Beets 2019

Journal of Academic Ethics
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-019-09333-5
The Charles Koch Foundation and Contracted

Universities: Evidence from Disclosed Agreements
S. Douglas Beets 1
# Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract
Since 2000, the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF) has paid hundreds of millions of dollars to
US universities in contractual exchanges. Many of these contracts have dictated the establish-
ment or support of a CKF-affiliated center or institute on campus and university employment
of CKF-affiliated tenured or tenure-track professors who agree to promote the CKF philosophy
of minimal government regulation of business. While many in the academic community are
opposed to these contracts because of concerns about academic freedom and the transfer of
university decision-making from the campus to the external wealthy, the CKF has successfully
forged many such contracts with universities. While most of these contracts are undisclosed,
14 of these contracts were obtained and analyzed to determine what the CKF has been
purchasing from these universities.
Keywords Charles Koch Foundation . Academic freedom . University centers . University

institutes . Wealthy donors . Curriculumcontrol . Universityagreements . Agreement transparency
Introduction
Since 2000, the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF) has paid hundreds of millions of dollars to
universities in the United States (US); in 2017 alone, the foundation paid more than $50
million to more than 300 colleges and universities. Many of these payments have been made to
compensate contracted universities to promote a specific, conservative philosophy on campus
(Barakat 2018; Hensley-Clancy 2018; Korn 2017; Kotch 2016; Roosevelt 2018; Safier 2017).
While the foundation’s requirements of the contracted universities are rarely disclosed, the
related agreements with 14 diverse universities have been made available for public perusal.
An analysis of these contracts provides insights into the foundation’s provision of extensive
targeted funding to fund centers and institutes on university campuses that promote free
* S. Douglas Beets
beets@wfu.edu
1
Wake Forest University, 7285 Reynolda Station, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA
S.D. Beets
enterprise with minimal government regulation. The analysis also reveals the willingness of
many universities to accept extensive funding with questionable attached provisions.
The State of Funding in Higher Education
Funding of universities from state and federal governments has declined substantially since
approximately 2000. In the years between 2008 and 2016, for example, state funding of higher
education in the US dropped by an average of more than 15% (Mitchell et al. 2017; Tugend
2016). Part of the reason for this funding decline is a gradual shift in state legislatures toward a
political perspective that favors smaller government and corresponding fewer resources for
education. (Basken 2017; Brownstein 2018; Fandos 2016; Fichtenbaum 2018; Flaherty 2016;
Green and Saul 2018; Hensley-Clancy 2018; Kotch 2015; McNair 2014; Miller and Bellamy
2012; Mintz et al. 2010; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016; Tugend 2016).
This decline in funding has created challenges for universities, as federal and state
governments have historically been primary sources of revenues for institutions of higher
learning. With reductions in government funding, university fundraising efforts have become
critically important to the operations, and even survival, of colleges and universities, and the
job expectations of many university administrators, such as presidents, provosts, and academic
deans, are shifting toward a greater emphasis on raising money for the institution. College
presidents, and increasingly provosts and academic deans, often spend the majority of their
time in fundraising for the university (Bai 2014; Blanchard 2013; Ezarik 2012; Kotch 2016;
Masterson 2017; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016; Selingo 2017; Selingo et al. 2017;
Seltzer 2016; Stripling 2016). One study of the expectations of presidents of colleges
and universities concluded:
Where there is agreement among presidents – no matter the size of the institution or their
tenure in the position – is on the outsized role fundraising plays in their job and how
many of them still feel unprepared for it (Selingo et al. 2017, p.15).
The combination of these two increasingly prevalent phenomena, i.e., a material reduction in
government-provided university revenues and increased fundraising responsibilities of univer-
sity administrators who may have been hired primarily because of their research and leadership
prowess, may result in universities now being willing to accept money in exchange for
contractual demands on the university that previously would have been considered unaccept-
able. To avoid public embarrassment and scrutiny, such arrangements are frequently undis-
closed, and when the stipulated demands on the university are made transparent, university
administrators sometimes defend them as harmless sources of cash with “no strings attached”
(Barakat 2018; Basken 2017; Berrett 2011; Blanchard 2013; Fandos 2016; Fichtenbaum 2018;
Flaherty 2018; Flannery 2014; Gibson 2016; Green and Saul 2018; Levinthal 2015; Lubove
and Staley 2011; Miller and Bellamy 2012; Mintz et al. 2010; Riddell 2015; Roosevelt 2018;
Wooster 2011).
Perhaps in recognition of opportunity created by these circumstances, some wealthy
individuals have attempted to use their resources to personally benefit from the financial needs
of universities, such as schemes to gain university admission for children of the wealthy (New
York Times 2019). Other individuals and organizations have instead offered payments to
universities in return for contracted promotion of specific ideologies and philosophies
(Barakat 2016; Berrett 2011; Campbell et al. 2002; Cohen 2008; Fandos 2016; Fichtenbaum
The Charles Koch Foundation and Contracted Universities: Evidence from...
2018; Flannery 2015; Flannery 2014; Gibson 2016; Green and Saul 2018; Jordan 2015; Kotch
2017a; Levinthal 2015; Lubove and Staley 2011; Mintz et al. 2010; Riddell 2015; Roosevelt
2018). One example is the Moral Foundations of Capitalism program that was devised and
implemented by BB&T Corporation around 2002. In this program, BB&T’s foundation paid
more than 60 universities an average of $1.1 million each to implement a course that promoted
the philosophy of objectivism and the morality of capitalism and utilized Ayn Rand’s novel,
Atlas Shrugged, as a required text (Beets 2015; Capeloto 2018; Flaherty 2016; Kotch 2015;
Lubove and Staley 2011; Mayer 2012; Mintz et al. 2010). While payments of this genre are tax
deductible to the donors, the strategy associated with these payments may be less oriented
toward providing any tangible benefit or return to the paying individual or organization but
more toward promoting or lobbying for an ideology (Beets 2015; Lubove and Staley 2011;
Mayer 2010; Porter 2018).
The Charles Koch Foundation
Another example of an organization which pays universities to promote a philosophy is the

