The Need for US Nuclear Weapon Disarmament in

Light of Rising Costs and International Conflict

Oscar Felegy April 9, 2024

“Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.” These words were uttered by J. Robert
Oppenheimer, the “Father of the Atomic Bomb,” while he witnessed the first nuclear test in
1945. Seventy-nine years later, in 2024, the world is still threatened with nuclear annihilation;
the eight nuclear-weapon states of the world possess enough arms to annihilate two thirds1 of
humanity in an escalation to nuclear conflict.

Still, it would seem as though in the modern day the political dogma of mutually assured
destruction has ensured peace, or at least the prevention of conflict escalation. However, that
does not nullify the great risks assumed with the possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
tensions have risen recently with Russia’s suspension of the New START treaty and Putin’s
threats to use tactical nuclear weapons should the tides turn in the Russo-Ukrainian war, hinting
at the possibility of a future increase in nuclear arms in both the US and Russia.

As a nation, we must evaluate if stockpiling a nuclear arsenal is still a viable deterrent to conflict,
or if it would be in the best interests of the country – and the world – to push for disarmament,
cutting the high costs of the program and reducing the threat of a world-ending war. To best
protect the lives of all humanity, the US should push to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapon
use, reduce spending towards the nuclear weapon program, and pursue international
collaboration to prevent nuclear war.

History
Following the discovery of nuclear fission by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in 1939, top
scientists from around the world began to imagine a weapon of unprecedented destructive power.
Racing against their adversaries in World War II, the Manhattan Project of the United States
became the first in the world to demonstrate a working nuclear weapon in July of 1945; later that
year would mark the first and only time these devices were used in war.2

While nuclear weapons marked the end of World War Two, they marked the beginning of the
Cold War. The Soviet Union’s demonstration of a nuclear fission bomb in 1949, and the

1
Francios, Diaz-Maurin, “Nowhere to Hide: How a Nuclear War Would Kill You – and Almost Everyone Else,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 20, 2022, https://thebulletin.org.
2
Robert S. Norris et al, “Nuclear Weapon,” Britannica, March 24, 2024, https://www.britannica.com.
realization of the possibility of fusion bomb development, sparked an arms race. Fueled by fear
of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, American officials implemented the policies and
organizations to maintain a technological lead over their adversaries, whose exact arsenal size
was unknown. Similarly, the funding and prestige that came with the nuclear program sparked its
own sort of arms race within America, with separate branches of the military and different
national labs all competing
against one another. Each of
these factions sought to
develop better methods of
nuclear weapon deployment
and design in order to gain
said funding and prestige.3 By
the height of the cold war, the
US had amassed a stockpile of
23,317 warheads, enough to
kill billions, but clearly not
enough to surpass the Soviet
Union, whose stockpile stood
at around 47,160.4

However, notable progress

was made by both the United
States and the Soviet Union to
throttle back nuclear arms
production. In the 60s and
70s, both countries pledged to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II, which set limits
on strategic nuclear weapon deployment. Unfortunately, both countries eventually came to
disregard these agreements, still viewing their adversary as a threat trying to gain the upper hand.
Later treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, II, and III and the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) saw more success by implementing warhead
limits and inspection committees for both countries. The terms of these treaties now fall under
the 2011 New START, which was approved by both countries to last until 2026.5 Thanks to these
agreements, the US has reduced its current arsenal to 3,708 warheads, and Russia to 4,489 as of
2023.6

3
Stephen I. Schwartz, “The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 30, 2008,
https://www.nti.org.
4
W.J. Hennigan, “Nuclear War: The Rising Risk, and How We Stop It,” The New York Times, March 4, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com.
5
Daryl Kimball, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, October
2022, https://www.armscontrol.org.
6
Schwartz.
Current Issues: The End of the START
As of February 2024, Russia has now suspended its participation in the New START treaty,
meaning that neither the US nor Russia has assurance of the capacity of the other’s arsenal, nor
restriction on rebuilding their nuclear stockpiles. While President Vladimir Putin has stated that
Russia does not plan to deploy more strategic nuclear arms7, this is an unverifiable claim without
the mandatory inspections implemented by the New START treaty.

