System Reliability

System Reliability
SRAN5.0
Feature Parameter Description
Issue 02
Date 2011-09-30
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.

Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2011. All rights reserved.
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The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Every effort has been made in the
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Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Address: Huawei Industrial Base
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SingleRAN
System Reliability Contents
Contents
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................1-1
1.1 Scope ............................................................................................................................................ 1-1
1.2 Intended Audience ........................................................................................................................ 1-1
1.3 Change History.............................................................................................................................. 1-1
2 System Redundancy ................................................................................................................2-1

3 Operating System Security Management ...........................................................................3-1
3.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 3-1
3.2 Operating System Antivirus ........................................................................................................... 3-1
3.3 Operating system Security Enhancement ..................................................................................... 3-3
3.4 Operating system Patching ........................................................................................................... 3-4
4 BSC/RNC Resource Sharing ..................................................................................................4-1

5 Board Switchover .....................................................................................................................5-1
5.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 5-1
5.2 Working Principle of the Board Switchover ................................................................................... 5-1
6 Remote EAC Maintenance ......................................................................................................6-1

6.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 6-1
6.2 Technical Description .................................................................................................................... 6-1
7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery ...................................................7-1

7.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 7-1
8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment Room .....................................8-1

8.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 8-1
9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure .............................................................9-1

9.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 9-1
10 Engineering Guidelines ......................................................................................................10-1

10.1 Guidelines for System Redundancy .......................................................................................... 10-1
10.2 Guidelines for Operating system Security Management .......................................................... 10-1
10.3 Guidelines for Board Switchover ............................................................................................... 10-1
11 Parameters .............................................................................................................................11-1
12 Counters .................................................................................................................................12-1
13 Glossary ..................................................................................................................................13-1
14 Reference Documents .........................................................................................................14-1
Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential ii

Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
SingleRAN
System Reliability 1 Introduction
1 Introduction
1.1 Scope
This document describes functions provided by the system reliability feature, including system
redundancy, operating system security management, BSC/RNC resource sharing, board switchover,
remote EAC maintenance, operation & maintenance system One-Key recovery, reporting the
temperature list of the BTS equipment room, and intelligent shutdown of TRX due to PSU failure.
1.2 Intended Audience

This document is intended for:
 Personnel who are familiar with GSM and WCDMA basics
 Personnel who need to understand system reliability
 Personnel who work with Huawei products
1.3 Change History

This section provides information on the changes in different document versions.
There are two types of changes, which are defined as follows:
 Feature change: refers to the change in the system reliability feature of a specific product version.
 Editorial change: refers to the change in wording or the addition of the information that was not
described in the earlier version.
Document Issues
The document issues are as follows:
 02 (2011-09-30)
 01 (2010-10-15)
 Draft (2010-05-15)
02 (2011-09-30)
This is the document for the second commercial release of SRAN5.0.
Compared with issue 01 (2010-10-15) of SRAN5.0, this issue incorporates the changes described in the
following table.
Change Type Change Description Parameter Change

Feature change None None
Editorial change This issue adds the following information: None
 5 Board Switchover
 6 Remote EAC Maintenance
 7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery
 8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment
Room
 9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure
Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 1-1

