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The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and

Regional Competition

Article in Asian Security · January 2013

DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2013.760926

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The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia:

Public Diplomacy and Regional
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Ian Hall & Frank Smith

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 Asian Security, vol. 9, no. 1, 2013, pp. 1–18
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ISSN 1479-9855 print/1555-2764 online
DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2013.760926

The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public

Diplomacy and Regional Competition
IAN HALL and FRANK SMITH

Abstract: Throughout Asia, states are competing to build and leverage soft power using public
diplomacy. This article examines these investments, whether they pay dividends, and why they
are being made. A mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis shows little, if any, positive cor-
relation between public diplomacy by Asian states and foreign public opinion. We therefore ask
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why states invest in public diplomacy when it does not seem to work. We argue that differ-
ent motives are at play: The struggle for soft power is driven by both a logic of consequences
and logic of appropriateness. Lastly, we suggest how this struggle might aggravate rather than
ameliorate tensions in the region.

There are two arms races happening in Asia today: one for military capabilities and
another for the weapons of “soft power.”1 East and South Asian states are investing
heavily in their armed forces, but many are also spending significant sums on public
diplomacy in various attempts to influence foreign public opinion. Using traditional
and new media, as well as cultural events and academic exchange programs, Asian states
now aim to project a better image than their neighbors to garner sympathy and support
for their foreign policy objectives.2
How did this struggle for soft power begin? What is the current state of play?
Perhaps more important, what motives are at work and how might they affect outcomes
in Asia? Conventional wisdom holds that public diplomacy helps states build soft
power and that it also has a beneficial or benign influence on international relations.3
We challenge both contentions. First, we look at the mixed history of public diplo-
macy during the Cold War in East and South Asia (the region inside a triangle cornered
by Japan, India, and Australia). Next, we describe the investments that Asian states
have made in public diplomacy since the late 1990s and analyze the available evidence
about how “profitable” those investments have been. China was among the first to
boost investment in public diplomacy, but other states soon followed suit, intensify-
ing what has been a longstanding struggle for soft power in the region. Despite this
increased investment in public diplomacy, however, a growing body of poll data and
other evidence suggests that it has had little or no positive effect on foreign public
opinion to date.

We would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as
Andrew O’Neil and Jason Sharman. A version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association
Asia–Pacific Conference in September 2011, and we are grateful for the feedback received.
Address correspondence to: Ian Hall, Graduate Studies in International Affairs Program, Department of
International Relations, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, Hedley Bull Centre,
Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. E-mail: ian.hall@anu.edu.au
 2 Asian Security

Given so little evidence of efficacy, we ask why policymakers might believe – despite
data to the contrary – that public diplomacy is a worthwhile investment. Apparently,
some believe that it is a consequential instrument of statecraft, while others believe
that it is an appropriate way to conduct diplomatic affairs. “Appropriate” is not the
same as “good,” however, and so we suggest that public diplomacy might have some
negative effects, undermining rather than improving international relations. As a result,
the struggle for soft power in Asia may deepen mistrust and increase the potential for
hard-power conflict in the region.

Past as Prologue: Cold War Public Diplomacy in Asia

Soft power and public diplomacy are not new, but both have received increased
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academic and political attention during the past decade. Whereas hard power rests
on threats and inducements, soft power is what Joseph Nye calls the “power of
attraction.”4 A country’s soft power is determined by how attractive foreigners find its
culture, values, and policies. Soft power works when it influences how these foreigners
and their governments behave. In theory, foreigners can be persuaded to act favorably
toward a given country, without recourse to threats or payments, if that country is suf-
ficiently appealing. Nye admits that “soft power resources are slower, more diffuse, and
more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources,” but he and others insist that
soft power is increasingly important in Asia and elsewhere.5
Though difficult to wield, governments still try to build and leverage soft power
to their advantage using – among other instruments – public diplomacy.6 Unlike
traditional diplomacy, which involves communication and negotiation with foreign
governments, public diplomacy is intended to communicate and negotiate with foreign
publics.7 We adopt a broad definition of public diplomacy as an instrument of statecraft
that aims to shape foreign public opinion and, through it, influence the policy decisions
made by other states. Given this understanding, public diplomacy consists of various
forms of media management, public relations, information campaigns, and academic
exchanges that include, among others, a subset of activities associated with cultural
diplomacy. And we do not distinguish “old” from “new” public diplomacy, as some of
its proponents have suggested.8 Instead, we follow Manheim and define public diplo-
macy as all forms of “strategic political communication” that are designed to “influence
public or elite opinion in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign pol-
icy of the target nation to advantage,”9 which therefore include short-, medium-, and
long-term efforts and objectives alike.10
People in Asia have long been the targets of public diplomacy and other attempts
to exert soft power. During the Cold War, the superpowers and other states fought
to gain influence over public opinion within the region.11 Their means ranged from
classic propaganda, distributed through print media or broadcast over radio and tele-
vision, to more subtle channels of influence that included language training and other
cultural or academic exchange programs. Their ends varied too, in accordance with the
different interests at play. The United States, for example, invested heavily in promot-
ing liberal democratic values in Japan after World War II with the aim of preventing a
slide back into militarism.12 For their part, the British, French, and Dutch all sought to
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 3

retain influence over their former colonies in Asia by nurturing cultural and educational
exchanges. In contrast, India, Indonesia, and other Asian states used public diplomacy
and propaganda to pursue anticolonial agendas, spreading ideas aimed at undermin-
ing European influence in the region and throughout the “Third World.” Along with
decolonization, the Soviet Union also used public diplomacy to promote Communism,
and this message was countered in turn by the United States, Australia, and Western
Europe.13
Nevertheless, the results of public diplomacy in Asia during the Cold War were –
at best – mixed. For example, the United States implanted democratic values in Japan,
but this success must be set against its failure to prevent the rise of Communism in
China, avert defeat in Vietnam, or persuade people elsewhere in the region of the
virtues of American political and economic objectives.14 Indeed, anti-Americanism
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became a significant theme in democratic as well as authoritarian regimes in India,

Indonesia, Pakistan, and South Korea.15 Here, as elsewhere, opinions seem to have been
swayed less by public diplomacy and more by the substance of American foreign pol-
icy. In South Korea, for instance, US support for the ruling military regime during the
1980s led to a marked increase in anti-American sentiment.16 Soviet public diplomacy
was often unwelcome as well, and so a diplomatic culture emerged in Asia that was hos-
tile to efforts by states to speak directly to foreign publics, emphasizing instead strong
norms of noninterference and traditional state-to-state relations.17

