contributor taking over from another, through minutes, months,
years, or even centuries’. Such dialogues are thus highly spread out—
across time, across venues, and across interlocutors. Since my aim in this
work is to offer prudential recommendations for future engagements in
such dialogue, it is most conducive to focus on contemporary philosophy
for the analysis of the relative prevalence of different types of dialogue.
Even so, philosophical dialogues are taking place across a multitude of
venues, such as imaginary debates, chats over a coffee, seminar discus-
sions, conference Q&As, unsolicited journal articles, symposia, edited
volumes, and monographs.
Articles in peer-reviewed journals (outside symposia or special issues),14
however, both provide a ready cross section of philosophical dialogues
and have been subjected to the most rigorous peer-review, and they there-
fore offer a sufficiently broad snapshot of contemporary philosophical
dialogues. There are three specific aspects to this suitability. First, journal
articles are very often developed out of (actual or hypothetical) relatively
brief discussions, and they precede the further elaboration of their con-
tents in any subsequent monographs. Journal articles are thus contribu-
tions to ongoing dialogues (between parties whose membership is
ever-changing) which are themselves conducted predominantly through
journal articles, comparatively briefer discussions, and monographs, the
latter two feeding into or drawing upon journal articles. It is therefore
prima facie likely that the types of dialogue observable in journal articles
match the types observable in other venues that feed into or draw upon
journal articles.
Second, journal articles undergo a more rigorous and more competi-
tive process of selection and refinement than dialogue contributions

14
I subsequently use ‘journal articles’ and cognate expressions to denote original, competitively
selected journal articles published in peer-reviewed journals outside any symposium, special issue,
or similar format.
16 C. Rhode

made in other venues. For a journal article to successfully pass through

the various rounds of peer-review and editorial selection, objections and
improvements by parties other than the authors’ are integrated into and
addressed in the article, either in advance of or during the peer-review
process. The contributions and role of other parties in the dialogue are
thereby internalised into the article, so that a journal article reflects a
sustained dialogue between the authors’ party and other parties, which is
itself a contribution to a longer, ongoing dialogue (Dutilh Novaes
2016).15 By contrast, seminar or conference contributions are typically
regarded as being, to some extent, works in progress, while monographs
enjoy somewhat greater liberty in the choice of which other parties to
internalise and to what extent—in both cases because the pressure of
peer-review to internalise other parties is arguably not applied with the
same reliability and/or strength as it is in the case of journal articles.
Journal articles therefore offer a greater concentration of moves in their
respective dialogues, thus making them more useful for an analysis of the
types of such dialogues.
Third, a journal’s peer-review process of selection and refinement not
only enforces this internalisation but (to some extent thereby) also legiti-
mises the eventual articles as recognised contributions to philosophical
debates—more so than a conference’s or book publisher’s review process
does (cf. Hemmings 2005: 117–8; Erikainen 2020: 6). An article’s pub-
lication in, say, a top-3 journal confers greater prestige than a presenta-
tion’s inclusion in a top-3 conference, or a monograph’s publication with
a top-3 press. As such, the venues regarded as admitting only the ‘best’
pieces of philosophical work are themselves journals, rather than confer-
ences or book publishers. These journals thereby create and reproduce a
legitimised standard which most philosophers seek to emulate. In order
to identify the types of dialogue recognised as satisfying this standard, it
is therefore more effective to look to the standard-setting venues them-
selves, rather than to venues where this standard is merely being accepted
and approximated. So, in summary, since journal articles are situated at
the centre of the development of philosophical ideas and at the peak of

