Contested World Orders Rising Powers Non Governmental Organizations and The Politics of Authority Beyond The Nation State Matthew D Stephen Editor Full Chapter

Contested World Orders: Rising
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Authority Beyond the Nation-State
Matthew D. Stephen (Editor)
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Contested World Orders

Contested World Orders

Rising Powers, Non-Governmental
Organizations, and the Politics of Authority
Beyond the Nation-State
Edited by
M AT T H EW D. ST E P H E N
AND
M IC HA E L Z Ü R N
1
1
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Acknowledgements
This book is the result of a close collaboration between researchers from the three
leading Leibniz institutes doing research on world politics: the German Institute
for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF),
and the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. The research project started on the basis
of a grant from the Leibniz Association awarded in 2012 (SAW-2012-WZB-3).
Our deep thanks go to the Leibniz Association, and to the leadership of the three
institutes who provided crucial institutional support. They supported the proposal
and the project from day one. This project and the studies in this collection also
benefited from the support provided by other people at these institutes. In par-
ticular, we wish to thank Editha von Colberg, Barçın Uluışık, Wolfgang Hein, and
Reinhild Wagner who contributed in important ways to this project’s realization.
We also thank Felix Große-Kreul, Damla Keşkekci, Alexander Maier, Aviv
Melamud, Pavel Šatra, and Rhianna Vonk for excellent research assistance.
Equally importantly, many colleagues commented on earlier versions of the
framework of this collection as well as the individual chapters. We want to thank
especially Paulo Estevez, Monica Hirst, Andrew Hurrell, Miles Kahler, Dries
Lesage, Siddharth Mallavarapu, Paul Mertenskötter, Amrita Narlikar, Georg
Nolte, and Thomas Streinz. We learned a lot from their comments and criticisms.
Without this enormous support this book would have not been possible. What
looks at first sight like an edited volume is actually a collaborative effort on a theme
and an approach that could be made operational only by a team as wonderful as
this one. We want to express our deep gratitude.
Matthew D. Stephen and Michael Zürn

Contents
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
List of Contributors xiii
1. Rising Powers, NGOs, and Demands for

New World Orders: An Introduction 1
PA RT I WO R L D E C O N OM IC O R D E R S
2. Contestation Overshoot: Rising Powers, NGOs, and the

Failure of the WTO Doha Round 39
Matthew D. Stephen
3. The Contestation of the IMF 82
Alexandros Tokhi
4. Exclusive Club Under Stress: The G7 between Rising
Powers and Non-state Actors after the Cold War 124
Dirk Peters
PA RT I I WO R L D SE C U R I T Y O R D E R S
5. The Devil is in the Detail: The Positions of the

BRICS Countries towards UN Security Council
Reform and the Responsibility to Protect 167
Anja Jetschke and Pascal Abb
6. The Contestation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 202
Harald Müller and Alexandros Tokhi
PA RT I I I H UM A N R IG H T S A N D E N V I R O N M E N T
7. Negotiating the UN Human Rights Council:

Rising Powers, Established Powers, and NGOs 245
Martin Binder and Sophie Eisentraut
8. Contestation in the UNFCCC: The Case of Climate Finance 272
Miriam Prys-Hansen, Kristina Hahn, Malte Lellmann,
and Milan Röseler
viii Contents
PA RT I V C R O S S - C U T T I N G C A SE S
9. Transnational Private Authority and Its Contestation 305

Melanie Coni-Zimmer, Annegret Flohr,
and Klaus Dieter Wolf
10. Cleavages in World Politics: Analysing Rising
Power Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly 345
Martin Binder and Autumn Lockwood Payton
11. Conclusion: Contested World Orders—Continuity or Change? 368
Michael Zürn, Klaus Dieter Wolf, and Matthew D. Stephen
Index 391
List of Figures
1.1 Varieties of world order 13

1.2 Policy space of world order demands 14
2.1 Mapping actor positions about the WTO 65
2.2 NGO accreditation at WTO Ministerial Conferences
and submission of position papers 69
3.1 Contestation of the IMF across constituencies 101
3.2 Distribution of contestation, demands, and critical statements
across topics, BICS, and non-BICS constituencies 102
3.3 The predicted linear effect is represented by the circles on the
vertical lines which show the 90 per cent confidence intervals 111
6.1 Distribution of the contestation rate across topics at the
2010 NPT Review Conference 223
6.2 Criticism and demands per topic at the 2010 NPT
Review Conference 224
6.3 Results from OLS analysis of nuclear contestation data 227
7.1 Group preferences about different types of human rights 255
7.2 Authority scores 256
7.3 Authority issues in the UNHRC negotiations: level of
contestation and salience 257
9.1 Assumed preferences of different groups of actors 310
9.2 Case selection based on degree of privatization 311
10.1 Spatial map of post-9/11 period ideal points and group centroids 356
List of Tables
1.1 Case selection 23

2.1 Influential NGOs at the WTO 47
2.2 International NGO case selection 47
2.3 Doha Round Ministerial Conferences: timeline 50
2.4 Preference coalitions on WTO policy scope 57
3.1 Distribution of quota and voting shares across the G7 and the BRICS 89
3.2 Regression results 110
5.1 BRICS statements on UNSC reform 178
5.2 Prediction matrix for positioning on UNSC reform and R2P 188
6.1 Dimensions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 203
6.2 Sample 219
6.3 OLS regression results 228
9.1 Potential for cooperation between BRICS and NGOs 337
10.1 Summary statistics of W-NOMINATE models 355
10.2 Average (median) angles for cutting lines 357
10.3 Regression analysis of state attributes on GA voting 358
10.4 Dispersion scores and Euclidean distances 2002–11 359
List of Contributors
Pascal Abb, Senior Researcher, Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Martin Binder, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Reading
Melanie Coni-Zimmer, Senior Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
Sophie Eisentraut, Senior Policy Advisor, Munich Security Conference
Anne Flohr, Project Coordinator, TMG Research gGmbH
Kristina Hahn, formerly Research Fellow, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies Hamburg
Anja Jetschke, Professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University

of Goettingen
Malte Lellmann, formerly Research Assistant, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies
Harald Müller, Associate Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
Autumn Lockwood Payton, Lecturer, University of Dayton
Dirk Peters, Senior Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
Miriam Prys-Hansen, Lead Research Fellow, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies Hamburg
Milan Röseler, formerly Research Assistant, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies
Matthew D. Stephen, Senior Research Fellow, Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social
Science Center
Alexandros Tokhi, Senior Research Fellow, Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social
Science Center
Klaus Dieter Wolf, Associate Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)
Michael Zürn, Director, Global Governance, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
1
Rising Powers, NGOs, and Demands
for New World Orders
An Introduction
1. Introduction
World order1 appears to be increasingly contested. Rising powers such as the

BRICS (Brazil, Russia, Indian China, and South Africa) have changed the
international distribution of power and are posing new demands on existing
international institutions. Having entered strong growth paths a few decades ago,
China and India have emerged as the second and third largest economies in the
world, while countries like Brazil and Russia are also striving for the status of
major powers.2 A changing distribution of international power has traditionally
been associated with fundamental contests over international hierarchies and
leadership in the international system. But compared to the past, international
politics today has become highly institutionalized. As a result, demands for change
are not only directed towards other states, as in earlier instances of power transi-
tions in international orders, but are increasingly directed towards international
institutions in a global order.
A multilayered system of overlapping and differentiated institutions and actors
has emerged that goes beyond the traditional world of governments and inter-
state diplomacy. ‘Global governance’ is often used as a concept to incorporate
these new features of international politics into the persistence of the traditional
state system. While contested in prescriptive terms,3 as a term of description glo-
bal governance implies a departure from the idea of an ‘international system’ as
the unmediated interaction of self-interested states in anarchy (Biersteker and
Hall 2002; Hurrell 2005). International and transnational organizations are by
now premier venues by which decisions are made and agreements enforced.
Public authority is thus exercised by different actors on the international and
transnational levels, and not only by nation states (Hurd 2007; Lake 2010). It is
not least these complex authority relationships which have become contested in
the contemporary world order (Zürn 2018).
It is also not only states who contest the contemporary world order. International
politics is no longer the exclusive preserve of grand statesmen and intergovermental
2 Contested World Orders
agreements. Transnationally organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

have emerged as important players in many issue areas, and are actively engaged
in shaping the activities of international organizations (IOs) (Meyer et al. 1997;
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reimann 2006; Tallberg and Jönsson 2010). The rise of
NGOs has often been seen in an enchanted light as the dawn of a less power-driven
and more moral force in international politics (e.g. Florini 2000). But NGOs are
so diverse as to belie easy generalizations. Some NGOs claim to represent normative
principles and the general interest independently of the material interests of their
members (such as Amnesty International, for instance), and seek to influence
global governance in ways that appeal mainly to ideas of the common good, while
other NGOs can be understood as transnationally organized interest groups such
as business associations, consumer advocacy groups, and labour unions. While
interest groups almost always present their goals in terms of serving the common
good, they also lobby for their members’ interests.
Both types of NGO have taken on a direct role in providing new ‘governance’
mechanisms as well as in providing new sources of criticism and change in
global governance (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Tarrow 2001). Widespread
economic and societal globalization has not only generated increased func-
tional demand for coordination and cooperation between states (Mitrany 1948;
Murphy 1994), but has also led to a greater role for NGOs as advocates towards
public institutions (Tallberg et al. 2013), and even as sites of governance and
authority (Büthe and Mattli 2011; Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Price 2003).4
So as rising powers seek changes to the international order, they not only encoun-
ter the outlooks, preferences, and strategies of established incumbent states; they
also encounter a plethora of NGOs who have their own ideas of how to improve
international affairs.
We contend that there is much to gain by analysing these three developments—
rising powers, the rise of international authority, and NGOs as new actors—in an
integrated framework, instead of in separate branches of the literature. Many
demands for change by both rising powers and NGOs are directed at the same
target—international institutions. And because they share the same political
arena, the demands of rising powers and NGOs are comparable, and can be studied
in relation to each other. While the implications of the rise of new major powers
have provoked enormous interest, to our knowledge there are no studies which
have positioned them in relation to transnational NGOs against the background
of an increasingly institutionalized system. In part, this is no doubt due to the
varying theoretical views of International Relations (IR) scholars, whose basic
ontologies of world politics emphasize different actors and different forms of
power. Power-based and state-centric theories naturally incline towards a focus
on power transitions amongst major states, while attention to the growing role
and influence of NGOs has come largely from scholars working within societal
and norm-based approaches. Global Governance studies, in turn, has been the
introduction 3
focus of institutionalist theorizing and is only lately taking traditional questions

of international power shifts into account. Consequently, the existing literatures
on great and rising powers, that on civil society and transnational NGOs, and that
on Global Governance, have developed largely in parallel and rarely in intersec-
tion. The tendency to study rising powers and NGOs as if they act in different
worlds obscures the reality that both type of actors often put forward their
demands and ideas to the same addressee: international institutions as the core
sites of global governance.
Against this backdrop, in this volume we take an institutionalist perspective on
the rise of new powers and NGOs (see also Kahler 2013; Zangl et al. 2016). We
base our analysis on the assumption that international institutions are conse-
quential for international outcomes (Krasner 1982), and that this has increased as
they have gained in political and epistemic authority (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn
et al. 2015). At the same time, we assume that international institutions are sen-
sitive to the implications of rapid shifts in international power, leading to new
challenges to institutional business-as-usual. The empirical studies included in
this volume aim to shed light on the nature and extent of these challenges.
Theoretically speaking, we attempt to shift focus from a preoccupation with
the structure of the international power distribution, as in power transition the-
ory (Organski and Kugler 1981; Tammen and Kugler 2006), and highlight instead
the demands for international institutional adaptations and the ways in which
institutions respond to them. Our framework for the analysis of rising power and
NGO demands first focuses on three prominent features of contemporary inter-
national institutions. These are (i) the variable degree of liberalism inscribed into
international and transnational rules, (ii) the variable extent of international or
transnational authority, and (iii) the distributive implications that international
institutions produce. In a second step, these demands can be compared with the
institutional status quo, revealing whether they have a more or less ‘revisionist’
character. Third, they can be compared with each other, revealing how the
demands of different actors overlap or diverge, and indicating what explanatory
factors may account for the different positions the actors adopt. Finally, the con-
stellation of demands can be compared across issue areas, indicating whether a
political cleavage between BRICS and the established powers characterizes the
international system or whether issue-area specific features structure the conflicts
differently from issue area to issue area, resulting in criss-crossing rather than
cross-cutting conflict lines.
In these ways, we aim at contributing to core debates in contemporary
international politics: What kind of challenge to world order do rising powers
represent? Do they spell the end of the ‘liberal international order’ cultivated by
the primarily ‘Western’ states since the Second World War? Do they constitute a
coherent group in international politics? Do their demands have a systemic
nature, or do we observe variance over different policy fields and forms of
international institutions? Do rising powers’ and transnational NGOs’ demands

intersect or diverge? The answers to these questions are interesting not only
because they are revealing towards key debates in IR, but also because they may
help us to understand the degree and types of changes that world order is cur-
rently undergoing.
2. Studying Contested World Orders
There is little doubt that the rise of new powers is one of the most important
developments for world order in recent decades. However, at the same time, the
institutionalization of world politics, and the closely related proliferation of
NGOs, indicate that there is more to world order than the strategic interactions
of unitary states under anarchy.
The Rise of International Authority
The time since the Second World War, and especially the last two to three decades,
has brought changes that have undermined Westphalian sovereignty (see, e.g.,
Grande and Pauly 2005). While major powers have never fully respected sovereignty
in practice (Krasner 1999), the norm of sovereignty emphasizes the principle of
non-intervention in domestic affairs and, closely related to this, the consensus
principle (that state parties are not subject to any law to which they do not con-
sent). From the perspective of Westphalian sovereignty, international institutions
are considered to be instruments of the territorial state.
Today, many international institutions have developed procedures that contradict
the consensus principle and the principle of non-intervention. Some international
norms and rules compel national governments to take measures even when they
have not agreed to do so. In some cases, decisions made by international institu-
tions even affect individuals directly, like those taken by the United Nations Security
Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Both types of activities—
those that bind states, thus affecting private actors only indirectly, and those that
affect individuals directly—are indications that international institutions have
public authority (Bogdandy, Dann, and Goldmann 2010; Lake 2010). In general,
international institutions have authority when the addressees of their policies
recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding
decisions (Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Cooper et al. 2008).
A dense network of international and transnational institutions has developed
in recent decades. Many of these new institutions are far more intrusive than
conventional international institutions. They can circumvent the resistance of
most governments via majoritarian decision-making (e.g. UNSC) and dispute
introduction 5
settlement procedures (e.g. DSB in the WTO), through the interaction of