Charles Koch Foundation (CKF). The CKF is funded by billionaire Charles Koch, who is the
focus of extensive publicity regarding his use of his wealth to influence politics and education.
Near the end of 2018, Koch was the seventh wealthiest person in the US (Kroll and Dolan
2018) and eighth wealthiest person in the world with a fortune valued at $60 billion (Forbes
2018). He is one of four siblings that comprise the 2nd wealthiest family in the world (Ross
2018). The siblings’ father, Fred, founded a business in 1940 which became Koch Industries
(KI), and Charles Koch has been chairman and CEO of the corporation since 1967. He and his
brother, David, each own 42% of the paper and energy corporation which has annual revenues
approximating $100 billion (Kroll and Dolan 2018). KI is the second largest private corpora-
tion in the US, is one of the 13 corporations in the US that emits the most air pollution, and one
of the ten US corporations that emits the most water pollution. Relatedly, the corporation has
incurred multimillion dollar fines and penalties for environmental infractions (Burke 2017;
Inskeep 2016; Political Economy Research Institute 2018; PolluterWatch 2019; Snyder 2016).
Charles Koch is a libertarian who believes in small government, minimal business regula-
tion, low taxes, few social services, and little environmental regulation (Basken 2017; Fortune
2016; Lewis et al. 2013; Mayer 2016, 2010). Koch has been politically engaged since the
1960’s in promoting these interests, and he and his family have formed a conservative political
network that rivals the size of the Republican or Democratic political parties (Inskeep 2016;
Kotch 2017a; Mayer 2016). Koch has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on political
campaigns and exerted influence on political races and politicians by giving or withholding
donations from political candidates (Basken 2017; Inskeep 2016; Korn 2017). In the 2016
election cycle, for example, Koch organized a small group of conservatives to spend about
$900 million on advocacy and campaigns (Inskeep 2016; Mayer 2016). Accordingly, Koch
has had significant influence on considered federal legislation (Edsall 2018; Flannery 2014;
Hohmann 2017; Inskeep 2016; Levinthal 2015; Lewis et al. 2013).
In addition to the hundreds of millions that Charles Koch uses to influence elections and
legislation, the CKF has donated millions of dollars to other conservative or libertarian causes.
In 2016 and 2017, for example, the CKF gave more than $2.5 million to the Cato
Institute and more than $950,000 to the Daily Caller News Foundation (Korn 2017,
2018 and 2017 990-PF CKF).
S.D. Beets
CKF Payments to Colleges and Universities
Although the CKF provides funding for many conservative and libertarian organizations, the
majority of CKF payments has been to colleges and universities. In 1974, Koch stated:
There are basically four ways in which we can fight for free enterprise. Through
education, through the media, by legal challenge, and by political action…I do maintain
however that the educational route is the most vital and most neglected.” (Flannery
2015, p.2)
Koch also stated in the same year that conservatives should not make donations to universities
that could lead to conservatives’ own destruction but instead begin “supporting only those
programs, departments or schools that contribute in some way to our individual companies or
to the general welfare of our free enterprise system.” (Jordan 2015, p.4).
Correspondingly, Koch, through the CKF, began contracting with several universities around
2000; the primary intention of the hundreds of millions of dollars since paid by the CKF to
universities has been the establishment of a pipeline of ideologically-conservative centers and
institutes at universities staffed by like-minded tenure-track or tenured professors who agree to
share Koch ideology with students and create policy position papers that may be used by Koch-
supported lobbyists and politicians to influence legislation and encourage unregulated business.
This pipeline, which the CKF has called the Structure of Social Change, has become a type of
grooming, incubator system as some CKF-supported students of CKF-supported centers and
institutes have completed their degrees and then became CKF-supported faculty of other centers
or institutes (Gibson 2016; Inskeep 2016; Kotch 2017b, 2016, 2015; Levinthal 2015; Parsons
2017; Roosevelt 2018; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016; Safier 2017; Shulman 2016; Strauss 2018;
Wilson 2016). The CKF has stated that it funds 5000 scholars and more than 50 centers or
institutes at universities (Kotch 2017b). In 2018, Koch stated that these university programs are
now giving “thousands and thousands of students the ability to become critical thinkers” and
exposing them to different ideas that they would not learn about otherwise (Hensley-Clancy
2018, p.2). This pipeline is expanding, as the CKF Center is extending their influence into
curricula and textbooks for K-12 education (Hohmann 2019; Safier 2017; Strauss 2018).
Many have expressed concern that the CKF payments to universities are an inappropriate
intrusion of the values of the wealthy into the education of college students and a violation of
academic freedom of faculty members in their teaching and research (Barakat 2016; Basken
2017; Burke 2017; Fandos 2016; Flaherty 2017, 2018; Glaser 2018; Green and Saul 2018;
Hasselbacher 2016; Korn 2017; Kotch 2017a, 2015; Larimer 2018a; Levinthal 2015;
Levinthal 2014; Lewis et al. 2013; Linskey 2018; McNair 2014; Miller and Bellamy 2012;
Mintz et al. 2010; Morris 2014; Parsons 2017; Roosevelt 2018; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016;
Strauss 2018; Tankersley 2016). As an example, the economics department of Florida State
was considering the requirements of a contract with the CKF in 2007, and the department chair
wrote an explanatory memo to department colleagues which included the following:
As we know there are no free lunches. Everything comes with costs. They want to
expose students to what they believe are vital concepts about the benefits of the market
and the dangers of government failure, and they want to support and mentor students
who share their views. Therefore they are trying to convince us to hire faculty who will
provide that exposure and mentoring. If we are not willing to hire such faculty, they are
not willing to fund us. (Benson 2007, p.3)
Unfortunately, however, while CKF payments to universities often generate speculation

regarding the underlying legal requirements of the contracts, few contracts have been made
public. While the CKF announced in 2018 that all future contracts with universities would be
publicly available for examination, most existing contracts created prior to the announcement
remain undisclosed despite many requests for their transparency (Flaherty 2018; Harris 2018).
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, CKF made payments of $325.3 million to nonprofit
organizations during the ten-year period of 2008–2017. While some of these payments were
to conservative or libertarian organizations, the majority of those payments ($233.5 million)
were to universities.
The primary university recipient of these payments was George Mason University (GMU),
which awarded Charles Koch an honorary doctorate in 2002 and received $117.2 million
during the 2008–2017 period, approximately half of the total paid to universities during that
decade. GMU is a public university in Fairfax, Virginia, close to Washington, D.C.; the
university was founded in 1972 and had an enrollment of approximately 35,000 students in
2018 (U.S. News and World Report 2018). During the 2008–2017 period, no other university
received nearly as much from CKF as GMU; Utah State, the university that was second in
CKF receipts during the same decade, received $6.9 million. These CKF payments to GMU
constitute a large proportion of the university’s income from private sources, and perhaps not
surprisingly, such payments have yielded influence as CKF officers have served on boards and
committees at GMU (Fandos 2016; Green and Saul 2018; Levinthal 2015). In 2018, the GMU
president expressed concern regarding the extensive influence of the CKF and called for a
review of such contracts (Barakat 2018; Capeloto 2018; Fichtenbaum 2018; Flaherty 2018;
Green and Saul 2018; Larimer 2018b; Woolsey 2018). A group of GMU students was also
concerned about CKF influence and filed a lawsuit in 2017 to expose the multiple
contracts between GMU and CKF, but the lawsuit has been unsuccessful in producing
the requested transparency (Flaherty 2018; Green and Saul 2018; Larimer 2018b;
Parsons 2017; Woolsey 2018).
Other than GMU, 13 other universities received total payments in excess of $2 million
during the ten-year period as indicated on Table 1, and two of those universities (Texas Tech
and Utah State) received more than $6.5 million. As enumerated on Tables 2, 16 other
universities received between $1 million and $2 million from the CKF during the decade.
The annual amount paid by the CKF to all universities increased from $6.7 million in 2008 to
$54.2 million in 2017. Of the total paid to universities in the ten-year period, almost 45% was
paid in the last two years of the period (2016 and 2017).
The 30 universities of Tables 1 and 2 that each received more than $1 million from the CKF
from 2008 to 2017 are a diverse group of private, public, large, small, and ivy league schools.
Of these 30 universities, some states are more represented than others; six of the universities
are located in Texas, and none of the 30 are located in west coast states. Several other schools
which are not listed on Tables 1 and 2 received amounts somewhat less than $1 million over
the 2008–2017 period; e.g., ten other universities received total payments between $800,000
and $1 million during the same period.
The information from Tables 1 and 2 was garnered from tax forms 990PFs of the CKF
which are annually filed with the US Internal Revenue Service. These forms are publicly
available and may be viewed at internet sites of nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations that
consider public dissemination of such information valuable (examples include
foundationcenter.org, polluterwatch.org, and propublica.org). Notably, there is no
requirement that foundations be utilized for payments to universities, nonprofit
Table 1 Universities that have accepted total payments exceeding $2,000,000 from the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF), 2008-2017
20081 20091 20101 20111 20121 20131 20141 20151 20162 20172 2008-2017
George Mason U. $5,092,000 $7,459,891 $5,826,644 $8,079,048 $8,444,770 $14,487,000 $16,761,330 $17,841,583 $19,235,732 $13,927,603 $117,155,601
Utah State U. $89,000 $172,000 $170,000 $205,000 $170,000 $145,000 $1,185,000 $1,310,000 $1,965,500 $1,520,000 $6,931,500
Texas Tech U. $109,000 $16,000 $2,034,500 $3,368,300 $1,004,300 $6,532,100
Florida State U. $289,150 $350,544 $373,765 $297,341 $358,140 $626,247 $46,500 $1,004,136 $519,684 $3,865,507
Catholic U. of A. $8,000 $215,000 $610,000 $212,500 $2,172,500 $552,500 $3,770,500
Rice U. $3,157,000 $3,157,000
Harvard U. $7,500 $40,000 $190,000 $772,540 $1,463,059 $2,473,099
West Virginia U. $55,000 $200,000 $272,100 $283,100 $118,300 $239,025 $258,625 $462,374 $553,162 $2,441,686
Arizona State U. $230,700 $942,227 $800,450 $354,400 $2,327,777
Clemson U. $130,116 $250,000 $250,000 $250,000 $165,000 $140,000 $55,000 $234,940 $419,742 $414,760 $2,309,558
S. Methodist U. $800 $101,000 $100,000 $192,000 $192,000 $636,000 $126,300 $897,800 $2,245,900
Purdue U. $84,000 $670,000 $1,089,000 $282,021 $2,125,021
Baylor U. $6,000 $171,263 $12,500 $253,500 $493,830 $1,104,550 $2,041,643
U.-Chicago $5,000 $455,000 $156,500 $1,385,256 $2,001,756
Total Excl. GMU $274,116 $911,150 $1,049,444 $1,212,865 $866,141 $1,370,403 $3,255,472 $7,243,792 $12,831,172 $13,208,492 $42,223,047
Total Paid to All Coll. $6,732,957 $10,596,713 $9,889,630 $11,940,004 $12,625,823 $19,354,163 $24,815,109 $33,454,162 $49,910,497 $54,213,525 $233,532,583
and Univ.
Total CKF 990-PF $7,719,403 $12,157,638 $11,096,508 $13,160,919 $14,920,448 $24,560,508 $31,874,705 $44,132,322 $76,901,930 $88,776,579 $325,300,960
Payments
1 http://polluterwatch.org/charles-koch-university-funding-database
2 annual 990-PF of the Charles Koch Foundation

