RULE 7 - CASES - Civil Procedure

Rule 7 – Parts and Contents of a
Pleading
CASES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Bucal v. Bucal, G.R. No. 206957 (2015)...............................................................................................................2

Ballao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162342, [October 11, 2006], 535 PHIL 236-247.........................................5
Municipality of Taguig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, [September 13, 2005)...........................................8
Fontana Development Corp. v. Vukasinovic, G.R. No. 222424, [September 21, 2016]......................................13
Vda. de Formoso vs. PNB, 650 SCRA 35, 44-45................................................................................................18
Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, [December 10, 2008], 594 PHIL 246-268..................................................24
LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, [January 25, 2006]................................................................30
1
Bucal v. Bucal, G.R. No. 206957 (2015)
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 206957 June 17, 2015
CHERITH A. BUCAL, Petitioner,

vs.
MANNY P. BUCAL, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 16, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated April 15, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 117731, which affirmed the Orders dated June 22, 2010 4 and November 23, 20105 of the
Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23 (RTC) in Protection Order No. PP0-002-10 granting visitation rights to
respondent Manny P. Bucal (Manny).
The Facts
Petitioner Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29, 2005 6 and have a daughter named Francheska A. Bucal
(Francheska), who was born on November 22, 2005.7 On May 7, 2010, Cherith filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Protection
Order8 (RTC Petition) based on Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,9 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004." She alleged that Manny had never shown her the love and care of a husband, nor supported her and
Francheska financially. Furthermore, due to Manny’s alcoholism, he was always mad and would even shout hurtful words at her.
Manny’s demeanor even affected her health detrimentally, leading her to suffer dizziness and difficulty in breathing on one
occasion.10 Thus, Cherith prayed that the RTC issue in her favor a Temporary Protection Order (TPO): (a) prohibiting Manny from
harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with her, directly or indirectly; (b) ordering a law enforcement
officer and court personnel to accompany her to the residence of Manny to supervise the removal of her personal belongings in order to
ensure her personal safety; (c) directing Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and any of her designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or
any specified place frequented by her and any of her designated family or household member; (d) enjoining Manny from threatening to
commit or committing further acts of violence against her and any of her family and household member; (e) granting her custody and
charge of Francheska, until further orders from the court; (f) ordering Manny to absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any restraint
on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of Francheska; and (g) directing Manny to provide support to her
and Francheska. Cherith also prayed that after hearing, the TPO be converted into a Permanent Protection Order (PPO). 11
The RTC Proceedings
After due proceedings, the RTC, in an Order12 dated May 14, 2010, issued a TPO granting the above-mentioned reliefs, effective for a
period of thirty (30) days. However, Manny was given visitation rights every Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with instruction that
Francheska be brought to his residence by Cherith’s relatives.13
Anticipating the expiration of the TPO, Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Extension and/or Renewal of the Temporary Restraining
Order14 (Motion) on June 10, 2010, which further sought a clarification of the visitation rights granted to Manny. 15
In an Order16 dated June 22, 2010, the RTC granted Cherith’s Motion and issued a PPO. It also ordered Manny to provide support to
Francheska in the amount of ₱5,000.00. The RTC also clarified that the visitation rights would only be from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. every
Saturday and that "the petitioner’s guardian" will bring the child, Francheska, to Manny’s home and accompany her until 5:00 p.m. 17
On July 30, 2010, Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, 18 seeking the reversal of the grant of visitation rights.19 She alleged
that upon perusal of her RTC Petition in the records of the court, she noticed an unauthorized intercalation praying for visitation rights
for Manny.20 Moreover, citing the further strained relations between her and Manny, Cherith argued that continuing Francheska’s
weekly visits to her father defeated the purpose of the protection order granted to them as the obligation made her and the child
vulnerable to the abuse from which they sought protection. 21
2
On August 12, 2010, Manny filed an Omnibus Motion22 praying that: (a) the attached Answer23 be admitted; (b) the PPO issued on June
22, 2010 be set aside; and (c) the case be set for trial. Manny also sought Cherith’s citation for contempt due to her failure to abide by
the visitation rights granted to him.24 In his Answer, Manny belied Cherith’s accusations of abuse by alleging delusion and paranoia on
her part and claiming himself to be a responsible and dedicated family man. 25 Cherith opposed26 Manny’s Omnibus Motion, alleging that
after she filed her petition, Manny personally appeared before the court but did not file any pleading, nor oppose the prayer in her RTC
Petition.27
Pending resolution of Manny’s Omnibus Motion, Manny filed a Manifestation and Opposition to Petition, 28 basically reiterating his
averments in the Omnibus Motion. In response, Cherith filed her comment, 29 positing that the Manifestation and Opposition to Petition
was a prohibited pleading for it sought, among others, the reconsideration of the PPO and the re-opening of trial. 30 In the same
pleading, Cherith prayed that her previous Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order, which sought the reversal of the grant of visitation rights,
be granted.31
After due hearing, the RTC, in an Order32 dated November 23, 2010 modified its June 22, 2010 Order, ordering Cherith to bring
Francheska to McDonald’s in Tanza at exactly 9:00a.m. on Saturdays where she will be picked up by her father, Manny, and be
returned in the same place the following day, Sunday, at 5:00 p.m.
Dissatisfied, Cherith filed a petition for certiorari33 before the CA, arguing that it was beyond the RTC’s authority to grant visitation rights
to Manny because the trial court cannot grant a remedy that was not prayed for. 34
The CA Ruling
In a Decision35 dated October 16, 2012, the CA dismissed Cherith’s petition for certiorari and affirmed the RTC Orders dated June 22,
2010 and November 23, 2010.36
At the outset, it pointed out that Cherith’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, without any justification therefor,
rendered her resort to certiorari premature.37 On the merits, it held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting
visitation rights to Manny because the same was only based on Cherith’s own prayer. 38
Aggrieved, Cherith moved for reconsideration,39 which was denied in a Resolution40 dated April 15, 2013; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cherith’s certiorari petition, thus, affirming the
June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 RTC Orders granting visitation rights to Manny.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
On the matter of procedure, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing Cherith’s certiorari petition on account of her failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed RTC Orders. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-
defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex-parte or
in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.41
The second and third exceptions obtain in this case.
During the course of the RTC proceedings, Cherith filed three (3) pleadings, namely: (a) an Ex-Parte Motion for Extension and/or
Renewal of the TPO;42 (b) an Ex-Parte Motion to Amend Order;43 and (c) a Comment to Respondent’s Manifestation and Opposition to
the Petition,44 all seeking for the clarification of, or the withdrawal of the visitation rights granted to Manny. Each was resolved by the
RTC reiterating the award of visitation rights to the latter. 45 As such, it cannot be denied that Cherith’s opposition to the award of
3
visitation rights had been squarely and definitively presented to the RTC which arrived at the same result. Thus, there was no need for
the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The urgency for resolution also rendered such filing unnecessary. It should be emphasized that Cherith had already been issued a
PPO. As defined in Section 8 of RA9262, "[a] protection order is an order issued x x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a
protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. x x x." With a standing PPO issued for
the purpose of protecting not only the woman, but also her child against acts of violence committed by the person against whom the
order is issued – in this case, Manny – the resolution of the issue of whether or not Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any
discernible basis therefor, is urgent, else Cherith and Francheska be unduly exposed to the very danger which they are seeking
protection from. As the Court sees it, any further delay would substantially prejudice their interests, thus, allowing a direct recourse to
certiorari.
That being said, the Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a
case.46 The rationale for the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 47 viz.:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the
pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The
fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to
the defendant.48
For the same reason, this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be available to petitioners.1âwphi1 Verily,
both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and arbitrary judgments. The very essence of due process is "the
sporting idea of fair play" which forbids the grant of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be
heard.49
The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO
and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for such relief.
Neither was it shown that Cherith sought the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband. In fact, Cherith’s RTC Petition
specifically prayed that the RTC prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with
her, directly or indirectly (which would tend to occur if Francheska would be turned-over to Manny during weekends), order Manny to
absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge of
Francheska, and direct Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and any of her designated family or household
members under the limitations set by the court. Further, as above-intimated, Cherith has repeatedly contested the award of visitation
rights during the course of the proceedings before the RTC, but to no avail. While there appears an intercalation of a prayer for
visitation rights in Cherith’s RTC Petition, it is evident that she never authorized such intercalation because: (1) she had consistently
contested the grant of visitation rights in favor of Manny, and (2) it was merely penned in the handwriting of an unidentified person,
which, thus, renders the same dubious. Meanwhile, Manny or any of the courts a quo did not proffer any credible explanation to the
contrary.
Hence, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of Manny, as contained in the
PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari. With this pronouncement, there is no
need to delve into the other ancillary issues raised herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated April 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 117731 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The portions of the Orders dated June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23
granting visitation rights to respondent Manny P. Bucal are hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.
4
Ballao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162342, [October 11, 2006], 535 PHIL 236-247
G.R. No. 162342 October 11, 2006
JAIME H. BALLAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65955 and
its Resolution dated February 6, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the Decision dated February
2, 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Jaime H. Ballao was an employee of respondent China Banking Corporation (Chinabank). As a "runner" in the cash
department of Chinabank’s Binondo Branch, he was tasked, among others, to get cash from the vault upon request of the teller.
On August 27, 1997, the cashier’s record reflected that the amount requisitioned did not tally with the records of the tellers. The
discrepancy was P150,000, which from the record of the cashier was the same amount teller Anna Margaret Ngo requisitioned. The
cash custodian Lauro Villapando allegedly gave the cash to Ballao to be delivered to Ngo. Ballao and Ngo denied receiving the amount.
After investigation, Chinabank found petitioner Ballao guilty of (1) serious misconduct; (2) fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him
by Chinabank; (3) stealing or attempting to steal from the bank or from others within the premises; and (4) falsifying bank records or
documents and tampering bank equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the bank or committing a dishonest act. Chinabank
terminated Ballao’s services.
Seasonably, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC-NCR Arbitration Branch, Quezon City. The Labor Arbiter
found Ballao’s termination illegal, and ordered Chinabank to pay his backwages and to reinstate him.
On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied for failure to file it within the reglementary period.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the NLRC decision already
became final and executory, considering that no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by Ballao. Petitioner sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner maintains that:
x x x [THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED] IN HAPHAZARDLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR THE
RECONSIDERATION OF THE NLRC’S FEBRUARY 2, 2001 DECISION WAS FILED ON MARCH 9, 2001 DESPITE NLRC’S
RECEIPT OF THE MOTION THAT WAS FILED THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL ON MARCH 5, 2001 AND THE
PRESENTATION OF THE REGISTRY RETURN CARD AND THE CERTIFICATION FROM THE FRISCO (MAIN) POST
OFFICE THAT THE MOTION WITH REGISTRY NUMBER 8388 WAS ADDRESSED TO THE NLRC, BANAWE STREET,
QUEZON CITY AND WAS MAILED ON MARCH 5, 2001, THE TENTH DAY TO FILE SAID MOTION.
x x x THE LACK OF A VERIFICATION OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A FORMAL, RATHER THAN A
SUBSTANTIAL, DEFECT AND IS NOT FATAL.2
5
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether Ballao’s motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was properly denied by the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred
Simply stated, the issue in this case is whether Ballao’s motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was properly denied by the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in finding that the motion was filed out of time despite submission of proof, namely, the
certification from the Frisco (Main) Post Office and the registry return card, that the same was filed on the tenth day of the reglementary
period.3 Further, petitioner argues that the lack of verification is merely a formal defect which may be corrected by requiring compliance
by petitioner to submit an oath, considering that he has a meritorious case. 4
Chinabank, for its part, maintains that the motion was fatally defective because of petitioner’s failure to verify it, and it should be
considered as an unsigned pleading. Private respondent also avers that there was no proof on record that the motion was filed on time
and served on Chinabank. In sum, Chinabank insists that petitioner was not illegally terminated. 5
The Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari found that the motion was not filed on time and it was not under oath, and
there was no proof of service on the other party, nor to its counsel. It added that petitioner did not comply with the rules of the NLRC,
and the motion should have been treated as a mere scrap of paper, as if no motion for reconsideration was filed, thus making the NLRC
decision final and executory.6
Under Section 15,7 Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision must be
under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision.
In the present case, we note that petitioner received the NLRC decision on February 23, 2001, thus the tenth day for filing a motion for
reconsideration was March 5, 2001.8 In his manifestation9 filed on March 9, 2001 with the NLRC, petitioner stated that he filed the
motion through registered mail on March 5, 2001, and that the pleadings attached therein were just copies of the motion. A registry
return receipt10 was also submitted which shows that the motion was posted on March 5, 2001 and received by the NLRC on March 21,
2001. Furthermore, on record is another registry return receipt 11 showing that Chinabank, through counsel, received a copy of the
motion on March 9, 2001. Chinabank filed an opposition to said motion, thus, it could not claim that it was not served a copy. These
matters could not be ignored as these served as proofs that clearly, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on time.
Time and again, we have said the lack of verification is merely a formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case,
the court may order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice. 12 It should be stressed that rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts cannot be enslaved by technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have
always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat vis-à-vis
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote
justice, it is always within the Court’s power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation. 13 This is more so in
labor cases where social justice should be emphasized. In light of the circumstances of this case, we find that the lack of verification
may be excused, so that the case could be decided on its merits.
Was petitioner illegally dismissed?
As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Again, this applies with greater force in labor cases. Factual findings of quasi-judicial
bodies like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and if supported by substantial evidence, are
accorded respect and even finality by this Court. But where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contradictory, as in this
case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. 14 Our perusal of the records shows
that petitioner’s dismissal was unjustified.
The acts allegedly committed by petitioner were (1) making an unauthorized and fraudulent requisition of P150,000 from the vault and