A Renewed Struggle for Soft Power

Things began to change, however, in the late 1990s. Despite the ambivalent record of
public diplomacy during the Cold War and the region’s seemingly unreceptive diplo-
matic culture, Asian states once again started to explore the possibilities of using public
diplomacy to build soft power in support of their foreign policies. Many now make
considerable efforts to identify and exploit assets that – for reasons we analyze below –
they believe represent their society and appeal to foreign audiences, thus building their
“nation brand.”18 These perceived soft-power assets range from historical figures and
artistic treasures to unusual flora and fauna, all of which are showcased through a
growing number of media outlets and educational exchange programs.
In particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) now appears to pour more
money than any other Asian state into public diplomacy.19 According to media reports,
China now spends almost US$9 billion per year on public diplomacy and other activi-
ties intended to boost its soft power.20 This includes more than US$1 billion spent per
year on its international news channel alone.21 In the past, the Chinese government
used classic propaganda and other isolated acts of public diplomacy – such as loan-
ing pandas to foreign zoos or playing “ping-pong diplomacy” with the Americans – in
attempts to improve its image abroad. By the late 1990s, however, this ad hoc approach
was abandoned as scholars and policymakers began to think more systematically about
how to build and use soft power, leading to a significant upgrade of China’s public
diplomacy.22
China’s new public diplomacy has at least five major strands. One of the first
to emerge was an effort to engage ethnic Chinese living abroad, initially because it
 4 Asian Security

offered a potential source of capital for investment and later because some of this
diaspora had political influence in other states.23 Second, the PRC tried to remedy
shortcomings in its management of international media. China also created its own
English-language TV channel, with French and Spanish channels soon to follow.24
Third, it established a dedicated Public Diplomacy Division in 2004 (now the Public
Diplomacy Office) within its Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Through this office and others, the PRC embarked on a sustained campaign
to counteract negative perceptions – mainly but not exclusively in the West – of its
foreign policy, promoting counternarratives about China’s “peaceful rise” (Zhongguo
heping jueqi) and “peaceful development” (heping fazhan).25 To further these ends,
China also created a Public Diplomacy Research Center at the Beijing Foreign Service
University, as well as a scholarly journal, Public Diplomacy Quarterly.26 Fourth,
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China sponsored more than 320 Confucius Institutes at foreign universities in almost
100 countries.27 Modeled loosely on the British Council, Goethe Institut, and Maison
Française, these institutes are designed to teach Mandarin and promote Chinese culture
abroad. With reported setup costs of around US$1 million each and operating costs in
excess of US$200,000 per year, these institutes represent a sizable investment in public
diplomacy.28 Finally, China hosted a series of set-piece sporting, cultural, and busi-
ness events, including the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Exhibition
in 2010.
China’s neighbors were quick to notice these initiatives and responded in what
might be considered a form of “soft balancing.” Sensitive to changes in the behav-
ior of the PRC, Taiwan’s policy community reacted swiftly to the surge in public
diplomacy from across the Strait.29 Emphasizing democracy as its “most valuable
soft-power asset,” the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Taiwan
Foundation for Democracy in 2003, which convened the first World Forum for
Democratization in Asia and started publishing the Taiwan Journal of Democracy.
At the same time, Taiwan’s vice president established what is now known as the
Democratic Pacific Union. And reportedly “in response” to China’s mounting “charm
offensive,” Taiwan’s Government Information Office commissioned a leading polling
organization to survey foreign opinion about its own soft-power assets in 2005.30
India, Japan, and Malaysia also responded quickly to China’s increased investments
in public diplomacy. All three established public diplomacy divisions inside their for-
eign ministries within a few years of the creation of the Chinese office in 2004.31
In addition, these and other Asian states moved too to improve their foreign media
management and boost their international media presence. The number and quality
of state-funded TV and radio channels increased markedly as a result. South Korea’s
Arirang World, for example, was established with an explicit mandate to “improve
the image of Korea” around the world.32 The Japan Public Broadcasting Corporation
NHK began to offer Internet-based news services in 18 languages.33 Even Myanmar
established an international TV channel, MRTV-3, coupled with an English-language
Web site that provides downloadable video clips.34
Almost all Asian states have established English-language Web sites for their for-
eign ministries and other government departments, along with government-sponsored
sites that try to present their countries in the best possible light. Here, Singapore
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 5

probably leads the way with its extensive www.sg site, but other examples include www.
indonesia.go.id and www.lookatvietnam.com. The content and accessibility of these
sites varies, but they are more than just portals for government services or tourism.
The Thai government, for example, produces a new Web site every year for the king’s
birthday, with an array of information in English.35 Web 2.0 and social media tech-
nologies are being employed alongside these conventional Web sites. India and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat are at the forefront of
using Twitter for public diplomacy.36 Singapore’s former foreign minister, George Yeo,
used Facebook to discuss foreign policy with the general public, and many other politi-
cians also appear to have accounts, including Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and
Myanmar’s former paramount general, Than Shwe.37
Several Asian states are upgrading their cultural diplomacy as well, particularly in
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response to the proliferation of Confucius Institutes. For example, South Korea is

rapidly expanding the number of its King Sejong Institutes, which promote the Korean
language and Korean culture, from around 35 in 2010 to a planned 150 by 2015. Though
a small fraction of 1,000 Confucius Institutes are expected to be in operation by 2020,
they nonetheless represent a significant move on the part of South Korea.38 Likewise,
Taiwan’s Council for Cultural Affairs is creating its own Taiwan Academies to teach
Chinese and promote local culture.39 The first will open in the United States, but more
are planned in Asia, and Taiwan is preparing to spend more than US$140 million on this
initiative between 2011 and 2015.40 With similar aims in mind, the Japan Foundation
has been reformed, refocused, and resupplied with new funds. Japanese popular culture,
which is a desired commodity in East Asia, has also been accorded a special place in the
government’s soft power strategy, with international manga competitions now held
annually along with other state-sponsored events.41 India is also opening new offices
of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) in Asia, the Middle East, and
elsewhere, having already established a dedicated Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
in 2004 and invested heavily in outreach to Indian diaspora communities around the
world.42
The cultural component of public diplomacy varies from state to state. Japan and
Thailand have been particularly creative – the former using assets from popular cul-
ture, like manga or pop music, and the latter leveraging its cuisine as a pioneer in
what has been termed “gastro-diplomacy.”43 Thailand has pursued the “Global Thai
program” for more than a decade to promote Thai food through embassy-sponsored
festivals and new restaurants abroad. A similar approach was recently adopted by
Taiwan, which aims to invest more than US$30 million in gastro-diplomacy by 2013,
paying for gourmet festivals and establishing Taiwanese restaurants.44 The Indonesian
Embassy in Washington even created a task force to investigate if it too could benefit
from promoting its own culinary products.45
Finally, to feed and shape other appetites, several Asian states have drastically
expanded their academic and educational exchange programs. This is a significant devel-
opment because they traditionally exported talent by sending their brightest students
off to Europe, the United States, and Australia – many of them never to return. Yet
during the last decade, China, Japan, and India have set up programs to lure back
this human capital, as well as bring foreign students and scholars to their universities.
 6 Asian Security

