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Constitutional Landmarks Supreme Court Decisions On Separation of Powers Federalism and Economic Rights 1St Ed Edition Charles M Lamb Full Chapter
Constitutional Landmarks Supreme Court Decisions On Separation of Powers Federalism and Economic Rights 1St Ed Edition Charles M Lamb Full Chapter
Constitutional
Landmarks
Supreme Court Decisions on Separation of Powers,
Federalism, and Economic Rights
Charles M. Lamb Jacob R. Neiheisel
Department of Political Science Department of Political Science
University at Buffalo, State University University at Buffalo, State University
of New York of New York
Buffalo, NY, USA Buffalo, NY, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Preface
v
vi PREFACE
In closing we thank Angie, Kelly, and especially Ada for their patience
and understanding; our editors, Michelle Chen and Rebecca Roberts, for
encouraging our work on the book; Sheldon Goldman, Rachel Hinkle,
Nancy Kassop, and David O’Brien for providing constructive suggestions
and sage advice; Lee Epstein for generously sharing a needed database;
and Josephine Moore for her excellent substantive and editorial assistance.
Without this encouragement and assistance, this project would not have
viii PREFACE
Index 275
ix
List of Figures
xi
List of Tables
xiii
CHAPTER 1
The U.S. Constitution, the oldest written constitution, gives each branch
of the federal government certain distinct powers, apportioned through
a system of separation of powers and checks and balances in order to
protect any one branch from abusing its authority. The nation is therefore
said to have three separate governmental branches sharing power. Let’s
take a few examples. Article I assigns all legislative powers to Congress;
accordingly, Congress is responsible for passing all federal statutes and
presenting them to the president for approval or disapproval. The presi-
dent, who is ultimately responsible for enforcing the law, can nevertheless
veto Congress’s proposed laws, but Congress can override a presiden-
tial veto, and the Supreme Court can still rule that the final statute is
unconstitutional. The president is likewise assigned all federal executive
authority under Article II, including that of commander in chief, but
Congress must pass laws appropriating funding for the armed forces and is
specifically delegated the power to declare war. As the ultimate check, the
House of Representatives can impeach the president for treason, bribery,
or other high crimes and misdemeanors, and the Senate can conduct a
trial to remove him (or her) from office. As a final illustration, Article II
stipulates that the president shall appoint all federal judges and numerous
executive branch officials, but those appointments must undergo the
advice and consent of the Senate, and the Supreme Court can rule that
actions by presidential appointees violate the law.
This chapter introduces the Supreme Court and its exercise of power,
beginning with five fundamental points. First, the Supreme Court is the
final interpreter of the Constitution—not the president or Congress (but
see Blackstone 2013; Fisher 2019; Murphy 1986).1 Second, many of the
Constitution’s words, phrases, and concepts are ambiguous and unde-
fined, so they frequently permit the justices ample leeway to make major
decisions, sometimes unprecedented in nature, affecting the entire nation
and millions of people. Third, the Constitution, other sources of law, judi-
cial precedents, legal history, social norms, or a lawsuit’s facts frequently
affect how the Supreme Court decides cases. Fourth, though, not only
legal but also political considerations influence whether the Court accepts
a case and how it is decided, including the justices’ ideologies, strategies,
and role conceptions (see, e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Gibson 1978;
Segal and Spaeth 2002) as well as the possibility of external factors such as
public opinion and interest groups (see, e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988;
Giles et al. 2008; Mishler and Sheehan 1993). Fifth, Supreme Court
decisions have legal, political, economic, and social impacts on America
(see, e.g., Canon and Johnson 1999; Rosenberg 2008). As you read the
following pages, the importance of these points will become apparent.
Constitutional Basics
The federal courts are the focus of Article III of the Constitution, where
Section 1 initially declares, “The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” So the Supreme
Court is the only court that Article III expressly creates; the Constitu-
tion leaves it up to Congress to create all inferior federal courts, which
are known as the U.S. district courts and the U.S. courts of appeals.
These inferior courts are, respectively, the federal courts of original juris-
diction and the initial courts of appellate jurisdiction in the vast majority
of cases before an appeal can ordinarily be taken to the High Court.