15
A dialogue is thus conducted between parties rather than between members of parties—though
I will subsequently often write in ways that suggest the latter, for the sake of expressive simplicity.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 17

enforced rigour, a representative sample of such journal articles should

also be indicative of the relative prevalence of different types of dialogue
in philosophy.
As the third point just mentioned already indicated, however, not any
odd set of journal articles will do—since the demandingness of peer-­
review reputedly varies between journals, with an article’s publication in
a highly reputed journal being considered an indication of the article’s
satisfaction of the highest philosophical standards. If the selected articles
were largely regarded as falling short of such standards, then any recom-
mendations for the optimal conduct of philosophy that I would subse-
quently draw from the analysis of these articles may be undermined. To
avoid such difficulties, I select articles for analysis exclusively from those
journals that are listed among the top-25 in both of the leading reputa-
tional journal rankings in philosophy, viz. the Brooks (2011) and Leiter
(2013) rankings.16 There is considerable overlap between these rankings,
with 22 journals being among the top-25 in both of them.17
Given the aforementioned focus on contemporary philosophy, it is rea-
sonable to sample journal articles merely from the most recent decade
preceding this research (which was conducted in 2015 and has also been
published in Rhode 2017). To estimate the number of journal articles
published in that period in the identified 22 journals, I have manually
counted their number for the years 2007, 2010 and 2013, and extrapo-
lated the result to a period of ten years. On the basis of this estimate,
approximately 6,960 journal articles have been published in the identi-
fied 22 journals in the ten-year period to 2015.18

16
Given their reputational ranks, these journals are relatively most likely to publish work instantiat-
ing what is predominantly regarded as meeting the highest philosophical standards. Of course, this
implies that they publish work actually meeting the highest philosophical standards only insofar as
‘the highest philosophical standards’ is defined by a disciplinary mainstream.
17
These 22 journals include: American Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis,
Ethics, European Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of the History of Philosophy,
Mind, Noûs, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly,
Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, Philosophy &
Public Affairs, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Synthese. Their ranks in
both rankings, and the ranks of journals ranked among the top-25 in only one of the two rankings,
are reproduced in Appendix A.
18
The number of journal articles counted in each journal in each of the three years selected is docu-
mented in Appendix B. Outlier results within any given journal are excluded, as also documented.
18 C. Rhode

I will analyse a representative sample of journal articles from among

these 6,960 articles in up to two stages, beginning with an exploratory
sample, and then expanding to a wider sample unless saturation is
attained. For the initial representative sample, I select one article from
each journal from every even-numbered year in the ten-year period to
2015, thus selecting 22 (journals) × 5 (even-numbered years) = 110 arti-
cles. The frequency of each type of dialogue found in such a sample of
110 articles will be representative of the frequency of these types of dia-
logue in the population of 6,960 articles at a confidence level of 95%
with a margin of error of ±9.3% (or at 90% confidence with a ±7.9%
margin). I will then conduct a second round of analyses, expanding the
sample size beyond these 110 articles, in order to decrease the margin of
error—unless saturation is attained within these 110 articles, that is,
unless the results from the initial representative sample are so uniform
that there is no basis for expecting different results from an expanded
sample (cf. Saunders et al. 2018).
In selecting a specific set of 110 articles I disregard not only articles
published within special issues and symposia, but also discussion notes,
reviews, editorials, and errata, due to the same considerations regarding
the pressures of the peer-review process already outlined. I also disregard
any obviously satirical articles.19 Among the journal articles thus remain-
ing, I select, arbitrarily, the third article published in the given journal in
the given year’s volume(s). Among the set of 110 articles thus selected,
none turned out to be in so-called continental philosophy or in any non-­
Western philosophy,20 and all were written in English. The sample thus
exclusively represents current so-called analytic Anglophone philosophy,
though it should be expected in light of shared methods and topics that
it is also representative of non-Anglophone analytic philosophy.
Analysing the sampled articles, I identify the exemplified type of dia-
logue in two steps. First, the non-embedded dialogue in the article must
be distinguished from any other dialogues embedded within it. Many
articles, for instance, provide initial definitions and/or an overview of the
state of the debate on an issue. This provision of background information
19
The only satirical article thus disregarded is Willoughby (2012), which I will return to shortly.
20
As a consequence, I subsequently employ ‘philosophy’ and ‘analytic philosophy’, as well as cognate
expressions of either, to denote ‘Western analytic philosophy’ and cognate expressions thereof.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 19