monitoring agencies with transnational society (e.g. IAEA), and by dominating
the process of knowledge interpretation in some fields (e.g. OECD). With the—
most often consensual—decision to install international institutions with such
features, state parties have become subject to a law other than their own, which
they have either not agreed to (mission creep) or do not agree with anymore
(costly exit option). At least in some issue areas, the global level has achieved a
significant degree of authority and has thus partially replaced the consensus prin-
ciple of the traditional international system. This development has been especially
accentuated in the 1990s and the early 2000s, leading to unprecendented levels of
international authority (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn et al. 2015).From this perspective,
problems of legitimation and growing resistance can be seen as a reaction to the
increased authority and distributional significance of international institutions.
This understanding has found a place in a variety of theoretical perspectives, all
of which attach a significant role to the trend for the exercise of authority beyond
the national context to become increasingly contested (See, inter alia, Amoore 2000;
Armstrong, Farrell, and Maiguashca 2003; Cochrane, Duffy, and Selby 2004;
Daase and Deitelhoff 2015). Especially in the 1990s, during the height of American
power and the expansion of liberal economic globalization, much of this con-
testation was associated with transnational protest activism and the so-called
anti-globalization movements. The agents of contestation were associated with
domestic and transnational social mobilization, often conceived as part of the
emergence of a ‘global’ civil society resisting a neo-liberal world order (Walgrave and
Rucht 2010; Stephen 2009, 2011; Zürn 2004). At the same time, NGOs became
more prominent and gained much greater access to IOs (Tallberg et al. 2013).
Two implications of this view are important. First, it is not only states but also
NGOs and other non-state actors who participate in challenging the current
world order. Second, both states and NGOs are not necessarily against international
institutions per se. Whereas especially right-wing populist parties challenge the
authority of international institutions as such, NGOs often ask for more or differ-
ent forms of global governance, for instance, by calling for drastic intensification
of climate policy measures at the international level. Similarly, there have been
numerous recent demands for much stronger interventions by the IMF and
multilateral development banks as a response to the financial crisis, both by
rising powers and by NGOs. We therefore also expect a growing utilization of
international institutions to the extent that they exercise authority.
In short, the rise of international political authority has increased the contest-
ation of international institutions independently of shifts in the underlying
distribution of power. It has increased the political opportunities for transnational
activities on the side of NGOs, and it has become a major object of interest for
rising powers. International institutions provide a site for the contestation of
world orders.
Power Shift
At the same time that international institutions have taken on a greater role,
the distribution and nature of international power has been rapidly shifting.
Emerging and developing countries have increased their share in the global
economy significantly, and increasingly seek to translate market power into influ-
ence over international institutions. Between 2004 and 2014, China’s GDP grew
from $6.6 trillion to $17.2 trillion (an increase of 159 per cent), while India’s
expanded from $3.4 trillion to $7.0 trillion (109 per cent). At the same time,
the United States’ grew from $14.2 trillion to $16.6 trillion (16.8 per cent)
(Stephen 2017: 486). According to the World Bank, the combined GDP of Brazil,
Russia, India, Indonesia, China, and South Africa represented, in 1995, around
a third of that of the G7. By 2013, this portion had risen to nearly three-quarters
(World Bank 2016). While these growth rates have stalled in recent years, it
appears highly unlikely that the power relations that underpinned the early
post-Cold War period can be restored. In fact, growth in emerging economies is
expected to remain stronger than in high-income countries in future (World
Bank 2016). Consequently, although we speak in this volume of ‘rising powers’, to
a significant extent, the power balance in the international system has already
changed (see also Kappel 2011; Layne 2012; Young 2010). Already in 2012, the
United States’ National Intelligence Council surveyed these trends and concluded
that ‘with the rapid rise of other countries, the “unipolar moment” is over and Pax
Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began
in 1945—is fast winding down’ (National Intelligence Council 2012: x). From this
longer historical perspective, the ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer 1991) of
American power after the Cold War appears more as a hiatus than an enduring
feature of the international system.
Power is a multivalent concept that we do not wish to reduce to the possession of
resources, although resources may underlie most forms of power (Barnett and
Duvall 2005; Lukes 2005). But there are at least three separate mechanisms by which
an increased share of the world’s economic activity translates quickly into an
increased influence on international institutions. These three mechanisms reflect
closely the well-known three faces of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005).
First, economic expansion increases the resources upon which a state and its
representatives can draw in its dealings with other states. Economic resources
can be converted into instruments of ‘direct’ and ‘relational’ power, such as bur-
eaucratic capacity, epistemic capacity, and the ability to furnish material (dis)
incentives and side payments. They can also ultimately be converted into military
capabilities, as often underlined by realist theories. Similarly, having a large econ-
omy also conveys bargaining power through the leverage of access to large internal
markets, which are particularly relevant in economic policy fields such as trade
(Krasner 1976). This bargaining power and influence is reinforced to the extent
introduction 7
that economic size is associated with a central position in world networks, fostering
rising states’ ‘network power’ (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009).
Growing economic size conveys the potential for ‘asymmetrical interdependence’
in relation to smaller states, and increasingly ‘symmetrical’ interdependence with
the economic hegemon (Keohane and Nye 2001).
Second, a country’s share of the world economy is significant from a systemic
point of view. Countries with particularly large shares of the world economy have
a functional importance to the global economy that makes them ‘systemically
significant’ in a way that smaller states are not. The threshold for systemic signifi-
cance has, moreover, been lowered as a result of economic globalization, as it
increases the need for states to coordinate and collaborate in their decisions to
govern transnational issues. Consequently, new powers have achieved a kind of
veto or spoiling capacity over collective decisions in global governance (Nel,
Nabers, and Hanif 2012).
A third mechanism for the translation of material power resource into power
over outcomes lies in the less tangible realm of status and recognition (Larson
and Shevchenko 2010; Paul, Larson, and Wohlforth 2014; Nel 2010). Rising
powers have articulated aspirations to change global politics, but they have also
been accorded recognition of their new status by established powers and other
participants in global governance. The shift from the G7 to the G20 as the primary
intergovernmental forum for the governance of the global economy is the clearest
indicator of the increased status of some major non-G7 countries. But it can also
be observed in other institutional domains, such as the changes in the inner circle
of negotiators in climate and trade politics. This external recognition is, moreover,
complemented by the increased self-identification of some states as ‘rising powers’,
which can be seen in the proliferation of new coalitions and networks of rising
powers (Flemes 2013), such as IBSA (since 2003), BRICS (since 2008–9), and
BASIC (since 2009). Together, these three mechanisms have altered the interstate
and inter-societal power relations that underpin international institutions, and
brought new voices to the fore in calling for institutional changes.
Bringing Rising Powers and Rise

of International Authority Together
There is virtually a cross-theoretical consensus that power shifts pose challenges

for existing international institutions (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Cox 1981;
Keohane 1984; Mearsheimer 1994; Simmons and Martin 2002), especially since
some of today’s rising powers have also been long-standing critics of the estab-
lished order. This has provoked numerous debates within existing IR literature.
What do rising powers want? Are the rising powers revisionist, satisfied, or some-
where in between? Is the authority of international institutions destined to
wane in the coming years? Do rising powers constitute a bloc across issue areas,
confronting established powers? Do NGOs reinforce such a cleavage or cut across it?
To answer these questions, we utilize a conceptual framework that brings together
rising powers, the rise of international authority, and the growing role of NGOs.
With the rise of authority beyond the nation state, international and transnational
organizations became key venues of political debates and struggles. Inter
national organizations are both instruments for producing norms and regulations
and sites of opposition and critique. International organizations thus have become
targets of a plethora of demands, advocating or criticizing specific policies,
defending or attacking institutional set-ups, and debating the merits of the
current world order as such. That IOs are targets of demands and claims is most
obvious for many transnational CSOs and interest groups, who rely on their com-
municative strategies to influence global policy. Rising powers of course also tar-
get international institutions. When Germany was a rising power before World
War I, the aspirations of the Kaiser were put forward primarily towards the
German people and secondarily towards the dominant powers, especially Great
Britain as hegemon. No doubt, today China similarly has expectations regarding
the United States. Yet, it is a striking feature of contemporary world order that
dissatisfied actors articulate their demands in terms of international norms and
rules. Even deeply dissatisfied actors argue that norms and rules should be fol-
lowed, complied with, deviated from, and, where necessary, changed, but rarely
rejected outright. Because of this, a focus on international institutions helps us to
look at the place where demands for change are bundled.
3. Mapping Demands of Rising Powers

and NGOs Towards IOs
Rising powers and NGOs have the capacity to affect international institutions, but
their demands will be a product not only of their increased influence but also
of their interests, however formed. We look more specifically at three types of
demands. Each speaks to an independent dimension of current international
institutions in different policy fields. We ask (i) to what extent an actor’s demand
calls for economic, social, or political liberalization, (ii) whether the demand implies
more or less authority on the international level, and (iii) what the distributive
intention of the demand is. These three dimensions allow us to locate demands
on international institutions in a three-dimensional property space. We discuss
these three properties of demands in detail.
On Liberal Content
Already E.H. Carr realized that international institutions tended to display cer-
tain world views and ideas. He wrote that dissatisfied powers try to use their
introduction 9
‘ideological power’, as well as their economic and military resources, to alter their
normative content and thus the distribution of material and normative goods in
the international system (Carr 1946: 102–45). International norms are, in his
view, products of the dominant (English-speaking) nations, and are ‘designed to
perpetuate their supremacy and expressed in the idiom peculiar to them’
(Carr 1946: 80). Following this reasoning, several strains of current IR theory
suggest that a decline of American or Western dominance will pose a threat to the
‘liberal’ content of international institutions—such as democratic government,
individual rights, private ownership, free markets, and economic openness—and
thus change its social purpose. Hegemonic stability theorists have traditionally
seen liberal economic orders as the products of the dominance of a single
economic hegemon, which may be eroded when the power of the hegemon wanes
(Gilpin 1987; Kindleberger 1981: 88; Layne 2012), while political economists see
‘catch-up’ developmental states as reliant upon interventionist industrial policies
to challenge the competitive advantages of the dominant powers (Caldentey 2008;
Wade 2003). Similar thinking leads others to conclude that rising powers will
challenge the most liberal aspects of international order which are incompatible
with their domestic orders (McNally 2012; Kupchan 2014; Nölke et al. 2015).
In associating power shifts with normative change, such perspectives dissent
from accounts emphasizing the socialization of emerging powers into the ( liberal)
norms and principles espoused by established powers and embedded in IOs
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Johnston 2008). Socialization describes a process
by which governing elites of states come to accept and internalize the norms and
principles supportive of structures of existing IOs. Socialization suggests that
emerging powers and even NGOs may be brought into line with existing nor-
mative structures of global governance, via mechanisms such as familiarization,
habitualization, argumentation and persuasion, and social integration (Checkel
2005; Kent 2002). John Ikenberry extends this line of argumentation and makes a
trenchant case that the liberal order is more robust than realists acknowledge
(Ikenberry 2010; Ikenberry 2011a; Ikenberry 2011b). Ikenberry emphasizes the
role of institutions in mitigating the effects of international a narchy and providing
benefits to both rising and established powers. First, the liberal order has fostered
economic interdependence, which has become increasingly important for rising
powers’ economic development. Second, existing institutions like the United
Nations have fostered strategic restraint on the side of the United States, alleviat-
ing the security dilemma inherent in an anarchical international system. Third,
even if rising powers wanted to change the current order, it would be very costly
to do so, because of high sunk costs within existing institutions, and the diffi-
culties of establishing alternatives. Finally, existing institutions contain ‘a wide
array of channels and mechanisms that allow the new rising states to join and
to be integrated into the governance arrangements of the old order’ (Ikenberry
and Wright 2008: 5). Consequently, rising powers ‘are finding incentives and
opportunities to engage and integrate into this order, doing so to advance their
own interests’ (Ikenberry 2011a: 61).
A similar divergence of expectations can be discerned about the preferences