SingleRAN
System Reliability 1 Introduction
01 (2010-10-15)
This is the document for the first commercial release of SRAN5.0.
Compared with issue Draft (2010-05-15) of SRAN5.0, this issue optimizes the description.
Draft (2010-05-15)
This is the draft of the document for SRAN5.0.
This is a new document.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 2 System Redundancy
2 System Redundancy
The system redundancy feature (corresponding to feature MRFD-210101 System Redundancy)
provides the reliability designs such as the active/standby mode, load sharing, and redundancy
configuration, improving the system reliability.
To ensure the reliable operation of the system, the SingleRAN system adopts the reliability designs such
as the active/standby mode, load sharing, and redundancy configuration.
 Load sharing
In the resource pool mode, the load sharing is performed among processing units in the pool. When
one or multiple processing units are faulty, the ongoing services are disrupted, and new services
requests are allocated to other normal processing units in the resource pool.
 Active/standby mode
In the active/standby mode, the active board processes services while the standby board acts as a
backup of the active one. When the active board is faulty or needs to be replaced, the services can be
switched over to the standby board to ensure the normal operation of services.
There are two types of switchover. One is automatic switchover. An automatic switchover is triggered
by the system in the case that the active board is faulty. The other is manual switchover. A manual
switchover is performed by maintenance engineers on the LMT. Maintenance engineers use the
immediate switchover command to switch over the active and standby boards.
To ensure a successful active/standby switchover, the following conditions must be met:
− The standby board must work normally.
− No major or critical alarm is reported.
When the standby board is switched over to the active state, the previously active board will be reset
automatically. If this board restarts normally, it is switched over to the standby state.
For the interface board, the board backup mode is adopted. Some interface boards also support the
standard backup modes specified in 3GPP specifications, such as MSP 1+1 or MSP 1: 1. When
detecting that the board is faulty, the system re-establishes the transmission links for the ongoing
services on the standby board through an active/standby switchover. When detecting that the active
channel is damaged, the system enables the ongoing services to be transmitted through the standby
channel through an active/standby switchover.
 Redundancy configuration
Redundancy configuration can be applied to the following units: boards, transmission interfaces,
power, and fans. The software version and important data configuration file are backed up to ensure
that the system works normally even if an exception occurs in the file or data.
For the BSC/RNC, the signaling processing system and service processing system of the SingleRAN
system are designed to work in resource pool mode. There are five independent system-level
resource pools, which are used to process the GSM CS, GSM PS, GSM signaling, UMTS user plane,
and UMTS signaling services respectively. The service processing boards of the BSC/RNC also work
in the resource pool mode. That is, load sharing is performed in the resource pool. The other boards
work in the active/standby mode. That is, the boards of the same type configured in two neighboring
slots work in the active/standby mode.
Huawei BTS/NodeB supports the board-level backup. Two boards of the same type work in the
active/standby mode. When the active board is faulty, a switchover is performed between the active
and standby boards to switch over the services to the standby board.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 3 Operating System Security Management
3 Operating System Security Management

3.1 Overview
The operating system security management feature (corresponding to feature MRFD-210102 Operate
System Security Management) provides system security management such as operating system
antivirus, operating system security enhancement, and operating system patching.
As the operation and maintenance unit of the BSC6900, the OMU is mainly responsible for the operation
and maintenance function of the BSC6900. The OMU supports the three operating systems: Windows,
Suse Linux, and Dopra Linux. The OMU works as an information exchange bridge between BSC6900
and the outside world, and at the same time the OMU becomes an entrance for security risks. In
accordance with the security risks of the operating system on the OMU, the measures such as antivirus,
system security enhancement, and system patching are taken to improve the security level of the
operating system.
In different scenarios, there are different operating systems.
 When BSC6810 is upgraded to BSC6900, Windows in BSC6810 can keep functioning in BSC6900 or
Windows can be switched to Dopra Linux through a tool for switching operating systems.
 When BSC6000 is upgraded to BSC6900, Suse Linux in BSC6000 can keep functioning in BSC6900
or Suse Linux can be switched to Dopra Linux through a tool for switching operating systems.
 When BSC6900 is newly built in an office, the default operating system on the OMU is Dopra Linux.
3.2 Operating System Antivirus

As widely used operating systems, Windows and Suse Linux on the OMU are confronted with increasing
network virus attack and malicious network attack. The security problem of the operating system is
triggered.
BSC6900 provides an antivirus solution for the entire network of mobile system operation and
maintenance, including providing integrated antivirus software and virus protection policies to the OMU
installed with Suse Linux or Windows. Dopra Linux is an operating system customized by Huawei and
involves no antivirus software.
 For Suse Linux
Before installing the antivirus software, refer to the Antivirus Software Installation Guide provided by
Huawei. Huawei OMU supports the antivirus software deployment: Trend Micro Control Manager
(TMCM) + ServerProtect for Linux2.5.