taking possession of the same without bank approval; (2) falsifying bank document to make it appear that teller Ngo supposedly
requested the said amount; and (3) concealing the Teller’s Cash Transaction Documents to suppress/delay the discovery of the fraud. 15
In a memorandum16 dated April 13, 1998, private respondent dismissed Ballao for the following reasons:
1. Serious misconduct (par. [a], of Article 282 Title I, Book Six, Labor Code);
2. Fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in [him] by the Bank (par. [c], Ibid.);
6
3. Stealing or attempting to steal from the Bank or from others within the Bank premises (Table 6.1. Honesty, No. 1, CBC
Code of Ethics); and
4. Falsifying Bank records or documents and tampering with Bank equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the
Bank or to commit a dishonest act. (No. 11, Ibid.)
We note that the bank procedure for request of cash is that the runner forwards the original copies of the machine-validated requisition
slip of the tellers to the cashier or cash custodian. The latter will thereafter release the requested denomination of cash and retains the
original copy of the slip. The tellers keep the duplicate copies of the requisition slips. The runners do not sign anything evidencing
receipt of the cash. During "off-line" hours, the slips must be stamped "posted" with the teller’s signature. 17
In this case, the requisition slip for the lost P150,000 forwarded to cash custodian Lauro Villapando was a duplicate copy and was
stamped "posted" but without the teller’s signature. It was nevertheless honored by Villapando who admitted releasing the money. He
said he gave the money to Ballao as the slip bore Ballao’s initials. The initials on the slip do not prove, however, that petitioner received
the money when it was not even shown that it was customary for the cash custodian to indicate the runner’s initials. The initials were
not made by petitioner himself, and could not indicate that he himself signed for the amount. Further, Chinabank’s claim that petitioner
admitted having received the money from Villapando did not appear on the records. As found by the Labor Arbiter, the acts of stealing
or attempting to steal from Chinabank and the falsification of documents were not sufficiently established by these cited facts
alone.18 On this point, we are in agreement with the Labor Arbiter.
Article 28219 of the Labor Code, provides that serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust are valid causes for the employer to
terminate an employee. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and
unimportant. But such serious misconduct must nevertheless be in connection with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his
termination.20 However, as earlier discoursed, the serious misconduct of which petitioner is accused has not been sufficiently,
definitively and convincingly shown.
Now, to validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence, the following requisites must be established: (a) the
loss of confidence must not be simulated; (b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified;
(c) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; (d) it must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and (e) the employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required, but substantial evidence is vital and the burden rests on the employer to establish such
evidence. Any other rule would place the employee absolutely at the mercy of the employer. Moreover, the term trust and confidence is
restricted to managerial employees only.21
Nothing on record shows that Chinabank had established the petitioner’s culpability for the loss of the cited amount. Neither did
Chinabank’s investigation reveal that petitioner committed the acts complained of. While he handles money to be delivered to the
requesting teller, the decision to release the requested amount is made by the cash custodian. What is so obvious in this case is that
the money was released without following bank procedures. The bank, with all its expertise and mastery of banking operations and
procedure could not make its employee take the blame for any loss without convincing proof nor sufficient evidence of the latter’s
misconduct. In this case, we are convinced that private respondent Chinabank failed to discharge the burden of showing a just cause to
dismiss the petitioner. To dismiss a lowly employee on mere suspicions and innuendos without substantial proof by management of his
alleged misconduct could result in unfairness and injustice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 65955 and
its Resolution dated February 6, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 26, 1999 of the Labor Arbiter is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
7
Municipality of Taguig v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142619, [September 13, 2005)
[G.R. NO. 142619. September 14, 2005]
MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, HON. MAYOR RICARDO PAPA, JR. and ROBERT O. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RODOLFO BONIFACIO and BARANGAY HAGONOY, TAGUIG, M.M., Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Resolution1 dated February 2, 2000 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56369 dismissing their case for violation of the rule against forum shopping and the
Resolution2 dated March 20, 2000 denying their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners, then Municipality of Taguig, together with the then Mayor Ricardo Papa, Jr. and Chief of the General Service Office (GSO)
Roberto Santos, and respondent Barangay Hagonoy, Taguig are fighting over the ownership of the Hagonoy Multi-Purpose Hall in
Hagonoy, Taguig, Metro Manila.
On December 8, 1999, respondent Barangay filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case No. 67720, against
petitioners to prevent the latter from taking over control and possession of the subject multi-purpose hall. On the same day, the trial
court presided over by Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio issued a 72-hour TRO against petitioners. On December 10, 1999, the trial court, after
hearing the application for TRO, issued an Order extending the 72-hour TRO to 20 days.
On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed a petition3 for certiorari and prohibition with application for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction in the CA, docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 56211 which was raffled to a member of the Fourteenth Division thereof.
On December 15, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution4 directing the trial
court to cease and desist from further proceeding or hearing Civil Case No. 67720 for 60 days and ordered respondents to file their
Comment.
The following day, December 16, 1999, respondent Barangay filed an urgent motion to lift the cease and desist order issued by the
appellate court as well as its comment on the petition. On the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 5 granting respondent's motion and
admitted the comment. It found that respondent Barangay has been in possession of the multi-purpose hall since 1996 and that its
continued possession until Civil Case No. 67720 between petitioners and respondent is finally resolved will not unduly prejudice or
cause injury and damage to petitioners. It then ordered the respondent Judge to speedily resolve Civil Case No. 67720.
On December 17, 1999, the trial court issued an order granting respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 22, 1999, petitioners filed with the CA Fourteenth Division a motion to withdraw 6 their Petition for Certiorari and
prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 56211, the first petition).
On the same day, petitioners filed another petition7 for certiorari and prohibition with application for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction with the same CA assailing the Order of the trial court dated December 17, 1999 granting respondent's application for
injunction, which is docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56369 (the second petition) and raffled to a member of the CA's Fourth Division.
Petitioners' motion to withdraw the earlier petition was opposed by respondents.
On February 2, 2000, the CA Fourth Division issued herein assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and prohibition for
violation of the rule against forum shopping. It said:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With application for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction), petitioners seek among
others, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing his Order dated 17 December 1999,
and from continuing proceedings in Civil Case No. 67720. The assailed Order issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners,
among others, from proceeding with the taking over, control and possession of the Hagonoy Multi-Purpose Hall, until further orders
8
from said court. Earlier, the same petitioners filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition (With Application for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) before the Former Fourteenth Division of this Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56211, similarly praying for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the same respondent judge from continuing proceedings in Civil case No. 67720, and
for the annulment of his order dated 10 December 1999, issuing a 17-day extension of the original 72-hour Temporary Restraining
Order issued on 08 December 1999.
Notably, the instant petition was filed while CA GR SP NO. 56211 is still pending with the former Fourteenth Division of this Court, and
only after the instant petition was filed did petitioners file a motion to withdraw CA-GR SP No. 56211. Thus, the filing of the instant
petition and the execution of the Verification/Certification attached on page 11 of the rollo of the instant petition evidently constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping.
In First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259, citing Words and Phrases, the Supreme Court ruled:
A litigant is open to a charge of "forum shopping" whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual surrounding of his suit.
xxx"
The test for determining whether a party violated a rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan v.
Lopez, 145 SCRA 34, i.e., forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other
Consequently, where a litigant sues the same party against whom another action for the alleged violation of the same right and the
enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other; and a final judgment
in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the other. In either case, forum shopping could be cited by
the other party as a ground for summary dismissal of the petition, and for the imposition of other sanctions.
The instant petition falls squarely under the foregoing tests. CA-G.R. SP. No. 56211 was filed to secure a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 67720 and to annul extension of his TRO preventing herein petitioners
from taking over, control and possession of the Hagonoy-Multi-Purpose Hall. The instant petition was filed to secure a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding with Civil Case No. 67720, and from enforcing his Order effectively
preventing herein petitioners from taking over the control and possession of the Hagonoy Multi-Purpose Hall until further orders from his
court. In brief, the objective of relief being sought, though pertaining to different Orders of the same judge, is ultimately the same, i.e.,
preventing respondent judge from enjoining herein petitioners from taking over, control and possession of the Hagonoy Multi-Purpose
Hall and from further proceeding with the case below. In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 175 SCRA 201, the highest
tribunal ruled that the filing of two apparently different actions, but with the same objective, constituted forum shopping. The Former
Fourteenth Division itself, in its Resolution dated 16 December 1999, recognized the fact that respondent Barangay has been in
possession of the Multi-Purpose Hall since 1996, which continued possession would not unduly prejudice or cause injury and damage
to petitioners. It conceded respondent's contention that "allowing the respondent judge to proceed in the case will not render moot and
academic whatever action this Honorable Court may take in this case." Though both CA-G.R. SP No. 56211 and the instant case are
for certiorari and prohibition and filed with the same court, which technically are not covered by the rules on forum shopping, the fact
that CA-G.R. No. 56211 is still pending (as there is no action yet on petitioners' motion to withdraw the same) when the instant petition
was filed, is enough proof that the instant petition was resorted to circumvent the law. 8
On February 18, 2000, the CA Fourteenth Division where the first petition is pending issued a Resolution 9 granting petitioners' motion to
withdraw and dismissed the petition. It likewise found that the instant petition violated the rule on forum shopping since petitioners had
also filed with the same court another petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 56369, the second petition) involving identical parties and issues, and
virtually the same facts and circumstances.
Hence, this Petition for Review .
Petitioners allege that there is no forum shopping committed since the second Petition for Certiorari and prohibition was filed after they
had filed a motion to withdraw their first petition citing Executive Secretary v. Gordon;10 that it was ruled in the Gordon case that there is
no forum shopping when a party files a case in the lower court even after applying for a similar relief with the Supreme Court where
such party had sought the withdrawal of his case in the SC in order to seek recourse in the lower court; that there could be no forum
shopping before the same court or when both petitions are filed in the same court; that the two petitions assailed two different orders of
the trial court: (1) the Order dated December 10, 1999 which extended the initial 72-hour TRO to 20 days; and (2) the Order dated
December 17, 1999 granting the preliminary injunction against petitioners; that there is no forum shopping since no decision had been
arrived at yet in the first petition nor did the filing of the second petition increase petitioners' chances of winning or securing a favorable
action. Respondents filed their Comment thereto.
The parties filed their respective memoranda as required by the Court.
9
On August 8, 2003, the Municipality of Taguig filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that petitioners Ricardo Papa, Jr. and Roberto
Santos were the then Mayor of Taguig and Chief of the GSO of the Municipality, respectively; that they are no longer occupying these
positions because of the election of a new Mayor and the appointment of a new GSO Chief; that petitioner Municipality of Taguig now
agrees with the position of respondent Barangay that it is the owner of the multi-purpose hall subject of this case, thus, the Municipality
of Taguig should be disassociated in this case as petitioner and instead be made one of the respondents; and that the issue on forum
shopping be resolved.
We find no merit in the petition.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one
or the other court would make a favorable disposition.11
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.12
Petitioners allege that forum shopping does not exist where two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and
issues were raised and two objectives were sought, citing the case of Golangco v. CA.13
We do not agree as the reliance of petitioners on Golangco is misplaced. We found no forum shopping in said case because the two
petitions, one filed in the CA and other with us, questioned two unrelated orders of the trial court. Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA assailing the decision of the trial court dated October 4, 1995, granting the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the wife which enjoined petitioner husband from seeing their children. The CA dismissed the petition for
violation of forum shopping since petitioner also filed a petition before us questioning the trial court's Order dated July 21, 1994,
granting custody pendente lite of petitioner husband's children to his wife. We reversed the finding of the CA that there was forum
shopping, thus:
In assailing the October 4, 1995 order, petitioner was actually questioning the propriety of the issuance of the writ of injunction. He
alleged therein that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order since it disregarded his right to procedural
due process. Moreover the said order restrained him from seeing his children. He, therefore, sought the reinstatement of the July 21,
1994 order wherein he was given visitation rights of at least one week in a month.
On the other hand, in the order dated July 21 1994, petitioner specifically questioned the award of custody of the children to his wife
and prayed for more time to spend with his children.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the issues raised in the two petitions, that is, first questioning the order dated July 21, 1994 and
second, the order dated October 4, 1995 are distinct and different from one another. 14
Unlike in the instant case, although two different orders are being questioned by petitioners in their separate petitions for certiorari filed
with the CA, to wit: (1) the Order dated December 10, 1999 which extended the initial 72-hour TRO for another 17 days and (2) the
Order dated December 17, 1999 granting the issuance of preliminary injunction against petitioners, the latter are asking for the same
relief, that is, to prevent respondent judge from enjoining petitioners from taking over, control and possession of the Hagonoy Multi-
Purpose Hall and from further hearing Civil Case No. 67720. Notably, the reliefs being asked by petitioners in both petitions are
founded on the same fact that the act sought to be enjoined, which is taking the control and possession of the multi-purpose hall, had
already been consummated. Thus, the two actions are based on the same cause of action.
Moreover, it bears stressing that the CA Fourteenth Division where the first petition was pending had earlier issued a Resolution dated
December 16, 1999 lifting the cease and desist order it issued against the trial court after finding that respondent Barangay is in actual
possession of the hall since 1996. In effect, there was already a preliminary finding that there was no merit to petitioners' contention
that they are in possession of the multi-purpose hall. With the filing of the second petition where petitioners are again claiming that they
are in possession and control of the hall, which was assigned by raffle to another member of the CA belonging to another Division of
the latter, they, in effect, sought to improve their chances of obtaining a more favorable action by the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in their favor.
In fact, there was no need for petitioners to file a separate second petition where a new case docket number was given since they could
have just filed a supplemental pleading to their first petition since the issue raised in the second petition, which is the issuance of the
preliminary injunction, is but a continuation of the order assailed in the first petition, the issuance of a TRO, which can properly be ruled
upon by the same Division. In not doing so, petitioners deliberately sought another forum to grant them the relief that they wanted.
10