of NGOs. Transnational protest movements often challenge the effects of ‘neo-
liberalism’ and are seen by some as part of an anti-globalization movement
directed against the contemporary world order (Kaldor 2000, 2003). At the same
time, interest groups and business actors are seen at least sometimes as actors
trying to ‘capture’ liberal regulation and to withdraw it from the realm of the
common good in order to control it and maximize profits (Mattli and Woods 2009).
Many others see transnational NGOs as demanding necessary complements to
the liberal regimes in order to deepen it (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Indeed, non-
state actors active on the level beyond the nation state sometimes challenge the
content of existing institutions fundamentally; sometimes they use these institu-
tions to further the policies they want to see.
Against this backdrop, we seek to define the ‘liberal’ dimension of world order
in an operational way that allows for comparisons across issue areas.5 In doing so,
we distinguish two versions of global liberalism—a neo-liberal version and an
embedded version of liberalism—and a non-liberal order.
We define international institutions as neo-liberal to the extent that they
promote the reduction of political barriers to the cross-national exchange of
material goods (capital and commodities), labour power (services and migration),
and ideas (cultural goods, rights, and knowledge). Demands in favour of neo-
liberalism can also be labelled as ‘market-making-demands’ (Streeck 1995), and
have been seen as part of attempts at constitutionalizing neo-liberalism at a level
beyond the nation state (Gill 2002). Mostly, they ask for institutions that guaran-
tee the free and unhindered exchange of goods, services, capital, and (less often)
people. They are directed against national political interventions and can be
labelled negative integration (Corbey 1995; Scharpf 1996). Mechanisms in sup-
port of ‘human rights’ broadly understood are compatible with both versions of
liberalism, but in tendency, ‘neo-liberal’ interpretations of individualist rights
centre on the defence of private property rights.
The other version of liberalism may be labelled embedded liberalism (Katzenstein
1985; Ruggie 1982). Demands for embedded liberalism seek to reconcile economic
openness with social stability via political interventions in order to reduce the
unwelcome effects of free exchange, be it the diminution of political rights,
inequality, environmental degradation, or the erosion of national cultures and
habits. Such ‘positive integration’ can come in two forms. A more nationally
oriented form of embedded liberalism seeks global recognition of some national
autonomy to allow for the development of market-braking or market-correcting
policies on the national level, while a more internationalist form seeks stronger
market interventions on the international level, in the extreme case in favour of
global redistribution. The notion of individual rights is much more broadly con-
ceived in embedded liberalism than in neo-liberalism. It includes political and
social rights in addition to economic rights.
introduction 11
One may therefore see embedded liberalism as lying between the poles of
eo-liberalism and an order in which free market and individual rights are
n
subordinated to collective goals such as sovereignty or equality. Such a non-liberal
order can be achieved either by the rejection of any international rules that
intrude into domestic affairs, in which case human rights and economic openness
would be decided by different national systems, or, alternatively, one may create
strong global agencies that push through politically determined schemes of
exchange and fair redistribution. In distinguishing negative integration (neo-
liberalism) from positive integration (embedded liberalism) from no liberal
integration at all (non-liberal stance), it is possible to assess new actors’ outlooks
on the liberal dimension of world order more concretely. It is also important to
point out that there is variation in the social purpose of different institutions in
the current world order. The IMF is clearly liberal in a way that the United Nations
General Assembly is not.
On International Authority
As we have argued above, the current world order is also characterized by a his-
torically high level of authority on the international level. Here, expectations
about the impact of rising powers and NGOs likewise vary. Some realists, for
instance, have clear expectations that international power shifts will erode or
destroy whatever international authority may be said to exist. The resurgence of
a security competition between the United States and China would push aside
international institutions that depend on cooperation between the great powers
(Mearsheimer 2001), while the institutions of the ‘pax Americana’ are ‘doomed to
wither in the early twenty-first century’ (Layne 2012: 205). Many authors, taking
a closer look at the demands of rising powers such as the BRICS states, also sug-
gest that a core feature of their foreign policy outlooks is a jealous approach to
ceding sovereignty to strong international institutions (Laïdi 2012).
By contrast, liberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane suggest that the
rise of new powers may make the functioning of IOs more contentious, but a dif-
fusion of international power is more likely to prevent the creation of strong new
institutions rather than undermine the stability of existing ones (Keohane 2012:
136). Ikenberry’s picture of a robust international order in which rising powers
are seeking greater influence would also appear amenable to the maintenance or
even strengthening of the authority of international institutions (Ikenberry 2011b).
In contrast to realists, liberal theorists make a clear distinction between inter-
national institutions and the primarily Western leadership within them, and
suggest that rising powers’ dissatisfaction is not so much over international
authority itself, but the privileged positions of established powers within it
(Ikenberry 2011a; Kahler 2013: 711–29; Schirm 2009).
Most transnational NGOs seem to support strong international institutions

and frequently ask for stronger ones, such as in the field of environmental politics
or regarding human rights. To some extent, it seems that the organizational form
of transnationally organized CSOs and interest groups predetermines their basic
orientation in favour of international regulation (Wapner 1995). However, other
NGOs act as defendants of weaker states trying to help them to protect their
autonomy, for example at the World Trade Organization (see Stephen, this vol-
ume). This group of NGOs does often argue against international institutions that
become too strong and too intrusive.
Our second question about preferences, therefore, concerns the degree to which
the actor under question demands international rules, institutions, and authority.
Actors’ positions on the role of international authority can be thought of as a
spectrum along which three major benchmarks can be identified: national discre-
tion, intergovernmental coordination, and supranationalism. National discretion
leaves all decisions to sovereign states, prioritizing unilateral autonomy over
international coordination. Intergovernmental coordination leaves decisions about
compliance and implementation up to the states concerned. Supranationalism,
the strongest form of international authority, involves the delegation or even
transfer of some policymaking function to a body or forum beyond the state,
undermining the consent principle of international politics.
If we consider these two dimensions of world order together—its liberal social
purpose and the level at which decisions are made—we already can think more
comprehensively about the kind of world orders that approximate different actors’
preferences (see Figure 1.1). Whereas the two dimensions are not fully orthog
onal to each other, most world order perspectives can be located within such a
two-dimensional space. World order demands which are simultaneously liberal
but reject all forms of international coordination result in a competitive system
of rival liberal capitalisms—a system depicted most vividly in the concept of a
competitive ‘race to the bottom’ of market regulations and the idea of the market-
oriented ‘competition state’ (Cerny 1997). A similar rejection of international
coordination combined with non-market structures can be discussed as a ‘sover-
eign autonomy’ system, which in economic terms would manifest as a mercantilist
or otherwise non-liberal order. The era of rival imperialisms and the lead up to
World War II can be considered historical precedents (Cox 1987: 151–210).
At the other extreme, world orders with high levels of supranational authority
combined with the institutionalization of negative integration can be considered
the ideal type of a neo-liberal minimal order in analogy to Nozick’s minimal state
or Stephen Gill’s notion of ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill and Cutler 2015;
Nozick 1974). Finally, one can think of a supranational order based on positive
integration and elements of global redistribution. Most varieties of cosmopolitan-
ism approach these demands (Colás 1993; Linklater 2007), seeking a compromise
with liberal constitutionalism in the form of global social democracy (Archibugi
and Held 1995; Pogge 1992; Pogge 2008).
introduction 13
Supranationalism New constitutionalism Cosmopolitanism
NIEO
Intergovernmentalism Embedded liberalism
Competition states Mercantilism

National discretion
Neo-liberal Embedded liberal Non-liberal

Fig. 1.1 Varieties of world order
The real world knows at best approximations to ideal types. John Ruggie’s
concept of ‘embedded liberalism’ as a description of the post-World War II order,
for example, reflects a mostly intergovernmental order which sought a balance
between liberal openness (coordinated liberalism) and domestic economic inter-
ventionism (coordinated dirigisme) (Ruggie 1982). While the extreme cases make
the concepts clear, the typical demands of most actors will probably be located in
the more central territory of the two-dimensional space.
On Distributive Goods
There are few international institutions which do not involve some forms of
distributional conflict (Krasner 1991). International agreements usually have
an efficiency-related and a distributional component. Conflicts in and about
international institutions often arise with respect to the distributional dimension.
Distributive conflicts may be mediated or mitigated by external factors as part of
a broader institutional environment, such as side payments and the presumed
continued gains from ongoing institutionalized cooperation, but they cannot be
avoided completely. Conflicts in this dimension tend to be over outcomes,
resources, and relative positions within a given domain. Examples germane to the
cases in this volume include the distribution of voting quota at institutions such
as the IMF and World Bank, the possession of permanent seats on the UN
Security Council, the distribution of financial resources or funding burdens,
access to proprietary technology, or the costs of agreeing mutually beneficial
standards. Particularly acute distributive conflicts involve the allocation of status
and prestige between countries (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Nel 2010; Wolf
2011). Recognition as a major power whose interests must be taken into account
is often a central goal of the foreign policies of rising states. At the same time,
threats to the status of established but potentially declining powers can be
Supranationalism
Major distribution conflict
Intergovernmentalism
National discretion Minor distribution conflict
Neo-liberal Embedded liberal Non-liberal

Fig. 1.2 Policy space of world order demands
expected vociferously to defend their relative standing. Where NGOs stand in

relation to distributive conflicts is an open question to which we will return in the
conclusion.
The contestation of international institutions may therefore involve not only
disagreements over institutional form and purpose, but also more parochial dis-
agreements over the gains of cooperation or distribution of relative goods. Rather
than seeking to alter the liberal content or exercise of international authority,
some actors may simply aspire to alter the distribution of material goods and sta-
tus. The extent to which actors seek a redistribution of the distributive material
and symbolic goods in a given institution constitutes the third dimension of the
policy space against which we map actors’ preferences, as depicted in Figure 1.2.
In sum, in order to make sense of different actors’ preferences, we seek to
analyse their demands with regard to three prominent features of contemporary
international institutions: liberal social purpose, level of international authority,
and distributional implications. While the dimensions are not fully orthogonal,
they vary conceptually and, as we will show, empirically as well.
4. Propositions
Once actors’ preferences are revealed, it becomes possible to analyse them in rela-
tion to the institutional status quo, in relation to each other, and across different
issue areas. In doing so, we can assess three sets of competing propositions. The
first set of propositions refers to the degree and depth of contestation. How much
do demands deviate from the institutional status quo? Is it really true that espe-
cially rising powers put forward demands that question the current world orders,
or do these demands come from under-represented actors generally? Second,
we aim to test competing propositions about the coalitions observable in world
politics. Is it true that the BRICS stand against the G7 states? Or, does the Global
introduction 15
South stand against the Global North? With whom do NGOs coalesce? Finally,
we want to know whether the observed conflict lines add up to an overarching
pattern. Do emerging powers or NGOs form coherent groups? Or, do they have
divergent, context-specific preferences? In exploring these propositions, we also
investigate the factors that might account for the positions adopted by rising
powers and NGOs. Do the behaviours we observe conform to the expectations of
theories emphasizing the international distribution of power, or is the picture more
indicative of the role of domestic politics, or international institutional structure?
In this section we offer a number of propositions in order to provide clear bench-
marks against which to assess the empirical findings of the studies in this volume.
Due to our case study approach, we do not expect to be able to corroborate or
reject them definitively. They are designed to focus our enquiry and we will return
to them in the conclusion.
Demands in Relation to the Status Quo
To what extent are rising powers and NGOs dissatisfied with the institutional sta-
tus quo? Traditional realism and Power Transition Theory (PTT) would suggest
that rising powers especially tend to be dissatisfied with the existing hierarchies,
institutions, and structures of the international system, because they reflect the
interests of the former hegemonic power (Gilpin 1981; Tammen et al. 2000). In
the classic PTT story, a rising power will challenge the status quo while the dom-
inant state typically will defend the status quo, ‘from which it accrues substantial
benefits’ (Tammen et al. 2000: 9). China looms large as the major likely challenger
(Lemke and Tammen 2003; Mearsheimer 2010; Schweller and Pu 2011; Tammen
and Kugler 2006). Such reasoning would suggest that the more power a rising
state has, the more its preferences will diverge from the status quo. Similarly, it has
been argued that at least the four biggest BRICS countries share several common-
alities that give rise to shared interests (Hurrell 2006). This would suggest that the
rising powers will be the most dissatisfied actors, and that they will form a fairly
coherent group in this dissatisfaction. Against this background, each of the chap-
ters in this volume asks to what extent the BRICS’ preferences diverge from those
of established powers, and whether the BRICS constitute a coherent group or bloc
in the issue areas under discussion.
In addition, we distinguish between (dis)satisfaction with existing institutional
features, and (dis)satisfaction with the way the status quo is currently imple-
mented. More ‘revisionist’ actors are likely to reject both established institutional
structures and institutional practice. But softer forms of dissatisfaction may
reflect unhappiness only with the way the institutional status quo is exercised and
implemented. For instance, an actor may be in favour of a strong dispute settle-
ment body in the WTO, but object to the practices of the DSB by pointing out
that it does not rule without bias. Similarly, not all rejections of intervention by
the United Nations Security Council amount to a complete rejection of a UN-based
responsibility to protect; instead, what is often called into question is the selectiv-
ity of interventionism (Binder 2017). Criticism of institutional practice is often
done by reference to principles and norms acknowledged by the institution under
question, such as transparency, equal treatment, fairness, and so on. These ‘internal
criticisms’ reflect a more reformist position. With a willingness to simplify, we
therefore formulate a benchmark ‘power transition’ proposition, which will be
elaborated in each of the empirical chapters.
P 1: Rising powers strongly diverge from the institutional status quo in a
revisionist manner, while established powers defend the status quo, with NGOs
in-between with a reformist stance. Whether a state is revisionist, reformist, or
satisfied is closely related to the state’s position in the international hierarchy.
Demands in Relation to Each Other
Power transition theory represents only one strand of theorizing about rising
powers. Other accounts stress the internal diversity of contemporary rising powers
and the many varying factors—such as regime type, level of development, and
normative compatibility with the existing order—that affect their behaviour and
demands regarding global governance (Armijo 2007). Liberal and domestic polit-
ical economy perspectives suggest that states’ preferences are shaped in crucial ways
in interaction with their domestic political and economic structures (Cox 1981;
Katzenstein 1977; Moravcsik 1997; Van der Pijl 1998). Different types of state—
democratic or authoritarian, developed and developing, liberal and illiberal—
typically have different preferences over global governance, suggesting strong
contrasts between the different states identified as rising powers. Some go so far
as to suggest that cross-cutting preference coalitions mean that some rising powers
will find common purpose with some established powers, depending on the issue
at stake (Schirm 2012). Moreover, collective ideas and the associated strategies
can vary not only across rising powers, but also within a rising power over time
(Legro 2007).
From these societal perspectives, states’ preferences are not determined by
the distribution of power, but arise from their domestic social bases. Because the
dominant states in the system have externalized a specifically liberal world order,
the more liberal the domestic structures of the rising powers, the more they
should be satisfied with the status quo. In particular, many authors have argued
that non-democratic states favour sovereignty as the primary principle of world
order, such that non-democratic rising powers are likely to be particularly sceptical
regarding the emergence of international authority (Johnston 2003: 14–15;
Laïdi 2012). This would suggest that the BRICS will be divided between the
introduction 17
democratic (Brazil, India, and South Africa) and non-democratic (China and
Russia) members. These perspectives relocate explanatory power to the domestic
level, suggesting that rising powers’ preferences can be explained with reference
to variables such as regime type, their levels of economic development, and
state–society relations in their domestic and transnational social contexts. These
considerations lead to the second set of propositions that will be probed in the
empirical chapters.
P 2a: States with a similar domestic structure direct similar demands towards
international institutions. Democratic states especially will adopt similar positions
regardless of whether they can be categorized as rising or established powers.
P 2b: The similarity between democratic states can be expected to be especially
obvious regarding liberal social purpose, while the similarity between
authoritarian states should be especially strong regarding the emphasis on
sovereignty. It is only the distributional dimension where the domestic structure
should play less of a role.
Similar questions arise concerning the behaviour and broader role of transnational
NGOs. In the vast literature on NGOs’ roles in global governance, one strand sees
NGOs as a means of ensuring the participation of world society in global deci-
sion-making and implementation (Beisheim 1997; Tallberg and Jönsson 2010). In
this view, they serve as ‘transmission belts’ between society and governance units,
and therefore contribute to the democratization of global governance (Steffek
and Hahn 2010; Steffek, Kissling, and Nanz 2008). By implication, the variety of
NGOs will be high since it should reflect the plurality of perspectives and interests
in world society. While some accounts stress the role of NGOs in contesting and
resisting features of existing international institutions (Daase and Deitelhoff 2013),
others see NGOs as becoming part of the very machinery of global governance
that they are supposed to contest (Hardt and Negri 2000, Higgott, Underhill, and
Bieler 2000; Murphy 1998), with Western views being much better represented
than the South (Ecker-Ehrhardt and Zürn 2013).
In order to better understand the real interaction of rising powers and NGOs
regarding international institutions, we therefore need to avoid generalizations
and look at specific rising powers and specific NGOs that can be seen as represen-
tatives of their actor type. We therefore ask whether systematic coalitions between
certain types of NGOs and certain state coalitions can be observed and whether
they are stable across issue areas.
These considerations lead to another pair of propositions which will be explored
in the empirical part. Those who see NGOs as transmission belts from society to
governors would expect NGOs generally to support international authority, and
for their specific policy demands to be closely related to their social origins. By
contrast, those who see NGOs through a resistance prism would expect them to
be on the side of the revisionists.
P 3a: While NGOs in general support international authority, especially