SingleRAN
 TMCM
TMCM is web-based management control console. TMCM provides centralized monitoring of antivirus
products and service in the entire network. TMCM manages the gateway, mail server, file server,
Trend Micro products and service, and third-party antivirus and security products.
The TMCM server can connect to the Internet, download the latest virus feature codes, and upgrade
the BSC6900 that is in the charge of the TMCM server and is based on Suse Linux.
 ServerProtect for Linux
Trend Micro ServerProtect for Linux 2.5 (TMSP) provides comprehensive and real-time protection to
enterprise servers. It protects the servers against internal or external virus propagation, spy software,
and other threats. TMSP provides centralized scanning of virus/malicious threats, update on virus
feature codes, reporting of events, and configuration.
Huawei BSC6900 supports TMSP, which monitors BSC6900 and protects it against virus.
 For Windows
Installing OfficeScan is recommended. OfficeScan is the enterprise network version of the virus
defense software for mainstream desktop system provided by Trend Micro. As verified through strict
testing by Huawei, OfficeScan is compatible with the OMU.
If operators hope to use other virus defense software such as Symantec and McAfee, they need to
purchase the software on their own. Huawei can aid them in installing the software. The software
needs to be tested for compatibility before its use.

SingleRAN
In addition to software installation, a separate server for virus feature codes and upgrade needs to be
deployed in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) of the operation and maintenance network. The server is
responsible for obtaining the latest virus feature codes or upgrade packet from the Internet. The
antivirus server in the internal network of operation and maintenance, for example, Officescan7 Server
is not connected to the Internet directly. Instead, the antivirus server is upgraded by being connected
to the server for virus feature codes and upgrade in the DMZ. After the antivirus server is upgraded,
the equipment in the entire network automatically upgrades virus feature codes and upgrade packets.
In this way, the defense of the BSC6900 is upgraded and viruses are monitored and managed.
3.3 Operating system Security Enhancement

Generally, security holes and hidden danger exist in operating systems. These security holes and hidden
danger are vulnerable to malicious attack on the operating system by local or remote attackers.
Consequently, operating systems and related software are damaged and normal operation of operating
systems is affected.
Considering the hidden security danger mentioned above, Huawei provides operating system security
enhancement solutions for Windows, Suse Linux, and Dopra Linux. By customizing the network visit,
network security, system service, and system installation of the operating systems, Huawei effectively
improves the antivirus and anti-attack capability of the system, strengthens the fault-free operation
capability of the system, and improves the overall service level of the network.
 For Windows and Suse Linux
The operating system security enhancement tools for Windows and Suse Linux are SetWin and
SetSuse respectively.
Through security customization policies, the operating systems are protected against attacks and the
security of the operating systems is strengthened. The applications of the security customization
policies include:
− Executing policies
Operators can execute one or several policies simultaneously. The execution results are recorded in
a log file.
− Rolling back policies
After executing policies, operators can roll back to the configuration state before execution or
customize execution policy anew. Operators can recover the executed policies.
− Generating a backup point
Operators can store the current state of policies in a file and create a backup point for the policy
settings.

SingleRAN
− Storing configuration
Operators can store the current state of policy configuration.
− Exporting configuration
Operators can export the current policy configuration to a file.
− Importing configuration
Operators can import files containing policy configuration information to the system so that the
system has the same configuration.
− Importing original configuration files
Operators can import the configuration files of SetWin or SetSuse in earlier versions.
− Loading the configuration file anew
The operating system tool includes a configuration file. If operators run the command of loading the
configuration file anew, the operating system loads the configuration file anew.
 For Dopra Linux
Customized by Huawei, Dopra Linux integrates multiple security policies such as basic security,
system service security, file and directory security, core security, system visit authentication, account
and password security, security auditing, and additional security. In this way, the security of the
operating system is improved greatly.
3.4 Operating system Patching