S.D. Beets
Table 2 Universities that have accepted total payments between $1 million and $2 million from the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF), 2008–2017
20081 20091 20101 20111 2012a 20131 2014a 20151 20162 20172 Total 2008–
2017
Montana State U. $24,000 $4,500 $18,000 $5,500 $9,000 $14,500 $793,380 $1,070,232 $1,939,112
Texas A&M U. $9,000 $16,700 $253,000 $84,000 $182,861 $637,000 $745,500 $1,928,061
Brown U. $136,050 $147,154 $116,978 $37,500 $13,000 $377,674 $731,442 $74,500 $1,634,298
U.-Texas (Austin) $2,400 $9,000 $7,000 $9,208 $1,360,000 $114,000 $72,850 $1,574,458
New York U. $97,000 $10,000 $35,500 $35,500 $35,500 $35,500 $95,000 $600,800 $605,000 $1,549,800
U.-Notre Dame $9,650 $18,000 $12,000 $60,000 $120,000 $876,000 $411,500 $1,507,150
Ohio State U. $112,000 $130,000 $132,000 $288,000 $835,000 $1,497,000
Wake Forest U. $7,500 $6,810 $8,000 5000 $87,000 $10,000 $316,600 $1,029,000 $1,469,910
U.-Wisc. (Madison) $5,400 $7,000 $11,000 $11,000 $99,000 $177,658 $692,360 $436,000 $1,439,418
U.-Arizona $13,500 $512,445 $200,000 $249,520 $40,000 $23,500 $116,600 $114,330 $65,200 $1,335,095
Georgetown U. $14,000 $657,000 $545,000 $82,500 $1,298,500
U.-Utah $1,250,000 $1,250,000
U.-NC (Chapel Hill) $5,000 $100,000 $116,800 $115,000 $139,100 $131,900 $263,288 $373,200 $1,244,288
LIndenwood U. $5,000 $6,000 $13,500 $10,000 $565,400 $644,000 $1,243,900
G. Washington U. $15,000 $90,620 $116,000 $62,000 $70,062 $421,451 $322,035 $132,035 $1,229,203
Troy U. $247,960 $240,000 $274,500 $50,000 $298,500 $1,110,960
Total $160,050 $272,054 $952,243 $742,620 $982,520 $743,000 $1,062,370 $3,650,144 $6,859,635 $7,826,517 $23,251,153
Total paid to all coll. $6,732,957 $10,596,713 $9,889,630 $11,940,004 $12,625,823 $19,354,163 $24,815,109 $33,454,162 $49,910,497 $54,213,525 $233,532,583
and univ.
Total CKF 990-PF $7,719,403 $12,157,638 $11,096,508 $13,160,919 $14,920,448 $24,560,508 $31,874,705 $44,132,322 $76,901,930 $88,776,579 $325,300,960
Payments
1 http://polluterwatch.org/charles-koch-university-funding-database
2 annual 990-PF of the Charles Koch Foundation

S.D. Beets
organizations, or charities, even when a foundation has been created by an individual or

corporation. Correspondingly, Koch and his affiliated corporations may have made extensive
payments to universities which were not made through the foundation and are not required to
be disclosed to the public. The amounts indicated on Tables 1 and 2, consequently, may be
considered the actual amount paid by the CKF, not inclusive of any additional amounts paid by
Koch or affiliated corporations (Beets and Beets 2017).
CKF Contracts with Colleges and Universities
Considering the magnitude of CKF payments to many universities, speculation has flourished
regarding what the foundation is paying universities to do. Would such payments be consid-
ered gifts, with no restrictions on usage, or does the CKF have specific requirements or
expectations? Some fear that CKF payments to universities are an attempt by the foundation to
purchase a “veneer of intellectual credibility” for their libertarian, anti-regulation actions
(Berrett 2011, p.2). Although students and faculty at many universities have asked adminis-
trators to disclose the contracts with the CKF, most universities have refused the requested
transparency, and the CKF has similarly refused to disclose all existing contracts. Faculty and
student groups of multiple universities have passed resolutions demanding disclosure of
university contracts with CKF, and some members of university communities have used
federal and state freedom of information legislation to obtain copies of the contracts
(Barakat 2018, 2016; Basken 2017; Flannery 2015; Korn 2017; Kotch 2017a, 2015;
Larimer 2018b; Wilson 2016). In a few circumstances such as with the CKF-GMU relation-
ship discussed above, student and faculty organizations have even initiated litigation in an
effort to force disclosure. Many universities, however, have created foundations related to their
fund-raising, and some of these foundations are exempt from requests related to freedom of
information provisions (Berrett 2011; Brusseler 2015; Capeloto 2018; Flaherty 2018; Flannery
2015; Hasselbacher 2016; Jordan 2015; Korn 2018; Larimer 2018b; MacDonald 2017;
Woolsey 2018). Despite these efforts, however, few of the CKF contracts with universities
have been made available for public scrutiny and understanding.
One CKF official, who signed some of the CKF-university contracts of Tables 3, 4, and 5,
stated that the reason why some are attempting to use open records laws to force disclosure of
contracts between universities and the CKF is not for the sake of transparency, but for the sake
of intimidation, bullying, and putting academic freedom at risk (Association of Private
Enterprise (APEE) Annual Meeting 2016; Kotch 2016). That official also stated:
It makes them look foolish that they file lawsuits. They hire attorneys, and then they get
nothing…I think they will learn this is an inappropriate use of open records laws. But we
don’t want to just give them something for free. (APEE Annual Meeting 2016)
While the CKF and most universities have been unwilling to make all of these existing
contracts publicly available, 14 such contracts have been made available for public perusal,
partially as a result of the efforts of those requesting CKF contract transparency. These agree-
ments have been analyzed and compared, and the results of this analysis are disclosed in Tables 3,
4, and 5. Five of the 14 contracts were extracted from the CKF website, and accordingly, these
five may introduce a bias into the group, as the CKF chose to make those contracts available for
scrutiny. Consequently, those five contracts are specifically identified on Tables 3, 4, and 5.
Table 3 Components of contracts between Charles Koch Foundation (CKF) and universities (A-MI)
Ball ST.U. Chapman U.1 Clemson U. Duke U.1 Florida ST.U. G. Mason U.1 Mid. Tenn.ST.U.1
Year Signed 2016 2016 2009 2018 2013 2016 2016