Section 1 continues by stating that federal judges shall hold office during
good behavior. Because it is rare for a federal judge to be removed from
office (only eight have been impeached and then convicted by the Senate),
they often serve into their seventies or their eighties. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes sat on the Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932—when
he finally retired at the ripe old age of ninety.
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 3
Article III, Section 2 indicates that federal judges have the power to
decide cases relating to the Constitution, federal law, and federal treaties.
In broad terms, it also explains other cases to which the federal judi-
cial power extends—“to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to
Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens
of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States; and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.” Finally, Section 2 makes the distinction between the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Original jurisdiction means
that a case can be initiated in the Supreme Court, which is rare, whereas
appellate jurisdiction means that the justices may only hear appeals from
the lower courts in those cases, which is typical.
Third, the Supreme Court must have jurisdiction to hear and decide
a case, and the Court’s jurisdiction is of two types. As noted above, the
Court’s original jurisdiction is narrow, but its appellate jurisdiction (which
is defined by Congress) includes the much larger number and variety of
cases that the Court hears on appeal from federal and state courts. Next,
justiciability deals with the question of whether the Court is the proper
branch of government to decide an issue. If most justices determine that a
case presents a political question, the Court will announce that it is not the
proper branch of government for a decision—that is, the case is said to be
nonjusticiable (see Luther v. Borden [1849]; Colegrove v. Green [1946]).
However, if the justices decide that a case does not involve a political
question, then they are likely to rule that it is justiciable (see Baker v. Carr
[1962]; Nixon v. United States [1993]). The sixth concept, standing to
sue, concerns whether litigants meet the judicial rules that permit them to
bring a matter to the Court, such as whether they are directly affected by
the issue involved. If they lack standing, their appeal is denied (see, e.g.,
Flast v. Cohen [1968]; Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency
[2007]).
Other concepts such as adverseness, advisory opinions, ripeness, and
mootness may also be relevant in a case. The Supreme Court requires
adverseness (that a case involve genuinely opposing parties) before it will
exercise power, so it will not decide friendly suits or hypothetical issues.
Likewise, the justices will not issue advisory opinions on questions not
raised in lawsuits, even at the request of executive or legislative branch
officials. Nor will they decide an appeal unless it is ripe—that is, it cannot
be too early or too late for review. Further, if a case is brought too late
because the issue has already been authoritatively decided, the justices will
hold that it is moot in most circumstances. Yet only the Court decides
whether it will exercise judicial power and how much. If the justices
find that no case or controversy is presented or that an issue is moot,
for instance, they are often choosing not to exercise power. If they say
they have jurisdiction and that an issue is justiciable, however, they then
routinely exercise their power by accepting the case for review.
Cases discussed in this chapter relate to whether the justices can or
will exercise power by deciding an appeal. As a result, judicial review is a
question in Marbury v. Madison; jurisdiction is a question in several cases,
including Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), Barron v. Baltimore (1833), Ex
parte McCardle (1869), and Rasul v. Bush (2004); justiciability is at issue
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 5
won the popular vote by roughly five hundred thousand ballots nation-
wide, but George W. Bush (R-TX) won the Electoral College vote (271 to
266) and, thus, the presidency (on the 2000 election see, e.g., Ackerman
2002; Gibson et al. 2003; Gillman 2001; Nicholson and Howard 2003).
Significantly, of course, the High Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore (2000)
effectively gave George W. Bush the election, 5–4, with five Republican
appointees voting in his favor.
Issues of representation in general remain fertile ground for exam-
ining the nexus of politics and law. The Court has repeatedly refused
to wade into debates over partisan gerrymandering (the drawing of elec-
toral boundaries in such a way that advantages one party over another),
declaring the matter to be a fundamentally political question and there-
fore not justiciable. However, during the brief period prior to the Court’s
decision in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), in which the majority once
again reiterated its stance that partisan gerrymandering is an issue that
lay beyond the reach of the judiciary, it appeared as though the Court
had signaled that a standard upon which determinations of fairness in the
redrawing of district boundaries might be created.