We likewise find no merit in petitioners' claim that since both petitions were filed in the CA, it is absurd for there to be forum shopping
when there is only one forum involved. In Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. NLRC,15 we held:
The labor arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the respondents was illegal. After receiving notice of a favorable decision, petitioner-
hotel dismissed the respondent-employees for having participated in this illegal strike. Respondents then filed its appeal from this
decision. And within the same month, the respondents filed their petition for injunction as a new injunction case.
It is not very difficult to see that the issues in these two cases are interrelated. Because of this relevant connection, the relief prayed for
by the respondents, i.e., injunction restraining the petitioner from dismissing them, could have been properly granted or denied in the
case on appeal. There was in fact no reason for the respondents to file a new injunction case before the same agency.
By doing this, they effectively sought another forum to grant them relief. The Court cannot but proscribe this as a species of forum
shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre, we said that:
There is forum shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari ) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative
processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.
And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we added that "filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court."
We have consistently ruled that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums. Although most
of the cases we have ruled upon regarding forum shopping involved petitions in the courts and administrative agencies, the rule
prohibiting it applies equally to multiple petitions in the same tribunal or agency.
By filing another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances in the same agency, as in this case where respondents
filed their appeal and injunction case separately in the NLRC, respondents approached two different fora in order to increase their
chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. This practice cannot be tolerated and should be condemned. 16 (Emphasis
supplied).
Thus, there is forum shopping in this case even if the petitions for certiorari and prohibition were both filed in the CA since there are
different Divisions involved.
Petitioners assert that they are in good faith since they specifically informed the CA of the existence of the first petition in their second
petition and that a motion to withdraw the same had already been filed. They cite the case of Executive Secretary v. Gordon17 where we
did not find Gordon to have committed forum shopping when despite the pendency of a Petition for Certiorari before us, he filed the
exact same petition with the trial court. Petitioners contend that the similarity of such case with this case is the fact that the motion to
withdraw petition was filed and that Gordon's second petition was filed before the motion to withdraw the first petition was granted; that
unlike in the Gordon case where he filed exactly the same case before different forum, the instant case involves two different orders
subject of two petitions, thus forum shopping is less likely to have been committed in the instant case than in the Gordon case.
We are not persuaded.
In the Gordon case, the filing of then Secretary Gordon of the second petition with the trial court was "due to the present policy of the
Court requiring parties and their counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of courts and to obviate any technical objection on this
ground." In this case, there was no valid reason advanced by petitioners in filing the second petition except that the first petition had
been mooted with the issuance of the preliminary injunction, subject of the second petition. Moreover, in the Gordon case, no action
had as yet been made on the case when he withdrew his earlier petition filed with us and filed the same case in the trial court. In the
instant case, however, the former Fourteenth Division of the CA where the first petition was pending had dissolved its earlier cease and
desist order issued against the trial court and ordered the respondent Judge to speedily resolve Civil Case No. 67720. It bears stressing
that petitioners were asking the CA to prevent respondent judge from enjoining petitioners from taking over, control and possession of
the Hagonoy Multi-Purpose Hall and from further hearing Civil Case No. 67720. With the filing of the second petition in the CA, it is
evident that they intended to take the chance that the second petition will be raffled off to another Justice belonging to a different
Division and thus improve their chances of obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction which was earlier denied by the former Fourteenth
Division.
Petitioners argue that the CA should have ordered the consolidation of the second petition with the first petition instead of dismissing
both cases on the ground of forum shopping.
11
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is contumacious, as well as an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and
abusive of their processes.18 It is improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. As held in BiÃ±an Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,19 thus:
Such contemptuous act is penalized by the summary dismissal of both actions as mandated by paragraph 17 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 and Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, to wit:
...
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL REQUISITES FOR PETITIONS FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING OR MULTIPLE FILING OF PETITIONS AND COMPLAINTS.
The attention of the Court has been called to the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, with the result that said tribunals or agency
have to resolve the same issues.
...
3. Penalties.
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint;
...
In Bugnay Construction & Development Corporation v. Laron, we declared:
Forum-shopping, an act of malpractice, is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is
improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. The rule has been formalized in Paragraph 17 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court of January 11, 1983, in connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act x x x.
The Rule ordains that (a) violation of the rule shall constitute a contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of
both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.
The rule against forum-shopping has been further strengthened by the issuance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Said circular formally established the rule that the deliberate filing of multiple complaints to obtain favorable action constitutes forum-
shopping and shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof.
Thus, a party's willful and deliberate act of forum shopping is punishable by summary dismissal of the actions filed. 20
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED and the Resolutions dated February 2, 2000 and March 20, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
12
Fontana Development Corp. v. Vukasinovic, G.R. No. 222424, [September 21, 2016]
G.R. No. 222424, September 21, 2016
FONTANA DEVELOPMENT CORP., DENNIS PAK AS GENERAL MANAGER, PASTOR ISAAC AS DIRECTOR OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, CHRIS CHENG* AS DEPUTY GROUP FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, JESUS CHUA, REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL
FELICIANO, ALMA EREDIANO, LEILANI VALIENTE, MAN CHOI AS GROUP FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, AND JAIME
VILLAREAL AS CHIEF ENGINEER, Petitioners, v. SASCHA VUKASINOVIC, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 dated April 28, 2015 and the
Resolution2 dated January 18, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125945.
The Facts
In July 2009, respondent Sascha Vukasinovic was hired by petitioner Fontana Development Corporation (FDC) as its Director for
Business Development for one year. His employment was renewed for another year at the end of his first contract. 3chanrobleslaw
Sometime in May 2010, he allegedly received a text message from one Jenny Mallari (Mallari) informing him that Nestor Dischoso
(Dischoso) and Chief Hotel Engineer Jaime Villareal (Engr. Villareal), both officers of petitioner FDC, were receiving commissions from
company transactions.
Thereafter, respondent met with Mallari and offered her money in exchange for evidence that will support her allegations. Mapari
handed over to respondent a photocopy of a check issued to Engr. Villareal, as proof of receiving commission. The check, however,
had an alteration so respondent asked Mallari to execute an affidavit and provide more proof. Respondent then paid Mallari the total
amount of fourteen thousand pesos (P14,000) on different occasions.
Mallari eventually gave respondent two invoices issued by one of the suppliers of petitioner FDC as proof of her allegations. Again,
respondent discovered discrepancies. Consequently, in his Inter-Office Memorandum dated June 7, 2010, respondent recommended to
Dennis Pak, petitioner FDC's General Manager, to conduct further investigations on the alleged corruptions of Engr. Villareal.
On June 15, 2010, FDC's Safety and Security Department brought Engr. Villareal and Mallari to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Office for questioning.4 During the inquiry, Mallari denied that Engr. Villareal asked for commissions from her and revealed that
she merely fabricated the story against Engr. Villareal so that she can ask money from respondent.
Following this turn of events, petitioner FDC received a complaint from Engr. Villareal claiming that respondent paid Mallari a
substantial amount of money to concoct a story depicting Engr. Villareal as a corrupt employee. 5chanrobleslaw
On October 2, 2010, respondent received a Show Cause/Preventive Suspension Order from petitioner FDC's Human Resources
Department, informing him of the complaint filed by Engr. Villareal and directing him to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for violating the provisions of the Company Code of Conduct on Dishonesty.
Respondent did not deny the allegations against him and, instead, admitted that he gave money to Mallari because "it is a common
practice in Fontana to give money to informants for vital information."6chanrobleslaw
Thus, petitioner FDC approved the recommendation of the Investigating Panel and terminated respondent's employment after finding
him guilty of acts of dishonesty in the form of "bribery in any form or manner" under Rule 1, Section 4 of petitioner FDC's Code of
Conduct,7 which carries the maximum penalty of dismissal. The Decision and the Notice of Termination were served on November 2,
2010. Respondent, however, refused to acknowledge its receipt and, instead, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
regularization, non-payment of salaries, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and demands for his reinstatement with full backwages against petitioner FDC and its officers. The case was docketed as NLRC Case
No. RAB-III-11-16967-10.
13
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On June 27, 2011, Labor Arbiter Mariano L. Bactin (Bactin) dismissed the complaint for lack of factual or legal basis, and ruled that
respondent cannot be regularized as he is an employee with a legal and valid fixed-term employment and that his dismissal was for a
just cause. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a Decision has been rendered DISMISSING this case with prejudice for lack of merit.
His claim for regularization, as well as his money claims, damages and attorney's fees must also be dismissed with prejudice for lack of
legal and factual basis.
SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent appealed the said Decision to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC rendered a Resolution9 dated March 15, 2012, dismissing the appeal and affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Bactin, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal filed by complainant is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter Mariano L.
Bactin dated June 27, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
In so ruling, the NLRC noted that respondent had previously filed another complaint before the same branch of the NLRC in San
Fernando, Pampanga, involving the same facts, issues, and prayer, entitled Sascha Vukasinovic v. Jimei International Ltd., Suk Man
Choi, as Group Financial Comptroller, and Chris Cheng, as Deputy Group Financial Comptroller, and docketed as NLRC Case No.
RAB III-09-18113-11. This previous case has been dismissed 11 by Labor Arbiter Reynaldo Abdon (Abdon) on the ground of forum
shopping. The dismissal was eventually sustained by both the NLRC and the CA. In its, March 16, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
126225, the 13th Division of the CA affirmed that there was, indeed, forum shopping. The CA Decision has become final there being no
appeal interposed by respondent.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 125945 and raffled to its 9 th Division.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA agreed with the NLRC when it ruled that herein respondent's employment had not ripened into regular employment and that he
was validly dismissed. Respondent, being a managerial employee, can be terminated on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
However, contrary to the Decision of the NLRC, the CA ordered the award of unpaid salaries to respondent. The CA held that petitioner
FDC failed to present evidence to show payment of the salaries of respondent for the period claimed. The dispositive portion of the April
28, 2015 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed March 15, 2012 Resolution is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner's
salaries for July 2009 to October 2009 and January 2010 to October 21, 2010 are hereby awarded.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, with dispatch, of the amounts due.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioners filed a petition for review before this Court, contending that the CA erred in not dismissing outright respondent's petition in
CAï¿½ G.R. SP No. 125945. They claim that given the final decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 126225, wherein all the elements of litis
pendentia were found, the CA should have refused to take cognizance of the case.
The Issue
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the CA gravely erred in not dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 125945 for deliberate
forum shopping.
14
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Respondent is guilty of forum shopping
There is forum shopping when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is
prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. 13 It degrades the administration of justice and
adds to the already congested court dockets.14chanrobleslaw
In Gloria S. Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc.,15 this Court had the occasion to explain the grave evil sought to be avoided by forum
shopping, to wit:
The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck
in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules
against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. To stamp out this abominable practice, which
seriously impairs the efficient administration of justice, this Court promulgated Administrative Circulars No. 28-91 and No. 04-94, which
are now embodied as Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasiï¿½ judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading,
but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification of or nonï¿½ compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of
court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another or
whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter
action pendant or lis pendens.16chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, there is no doubt that all the elements of litis pendentia have already been established, as this was already settled
with finality in CA-G.R. SP No. 126225. Yet, in his Comment, respondent repeatedly claimed that there was no forum shopping and
petitioners are misleading this Court, making it appear that forum shopping exists when there is none at all.
Respondent's position is without basis.
It should be noted that in his Decision in NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-11, Labor Arbiter Abdon observed that there is an identity of
parties between NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-18113-11 and NLRC Case No. RABï¿½ III-11-16967-10 which is the complaint incipient in
the present controversy. He pointed out that both complaints show that petitioners Chris Cheng and Man Choi are similarly impleaded
in their capacities as officers of petitioner FDC and that there is also an identity of causes of action and reliefs prayed for by
respondent.17 To reiterate, Labor Arbiter Abdon's Decision was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. In particular, in its Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 126225 denying the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, the CA observed, thus:
What is truly important to consider in determining whether Jorum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and
partiesï¿½ litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different for a upon the same issues.
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent filed two labor complaints: first, NLRC Case No. RAB III-11-16967-10-P entitled
15
"Sascha Vukasinovic v. Fontana Development Corporation, Dennis Pak, Pastor Isaac, Cllris Clleng, Jesus Chua, Michael
Feliciano, Alma Erediano, Leilani Valiente, Man Clwi and Jaime Villareal' for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension,
regularization, non-payment of salaries, service incentive leave pay, 13 th month pay, as well as actual, moral and exemplary
damages andï¿½ attorney's fees, with prayer for reinstatement and full back wages; and second, NLRC Case No. RAB III-09-
18113-11 entitled "Sascha Vukasinovic v. National Labor Relations Commission, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo B. Abdon, Jimei S.
International, Ltd. (JSIL), Mr. Suk Man Choi in his capacity as Group Financial Comptroller of JSIL, Chris Cheng in his
capacity as Deputy Group Financial Comptroller of JSIL", for constructive (illegal) dismissal, regularization, non-payment of
salaries, premium pay for holiday and rest days, service incentive leave pay, 13 th month pay, as well as damages and
attorney's fees and other monetary claims including bonuses and travel expenses (repatriation expenses). It is also
undisputed that the causes of action (illegal dismissal and constructive dismissal) in the respective complaints in the two (2)
cases stemmed from the adverse decision in the administrative case filed againstï¿½ respondent that resulted toï¿½ hisï¿½
dismissal from employment.
In Jesse Yap v. Court of Appeals, it was held:
xxxx
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at.least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
All the elements of litis pendencia are present in this case.18chanrobleslaw
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the existence of forum shopping has been duly proved in this case. As a result, petitioners hinge this present appeal on the
error committed by the CA in not dismissing outright the appeal filed by respondent.
When there is forum shopping, all pending