China has been particularly successful in this regard. Between 1997 and 2007, the num-
ber of foreigners enrolled in Chinese universities rose by an order of magnitude (from
fewer than 40,000 to almost 200,000), giving China the fifth highest number of overseas
students in the world.46 In 2010, it reportedly attracted some 223,000 foreign students,
which is equal to about a third of the number studying in the United States. The major-
ity of these students are from other states in Asia – mainly South Korea, Japan, and
Vietnam. And the China Scholarship Council recently offered funding for 20,000 inter-
national students, including schemes designed to target regions of strategic interest,
such as Africa and the South Pacific.47
Here again, China is not alone: Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam are boosting their
exchange programs as well. The Japanese government announced the “300,000 Student
Plan” in 2008, for example, aiming to more than double its current international enroll-
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ment of about 120,000 by 2020.48 More than 90 percent of international students

currently in Japan are from other Asian states, and the Japanese government aims to
attract more students from the region.49 The numbers involved in Indian initiatives pale
in comparison to Japan and China, but like China, India is also seeking to draw students
from Africa as well as Asia. The Indian government provided scholarships for about
3,550 foreign students in 2009, and it is investing in telecommunications infrastructure
in Africa so that people there can study courses provided by Indian universities via the
Internet.50 Taiwan also has an active academic exchange program, with 400 scholarships
offered to students from across the world.51 For its part, Vietnam has concentrated on
its neighbors in the region and, as part of its “people’s diplomacy” initiative, provided
at least 1,800 scholarships to Cambodian students.52

Does Public Diplomacy Work?

The increasingly intense struggle for soft power in Asia – a struggle waged through pub-
lic diplomacy – is a battle over public opinion. Working out who is winning and why,
however, is hard.53 It is notoriously difficult to gauge the amount of a state or society’s
soft power, let alone its general effect on public opinion in the crowded global market-
place of ideas.54 It is no less challenging to determine the impact of any given aspect
or initiative of public diplomacy, either on a state’s stock of soft power or its ability to
achieve particular foreign policy objectives.55 Analysis is made even more complicated
by the fact that public diplomacy can involve short-, medium-, and long-term efforts
and objectives, so its impact may not be felt for months, years, or even decades. And
public opinion polls may fail to capture some long-term effects, particularly because
some types of public diplomacy aim to influence political or cultural elites more than
the public at large. Therefore, what little evidence we have on the distribution of soft
power in Asia should be considered with caution.
Nevertheless, the most striking result from recent opinion polls is that there appears
to be little if any positive correlation between the investments that Asian states have
made in public diplomacy and how foreigners elsewhere in the region tend to perceive
them. This tentative finding suggests that – as was true in Asia during the Cold War
– the current struggle for soft power stands to have little direct effect on how these
states behave regarding other aspects of their foreign policy. This result is particularly
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 7

striking with regard to China, since it has invested more than most other states in trying
to create and use soft power through public diplomacy.
In 2005, for example, the BBC World Service asked almost 23,000 people from
22 states around the world about their perceptions of China. Overall, 48 percent of
the people polled viewed China’s global influence as positive and 30 percent viewed
it as negative. Perceptions of China were better in Asia (based on poll data from the
Philippines, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, and India), where 55 percent of
people saw Chinese influence as mainly positive.56 However, subsequent BBC polls
show that China’s image abroad deteriorated despite its increased investment in public
diplomacy. Though global perceptions have since rebounded, by 2011, only 44 percent
of people polled around the world viewed China positively, while 38 percent viewed
it negatively. More importantly, the decline of China’s reputation was even more acute
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and enduring in Asia. As shown in Figure 1, positive views of China in other Asian
states have dropped below the global average and now hover around 40 percent. At the
same time, these positive perceptions are now matched, if not overtaken, by negative
views of China, which have increased to 40 percent or more within other states in the
region, as shown in Figure 2.57
Some of these differences are statistically significant. Using the paired-sample t-test,
for example, t(4) = 3.53, p < .025, for the drop in positive perceptions of China in
the region between 2005 and 2009, just as t(5) = 2.69, p < .05, for the regional rise
in negative perceptions between 2005 and 2011. These trends are also reflected in the
data for individual countries. Back in 2005, people in several Asian states were quite
enthusiastic about the benefits of Chinese influence in the world, including those in the
Philippines (70 percent viewed China positively), Indonesia (68 percent viewed China
positively), and India (66 percent viewed China positively).58 Yet by 2011, these once-
positive perceptions of China had dimmed (only 62 percent positive in the Philippines;

FIGURE 1
POSITIVE VIEWS IN ASIA OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ INFLUENCE.99

70

60

50

40
%
30

20

10

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
China Japan India
 8 Asian Security

FIGURE 2
NEGATIVE VIEWS IN ASIA OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ INFLUENCE.99

70

60

50

40
%
30

20
Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 13:02 08 March 2013

10

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year
China Japan India

63 percent positive in Indonesia; and 25 percent positive in India).59 Perceptions are

volatile in some countries, but the regional trend has been unfavorable for China.
Of course, we do not know the counterfactual scenario – namely, what perceptions
of China would have been if it had not invested in public diplomacy. But this investment
looks misplaced or, at the very least, suspect when China’s performance is compared
with other states in the region. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, perceptions of Japan and
India held steady in Asia during the same period, even though they invested in public
diplomacy later or less lavishly than did China. Indeed, for both India and Japan, none
of the differences between their respective highs and lows in either positive or negative
perceptions are statistically significant. The only other Asian country to suffer a sta-
tistically significant decline in regional perceptions appears to be North Korea, which
unlike China, rarely attempts to build or leverage its soft power using public diplomacy.
The results from these BBC World Service polls have been replicated in several other
studies, including the Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey, Gallup Poll, Nation Brands
Index, and Lowy Institute Poll.60 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs has also
reported that Chinese soft power is in far shorter supply than the conventional wis-
dom about its “charm offensive” would predict.61 Overall, China scored well below
Japan on a “Soft-Power Index” that the Chicago Council constructed using survey
data from China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the United States.62
Even when soft power was disaggregated into its economic, cultural, human capital,
diplomatic, and political dimensions, China still fell toward the middle or bottom of
the pack. It fared worst on public perceptions of political soft power, though bet-
ter on cultural and economic dimensions.63 In contrast, other Asian states were often
viewed more positively. For example, Japanese soft power ranked highly across most
indexes – particularly its economic soft power and human capital.64 And although
South Korea reportedly “lacks Japan’s ‘Gross National Cool,’” let alone the economic
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 9