NGOs from the Global South can be expected to coalesce with those rising
powers which want to have less liberal and more redistributive policies on the
global scale.
P 3b: NGOs coalesce with states that put forward the most radical demands
for changes of the global order.
Comparison of Issue Areas
The three faces of power discussed in section two can play out in different contexts.
While power transition theorists locate power mainly in the international system
writ large and consider the ‘overall’ power structure as most important, others cast
doubt on the fungibility of power across issue areas. David Baldwin, for example,
argued that ‘the notion of a single overall international power structure unrelated
to any particular issue area is based on a concept of power that is virtually mean-
ingless’ (Baldwin 1979: 193). Given the limited fungibility of power, institutional-
ists often point to ‘issue area structure’ as the relevant context for assessing power
relationships (Keohane and Nye 2001). For this reason, the nature and extent of
contemporary power shifts and the question of which countries qualify as ‘rising
powers’ are issues that need to be taken up in a manner sensitive to institutional
and issue area context (Lesage and Van de Graaf 2015: 5).
In line with a power-sensitive institutionalist reasoning, it has been observed
that while international institutions are important, their most powerful members
often exercised outsized influence over them and are powerful enough to resist
decisions they do not like (Krasner 1999). There is little reason to assume that
rising powers behave differently. Consequently, institutionalists would expect
rising powers to be most critical of those international institutions which exercise
a high level of authority and do not follow the one state, one vote principle.
Conversely, established powers are most supportive of those institutions which
exercise a high level of authority and have institutionalized inequality between
states (Zürn 2018).
Only if the overall power logic dominates across issue areas can one speak of
a fully developed systemic conflict or ‘cleavage’ that dominates world politics.
The East–West divide of the twentieth century may be seen as such a cleavage.
The question of whether a country belonged to the ‘West’ or the ‘East’ was almost
always sufficient to predict their international preferences in almost all issue areas
(Link 1980). While power transition theory predicts the development of such a
cleavage at least regarding high politics issues, institutionalists would expect to
see issue-area specific conflicts. We therefore ask about BRICS’ coalitions in each
issue area and the role of NGOs to see whether they amount to a systemic con-
flict or ‘cleavage’ when looked at world politics as a whole. The following two
introduction 19
propositions will be elaborated in the cross-cutting studies and in the conclusion

by drawing from the case studies.
P 4a: The conflict lines in all issue areas under consideration resemble each
other. A cleavage pitting the revisionist rising powers against the Western status
quo powers can be observed.
P 4b: Depending on the institutional set-up in the issue area, we see differences
in sectoral conflict lines primarily driven by the issue-area specific institutional
status quo.
5. Research Design
Our research questions frame the contributions in this collection. We have for-
mulated competing expectations about conflict formations in the fields under
study. In order to make cross-case comparisons, which are put forward in the
conclusion to this book, each chapter also needs to focus on a common set of
actors, and utilize comparable methodological assumptions and empirical research
strategies. We outline these here before introducing the institutional cases covered
in this volume.
Actors
We focus on a common group of states across institutional cases. Only by doing

so is it possible to comparatively assess the extent to which rising powers consti-
tute a common strategic or preference coalition against established powers. On
the side of established powers, we take the G7 states as the most relevant ones.
On the other side, it is the group of self-proclaimed and increasingly externally
recognized ‘BRICS’ countries that command our attention (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa). Not only is this set of countries recognized for their
rising power status, but it also encompasses diverse countries that bring in meth-
odologically useful variance on the country level. Indeed, the BRICS category is a
blessing in this respect, as it combines variation on regime type, level of economic
development, economic size, and levels of material power, subject to context-
specific variations.
Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of the BRICS in the world of transnational
NGOs. We are primarily interested in leading transnational NGOs who are most
capable of having influence on the exercise of authority beyond the state. Due to
the issue area-specific nature of most NGOs and the diversity of international
institutions, measuring the salience of different NGOs needs to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. We explicitly do not assume that all NGOs espouse
‘progressive’ or ‘internationalist’ positions, but seek to cover variation across

several dimensions that both vary independently and seem to cover the most
important potential lines of division amongst the NGO population. Among these
we consider especially organizational goals and geographical origin. Organizational
goals are in the first instance divided between interest groups and those organiza-
tions seeking to represent the public interest, with interest groups further divided
between employers’ and industry associations, on the one hand, and labour
organizations, on the other. Geographical origin refers to whether an NGO is
based in the Global North or South, with the latter category further divided
between NGOs from the emerging BRICS countries and those from the rest of
the developing world.
Preferences and Demands
Preferences, broadly conceived, are properties of actors that differentiate between

the desirability of outcomes (Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff 2011). Indirectly, these
preferences indicate broader descriptive (ontological) and normative (ethical)
beliefs (Legro 2005). The increased influence of our two sets of actors—rising
powers and NGOs—increases the salience of their preferences regarding the core
features of the current world order.
The studies that make up this volume primarily rely on empirical approaches
to analysing actors’ revealed preferences via demands. While not limited to public
statements, we propose that public statements and justifications are a useful
empirical entry point. Actors’ behaviour or their voting patterns in IOs are other
ways to approximate actor preferences and demands, which some of our contri-
butions focus on. But to become part of international political debates and
conflicts, preferences usually have to be communicated. We therefore focus on
contestation in public spheres, studying the statements, claims, and symbolic acts
of rising powers and NGOs.6 Both groups of actors under question necessarily
engage in the public processes of contestation and deliberation involved in the
politics of international institutions, and both are required to provide justifica-
tions for their preferred visions for global governance. Central to our understand-
ing of the public contestation of international institutions are therefore political
evaluations and criticisms.
Public discourse and political statements are important because they represent
the threshold at which a privately held preference enters into the domain of political
contestability. States and NGOs can privately aspire to profound changes in the
global order, but these aspirations only become a feature of international politics
and public debate if they become part of their strategic and communicative
behaviour, at which point they become demands in the terrain of political con-
testability. We are aware that our focus on public contestation is not able to
introduction 21
capture all aspects of and the full scale of conceivable strategies of resistance. For
instance, one strategy of resistance may be to support a norm rhetorically but
ignore it systematically when it comes to behaviour. Whereas public contestation
certainly is a kind of resistance, there are also other forms of resistance that do
not entail public contestation. It has been persuasively argued by James Scott that
to limit one’s attention to those openly declared instances of public resistance is to
obscure the world of passive, ‘everyday resistance’ and undeclared resentments
‘by which new political forces and demands germinate before they burst on the
scene’ (Scott 1990: 199). We take this as a healthy note of caution, but argue none-
theless that public demands can both provide insight into preferences, and be
meaningful in themselves as contributing to normative development. First, while
public demands are always to some extent strategic, there is little reason to think
that countries like the BRICS are particularly reticent about expressing their pref-
erences fairly openly. On the side of NGOs, communications are typically central
to their modes of influence in world politics, which therefore serves as a particu-
larly appropriate empirical entry point. Where doubts remain, statements are also
able to be cross-checked with other forms of behaviour. Second, demands via
public communicative acts are also important for the normative structuring of
world order (see below). Based on this reasoning, we separate between public
statements that consist of claims and those that serve as justification. In this way,
we hope to account for the double-edged role of language as an act and on a
reflexive level as a justification for acting.
Statements as Indications of Preferences
Statements can be considered from a purely rationalist perspective as a mechan-

ism by which states as well as non-state actors exchange information about their
preferences, making promises about their future actions, and issuing credible
promises or threats or ‘claims’.7 All of these activities are social acts. Of course,
interpreting such statements must take into account the strategic nature of the
international environment, so that statements cannot be read uncritically as
reflections of ‘true’ preferences. Taking actors’ statements at their face value risks
conflating strategic discourse for honest reflections of underlying interests or
preferences.8 Even from a purely ‘cheap talk’ model of public statements, however,
political demands are important sources of information regarding the preferences
that rising powers and NGOs hold regarding international institutions. There
may be instances of international interactions in which actors may have a strong
interest in revealing their true preferences. In the case of NGOs, the reputation
costs of disingenuousness could be fatally high. For powerful states, there are
clear incentives, especially in bargaining situations, to exaggerate or downplay
one’s demands as a bargaining tactic. But there are, equally, reasons for state
officials to stipulate their true preferences in order to elicit compromises from

the opponent. Moreover, public statements of states can be cross-checked through
other empirical strategies. The interests of corporate entities such as NGOs and
states can be publicly embedded in ‘symbols, speeches by officials, and even in
institutional rules and procedures’ (Legro 2005: 183). For all these reasons, and in
the absence of clear alternatives, we believe that public statements can act as clues
to actors’ preferences.
Statements as Justifications
A different interest in public acts of communicative contestation stems from

interest in the discursive politics of justification, i.e. of legitimation and delegit-
imation (compare to contributions in Geis, Nullmeier, and Daase 2012). This
approach emphasizes the role of legitimacy as a mechanism for political control
(Hurd 1999), but also as a mechanism by which existing institutions and relation-
ships can be challenged and contested through strategic delegitimation (Hurd
2008; Schweller and Pu 2011; Stephen 2015). This mechanism of contestation
has often been associated with the tactics of civil society organizations, such as
naming and shaming campaigns. As Martha Finnemore explains, ‘Even actors with
limited or no material capability can mount damaging attacks on the credibility,
reputation, and legitimacy of the powerful. The tools to mount such attacks are
not hard to come by in contemporary politics’ (Finnemore 2009: 66). But chal-
lenging the legitimacy of international institutions is also a mechanism by which
institutionally marginalized powers can contest their subordination, especially
when formalized routes to institutional change are difficult or blocked by incum-
bent powers, and the legitimacy discourses of states retain a prime position if
states remain ‘the privileged constituency of legitimation for intergovernmental
institutions’ (Bernstein 2011: 34).
Such approaches lend themselves methodologically to the study of the ‘legitim-
ation statement’ as the primary unit of analysis. Such an approach asks of public
political actors ‘Which criteria and arguments do they use to assess their regime
and to justify these evaluations?’ (Schneider, Nullmeier, and Hurrelmann 2007).
And in turn: it presses authority holders to justify themselves by making explicit
how they serve the common good. While this can be dismissed as ‘rhetorical action’,
many argue that such rhetorical action can have real effects or even slide uneasily
into genuine deliberation via the mechanisms of the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy’,
‘hypocrisy traps’, ‘rhetorical entrapment’, and ‘argumentative self-entrapment’
(Elster 1995; Finnemore 2009; Risse 2000; Schimmelfennig 2003; Weaver 2008).
Consequently, the statements become meaningful in a second, normative sense.
For these reasons, we propose that public statements can be a useful resource
with which to study the contested politics of authority beyond the nation state on
both levels: claims as acts and justification.
introduction 23
Table 1.1 Case selection*
Liberal content authority Low High

Low UNFCCC G7
UN General Assembly UN Human Rights Council
High NPT WTO
UN Security Council IMF
* The chapter by Coni-Zimmer and others on private regulation includes multiple cases.
Case Selection
Which actors and which policy fields contribute the most analytical value to
understanding the interaction of rising powers and NGOs with established
powers over the development of world order? By its very nature, case selection
runs the risk of introducing bias into our general conclusions (we come back
to this in the conclusion). Against this backdrop, case selection here is guided
by three major considerations: capturing institutional variation regarding both
international authority and the degree of liberal social purpose, capturing actor-
level variation regarding the population of our two major sets of actors (NGOs
and rising powers), and selecting from a variety of policy fields or issue areas.
Issue areas are spheres of social regulation that tackle issues which are perceived
to hang closely together and are often structured by a common institutional set-
ting such as ministries at the national level or international regimes at the inter-
national level (Keohane and Nye 2001; Potter 1980). In order to avoid a biased
selection of issue areas, we attempt to include issue areas from several major fields
of world order: economic governance (the WTO, IMF, and G7), international
security (the UN Security Council, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime),
human welfare and the environment (the UN Human Rights Council, the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change), and two studies of cross-cutting
issues (transnational private regulations, and voting in the UN General Assembly).
We therefore draw our case studies from all four of the cells in Table 1.1, which
positions international institutions regarding their authority, the extent of liberal
content, and issue area.
6. Guide to the Chapters
In taking the international institutional order as our main focus, each of the chap-
ters that follows examines the key points of tension, and the coalitions that have
formed around these tensions, in relation to a specific international institution.
In a first set of analyses, the governance of global economic issues is targeted
in Part I. In his contribution, Matthew D. Stephen shows how the WTO’s Doha
Round has been the subject of protracted and fundamental disagreements
between major rising powers such as Brazil and India, and the established trading
powers of the United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. But it is also true that
few international institutions have attracted as much societal contestation as the
WTO, as the vivid street protests in Seattle in 1999 testified. The high visibility of
the WTO and the potentially far-reaching domestic implications of its rules have
fuelled conflicts over how to delineate its authority and over the proper extent of
liberal market rules. Stephen argues that contestation of the WTO ultimately
exceeded the capacity of the organization to respond, which has resulted in a shift
to alternative venues by countries such as the United States, and a decline in NGO
participation. The case of the WTO highlights that liberal authority is deeply con-
tested by each group of actors, and has ultimately stalled as disagreements result
in deadlock. It also shows that the most active rising powers are Brazil and India,
long-standing activists in the regime and arguably the two most democratic states
within the BRICS group.
The case of the IMF is the focus of the chapter by Alexandros Tokhi. Like the
WTO, the IMF has also acquired a significant degree of political authority, and
wields this in the service of a largely liberal economic paradigm. While the legit-
imacy of IMF programmes and policy advice was long criticized by NGOs, rising
powers have generated new demands for increased representation in its voting
quota and its executive board. Bridging qualitative and quantitative methods,
Tokhi analyses statements within the International Monetary and Financial Affairs
Committee to show that the BRICS states form in this issue area a coherent group
that distinguishes them from other emerging or developing countries. In particu-
lar, the BRICS’ number one demand is for greater representation and influence
over IMF decision-making. For the rising powers, policy disagreements, such as over
the role of capital controls, appear to take a back seat over the question of simple
institutional power, while for NGOs the reverse appears to be true. As a result,
BRICS contestation lessened significantly after the reform was finally implemented.
In the final chapter of Part I, Dirk Peters analyses the development of the G7
summits. He shows that the G7 was contested by BRICS countries and non-state
for two reasons: the character of the G7 as a small, exclusive group that aims to
make a key contribution to global governance; and the substance of the policies
promoted by the G7, especially their liberal character. All critical actors could
easily agree on their rejection of the exclusionary character of the G7. This is,
however, where agreement ended. Rising powers and G7 members are much
closer in their vision for future macroeconomic governance than non-state actors,
and the upgrading of the G20 brought the divergence of positions between the
BRICS and CSOs clearly to light.
Part II contains analyses about global security governance. Anja Jetschke and
Pascal Abb shift focus to an IO in which the BRICS states hold radically different
positions. While all of the BRICS states and many NGOs have expressed support
for an expansion in the membership of the UN Security Council, China and Russia
introduction 25
have fundamentally different interests as a result of their favourable position in the