The concern here is that a lack of information on both sides could lead to another buildup of
weapon stockpiles, causing further tensions and lack of communication. Furthermore, Putin has
threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons (smaller, battlefield-use warheads) against
Ukraine.8 Should this occur, and NATO nuclear-weapon nations retaliate, a larger stockpile of
US and Russian nuclear weapons would exaggerate the ensuing conflict to catastrophic effect.

Besides Russia, the nuclear capacities of other nations are also of concern. China has recently
seen a buildup of its arsenal, creating worry over potential implications with Taiwan. Similarly,
North Korea has also taken on an aggressive posture towards the United States and is reinforcing
its ties to Russia, raising its level of nuclear threat.9 Surveillance of Iran has indicated progress in
producing the material for nuclear weapons.10 The prevalence of these nuclear threats indicates
that it is necessary for the US to have the means to either deter a nuclear strike in the first place
or fully protect itself and its territory.

But the US is not without its faults either. Current nuclear control systems still rely on
cold-war-era thinking, such as the sole authority of the president to launch a nuclear attack, or
hair-trigger missiles on standby to be launched in less than half an hour. Additionally, the US has
never formally declared a position against the use of nuclear weapons as a first strike instead of a
retaliatory and defensive measure. This needs to change.

Why Are Nuclear Weapons Necessary?

The benefit of a stockpile of nuclear weapons rests solely on the political dogmas of a nuclear
deterrent and mutually assured destruction (MAD). If two nations possessing nuclear weapons
come in conflict with one another, it would be risking extinction to use a nuclear strike on the
other, knowing that the other has the capacity to retaliate. As such, it would be in a country’s best
interest to stockpile enough nuclear weapons that no opponent would dare attack it.

7
David E Sanger, “Putin’s Move on Nuclear Treaty May Signal End to Formal Arms Control,” The New York
Times, February 21, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com.
8
Schwartz.
9
Hartigan, Kelsey. “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Five Nuclear Weapons Issues to Address in 2024,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies, February 9, 2024.
10
Sanger.
So far, this doctrine has held up. Since the use of nuclear arms in World War Two, a time when
only one nation possessed nuclear capability, no nuclear weapons have been used in conflict. A
joint 2022 statement from five nuclear-weapon states of the world agrees that “nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences,
we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve
defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”11 Even though in a perfect world no
country would possess nuclear weapons, while any nation or rogue group does possess them, at
least some nuclear capacity should be maintained to ward off threats.

Costs of a Nuclear Arsenal

One of the less pressing, yet incessant, drawbacks to a nuclear arsenal is the monetary cost. In
2021, the government spent $42.1 billion on the development and maintenance of the nation’s
nuclear stockpile, and these costs are only expected to grow over the next ten years.12 A complete
breakdown of the budget is
shown in figure 2, highlighting
the significant disparity
between defensive systems
(Command, Communications,
and Early Warning Systems)
and weapon development
(Stockpile Maintenance,
Tactical and Strategic Weapon
Development and Research).

However, the more pressing

issue against nuclear weapons is
the cost of human life. The
detonation of even one of the
smallest nuclear warheads in
military use could cause
thousands of deaths from the
initial blast and radioactive
fallout. The escalation to the use
of just one percent of the
world’s current arsenal would
11
“Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding
Arms Races,” The White House, January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov.
12
“Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2021 to 2030,” Congressional Budget Office, May 2021,
https://www.cbo.gov.
be estimated to kill around 27 million immediately, with 255 million deaths from global effects
within two years.13 A full scale nuclear war could lead to the eventual death of over 5.3 billion.14

Pushing for US nuclear disarmament does not fully eliminate this threat, but it does reduce it.
Not only does it limit the catastrophic effects of nuclear retaliation and escalation, but it inhibits
the likelihood of an accidental first strike. Since the 1950s, there have been at least thirteen
documented instances of “close calls” nearly warranting nuclear strikes, including nuclear bombs
accidentally falling out of bombers over the US or allied territories.15 While these incidents have
gotten less frequent as technology has improved, it’s hard to fathom the great risk that is taken on
by simply possessing the destructive power of these weapons.