might of either Japan or China, it still outranked China with regards to its political and
diplomatic soft power.65
Taken together, the Chicago Council, BBC World Service, and other poll data there-
fore suggest that there is no clear relationship between the investment that China and
other Asian states have made in public diplomacy and improvement in foreign pub-
lic opinion. Rather than target the public at large, however, it could be argued that
some public diplomacy is aimed at elites, operating on the plausible assumption that
elite opinions matter most when it comes to shaping government policy. Some evi-
dence indicates that public diplomacy might affect elites, but, here again, the data are
mixed. For instance, educational exchange and study abroad programs have been shown
to change the attitudes of students about their erstwhile host country. Perhaps these
changes are mostly positive, but there are unintended consequences as well.66 Although
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study abroad may make students more sympathetic toward foreign cultures, it can also
reinforce nationalistic feelings toward the students’ home countries.67 There are also
notable examples of what might be called blowback, where students are repelled rather
than attracted by their host country – as Nye observes of Sayyid Qutb, a leading ide-
ologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose experience studying in America during the
1950s helped shape his views on militant Islamism.68
It is one thing to change the opinions of individual elites and yet another for gov-
ernments to change their policies in response. More often than not, the policymaking
process is complex, which makes it difficult to trace the political impact of even elite-
focused public diplomacy. For example, Carol Atkinson argues that American military
exchange programs produce “liberalizing trends” in authoritarian regimes by social-
izing their military personnel with democratic norms.69 But while there may be a
statistically significant correlation between these exchange programs and democratic
transitions, that tells us little about the process through which these transitions come
about and thus what causal role, if any, this kind of public diplomacy might have played.
Although poll data on mass public opinion may not capture the full story, they are
also difficult to dismiss, particularly if no alternative measure of success or failure is
offered. So contrary to the conviction that public diplomacy shapes public opinion,
there is little evidence to suggest that the recent surge of public diplomacy in Asia has
had a positive effect. Furthermore, if public opinion is not positively swayed, then it is
unlikely that public diplomacy is actually influencing the policy decisions that foreign
governments make with regard to other aspects of their international relations.70
Why public diplomacy might fail is beyond the scope of this article. In the case of
China, it may be due to the difficulty of promoting the PRC because of its actions
at home and abroad.71 Public diplomacy notwithstanding, these actions are often per-
ceived as evidence of an oppressive domestic political system or confrontational foreign
policy. The comparatively better perceptions enjoyed by India, Japan, and South Korea
may therefore result from their democratic politics rather than their public diplomacy.
Alternatively, or perhaps in conjunction, the PRC and other governments may fail to
build and leverage soft power because of the inherent limits of public diplomacy inside
a crowded global marketplace of ideas. Nye is inconsistent on this point. On the one
hand, he acknowledges that many soft power resources fall outside government con-
trol, but, on the other hand, he still admonishes the US government for not investing
 10 Asian Security

more in public diplomacy.72 In all likelihood, however, most signals sent through public
diplomacy are simply lost in the overwhelming noise created by all of the other ideas at
play. In sum, public diplomacy appears to lack obvious benefits, at least in Asia, which
makes the ongoing struggle for soft power puzzling and possibly problematic as well.

The Logics of Public Diplomacy

If public diplomacy is as ineffective as most evidence suggests, then why are Asian
states increasingly investing in this practice? How has this practice acquired an “almost
magical attractive quality,” as some analysts have observed?73 Several different motives
appear to be at play – some animated by the “logic of consequences” and some that
embody the “logic of appropriateness.”74 First, some states pursue public diplomacy
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because their leaders believe that it actually works and thus has “strategic value” (i.e., it
is consequential).75 Second, some engage in the struggle for soft power because they
observe others doing it (i.e., it has become the “norm” and therefore appropriate).
Policymakers may even invest in public diplomacy because they believe it will have a
transformative effect on Asian international relations, opening up hitherto closed pro-
cesses to public scrutiny and democratizing foreign policy. This motive also has an
inherent “logic of appropriateness,” but one that sees the “norm” as an ideal or aspi-
ration, rather than just a common pattern of behavior. These motives are conceptually
distinct but not mutually exclusive. For example, it is possible to believe that public
diplomacy works to advance a state’s interests and yet deny that it improves interna-
tional relations. Equally, it is possible to believe that public diplomacy works and is a
positive force within the region.
In Asia, the belief that public diplomacy is consequential is particularly strong in
China. This belief is typically grounded in the conviction that other states (particularly
the United States) derive significant strategic advantages from soft power. As David
Shambaugh has shown, Chinese analysts are convinced – some to the point of obses-
sion – that American soft power and public diplomacy were major factors contributing
to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These analysts
think that American broadcasting, human rights promotion, educational exchanges, and
the like are integral parts of a concerted attempt to undermine Communist regimes
through “peaceful evolution,” which is a strategy that they assume has been extremely
effective.76 They also see evidence of this strategy at work in the more recent “color rev-
olutions” against authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as
in US support and funding for prodemocratic nongovernmental organizations.77 From
this perspective, soft power and public diplomacy appear critical to the survival of
the PRC, as well as its relative power and thus its capacity to influence international
relations.78
Many practitioners and analysts elsewhere in Asia are also convinced that pub-
lic diplomacy is consequential. In Japan, as Akiko Fukushima argues, interest in soft
power is widespread and backed by the belief among diplomats and scholars that it can
be built by public diplomacy.79 Similar ideas are evident in Korea and India, both of
which think that they have considerable soft-power resources and yet worry about not
using them to their full advantage.80 In Indonesia, the concerns differ but not belief in
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 11