Patches for the operating system consist of the basic patch and incremental patch. The basic patch for
the previous year is released once a year and the incremental patch for the current year is released
periodically. The BSC6900 is installed with the basic patch on the OMU before delivery. The operating
equipment in the existing network installs patches in time according to patch release notifications from
Huawei.
The BSC6900 provides local patching and remote patching.
 Local patching
By connecting the local maintenance terminal directly to the OMU, operators can log in to the OMU
operating system for operation. Patches are installed for the operating system of only one OMU at a
time.
 Remote patching
In remote patching, operators install patches for the operating system on the OMU by using upgrade
tools through the local network. Remote patching enables operators to install patches for the operating
system of a batch of OMUs. This improves service ability.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 4 BSC/RNC Resource Sharing
4 BSC/RNC Resource Sharing

The BSC/RNC resource sharing feature (corresponding to feature MRFD-210104 BSC/RNC Resource
Sharing) provides resource sharing of the control plane and of the user plane.
The BSC/RNC Resource Sharing feature is classified into user plane resource sharing and control plane
resource sharing. Based on the load balancing mechanism applied to the boards in the same subrack or
the boards in other subracks, the MBSC implements the control plane resource sharing and user plane
resource sharing in the BSC/RNC, improving the resource utilization in the system.
Control plane resource sharing is used to share the CPU usage and memory. When the CPU usage of a
certain control plane unit (CP unit) is too high or when the memory of a certain CP unit is insufficient, a
new call is transferred to other CP units with low load.
The BSC/RNC implements the dynamic resource sharing based on the resource pool and load
balancing in the BSC/RNC. If a certain user plane unit (UP unit) is overloaded, a new service is
transferred to other UP units with low load.
The working principles of load balancing in the BSC are the same as those in the RNC. For details about
load balancing, see Flow Control Feature Parameter Description of the RAN.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 5 Board Switchover
5 Board Switchover
5.1 Overview
Telecommunication system plays an important role in the national economy. In the telecommunication
system, the reliability and availability of the telecommunication equipment are of vital importance.
Huawei GBSS provides the 1+1 backup solution for all boards (except for the boards that are designed
to work in the resource pool mode). That is, the boards are configured in the active/standby mode, and a
switchover can be performed between the active and standby boards when the active board is faulty.
The active/standby mode for BSC boards improves the reliability of the GBSS system, prolongs the
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), and prevents service disruption caused by a faulty board.
For the boards that work in the active/standby mode, the active board processes services, and the
standby board performs real-time backup for the active board. When the active board becomes faulty,
the system automatically performs a switchover. After the switchover, the standby board takes over the
role of the active board and processes services. Under this circumstance, the switchover between the
active and standby boards ensures the normal operation of the system. (GBFD-111701 Board
Switchover).
There are two types of switchovers, namely, automatic switchover and manual switchover. An automatic
switchover is triggered by the system in the case that the active board is faulty. A manual switchover is
performed by the maintenance engineer on the LMT. The maintenance engineer sends an immediate
switchover command to the system, which then instructs the related boards through a dedicated
maintenance module to perform a switchover if the switchover is allowed.
To ensure a successful switchover, the following conditions must be met:
1. The standby board is present and works normally.
2. No major or critical alarm is reported.
After the standby board is switched over to the active state, the previously active board will be
automatically reset. If the previously active board restarts normally, it is switched over to the standby
state.
The BSC boards that support the board switchover feature include the SCUa, TNUa, GCUa, GCGa, and
all types of XPU boards and of interface boards. The DPU boards do not support the board switchover
feature, because the DPU boards are designed to work in the resource pool mode.
5.2 Working Principle of the Board Switchover

When an automatic switchover is triggered or a manual switchover is performed, the active and standby
boards are switched over. Figure 5-1 shows the working principle of the board switchover.
Figure 5-1 Working principle of the board switchover