claims on the same claim must be dismissed
It is well-settled that once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before
this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is the punitive measure to those
who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.19chanrobleslaw
The rule originated from the 1986 case of Buan v. Lopez, Jr.20 In the said case, petitioners therein instituted before the Court a special
civil action for prohibition and, almost a month earlier, another special civil action for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila. Finding petitioners guilty of forum shopping since all the elements of litis pendentia were duly
proved, the Court dismissed not only the action before it, but also the special civil action still pending before the RTC, viz:
Indeed, the petitioners in both actions x x x have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in
accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and
that in Regional Trial Court as well.
The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by dismissing all pending actions on the same claim filed in any court. Because of the
severity of the penalty of the rule, an examination must first be made on the purpose of the rule. 21 The purpose of the rule is to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to prevent a party from instituting two or more actions or proceeding involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.22chanrobleslaw
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.23 Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a
ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt. 24chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court mandates that a willful and deliberate forum shopping shall be a ground for
summary dismissal of a case with prejudice, thus:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. ï¿½The plaintiff or principal party shall cetify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
16
complete statement of the present status thereof and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, the CA should have dismissed the case outright without rendering a decision on the merits of the case. Respondent
should be penalized for willfully and deliberately trifling with court processes. The purpose of the law will be defeated if respondent will
be granted the relief prayed for despite his act of deliberately committing forum shopping.
Respondent, per Manifestation of his counsel, Atty. Erick Nolan G. Mosuela (Mosuela), died on July 19, 2016. Atty. Mosuela manifested
that he has no information as to the heirs of respondent, hence, his inability to substitute them, if any, in the place of respondent.
The instant case involves an illegal dismissal which is an action that does not survive the death of the accused. The Court ruled
in Bonilla v. Barcena,25cralawred to wit:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and
rights of property affected being incidental.
Since the property and property rights of the respondent is only incidental to his complaint for illegal dismissal, the same does not
survive his death. Nonetheless, considering the foregoing disposition dismissing respondent's petition before the CA and ergo his
complaint for illegal dismissal, the Court can proceed with the resolution of the petition even without the need for substitution of the
heirs of respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 125945
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari filed by respondent Sascha Vukasinovic with
the CA is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of deliberate forum shopping.
SO ORDERED.
17
Vda. de Formoso vs. PNB, 650 SCRA 35, 44-45