institutional context. As Jetschke and Abb show, the nuances of the different BRICS
states’ positions on both Council reform and the concept of the Responsibility to
Protect, combined with the institution’s own status quo bias, preclude the BRICS
states from posing a fundamental challenge to the status quo. Jetschke and Abb
also highlight the role of rising powers’ regional contexts in shaping their capacity
for upward mobility in the institutional order: so far, India, Brazil, and South
Africa have all been thwarted to some extent by regional rivals.
Harald Müller and Alexandros Tokhi focus on the patterns of contestation in
the Nuclear Non-proliferation regime. By combining qualitative content analysis
and regression analysis, they study country statements at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference. The NPT institutionalizes a particular power distribution in that it
grants the right to five states to retain their nuclear weapons while outlawing the
possession, development, and acquisition of atomic bombs for all other signatory
states. This power asymmetry translates into an institutional asymmetry in rights
and obligations between these two categories of state parties. It is this conflict line
that pervades a series of salient thematic topics at the NPT Review Conference
and creates particular groupings of state parties against each other in which
BRICS membership does play no discernible role.
In Part III, we turn to IOs for human welfare and the environment. Martin
Binder and Sophie Eisentraut systematically examine the demands of rising powers,
established powers, and NGOs about the policy content and the institutional
design of the UNHRC. They argue that the policy content of the UNHRC—the
question of whether to focus on more ‘liberal’ civil and political rights or on more
‘interventionist’ social, economic, and cultural rights—not only attracts little
attention in the debate, but is also largely uncontroversial among the actors
involved in the negotiation. Looking however at the overall levels of support for
and opposition to a strong UNHRC, a conflict line between ‘old’ powers and NGOs,
on the one side, and rising powers, on the other, can be observed. More precisely,
while established powers and NGOs demand a transfer of authority to the UNHRC,
rising powers oppose it (with the exception of Brazil). These actors could agree on
a new institutional set-up in the end, thus pointing to manageable differences.
The UNFCCC is analysed in the chapter by Miriam Prys-Hansen, Kristina Hahn,
Malte Lellmann, and Milan Röseler. Focusing on the issue of climate finance in the
negotiations over a post-Kyoto Protocol treaty on climate change as their object
of study, their story is one of significant change in the conflict lines over time.
While the ‘BASIC’ coalition of rising powers proved for a long time highly cohe-
sive, this has recently changed as China and the United States developed enough
common ground to simultaneously ratify the Paris Agreement in September
2016. Of course, this was only made possible by the move away from bindingness
in the agreements. At the same time, the so-called High Ambition Coalition has
come to include the EU, the United States, several LDCs, and even Brazil. While
this is true for the states under study, the same cannot be said for the NGO
coalitions that they study. Here, again, we see a strong divergence between the
demands of rising powers and those of the most influential transnational NGOs.
The final two chapters, in Part IV, transcend the issue area-orientation of the
others. Chapter 9 focuses on global governance arrangements with a significant
but varying degree of private actors as holders of authority. Melanie Coni-Zimmer,
Annegret Flohr, and Klaus Dieter Wolf compare with SA 8000, the Global Compact,
and the Kimberley Process three cases of public authority exercised by private
actors in world politics. First of all, the analysis shows significant support rather
than contestation for the status quo. When privatized governance schemes are
contested, they are most likely to be criticized by some CSOs. While it is not
surprising that business-related interest groups are usually quite satisfied with
privatized governance schemes, this is more surprising in the case of rising powers.
In all cases examined in this chapter, BRICS show a remarkable level of support
for privatized forms of governance. Contestation only comes in when regulatory
schemes at the level beyond the state interfere with the national discretion of ris-
ing powers. BRICS generally tend to accept and support such privatized forms of
regulation as long as they do not seriously interfere with their sovereignty.
Finally, Martin Binder and Autumn Lockwood Payton carry out an analysis
that cuts across issue areas by focusing on voting in the General Assembly. They
employ spatial modelling techniques to analyse rising power behaviour in the
GA. A major advantage of such an approach is that GA voting runs the gambit of
issues confronted in the international system and provides a forum where states
can speak relatively freely about their position on these issues. They find substan-
tial levels of voting cohesion among the BRICS and significant disagreement
between rising and established powers over many important issues in world
politics, at least when we analyse their voting behaviour in the GA. The major
outlier in the rising power group is Russia whose revealed preferences are closer,
by comparison, to the established powers.
In the conclusion to this book, Michael Zürn, Klaus Dieter Wolf, and Matthew D.
Stephen draw together the findings. Accordingly, international authority as such is
hardly contested by rising powers and even less so by the majority of transnational
NGOs. We see neither a generalized rejection of political authority located at the
level of international institutions, nor a systematic, cross-cutting preference of
rising powers and NGOs for having less international authority and less regula-
tion. While BRICS without doubt have a preference for national discretion with
international institutions that leave a large degree of political authority located at
the level of the state, they at the same time all ask for a version of liberalism which
is more embedded and less neo-liberal. Against this backdrop, an established and
ritualized confrontation that cuts across different issues does not exist between
BRICS and NGOs on the one side and established power on the other. To the
contrary, coalition-building varies from issue area to issue area, often driven by
introduction 27
the existing distribution of institutional privileges for established powers. The final
chapter concludes with some implications of these findings for future world order.
7. Notes
1. The term ‘world order’ refers to the structures and principles which produce regularities
in political processes and outcomes beyond the nation state. It is used as a generic term
which includes both the notion of a global order consisting of multiple actors and based
on common norms, as well as an international system consisting only of sovereign
states and based on anarchy. In this sense, our use of the term is different from the
much more normative meaning in the World Order Models put forward by Richard
Falk and Saul H. Mendlowitz (1973).
2. For overviews, see inter alia Gray and Murphy (2013), Hurrell (2006), Kahler (2013),
Kappel (2011), OECD (2010), Young (2010).
3. Compare Commission on Global Governance (1995) with, e.g., Brand (2005) and
Overbeek (2010).
4. For the liberal approach, see Florini (2000) and Keck and Sikkink (1998). For a more
critical take, see Amoore and Langley (2004), Cox (1999).
5. John Ikenberry’s understanding of liberal world order as one that is ‘open and loosely
rule-based’ is arguably so broad as to conflate liberalism with order as such, as long as
the order prescribes more than the mutual recognition of closed borders (Ikenberry
2011b: 18).
6. In this use of the term contestation, most forms of behaviour including voting can be
considered a form of communication.
7. For a discussion and critique, see Risse (2000: 8).
8. For a discussion, see Frieden (1999) and Zürn (1997). For a different approach to the
same underlying problem, see Scott (1990).
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häneen… En ole koskaan tullut ajatelleeksi, että sinä häntä siinä
määrin halveksit! Ansaitseeko hän tosiaankin sen?
— Jos käyn hänen luonaan, niin siihen minulla saattaa olla omat
syyni, siinä on kyllin sinulle. Mitä taas sukulaisuuteen tulee, niin
pikemmin hän on veljesi tai itse isäukkosi kautta sukua sinulle kuin
minulle. No, nyt olemme perillä. Mene mieluummin keittiöön. Ai! Mitä
täällä, mitä tämä on? Olemmeko myöhästyneet? Mutta eiväthän he
ole voineet syödä niin pian? Ovatko täällä taas Karamazovit jotakin
rötöstäneet? Varmaankin. Kas tuossahan on isäsikin ja Ivan
Fjodorovitš hänen jäljessään. He ovat syöksyneet ulos igumenin
luota. Kas tuolla isä Isidor huutaa portailta jotakin heidän jälkeensä.
Ja sinun isäsi huutaa myös ja huitoo käsillään, nähtävästi riitelee.
Ohoo, tuollahan on Miusov vaunuissaan menossa pois, näetkö, hän
ajaa! Ja tuossa juoksee tilanomistaja Maksimov — täällähän on
tapahtunut skandaali! ei päivällisiä ole ollut! Kunhan eivät vain olisi
pieksäneet igumenia? Tai ehkäpä he itse ovat saaneet selkäänsä?
Sepä olisi ollut paikallaan!
Rakitin ei huudahdellut suotta. Oli todellakin tapahtunut skandaali,

ennenkuulumaton ja odottamaton. Kaikki oli tapahtunut
»innostuksessa».
8.
Skandaali
Kun Miusov ja Ivan Fjodorovitš jo olivat astumassa sisälle

igumenin luo, niin Pjotr Aleksandrovitšissa, kuten todella
kunnolliselta ja huomaavaiselta mieheltä sopi odottaakin, tapahtui
tavallaan herkkä prosessi: häntä alkoi hävettää vihastumisensa. Hän
tunsi mielessään, että ala-arvoista Fjodor Pavlovitšia hänen
oikeastaan olisi pitänyt pitää niin vähäarvoisena, että hänen tähtensä
ei olisi kannattanut menettää mielentyyneyttään luostarinvanhimman
kammiossa ja siinä määrin kiivastua, kuin hänelle oli tapahtunut.
»Ainakaan munkit eivät tässä ole syypäitä mihinkään», päätti hän
äkkiä igumenin portailla, »ja jos täälläkin on kunnon väkeä (tuo isä
Nikolai, igumeni, lienee myös aatelissukua), niin miksi en olisi heitä
kohtaan ystävällinen, rakastettava ja kohtelias?… En rupea
kiistelemään, vieläpä olen samaa mieltäkin kuin he, kiehdon heidät
rakastettavuudella ja… lopuksi osoitan heille, että minun seuraani ei
ole tuo pilkkakirves, tuo narri, tuo Pierrot, ja että minä olen joutunut
välikäteen aivan samoin kuin hekin kaikki…»
Riidanalaiset hakkuupaikat metsässä ja tuon kalanpyyntipaikan

(missä ne kaikki olivat, sitä hän ei itsekään tietänyt) hän päätti
luovuttaa heille lopullisesti, kerta kaikkiaan, jo tänään, sitäkin
suuremmalla syyllä, kun kaikki tämä maksoi sangen vähän, sekä
antaa kaikkien haasteittensa luostaria vastaan raueta.
Kaikki nämä hyvät aikomukset vielä vahvistuivat, kun he astuivat

igumenin ruokasaliin. Ruokasalia tällä muuten ei ollut, sillä
oikeastaan igumenilla oli koko rakennuksessa vain kaksi huonetta,
jotka tosin olivat paljon isommat ja mukavammat kuin
luostarinvanhimman. Mutta huoneitten kalusto ei ollut erikoisen
mukava: huonekalut olivat nahalla päällystetyt, mahonkiset,
kaksikymmentäluvun vanhaa tyyliä, ja lattiatkin olivat
maalaamattomat. Sen sijaan kaikki hohti puhtautta, ja ikkunoilla oli
paljon kalliita kukkasia. Mutta komeinta oli tällä hetkellä tietenkin
ylellisesti katettu pöytä, vaikka luonnollisesti tämäkin on käsitettävä
suhteellisesti: pöytäliina oli puhdas, astiat kiilsivät. Oivallisesti
paistettua leipää oli kolmea lajia, kaksi pulloa viiniä, kaksi pulloa
luostarin mainiota mettä ja iso lasikannu täynnä luostarin kaljaa, joka
oli kuuluisaa koko paikkakunnalla. Viinaa ei ollut ollenkaan. Rakitin
kertoi myöhemmin, että päivälliseksi oli tällä kertaa laitettu viisi
ruokalajia: sterlettilientä kalapiirakoiden kanssa, sitten pehmeäksi
keitettyä kalaa, joka oli valmistettu jollakin erikoisella ja erinomaisella
tavalla, sitten sampikotlettia, jäätelöä ja hilloketta ja lopuksi
kermahyytelön tapaista kiisseliä. Kaiken tämän Rakitin sai selville,
hän kun ei malttanut olla kurkistamatta igumenin keittiöön, jossa
hänellä myös oli suhteita. Hänellä oli kaikkialla suhteita, ja kaikki tuli
hänen korviinsa. Hänellä oli sangen levoton ja kateellinen sydän.
Huomattavista lahjoistaan hän oli täysin tietoinen, mutta omassa
mielessään hän niitä hermostuneesti yliarvioi. Hän tiesi varmasti,
että hänestä tulee omalla tavallaan huomattava henkilö, mutta
Aljošaa, joka oli häneen hyvin kiintynyt, kiusasi se, että ystävä
Rakitin oli epärehellinen eikä ollenkaan huomannut sitä itse, vaan
päinvastoin piti itseään mitä rehellisimpänä miehenä, koska tiesi
itsestään, että hän ei varastaisi pöydälle jätettyjä rahoja.
Tämmöiselle miehelle ei Aljoša eikä kukaan muukaan voinut mitään.
Rakitinia, joka oli vähäpätöinen henkilö, ei ollut voitu kutsua