Social scientists and mathematicians alike seized upon several justices’
suggestions in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (2006)
that a legal test rooted in the concept of “partisan symmetry” might
be constructed so as to promote fairness in the conversion of votes to
seats in the legislature (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 2015). Thus, some-
thing of a cottage industry emerged within the scholarly community with
respect to the construction and testing of different metrics associated
with the concept of partisan symmetry (e.g., Best et al. 2018; Chen and
Rodden 2015; Tam Cho and Liu 2016). Hopes that such efforts might
yield a usable standard that the Court would be able to apply in future
cases involving partisan gerrymandering were dashed with the majority’s
outright refusal to engage with what Chief Justice Roberts described as
“sociological gobbledygook” during oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford
(2018). By deciding not to decide on the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymanders, then, the Court has all but assured that, at least for the
foreseeable future, one political party will continue to wield an outsized
degree of influence in Congress as well as in the legislative bodies of the
several states.
A similar sequence of events played out in the wake of the Court’s deci-
sion in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), as some states interpreted that ruling
as effectively mandating the creation of majority-minority districts. States,
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 7
Chief Justice John Jay advised George Washington; Chief Justice Roger
B. Taney advised Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren; Brandeis
advised Woodrow Wilson; Stone counseled Herbert Hoover; at least three
justices—Douglas, Frankfurter, and Stone—advised Franklin Roosevelt;
Chief Justice Fred Vinson advised Harry Truman; and Abe Fortas coun-
seled Lyndon B. Johnson. At one time or another, several justices were
also considered as potential presidential or vice presidential candidates.
Earlier in the nation’s history a few justices even openly campaigned for
presidential candidates or occasionally ran for their home-state governor-
ship. Other justices have held unique quasi-political positions, including
Robert Jackson, who was the chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg War
Crimes Trial following World War II, and Earl Warren, who headed the
commission that investigated President John F. Kennedy’s assassination
during the 1960s (Abraham 1992; Epstein et al. 2015).
narrower span), moving from left to right, the Court’s judicial power
cases begin in a highly liberal position in the first period, reflecting
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions establishing a strong Supreme Court,
including Marbury v. Madison. The early years of the Court represent a
high-water mark of sorts when it comes to the exercise of judicial power.
However, there is a great deal of term-to-term variability in the first
period—and, indeed, throughout the time series—so the judicial power
trend line quickly slopes downward, rises slightly again in a liberal direc-
tion, and then fluctuates until the 1860s. In the second period, from the
end of the American Civil War until just before the turn of the century,
the trend is fairly flat, then it turns downward during the twilight of the
nineteenth century, and it remains steady until the dawning of the third
constitutional era. The ideological direction in judicial power cases then
briefly rises early in the third period, only to fluctuate down and then
back up, leveling off in the 1990s and continuing along that basic path in
recent years. An entirely different storyline emerges with reference to the
second LOWESS curve that we fitted to the scatterplot, as a wider span
(the dashed line) produces a curve that is essentially flat throughout the
entire history of the Court, with only a slight downward trend emerging
since the energetic exercise of judicial power during the early days of the
Court when Chief Justice John Marshall established the judiciary as a
co-equal branch of the national government.
Figure 1.2 depicts liberal outcomes, aggregated by term, in judicial
power cases decided between Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes (1930–
1941) and Chief Justice John G. Roberts (2005–present). Once more,
superimposed on each scatterplot is a linear regression line, the slope of
which is relatively flat during the Hughes Court, becomes slightly more
liberal under Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and then quickly declines
on a more conservative trajectory under Chief Justice Fred Vinson. With
President Eisenhower’s appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice, the
trend line flattens, alternates slightly more liberal, then slightly more
conservative, and finally in a somewhat more liberal direction under Chief
Justices Warren E. Burger, William H. Rehnquist, and Roberts. The deci-
sions handed down under the last two chief justices also appear to have
the distinction of exhibiting relatively high levels of variability around the
trend line.