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154704 June 1, 2011
NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY
JANE FORMOSO, BERNARD FORMOSO and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO, and ROBERTO NAVARRO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition are the January 25, 2002 Resolution 1 and the August 8, 2002 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioners in CA G.R. SP No. 67183, entitled "Nellie P. Vda. De Formoso, et al. v. Philippine National Bank,
et al."
The Factual and
Procedural Antecedents
Records show that on October 14, 1989, Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely: Ma. Theresa Formoso-
Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso, executed a special power of attorney in
favor of Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him, among others, to secure all papers and documents including the owner’s copies
of the titles of real properties pertaining to the loan with real estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband,
Benjamin S. Formoso, from Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch (PNB) on September 4, 1980.
On April 20, 1990, the Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Subsequently, on March 22, 1994, Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation including interests in the amount
of ₱2,461,024.74.
PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcaba’s tender of payment and to release the mortgage or surrender the titles of the
subject mortgaged real properties.
On March 24, 1994, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur (RTC) praying, among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of ₱2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan
obligation of the Formosos.
After an exchange of several pleadings, the RTC finally rendered its decision 3 on October 27, 1999 favoring the petitioners. The
petitioners’ prayer for exemplary or corrective damages, attorney’s fees, and annual interest and daily interest, however, were denied
for lack of evidence.
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply with Rule 15, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal but it was dismissed for being filed out of time.
The petitioners received their copy of the decision on November 26, 1999, and on January 25, 2001, they filed their Petition for Relief
from Judgment4 questioning the RTC decision that there was no testimonial evidence presented to warrant the award for moral and
exemplary damages. They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion for reconsideration because they could not get hold of a
copy of the transcripts of stenographic notes. In its August 6, 2001 Order, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. 5
18
On September 7, 2001, the petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Omnibus Order of September 26,
2001.6
Before the Court of Appeals
On November 29, 2001, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the RTC Order of August 6, 2001 and its
Omnibus Order dated September 26, 2001.
In its January 25, 2002 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition stating that:
The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr. Primitivo Macalba) of the many petitioners.
In Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000, it was ruled that all petitioners must be signatories to the
certification of non-forum shopping unless the one who signed it is authorized by the other petitioners. In the case at bar, there was no
showing that the one who signed was empowered to act for the rest. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to
the best of his knowledge whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar claims or actions filed or pending. The ruling in Loquias
further declared that substantial compliance will not suffice in the matter involving strict observance of the Rules. Likewise, the
certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who executed the same and that petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harping on
the policy of liberal construction.
Aggrieved, after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed this petition for review anchored on the following
GROUNDS
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS MUST SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEREIN ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE
INVOLVED.
ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE WHOLE PETITION WHEN AT THE VERY
LEAST THE PETITION INSOFAR AS PETITIONER MALCABA IS CONCERNED BEING THE SIGNATORY THEREOF SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT ON TECHNICALITIES WHEN THE PETITION BEFORE
IT WAS CLEARLY MERITORIOUS.7
The petitioners basically argue that they have substantially complied with the requirements provided under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The petitioners are of the view that the rule on Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping that all petitioners must sign should be liberally construed, since only questions of law are raised
in a petition for certiorari and no factual issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners.
The petitioners further claim that they have a meritorious petition because contrary to the ruling of the RTC, their Petition for Relief
clearly showed that, based on the transcript of stenographic notes, there was enough testimonial evidence for the RTC to grant them
damages and attorney’s fees as prayed for.
On the other hand, PNB counters that the mandatory rule on the certification against forum shopping requires that all of the six (6)
petitioners must sign, namely: Nellie Vda. De Formoso and her children Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane
Formoso, and Bernard Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Therefore, the signature alone of Malcaba on the certification is insufficient.
PNB further argues that Malcaba was not even a party or signatory to the contract of loan entered into by his co-petitioners. Neither
was there evidence that Malcaba is a relative or a co-owner of the subject properties. It likewise argues that, contrary to the stance of
the petitioners, the issue raised before the CA, as to whether or not the petitioners were entitled to moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees, is a factual one.
Finally, PNB asserts that the body of the complaint filed by the petitioners failed to show any allegation that Macalba alone suffered
damages for which he alone was entitled to reliefs as prayed for. PNB claims that the wordings of the complaint were clear that all the
petitioners were asking for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
19
Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it
must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.8 Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph
of Section 3, Rule 46. [Emphasis supplied]
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. – The petition shall contain the full names and
actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the
case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial
thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy
intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and
other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or his duly authorized
representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The
other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the
original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of ₱500.00 for
costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of
the petition. [Emphases supplied]
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition
fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural
errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars.9 [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA substantially complied with the
requirements provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
The Court disagrees.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
20
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and
belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x.
In this regard, the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, 10 is enlightening:
Respecting the appellate court’s dismissal of petitioners’ appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying
verification and certification against forum-shopping, the Court’s guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, which were culled
"from jurisprudential pronouncements," are instructive:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating
his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso, Ma. Theresa
Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba.
Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power
of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could
21
the petitioners give at least a reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
In Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R. Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, the Court explained that:
The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There
is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by
Jimenez but also by Athena’s duly authorized representative.
In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in
a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal
knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge
of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition.
The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both
petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against
forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be
signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in
such document.
While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case, petitioners have
not shown any reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these persuasive reasons is present here.
In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the procedural lapses committed
by petitioners.11 [Emphases supplied]
Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA should not have dismissed the whole petition but should have given it due course insofar
as Malcaba is concerned because he signed the certification. The petitioners also contend that the CA should have been liberal in the
application of the Rules because they have a meritorious case against PNB.
The Court, however, is not persuaded.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they
refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution. 12
Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.13 In these cases, however, those who did not sign were relatives of the
lone signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners and who cannot
speak for them. In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,14 it was written:
In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed
of the subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents’ construction of a family home and occupation thereof for more than 10
years. The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority to
inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same
issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same
issues.
Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common
cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to
speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal
involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the
Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative,15 where it was stated:
22
The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the certification of
non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x x 16
Considering the above circumstances, the Court does not see any similarity at all in the case at bench to compel itself to relax the
requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification against forum shopping.
At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the petitioners’ request to re-examine the testimony of Malcaba in the transcript of
stenographic notes of the April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged testimonial proof of damages for obvious reasons.
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.17
In this case, the petition clearly raises a factual issue.1avvphil As correctly argued by PNB, the substantive issue of whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a
petition for review on certiorari.
Secondly, even if the Court glosses over the technical defects, the petition for relief cannot be granted. A perusal of the Petition for
Relief of Judgment discloses that there is no fact constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which are the grounds
therefor. From the petition itself, it appears that the petitioners’ counsel had a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes which was in
his cabinet all along and only discovered it when he was disposing old and terminated cases. 18 If he was only attentive to his records,
he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal in behalf of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
23
Altres v. Empleo, G.R. No. 180986, [December 10, 2008], 594 PHIL 246-268