University Signatories2 P, UFP P PRO P P, UFP, PRO, BSD P, UFP P, UFP, VPD
Total grant and duration $1.085million/5yrs. $5million/10yrs. $1million/4yrs. $5.044million/5yrs. $1.5million/10yrs. $10million/4yrs. $3.5million/4yrs.
Payment Schedule Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Purpose Estab. of an institute Support for existing Support for existing Support for existing Estab. of 2 new programs Estab. of 2 centers (12 new Support for existing
(4 new tenure-track institute (9 new institute (1 new center (1 new tenured within an existing center tenure-track profs., 57 institute (2 new
profs.) tenure-track profs, tenure-track full prof., 1 new tenure- (5 new tenure-track profs.) scholarships) tenure-track profs,
2 new assoc. profs, prof., 1 new track prof., 1 new 5 grad. fellowships,
1 new visiting prof., visiting prof.) research prof.) 35 undergrad.
5 post-doc. fellows.) fellowships)
Involved academic department Economics, entreprenuership Economics Business Economics Economics Law Economics, business
The contract requires services of Yes, NI is institute Yes, NI is institute Yes, NI is a faculty Yes, NI is center No NI3 Yes, NI is law school No NI
a named individual (NI). director director member director dean
If there is a change in the NI, the Yes Yes No Yes No NI3 Yes Yes
university must notify CKF.
The NI influences hiring of faculty/ Yes Yes Yes Yes No NI3 Yes No NI
operation of center/institute.
New Courses? Yes No No No No No No
Continued CKF funding is contingent Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
upon annual university reporting.

CKF assessment of noncompliance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
can sever funding in 30 days or
fewer.
Related publicity must be approved Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
by CKF.
1 Contract included as an example in CKF internet site (https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/our-grant-agreements/)

2 BSD=business school dean, EDD=economics dept. director, P=president, PRO=provost, UFP=univ. foundation president, VPD=vice pres.-development
3 No NI. Decisions are made unanimously by 3-member advisory committee; one member is CGK.
Table 4 Components of contracts between Charles Koch Foundation (CKF) and universities (Mo-Z)
Montana ST.U. U.-Kentucky U.-Louisville U.-NC(CHAP.)1 U.-Utah Utah ST.U. W. Virginia U.
Year signed 2016 2015 2015 2018 2017 2017 2009

University signatories2 VPD BSD, VPD P, UFP UFP, PRO P, BSD BSD UFP, PRO, BSD, EDD
Total grant and duration $5.76million/4yrs. $4million/8yrs. $1.66million/7yrs. $3.4million/6yrs. $10million/8yrs. $25million/10yrs. $600,000/3yrs.
Payment schedule Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Purpose Estab. of a center Support for existing Support for existing Support for existing program Estab. of an institute Support for existing Support for the economics
(2 tenured institute (4 new tenured center (2 new (2 new tenure-track profs., (7 new tenure-track center (6 new dept. (1 and 1/2 new
co-directors, 2 or tenure-track profs., tenure-track 6 new visiting profs.) profs.) faculty - at least tenure-track profs.)
new tenure-track 1 new senior lecturer, profs., 2 new 3 of which are
profs.) 13 Ph.D. fellows.) visiting profs.) tenure-track
profs.)
Involved academic department Economics Economics, entreprenuership Entreprenuership Philosophy, politics, economics Economics, quant.analysis Business Economics
The contract requires services Yes, 2 Nis are center Yes, NI is institute director Yes, NI is center Yes, NI is program director Yes, NI is institute director No Yes, NI is head of free
of a named individual (NI) co-directors director market studies program
If there is a change in the ni, Yes Yes no no no no NI no
the university must notify
CKF
The ni influences hiring of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No NI Yes
faculty/operation of center/
institute
New courses? No Yes Yes No No No No
Continued ckf funding is Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
contingent upon annual
university reporting.
CKF assessment of noncompliance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
severs funding in 30 days or
fewer.
Related publicity must be approved Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
by CKF
1 Contract included as an example in CKF internet site (https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/our-grant-agreements/)