Judicial strategies and small-group interactions additionally influence
how the justices decide cases (see, e.g., Epstein and Knight 2017; Lax
and Rader 2015; Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Maltzman et al. 2000;
12 C. M. LAMB AND J. R. NEIHEISEL
Fig. 1.2 Ideological direction in judicial power cases in the third constitutional
era
Segal 1997). Scholars using this theory stress that the justices are polit-
ical actors pursuing certain policy goals while serving on the Court. This
rational choice approach does not deny that attitudes or role concep-
tions influence the justices’ opinions and voting behavior; rather, they
emphasize that the justices’ ability to achieve their policy goals “depends
on a consideration of the preferences of other relevant actors (such as
their colleagues and members of other political institutions), the choices
they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they
act” (Epstein and Walker 2020a, 37). Different strategic models vary in
their details, but Epstein and Knight (1998, 10–11) boil their model
down to three concepts: “justices’ actions are directed toward the attain-
ment of goals; justices are strategic; and institutions structure justices’
interactions.” Although strategic models are an important part of today’s
literature on judicial politics, they are not relied on in this volume because
we lack the type of documents necessary for this kind of analysis.
The role conceptions of judicial activism and restraint are also rele-
vant to understanding how and why justices make their decisions (see,
e.g., Halpern and Lamb 1982; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Spaeth 1964;
Whittington 2014). Activism is said to be evident when justices overrule
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 13
Table 1.1 Selected decisions on the Supreme Court and judicial power
(continued)
16 C. M. LAMB AND J. R. NEIHEISEL
Shaw v. Reno (1993). State legislatures may not redraw district lines in a way that is so
irregular on their face that they rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate
the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles
and without a sufficiently compelling justification
Rasul v. Bush (2004). Federal courts have jurisdiction in cases involving habeas corpus
requests from aliens detained by the president in a territory over which the United
States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction but not ultimate sovereignty
Rucho v. Common Cause (2019). Partisan gerrymandering is a political question, and
the federal courts cannot decide these issues
Judicial Impact
Each chapter of this volume contains an introductory essay like this one
that includes a brief description of some of the legal, political, economic,
or social impacts that particular rulings had in America (on the study
of judicial impact see, e.g., Canon and Johnson 1999; Rosenberg 2008;
Wasby 1970). In order to understand the concept of judicial impact, again
consider Rucho, which illustrates the effect that only a few new Supreme
Court appointees can have on pressing political problems, in this case
partisan gerrymandering. President Trump appointed two new justices
during his first two years in the White House—Neil M. Gorsuch and
Brett M. Kavanaugh. Both Trump appointees in turn voted with the 5–4
Rucho majority, along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Samuel A.
Alito and Clarence Thomas. All five majority justices were appointed by
18 C. M. LAMB AND J. R. NEIHEISEL
for example, Rehnquist Court decisions are those handed down while
William Rehnquist was chief justice. Table 1.2 shows the men who have
served as chief justice and their years of service. (Of course, as of this
writing there has never been a female chief justice, although four women
have served on the Court—Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.) But there is far more to
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 21
unduly hinder business in its mission to make America wealthy and wise”
(69).
McCloskey indicates that the Court again adjusted its focus, priorities,
and policies in the third constitutional era in order to emphasize indi-
vidual civil rights and liberties (see McCloskey, chaps. 7–8). This third
period he labeled the civil rights era. According to McCloskey, by the
end of the 1930s the necessary political and historical conditions existed
for the country and the Court to pass into this third constitutional period.
If the justices were to play a meaningful role in modern politics and law,
though, they needed to evolve a new sphere of interests and a new set
of values to guide them. The two principal problems of the past—the
nation-state problem and the business-government problem—had largely
disappeared. As a result, the Court once more had to reorient its polit-
ical and policy-making role, concentrating on individual political and legal
rights.
Figure 1.3 plots the data for all Supreme Court judicial power deci-
sions across McCloskey’s three constitutional eras based on the U.S.