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180986 December 10, 2008
NORBERTO ALTRES, EVITA BULINGAN, EVANGELINE SASTINE, FELIPE SASA, LILIBETH SILLAR, RAMONITO JAYSON,
JELO TUCALO, JUAN BUCA, JR., JUE CHRISTINE CALAMBA, ROMEO PACQUINGAN, JR., CLEO JEAN ANGARA, LOVENA
OYAO, RODOLFO TRINIDAD, LEONILA SARA, SORINA BELDAD, MA. LINDA NINAL, LILIA PONCE, JOSEFINA ONGCOY,
ADELYN BUCTUAN, ALMA ORBE, MYLENE SOLIVA, NAZARENE LLOREN, ELIZABETH MANSERAS, DIAMOND MOHAMAD,
MARYDELL CADAVOS, ELENA DADIOS, ALVIN CASTRO, LILIBETH RAZO, NORMA CEPRIA, PINIDO BELEY, JULIUS
HAGANAS, ARTHUR CABIGON, CERILA BALABA, LIEZEL SIMAN, JUSTINA YUMOL, NERLITA CALI, JANETH BICOY, HENRY
LACIDA, CESARIO ADVINCULA, JR., MERLYN RAMOS, VIRGIE TABADA, BERNARDITA CANGKE, LYNIE GUMALO, ISABEL
ADANZA, ERNESTO LOBATON, RENE ARIMAS, FE SALVACION ORBE, JULIE QUIJANO, JUDITHO LANIT, GILBERTO ELIMIA,
MANUEL PADAYOGDOG, HENRY BESIN, ROMULO PASILANG, BARTOLOME TAPOYAO, JR., RUWENA GORRES, MARIBETH
RONDEZ, FERDINAND CAORONG, TEODOMERO CORONEL, ELIZABETH SAGPANG, and JUANITA ALVIOLA, petitioners,
vs.
CAMILO G. EMPLEO, FRANKLIN MAATA, LIVEY VILLAREN, RAIDES CAGA, FRANCO BADELLES, ERNESTO BALAT, GRACE
SAQUILABON, MARINA JUMALON and GEORGE DACUP, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated February 2, 2007 1 and Order dated October 22, 20072 of Branch 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, which denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus praying for a writ commanding the city
accountant of Iligan, Camilo G. Empleo (Empleo), or his successor in office, to issue a certification of availability of funds in connection
with their appointments, issued by then Iligan City Mayor Franklin M. Quijano (Mayor Quijano), which were pending approval by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC).
Sometime in July 2003, Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions in the city government to the CSC. The city
government and the CSC thereupon proceeded to publicly announce the existence of the vacant positions. Petitioners and other
applicants submitted their applications for the different positions where they felt qualified.
Toward the end of his term or on May 27, June 1, and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.
In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued Resolution No. 04-2423 addressed to the CSC Iligan City Field Office
requesting a suspension of action on the processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city government as of
March 19, 2004 until the enactment of a new budget.
The Sangguniang Panglungsod subsequently issued Resolution No. 04-2664 which, in view of its stated policy against "midnight
appointments," directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management Office to hold in abeyance the transmission of all
appointments signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor in order to ascertain whether these had been hurriedly prepared or
carefully considered and whether the matters of promotion and/or qualifications had been properly addressed. The same Resolution
enjoined all officers of the said Office to put off the transmission of all appointments to the CSC, therein making it clear that non-
compliance therewith would be met with administrative action.
Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
petitioners, as required by Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 reading:
xxxx
e. LGU Appointment. Appointment in local government units for submission to the Commission shall be accompanied, in
addition to the common requirements, by the following:
24
xxxx
ii. Certification by the Municipal/City Provincial Accountant/Budget Officer that funds are available. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
And the other respondents did not sign petitioners’ position description forms.
The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments issued to petitioners invariably due to lack of
certification of availability of funds.
On appeal by Mayor Quijano, CSC Regional Office No. XII in Cotabato City, by Decision of July 30, 2004, 5 dismissed the appeal, it
explaining that its function in approving appointments is only ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed by the
civil service law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it without delving into the reasons why the requirement was not complied
with.
Petitioners thus filed with the RTC of Iligan City the above-stated petition for mandamus against respondent Empleo or his successor in
office for him to issue a certification of availability of funds for the payment of the salaries and wages of petitioners, and for his co-
respondents or their successors in office to sign the position description forms.
As stated early on, Branch 3 of the Iligan RTC denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus. It held that, among other things, while it is the
ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify as to the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenses and obligations may
properly be charged under Section 474(b)(4) of Republic Act No. 7160, 6 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the
city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
petitioners as this ministerial function pertains to the city treasurer. In so holding, the trial court relied on Section 344 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 the pertinent portion of which provides:
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. – No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the
existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation,
and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration7 in which they maintained only their prayer for a writ of mandamus for respondent Empleo
or his successor in office to issue a certification of availability of funds for the payment of their salaries and wages. The trial court
denied the motion by Order of October 22, 2007,8 hence, the present petition.
By Resolution of January 22, 2008,9 this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice, and at the same time required petitioners to comply, within the same period, with the relevant
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners filed a Compliance Report dated February 18, 2008 10 to which they attached 18 copies of (a) a verification and certification,
(b) an affidavit of service, and (c) photocopies of counsel’s Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) official receipt for the year 2008 and
his privilege tax receipt for the same year.
Respondents duly filed their Comment,11 alleging technical flaws in petitioners’ petition, to which Comment petitioners filed their
Reply12 in compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2008.13
The lone issue in the present petition is whether it is Section 474(b)(4) or Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
applies to the requirement of certification of availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular Number
40, Series of 1998. As earlier stated, the trial court ruled that it is Section 344. Petitioners posit, however, that it is Section 474(b)(4)
under which it is the ministerial duty of the city accountant to issue the certification, and not Section 344 which pertains to the ministerial
function of the city treasurer to issue the therein stated certification.
A discussion first of the technical matters questioned by respondents is in order.
Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition as it bears the
signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. They thus
move for the dismissal of the petition, citing Section 5, Rule 7 14 vis a vis Section 5, Rule 4515 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and Docena v. Lapesura16 which held that the certification against forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in
a case and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient as the attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the
same.17
25
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that they have a justifiable cause for their inability to obtain the signatures of the other petitioners
as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case. 18 Petitioners plead substantial compliance,
citing Huntington Steel Products, Inc., et al. v. NLRC19 which held, among other things, that while the rule is mandatory in nature,
substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances is enough.
Petitioners’ position is more in accord with recent decisions of this Court.
In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada,20 the Court held:
The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, where the
Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of petitioners because he is a relative of the other petitioners
and co-owner of the properties in dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines, where the
Court allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home in which all the
petitioners shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver, where the Court considered as valid the certification signed by
only four of the nine petitioners because all petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for
quieting of title and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole; and DAR v. Alonzo-Legasto, where
the Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they were sued jointly involving a property in which
they had a common interest.21 (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Very recently, in Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al.,22 the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to the original petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was signed by only two out of over 100 petitioners and the same was filed one day beyond
the period allowed by the Rules. The appellate court initially resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for these reasons, but on
the therein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the appellate court ordered the filing of an amended petition in order to include all the
original complainants numbering about 240. An amended petition was then filed in compliance with the said order, but only 180 of the
240 original complainants signed the verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for
reconsideration and resolved to reinstate the petition.
In sustaining the Court of Appeals in Tan, the Court held that it is a far better and more prudent course of action to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause
grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
The Court further discoursed in Tan:
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the requirements of verification and certification so
that the ends of justice may be better served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in
good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.
In Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, we ruled that the verification requirement had been substantially
complied with despite the fact that only two (2) out of the twenty-five (25) petitioners have signed the petition for review and
the verification. In that case, we held that the two signatories were unquestionably real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly
had sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the Petition.
In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we also ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of
verification when only one of the petitioners, the President of the University, signed for and on behalf of the institution and its
officers.
Similarly, in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Uy, we allowed the signature of only one of the principal parties
in the case despite the absence of a Board Resolution which conferred upon him the authority to represent the petitioner
BCDA.
In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus,
we see no reason why we should not uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the petition despite the said
formal defect.
On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is that all the petitioners must sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have signed the certification cannot be
presumed to have the personal knowledge of the other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any
action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. The rule, however, admits of an exception and that is when the
petitioners show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince the
court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
26
In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the respondents who were the original complainants
have since sought employment in the neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles City. Only the one hundred
eighty (180) signatories were then available to sign the amended Petition for Certiorari and the accompanying verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.23
In the present case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the Court that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; that the pleading is
filed in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be
contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the case.
In fact, even Docena24 cited by respondents sustains petitioners’ position. In that case, the certification against forum shopping was
signed by only one of the petitioning spouses. The Court held that the certification against forum shopping should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the Rules considering, among other things, that the petitioners were husband and wife, and that
the subject property was their residence which was alleged in their verified petition to be conjugal. 25
With respect to petitioners’ non-presentation of any identification before the notary public at the time they swore to their verification and
certification attached to the petition, suffice it to state that this was cured by petitioners’ compliance 26 with the Court’s Resolution of
January 22, 200827 wherein they submitted a notarized verification and certification bearing the details of their community tax
certificates. This, too, is substantial compliance. The Court need not belabor its discretion to authorize subsequent compliance with the
Rules.
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 28
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.29
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable
by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance"
or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."30
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;31 otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 32
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. 33 If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney 34 designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
And now, on respondents’ argument that petitioners raise questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari as
the same must raise only questions of law. They entertain doubt on whether petitioners seek the payment of their salaries, and assert
that the question of whether the city accountant can be compelled to issue a certification of availability of funds under the circumstances
herein obtaining is a factual issue.35
The Court holds that indeed petitioners are raising a question of law.
The Court had repeatedly clarified the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
27
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. 36 A question of fact, on
the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 37 When there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law. 38
In the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented, but
rather the determination of which of the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies to the Civil Service Memorandum
Circular requiring a certificate of availability of funds relative to the approval of petitioners’ appointments.
At all events, respondents contend that the case has become moot and academic as the appointments of petitioners had already been
disapproved by the CSC. Petitioners maintain otherwise, arguing that the act of respondent Empleo in not issuing the required
certification of availability of funds unduly interfered with the power of appointment of then Mayor Quijano; that the Sangguniang
Panglungsod Resolutions relied upon by respondent Empleo constituted legislative intervention in the mayor’s power to appoint; and
that the prohibition against midnight appointments applies only to presidential appointments as affirmed in De Rama v. Court of
Appeals.39
The Court finds that, indeed, the case had been rendered moot and academic by the final disapproval of petitioners’
appointments by the CSC.
The mootness of the case notwithstanding, the Court resolved to rule on its merits in order to settle the issue once and for all,
given that the contested action is one capable of repetition 40 or susceptible of recurrence.
The pertinent portions of Sections 474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provide:
Section 474. Qualifications, Powers and Duties. –
xxxx
(b) The accountant shall take charge of both the accounting and internal audit services of the local government unit concerned
and shall:
xxxx
(4) certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations may be properly charged.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. – No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the
existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners propound the following distinctions between Sections 474(b)(4) and 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991:
(1) Section 474(b)(4) speaks of certification of availability of budgetary allotment, while Section 344 speaks of certification of
availability of funds for disbursement;
(2) Under Section 474(b)(4), before a certification is issued, there must be an appropriation, while under Section 344, before a
certification is issued, two requisites must concur: (a) there must be an appropriation legally made for the purpose, and (b) the
local accountant has obligated said appropriation;
(3) Under Section 474(b)(4), there is no actual payment involved because the certification is for the purpose of obligating a
portion of the appropriation; while under Section 344, the certification is for the purpose of payment after the local accountant
had obligated a portion of the appropriation;
(4) Under Section 474(b)(4), the certification is issued if there is an appropriation, let us say, for the salaries of appointees;
while under Section 344, the certification is issued if there is an appropriation and the same is obligated, let us say, for the
payment of salaries of employees.41
28
Respondents do not squarely address the issue in their Comment.
Section 344 speaks of actual disbursements of money from the local treasury in payment of due and demandable obligations of the
local government unit. The disbursements are to be made through the issuance, certification, and approval of vouchers. The full text of
Section 344 provides:
Sec. 344. Certification and Approval of Vouchers. – No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to
the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said
appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be
certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to
validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring
administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and
telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, SSS, LDP, DBP, National Printing Office,
Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall
be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of the fund.
In case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically
perform his function and he shall be fully responsible therefor. (Italics and underscoring supplied)
"Voucher," in its ordinary meaning, is a document which shows that services have been performed or expenses incurred. 42 When used
in connection with disbursement of money, it implies the existence of an instrument that shows on what account or by what authority a
particular payment has been made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. 43
Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 thus applies only when there is already an obligation to pay on the part of the local
government unit, precisely because vouchers are issued only when services have been performed or expenses incurred.
The requirement of certification of availability of funds from the city treasurer under Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991
is for the purpose of facilitating the approval of vouchers issued for the payment of services already rendered to, and expenses incurred
by, the local government unit.
The trial court thus erred in relying on Section 344 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in ruling that the ministerial function to issue
a certification as to availability of funds for the payment of the wages and salaries of petitioners pertains to the city treasurer. For at the
time material to the required issuance of the certification, the appointments issued to petitioners were not yet approved by the CSC,
hence, there were yet no services performed to speak of. In other words, there was yet no due and demandable obligation of the local
government to petitioners.
Section 474, subparagraph (b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the other hand, requires the city accountant to "certify to
the availability of budgetary allotment to which expenditures and obligations may be properly charged."44 By necessary implication, it
includes the duty to certify to the availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of appointees to positions in the plantilla of
the local government unit, as required under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of CSC Memorandum Circular Number 40, Series of 1998, a
requirement before the CSC considers the approval of the appointments.
In fine, whenever a certification as to availability of funds is required for purposes other than actual payment of an obligation which
requires disbursement of money, Section 474(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991 applies, and it is the ministerial duty of the
city accountant to issue the certification.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares that it is Section 474(b)(4), not Section 344, of the Local Government Code of 1991, which applies to
the requirement of certification of availability of funds under Section 1(e)(ii), Rule V of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
Number 40, Series of 1998.
SO ORDERED.
29
LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, [January 25, 2006]
G.R. No. 159653 January 25, 2006
LDP MARKETING, INC. and MA. LOURDES DE LA PEÑA, Petitioners,