SingleRAN
System Reliability 5 Board Switchover
There is a logical circuit between an active board and a standby board. Through the logical circuit, one
can query whether a board serves as the active board or the standby board and whether the
corresponding standby board or the corresponding active board is present. In addition, the logical circuit
can be used to perform a switchover. Under normal conditions, there is a service channel between the
active board and other boards. The service channel carries all services processed by the active board.
The active and the standby boards are connected through a backup channel. Through the backup
channel, the standby board synchronizes itself with the active board. In this manner, the standby board
can always obtain the latest data and maintain the consistency with the active board. When an automatic
switchover is triggered or a manual switchover is performed, the active and standby boards are switched
over. In such a case, the previously standby board takes over the role of the active board, and the
previously active board is reset. After taking over the role of the active board, the previously standby
board starts data configuration according to the backup data. The data configuration includes the
configuration of chips, transmission channels, operating system, and upper-level software. The
switchover does not affect the other boards that are connected to the previously active board. There is
also an operation and maintenance channel between the active and standby boards. This channel is not
depicted in the preceding figure.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 6 Remote EAC Maintenance
6 Remote EAC Maintenance

6.1 Overview
With the increasingly fierce competition in the radio communications market, operators have a higher
requirement on the way of environment and power supply monitoring. The EAC board monitors the
environment and power supply in the equipment room to ensure the security of physical devices. The
environment monitor unit (EMU) board is an enhanced EAC board. The EMU board applies to the GSM,
CDMA, and WCDMA indoor BTS, it monitors the environment (through temperature, humidity, water, and
smoke sensors), illegal intrusion (through infrared and door status sensors), and power supply.
(GBFD-112301 Remote EAC Maintenance)
You can query the value of the sensors through the TMU board, or you can set reporting thresholds for
the sensors, that is, when the value of a sensor exceeds the preset threshold, the EMU reports an alarm.
6.2 Technical Description

The monitoring system implemented by the EMU board has the following advantages:
 Provides the voltage detection for a single power input. The voltage alarm threshold can be set by
the TMU.
 Provides the temperature, humidity, smoke, water, illegal intrusion, and power supply detection.
 Provides reverse connection protection for power cable connectors.
 Provides dual-input power port.
− If the 24D12 power module is used, the 24 V power system (power range: 18 V to 36 V) is
supported.
− If the 48D12 power module is used, the -48 V power system (power range: -36 V to -72 V) is
supported.
 Provides the port for the 12V DC/24V DC current type (4 mA to 20 mA) temperature and humidity
sensors.
 Provides four routes of analog input sensors. The sensor can be of either voltage type (0 V to 5 V) or
current type (4 mA to 20 mA). The sensor type can be set through DIP switches.
 Provides ports for 32 routes (S1+/S1– to S32+/S32–) of Boolean value inputs. The dry contact mode
and the OC mode Boolean value input are supported.
 Provides six output control ports for external Boolean signals of the relay node type.
 Provides two RS485 ports for the communication with the TMU.
 Provides two LEDs on the front panel: RUN and ALM. Table 6-1 describes the LEDs on the EMU
front panel.
Table 6-1 LEDs on the EMU front panel
Board Status RUN (Green) ALM (Red)
Unregistered Blinks at 4 Hz Off
Normal Blinks at 0.5 Hz Off
Detectable faults Blinks at 0.5 Hz Blinks at 0.5 Hz
exist
MCU collapsed Other status

SingleRAN
System Reliability 6 Remote EAC Maintenance
The EMU board has the following advantages:

 High reliability: hot backup is applied for both the power supply and the circuits.
 Wide voltage support range:
27 V system: 18 V to 36 V.
-48 V system: -36 V to -72 V.
 Wide temperature detecting range: –20°C to +80°C
 Jumper not needed: all settings specified through DIP switches.
 External surge protector not needed for power cables and other circuits: internal surge protection
circuits in the EMU can meet the requirements of the indoor BTS.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery
7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery

7.1 Overview
The software that runs on the OMU board includes the Dopra Linux operating system and the OMU
applications. When the Dopra Linux operating system on the OMU board is corrupted, the OMU
applications are corrupted, or the operating system on the OMU board is switched from non-Dopra Linux
to Dopra Linux, on-site engineers need to manually recover the operating system, the OMU applications,
or perform the operating system switchover. Such manual operations entail very complicated steps. In
addition, such manual operations may even disrupt the ongoing services of the BSC.
The Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery feature is introduced to solve this problem.
This feature reduces the complexity of the backup and recovery of the operating system and of the
configuration data of the OMU board. In addition, it minimizes the duration of service disruption caused
by the operation & maintenance operations. (GBFD-111214 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key
Recovery)