public diplomacy, which is seen as an effective way to burnish the country’s image in a
manner befitting its new democratic politics.81 And even where policymakers might be
skeptical about public diplomacy, they may still invest in it – as a hedge against uncer-
tainty – because they fear the relative power that other states might acquire if it actually
works.82
Although the logic of consequences is apparent in these and other countries, it
cannot fully explain why public diplomacy is increasingly popular despite growing evi-
dence of its inefficacy. Some Asian governments also appear motivated by the logic of
appropriateness, whereby they pursue public diplomacy because they see other states
doing so as well. If the norms associated with public diplomacy are seen as increasingly
appropriate, then states might invest in it because doing so is interpreted as consistent
with their identity or role within the international system. China aspires to achieve the
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status of a great power, for example, so some Chinese elite argue that it is expected to
build soft power through public diplomacy.83 Likewise, when India created its Public
Diplomacy Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, one interpretation was that
India was merely trying to emulate the United States.84 The struggle for soft power
has, in other words, an element of faddishness about it, with states investing in public
diplomacy just because it has become common practice.
However, there is a difference between those that think public diplomacy might be
appropriate but threatening versus those who think it is both appropriate and desirable.
On the one hand, some Indian, Indonesian, Taiwanese, and Malaysian policymakers
believe that public diplomacy is desirable because it might lead to the democratization
of foreign policy and regional diplomacy (though they face considerable resistance,
even at home).85 Thus, the head of the Indian Public Diplomacy Division has argued
that using social networking technologies is necessary – not just for disseminating infor-
mation to external audiences, but also for involving domestic and foreign constituencies
in the policy process, thereby mixing public affairs with public diplomacy.86 Similar
arguments have also been aired in Indonesia, which, since the fall of Suharto, has looked
to the instruments of soft power to promote democratic and pluralistic values in the
region.87 Here, Indonesian and Indian thinking has been influenced by American and
European ideas, as proponents of public diplomacy from the University of Southern
California’s Center on Public Diplomacy and the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies
Programme have reached out to Asian policymakers through various workshops and
conferences.88
On the other hand, public diplomacy might be seen as appropriate but not “good,”
because many governments in Asia remain wary about other states influencing their
populations and policy decisions.89 Despite the rise of public diplomacy, Asian diplo-
macy is still influenced by strict interpretations of sovereignty, punctilious adherence to
secret negotiations, the monopolization of international relations by professional diplo-
mats, and limited flows of information to domestic as well as foreign media. Although
there are some signs of change, it is doubtful that they augur the imminent transfor-
mation of international relations into a more open and democratic system. Rather,
as China’s fear of American soft power and regional concerns about Chinese public
diplomacy both illustrate, Asian states remain deeply sensitive to foreign attempts to
influence domestic public opinion. In this light, public diplomacy looks somewhat akin
 12 Asian Security

to espionage, which is roundly condemned even though most states have official agen-
cies dedicated to spying on other governments. And just as concealing, spinning, or
even stealing information may be appropriate in some situations, few would argue that
deception is desirable as a general practice.90
So while some practitioners of public diplomacy are motivated by the logic of appro-
priateness, this does not mean that the ensuing struggle for soft power actually benefits
international relations. To the contrary, the increasing emphasis on public diplomacy in
Asia may inadvertently create more problems than it solves, especially when it fails to
work as intended.

Soft Power and Hard Consequences

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Using public diplomacy when it does not work may be more than merely wasteful –
failed public diplomacy might have corrosive effects. First, by its very nature, public
diplomacy can arouse suspicion because it often aims to convince foreign audiences
of ideas that their governments might not approve, such as “American foreign policy
is benign” or “the rise of China is beneficial.” Regardless of the logic that motivates
these attempts to influence public opinion, they can provoke hostile reactions from
other governments or even the public at large. For example, the proliferation of Chinese
Confucius Institutes has led to allegations that they are propaganda outlets or even “spy
posts.”91 One result of such suspicions is that none of the planned Confucius Institutes
have opened at Indian universities.92 South Korea has also suffered a backlash against its
attempt to invigorate the “Korean Wave” or Hallyu phenomenon.93 In a similar man-
ner, American public diplomacy, Western support for Chinese dissidents, and Western
media coverage of Tibetan unrest have prompted some Chinese nationalists to warn
against foreign plots aimed at turning the people against their government.94 And these
nationalistic outbursts can, in turn, further alienate foreign opinion.95
Second, as Nye admits, “actions speak louder than words.”96 When there is a gap
between how a government describes itself through public diplomacy and how for-
eign audiences perceive its foreign policy, this disconnect between words and deeds
can create a backlash. While most proponents of public diplomacy – including Nye
– recognize that it cannot rescue the reputation of a state that persists with unpopu-
lar policies, few acknowledge that failed public diplomacy can actually make matters
worse. However, “under conditions of lost credibility,” Goldsmith and Horiuchi have
found that “increased public diplomacy efforts without substantial policy changes can
actually cause more negative views . . . than would doing nothing at all.”97 Therefore,
it is not the case that failed public diplomacy has no effect at all; rather, it can deepen
mistrust and harden hostility.
Finally, when negative opinions abroad remain intransigent despite increased invest-
ment in public diplomacy, this may increase frustration at home. Polls consistently
demonstrate that most people maintain very positive opinions about their own country,
as shown in Table 1.
This suggests that people rarely find sufficient fault with their government’s actions
to share what are often the more negative views expressed by foreigners. As a result,
when their government tries but fails to convince foreign audiences that its policies
are benign, people are more inclined to blame foreigners for this failure, rather than
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 13

TABLE 1
DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN VIEWS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ INFLUENCE.100

Positive Views inside the Positive Views of the Same

Country in Question Country, elsewhere in Asia

China 84% 39%

India 60% 42%
USA 59% 44%

their own policies. The common tendency to blame others for not accepting our virtues
stands to increase the potential for international conflict or, at the very least, frustration
with the status quo.
Of course, further research is required to test these propositions. Our primary pur-
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pose here is only to show that public diplomacy has little or no positive correlation to
public opinion in Asia. But when this finding is coupled with the fact that the different
motives and mechanisms at play permit different outcomes, it raises the distinct possi-
bility that public diplomacy may have negative as well as positive consequences. The
risks of public diplomacy therefore warrant careful consideration, even as the hunt for
elusive evidence of its positive effect will no doubt continue.

Conclusion
Proponents of public diplomacy argue that struggles for soft power are far preferable to
struggles for hard power.98 They claim that the latter produce arms races that can lead
to war, whereas competitions to tell the “better story” pose no such risk. From this
perspective, public diplomacy is akin to the Olympic Games: It helps domesticate the
clash of national egos that might otherwise become violent. Advocates for the so-called
“new” public diplomacy even argue that it can transform international relations from
a hierarchical and power-oriented system of states to a more democratic world. For
them, public diplomacy is not just a civilizing force – it is also a force for good. If this
were true, then the struggle for soft power in Asia could be welcomed as a shift toward
a more harmonious region.
Unfortunately, this struggle may inadvertently have the opposite effect, accentuating
rather than alleviating differences between states and even intensifying the competition
for hard power. At the very least, there is little evidence to suggest that public diplomacy
actually works as intended, particularly when it is motivated by a logic of consequences
that seeks to sway mass public opinion. This discrepancy between the limited efficacy of
public diplomacy and its increasing popularity would not be troubling, if failed public
diplomacy had no negative effects. But failed public diplomacy may not be benign, in
which case the potential downside for increased hostility in Asia could be considerable.