Possible Solutions
While a complete end to the issue of nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur without some global
form of governing agency, there are smaller-scale policies that can be implemented to reduce
nuclear stockpiles or reduce their costs and risks. Listed from the policies that would be the
quickest to implement to ones which could take a longer duration, these include solutions which
reduce the risk of stockpile usage, reduce the size of our country’s nuclear stockpile, and strive
for international cooperation to reduce nuclear stockpiles globally.

Reduce Risk of Stockpile Use

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the threat of global annihilation exists. If stockpiles must be
maintained per mutually assured destruction, the US can at least take steps to more carefully
manage and control the use of its nuclear arms.

● Renounce First Use: The US has never fully declared the purpose of nuclear weapons to
be just a deterrent; leaving the possibility for the president to declare a nuclear first strike
– potentially sparking a catastrophic escalation of nuclear conflict as a response to mere
conventional warfare. The US should renounce the first use of nuclear weapons to not
only set a good precedent for the rest of the world’s nuclear-weapon states, but also to
prevent subversion or misinformation within our government from leading to a nuclear
war.16
● End Sole Authority: The executive branch of the US government has the sole,
unchecked power to order a nuclear strike. No single individual should be responsible for
a decision of this magnitude; a small committee of military, political, and scientific

13
Schwartz.
14
Diaz-Maurin.
15
Bastian Herre et al, “Nuclear Weapons,” Our World in Data, February 2024, https://ourworldindata.org.
16
“Our Five Policy Solutions,” Back from the Brink, https://preventnuclearwar.org.
 advisors should be established to better evaluate the costs of nuclear retaliation and avoid
false alarms.17
● End Hair-Trigger Alert: The US has around 400 nuclear warheads ready to be launched
within minutes. While this strategy was viable during the threats of the cold war, it is an
unnecessary risk that limits the time to properly evaluate the necessity for a nuclear
strike. The US should remove these hair-trigger systems and instead rely on
submarine-launched missiles, which can be launched with relative ease yet provide time
to re-evaluate the launch decision.18

Reduce Domestic Stockpile

In order to cut the costs and risks associated with the possession of nuclear weapons, the US
should pursue stockpile reduction domestically, even if no treaties specifically mandate it.

● Continue arsenal limitations in good faith: An arms race only works if both parties are
participating; Russia will have no incentive to stockpile weapons if it can verify that the
US is doing the same. The US currently has a completely sufficient nuclear arsenal that
only costs an annual $0.9 billion to maintain. Funding over $20 billion annually in
advanced weapons development is overkill; limiting the nuclear arsenal promotes safety
and also frees up funding for more pressing issues like climate change.19
● Transition spending to defense systems: While reduction of the US arsenal is indeed a
risk while other nations still possess nuclear capabilities, the US can choose to develop
more defensive, instead of offensive, technologies. As shown in figure 2, development of
weapons is allotted more funding than early warning systems – transitioning spending to
early warning systems and defensive cruise missiles could reduce expenditures while still
adequately protecting the nation.

Pursue International Cooperation

While two-way treaties like the New START have fallen through and are unlikely to be
reestablished amid current tensions, international cooperation should continue to be sought.
Trilateral agreements, with a third party such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
serving as an arbiter between the two nations, have shown promise in the past, presenting a
possible future solution. Additionally, non-governmental collaborations. such as those between
scientific organizations, have historically helped to create dialogue and open the way for
governmental treaties between nations.20

17
“Our Five Policy Solutions.”
18
“Our Five Policy Solutions.”
19
Herre et al.
20
Martin Rees, Ben Koppelman and Neil Davison, “Scientific Steps to Nuclear Disarmament,” Nature, May 19,
2010, https://www.nature.com.
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