päivälliselle, mutta sen sijaan oli kutsuttu isä Josef ja isä Paísi sekä
heidän mukanaan vielä eräs pappismunkki. He odottivat jo igumenin
ruokailuhuoneessa, kun huoneeseen astuivat Pjotr Aleksandrovitš,
Kalganov ja Ivan Fjodorovitš. Syrjemmällä oli odottamassa myös
tilanomistaja Maksimov. Isä igumeni astui vastaanottamaan vieraita
keskelle huonetta. Hän oli pitkä, laiha, mutta vielä vahva vanhus,
jonka mustissa hiuksissa oli paljon harmaata ja jolla oli pitkät,
tekopyhät ja arvokkaat kasvot. Hän kumarsi vieraille ääneti, mutta
nämä lähestyivät tällä kertaa ottamaan vastaan siunausta. Miusov
uskalsi yrittää suudella hänen kättänsäkin, mutta igumeni veti
jotenkin kätensä oikeaan aikaan pois, niin että suutelemisesta ei
tullut mitään. Sen sijaan Ivan Fjodorovitš ja Kalganov tällä kertaa
saivat täydellisen siunauksen, t.s. he suudella mäiskäyttivät aivan
vilpittömästi ja rahvaan tapaan kättä.
— Meidän täytyy suuresti pyytää anteeksi, teidän korkea-

arvoisuutenne, — aloitti Pjotr Aleksandrovitš kohteliaasti hymyillen,
mutta kuitenkin arvokkaasti ja kunnioittavasti, — pyytää anteeksi,
että saavumme yksin, ilman teidän kutsumaanne seuralaistamme
Fjodor Pavlovitšia. Hänen oli pakko kieltäytyä tulemasta pöytäänne
eikä syyttä. Arvoisan isä Zosiman kammiossa hän kiihtyi
onnettomasta perheriidastaan poikansa kanssa ja lausui muutamia
sanoja, jotka eivät ensinkään olleet paikallaan… sanalla sanoen
aivan sopimattomia… josta, niinkuin näyttää (hän katsahti
pappismunkkeihin), teidän korkea-arvoisuudellanne jo on tieto. Sen
vuoksi hän tunnustaen syyllisyytensä ja vilpittömästi katuen tunsi
häpeätä, jota ei voinut voittaa, minkä vuoksi hän pyysi meitä, minua
ja poikaansa Ivan Fjodorovitšia, esiintuomaan teille vilpittömän
valittelunsa, pahan mielensä ja katumuksensa… Sanalla sanoen hän
toivoo voivansa ja tahtoo hyvittää kaiken myöhemmin, mutta nyt hän
pyytäen siunaustanne toivoo teidän unohtavan sen, mikä on
tapahtunut…
Miusov vaikeni. Päästyään sanatulvansa loppuun hän oli itseensä

niin tyytyväinen, että äskeisestä ärtyneisyydestä ei ollut jäänyt
jälkeäkään hänen sieluunsa. Hän rakasti taas ihmiskuntaa
täydelleen ja vilpittömästi. Igumeni, joka oli kuunnellut häntä
arvokkaasti, taivutti hiukan päätään ja lausui vastaukseksi:
— Valitan sydämestäni poisjäämistä. Kenties poistunut
pöydässämme olisi mieltynyt meihin, samoin kuin me häneen. Terve
tuloa, hyvät herrat, aterialle!
Hän asettui jumalankuvan eteen ja alkoi ääneensä rukoilla. Kaikki

kumartuivat kunnioittavasti, ja tilanomistaja Maksimov asettui
sitäpaitsi erikoisesti eteen ja pani hartaasti kätensä ristiin.
Juuri silloinpa Fjodor Pavlovitš löikin viimeisen valttinsa.

Huomattavaa on, että hän todellakin aikoi lähteä pois ja todellakin
tunsi, että hänen oli viimeisen häpeällisen esiintymisensä jälkeen
luostarinvanhimman kammiossa mahdotonta mennä igumenin luo
päivälliselle aivan kuin ei mitään olisi tapahtunut. Eipä silti, että hän
niin kovin olisi hävennyt ja syyttänyt itseään. Kenties asian laita oli
aivan päinvastoin. Joka tapauksessa hän tunsi kuitenkin, että ei ollut
sopivaa mennä päivälliselle. Mutta heti kun majatalon oven eteen
tuotiin hänen rämisevät rattaansa ja hän jo alkoi nousta niihin, hän
äkkiä pysähtyi. Hänelle muistuivat mieleen hänen omat sanansa
luostarinvanhimman luona: »Niinpä minusta juuri aina tuntuukin, kun
menen ihmisten pariin, että minä olen huonompi kaikkia ja että kaikki
pitävät minua narrina, — ja niinpä: annahan kun tosiaankin
heittäydyn narriksi, sillä te olette jok'ikinen tyhmempiä ja katalampia
kuin minä.» Hänessä virisi halu kostaa kaikille oman
ruokottomuutensa tähden. Hän muisti nyt yht'äkkiä, kuinka häneltä
kerran jo entisinä aikoina oli kysytty: »Miksi te niin vihaatte sitä ja sitä
henkilöä?» Hän oli silloin vastannut narrimaisen
hävyttömyydenpuuskan vallassa: »Seuraavasta syystä: hän ei tosin
ole tehnyt minulle mitään, mutta sen sijaan minä olen tehnyt häntä
kohtaan erään tunnottoman ja ilkeän teon ja heti sen tehtyäni aloin
vihata häntä.» Muistettuaan nyt tämän hän naurahti hiljaa ja ilkeästi
ja mietti hetkisen. Hänen silmänsä välähtivät ja huuletkin alkoivat
vavista. »Kun kerran aloin, niin lopetankin», päätti hän yhtäkkiä.
Hänen salaisimman tunteensa tällä hetkellä olisi voinut ilmaista
seuraavin sanoin: »Enhän nyt enää voi korjata asioitani entiselleen,
annapa kun vielä syljen heidän päälleen häpeämättömästi: näytän,
että en häpeä heitä, siinä kaikki!» Hän käski ajomiehen odottaa ja
palasi itse nopein askelin luostariin suunnaten kulkunsa suoraan
igumenin luo. Vielä hän ei itsekään tietänyt, mitä aikoi tehdä, mutta
hän tiesi, että ei enää voinut hillitä itseään, ja pienikin sysäys sai
hänet samassa menemään iljettävyyden äärimmäisille rajoille, —
muuten vain iljettävyyden eikä ollenkaan rikoksen tai sellaisen
kepposen, josta tuomioistuin voi rangaista. Viimeksimainitun
laatuisessa tapauksessa hän osasi aina hillitä itsensä ja ihmetteli
toisinaan itsekin tätä. Hän ilmestyi igumenin ruokasaliin juuri sillä
hetkellä, kun rukous päättyi ja kaikki siirtyivät pöytää kohti.
Pysähtyen kynnykselle hän silmäili seuraa ja alkoi nauraa pitkää,
julkeata, ilkeätä naurua katsellen kaikkia rohkeasti silmiin.
— Hepä luulivat minun lähteneen pois, mutta tässäpä mies on! —

huudahti hän kuuluvasti.
Hetken ajan olivat kaikkien katseet kiintyneet häneen ja kaikki

olivat vaiti, mutta äkkiä kaikki tunsivat, että kohta tapahtuu jotakin
inhoittavaa, järjetöntä, ehdoton skandaali. Pjotr Aleksandrovitšin mitä
hellin mieliala muuttui äkkiä mitä rajuimmaksi. Kaikki, mikä hänen
sydämessään oli sammunut ja tyyntynyt, heräsi yht'äkkiä eloon ja
nousi pinnalle.
— Ei, minä en voi kestää tätä! — huudahti hän. — En ollenkaan

voi… enkä… mitenkään voi!
Veri tulvahti hänen päähänsä. Hänen puheensakin sekaantui,

mutta nyt ei ollut aika puhua, ja hän tempasi hattunsa.
— Mitä hän oikein ei voi? — huudahti Fjodor Pavlovitš. — »Ei
mitenkään voi eikä ensinkään voi?» Teidän korkea-arvoisuutenne,
saanko astua sisälle vai enkö? Otatteko vastaan pöytätoverin?
— Terve tuloa kaikesta sydämestä, — vastasi igumeni. — Hyvät

herrat! Uskallanko pyytää, — lisäsi hän äkkiä, — teitä sydämestäni
jättämään tilapäiset riitanne ja yhtymään rakkaudessa ja
sukulaissovussa Jumalaa rukoillen rauhallisessa ruokapöydässäni…
— Ei, ei, se on mahdotonta! — huudahti Pjotr Aleksandrovitš ollen

aivan kuin suunniltaan.
— Jos kerran Pjotr Aleksandrovitšille on mahdotonta, niin

minullekin on mahdotonta enkä minäkään jää. Sillä ehdolla tulinkin.
Olen tästä lähin kaikkialla Pjotr Aleksandrovitšin kanssa: jos te, Pjotr
Aleksandrovitš, menette pois, niin minäkin menen, jos te jäätte —
niin minäkin jään. Sukulaissovulla te, isä igumeni, häntä pahimmin
pistittekin: hän ei tunnusta itseään sukulaisekseni. Eikö niin, von
Sohn? Tässä seisookin von Sohn. Terve, von Sohn!
— Mi… minuako te? — mutisi hämmästyneenä tilanomistaja

Maksimov.
— Tietysti sinua, — huudahti Fjodor Pavlovitš. — Ketä muuta

sitten? Ei suinkaan isä igumeni ole von Sohn.
— Enhän minäkään ole von Sohn, minä olen Maksimov.
— Ei, sinä olet von Sohn. Teidän korkea-arvoisuutenne, tiedättekö,

mikä on von Sohn? Oli semmoinen rikosjuttu: hänet tapettiin
porttolassa, — niin kaiketi noita paikkoja teillä nimitetään, — tapettiin
ja ryöstettiin ja kunnioitettavasta iästään huolimatta tungettiin
laatikkoon ja lähetettiin pakaasivaunussa Pietarista Moskovaan,
numerolappu päällä. Ja samaan aikaan kuin laatikkoa nakuteltiin
kiinni, haureliaat tanssijattaret lauloivat lauluja ja soittivat kanteleita,
toisin sanoen pimputtelivat fortepianoa. Tämä tässä on juuri sama
von Sohn. Hän on noussut kuolleista, eikö niin, von Sohn?
— Mitä tämä oikein on? Kuinka tämä on ymmärrettävä? — kuului

ääniä pappismunkkien ryhmästä.
— Menkäämme! — huudahti Pjotr Aleksandrovitš kääntyen

Kalganovin puoleen.
— Ei, sallikaahan! — keskeytti Fjodor Pavlovitš vinkuvalla äänellä

astuen vielä askelen huoneeseen. — Sallikaa minunkin lopettaa.
Siellä kammiossa minulle toitotettiin, että muka käyttäydyin
epäkunnioittavasti nimenomaan siinä suhteessa, että mainitsin
rantatöröistä. Pjotr Aleksandrovitš Miusov, sukulaiseni, pitää siitä,
että puheessa on plus de noblesse que de sincérité, mutta minä
päinvastoin pidän siitä, että puheessani olisi plus de sincérité que de
noblesse, ja hiiteen koko noblesse! Eikö niin, von Sohn! Sallikaa, isä
igumeni, vaikka minä olenkin narri ja esittäydyn narrina, niin olen
kunnian ritari ja tahdon sen lausua julki. Niin, minä olen kunnian
ritari, mutta Pjotr Aleksandrovitšissa on loukattu itserakkaus eikä
mitään muuta. Ehkäpä minä äsken tulinkin tänne katsomaan ja
puhumaan suuni puhtaaksi. Täällä on poikani Aleksei pelastusta
etsimässä. Minä olen isä, minä huolehdin ja velvollisuuteni on
huolehtia hänen kohtalostaan. Minä kuuntelin ja teeskentelin kaiken
aikaa ja katselin kaikessa hiljaisuudessa, mutta nyt tahdon esittää
teille näytelmän viimeisenkin näytöksen. Millaista onkaan meillä? Jos
meillä mikä lankeaa, niin se jääkin makaamaan. Mikä meillä on
kaatunut, se saakin ikänsä maata. Eipä niinkään! Minä tahdon
nousta. Pyhät isät, te olette saattaneet minut raivoon. Rippi on suuri
sakramentti, jota kohtaan tunnen suurta kunnioitusta ja jonka edessä
olen valmis lankeamaan maahan, mutta täällä kammiossa ovat
yht'äkkiä kaikki polvillaan ja ripittäytyvät kaikkien kuullen. Onko lupa
ripittäytyä toisten kuullen? Pyhät isät ovat määränneet korvaripin,
vain silloin rippinne on sakramentti, ja näin on ollut ammoisista
ajoista. Kuinka minä voin hänelle selittää kaikkien kuullen, että minä,
esimerkiksi, olen sitä ja sitä… no, se on sitä ja sitä, ymmärrättekö?
Toisinaan on säädytöntä sanoakin. Tämähän on skandaali! Ei, isät,
teidän kanssanne täällä kenties joutuu ruoskijain uskonlahkoon…
Minä kirjoitan ensi tilassa synodiin ja otan poikani Aleksein kotiin…
Tässä pieni huomautus. Fjodor Pavlovitš tunsi kielikellojen jutut.