NOTES

1. Defense spending in Asia and Oceania increased by more than 60 percent between 2000 and 2009 (see Sam
Perlo-Freeman, Olawale Ismail, and Carina Solmirano, “Military Expenditure,” in the SIPRI Yearbook 2010:
Armament, Disarmament and International Security [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], pp. 177, 189,
192, and 214). On “soft power,” see especially Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).
 14 Asian Security

2. Sook Jong Lee and Jan Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (New York: Palgrave,
2011), pp. 1–5.
3. See, for example, Daryl Copeland, Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2009), pp. 161–186. Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson, Going Public: Diplomacy for the
Information Society (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2008).
4. Nye, Soft Power, p. 5.
5. Nye, Soft Power, p. 100. See also Lee and Melissen, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.
6. Other instruments that relate to soft power might include foreign aid and development assistance. Although
Nye argues that soft power cannot be bought, some analysts see these economic inducements as part of
China’s broader soft-power strategy. See, for example, Xin Li and Verner Werm, “Building China’s Soft
Power for a Peaceful Rise,” Journal of Chinese Political Science Vol. 16, No. 1 (2011), pp. 69–89.
7. See Ian Hall, “Diplomacy, Antidiplomacy and International Society,” in Richard Little and John Williams,
eds., The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 141–161.
8. See, for example, Leonard and Alakeson, Going Public, or Philip Seib, ed., Toward a New Public Diplomacy:
Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2009). Nancy Snow distinguishes between the “tough”
and “tender-minded” school of thought on public diplomacy. The first, into which the Leonard and Alakeson
and Seib books fall, think public diplomacy is about improving international understanding and the democ-
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ratization of foreign policy; the second considers public diplomacy, as we do, simply as an instrument of
strategic influence (Nancy Snow, “Rethinking Public Diplomacy,” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds.,
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy [London and New York: Routledge, 2009], p. 9). For a critical
commentary on this argument, see Ian Hall, “The Transformation of Diplomacy: Mysteries, Insurgencies and
Public Relations,” International Affairs Vol. 66, No. 1 (2010), pp. 247–256.
9. Jarol B. Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 4.
10. See Gifford D. Malone, Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation’s Public
Diplomacy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988).
11. On American efforts, see Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency:
American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
Wilson P. Dizard, Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2004), and Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy.
12. Justin Williams, Sr., “American Democratization Policy for Occupied Japan: Correcting the Revisionist
View,” Pacific Historical Review Vol. 57, No. 2 (1988), pp. 179–202.
13. Yale Richmond, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: Berghahn, 2008).
14. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, pp. 285–291.
15. Alvin Z. Rubenstein and Donald E. Smith, “Anti–Americanism in the Third World,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 497 (1988), pp. 35–45.
16. Jinwung Kim, “Recent Anti-Americanism in Korea: The Causes,” Asian Survey Vol. 29, No. 8 (1989),
pp. 749–763.
17. See especially Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003).
18. Simon Anholt, “‘Nation-Branding’ in Asia,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy Vol. 4 (2008), pp. 265–269.
19. On the growth of Chinese public diplomacy, see Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong, “China’s Soft Power:
Discussions, Resources, and Prospects,” Asian Survey Vol. 48, No. 3 (2008), pp. 456–461; Y.-H. Heng,
“Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Is the Softest of Them All? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese Strategies
in the ‘Soft’ Power Competition Era,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific Vol. 10 (2010), pp. 275–304;
Ingrid d’Hooghe, “Into High Gear: China’s Public Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy Vol. 3,
No. 1 (2008), pp. 37–61; Ingrid d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe: Beijing’s Public
Diplomacy Puzzle,” in Lee and Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 163–190;
A. Hunter, “Soft Power: China on the Global Stage,” Chinese Journal of International Relations Vol. 2,
No. 3 (2009), pp. 373–398; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming
the World (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2007); Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft
Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 2, No. 2 (2008), pp. 287–302; Li Mingjiang, Soft Power:
China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2009); Gary D. Rawnsley,
“China Talks Back: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power for the Chinese Century,” in Snow and Taylor, eds.,
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, pp. 282–291; Shogo Suzuki, “Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity
Studies, Myopia and Fantasy,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pp. 779–793; Shogo Suzuki, “The
Myth and Reality of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” in Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, eds., Soft Power and US
Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge,
2010), pp. 199–214; Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. 616 (2008), pp. 257–273; Wang Jian, ed., Soft Power
in China: Public Diplomacy through Communication (New York: Palgrave, 2011); and Zhiqun Zhu, China’s
New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2010).
20. Shafi Rahman, “Slouching Tiger, Racing Dragon,” India Today, July 3, 2010. Available at http://indiatoday.
intoday.in/site/story/slouching-tiger,-racing-dragon/1/103941.html
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 15

21. d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe,” p. 184.

22. See especially Li, “China Debates Soft Power.”
23. See Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, pp. 76–78 and p. 125.
24. China’s English-language channel, CCTV-9, was launched in 2000, and the Spanish and French versions
(CCTV E and F) were launched in 2004. CCTV America launched in 2012.
25. Joel Wuthnow, “The Concept of Soft Power in China’s Strategic Discourse,” Issues and Studies Vol. 44, No. 2
(2008), p. 5.
26. See “Public Diplomacy: New Luminance Color of Chinese Diplomacy,” People’s Daily Online, September 1,
2010. Available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7125349.html
27. Confucius Institute Online, Introduction to the Confucius Institutes (August 2009). Available at http://www.
college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22308.htm
28. Nicholas Kralev, “China 60, US 0: Cultural Centers in Other’s Country,” The Washington Times, April
8, 2010. Available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/08/china-60-us-0-culture-centers-in-
others-country
29. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: A
Comparative Study of China and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 15, No. 56 (2008), p. 438.
30. Wang and Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,” pp. 442–443, 432.
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31. Kishan S. Rana, Asian Diplomacy: The Foreign Ministries of China, India, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand
(Washington, DC, and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
32. See Arirang World, Korea’s Global TV Arirang Web site, http://www.arirang.co.kr/prroom/
About_ArirangN1.asp?sys_lang=Eng Similarly, “Hallyu Seen through Southeast Asian Eyes,” Korean
Wave, May 11, 2010. Available at http://www.korea.net/Government/Current-Affairs/Others/view?subId=
288&affairId=209&pageIndex=7&articleId=81224
33. See NHK International’s NHK World English Web site: http://www.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/index.html
34. MRTV-3, Myanmar International TV: http://www.mrtv3.net.mm
35. “Information Center for the Celebrations of the Auspicious Occasion of His Majesty the King’s 7th Cycle
Birthday Anniversary, 5th December 2011.” King 84. Available at http://www.king84.th/en/index.php
36. On India, see Ian Hall, “India’s New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action,”
Asian Survey Vol. 42, No. 6 (2012), pp. 1189–1110; Kishan S. Rana, “Re-Setting India’s Public Diplomacy,”
Business Standard, January 16, 2011. On the ASEAN Secretariat, see Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Digital
Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” in Peng Er Lam and Colin Duerkop, eds., Rethinking Diplomacy: New
Approaches and Domestic Challenges in East Asia and the European Union (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2011), p. 112.
37. Chachavalpongpun, “Digital Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” p. 123.
38. “Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and Friendliness,” Xinhua, October 2, 2006. Available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm
39. Paul S. Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan: Taiwan’s Public Diplomacy Outreach,” Issues and Studies Vol. 47,
No. 1 (2011), pp. 123–124.
40. Shih Hsiu-Chan, “‘Taiwan Academies’ to Open First in US,” Taipei Times, August 4, 2010. Available at http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/05/2003509975
41. On Japanese public diplomacy, see Peng Er Lam, “Japan’s Quest for ‘Soft Power’: Attraction and Limitation,”
East Asia Vol. 24 (2007), pp. 349–363; Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular
Culture in East and Southeast Asia,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 8 (2008), pp. 73–101;
Nakano Yoshiko, “Shared Memories: Japanese Pop Culture in China,” in Watanabe Yasushi and David L.
McConnell, eds., Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States
(Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2008, pp. 111–127); and Yonezawa Akiyoshi, “Facing Crisis:
Soft Power and Japanese Education in a Global Context,” in Yasushi and McConnell, eds., Soft Power
Superpowers, pp. 54–74.
42. ICCR, ICCR’s Global Presence: Foreign Cultural Centres. Available at http://www.iccrindia.net/
foreigncentres.html; Kishan S. Rana, “India’s Diaspora Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy Vol. 4,
No. 3 (2009), pp. 361–372.
43. Hiro Katsumata, “Japanese Popular Culture in East Asia: A New Insight into Regional Community
Building,” International Relations of the Asia–Pacific Vol. 12, No. 1 (2012), 133–160.
44. Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan,” pp. 125–126.
45. “At the Embassy of Indonesia, a New Tool: Gastro-Diplomacy – Indonesian Officials Turn to Food as a Way
to Inspire Interest,” Embassy of Indonesia, October 10, 2011. Available at http://www.embassyofindonesia.
org/press/gastrodiplomacy.htm
46. Mara Hvistendahl, “China Moves up to Fifth as Importer of Students,” Chronicle of Higher Education,
September 19, 2008.
47. China’s University and College Admission System, 20,000 Quotas for International Students Studying in
China with Chinese Government Scholarship in 2010. Available at http://www.cucas.edu.cn/HomePage/
2010-02-24/page_400.shtml
48. Study Japan, The ‘300000 Foreign Students’ Plan (2008). Available at http://www.studyjapan.go.jp/en/toj/
toj09e.html This plan has been criticized for seemingly lax implementation (see David McNeill, “Japan’s
 16 Asian Security