This chapter describes how to implement the Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery
feature.
The USB creator (U_creator_eng.exe tool) is used to create the USB disk for installing the Dopra Linux
operating system and the OMU applications. The USB installation disk is plugged into the USB port on
the OMU board. The OMU board is then reset. Five to ten minutes later, the operating system or OMU
applications on the OMU board are recovered.
Note that the operating system, OMU applications, and the respective configuration information must be
stored onto the USB installation disk during the creation of the USB installation disk. Then, Bootstrap
scripts are generated on the USB installation disk to facilitate the start-up of the OMU board through the
USB installation disk.
The Bootstrap scripts first install the Dopra Linux operating system and configure the information for the
operating system. Then, the Bootstrap scripts install the OMU applications and configure the information
for the OMU applications. Figure 7-1 shows the OMU board software recovery process.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery
Figure 7-1 OMU board software recovery process
When the operating system on the existing OMU boards is switched from non-Dopra Linux to Dopra
Linux, the USB creator is used to obtain the configuration information, especially the network
configuration information, the OMU applications configuration information, and the network element (NE)
confirmation information, of the OMU board whose operating system is to be switched. Based on the
information obtained, the USB creator creates a USB installation disk for installing the Dopra Linux
operating system. Then, the USB installation disk is plugged into the USB port on the OMU board. The
OMU board is then reset. Five to ten minutes later, the switchover of the operating system is complete.

SingleRAN 8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment
System Reliability Room
8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment

Room
8.1 Overview
With this feature, the temperature in the BTS equipment room can be reported to the BSC at specified
intervals in a specific period. In this way, operators learn about the temperature in the equipment room,
without entering the equipment room.
This feature not only reduces the labor of the O&M and check, but also helps operators remotely monitor
the temperature in the BTS equipment room. In addition, the air conditioner can be remotely adjusted
according to the actual situation. In this way, the energy consumption can be reduced and operators
achieve the aim of becoming green operators. This feature also helps find security problems, such as
the abnormal temperature change, fire, and exogenetic damage in advance. (GBFD-111211 Reporting
the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment Room)

Temperature detection is performed by the environment monitoring unit (EMU). The EMU collects the
information about the temperature and humidity and then reports the analog values to the GTMU. The
GTMU then reports the values to the BSC. In addition, the information about temperature and humidity is
displayed on the site maintenance terminal. The EMU does not report the information about the
temperature and humidity to the BSC unless the BSC sends a temperature reporting request to the BTS.
When the temperature and humidity detection function is started, the site maintenance terminal displays
whether the reporting of the temperature information of the BTS equipment room is started successfully.
The temperature information is reported to the BSC. On the M2000 client, users can download the files
of the temperature in the equipment room from the OMU through FTP. In addition, users can also query
the temperature information of the equipment room on the M2000 client and save the query results

SingleRAN
System Reliability 9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure
9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure

9.1 Overview
In the scenario where the BTS uses the AC power input, the power supply unit (PSU) converts the AC
power into the DC power to provide power supply for the boards of a BTS. Generally, multiple PSUs are
required to provide sufficient electricity for a BTS. The PSUs work in the parallel connection. If one or
several PSUs are faulty, the load of the PSUs that work properly increases. As a result, all PSUs may
stop working due to overcurrent protection, and all the services processed on the BTS are disrupted.
To prevent such a problem, the function of the intelligent shutdown of TRX due to PSU failure is
introduced to Huawei GSM BSS. With this function, when one or several PSUs are faulty, the BTS shuts
down the power amplifiers of the TRXs that consume excessive electricity, based on the power supply
capability of the PSUs that work properly. In this manner, the rest of TRXs continue to work normally,
minimizing the impact of service disruption. (GBFD-117804 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU
Failure)