vs.
ERLINDA DYOLDE MONTER, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent, Erlinda Dyolde Monter, a cashier at the Red Tag Convenience Store, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and related
causes of action against petitioner LDP Marketing, Inc., owner-operator of the store, and LDP’s Vice-President-co-petitioner Ma.
Lourdes Dela Peña.
By Decision1 of January 2, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), by Resolution 2 of May 24, 2002, affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision,
modifying, however, the amount of attorney’s fees awarded.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, they filed on May 19, 2002 before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari wherein the Verification/Certification of non-forum shopping was accomplished by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Dela
Peña-Vice-President of its co-petitioner corporation.
By Resolution of December 23, 2002, the appellate court, citing Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals,3 dismissed petitioners’
Petition for Certiorari for "failing to attach to the petition a copy of the company board resolution authorizing said Ma. Lourdes Dela
Peña to sign the said Verification/Certification of [non-]forum shopping for and in behalf of petitioner corporation."
To the appellate court’s Resolution, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 4 to which they attached a January 24, 2003
Secretary’s Certificate5 quoting a Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of petitioner corporation during a special meeting on
May 19, 1999 reading:
xxxx
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved that Ms. Ma. Lourdes dela Peña and/or Ms. Nonita R. Dela Peña are hereby appointed,
designated and authorized to be the attorney-in-fact and representative of the Corporation, with absolute and complete authority to
sign, enter into any stipulation, agreement, settlement or compromise and act on any and all matters that may be taken up in behalf of
the Corporation in all the proceedings in connection with the case entitled "Erlinda D. Monter vs. LDP Marketing, Inc. and/or Ma.
Lourdes dela Peña" with NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-03-02699-99, pending with the National Labor Relations Commission, National
Capital Region, wherein the Corporation is a respondent.
3. The above-resolution has not been revoked and is in full force and effect as of the date of this certification. 6 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, "find[ing] no cogent reason to reverse" its Resolution of December 23, 2002, denied petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration by Resolution7 of August 20, 2003.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners advancing the following arguments:
1. The case of Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 286 (2000) relied upon by the Court of Appeals in
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari is not applicable in this case.
2. The more recent case of Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 334 (2001) which affirmed the validity of a
verification/certification against forum shopping despite the absence of an attached authorization confirming the authority of
the person signing for and in behalf of a corporate entity, is the leading case applicable to the present controversy.
3. Assuming for the sake of argument that there was indeed a technical defect in the Petition for Certiorari due [to] the failure
of [p]etitioners to attach a written authorization to sign the verification/certification against forum shopping, the merits of the
case and the substantial interest of justice dictates that the Petition for Certiorari should be given due course.8 (Underscoring
supplied)
30
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping.9
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.10
The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.11
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof, and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.12
The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations,
considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and juridical persons. 13
A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts,
like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a
specific act of the board of directors. 14
In Digital Microwave Corporation15 relied upon by the appellate court in dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari, the certification of
non-forum shopping was signed by the therein petitioner corporation’s counsel, hence, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as amended. On the therein petitioner corporation’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the appellate court denied the same "absent any compelling reason for petitioner’s failure to comply at the first
instance with [the circular] . . ." On the petitioner’s petition, this Court denied the same in this wise:
In this case, petitioner has not adequately explained its failure to have the certification against forum shopping signed by one of its
officers. Neither has it shown any compelling reason for us to disregard strict compliance with the rules.
As we further stated in Spouses Ortiz,
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals17 cited by herein petitioners, the therein petitioner Shipside
Incorporated filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed it, citing absence of proof
that the one who signed the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, its Manager Lorenzo Balbin, Jr., was authorized to
institute the petition for and in behalf of the petitioner. Shipside Incorporated filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which it attached a
certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten days before the filing of the petition, its board of directors authorized Balbin to
file it. The Court of Appeals just the same denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In granting petitioner Shipside Incorporated’s Petition
for Certiorari, this Court held:
It is undisputed that on October 21, 1999, the time petitioner’s Resident Manager Balbin filed the petition, there was no proof attached
thereto that Balbin was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certification therein, as a consequence of which the
petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, subsequent to such dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
attaching to said motion a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that on October 11, 1999, or ten days prior to the filing of the
petition, Balbin had been authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to file said petition.
The Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy v.
LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419). Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading,
non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
31
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest
as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court
allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, supra, the Court had dismissed
Uy’s petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after
Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum
shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify
tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the
instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was
authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action
on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless
the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-
shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255 SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent
ideal.18 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner corporation rectified its failure to submit proof of its petitioner-Vice-President Ma. Lourdes dela Peña’s
authority to sign the Verification/Certification on non-forum shopping also on its behalf when it attached the necessary document to its
Motion for Reconsideration before the appellate court. And petitioners stressed in said motion their "basic and principal argument x x x
that the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that private
respondent x x x was illegally dismissed, when the facts and circumstances show otherwise."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated December 23, 2002 and August 20, 2003
are SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is hereby DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in
light of the foregoing discussion.
SO ORDERED.
32