Globalization Project Stalls as Some Criticize Focus on Elite Universities,” Chronicle of Higher Education,
September 8, 2010. Available at http://chronicle.com/article/A-Slow-Start-for-Japans/124346).
49. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Student Exchange Programs (2011). Available at http://www.mofa.go.
jp/policy/culture/people/student/index.html
50. ICCR, The Many Scholarship Schemes of the ICCR (2011). Available at http://www.iccrindia.net/
scholarshipschemes.html; Pan-Africa e-Network Project, Project Launched (2011). Available at http://www.
panafricanenetwork.com
51. Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan,” p. 128.
52. Vietnam Ministry of External Affairs, “Deputy PM Hails People’s Diplomacy Work,” Look at Vietnam, May
3, 2009. Available at http://www.lookatvietnam.com/2009/03/deputy-pm-hails-peoples-diplomacy-work.
html
53. For different attempts to measure Chinese soft power, see Yuangzong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s
Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,” East Asia Vol. 23, No. 4 (2006), pp. 22–44; and Gregory
G. Holyk, “Paper Tiger: Chinese Soft Power in Asia,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 126, No. 2 (2011),
pp. 223–254.
54. For a discussion of this problem, see Shin-Wha Lee, “The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical
Approaches in East Asia,” in Lee and Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 11–32.
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55. See especially Matthew Kroenig, Melissa McAdam, and Steven Weber, “Taking Soft Power Seriously,”
Comparative Strategy Vol. 29, No. 5 (2010), pp. 412–431.
56. BBC World Service, BBC World Service Program on International Policy Attitudes – GlobeScan Poll (March
2005). Available at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/China/China_Mar05/China_Mar05_rpt.pdf
57. BBC World Service, BBC World Service Program on International Policy Attitudes – GlobeScan Poll
(March 2011). Available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar11/BBCEvalsUS_Mar11_rpt.
pdf Global attitudes toward China improved in 2012, but those within the region remained relatively
constant and unfavorable. See the 2012 BBC World Service Poll at http://www.globescan.com/images/
images/pressreleases/bbc2012_country_ratings/2012_bbc_country%20rating%20final%20080512.pdf The
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 BBC World Service Polls can be found at: http://www.worldpublicopinion.
org/pipa/pdf/mar07/BBC_ViewsCountries_Mar07_pr.pdf; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/
02_04_08_globalview.pdf; http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/BBCEvals_Feb09_rpt.pdf;
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pipa/pdf/apr10/BBCViews_Apr10_rpt.pdf
58. BBC World Service, BBC World Service Program on International Policy Attitudes – GlobeScan Poll (March
2005).
59. BBC World Service, BBC World Service Program on International Policy Attitudes – GlobeScan Poll (March
2011).
60. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey, for example, China’s favorability within
the region fell from 63 percent in 2002 to about 40 percent by 2010 (Pew Research Center, Pew
Global Attitudes Project Survey [2010], p. 52. Available at http://pewglobal.org/files/2011/04/Pew-Global-
Attitudes-Spring-2010-Report2.pdf). Likewise, Gallup Poll data indicate that approval for Chinese lead-
ership among people in other Asian states was about 42 percent between 2006 and 2008, but then
it dropped to 36 percent by 2010 (Ian T. Brown and Tao Wu, “China and the U.S.: Competing
for Political Influence,” Gallup, May 22, 2009. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/118591/china-
competing-political-influence.aspx; Cynthia English, “Global Wellbeing Surveys Find Nations Worlds
Apart,” Gallup, March 25, 2010. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/126977/global-wellbeing-surveys-
find-nations-worlds-apart.aspx). A similar decline is reported through the Nation Brands Index (Anholt,
“‘Nation-Branding’ in Asia,” p. 266) and Lowy Institute Poll (Ivan Cook, The Lowy Institute Poll 2006,
p. 6. Available at http://www.lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/pubfiles/Lowy_Institute_Poll_2006.pdf; versus
Fergus Hanson, The Lowy Institute Poll 2010,p. 5. Available at http://www.lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/
pubfiles/LowyPoll_2010_LR_Final.pdf). Similar trends are noted in Byong-Kuen Jhee and Nae-Young
Lee, “Measuring Soft Power in East Asia: An Overview of Soft Power in East Asia on Affective and
Normative Dimensions,” in Lee and Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia,
pp. 55, 59.
61. C. B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia: Results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public
Opinion, new ed. (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2009), p. 2.
62. Whitney and Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia, p. 15.
63. Whitney and Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia, p. 10 and pp. 35–36.
64. Whitney and Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia, pp. 18–20 and pp. 35–36.
65. Whitney and Shambaugh, Soft Power in Asia, p. 22.
66. See, for example, Steven E. Deutsch, International Education and Exchange: A Sociological Analysis
(Cleveland, OH: Case Western University Press, 1970).
67. Jerry S. Carlson and Keith F. Widaman, “The Effects of Study Abroad during College on Attitudes toward
Other Cultures,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations Vol. 12 (1988), pp. 1–17.
68. Nye, Soft Power, p. 96.
69. Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the Socialization
of States, 1972–2000,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 50 (2006), p. 509; and “Does Soft Power Matter?
 The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia 17