When some PSUs are faulty, the PSUs that work properly cannot provide the BTS with sufficient power.
In this case, the BTS shuts down the power amplifiers of some TRXs to reduce the power consumption
of a site. The TRXs whose power amplifiers are still powered on can work normally.
When an alarm regarding the PSU fault is reported, the BTS calculates the number of TRXs whose
power amplifiers need to be shut down based on the power supply capability of the PSUs that work
properly. This ensures that the power consumption of the BTS does not exceed the power supply
capability supported by the remaining PSUs after the power amplifiers of some TRXs are shut down.
The principle of the intelligent shutdown of TRX due to PSU failure is described as follows: The BTS
calculates the power supply capability of the PSUs that work properly according to the PSU type and
quantity and calculates the power consumption of the BTS according to the TRX type and quantity. Then,
the BTS shuts down the power amplifiers of some TRXs by comparing the difference between the power
supply capability and the power consumption. When ISTRANCABCON is set to CONFIG, the power
consumption of the transmission cabinet needs to be considered for the calculation of BTS power
consumption. After the power amplifiers of some TRXs are shut down, the power consumption of the
BTS is expected not to exceed the power supply capability of the PSUs that work properly.
When the BTS determines the TRXs whose power amplifiers need to be shut down, the following factors
are considered:
1. The TRX whose ISMAINBCCH is set to NO is preferentially selected.
2. The TRX whose TRXTP is set to a multi-carrier TRX board type is preferentially selected.
The multi-carrier TRX boards consist of the MRRU, MRFU, GRRU, and GRFU.
3. The operation of the TRX processing the GSM services is preferentially ensured by setting
SRVPRIPOLICY to GSM_PRIOR.
After determining the TRXs whose power amplifiers need to be shut down, the BTS reports the
information to the BSC. On receipt of the information, the BSC does not assign new services to the
TRXs whose power amplifiers are to be shut down. After all the services carried on these TRXs are
released normally, the BTS shuts down the power amplifiers of the TRXs.
When the faulty PSUs recover, the BTS immediately reports the information to the BSC. Then, the BSC
powers on the TRXs whose power amplifiers are shut down.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 10 Engineering Guidelines
10 Engineering Guidelines
10.1 Guidelines for System Redundancy
Different boards support different reliability modes. The details are as follows:
 Service processing boards support only the loading sharing in the resource pool mode.
 Signaling processing boards support only the active/standby mode.
 Switching boards support only the active/standby mode.
 Clock boards support only the active/standby mode.
 Interface boards support both the active/standby mode and the independent mode.
 Operation and maintenance boards support both the active/standby mode and the independent mode.
10.2 Guidelines for Operating system Security Management

The antivirus software for Windows and Suse Linux needs to be purchased. Dopra Linux does not
involve antivirus software for the moment.
The operating system security enhancement tools for Windows and Suse Linux are SetWin and SetSuse
respectively. For Dopra Linux, the security enhancement function is integrated.
10.3 Guidelines for Board Switchover

The GCUa board must be installed in the Main Processing Subrack (MPS). The SCUa boards in a
subrack are automatically configured in the active/standby mode (to add a subrack, use the ADD
SUBRACK command). The TNUa boards are configured in the active/standby mode by default
whenever the TNUa boards are added. One is also advised to configure the INT boards, that is, interface
boards, in the active/standby boards. When interface boards are added, one is advised to set the RED
parameter to YES (YES) and set the SN parameter to the even slot number for the interface board. In
this way, two interface boards, one active and the other standby, are added at one time.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 11 Parameters
11 Parameters
Table 11-1 Parameter description
Parameter ID NE MML Command Description
ISMAINBCCH BSC6900 ADD GTRX(Optional) Meaning: Whether to enable the TRX to carry the
main BCCH in the cell
GUI Value Range: NO(No), YES(Yes)

Actual Value Range: NO, YES
Unit: None
Default Value: NO
ISTRANCABCON BSC6900 SET Meaning: Whether to configure the transmission
BTSPSUFP(Optional) cabinet. The BTS uses this parameter to calculate
the number of TRXs to be shut down.
GUI Value Range: NOT_CONFIG(NOT