2 BSD=business school dean, EDD=economics dept. director, P=president, PRO=chancellor/provost, UFP=univ. foundation president, VPD=vice pres.-development
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Table 5 The Stated Mission of the Contracts between the Charles Koch Foundation (CKF) and Universities of
Tables 3 and 4
Ball State University (2016 contract) “…the Institute’s mission is to become a national model for values- and
ethics-based entrepreneurship, developing research and talent to help solve contemporary problems and promote
understanding of the characteristics and virtues of free enterprise in helping people improve their lives.”
Chapman University (2016 contract1) “…the Institute’s broad mission is to reintegrate the study of the humanities
and economics in the spirit of Adam Smith and to recombine research and undergraduate education as a
discovery process in the spirit of Vernon Smith.”
Clemson University (2009 contract) “The primary objectives and purposes of (the institute) are to advance the
understanding and practice of those free voluntary processes and principles that promote social progress, human
well-being, individual freedom, opportunity and prosperity based on the rule of law, constitutional government,
private property and the laws, regulations, organizations, institutions and social norms upon which they rely.”
Duke University (2018 contract1) “…the mission of the Center is to promote and support research in, and the
teaching of, the history of economics.”
Florida State University (2013 contract) “…to advance and expand research and teaching efforts relating to the
economic impact of institutions and free enterprise and to strengthen and extend publication, dissemination,
and continued academic and public knowledge of the causes, measurements, impact, and appreciation of
economic institutions and free enterprise.”
George Mason University (2016 contract1) “…the school’s mission is to become a national leader in legal
education by applying tools of economics and other social sciences to the study of legal doctrine, process, and
institutions.”
Middle Tennessee State University (2016 contract1) “…the Institute’s mission is to engage undergraduate and
graduate students with faculty in research that will further the understanding of business and economic
principles, as well as their impact on regional, national, and international financial conditions and the
well-being of society.”
Montana State University (2016 contract) “…the Center’s mission is to engage undergraduate and graduate
students with faculty in academic research that will further the understanding of economic regulation and
policy’s impact on societal well-being.”
University of Kentucky (2015 contract) “…the Institute’s mission is to discover and understand aspects of free
enterprise that promote the well-being of society.”
University of Louisville (2015 contract) “…the Center’s mission is to engage in research and teaching that
explores the role of enterprise and entrepreneurship in advancing the well-being of society.”
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (2018 contract1) “…the mission of the Program is to pursue and
promote and integrated study of philosophy, politics, and economics, building on the long tradition of those
who see questions of moral philosophy, political science, and economics as inextricably intertwined.”
University of Utah (2017 contract) “…the mission of the Institute is to push the frontiers of knowledge through
academic research and provide University students access to education in economics, game theory and
econometric analysis.”
Utah State University (2017 contract) “…the purpose of this Agreement is for the (school of business) to expand
an academically rigorous and experientially rich program to develop leaders of distinction in commerce and
public affairs; and so that the (school of business) and the Center can explore the scientific foundations of the
interaction between individuals, business, and government to improve well-being for individuals and society.”
West Virginia University (2009 contract) “The University and its Department of Economics, within the College
of Business and Economics, have established a focused research effort among select faculty members with the
purpose of advancing the philosophical and interdisciplinary understanding of human freedom in the political,
economic, social and personal domains and to explore the nature of free market economics and its impact on
our society.”
1 Contractincluded as an example in CKF internet site (https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/our-grant-
agreements/)
Inception and Duration
As noted on Tables 3 and 4, the 14 contracts were signed in the decade between 2009 and
2018, and 11 of those were signed during the four years, 2015–2018 inclusive. The duration or
term of the contracts ranged from three years to ten years. At the end of 2018, the two oldest
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contracts (Clemson University and West Virginia University, both signed in 2009) had expired,
and the remaining 12 contracts were still in effect.
University Signatories
In addition to officials of the CKF, officers of the university and the university foundation
signed the contracts, and there is much variation among the contracts regarding how many and
which officers signed, as indicated on Tables 3 and 4. Some contracts were signed by only one
university official, while others were signed by as many as four university representatives.
Most of the contracts were signed by the university president, but some of the contracts were
signed by other university officers such as the provost, business school dean, or the university
foundation president.
Payment Schedule, Payment Magnitude, and Required Reporting to the CKF
All of the examined contracts dictated annual payments from the CKF, but the amount of the
payments varied. The 2017 contract with Utah State University, for example, specified CKF
payments of $2.5 million annually for ten years, while the 2009 contract with West Virginia
University dictated annual payments of $200,000 for three years. All of the examined contracts
also require annual reporting to the CKF regarding operations of the center or institute and use
of past CKF payments (Berg 2016; Flaherty 2016; Hiltzik 2017; Hasselbacher 2016).
Support or Establishment of a CKF-Affiliated Center or Institute
With the exception of the contract with West Virginia University, one of the oldest contracts in
the group of 14, all contracts dictated the creation of a CKF-affiliated center or institute within
the university or support for an existing center or institute. These centers and institutes, while
not necessarily physical “bricks and mortar” locations, provide a tangible presence of the CKF
on campus, a degree of insulation of the associated faculty from the remainder of the university
community, and continuity as associated faculty arrive and depart (Burke 2017; Flaherty 2017;
Gibson 2016; Kotch 2016).
New Tenure-Track or Tenured Positions
All of the contracts created new tenure-track or tenured positions. As indicated on Tables 3 and
4, CKF contracts with seven of the 14 universities dictated the hiring of four or more new
tenure-track or tenured professors, and contracts with the Chapman University, George Mason
University, and the University of Utah each stipulated the hiring of seven or more tenure-track
or tenured professors. In 2016, the CKF had funded more than 220 tenured and tenure-track
professors at CKF-affiliated centers and institutes on university campuses (Kotch 2016).
With some of the contracts, such as those with the universities of Clemson, Florida State,
George Mason, Louisville, Utah State, and West Virginia, the CKF was given an active role in
hiring the funded professors (Capeloto 2018; Fandos 2016; Fichtenbaum 2018; Flaherty 2017,
2016; Flannery 2015; Gibson 2016; Green and Saul 2018; Hiltzik 2017; Hundley 2011; Jordan
2015; Kotch 2015; Levinthal 2014; McNair 2014; Miller and Bellamy 2012; Strauss 2014;
Wilson 2016). Donor-influenced hiring of tenure-track and tenured professors may be espe-
cially impactful, as many schools have reduced the number of tenure-track professors in the
university, and the tenure-track and tenured professors typically control the university curric-
ulum (Griffey 2017; Kezar and Maxey 2013; Weissmann 2013). An increase in a department’s
tenure-track and tenured faculty of even three professors with similar donor-sponsored phi-
losophies could influence departmental decisions for decades (Sadasivam and Sigler 2016).
In addition to new tenure-track and tenured positions, Tables 3 and 4 reveal that many of
the examined 14 contracts provided funds for administrators, lecturers, visiting professors,
research professors, scholarships, or fellowships.
Affected Academic Departments
With the exception of the contract with the law school of George Mason University, the
examined CKF contracts involved the economics department of the university or the business
school, which typically includes faculty and departments related to entrepreneurship (Basken
2017; Roosevelt 2018). At some universities, the economics department is part of the broader
business school; while at others, the economics department exists outside of the business
school. Even in the contract with the George Mason Law School, an economics perspective is
expected. As noted in Table 5, the agreement specifies that the Law School mission is to
“become a national leader in legal education by applying tools of economics and other social
sciences to the study of legal doctrine, process, and institutions”.
A Named Individual
11 of the 14 examined CKF contracts specify a named individual (NI), a specific person (not a
position), who was originally hired by the university but selected by the CKF. The NI serves as
a contractual liaison between the CKF and the university and may be compensated, directly or
indirectly, by the foundation. The NI influences the hiring of faculty for the related center or
institute and its operations, may also serve as a related director of the CKF-sponsored center or
institute, and may have a role in monitoring university compliance with the contract and
reporting to the CKF. Some of the contracts specifically require the university to notify the
CKF when personnel actions regarding the NI occur (Basken 2017; Fandos 2016; Gibson
2016; Hensley-Clancy 2018; Hasselbacher 2016; Kotch 2016).
While some CKF contracts state that the NI has been hired according to the usual protocol
of the university, the CKF (not the university) selects the NI from the employees of the
university, and the NI influences or leads the related center or institute. Correspondingly, the
leadership of the related university center or institute is not chosen by the university but by an
outside organization with its own purposes and agenda (Hasselbacher 2016; Kotch 2016).
Related to compensation, some CKF contracts dictate stipends for NIs or directors. Such
stipends are typically a payment in addition to the compensation paid by the university; for
example, the CKF contract with the University of Kentucky stipulates a director stipend of
$176,000 over the duration of the contract.
New Courses and Required Texts
Three of the examined CKF contracts mention the creation of new courses, although specific
course requirements, topics, or texts were not enumerated. This facet of the CKF program
differs from the BB&T Foundation’s Moral Foundations of Capitalism program, mentioned
earlier, which required contracted universities to develop and offer a specific course which
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utilized a specific Ayn Rand novel (Beets 2015). In contrast, the examined contracts of the
CKF program do not require specific university courses or specific texts.
CKF Contract Severance in 30 Days
All of the examined contracts specify that the CKF, at its discretion, can withdraw from the
contract 30 days (15 days with some contracts) after giving the university notice that the
foundation has decided to sever the contract because the CKF believes that the contract has
been violated or is not being adequately fulfilled. Especially after hiring tenure-track or tenured
professors and creating the infrastructure and publicity related to a new center or institute, an
unanticipated CKF contract severance would be very expensive and embarrassing to a
university. Correspondingly, university administrators and academic deans of contracted
universities may be tempted to satisfy the CKF at nearly all costs, including pleasing the
demands of the NI or center director and granting tenure and promotions to CKF-affiliated
faculty. The threat of CKF contract severance also discourages academic freedom, as CKF-
affiliated faculty may fear the consequences of research findings that were incongruent with
CKF philosophy (Flaherty 2016; Hiltzik 2017; Hasselbacher 2016; Kotch 2017a, 2016; Miller
and Bellamy 2012; Roosevelt 2018).
Secrecy and Transparency
All of the examined CKF contracts specified that any related disclosure of the contract by the
university had to be approved by CKF. Such required secrecy has positive and negative
dimensions for both the university and the CKF. On the positive side, such secrecy affords
the university an excuse for the avoidance of potentially embarrassing disclosures, as univer-
sity and CKF administrators explain that discussion of the contract is limited because of the
required secrecy. On the negative side, a lack of transparency may breed suspicion, especially
when millions of dollars are flowing. This secrecy has led to multiple student and faculty
efforts to force disclosure of the CKF contracts, as discussed previously (Basken 2017;
Capeloto 2018; Glaser 2018; Levinthal 2015; Parsons 2017; Shulman 2016). In 2016, a
CKF officer addressed the related lack of transparency:
…we’re all for the idea of transparency. We’ve got nothing to hide, you know. There’s
nothing untoward happening. All of our philanthropy is based on faculty governance,
academic freedom, and donor intent; and those things aren’t in conflict. (APEE Annual
Meeting 2016)
Undefined Jargon
Most of the examined CKF contracts are similarly structured with similar wording and often
include critical terms or phrases that are not defined in the contracts (Berrett 2011; Burke 2017;
Flaherty 2016; Hiltzik 2017). Some of these undefined words and phrases include the
following:
1. REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE. This phrase relates to a concept developed by British scientist