A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 6 (2010),
pp. 1–22.
70. For evidence of the effect of public opinion on policy decisions, see Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Yusaku
Horiuchi, “In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?” World
Politics Vol. 64, No. 3 (2012), pp. 555–585.
71. d’Hooghe argues that, in Europe at least, the main obstacle to “successful Chinese public diplomacy” is its
“lack of credibility.” The “nondemocratic nature of China’s government and its opaque political decision-
making,” she suggests, “raises questions about the legitimacy of the Chinese government to speak for its
people.” In essence, the message is mistrusted because the messenger is mistrusted (“The Limits of China’s
Soft Power in Europe,” p. 183).
72. Nye, Soft Power, pp. 15, 123.
73. Lee and Melissen, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, p. 1.
74. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,”
International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 943–969.
75. Jan Melissen, “Concluding Reflections on Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in East Asia,” in Lee and
Melissen, eds., Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, p. 250.
76. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, DC, and Berkeley, CA:
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Woodrow Wilson Center Press and University of California Press, 2008), pp. 74–75.
77. Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 88–92.
78. Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China and Its Power Status,” Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 1,
No. 1 (2006), pp. 16–18. On this point, see also d’Hooghe, “The Limits of China’s Soft Power in Europe,”
p. 165.
79. Akiko Fukushima, “Modern Japan and the Quest for Attractive Power,” in Lee and Melissen, eds., Public
Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 65–90. See also Tadashi Ogawa, “Origin and Development
of Japan’s Public Diplomacy,” in Snow and Taylor, eds., Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy,
pp. 270–281.
80. On Korea, see G. Lee, “A Theory of Soft Power and Korea’s Soft Power Strategy,” Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis Vol. 21, No. 2 (2009), pp. 205–218; and Sook Jong Lee, “South Korea’s Soft Power Diplomacy,” East
Asia Institute Issue Briefing No. MASI 2009-01 (2009). On India, see Hall, “India’s New Public Diplomacy”;
Chidanand Rajghatta, “Sweet Are the Ways of Mango Diplomacy,” The Times of India, November 22, 2009;
and Navdeep Suri, “Public Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 35, No. 2 (2011),
pp. 300–301.
81. Rizal Sukma, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: The Case of Indonesia,” in Lee and Melissen, eds., Public
Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, pp. 91–116.
82. Hedging is particularly understandable if public diplomacy is relatively cheap. India’s Ministry of External
Affairs, for example, planned to spend less than US$6 million on publications, outreach, and media rela-
tions in 2011, out of a total budget of about US$1.4 billion (Ministry of External Affairs [India], Outcome
Budget, 2010–11. Available at http://202.131.117.199/MEAFinal/Uploads/PublicationDocs/160_Outcome-
Budget-2010-11.pdf).
83. Li, “China Debates Soft Power,” p. 299.
84. See Madhavi Bhasin, “Public Diplomacy: Lessons for the Conduct of Indian Foreign Policy,”
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 26, 2008. Available at http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.
php?articleNo=2522&cID=
85. Among others, see Hall, “India’s New Public Diplomacy”; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia,
Speech for the Honourable Senator A. Kohilan Pillay, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2011).
Available at http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/speeches-delivered-in-malaysia-2011/-/journal_content/56/
10136/1452331; Wang and Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,” p. 444.
86. See Suri, “Public Diplomacy in India’s Foreign Policy.”
87. Sukma, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy.”
88. See, for example, the Public Diplomacy in the Information Age conference held in New Delhi in December
2010, which included keynotes from Nicholas Cull and Philips Seib from University of Southern California.
89. Early arguments about the logic of appropriateness did not conflate “appropriate” with “good,” in part
because this logic was coupled with the notion of inefficient history, whereby poor feedback and local equi-
librium can create fads or other suboptimal and undesirable outcomes (March and Olsen, “The Institutional
Dynamics of International Political Orders”). Unfortunately, subsequent scholarship neglects historical
inefficiency and thus confuses appropriateness with desirability and even morality.
90. For one discussion, see John Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 9, 87.
91. Adam McDowell, “Are Chinese Language Centres in Canada Culture Clubs or Spy Posts?” National Post
(Canada), July 9, 2010. For a Chinese response to these accusations, see Liu Chang, “No Need to Fuss
Over Confucius Institutes,” China Daily, August 14, 2010. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
opinion/2010-08/14/content_11153143.htm; and for a measured assessment, see James F. Paradise, “China
and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian
Survey Vol. 49, No. 4 (2009), pp. 647–669.
 18 Asian Security

92. Agreements were signed to open Confucius Institutes at Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi (2005) and at
Vellore Institute of Technology (2007), but neither has yet opened.
93. Shin-Wha Lee, “The Theory and Reality of Soft Power,” p. 23.
94. See, for example, these editorials from a prominent nationalist newspaper: “Beware of US ‘Smart Power’
in Asia,” Global Times, November 10, 2010. Available at http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/
7194895.html and “How Long Will Jeers from the West Last?” Global Times, December 9, 2010. Available at
http://globaltimes.cn/opinion/editorial/2010-12/600318.html
95. Melissen, “Concluding Reflections on Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in East Asia,” p. 260.
96. Nye, Soft Power, p. 110.
97. Benjamin E. Goldsmith and Y. Horiuchi, “Spinning the Globe? US Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public
Opinion,” Journal of Politics Vol. 71, No. 3 (2009), p. 864.
98. See, for example, Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2003).
99. Data for both Figures 1 and 2 from BBC World Service Polls (2005, 2006–11).
100. Data averaged from BBC World Service Polls (2007–11). Japan is a rare exception, where the percentage of
Japanese reporting positive views of Japanese influence was smaller than the percentage of others in the region
(40% versus 55%).
Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 13:02 08 March 2013

Ian Hall is a Senior Fellow in the Department of International Relations, Australian National University,
Canberra, Australia.
Frank Smith is a Lecturer in the Centre for International Security Studies, Department of Government
and International Relations, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.

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