CONFIGURED), CONFIG(CONFIGURED)
Actual Value Range: NOT_CONFIG, CONFIG
Unit: None
Default Value: NOT_CONFIG
RED BSC6900 MOD Meaning: Whether to back up the data of the
BRD(Mandatory) board
GUI Value Range: YES(YES)

Actual Value Range: YES
Unit: None
Default Value: None
SRVPRIPOLICY BSC6900 SET Meaning: The parameter specifies which type of
BTSPSUFP(Optional) service TRXs should be preferentially processed
when the PSU is faulty.
GUI Value Range: GSM_PRIOR(GSM Traffic

Prior), UMTS_PRIOR(UMTS Traffic Prior)
Actual Value Range: GSM_PRIOR,
UMTS_PRIOR
Unit: None
Default Value: GSM_PRIOR
TRXTP BSC6900 ADD Meaning: Type of the TRX board bound to the
TRXBIND2PHYBRD( TRX
Mandatory)
GUI Value Range: TRX(TRX), TRU(TRU/DTRU),
QTRU(QTRU), DRRU(DRRU), DRFU(DRFU),
MRRU(MRRU), MRFU(MRFU), GRFU(GRFU),
GRRU(GRRU), BTS3900B(BTS3900B),
BTS3900E(BTS3900E)
Actual Value Range: TRX, TRU, QTRU, DRRU,
DRFU, MRRU, MRFU, GRFU, GRRU, BTS3900B,
BTS3900E
Unit: None
Default Value: None

SingleRAN
System Reliability 11 Parameters
Parameter ID NE MML Command Description

SN NodeB ADD BRD(Optional) Meaning: Slot number
RMV BRD(Optional)
GUI Value Range: 0~7, 16, 18~19
Actual Value Range: 0~7, 16, 18~19
Unit: None
Default Value: -

SingleRAN
System Reliability 12 Counters
12 Counters
For the counters, see the BSC6900 GSM Performance Counter Reference.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 13 Glossary
13 Glossary
For the acronyms, abbreviations, terms, and definitions, see the Glossary.

SingleRAN
System Reliability 14 Reference Documents
14 Reference Documents
[1] BSC6900 Feature List
[2] BSC6900 Optional Feature Description
[3] BSC6900 GSM Parameter Reference
[4] BSC6900 GSM MML Command Reference


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HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.

Trademarks and Permissions

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

2 System Redundancy ................................................................................................................2-1

4 BSC/RNC Resource Sharing ..................................................................................................4-1

6 Remote EAC Maintenance ......................................................................................................6-1

7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery ...................................................7-1

8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment Room .....................................8-1

9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure .............................................................9-1

10 Engineering Guidelines ......................................................................................................10-1

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential ii

1.2 Intended Audience

1.3 Change History

Change Type Change Description Parameter Change

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 1-1

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 1-2

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 2-1

3 Operating System Security Management

3.2 Operating System Antivirus

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 3-1

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 3-2

3.3 Operating system Security Enhancement

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 3-3

3.4 Operating system Patching

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 3-4

4 BSC/RNC Resource Sharing

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 4-1

5.2 Working Principle of the Board Switchover

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 5-1

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 5-2

6 Remote EAC Maintenance

6.2 Technical Description

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 6-1

The EMU board has the following advantages:

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 6-2

7 Operation & Maintenance System One-Key Recovery

7.2 Technical Description

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 7-1

Figure 7-1 OMU board software recovery process

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 7-2

8 Reporting the Temperature List of the BTS Equipment

8.2 Technical Description

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 8-1

9 Intelligent Shutdown of TRX Due to PSU Failure

9.2 Technical Description

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 9-1

10.2 Guidelines for Operating system Security Management

10.3 Guidelines for Board Switchover

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 10-1

GUI Value Range: NO(No), YES(Yes)

GUI Value Range: NOT_CONFIG(NOT

GUI Value Range: YES(YES)

GUI Value Range: GSM_PRIOR(GSM Traffic

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 11-1

Parameter ID NE MML Command Description

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 11-2

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 12-1

Issue 02 (2011-09-30) Huawei Proprietary and Confidential 13-1