Michael Polanyi wherein science would function like an economic market, with research
dollars flowing to the best scholars and ideas determined by scientific consensus (Fortune
2016; Tankersley 2016). The concept may be a favorite of Charles Koch: in one interview,
he used the term, “republic of science”, at least 23 times. The reality of CFK funding,
however, is that scholars and ideas may be funded only if they agree with the philosophy
of CKF (Tankersley 2016).
2. ACADEMIC FREEDOM. The concept of academic freedom is foundational to the
academic community and the system of higher education. One of the most widely
accepted definitions of academic freedom is that of the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP) which first developed a definition in 1915. The current
definition was developed in 1940 and simply defines academic freedom in research as the
following:
Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results,
subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties… (AAUP 1940, p.2).
This simple definition essentially means that a professor may design a research project,
unaware of what the related data may reveal, analyze the data, and then write and publish
the results, regardless of who may or may not be pleased with those results (Fichtenbaum
2018; Flannery 2014). The second part of the AAUP definition addresses teaching:
Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but they
should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to their subject. (AAUP 1940, p.2).
The CKF promotes a concept of academic freedom that differs from that of the AAUP. Most of
the CKF contracts include the following sentence in a paragraph titled, “Promoting Academic
Freedom”:
…the parties agree that the academic freedom of the University, the Center, and their
faculty, students, and staff is critical to the success of the Center’s research, scholarship,
teaching, and service (CKF Agreement with Duke University 2018).
An important distinction between the two concepts of academic freedom is that the definition
developed and refined over a century by the AAUP applies to the protection of individual
teachers but not broadly to the protection of universities, externally-funded centers, students, or
staff as stated in the CKF contracts. The extension of academic freedom to an externally-
funded center or institute would provide a degree of insulation and protection of the center
from the university and the academic community which would be inappropriate and counter-
intuitive in a university. Further, academic freedom of a center could, in a dysfunctional sense,
impinge on the academic freedom of individual professors who are part of the center as
protections extended to the center may be counter to those of the individual academician.
While the CKF often touts academic freedom, the organization has attempted to coopt and
redefine a term that has been well-understood in the academic community for more than a
century (Berrett 2011; Burke 2017; Fichtenbaum 2018; Flaherty 2017, 2016; Flannery 2014;
Larimer 2018a; Levinthal 2015; Mintz et al. 2010; Strauss 2014).
3. OTHER VARIATIONS OF THE TERM “FREE”. In addition to the term, academic

freedom, the examined CKF contracts with universities included several variations of
“free”, none of which are defined in the contracts. These “free” variants include: “eco-
nomic freedom”, “free enterprise”, “free market economics”, “free voluntary processes”,
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“human freedom”, and “individual freedom”. The most frequently used of these variations
is “free enterprise”; some of the centers and institutes have this term in their contracted
name, and some of the directors have this term in their title. While undefined in the CKF
contracts, these several “free” variants may refer to a business environment with minimal
regulation or government involvement (Berrett 2011; Burke 2017; Flaherty 2016).
4. WELL-BEING. An additional undefined term of most of the examined CKF contracts is
“well-being” of individuals and society. While seemingly altruistic, this term may be a
reframing of the CKF philosophy that less regulation and less government yield enhance-
ment of human life (Burke 2017; Gibson 2016; Hasselbacher 2016; Mayer 2016; Schwab
2014). At a well-being forum sponsored by the Charles Koch Institute in 2014, one of the
advisory board members stated:
The earned-success system that brings you happiness is the system of free enterprise that
lifts people out of poverty (Mayer 2016, p.26).
Missions of Centers or Institutes
Each of the examined CKF contracts briefly explains the mission of the CKF funding and the
related center or institute, and Table 5 lists the mission included in each contract. While there
are differences among these missions, all of these missions focus on one or more of the
following: business, economics, entrepreneurship, freedom, free enterprise, government, reg-
ulation, and well-being.
Discussion
For decades, wealthy people and organizations have given money to colleges and universities
with no expectation of a service rendered to the wealthy other than wise utilization of the funds
in the educational mission of the university. Contributors to universities often represent a wide
range of political philosophies, and while the focus of this research is the foundation funded by
Charles Koch, a conservative, some who are politically liberal, such as philanthropist George
Soros, also give extensively to universities. But while Soros’ payments are gifts primarily to
universities outside the US, those of the CKF are not gifts but are tax-deductible, quid pro quo,
contract payments primarily to US universities whereby payments are contingent upon
services performed for the CKF (Kotch 2015; Levinthal 2015; Luzer 2015; Mayer 2010;
Soskis 2017).
The current financial vulnerability of many universities has resulted in an unprecedented
dependence on these wealthy people and organizations, and some of the wealthy have devised
programs to dole out periodic payments to universities in exchange for university advancement
of their favorite philosophy. While this research has examined the university program of the
CKF, other organizations have devised similar programs. One example which was mentioned
earlier is the Moral Foundations of Capitalism Program, developed and funded by the
foundation of the BB&T Corporation during the decade following 2000. While both the
CKF and BB&T programs paid universities to promote specific ideologies, their demands of
the participating universities differed. The BB&T program was primarily oriented toward
development of a college course, typically an elective that explored the morality of capitalism
(Beets 2015; Capeloto 2018; Flaherty 2016; Fichtenbaum 2018; Kotch 2015; Mayer 2012;
Miller and Bellamy 2012; Mintz et al. 2010; Sparks 2011; Wooster 2011). The CKF program,
alternatively, does not focus extensively on specific courses or texts but on creating Koch-
affiliated centers and institutes and staffing those university organizations with instructors and
professors who reflect the CKF philosophy. Arguably, the effects of the CKF program may last
longer than those of the BB&T program, as the viability and popularity of college electives
may devolve without continued funding, but tenured faculty may retain their professional
philosophy long after funding of a particular program ceases.
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, the CKF paid more than $223 million to universities in the
ten-year period of 2008–2017, at least in part, to promote the CKF philosophy by creating or
supporting CKF-affiliated centers and institutes that hire CKF-affiliated faculty. About half of
that amount, $117.2 million, was paid to one institution, George Mason University, and each of
29 other universities received more than $1 million during the examined decade. Most of the
related contracts between these universities and the CKF are not publicly available, although
an analysis of 14 agreements provides insights regarding the expectations of the CKF.
These agreements are summarized in Tables 3, 4, and 5 and reveal that the CKF university
program has created an attractive, but sticky, temptation for universities from which they may
be incapable of escaping. Attracted by the contingent cash payments, compliant university
administrators have committed to create somewhat autonomous, CKF-affiliated centers and
institutes which hire instructors and tenure-track professors who may be recruited because of
their congruent ideology (Hasselbacher 2016; Roosevelt 2018; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016;
Wilson 2016). Because tenure-track professors are a relatively expensive, long-term commit-
ment for a university, a university’s employment of an academician who was hired because of
the CKF contract could last decades longer than the contract term, which may be less than five
years. Because of this expense and its longevity, the university may be reluctant to disappoint
the CKF regarding accomplishment of the contract provisions, as foundation disappointment
could result in the loss of future contingent payments from the CKF. Correspondingly,
contracted universities may feel pressure to tenure CKF-affiliated professors to please the
CKF. At many universities, the tenure decision is primarily the decision of the relevant
academic dean, i.e., the business school dean in most of the studied situations. While a dean
typically decides on tenure considering the advice of the relevant tenured faculty, the business
school dean may also be signatory on the CKF contract. Additionally, the NI of many of the
CKF contracts may provide the foundation with an on-site information source of
university compliance with the contract. Consequently, the conflicts of interest with
these contractual commitments are rife (Arenson 2008; Gibson 2016; Kotch 2017a;
Mintz et al. 2010; Roosevelt 2018).
Relatedly, while the CKF occasionally contracts media directors to promote the output of
their sponsored centers and institutes, members of university communities have expressed
concerns about the teaching and research efforts of Koch-funded professors. In some cases,
students have complained about the bias of the Koch-supported professors, and faculty
colleagues have noted a lack of published peer-reviewed research. Some have expressed
concern that the CKF largesse may be an effort to legitimize the past ethically questionable
actions of Koch Industries by purchasing a group of tenure-track and tenured professors who
will defend Koch actions for several years into the future (Chen et al. 2008; Gibson 2016;
Kotch 2016; Levinthal 2015; Linskey 2018; McNair 2014; The Phoenix 2019; Roosevelt
2018; Tankersley 2016). In response to published research that may be inappropriately biased
by the CKF and similar sources, some concerned academicians are attempting to bring
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transparency to questionable academic research associated with “crony philanthropy”; one