Aikoineen kierteli ilkeämielisiä juoruja, jotka saapuivat piispankin
korviin (ei vain meidän luostaristamme, vaan muistakin luostareista,
joissa oli luostarinvanhin), että luostarinvanhimpia muka liiaksi
kunnioitetaan, niin että igumenin arvokin siitä kärsii, ja että muun
muassa luostarinvanhimmat väärinkäyttävät ripin sakramenttia y.m.,
y.m. Järjettömiä syytöksiä, jotka aikoinaan raukesivat itsestään niin
meillä kuin kaikkialla muuallakin. Mutta typerä piru, joka oli saanut
kynsiinsä Fjodor Pavlovitšin ja kiidätti häntä hänen omilla
hermoillaan jonnekin yhä kauemmaksi ja kauemmaksi häpeälliseen
syvyyteen, kuiskasi hänen korvaansa tämän vanhan syytöksen, josta
Fjodor Pavlovitš itse ei ymmärtänyt luotuista sanaakaan. Eikä hän
edes osannut lausua sitä oikeassa muodossa, varsinkin kun tällä
kertaa ei kukaan vanhuksen kammiossa ollut langennut polvilleen
eikä ripittäytynyt kaikkien kuullen, niin että Fjodor Pavlovitš ei ollut
voinut itse nähdä mitään semmoista, vaan puhui ainoastaan
vanhojen huhujen ja juorujen mukaan, joita sattui jossakin määrin
muistamaan. Lausuttuaan tyhmyytensä hän tunsi lasketelleensa
järjetöntä hölynpölyä, ja silloin hänen mielensä heti teki osoittaa
kuulijoille ja ennen kaikkea itselleen, että hän ei ollut puhunut
ensinkään pötyä. Ja vaikka hän varsin hyvin tiesi, että jokainen uusi
sana lisäisi jo lausuttuun pötyyn yhä uutta ja järjettömämpää, niin
hän ei enää voinut hillitä itseään, vaan syöksyi siihen päistikkaa.
— Millaista halpamaisuutta! — huudahti Pjotr Aleksandrovitš.
— Anteeksi, — sanoi äkkiä igumeni. — On sanottu vanhastaan:

»Ja hän alkoi minua vastaan puhua paljon ja monenlaista ja
saastaisiakin asioita. Mutta minä kuultuani kaiken sanoin itselleni: se
on Jeesuksen lääkitsemistointa ja hän on lähettänyt sen
parantamaan ylpeilevää sieluani.» Ja siksi mekin nyt kiitämme teitä
nöyrästi, kallis vieras!
Ja hän kumarsi syvään Fjodor Pavlovitšille.
— Tö-tö-tö! Teeskentelyä ja vanhoja fraaseja! Vanhoja fraaseja ja

vanhoja eleitä! Vanhoja valheita ja muodollisia kumarruksia maahan
asti! Me tunnemme nämä kumarrukset! »Suudelma suulle ja tikari
sydämeen», kuten Schillerin Rosvoissa. Minä en pidä petkutuksesta,
isät, minä tahdon totuutta! Mutta totuus ei ole rantatöröissä, ja sen
minä olen lausunut julki! Isät ja munkit, miksi te paastoatte? Miksi te
odotatte siitä itsellenne palkintoa taivaissa? Semmoisesta palkasta
minäkin rupean paastoamaan! Ei, pyhä munkki, olepa hyveellinen
elämässä, tuota hyötyä yhteiskunnalle sulkeutumatta luostariin
valmiin leivän ääreen ja odottamatta palkintoa siellä, ylhäällä, — kas
sepä onkin vaikeampaa. Osaanhan, isä igumeni, minäkin kauniisti
puhua. Mitä heillä täällä on varattuna? — hän astui pöydän luo. —
Vanhaa Old factory -portviiniä, Médoc-viiniä, Jelisejevin veljesten
pulloihin panemaa, onpa ne isiä! Eipä tämä näytä rantatöröiltä. Kas
vain, kun isät ovat panneet puteleita pöytään, hehehe! Kuka onkaan
tämän kaiken tänne hankkinut? Sen on tehnyt venäläinen talonpoika,
raataja, hän tuo tänne känsäisillä käsillään ansaitun roponsa, riistää
sen perheeltään ja valtion tarpeilta! Tehän, pyhät isät, imette kansaa!
— Tuo on aivan arvotonta teidän puoleltanne, — lausui isä Josef.

Isä Paísi oli itsepintaisesti vaiti. Miusov syöksyi juoksujalkaa ulos
huoneesta, ja Kalganov seurasi häntä.
— No, isät, minäkin riennän Pjotr Aleksandrovitšin jälkeen! Enää

en tule teille, pyytäkää vaikka polvillanne, niin en tule. Tuhat ruplaa
lähetin teille, siksipä te taaskin odotatte vesissä suin, hehehe! Ei,
ette saa minulta lisää. Kostan menneestä nuoruudestani, kaikesta
nöyryytyksestäni! — hän iski nyrkkiä pöytään valmistamansa
tunteenpuuskan vallassa. — Paljon on merkinnyt tämä
luostaripahanen elämässäni! Paljon katkeria kyyneliä olen sen takia
vuodattanut! Te yllytitte vaimoni, riivatun, minua vastaan. Te olette
senkin seitsemässä kokouksessa minut kironneet, levittäneet
mainettani ylt'ympäri! Riittää jo, isät, nyt on liberaalinen aika,
höyrylaivojen ja rautateitten aikakausi. Ette saa minulta tuhatta
ettekä sataa ruplaa, ette sataa kopeekkaa, ette mitään!
Taas huomautus. Meidän luostarimme ei ollut koskaan mitään

tuommoista merkinnyt hänen elämässään eikä hän ollut sen takia
vuodattanut mitään katkeria kyyneliä. Mutta hän innostui siinä
määrin teeskennellyistä kyynelistään, että hän itsekin eräänä
hetkenä oli vähällä uskoa itseään, vieläpä ruveta itkemään
liikutuksesta. Mutta samalla hetkellä hän tunsi, että oli aika pyörtää
takaisin. Kuultuaan hänen ilkeän valheensa igumeni painoi päätään
alaspäin ja lausui taas vakavasti:
— Jälleen on sanottu: »Kärsi sinuun kohdistettu ansaitsematon

häväistys ilomielin, älä suutu äläkä rupea vihaamaan häpäisijääsi.»
Näin me menettelemme.
— Tö-tö-tö, pupatusta ja papatusta ja muuta puuta heinää!
Papattakaa, isät, mutta minä lähden. Ja poikani Aleksein otan täältä
isän oikeudella ainiaaksi. Ivan Fjodorovitš, kelpo poikani, sallikaa
minun käskeä teitä seuraamaan itseäni! Von Sohn, mitä sinä tänne
jäisit! Tule heti luokseni kaupunkiin. Minun luonani on hauskaa.
Matkaa on vain virstan verran, paastoöljyn asemesta tarjoan
porsasta puuron kera. Syömme päivällistä, panen pöytään konjakkia,
sitten likööriä, mesimarjalikööriä… Hei, von Sohn, älä päästä onnea
käsistäsi!
Hän lähti ulos huutaen ja huitoen. Juuri sillä hetkellä Rakitin hänet
näki tulemassa ulos ja näytti Aljošalle.
— Aleksei! — huudahti isä hänelle jo kaukaa hänet nähtyään. —

Muuta jo tänään luokseni kokonaan ja tuo mukanasi tyyny ja patja,
älköönkä täällä enää olko hajuakaan sinusta.
Aljoša pysähtyi kuin jähmettyneenä ja katseli ääneti ja

tarkkaavaisesti kohtausta. Sillävälin oli Fjodor Pavlovitš noussut
rattaille ja hänen jäljessään alkoi äänettömänä ja jurona niihin nousta
Ivan Fjodorovitš käännähtämättä Aljošaan edes hyvästelläkseen.
Mutta nyt tapahtui vielä eräs kohtaus, joka oli miltei uskomaton ja
ilveilyn kaltainen ja täydensi episodin. Äkkiä ilmestyi rattaitten
astuimen luo tilanomistaja Maksimov. Hän juoksi hengästyneenä
ennättääkseen mukaan. Rakitin ja Aljoša näkivät, miten hän juoksi.
Hänellä oli niin kiire, että hän malttamattomuudessaan pisti jalkansa
astuimelle, jolla vielä oli Ivan Fjodorovitšin vasen jalka, ja tarttuen
kärrykoriin hän alkoi kiivetä rattaille.
— Minäkin, minäkin tulen kanssanne! — huusi hän hypäten

rattaille ja nauraen hiljaista, iloista naurua autuaan näköisenä ja
valmiina kaikkeen. — Ottakaa minutkin mukaan!
— No, enkö sanonut, — huudahti Fjodor Pavlovitš
voitonriemuisesti, — että tämä on von Sohn! Sehän on todellinen
kuolleista noussut von Sohn! Miten kykenitkään sieltä irtaantumaan?
Mitä Sohnin sotkua sinä siellä olet saanut aikaan ja miten sinä
saatoit lähteä pois päivälliseltä? Onpa siinä paksunahkainen mies!
Minä olen purrut hävyltä hännän poikki, mutta en toki ole sinun
veroisesi! Hyppää, hyppää pian! Päästä hänet, Vanja, tulee hauskaa.
Hän voi jotenkuten loikoa tässä jalkojen päällä. Lojutko, von Sohn?
Vai pistäisikö hänet pukille ajomiehen kanssa?… Hyppää pukille,
von Sohn!
Mutta Ivan Fjodorovitš, joka jo oli istuutunut paikalleen, töytäisi

äkkiä mitään sanomatta ja kaikin voimin Maksimovia rintaan, niin
että hän lensi sylen päähän. Sattumalta vain hän ei kaatunut.
— Antaa mennä! — huudahti Ivan Fjodorovitš vihaisesti

ajomiehelle.
— No, mitäs sinä? Mitä sinä? Miksi sinä häntä noin? — alkoi
Fjodor
Pavlovitš torua, mutta rattaat olivat jo lähteneet liikkeelle. Ivan
Fjodorovitš ei vastannut.
— Senkin mokoma! — lausui Fjodor Pavlovitš oltuaan vaiti pari

minuuttia ja katsoi karsaasti poikaansa. — Sinun keksintöäsihän oli
koko tämä luostari, sinä itse yllytit, itse hyväksyit, miksi sitten nyt olet
vihainen?
— Riittää jo roskan puhuminen, levätkää edes nyt pikkuisen, —

tokaisi
Ivan Fjodorovitš töykeästi.
Fjodor Pavlovitš oli taas vaiti pari minuuttia.
— Nyt olisi konjakki paikallaan, — huomautti hän mietteissään.

Mutta
Ivan Fjodorovitš ei vastannut.
— Kunhan tullaan perille, niin sinäkin juot.
Ivan Fjodorovitš oli yhä vaiti.
Fjodor Pavlovitš odotti vielä pari minuuttia.
— Mutta Aljoškan minä kuitenkin otan pois luostarista siitä

huolimatta, että se on teistä sangen epämieluisaa, kunnioitettava
Karl von Moor.
Ivan Fjodorovitš kohautti halveksivasti olkapäitään, kääntyi

poispäin ja alkoi katsella tielle. Sen jälkeen he eivät koko
kotimatkalla enää puhuneet mitään.
Kolmas kirja
Hekumoitsijat
1.
Palvelijainhuoneessa
Fjodor Pavlovitš Karamazovin talo ei suinkaan ollut aivan
kaupungin keskustassa, mutta ei ihan laidassakaan. Se oli
vanhanpuoleinen, mutta ulkoapäin miellyttävän näköinen: se oli
yksikerroksinen, siinä oli ullakkokerros, väriltään se oli harmaa, ja
rautakatto oli punainen. Se saattoi muutoin tehdä tehtävänsä vielä
pitkät ajat, oli tilava ja kodikas. Siinä oli paljon monenlaisia
komeroita, erilaisia piilopaikkoja ja portaita siellä, missä niitä ei olisi
odottanut. Talossa oli rottia, mutta Fjodor Pavlovitš ei ollut niille ihan
koko sydämestään vihainen: »Onhan kuitenkin vähän rattoisampaa,
kun on yksin kotona.» Hänellä oli tosiaankin tapana lähettää
palvelijat yöksi sivurakennukseen ja sulkeutua taloon yksin koko
yöksi. Tämä sivurakennus oli pihan puolella ja oli avara sekä
lujatekoinen. Sinne oli Fjodor Pavlovitš määrännyt sijoitettavaksi
myöskin keittiön, vaikka talossakin oli keittiö. Hän ei pitänyt keittiön
hajusta, ja ruoat tuotiin pihan poikki sekä talvella että kesällä.
Yleensä talo oli rakennettu isolle perheelle, ja sekä herrasväkeä että
palvelijoita olisi siihen mahtunut viisi kertaa enemmän. Mutta
kertomuksemme aikana asuivat talossa vain Fjodor Pavlovitš ja Ivan
Fjodorovitš, kun taas sivurakennuksessa oli ainoastaan kolme
henkeä palvelusväkeä: vanhus Grigori, vanha eukko Marfa, hänen
vaimonsa, ja palvelija Smerdjakov, joka vielä oli nuori mies. Täytyy
mainita hieman tarkemmin näistä kolmesta palvelijasta. Ukko Grigori
Vasiljevitš Kutuzovista muuten olemmekin jo puhuneet tarpeeksi.
Hän oli luja ja taipumaton mies, joka itsepintaisesti ja suoraa tietä
kulki määräämäänsä pistettä kohti, jos vain tuo piste joistakin syistä
(usein ihmeellisen epäjohdonmukaisesti) oli hänen edessään
eittämättömänä totuutena. Yleensä hän oli rehellinen ja lahjomaton.
Hänen vaimonsa Marfa Ignatjevna, joka oli koko elämänsä ajan
vastaansanomatta taipunut miehensä tahtoon, ahdisteli siitä
huolimatta kovasti miestään, esimerkiksi kohta talonpoikain
vapautuksen jälkeen, kehoittamalla tätä lähtemään pois Fjodor
Pavlovitšin talosta Moskovaan ja aloittamaan siellä jotakin pientä
kaupustelua (heillä oli jonkin verran rahoja). Mutta Grigori päätti
silloin kerta kaikkiaan, että akka jaarittelee joutavia, »sillä kaikki akat
ovat epärehellisiä», ja että heidän ei pidä lähteä entisen isännän
luota, olipa tämä millainen tahansa, sillä »tämä oli nyt heidän
tällöinen velvollisuutensa».
— Ymmärrätkö sinä, mitä velvollisuus on? — kääntyi hän Marfa