Supreme Court Database (2019). During the first era the Marshall
Court’s influence is immediately apparent; its pro-judicial power deci-
sions are clearly visible in the upper-left portion of the figure. The trend
line declines, though, throughout the remainder of the first constitutional
era, despite occasionally fluctuating higher in selected cases. During the
second constitutional era the trend line starts at a lower intercept and
gradually declines a bit further between the chief justiceships of Salmon
P. Chase and Charles Evans Hughes, even as the observations are more
tightly clustered around the trend line than they were in the previous
Fig. 1.3 Ideological direction in judicial power cases across constitutional eras
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 23
Judicial Review
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)
Facts: John Marshall was an ardent Federalist, while Thomas Jefferson
was the founder of the present-day Democratic Party. Prior to Jeffer-
son’s election as president in 1800, Federalist president John Adams and
his secretary of state, John Marshall, concluded that their party’s future
power must rest in part in the judicial branch. As a result, before leaving
office Adams appointed Marshall as chief justice of the Supreme Court.
The Federalist Congress also passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which
created new lower federal court judgeships and new justices of the peace
for the District of Columbia. Time was running out before Jefferson’s
inauguration, however, and although Adams signed all the justice of the
peace commissions, he left seventeen to be delivered by the Jeffersonians.
Jefferson refused to allow his secretary of state, James Madison, to deliver
them. The stage was set for William Marbury, one of Adams’s appointees,
to challenge Madison for his commission as justice of the peace. Relying
on Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Marbury petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus —a court order commanding a
public official to carry out his or her official duty. The writ would attempt
to compel Madison to deliver the commission. Marshall requested from
Madison any reasons why the writ of mandamus should not be issued,
but Madison ignored the request.
Issue: In light of Article III and Section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, may the Supreme Court declare a statutory provision passed
24 C. M. LAMB AND J. R. NEIHEISEL
Jurisdiction
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas 419 (1793)
Facts: The executor of the estate of a South Carolina merchant sued the
state of Georgia in federal court for payment of a debt incurred during
the Revolutionary War. The federal court ruled in favor of Georgia,
concluding it had no jurisdiction because a sovereign state cannot be sued
without its consent, and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
Issue: In light of Article III, Section 2, does the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court extend to lawsuits by a citizen of one state against another
state?
Decision: Yes
Vote: 4–1
Majority Opinion: Justice Wilson begins by addressing the concept of
sovereignty. He notes that it is not mentioned in the Constitution; not
even the people are said to be sovereign. Thus, Wilson asserts, a state is
subordinate to its people, but everything else is subordinate to the state.
As a result, whereas a state may enter contracts, it may be held account-
able—just as citizens are—for willfully refusing to abide by a contract.
This too suggests that a state is not sovereign and, thus, does not exercise
supreme power. To be sovereign, the state must have subjects, but under
the Constitution there are only citizens, not subjects. If Georgia has no
sovereignty over its own citizens, Wilson argues, certainly Georgia has no
sovereignty over citizens of another state.
Before joining the issue of whether the Constitution makes a state
subject to the jurisdiction of a federal court under these circumstances,
Wilson observes that the citizens of the nation as a whole approved the
Constitution, and the American people intended the states to be subject
to both the legislative and executive powers of the national government.
Because of this, logic would dictate that the Supreme Court has juris-
diction in cases where the states are a party. For example, the Court’s
jurisdiction would extend to questions dealing with whether the states
have ensured justice and domestic tranquility or if they have impaired
the obligation of contracts. Wilson contends as well that the literal and
explicit language of Article III confirms beyond all doubt his conclusion
about the Court’s jurisdiction here: “The judicial power shall extend to
all cases, in law and equity … between a State and Citizens of another
state.”
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 27
a federal district court would in fact fall within the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.
Majority Opinion: Justice Stevens explains that Congress long ago gave
the federal district courts the power to hear habeas corpus requests from
persons saying they were held in violation of federal law. The right of
habeas corpus in America can be traced back to the Judiciary Act of 1789
and, before that, to English common law. It is a right provided for by
28 U.S.C. Section 2241(a) and has been recognized in various Supreme
Court decisions. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution also
prohibits the suspension of “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
… unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”
Stevens poses the jurisdictional issue in the case in the following terms:
“whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the
legality of Executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the
United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction but not ‘ulti-
mate sovereignty.’” The Bush administration relied on Eisentrager, but
the Court distinguishes the detainees in that case from those in Rasul.