such example is the Academic Capture Warning System, which maintains a website
(https://www.academiccapture.org/) including a database of such potentially biased
publications (Scutari 2019).
Additional integrity concerns regarding these CKF-affiliated faculty include their
contracted allegiance to the philosophy of a funding source external to their institution and
universities’ agreement to accept cash from that source to allow the promotion of the source’s
favorite philosophy on campus. Apart from such integrity and academic freedom issues, the
addition of multiple tenure-track professors of the same ideology to many academic depart-
ments may be enough to sway the decision-making of an academic department to reflect the
philosophy of the contracting source of funds, such as the CKF. This possibility may be
particularly relevant as many universities are in a long-term process of replacing tenure-track
positions with short-contract positions, even though the tenure-track professors are often
vested with the academic decision-making responsibilities of the department. In 1969, for
example, 78% of the instructional faculty at US colleges and universities were tenure-track or
tenured; in 2013, that percentage had decreased to 25% (Kezar and Maxey 2013; Weissmann
2013). The corresponding integrity issue may be the evolution of an academic department that
does not reflect a diversity of thought but instead exhibits philosophical homogeneity of an
externally-funded perspective (Barakat 2016; Berrett 2011; Griffey 2017).
The stipulated creation of CKF-affiliated centers or institutes provides visible continuity
within the university for the CKF and a degree of insulation for the affiliated faculty from the
rest of the university. Several agreements have created new centers or institutes, while others
have provided support for existing centers or institutes (Burke 2017; Gibson 2016; McNair
2014; Roosevelt 2018; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016). In some circumstances, an existing center
has been repurposed to align with the CKF contract. At Lindenwood University, for example, a
center originally intended to focus on the natural environment was repurposed to focus on the
business environment (Kotch 2016). These centers or institutes are often given names that may
attempt to mask the underlying, anti-regulation purposes of the center or institute with names
that emphasize concepts such as ethics, freedom, liberty, justice, or well-being, (Gibson 2016;
Kotch 2016; Roosevelt 2018). At some universities, the missions of these new centers or
institutes overlap or compete with long-established academic departments, creating a degree of
animosity within the university (Flaherty 2017; Sadasivam and Sigler 2016; Strauss 2018).
In addition to CKF-affiliated centers and institutes, the associated CKF-affiliated NIs are
pivotal components of the contracts. This individual may be the center or institute director, is
selected from university employees by the CKF, has responsibilities to both the university and
the CKF, and may be compensated, either directly or indirectly, by both the university and the
CKF. Additionally, while the university’s expectations of the NI, as a faculty member or
university administrator, are transparent to the university community, the CKF’s expectations
of the NI, as an agent or contractor to the CKF, are unknown to the university community. This
arrangement may present conflicts of interest for the NI, a university employee, as formal and
informal reporting by the NI to the CKF may threaten the continuation of the contract and
place the NI is an ethically awkward position.
Ultimately, the results of this study provide both encouragement and discouragement for
those who are concerned about the influence of the CKF on academia. Possibly tempted by
multimillion dollar cash payments from the CKF, many university presidents and business
school deans have agreed to the long-term effects of these commitments which promote one
specific philosophy in the creation and operation of centers and institutes and the related hiring
and promotion of like-minded tenure-track faculty. The CKF has paid millions of dollars to
several universities, and the total amount of these annual payments, and possibly influence,
increased during the decade 2008–2017 from $6.7 million to $54.2 million. Conversely,
however, hundreds of colleges and universities have not contracted with the CKF, and some
universities have severed or curtailed their relationships with the CKF (Kotch 2015; Levinthal
2015; Linskey 2018). Additionally, the contract analysis of this study found relatively little
evidence of CKF influence outside of the schools of business, economics, and law. Thus, many
universities do not seek or accept CKF funding, and while many other schools take CKF cash
and agree to the contract terms, the influence of the CKF within those universities is typically
confined to relatively few academic departments.
In considering CKF inroads to universities of the last two decades, the CKF has not
nefariously invaded universities. The foundation was essentially welcomed on campus by
university presidents, provosts, or business school deans who are signatories on most of the
examined contracts. As chief academic officers, they may have conflicts of interest as their
focus on fund-raising may obscure threats to academic quality of university programs by
allowing the external wealthy to purchase the promotion of a particular philosophies in the
university. Essentially, these administrators are selling the important concepts of
shared university governance and curriculum control, traditionally the domain of the
faculty, to the wealthy outside the university who will pay for advancement of their
preferred philosophy. While the conservative, free-market perspective is a legitimate
perspective to be analyzed and discussed in universities along with other legitimate
perspectives, allowing wealthy individuals and organizations to purchase the promo-
tion of a particular philosophy is counter to academic freedom (Fichtenbaum 2018;
Flannery 2014; Roosevelt 2018). University presidents, provosts, and academic deans are
gatekeepers of the university, and one dimension of their professional responsibilities is the
recognition and elimination of infringements of academic freedom, conflicts of interest, and
other inherent problems of such contracts and arrangements (Berrett 2011; Burke 2017;
Flaherty 2017; Gibson 2016; Stripling 2016).
In addition to university administrators, however, CKF inroads to university governance
have been facilitated by some faculty members who are philosophically congruent with the
CKF and may be tempted by the previously-discussed stipends and associated pecuniary
rewards. These faculty members may also be attracted to the protections afforded by associ-
ation with an externally-funded university center or institute, as university administration may
wish to maintain a flourishing relationship with the funding source and associated faculty.
Of the many academic ethics issues presented by the CKF contracts with universities, the
infringement of academic freedom is perhaps the most serious. While the CKF has attempted
to redefine academic freedom to benefit the centers and institutes created by foundation cash,
the concept of adequate protection for individual university teachers and researchers has been
well-understood in the academic community for more than a century and predates the CKF
and its founder. All of the reviewed contracts of this study have a threefold threat to the
academic freedom of the involved universities: (1) CKF payments are made in annual
contingent installments, (2) universities must annually report the use of funds to the CKF,
and (3) the CKF can end the contract in 30 days if the foundation perceives a breach of
contract. This combination presents issues of ethics and integrity and constitutes a violation of
academic freedom, as CKF-affiliated professors, their deans, their provosts, and their presi-
dents know that future CKF funding is contingent on pleasing the CKF, and a threat to that
funding could occur when CKF-affiliated professors publish research or teach class sessions
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that do not support the funded philosophy (Flaherty 2017, 2016; Kotch 2017a; Levinthal 2015;
Roosevelt 2018).
Conclusion
The current era is one of increased financial need for many universities, as several traditional
sources of funding, such as state and federal governments, are not as generous to higher
education as they once were. Some universities, correspondingly, have turned to private
individuals and organizations which may offer funds in exchange for on-campus promotion
of certain concepts or philosophies. Invariably, however, universities have many potential
sources of funds, and in attempting to understand why university administrators have
contracted with the CFK, consideration should be given to possible strategies of these
administrators. While many universities have accepted millions of dollars from the
CKF, many other universities have not, so the necessity of accepting CKF funding for
university survival is questionable. Additionally, while a university may have accepted
large amounts of cash from the CKF, the amount received may be comparatively
small compared to the university budget. So why not avoid the demands attached to
CKF funding and the associated negative publicity? Perhaps the publicity of the
university’s relationship with the CKF is partially what the university seeks.
Through such publicity, the message that some universities may want to send to the wealthy
of any ideology is that the curriculum and faculty are somewhat negotiable, and large donations
may enable the engagement and promotion of a particular philosophical legacy in higher
education (Linskey 2018).
One of the fundamental issues related to the CKF university program is whether wealthy
individuals or organizations should pay a university for the promotion of one particular
legitimate philosophy, which is one of many legitimate philosophies. Lured by the cash and
shrouded by secrecy, university administrators and some faculty members may agree to such
temptations and hope that the money can successfully be harvested without angering the
university community and ruining academic freedom and the integrity of the university or
introducing a significant, wealth-funded bias into research or the education of university
students. A minimal first step in resolving the host of issues presented by these funding
contracts is public disclosure of donor agreements, as transparency may foster a greater
understanding of the role and challenges of monetary resources in higher education. A
necessary second step regarding this funding phenomenon is the development of extensive
university policies and procedures for evaluating and controlling funding from sources
external to the university, especially when those sources require the performance of services
in return for the tempting funds. These policies may include enforced codes of conduct for
faculty and administrators to define acceptable behavior regarding external funding. A third
and perhaps most difficult step is a careful review, on the part of state and federal governments,
of (a) the appropriate level of funding of higher education and (b) the tax deductibility of
contract payments, such as those between the CKF and universities (Beets 2015; Berrett 2011;
Capeloto 2018; Fichtenbaum 2018; Flannery 2015; Gibson 2016; Green and Saul 2018;
Larimer 2018b; Levinthal 2015; McNair 2014; Miller and Bellamy 2012; Parsons 2017;
Roosevelt 2018; Shulman 2016).
From the perspective of the wealthy who wish to use their wealth to advance their favorite
philosophy on a university campus, the CKF has been successful and has enjoyed help from
many in accomplishing the goals and objectives of the foundation. Following are some of the
principal contributors to the success of the program.
1. Charles Koch decided that a portion of his considerable wealth should influence univer-
sities to reflect his values and philosophy. He created and funds the CKF to accomplish
that goal.
2. The federal government allows Charles Koch to deduct his contributions to the CKF from
his federal income taxes. The CKF university program, consequently, is essentially a tax
deduction of Charles Koch (Porter 2018).
3. The federal and state governments have reduced funding to universities in the past few
years, forcing university administrators to seek sources of funding that may not have been
considered acceptable in the past.
4. Tempted by CKF largesse, many university administrators, whose responsibilities include
the protection of academic freedom and the quality of the faculty and academic programs,
committed their universities to secret CKF contracts which resulted in the creation or
support of CKF-affiliated centers and institutes on campus and employment of CKF-
affiliated faculty.
5. Some faculty members, who share the CKF philosophy and may also be tempted by CKF
cash and the protection of an externally-funded center or institute on campus, encouraged
and facilitated the creation of a CKF-university contract.
6. Many in the local and national university communities, including faculty and students,
have been slow to study and consider the effects of CKF-university contracts, possibly
fearing reprisal from university administrators.
From the perspective of those who are concerned about the influence of wealth on the
operations of the university, as well as academic freedom, transparency of university
contracts that affect the faculty or curriculum may be helpful in understanding
university commitments, and extensive university policies and procedures to govern
such contracts could prove beneficial to the mission of the university. Ultimately, if
the wealthy can pay to create university centers which align with their philosophy and
staff those centers with professors who reflect the same perspective, the value of higher
education is at risk.
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Journal of Academic Ethics