Ignatjevnan puoleen.
— Velvollisuuden minä ymmärrän, Grigori Vasiljevitš, mutta mikä

velvollisuus meidän on jäädä tänne, sitä minä en ensinkään
ymmärrä, — vastasi Marfa Ignatjevna lujasti.
— Ole sitten ymmärtämättä, mutta niin tehdään. Vastedes pidä

suusi kiinni.
Niin kävikin: he eivät lähteneet pois, ja Fjodor Pavlovitš määräsi

heille pienen palkan, jonka hän maksoi säännöllisesti. Grigori tiesi
sitäpaitsi, että hänellä oli kiistämätön vaikutusvalta isäntäänsä. Hän
tunsi sen, ja asia oli niin: viekas ja itsepäinen narri Fjodor Pavlovitš,
joka oli sangen lujaluonteinen »muutamissa elämän asioissa», kuten
hänellä itsellään oli tapana sanoa, oli omaksi hämmästyksekseen
luonteeltaan suorastaan sangen heikko eräissä toisissa »elämän
asioissa». Ja hän tiesi itse, millaisia asioita ne olivat, ja pelkäsi
monia seikkoja. Muutamissa elämän asioissa täytyi olla varovainen,
ja tällöin oli vaikeata tulla toimeen ilman uskollista ihmistä, mutta
Grigori oli mitä uskollisin mies. Kävi niinkin, että Fjodor Pavlovitš
monta kertaa elämänsä aikana olisi voinut saada selkäänsä ja tulla
pahoinkin piestyksi, mutta joka kerta tuli hänelle avuksi Grigori,
vaikka joka kerta sitten nuhteli häntä jäljestäpäin. Mutta pelkkä
selkäsauna ei olisi peloittanut Fjodor Pavlovitšia: oli tärkeämpiä
tilanteita, vieläpä sangen arkaluontoisia ja monimutkaisia, jolloin
Fjodor Pavlovitš kenties ei itsekään olisi kyennyt määrittelemään sitä
erikoislaatuista uskollisen ja läheisen henkilön tarvetta, jota hän
äkkiä toisinaan käsittämättömällä tavalla silmänräpäyksessä alkoi
itsessään tuntea. Ne olivat melkein sairauden kaltaisia tapauksia:
irstas Fjodor Pavlovitš, joka hekumallisuudessaan usein oli julma
kuin ilkeä hyönteinen, tunsi toisinaan juovuspäissään sielullista
kauhua ja siveellistä järkytystä, joka niin sanoakseni tuntui myöskin
fyysillisesti hänen sielussaan. »Sieluni ikäänkuin vapisee kurkussani
noina kertoina», puhui hän toisinaan. Juuri näinä hetkinä hänestä oli
mieluisaa, että hänen vierellään, läheisyydessään tai vaikkapa
toisessa huoneessa, sivurakennuksessa, oli tuommoinen ihminen,
uskollinen, luja, aivan toisenlainen kuin hän, ei irstailija, joka kyllä
näki kaiken irstailun ja tiesi kaikki salaisuudet, mutta kuitenkin
uskollisuudessaan salli kaiken tapahtua, ei pannut vastaan eikä —
mikä oli tärkeintä — nuhdellut eikä uhannut millään enemmän tässä
kuin tulevassakaan elämässä, vaan tarpeen tullen ikäänkuin puolusti
häntä, — ketä vastaan? Jotakin tuntematonta, mutta peloittavaa ja
vaarallista vastaan. Kysymys oli nimenomaan siitä, että oli
välttämättömästi toinen ihminen, vanhastaan tuttu ja ystävällinen,
jonka saattoi sairauden hetkenä kutsua luokseen ainoastaan
katsellakseen hänen kasvojaan, ehkäpä vaihtaa jonkin aivan
asiaankuulumattoman sanankin, ja jos hän ei ole millänsäkään, ei
ole vihainen, niin on ikäänkuin helpompi sydämelle, mutta jos hän on
vihainen, no, silloin on surullisempaa. Tapahtui (muutoin sangen
harvoin), että Fjodor Pavlovitš meni yölläkin sivurakennukseen
herättämään Grigorin, jotta tämä hetkiseksi tulisi hänen luokseen.
Tämä tuli, ja Fjodor Pavlovitš alkoi puhella aivan joutavista asioista
sekä päästi hänet pian menemään, toisinaan ivaillen ja leikkiä
laskien, minkä jälkeen hän sylkäisi, kävi makaamaan ja nukkui
hurskaan unta. Jotakin tämäntapaista sattui Fjodor Pavlovitšille
silloinkin, kun Aljoša oli tullut. Aljoša »lävisti hänen sydämensä» sillä,
että »eli, näki kaikki eikä mitään tuominnut». Vieläpä enemmänkin,
hän toi tullessaan jotakin aivan uutta: täydellisen halveksimisen
puutteen häntä, ukkoa, kohtaan; päinvastoin hän osoitti aina
ystävällisyyttä ja aivan luonnollista, rehellistä kiintymystä häneen,
joka niin vähän sitä ansaitsi. Tämä kaikki oli vanhalle irstailijalle ja
perheettömälle miehelle täydellinen yllätys, aivan odottamatonta
hänelle, joka tähän asti oli rakastanut vain »saastaa». Aljošan
mentyä pois hän myönsi oppineensa ymmärtämään yhtä ja toista,
mitä tähän saakka ei ollut tahtonut ymmärtää.
Olen jo maininnut kertomukseni alussa, miten Grigori vihasi

Adelaida Ivanovnaa, Fjodor Pavlovitšin ensimmäistä vaimoa ja
hänen vanhimman poikansa Dmitri Fjodorovitšin äitiä, ja miten hän
päinvastoin puolusti hänen toista vaimoaan, riivattua, Sofia
Ivanovnaa, omaa herraansakin vastaan ja kaikkia vastaan, joille
saattoi pistää päähän lausua tästä naisesta paha tai kevytmielinen
sana. Myötätunto tuota onnetonta kohtaan oli muuttunut hänessä
jonkinlaiseksi pyhäksi tunteeksi, niin että vielä kaksikymmentä vuotta
myöhemmin hän ei olisi suvainnut keneltäkään epäedullista
viittaustakaan, joka koski vainajaa, vaan olisi heti torjunut
loukkauksen. Ulkonaiselta olemukseltaan Grigori oli kylmä ja
arvokas mies, ei lörpötellyt, vaan puhui harkiten eikä kevytmielisesti.
Niinikään olisi ollut mahdotonta saada hänestä selville ensi
katsauksella, rakastiko hän säyseätä, nöyrää vaimoaan vai eikö,
mutta hän rakasti häntä todellakin ja vaimo tietysti ymmärsi sen.
Tämä Marfa Ignatjevna ei ensinkään ollut tyhmä nainen, vaan oli
kenties viisaampikin kuin miehensä, ainakin hän oli tätä järkevämpi
käytännöllisissä asioissa, mutta kuitenkin hän alistui miehensä
tahtoon nurkumatta ja vastaansanomatta aivan avioliiton alusta
alkaen ja kunnioitti häntä henkisessä suhteessa korkeammalla
olevana. Huomattavaa on, että he koko elämänsä aikana puhuivat
keskenään perin vähän, vain kaikkein tärkeimmistä juoksevista
asioista. Arvokas ja juhlallinen Grigori harkitsi kaikki asiansa ja
huolensa aina yksinään, niin että Marfa Ignatjevna jo kauan sitten oli
tullut ymmärtämään, että mies ei ollenkaan kaivannut hänen
neuvojaan. Hän tunsi, että hänen miehensä pitää arvossa hänen
vaitioloaan ja pitää sitä älykkyyden merkkinä. Vaimoaan Grigori ei
koskaan lyönyt, yhden kerran vain ja silloinkin vähän. Adelaida
Ivanovnan ollessa ensimmäistä vuotta naimisissa Fjodor Pavlovitšin
kanssa olivat kerran maalla kylän tytöt ja eukot, jotka silloin vielä
olivat maaorjia, kokoontuneet herraskartanoon laulelemaan ja
tanssimaan. Aloitettiin eräs tanssilaulu »Niityllä», ja äkkiä Marfa
Ignatjevna, joka silloin vielä oli nuori nainen, hyppäsi kuoron eteen ja
alkoi lasketella »venäläistä» erikoisella tavalla, ei maalaistapaan
niinkuin eukot, vaan kuten hän oli tanssinut silloin, kun palveli
rikkailla Miusoveilla heidän kotiteatterissaan maalla, jossa
näyttelijöitä opetti tanssimaan Moskovasta tilattu tanssimestari.
Grigori näki, millä tavoin hänen vaimonsa tanssi, ja kotona
mökissään hän tuntia myöhemmin antoi tälle hiukan opetusta vetäen
häntä hiuksista. Mutta siihen kuritukset kerta kaikkiaan loppuivatkin
eivätkä enää kertaakaan toistuneet koko elämän aikana, eikä Marfa
Ignatjevnaakaan siitä lähin ollut halu vetänyt tanssimaan.
Lapsia ei Jumala heille suonut. Yksi lapsi oli ollut, mutta sekin oli
kuollut. Grigori oli ilmeisesti lapsirakas eikä salannutkaan sitä, t.s.
hän ei hävennyt tunnustaa sitä. Dmitri Fjodorovitšin hän oli ottanut
kolmivuotiaana poikana hoitoonsa, kun Adelaida Ivanovna karkasi, ja
puuhasi hänen kanssaan melkein vuoden, itse kampasi häntä, itse
pesi häntä kaukalossa. Myöhemmin hän puuhasi sekä Ivan
Fjodorovitšin että Aljošan kanssa ja sai siitä palkakseen
korvapuustin. Mutta kaikesta tästä olen jo kertonut. Oma lapsi
taasen ilahdutti häntä vain toivolla Marfa Ignatjevnan ollessa
raskaana. Mutta syntyessään lapsi täytti hänen sydämensä
murheella ja kauhulla. Tämä poika nimittäin syntyi kuusisormisena.
Sen nähtyään Grigori masentui siinä määrin, että ei ainoastaan ollut
sanaakaan puhumatta aivan ristiäisiin asti, vaan meni varta vasten
puistoon saadakseen olla puhumatta. Oli, kevät, hän kaiveli yhtä
mittaa kolme päivää lavoja hedelmätarhassa ja kukkapenkkejä
puistossa. Kolmantena päivänä oli pienokainen kastettava. Siihen
mennessä oli jokin ajatus kypsynyt Grigorin päässä. Kun hän saapui
tupaan, jonne jo olivat kokoontuneet kirkonpalvelijat ja vieraat ja
lopulta tullut itse Fjodor Pavlovitš ollakseen risti-isänä, niin hän
yht'äkkiä ilmoitti, että lasta »ei pitäisi ollenkaan kastaa», — ilmoitti
sen hiljaisella äänellä eikä monisanaisesti, vaan sanoi vaivoin sanan
kerrallaan katsellen tylsästi ja silmiään pois kääntämättä pappia.
— Miksi niin? — tiedusti pappi iloisesti ihmetellen.
— Siksi… että tämä on… traakki… — mutisi Grigori.
— Mikä ihmeen traakki? Kuinka niin?
Grigori oli jonkin aikaa vaiti.
— Luonnossa on tapahtunut sekaannus… — mutisi hän hyvin

epäselvästi, mutta sangen varmasti, eikä nähtävästi halunnut ryhtyä
tarkempiin selityksiin.
Naurettiin ja lapsi-raukka tietysti kastettiin. Grigori rukoili

kastemaljan ääressä hartaasti, mutta ei muuttanut mielipidettään
äskensyntyneestä. Muuten hän ei mitenkään häirinnyt toisten

Contested World Orders Rising Powers Non Governmental Organizations and The Politics of Authority Beyond The Nation State Matthew D Stephen Editor Full Chapter

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Contested World Orders: Rising

Contested World Orders

Contested World Orders

Matthew D. Stephen and Michael Zürn

1. Rising Powers, NGOs, and Demands for

2. Contestation Overshoot: Rising Powers, NGOs, and the

5. The Devil is in the Detail: The Positions of the

7. Negotiating the UN Human Rights Council:

9. Transnational Private Authority and Its Contestation 305

1.1 Varieties of world order 13

1.1 Case selection 23

Martin Binder, Associate Professor in International Relations, University of Reading

Sophie Eisentraut, Senior Policy Advisor, Munich Security Conference

Anne Flohr, Project Coordinator, TMG Research gGmbH

Anja Jetschke, Professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University

Harald Müller, Associate Fellow, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)

Autumn Lockwood Payton, Lecturer, University of Dayton

World order1 appears to be increasingly contested. Rising powers such as the

2 Contested World Orders

agreements. Transnationally organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

focus of institutionalist theorizing and is only lately taking traditional questions

4 Contested World Orders

international institutions? Do rising powers’ and transnational NGOs’ demands

2. Studying Contested World Orders

The Rise of International Authority

settlement procedures (e.g. DSB in the WTO), through the interaction of

6 Contested World Orders

Bringing Rising Powers and Rise

There is virtually a cross-theoretical consensus that power shifts pose challenges

8 Contested World Orders

3. Mapping Demands of Rising Powers

10 Contested World Orders

A similar divergence of expectations can be discerned about the preferences

12 Contested World Orders

Most transnational NGOs seem to support strong international institutions

Supranationalism New constitutionalism Cosmopolitanism

Intergovernmentalism Embedded liberalism

Competition states Mercantilism

Neo-liberal Embedded liberal Non-liberal

14 Contested World Orders

Major distribution conflict

National discretion Minor distribution conflict

Neo-liberal Embedded liberal Non-liberal

expected vociferously to defend their relative standing. Where NGOs stand in

Demands in Relation to the Status Quo

16 Contested World Orders

Demands in Relation to Each Other

18 Contested World Orders

P 3a: While NGOs in general support international authority, especially

Comparison of Issue Areas

propositions will be elaborated in the cross-cutting studies and in the conclusion

We focus on a common group of states across institutional cases. Only by doing

20 Contested World Orders

‘progressive’ or ‘internationalist’ positions, but seek to cover variation across

Preferences and Demands

Preferences, broadly conceived, are properties of actors that differentiate between

Statements as Indications of Preferences

Statements can be considered from a purely rationalist perspective as a mechan-

22 Contested World Orders

officials to stipulate their true preferences in order to elicit compromises from

A different interest in public acts of communicative contestation stems from

Table 1.1 Case selection*

Liberal content authority Low High

9. Transnational Private Authority and Its Contestation 305

1.1 Varieties of world order 13

1.1 Case selection 23