(itself seemingly instantiating information dialogue) serves to facilitate

the dialogues that follow it, and is thus embedded within one of these
subsequent dialogues. Equally, an article may incorporate an inquiry dia-
logue wherein a given hypothesis is being tested, with the test result being
employed to advance some other dialogue in the article and the inquiry
thus being embedded within that other dialogue. As such, the task in this
step is, first, to assess each paragraph or similar unit of text in an article
for its function or purpose within the article as a whole. Second, it is
necessary to identify the passages or paragraphs that together serve the
same function or purpose, thus identifying the different dialogues in the
article (such as a series of paragraphs that provide background informa-
tion on existing arguments, followed by several paragraphs attempting to
undermine those arguments). Third, from among the dialogues thus dis-
tinguished it is necessary to identify the dialogue that is facilitated or
advanced by all others without itself facilitating or advancing any other
dialogue in the article. On the basis of the functions of the various para-
graphs of an article I thus identify the one dialogue (i.e. series of passages
or paragraphs) in which all other dialogues are embedded. (No article
contains a plurality of such non-embedded dialogues; for if it did, it
would be pursuing a plurality of separate and wholly independent con-
clusions or purposes—presumably barring it from publication at least in
any of the above 22 most highly reputed journals.)
The next task is to identify the type of the non-embedded dialogue just
distinguished. Here I assess the given non-embedded dialogue against the
characteristics of each type listed above (including in Table 1.1). These
characteristics, though quite clearly characterised, are themselves qualita-
tive rather than quantitative, so the assessment of their respective instan-
tiation or non-instantiation is to a degree interpretive. To mitigate against
undue bias, I disregard any characteristics in the analysis of a given non-­
embedded dialogue to the extent that their instantiation is not unam-
biguous and readily apparent. The analysis of a given non-embedded
dialogue thus relies upon the characteristics listed above solely to the
extent that their instantiation is clear and unequivocal—which turned
out to be true in most cases. On this basis, I judge the type of a given
non-embedded dialogue according to the preponderance of evidence
from the individual characteristics. For most dialogues, though, the type
20 C. Rhode

was so clear as to leave very little room for doubt, where the assessed
characteristics effectively admitted of the identification of only one type.21
To uncover any significant level of error in this analysis, I repeated the
analysis for 20% of the sample (viz. one article selected at random from
each of the 22 journals) one month after carrying out the original analy-
sis. This led to no corrections of the initial results.

Example Analysis: Willoughby (2012)

I will now illustrate this analysis using the example of Willoughby

(2012)—a satirical article published in the Journal of Philosophy. This
article is of particular present interest because any successful satire must
contain a recognisable depiction of the target to be satirised—so the type
of dialogue of this article is potentially indicative of the type that is preva-
lent among the targeted philosophical dialogues.
Authored under the pseudonym of New York City subway stop Myrtle
Willoughby and entitled ‘Stoppism: Retrospects and Prospects’,
Willoughby (2012) offers an attack on stoppism: the thesis that trains are
metaphysically dependent upon stops, such that a train is a local (or
express) train because it calls at local (or express) stops. That thesis is con-
trasted in the introductory section of the article from theses affirming
dependence in the reverse direction (train-realism), no dependence at all
(coincidentalism), dependence of both trains and stops upon some other
thing ‘inside the subway’ (naturalism) and dependence of both upon
some other thing ‘outside the subway’ (theological views; 2012: 282).
With stops understood roughly as the places where one boards or alights
a train, the author outlines fictional historical debates regarding stoppism
in Sect. 1, discussing such problems as the obvious fact of trains some-
times being motionless between stops. This fact seemed inexplicable
under stoppism prior to the invention of precise instruments for time-­
keeping which enabled us to recognise a train’s stop between stops as
caused by some other train’s stop at a stop—thus reviving stoppism. In

21
I suspect that the very high standards of writing applied to publications in top-ranked philosophy
journals provide at least part of an explanation for this relative clarity of the types of dialogue of the
sampled articles.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 21

Sect. 2 the author discusses four generally known facts that are difficult
for stoppists to accommodate, including, for instance, that stops change
under certain conditions from being local to being express stops or vice
versa, which is inexplicable if stops are metaphysically basic. The author
here also considers the naturalistic thesis of station-stoppism advocated by
one Davis Wilde (an anagram of ‘David Lewis’), which regards stations as
metaphysically basic entities possessing varying, numerous and fine-­
grained stop-properties (that are themselves left for scientists to investi-
gate). This thesis is rejected, as it would leave us unable to specify the
identity conditions of any single station. Other naturalistic deflations of
stoppism are discussed in Sect. 3, all being rejected due to their failure to
provide ‘a set of natural facts [consistent with stoppism] on which to rest
the local-stop/express-stop distinction’ (Willoughby 2012: 293). In the
concluding Sect. 4, the author thus rejects stoppism.
Turning to the analysis of this satirical article, it should initially be
noted that satire depicts as laughable a target that is taken seriously by
certain people, thus effectively depicting as laughable the people taking
said target seriously. Depicting an interlocutor as laughable may be
regarded as a contribution to an eristic dialogue. But for present pur-
poses, this satire is more instructive if we identify its type of dialogue on
the counterfactual assumption that the article is serious rather than satiri-
cal. (After all, the philosophical dialogues targeted by this satire are not
themselves satirical—or so I assume.) Given the assumption that the
article is serious rather than satirical, we must first distinguish the differ-
ent dialogues within the article, in order to identify the non-embedded
dialogue. The introductory section and Sect. 1 together provide a basic
overview of the logical space and fictional historical development of stop-
pism, seemingly for the purpose of ensuring that readers possess certain
background information. In contrast, Sects. 2 and 3 set out various con-
siderations against stoppism (which are distilled in Sect. 4), with the clear
purpose of undermining stoppism. Thus, there are just two dialogues in
this article, distinguished by their respective goals. If one dialogue fur-
thers the other one and not vice versa, then that dialogue is embedded
within the other dialogue. And this is clearly the case: The dialogue in the
earlier sections advances the dialogue thereafter by preparing the ground
for the latter. So we need not be concerned further with the earlier
22 C. Rhode

dialogue (which appears to be an information dialogue) and can focus

upon the later sections.
The object of the conclusion pursued in that non-embedded dialogue
is a proposition (viz. the thesis that stoppism is false) rather than a set of
actions, so this dialogue instantiates inquiry, discovery, or persuasion dia-
logue, rather than deliberation or negotiation dialogue. As such, the non-­
embedded dialogue has the goal of (dis)proving some hypothesis,
choosing the best explanation for some phenomenon, or getting the
author’s opponents to adopt the author’s dialogical commitment. We can
rule out discovery dialogue, both because there is no single, overarching
phenomenon at issue here that would demand explanation, and because
the proposition at issue is given from the start. But the essential goals,
though perhaps suggestive, are not obviously decisive between inquiry
and persuasion dialogue: Is it the goal of this dialogue to disprove stop-
pism or to get the author’s opponents to reject stoppism? We need to
assess the dialogue against the other characteristics of inquiry and persua-
sion dialogue to answer this question. The initial situation of the dialogue
appears to be a conflict of commitments rather than a need for conclusive
proof of a hypothesis (as there is no such apparent need); and the relation
between participants is clearly adversarial rather than collaborative. Both
of these characteristics indicate that the dialogue instantiates persuasion
dialogue. Moreover, the characterisation of persuasion dialogue as offer-
ing a chain of arguments seems to match exactly the non-embedded dia-
logue of this article. Lastly, recall the conception of philosophy as a critical
enterprise, which is associated with persuasion dialogue. On that concep-
tion, ‘[an argumentation] is typically directed towards refuting opposed
views’ (Walton 1992: 137), and the present dialogue obviously aims at
refuting stoppism. So we can conclude on the preponderance of evidence
that the non-embedded dialogue of this satirical article instantiates per-
suasion dialogue.
A small selection of additional example analyses is provided in
Appendix C. These example analyses further illustrate the process of
identifying the type of dialogue instantiated by the non-embedded dia-
logue of an article. The articles analysed in Appendix C are drawn from
the present sample and include one article for each of the types found to
be represented in the present sample.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 23

Results

Does the type of dialogue of the foregoing satire, then, prove to be indic-
ative of the prevalent type of dialogue among the sampled articles anal-
ysed here? It very much does, as the results in Table 1.2 show.22 Of the
non-embedded dialogues of the 110 sampled articles, 95.5% are found
to instantiate persuasion dialogue.
Given the margin of error of ±9.3%, we can say with 95% confidence
that at least 86.2% of the 6,960 journal articles in the population equally
exemplify persuasion dialogue (and we can say with 90% confidence
that the proportion is at least 87.6%). (Hence Hid and H0(p) can be
rejected, while Hp and H0(id) are strongly supported.)23 Moreover, the
non-­embedded dialogues of the 110 sampled articles so uniformly instan-
tiate persuasion dialogue that there is no basis for expecting a different
result from an expanded sample, that is to say, that saturation has been
attained. The present analysis therefore indicates that the vast majority of
philosophical dialogues represented here are essentially characterised by
the goal of each participant with an initial dialogical truth-value commit-
ment regarding a given proposition P to influence her opponent by way
of argument to the effect that the opponent abandons his initial

Table 1.2 Frequency of Number of non-embedded

types of dialogue dialogues instantiating this
Type of dialogue type of dialogue
Information 0
Inquiry 3
Discovery 0
Persuasion 105
Deliberation 2
Negotiation 0
Eristic 0

22
A breakdown of the results by article is provided in Appendix D.
23
It is interesting that, of the five articles not instantiating persuasion dialogue, four are located in
one or another sub-discipline of the philosophy of science and mathematics, while the fifth is
located in metaphilosophy. The remainder of the 26 philosophy of science and mathematics articles
in the sample (or 28 if metaphilosophy is included), however, all instantiate persuasion dialogue.
As I subsequently focus on articles that do instantiate persuasion dialogue, the prevalence of articles
in philosophy of science and mathematics among those not instantiating persuasion dialogue is of
no relevance to the present work.
24 C. Rhode

dialogical truth-value commitment regarding P and instead adopts her

initial dialogical truth-value commitment regarding P. In effect, the
essential dialogical goal of the vast majority of dialogues in contemporary
analytic philosophy is to defeat one’s opposing party in argument—by
technical knockout, one might say.
Of course, this result applies to analytic philosophical dialogues that
have been found to instantiate persuasion dialogue, and it does not apply
to such dialogues as have been found to instantiate a type other than
persuasion dialogue. Yet where the type of the analytic philosophical dia-
logue one is currently engaged in has not yet been identified, it is exceed-
ingly likely (given the foregoing empirical results) that this dialogue too
instantiates persuasion dialogue. Considering the practical difficulties of
analysing the type of one’s own, ongoing dialogue with another party, it
is thus prudent to assume the instantiation of persuasion dialogue for any
analytic philosophical dialogue one engages in. For all practical purposes,
then, it is the goal of dialogue in contemporary analytic philosophy to
defeat one’s opponent in argument and not be defeated oneself.24

Attitudinal Goals

In light of this conclusion, one might perhaps insist that contemporary

analytic philosophy is a cognitive enterprise after all, although its cogni-
tive pursuit of truth or knowledge is attitudinal rather than dialogical.
Philosophy, one might hold, pursues the essential goal of inquiry dia-
logue and/or discovery dialogue, but it does so by way of interrogating
hypotheses in persuasion dialogue. This conception of philosophy would
acknowledge the observed prevalence of persuasion dialogue, thus grant-
ing that the critical conception of philosophical dialogue is accurate,
while nonetheless upholding an ultimately and attitudinally cognitive
conception of philosophy. Of course, philosophers’ self-conception of the
type of dialogue they are engaged in, as noted earlier, is not necessarily
indicative of the actual type of their dialogue. But might a cognitive

24
An exception to this rule is provided by analytic philosophical dialogues that, by their very
design, instantiate a type other than persuasion dialogue. I will discuss this exception in Chap. 6,
Sect. 6.2.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 25

self-­conception not be indicative of an attitudinally cognitive purpose

motivating their engagement in such dialogue? That is to say, perhaps a
cognitive self-conception does not indicate a cognitive type of dialogue
but rather a cognitive attitudinal goal underlying the prevalent persua-
sion dialogue.
We should remember here, first of all, that one’s own conception of the
attitudinal goal pursued through philosophical dialogue is not necessarily
shared by other philosophers. It is entirely possible (and, I suspect, actu-
ally the case) that philosophers, though predominantly engaged in the
same type of dialogue, are motivated by a colourful variety of different
attitudinal goals. Some philosophers might simply want to clarify their
own commitments in order to render them consistent (cf. Scanlon 2003).
Other philosophers might wish to convince their colleagues of some fun-
damental truth that answers many a question in a particular sub-disci-
pline (e.g. Elder 2004). Yet other philosophers might believe themselves
to be contributing to society’s stock of knowledge in much the same way
as scientists are (cf. Papineau 2015). And yet further philosophers might
seek to dissolve linguistic confusions arising in both philosophy and the
sciences (cf. Hacker 2009). Some philosophers might also quite simply
want to play the argumentation game of philosophy for their own enjoy-
ment, seeking no other achievement than their mind’s pleasure (includ-
ing asteistic pleasure from analytical care and interpretive charity). And
there may also be many philosophers who are motivated quite sufficiently
by their occupational goal of securing tenure, thank you very much (cf.
Gettier 1963; Schukraft 2017: 9–10). So, in short, one’s own attitudinal
goal, whether cognitive or otherwise, should not be considered to be
indicative of other philosophers’ attitudinal goals that motivate their
engagement in philosophical persuasion dialogue. (An empirical exami-
nation of philosophers’ explicitly declared attitudinal goals through both
comprehensive surveys and extensive textual analyses may establish the
relative prevalence of different attitudinal goals. But such research would
itself likely be similar in extent to the present work and is at the same
time unnecessary for present purposes.)
Aside from this cautioning note, there are also some significant consid-
erations against a cognitive attitudinal goal. On the one hand, conceiving
of philosophical persuasion dialogue as being motivated by a cognitive
26 C. Rhode

goal at the attitudinal level would ascribe to philosophers the imprudence

of pursuing an attitudinal goal related to one type (or set of types) of
dialogue through an entirely different type of dialogue, whose associated
rules arise from and are optimised for the pursuit of an entirely different
kind of goal. It is at least unclear how exactly one might get closer to
attaining an attitudinally cognitive goal by persuading someone else of
some particular claim. Indeed, it is not even clear whether engagement in
persuasion dialogue would actually advance the pursuit of any attitudi-
nally cognitive goal at all.
On the other hand, such insistence upon an attitudinally cognitive
goal pursued through persuasion dialogue would also ascribe to philoso-
phers the remarkable epistemic immodesty of holding that their own col-
lective failure to find persistent fault with a hypothesis in and of itself
constitutes evidence of the truth of that hypothesis. We need only apply
this evidential standard to an unfalsifiable hypothesis, such as the theistic
hypothesis of creation and evolution by intelligent design, to recognise its
inadequacy: No expert may be able to refute the hypothesis of intelligent
design, but the inability of experts to refute an unfalsifiable hypothesis
would not lend any support to that hypothesis. If philosophers, however,
collectively and consistently fail to refute intelligent design, then this is
evidence of the truth of intelligent design!—or so this attitudinally cogni-
tive conception of philosophy would have it. Besides, philosophers’ excel-
lent track-record at finding persistent fault with the vast majority of
philosophical hypotheses would then also mean that philosophy has
hardly ever produced any knowledge at all, and thus that philosophy is
altogether a failure as a cognitive enterprise (cf. Walton 1992: 137).
As such, conceiving of philosophy as attitudinally cognitive but dia-
logically critical (aimed at persuasion) would amount to conceiving of
analytic philosophers as methodologically imprudent, epistemically
rather presumptuous, and all along singularly unsuccessful. This down-
right quixotic conception of philosophy seems very uncharitable indeed,
and philosophers who are pursuing a cognitive attitudinal goal through
persuasion dialogue may be well advised to engage in a cognitive type of
dialogue instead.25 I would conjecture, moreover, that this quixotic con-

25
I will discuss the feasibility of opting for such different types of dialogue in Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.
 1 Dialogue and Persuasion 27

ception is also inaccurate.26

I therefore disregard speculation about the attitudinal goal of philo-
sophical dialogue here, although I will return to the foregoing questions
about that attitudinal goal towards the end of the present work. At this
point and for present purposes, it remains the vastly predominant dia-
logical goal of philosophical dialogue to defeat one’s opponent; and it is
this dialogical goal that I will draw upon in subsequent discussions.

1.4 Looking Ahead

In the foregoing sections, I hope to have established the following two
premises. First, a truth-value commitment made in dialogue does not
necessitate any (corresponding or otherwise) truth-value commitment in
attitude, nor vice versa. It is thus possible to examine commitments in
dialogue independently of any potential attitudinal implications of such
commitments, since there are no such necessary implications. Second, it
is the dialogical goal of participants in analytic philosophical dialogue to
persuade (that is, defeat) their respective argumentative opposing party.
Chiefly on the basis of these two premises, I will offer considerations
regarding the instrumentally most rational conduct of philosophical dia-
logue in pursuit of the above goal of persuasion. I will not seek to argue
that a certain conduct or goal ought to be pursued, nor that any particu-
lar conduct or goal of philosophical dialogue is good, right, true, real, or
in any other sense appropriate. Rather, I will presuppose the dialogical
goal of persuading one’s opponent (as just established), and I will seek to
argue that the adoption of certain conduct would be practically most
conducive to the attainment of this goal. (As such, the present work will
not instantiate persuasion dialogue but rather deliberation dialogue—so,
notably, the conclusions to be drawn here for philosophical persuasion
dialogue do not apply to this work.) These purely advisory purposes of
the present work will proceed from a response to the methodological
conservatism described at the outset, according to which the

Support for this conjecture would have to be provided by an empirical examination of philoso-
26

phers’ explicitly declared attitudinal goals as mentioned above.

Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
STEREOSCOPE ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright
in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and without
paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General
Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and
distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if
you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the
trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the
Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such
as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and
printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in
the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright
law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially
commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
 PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this
work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase
“Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of
the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or
online at www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand,
agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual
property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to
abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using
and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for
obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms
of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by
people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.
There are a few things that you can do with most Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the
full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There
are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™
electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and
help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright
law in the United States and you are located in the United
States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying,
distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project
Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will
support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project
Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this
agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name
associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms
of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with
its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it
without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must
appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project
Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United
States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to
anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges.
If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of
paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use
of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth
in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and
distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder.
Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™
License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright
holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files
containing a part of this work or any other work associated with
Project Gutenberg™.
 1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute
this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1
with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the
Project Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™
works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
 about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different
terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain
permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™
trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on,
transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright
law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite
these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the
medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,”
such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other
medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -

Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic
work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for
damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU
AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH
OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH
1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If

you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you
paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you
received the work from. If you received the work on a physical
medium, you must return the medium with your written
explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu
of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or
entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.
If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund
in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set

forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’,
WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this
agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this
agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the
maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable
state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of
this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the

Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless
from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project
Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or
deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect
you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new
computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of
volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project
Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™
collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In
2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was
created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project
Gutenberg™ and future generations. To learn more about the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your
efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the
Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by
the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal
tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and
your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500

West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at
www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission
of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works
that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form
accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated
equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly
important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws

regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of
the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform
and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many
fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not
solicit donations in locations where we have not received written
confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states

where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know
of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from
donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations
received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp
our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current

donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a
number of other ways including checks, online payments and
credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could
be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose
network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several

printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by
copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus,
we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any
particular paper edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear
about new eBooks.