The Charles Koch Foundation and Contracted

# Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Keywords Charles Koch Foundation . Academic freedom . University centers . University

The State of Funding in Higher Education

The Charles Koch Foundation

Another example of an organization which pays universities to promote a philosophy is the

CKF Payments to Colleges and Universities

Unfortunately, however, while CKF payments to universities often generate speculation

2 annual 990-PF of the Charles Koch Foundation

2 annual 990-PF of the Charles Koch Foundation

organizations, or charities, even when a foundation has been created by an individual or

CKF Contracts with Colleges and Universities

Year Signed 2016 2016 2009 2018 2013 2016 2016

upon annual university reporting.

1 Contract included as an example in CKF internet site (https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/our-grant-agreements/)

Montana ST.U. U.-Kentucky U.-Louisville U.-NC(CHAP.)1 U.-Utah Utah ST.U. W. Virginia U.

Year signed 2016 2015 2015 2018 2017 2017 2009

1 Contract included as an example in CKF internet site (https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/our-grant-agreements/)

Inception and Duration

Payment Schedule, Payment Magnitude, and Required Reporting to the CKF

Support or Establishment of a CKF-Affiliated Center or Institute

New Tenure-Track or Tenured Positions

Affected Academic Departments

New Courses and Required Texts

CKF Contract Severance in 30 Days

Secrecy and Transparency

1. REPUBLIC OF SCIENCE. This phrase relates to a concept developed by British scientist

3. OTHER VARIATIONS OF THE TERM “FREE”. In addition to the term, academic

Missions of Centers or Institutes

transparency to questionable academic research associated with “crony philanthropy”; one

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