The detainees in Rasul “are not nationals of countries at war with the
United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts
of aggression against the United States; they have never been afforded
access to any tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrong-
doing; and for more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory
over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”
Additionally, the Court in Eisentrager delved into the constitutional
basis for the right of habeas corpus , not its statutory basis. Yet since then,
Stevens argues, the Court has “filled the statutory gap” so that aliens do
not have to rely on the Constitution as the grounds for their habeas corpus
claims. Statutory law now provides a basis for habeas claims by aliens. The
majority relies on statutory law, not the Constitution, in reaching its deci-
sion and says that the federal district court has jurisdiction in this case.
“What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have juris-
diction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite
detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.
Answering the question in the affirmative, we reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand for the District Court to consider in
the first instance the merits of petitioners’ claims.”
Concurring Opinion: Justice Kennedy agrees that the federal courts
have jurisdiction in this case but would “follow the framework of Eisen-
trager.” “The decision in Eisentrager indicates that there is a realm of
political authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not
1 THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL POWER 31
enter. The existence of this realm acknowledges the power of the Presi-
dent as Commander in Chief, and the joint role of the President and the
Congress in the conduct of military affairs.”
Dissenting Opinion: Justice Scalia complains that the majority’s deci-
sion is “an irresponsible overturning of settled law in a matter of extreme
importance to our forces currently in the field.”
Justiciability
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
Facts: In the early 1960s Tennessee’s state legislature had not been reap-
portioned since 1901, so rural areas of the state were overrepresented
relative to urban areas. Charles Baker, a Tennessee citizen, sued state
officials, claiming that he was denied equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment because he was an underrepresented urban resident.
The district court said that it could provide no remedy because the issue
was nonjusticiable. It relied on Colegrove v. Green (1946), where the
Supreme Court declared that congressional districts in Illinois did not
raise a justiciable issue—that, instead, they presented a political question.
Issue: In light of Article III, is the malapportionment of state legislative
districts a nonjusticiable political question that the Supreme Court should
decline to decide?
Decision: No
Vote: 6–2
Majority Opinion: Justice Brennan suggests that the district court
misconstrued Colegrove v. Green. After all, Colegrove dealt with federal—
not state—legislative redistricting. In reaching this conclusion, Brennan
makes two vital points about justiciability and political questions. First,
because a case deals with a political right does not mean that it presents a
political question. Second, reapportionment cases may raise equal protec-
tion questions under the Fourteenth Amendment, which are not political
questions.
Because confusion existed in the lower courts over what constituted a
political question, Brennan tries to clarify it by reviewing relevant prece-
dents. He concludes that cases raising issues of foreign relations, the
recognition of Indian tribes, and what constitutes a republican form of
government are all typically political questions because they concern sepa-
ration of powers and the fact that the courts need to defer to Congress
32 C. M. LAMB AND J. R. NEIHEISEL
Standing to Sue
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)
Facts: Florance Flast, a taxpayer, filed suit to contest the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided financial assistance to
religious schools for teaching secular courses and purchasing instructional
materials. Flast’s suit claimed this assistance violated the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The district court
said that Flast lacked standing under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Froth-
ingham v. Mellon (1923), which had been interpreted as blocking judicial
review by a taxpayer of national spending legislation. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
Issue: In light of the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1, and the Establishment and Freedom of Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, does a taxpayer have standing to chal-
lenge a federal statute as violating constitutional provisions that restrict
Congress’s taxing and spending powers?
Decision: Yes
Vote: 8–1
Majority Opinion: Chief Justice Warren recounts the Frothingham case,
where the Court ruled that Ms. Frothingham suffered no direct injury
from a funding program under the Maternity Act of 1921. Frothingham
had caused confusion as reflected in the two opposing arguments in
Flast: the government argued that Frothingham prohibited all taxpayer
suits against the federal government, and Ms. Flast claimed that Froth-
ingham stood only for the notion that the courts should exercise restraint
in taxpayer suits unless a compelling constitutional reason indicated
otherwise.
After discussing the concepts of jurisdiction and justiciability, Warren
speaks to the concept of standing. Standing is an aspect of justiciability.
To be granted standing, a plaintiff—the individual bringing suit—must
have a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy and adverse parties
must be involved. This ensures that a proper party is requesting a court
to decide an issue. If the court denies standing, it is saying the petitioner
is not a proper party.
Whether the taxpayer has standing should be determined by a logical
nexus test, according to Warren, which has two aspects: “First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status [as a taxpayer]
and the type of legislative enactment attacked. A taxpayer will be a
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[256]Ib., p. 165.
[257]“Modern Abyssinia,” p. 224.
[258]Compare, e.g., his remark on p. 223, “They have any
amount of pluck,” with Parkyns’s comments quoted on p. 24 of
this book.
[259]E.g. p. 222.
[260]Ib., p. 216.
[261]Eyre and Spottiswoode.
[262]Cf. p. 308.
[263]Mr. Wylde describes the Ras as “by far the cleverest and
most enlightened man that the country possesses.” He is a
possible successor to the Abyssinian throne.
[264]Colonel Rochfort’s Report.
APPENDIX
LEPIDOPTERA.
NYMPHALIDAE.
Danainae: Limnas chrysippus (Linn.) ♀. The ground
colour of the pale tint characteristic of
1
Oriental specimens and usually replaced by
a much darker shade in African.
Danainae: L. chrysippus (Linn.) var. alcippus (Cram.) ♂♂.
2
Typical.
Nymphalinae: 1 Neptis agatha (Cram.).
1 Precis cebrene (Trim.).
PAPILIONIDAE.
Pierinae: 1 Catopsilia florella (Fabr.) ♂.
2 Colias electra (Linn.) ♂ ♀.
Terias brigitta (Cram.) ♂ ♂ ♀.
3
Dry season forms; not extreme.
3 Eronia leda (Boisd.) ♂ ♀ ♀.
One of these females has an orange apical
patch on the forewing, almost as distinct as
that of the male.
1 Pinacopteryx sp. ?
A female, rather worn; simulating Mylothris
agathina ♀.
Probably a new species, but being in poor
condition and a single specimen it would not
be advisable to describe it.
1 Belenois severina (Cram.) ♀. Dry season form.
1 Phrissura sp. ♂.
A male, of the P. sylvia group. This form of
Phrissura has not previously been recorded
from any part of East Africa.
Papilioninae: 8 Papilio demodocus (Esp.).
HYMENOPTERA.
1 Dorylus fimbriatus (Shuck.) ♂.
COLEOPTERA.
LAMELLICORNIA.
Scarabaeidae: Oniticellus inaequalis (Reiche).
1
Only known from Abyssinia.
Cetoniidae: 1 Pachnoda abyssinica (Blanch.).
1 Pachnoda stehelini (Schaum).
Both Abyssinian species.
PHYTOPHAGA.
Cassididae: 1 Aspidomorpha punctata (Fab.).
HETEROMERA.
Cantharidae: 2 Mylabris, probably a new species.
NEUROPTERA.
1 Nemoptera, probably a new species.
ORTHOPTERA.
Acridiidae: 1 Cyrtacanthacris
sp.
1 Phymateus brunneri? (Bolivar).
1 Phymateus leprosus (Fab.).
1 Petasia anchoreta (Bolivar).
Mantidae: 1 Sphodromantis bioculata (Burm.).
1 Chiropus aestuans? (Sauss.).
In addition to the above, Dr. Hayes presented three insects
captured by him at Gedaref in the Soudan, including a pair of a
magnificent new species of Buprestid beetle of the genus
Sternocera, taken in coitu. This species has recently been described,
from Dr. Hayes’ specimen and two others in the British Museum, by
Mr. C. O. Waterhouse, who has given it the name Sternocera druryi
(“Ann. Mag. Nat. Hist.” Oct., 1904, p. 247). The third insect is an
example of a Cantharid beetle, which does great damage to the
crops at Gadarif. Its determination as Mylabris hybrida (Bohem.) is
therefore a matter of some importance.
THE END
(Large-size)
LAKE TSANA
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