RULE 7 - CASES - Civil Procedure

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

RULE 7 - CASES - Civil Procedure

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

RULE 7 - CASES - Civil Procedure

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rule 7 – Parts and Contents of a

Bucal v. Bucal, G.R. No. 206957 (2015)...............................................................................................................2

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206957 June 17, 2015

CHERITH A. BUCAL, Petitioner,

The RTC Proceedings

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The second and third exceptions obtain in this case.

G.R. No. 162342 October 11, 2006

JAIME H. BALLAO, petitioner,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Hence, the instant petition where petitioner maintains that:

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred

Was petitioner illegally dismissed?

Costs against private respondent.

[G.R. NO. 142619. September 14, 2005]

On December 15, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution4 directing the trial

Hence, this Petition for Review .

The parties filed their respective memoranda as required by the Court.

We find no merit in the petition.

In Villanueva v. Adre, we said that:

We are not persuaded.

In Bugnay Construction & Development Corporation v. Laron, we declared:

G.R. No. 222424, September 21, 2016

VELASCO JR., J.:

Respondent appealed the said Decision to the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC).

The Ruling of the NLRC

The Ruling of the CA

The petition is meritorious.

Respondent is guilty of forum shopping

Respondent's position is without basis.

In Jesse Yap v. Court of Appeals, it was held:

All the elements of litis pendencia are present in this case.18chanrobleslaw

When there is forum shopping, all pending

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 154704 June 1, 2011

The Factual and

Before the Court of Appeals

The petition lacks merit.

The Court disagrees.

Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

The Court, however, is not persuaded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 180986 December 10, 2008

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

A discussion first of the technical matters questioned by respondents is in order.

Petitioners’ position is more in accord with recent decisions of this Court.

In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Ponferrada,20 the Court held:

The Court further discoursed in Tan:

Section 474. Qualifications, Powers and Duties. –

G.R. No. 159653 January 25, 2006

LDP MARKETING, INC. and MA. LOURDES DE LA PEÑA, Petitioners,

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By Decision1 of January 2, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent.