Cultural Objects and Reparative

Justice: A Legal and Historical Analysis

(Cultural Heritage Law and Policy)
Gerstenblith
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 CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW AND POLICY

Series Editors
PROFESSOR FRANCESCO FRANCIONI
Professor Emeritus of International Law, European University
Institute, Florence, and Professor of International Cultural Heritage
Law, LUISS University, Rome
PROFESSOR ANA FILIPA VRDOLJAK
Professor of Law and UNESCO Chair in International Law and
Cultural Heritage, University of Technology, Sydney

Cultural Objects and Reparative Justice

 CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW AND POLICY

The aim of this series is to publish significant and original research

on and scholarly analysis of all aspects of cultural heritage law
through the lens of international law, private international law, and
comparative law. The series is wide in scope, traversing disciplines,
regions, and viewpoints. Topics given particular prominence are
those which, while of interest to academic lawyers, have significant
bearing on policymaking and current public discourse on the
interaction between art, heritage, and the law.

ADVISORY BOARD

James Nafziger
Kurt Siehr
Ben Boer
Roger O’Keefe
Marc-André Renold
Federico Lenzerini
Keun-Gwan Lee
Folarin Shyllon
Cultural Objects and Reparative
Justice
A Legal and Historical Analysis

PATTY GERSTENBLITH
 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
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First Edition published in 2023
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 Preface

I started thinking about this project close to fifteen years ago.

During this time, it evolved through numerous stages, but I kept
returning to particular issues. One was the formative time period
between the mid-eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth
century when the strands of the cultural heritage debate developed.
This formative period set the groundwork for the questions of why
cultural objects were appropriated during colonialism, imperialism
and armed conflict and under what circumstances they should be
returned.
Cultural heritage and cultural heritage law have received
increasing attention in the past several decades. Much of this
attention has expanded in two directions: first, to give greater
consideration to intangible heritage, and, second, with respect to
tangible heritage, to focus on the destruction of historic structures,
looting of archaeological sites, and thefts from institutions, often in
the context of armed conflict. This volume focuses not on
destruction and the means of preservation but what I call the
cultural heritage debate—the question of where movable tangible
cultural objects that were taken without consent both recently and in
the further past should be located. Such objects have often been
appropriated through armed conflict, theft, colonialism, and different
forms of imperialism. These different methods of appropriation in
different time periods implicate different legal responses and the
search for other answers when the law, as currently configured,
gives an inadequate response. In particular, focus has turned to
what may be termed ‘historic appropriations’—those that occurred
beyond the reach of contemporary law and therefore require other
solutions.
 This volume attempts to bridge legal approaches and non-legal
approaches in an interdisciplinary manner. Any attempt to provide a
comprehensive answer to the question of where cultural objects
should be located depends on the use of three interdisciplinary
methodologies. The first requires us to look at cultural heritage from
three perspectives: the universal or global, the State (or national),
and the local community. The second methodology is
interdisciplinary within the fields of law and ethics, combining
international and domestic law, international humanitarian law, and
international human rights law. The third methodology includes the
several disciplines of history, art history, archaeology, and
anthropology. This volume also attempts to interrelate within
tangible cultural heritage three areas that are often analysed
independently: Holocaust-looted art, Indigenous cultural heritage
and human remains, and archaeological artefacts. Distinct legal
responses have evolved around these, but each can learn from the
solutions and challenges that restitution in the context of the other
two has posed.
In an innovative approach, the work analyses several examples of
appropriation cutting across time and geography to consider the
Parthenon Sculptures, the Yuanmingyuan Palace, the Benin objects,
Indigenous human remains and cultural items, archaeological
artefacts, and artworks looted during the Holocaust. These types of
cultural objects and different circumstances of their appropriation
inform the work’s proposal of a paradigm for reparations.
Acknowledging that the foundations of our modern laws and ethical
guidelines with respect to cultural heritage are built on a history of
imperialism and colonialism, this work advocates for a new structure
based on reparation, restitution, repatriation, compensation, and
market regulation in order to no longer perpetuate past harms while
disincentivizing new harms. Finally, it sets out a paradigm based on
process and defined principles for the restitution of human remains
and cultural objects that were removed from their communities and
States as a result of colonialism, armed conflict, or imperialism. It is
in proposing this paradigm and set of principles for reparations that
this volume hopes to make its contribution to the debate concerning
the location of cultural objects.
July 2023
 Series Editors’ Preface

The complex legal and moral questions surrounding the return of

‘historically removed’ cultural objects have increasingly enlivened the
imagination of lawyers, scholars, and the general public in the last
decade. The fraught circumstances surrounding the removal, display,
and possible restitution of cultural objects during foreign occupation,
especially colonial occupation has come to the fore again, some half
century or more since the formal commencement of decolonization
by the United Nations. The current iteration of these debates
reveals, once again, that these processes are incomplete, and its
legacies ongoing.
Patty Gerstenblith’s book is the first volume in this series which
focuses on the fate of movable heritage as defined in national and
international law. Professor Gerstenblith zeroes in on the perennial
issues around removal, protection, and return in an all-
encompassing way, drawing on veins of scholarship from multiple
disciplines and legal and policy practice across several continents.
The first half of this important monograph lays out the key
conceptual and historical concerns which have come to define this
field. For it is impossible to truly appreciate the constructs (legal and
linguistic) which define the legal and scholarly debates and
blockages (real and perceived) which hinder confrontation and
resolution of restitution claims without a detailed, nuanced, and
critical understanding of the historical context. The second half is
equally meticulous in its forensic and systematic examination of the
national and international legal and non-legal frameworks which
define responses to restitution claims. Mirroring the ambition of the
first part, Professor Gerstenblith draws on important recent
developments from a broad swath of sources to emphasize the
perennial nature of legal and ethical concerns across time and space.
For the circumstances which gave rise to ‘historic’ removals continue
to inform cultural losses in the same communities today. And lessons
learned in respect of successful restitution of human remains or
Holocaust-related claims may inform responses to other restitution
requests. Satisfyingly, the author brings all these threads together to
distil the major modalities for the resolution of restitution claims.
From beginning to end—from its framing of the conceptual and
historic issues, to its all-encompassing treatment of the legal and
ethical concerns, to its enunciation of a way forward for resolving
claims—this volume provides a vital and rich contribution to one of
the most important issues in cultural heritage law today.
Francesco Francioni and Ana Filipa Vrdoljak
 Acknowledgements

This project evolved over many years, attempting to keep pace with
the many changing facets of the issues involved in determining
where cultural objects should be located. The project benefited from
conversations, both serious and casual, with many colleagues and
mentors in this field. While I risk omitting someone from this list, I
want to thank especially Professor Francesco Francioni and Professor
Ana Vrdoljak, the editors of the Oxford University Press Cultural
Heritage Law and Policy series, for their wisdom, guidance,
encouragement, and friendship. Among my peers, colleagues, and
friends to whom I am much indebted, I include Neil Brodie, Brian
Daniels, Holly Flora, Morag Kersel, Laetitia La Follette, Richard
Leventhal, Jane Levine, Claire Lyons, Victoria Reed, and Nancy
Wilkie. I owe much to my mentors including Willard Boyd, Norman
Palmer, Lyndel Prott, and Patrick O’Keefe. I am grateful to the
Dartmouth Montgomery Fellowship Program, which gave me the
opportunity to spend two weeks at Dartmouth in the autumn of
2021. There I was able to present some of this research and to
discuss issues of colonialism and imperialism with several members
of the Dartmouth faculty. I also presented segments of this work at
the University of Pennsylvania Cultural Heritage Center and at
Cardozo Law School. I appreciate the feedback I received that
helped to improve this endeavour. I also want to thank the
anonymous reviewers whose critiques contributed to improvement of
the volume.
Much as I have learned from my teachers and colleagues, I have
also learned from my students. Many have helped me with this
project over the years, including Lauren Bursey, Kahlia Halpern, and
Meghan Jackson. I want to thank the Dean of the College of Law
Jennifer Rosato Perea for her encouragement of this endeavour over
the past several years. The DePaul University Research Council
supported my work on the volume through a research leave and
funding for illustration permissions.
Above all, I want to thank my family and especially my husband,
Sam Gordon, for their love, patience, guidance, and support.
 Contents

List of Illustrations
Table of Cases
Table of Instruments
List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Defining Culture and Cultural Objects
1.3 Defining Cultural Property and Cultural Heritage
1.4 Interests and Authority
1.4.1 International Community
1.4.2 States
1.4.3 Local and Descendant Communities
1.4.4 Contextualism
1.5 Structure

2. Origins of the Debate Concerning Location of Cultural Objects

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Armed Conflict and Cultural Objects: Antiquity to the
Beginning of the Modern Era
2.2.1 Antiquity to the French Revolution
2.2.2 The French Revolution
2.2.3 The Napoleonic Wars and Their Aftermath
2.3 The Encyclopedic or Universal Museum
2.4 Development of the Study of the Past as a Science
2.4.1 Early Exploration of the Past
2.4.2 Towards the Science of Archaeology
2.4.3 Archaeology and Imperialism
 2.5 Conclusion

3. Historical Appropriations/Historical Claims

3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Parthenon Sculptures
3.2.1 The Sculptures in Antiquity
3.2.2 The Sculptures in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries
3.2.3 The Parthenon Sculptures as Contemporary Symbol
3.2.4 The Rescue Narrative and Contextualism
3.3 The Yuanmingyuan Palace Complex
3.4 The Benin Cultural Objects
3.5 Conclusion

4. Appropriation of Archaeological Heritage: Market Demand and

Legal Responses
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Role of the International Market in Antiquities
4.2.1 Loss of Cultural and Intellectual Capital
4.2.2 Loss to Knowledge
4.2.3 Physical Integrity
4.2.4 Forgeries
4.2.5 Funding of Armed Conflict and Other Criminal
Activity
4.3 Legal Responses
4.3.1 Development of Laws Protecting Archaeological
Heritage
4.3.2 State Ownership of Antiquities
4.3.3 Cultural Property Agreements and International
Conventions
4.3.4 Customs Laws
4.4 Conclusion

5. The Right to Objects of Cultural Heritage

5.1 Introduction
5.2 The Law of Armed Conflict: The Hague Conventions
 5.2.1 The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and the
Two World Wars
5.2.2 The Framework of the 1954 Hague Convention
5.3 A Human Rights Approach to the Disposition of Cultural
Objects
5.3.1 The Role of Cultural Genocide
5.3.2 Human Rights and Cultural Objects
5.3.3 Human Remains and Burial Goods
5.4 International and Regional Conventions and the Regulation
of Trade in Cultural Objects
5.4.1 The 1970 UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT
Conventions
5.4.2 European Union Import and Export Restrictions
5.4.3 UN Security Council Resolutions
5.5 Conclusion

6. Beyond the Law: Ethical Considerations

6.1 Introduction
6.2 General Codes of Conduct
6.3 Codes of Conduct with Respect to Cultural Works Looted
during the Holocaust
6.4 The 1970 UNESCO Convention as an Ethical Standard
6.4.1 Professional and Scholarly Associations
6.4.2 Museum Policies
6.4.3 Codes of Conduct among Market Participants
6.5 Human Remains and Indigenous Sacred and Cultural
Objects
6.6 Conclusion

7. Historical Appropriations: Of Time and Reparative Justice

7.1 Introduction
7.2 The Problem of Time
7.2.1 Bars Based on Passage of Time
7.2.2 Bars Based on Non-Retroactivity
7.2.3 The Double Standard of Nineteenth-Century
International Law
 7.3 The Cultural Heritage Debate in Contemporary Context
7.3.1 The Rescue Narrative Revisited
7.3.2 The Universal or Encyclopedic Museum
7.3.3 National Identity
7.4 The Right to Reparations
7.4.1 Justice through Reparations
7.4.2 Principles of Reparative Justice Applied: Reparations
Design
7.4.3 Means of Reparation
7.5 Conclusion
Index
 List of Illustrations

2.1 Arch of Titus, Rome, 81 CE. Panel (copy), depicting the

Triumphal March and Spoils of the Second Temple. Wikimedia
Commons/Beit HaShalom (CC by 3.0)
2.2 Laocoön. Hellenistic style, date uncertain, possibly a Roman
copy. Photo copyright © Governorate of the Vatican City State
—Directorate of the Vatican Museums
2.3 Salvator Rosa, Rocky Landscape with Figures (c 1650) oil on
canvas, 51.3 × 66.4 cm. Gift of the United States in
Recognition of the historic 1813 decision by the Honourable Sir
Alexander Croke, Justice of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, Halifax,
respecting prizes of war. Presented by the United States
Consul-General of Halifax, 1952
2.4 Salvator Rosa, Landscape with Two Soldiers and Ruins (c.
1650), oil on canvas, 50.4 x 66.4 cm. Gift of the United States
in Recognition of the historic 1813 decision by the Honourable
Sir Alexander Croke, Justice of the Court of Vice-Admiralty,
Halifax, respecting prizes of war. Presented by the United
States Consul-General of Halifax, 1952
2.5 Rosetta Stone. Egypt. 196 BCE. Photos.com/Getty Images Plus
2.6 The Colossi of Memnon. Baron Dominique Vivant Denon, study
for Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Égypte, pendant les
campagnes du Général Bonaparte, Paris 1802. British Museum
1836,0109.56 © The Trustees of the British Museum
3.1 Edward Dodwell drawing of West front of the Parthenon
(1821). Heidelberg University Library
3.2 Archibald Archer, The Temporary Elgin Room in 1819. Oil
painting on canvas (1819) © The Trustees of the British
 Museum
3.3 Statue of the Greek river god Ilissos from the Parthenon on
display at the Hermitage Museum in 2014. Dimitri
Lovetsky/AP/Shutterstock
3.4 Hall of Audience, Yuanmingyuan palace (1845). Edward
Paxman (engraver) and Thomas Allom (artist). Image courtesy
of the New York Public Library
3.5 Gold Cups of Eternal Stability (probably 1739–1740 and 1740–
1741), made for the Quianlong Emperor (1711–1799) and
acquired by Wallace at auction in Paris in 1872. © The Wallace
Collection. London, UK/Bridgeman Images
3.6 Queen Mother Pendant Mask. Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria.
Early sixteenth century. Image courtesy of Metropolitan
Museum of Art. The Michael C Rockefeller Memorial Collection,
Gift of Nelson A Rockefeller, 1972
3.7 Brass Triad Plaque depicting the Oba flanked by two attendants
and two Europeans shown on either side of his head. Benin
City, Edo State, Nigeria. sixteenth–seventeenth century. © The
Trustees of the British Museum
4.1 Gilgamesh ‘Dream’ Tablet, c 1600 BCE, returned to Iraq in 2021.
Reuters/Alamy Stock Photo
4.2. Sarpedon Krater. Euphronios (painter) and Euxitheos (potter).
Attic red-figure calyx-krater, c 515 BCE. Returned to Italy, now
in the Museo Nazionale Cerite (Cerveteri).Heritage Image
Partnership Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo
4.3 Nefertiti Bust. Thutmose (sculptor). Amarna Period, New
Kingdom, 18th Dynasty. Egypt, c 1340 BCE. Neues Museum,
Staatliche Museen zu Berlin. Realy Easy Star/Alamy Stock
Photo
5.1 Temple of Preah Vihear. Khmer Empire, c eleventh–twelfth
century. Cambodia. John W Banagan/Getty Images
5.2 Religious sites, Timbuktu, Mali. © UNESCO (CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO)
6.1 Lid of the coffin of Nedjemankh, priest of Heyrshef, Egypt,
150–50 BCE. Returned to Egypt 2019, now in the National
Museum of Egyptian Civilization. Image courtesy of the
Metropolitan Museum of Art. Purchase, 2017 Benefit Fund; Lila
Acheson Wallace Gift; Louis V Bell, Harris Brisbane Dick,
Fletcher, and Rogers Funds and Joseph Pulitzer Bequest; Leona
Sobel Education and The Camille M Lownds Funds; and 2016
Benefit Fund, 2017
6.2 Rock Crystal Ewer, Egypt, Fatimid, late tenth–eleventh century.
Ewer, Egypt, Fatimid dynasty, late tenth–early eleventh
century; Base: Jean-Valentin Morel (French, 1794–1860),
nineteenth century. Rock crystal (quartz), enamelled gold. The
Keir Collection of Islamic Art on loan to the Dallas Museum of
Art, K.1.2014.1.A-B. Photo © The Dallas Museum of Art
7.1 View of the Acropolis Museum, Athens. Hercules Milas/Alamy
Stock Photo
7.2 Statue of Sekhemka, Egypt, Old Kingdom period (2650–2150
BCE). Guy Bell/Shutterstock
 Table of Cases

INTERNATIONAL
Application de la Convention pour la Prévention et la Répression du Crime du
Génocide (Croatie v. Serbie) [2015] ICJ Reports 3 . . . . . 162
Application of the Convention on the Preventing and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgement)
[2007] ICJ Reports 43 . . . . . 162
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan) (Pending) General List No 180 . . . .
. 10–11, 170
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Merits, Judgment) [1962] ICJ Rep
6 . . . . . 10–11, 168–70, 228
Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Judgment)
[2013] ICJ Rep 281 . . . . . 10–11, 228, 251–52
Prosecutor v Al Mahdi, Reparations Phase, 27 April 2017, ICC-01/12-01.15 . . . . .
151
Prosecutor v Al Mahdi [2016] ICC-01/12-01/15-171 . . . . . 10–11, 13, 171–72
Prosecutor v Al Hassan ICC-01/12-01/18 . . . . . 10–11, 151
Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Trial Judgment) ICTY-00-39-T (27 September 2006) 281 . .
. . . 162–63
Prosecutor v Krstić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-98-33-T (2 August 2001) . . . . . 162
Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda [2020] ICC-01/04-02/06 . . . . . 10–11, 151
Prosecutor v Prlić et al, Appeal Judgment, Vol I, IT-04-74-A (29 November 2017) .
. . . . 151–52
Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 29, 55–
56 (Nuremberg, 1948) . . . . . 147
United States and others v Göring and others, Indictment International Military
Tribunal (E) Plunder of Public and Private Property . . . . . 147
 REGIONAL
Moiwana Community v Suriname, Inter-Amer Ct HR (ser C) No 124 (28 November
2007) . . . . . 14–15
Syllogos Ton Athinaion v United Kingdom, Application No. 48259/15, ECHR (31
May 2016) . . . . . 77
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) No 125 (17
June 2005) . . . . . 14–15

NATIONAL
Canada
R v Yorke, [1998] 166 NSR (2d) . . . . . 138, 186

France
Heirs Simon Bauer v Toll, Court of Cassation – First civil chamber, judgement no
810, 11 Septembre 2019 (18-25.695) . . . . . 145–46

Germany
Application for export ban on archaeological objects by means of injunction: proof
of ownership or possession by the applicant foreign state. Higher Regional Court
of Berlin, judgment of 16 October 2006 – 10 U 286/05, Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (NJW) 2007, p. 705 . . . . . 130

Netherlands
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus v Willem O.A. Lans, Rb (First
Instance Ct) Rotterdam 4 February 1999, NJ 1999, Hof (Appeals Ct) . . . . . 153
Tavrida Central Museum and others v Ukraine, (High Council, Civil Chamber)
22/00270 (9 Junw 2023) . . . . . 265–66

United Kingdom
Attorney-General of New Zealand v Ortiz, [1982] 3 All ER 432, [1982] QB 349,
revd [1982] 3 All ER 432, [1984] AC 1, affd [1983] 2 All ER 93, [1984] AC 1 . . .
. . 128–29
Islamic Republic of Iran v Barakat Galleries, Ltd, [2007] EWHC 705 (QB), revd
[2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2008] 1 All ER 1177 . . . . . 130–31
Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq Airways Co, (no 3) [2002] UKHL 19 at 13, [2002] All
ER 209 at 13, [2002] 2 AC 883 . . . . . 131–32
HM Revenue & Customs v Al Qassas, unpublished, Westminster Magistrates Court
(1 Sept 2015) . . . . . 140
R v Tokeley-Parry, [1999] Crim. L.R. 578 (CA 1999) . . . . . 129–30
The Marquis de Somerueles, Stewart’s Vice-Admiralty Reports, 21 April 1813, 482
(Vice-Adm. Ct Halifax N.S.) . . . . . 33–34, 36

United States
Abelesz v Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) . . . . . 163–64
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S. Ind. 1989), aff’d, 917 F2d 278 (7th Cir 1990) . . . . .
116
Bonnichsen v United States, 357 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2004) . . . . . 13–14, 54–55,
177, 180–81, 220–21
Cassirer v Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S. Ct. 1502 (2022) . . . . .
146
Charrier v Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (Ct. App. Louisiana 1986) . . . . . 176
DeCsepel v Republic of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2017) . . . . .
163–64
Federal Republic of Germany v Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703 (2021) . . . . . 146, 163–64
Hahn v Duveen, 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929) . . . . . 80–82, 236–37
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) . . . . . 146
Newman v State, 174 So. 2d 479, 483 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) . . . . . 176
New York v Wiener, Criminal Complaint (21 December 2016) . . . . . 129–30
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc v The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d
1159 (11th Cir. 2011) . . . . . 233–35
Republic of Austria v Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) . . . . . 146
Republic of Turkey v Christie’s Inc and Steinhardt, 425 F. Supp. 3d 204, 214-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2019), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169215 *16-*18 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) . . . . .
130
Republic of Turkey v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
. . . . . 129–30
Republic of Turkey v OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass. 1994) .
. . . . 122–23, 129–30, 135
Simon v Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2016) . . . . . 163–64
Town of Sudbury v Dept of Public Utilities, 351 Mass. 214, (1966) . . . . . 176
United States v An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d
on other grounds 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) . . . . . 115–16, 129–30, 139
United States v Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Cuneiform Tablets et. al.,
CV17-3980 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) . . . . . 112, 115–16
United States v Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) . . . . . 128
United States v Latchford, 19 Crim. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) . . . . . 120, 129–30
United States v McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979)
. . . . . 128, 130, 135, 136
United States v One Tyrannosaurus Bataar Skeleton, 2021 US Dist. LEXIS 165153
*29-*31 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) . . . . . 135
United States v One Cuneiform Tablet known as the ‘Gilgamesh Dream Tablet’ CV
20-2222 Amended Verified Complaint in Rem (EDNY 2021) . . . . . 112
United States v Portrait of Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) . . . . .
128
United States v Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F 3d 393
(2d Cir. 2003) . . . . . 129–30, 209–10
Vineberg v Bissonette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008) . . . . . 145–46
von Saher v Norton Simon Museum of Art, 897 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2018) . . . . .
146, 229
Wana the Bear v Community Construction, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426-27 (Ct.
App. 1982) . . . . . 176
Zuckerman v Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186 (2nd Cir. 2019) . . . . .
145–46, 202, 229–30
 Table of Instruments

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Capitulation of Alexandria (1803) ...... 70
Art 16 ...... 37–38, 38f
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (adopted 17
October 2003, entered into force 20 April 2006) 2368 UNTS 1 ...... 4–5, 165
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (opened for
signature 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 187 CTS 227
...... 4, 143–44, 153–54, 234
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted
29 July 1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) 187 CTS 429 (1899 Hague
Convention (II)) ...... 143–44, 234
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Cultural Property (adopted 14 November 1970, entered into
force 24 April 1972) 823 UNTS 231 (1970 UNESCO Convention) ...... 4–5, 7, 9–
10, 11–12, 13n.57, 77, 122, 132–33, 138–39, 141, 147–48, 152n.39, 152–
53n.41, 158–59, 165n.97, 167, 168, 184, 186–89, 190n.211, 191, 193, 203–19,
231–33, 256, 259n.146, 265, 271
Art 1 ...... 4–5, 9n.35, 12n.48, 138, 186, 191–92
Art 2 . . . . . 9n.35
Art 3 ...... 138–39, 187
Art 4 . . . . . 11n.40
Art 5 . . . . . 11n.40, 187–88
Art 6 . . . . . 11n.40, 187–88
Art 9 ...... 138–39, 187
Art 10 ...... 187–88
Art 11 . . . . . 194n.223
Convention on the Preservation and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions (adopted 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007) 2440
UNTS 311 ...... 165
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted
9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide
 Convention) ...... 159–60, 161–62, 163–64
Art 2(c) ...... 163–64
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (adopted 2
November 2001, entered into force 2 January 2009) 2562 UNTS 1 ...... 126–27
Art 94 . . . . . 126n.70
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
(opened for signature 16 November 1972, entered into force 17 December
1975) 1037 UNTS 151 (1972 UNESCO Convention) ...... 4–5
Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects
Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State (EU) ...... 132, 189
The Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property
(adopted 19 May 2017) (2017) CETS 22 (Nicosia Convention) ...... 193
Council Regulation (EC) 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural
goods [2009] OJ L39/1 (EU)
Art 2(2) ...... 189
Council Regulation (EC) 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003 concerning certain specific
restrictions on economic and financial relations with Iraq (EU) 2465/96 [2003]
OJ L169/6 ...... 189, 191–92
Council Regulation (EU) 1332/2013 of 13 December 2013 concerning restrictive
measures in view of the situation in Syria (EU) ...... 189, 192–93
Directive 2014/60/EU (EU) ...... 132, 189
European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into
force 3 September 1953) UNTS 222 ...... 77
Art 8 ...... 174–75
Art 9 ...... 174–75
EU 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive 2018/843 (30 May 2018) ...... 120
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 ...... 150–51, 159–60
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Geneva (adopted 8
June 1977, opened for signature 12 December 1977, entered into force 7
December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 ...... 150–51
Art 16 ...... 150–51
Art 53 ...... 150–51
Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899)
...... 143–44, 234
Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (adopted 14 May1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 UNTS
240.
Art 4(2) . . . . . 11n.40
Art 4(3) ...... 193–94
Art 28 . . . . . 11n.40, 12n.47
 First Protocol (1954) ...... 4–5, 31, 147–48
Art 4(3) ...... 193–94
Second Protocol (adopted 26 March 1999, entered into force 9 March 2004)
UNTS 172 ...... 10–11, 147–48
Art 6 . . . . . 11n.40
Art 15 . . . . . 11n.40
Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories
under Enemy Occupation or Control United States Diplomatic Papers Vol 1
(1943) ...... 145–46, 202
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) UNGA Res
2106 (XX) annex, 660 UNTS 195 ...... 10–11, 170
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 ...... 165
Art 27 ...... 165, 174–75
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 ...... 166
Preliminary Draft International Convention for the Protection of Historic Buildings
and Works of Art in Time of War, proposed by the International Museums Office
(October 1936) ...... 145
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Geneva (8 June
1977, opened for signature 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December
1978) 1125 UNTS 609 ...... 150–51
Art 1(4) ...... 150–51
Regulation (EU) 2019/880 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17
April 2019 on the introduction and the import of cultural goods [2019] OJ
L151/1 ...... 189–90
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/Conf 183/9, 37 ILM
999 (17 July 1998) ...... 4, 10–11, 151–52, 159, 162–63
Art 8(2)(a)(iv) ...... 151–52
Art 8(2)(b)(ix) ...... 151
Art 8(2)(b)(xiii) ...... 151–52
Art 8(2)(b)(xvi) ...... 10–11, 151–52
Art 8(2)(e)(v) ...... 10–11, 151–52
Art 8(b)(ix) ...... 4
Art 8(e)(iv) ...... 4
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany,
Versailles, 28 June 1919, in force 10 January 1920, Cmd 516 (1920) ...... 144
Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic
Monuments (adopted 15 April 1935, entered into force 26 August 1935) 167
UNTS 289 (Roerich Pact) ...... 145
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (adopted 24
June 1995, entered into force 1 July 1998) 34 ILM 1322 ...... 4, 7, 132–34,
138n.125, 186–89, 189n.207, 191, 271
Art 3(2) ...... 133, 188n.202
Art 3(8) . . . . . 229n.4
Art 4(1) . . . . . 188n.202, 188n.203
Art 4(4) . . . . . 188n.204
Art 6 . . . . . 188n.203
Art 10(1) . . . . . 231n.13
Art 10(2) . . . . . 231n.13
Art 10(3) . . . . . 231n.13
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) UNGA
A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) ...... 165, 167, 184, 250–51
Art 11(2) ...... 250–51
Art 12 ...... 174–75, 250–51
Art 32(2) ...... 174–75
United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc
S/RES/661 ...... 233–34
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003) UN Doc
S/RES/1483 ...... 138–39, 155–56, 191–93, 233–34
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2199 (12 February 2015) UN Doc
S/RES/2199 ...... 138–39, 155–56, 191–93, 233–34
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2347 (24 March 2017) UN Doc
S/RES/2347 ...... 120, 157–58, 173, 193, 194
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) UN General Assembly Resolution
217A (10 December 1948) ...... 159–60, 165
Art 27 ...... 165
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969,
entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 ...... 231

NATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Australia
Aboriginal and Torres Islander Strait Heritage Preservation Act 1984 (Cth)
s 4 ...... 176
Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (No 11, 1986) ...... 232–33
s 14(1) ...... 232–33
s 14(2) ...... 232–33

Canada
Cultural Property Export and Import Act, RSC 1985, c C-51
 s 37(2) ...... 138, 187
First Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act RSA 2000
c F-14 (1)(e) ...... 178
s F-14 (2) ...... 178

Egypt
Law No 117 of the Year 1983 concerning the Issuance of Antiquities’ Protection
Law
Law No 14 of 1912 ...... 124–26
Law No. 215 of 1951 ...... 124–26
Ordonnance du 15 août 1835 portant mesures de protection des antiquités ......
124–26
Art 6 ...... 265–66

France
Code du Patrimoine ...... 182, 183–84
Art L111-11 ...... 157–58
Law No. 2002-323 of 6 March 2002, on the restitution by France of the remains of
Saartje Baartman to South Africa ...... 182
Loi No 2010-501 of 18 May 2010 visant à autoriser la restitution par la France des
têtes maories à la Nouvelle-Zélande et relative à la gestion des collections ......
183–84, 230–31
Loi No 2022-218 du 21 février 2022 relative á la restitution ou la remise de
certains biens culturels aux ayants droit de leurs propriétaires victims de
persecutions antisémites ...... 230

Germany
Act on the Protection of Cultural Property (Cultural Property Protection Act—KGSG)
31.7.2016, BGBl I, 2016 ...... 138, 186–87, 232–33
Transformation Act of 25 April 2007; Implementation Act of 18 April 2007; BGBl I,
Nr 21 (23 May 2007) ...... 153
Art 4 ...... 233

Greece
Law 5351/32 “On Antiquities” of 1932 ...... 122–23

Italy
Code of the Cultural and Landscape Heritage, D Lgs no 42, 22 January 2004, GU
Supp no 45, 24 February 2004 ...... 126–27
Art 10 ...... 126–27
Art 88(1) ...... 126–27
 Art 89(1) ...... 126–27
Art 90(1) ...... 126–27
Art 91 ...... 126–27
Art 91(1) ...... 127
Art 92(1) ...... 127
Art 92(2) ...... 127

Iraq
Antiquities Law No. 59 of 1936 ...... 132–33, 203–4
Art 3 ...... 203–4
Antiquities and Heritage Law No. 55 of 2002 ...... 132–33, 203–4

Jordan
Law of Antiquities, Law No 21 for the year 1988, amended by Law No 23 for the
year 2004
Art 2(11) ...... 126–27
Arts 14–20 ...... 126–27

Netherlands
Cultural Property Originating from Occupied Territory (Return) Act (2007) ...... 153,
233
Heritage Act Relating to the Combining and Amendment of Rules Regarding
Cultural Heritage (2016)
ss 6.9–6.15 ...... 153, 233

Switzerland
Federal Act on the International Transfer of Cultural Property (Cultural Property
Transfer Act) (20 June 2003)
Art 7 ...... 138–39, 189–90
Ordonnance instituant des mesures économiques envers la République d’Irak, RS
946.206 (2003) ...... 191–92
Verordnung über Massnahmen gegenüber Syrien (Ordinance on Sanctions against
Syria) ...... 192–93
Loi fédérale sur la protection des biens culturels en cas de conflit armé, de
castastrophe ou de situation d’urgence (LPBC) RS 520.3 (20 June 2014)
(Switzerland)
Art 12 ...... 157–58

Turkey
Decree on Antiquities (Asar-ı Atika Nizamnamesi) of 10 April 1906 ...... 203–4
Turkish Civil Code no 753
 Art 697 (1926) ...... 203–4

United Kingdom
A Bill to Provide for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments (UK) 1873 ...... 137
British Museum Act 1963
c. 24, s 4(4) ...... 76–77
Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 2017 ...... 233
s 16(1)(a)(b) ...... 153–54
s 16(2) ...... 153, 233
s 16(3) ...... 153
s 17(2) ...... 153, 233
s 21 ...... 233
Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act (UK)
Ch 27 ...... 133–34
Export Control (Syria Sanctions (Amendment)) Order 2014 (UK) SI 2014/1896
para 2 ...... 192–93
Art 12A ...... 192–93
Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) (formerly known as Holocaust (Stolen Art)
Restitution) Act (2009)
Ch 16 ...... 180, 230–31
Human Tissue Act 2004 ...... 180
c 30, s 47 ...... 180, 221, 230–31
Iraq (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2003, SI 2003/1519 (UK)
s 8 ...... 191–92
Treasure Act 1996 (UK) ...... 136

United States
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978) ...... 184
§ 6110, Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for 2021, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021) ...... 120
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C §§ 201(b), 1101 ...... 268–69
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CCPIA) 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2613 ...... 138–39, 186–87, 218
Customs Statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) ...... 139
Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-8-
429, 118 Stat. 2434, §§ 3001–03 ...... 191–92
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 ...... 163–
64
Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act), Pub. L. 114-4-308, 130 Stat.
1524 ...... 146, 202, 229–30
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C § 501(c) ...... 199
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No 100 (24 April 1863) (Lieber Code) ...... 143–44
Art 34 ...... 143–44
Art 35 ...... 143–44
Art 36 ...... 143–44
National Defense Authorization Act for 2021, Pub. L. 116-6-283 § 1216 ...... 158
National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-15 (2015) ......
176, 177
National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 et seq. ...... 128
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 25 U.S.C. §§
3001–3013; 18 U.S.C. § 1170 ...... 15–16, 54–55, 174–75, 176–79, 180–81,
184–85, 199, 223–24, 224–198nn.133–4, 225n.135, 251–52, 258–59, 261–62,
268–69
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 10.11
...... 177
Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act, Pub. L. 114-4-151, 130
Stat. 369 (2016) ...... 192–93
s 3(c)(4) ...... 158
Transmittal of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict and, for Accession, the Hague Protocol to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, S Treaty Doc No 106-6-1, III-IV, IX (1999) ......
152–53
 List of Abbreviations

AAL Art Antiquity and Law

AAM American Alliance of Museums
AAMD Association of Art Museum Directors
AHR American Historical Review
AIA Archaeological Institute of America
AJIL American Journal of International Law
ASOR American Society of Overseas Research
ATADA Authentic Tribal Art Dealers Association
BJIL Brooklyn Journal of International Law
CAELJ Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal
CINOA Confédération Internationale des Négociants en Oeuvres d’Art
CJIL Chinese Journal of International Law
CTS Consolidated Treaty Series
DCMS Department of Culture, Media and Sport
EJCPR European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research
EJIL European Journal of International Law
ERR Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg
FSIA Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
HEAR Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act
HHRJ Harvard Human Rights Journal
HLR Harvard Law Review
HRC Human Rights Council
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICJ Rep International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions
and Orders
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ICOM International Council of Museums
IJCP International Journal of Cultural Property
ILM International Legal Materials
IRRC International Review of the Red Cross
IS International Spectator
JEMAHS Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage
JICJ Journal of International Criminal Justice
JIPITEC Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic
Commerce Law
JIPL Journal of Intellectual Property Law
MFA&A Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives
MiJIL Michigan Journal of International Law
MJIL Melbourne Journal of International Law
NAGPRA Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
NEA Near Eastern Archaeology
NYUJILP New York University Journal of International Law & Policy
PPICPA Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act
SAACLR Santander Art and Culture Law Review
SBL Society of Biblical Literature
SCJ Sixteenth Century Journal
TEFAF Maastricht Code of Conduct for The European Fine Art Fair
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Counsel
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
USC United States Code
YLJ Yale Law Journal
 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction
This is a study of the question of whether those tangible movable
cultural objects that have been removed in the past from their
original contexts should be returned to the places from which they
were taken or whether current possessors have the right to continue
to maintain their possession of these cultural objects. We look to
cultural heritage to help us define our identities, our communities,
our place in the world, our past, and also our future. As a result,
many aspects of cultural heritage are imbued with fraught meanings.
One of the most contentious of these aspects centres on the debate
as to where movable cultural objects should be located and under
what circumstances removed objects should be returned to the
contexts from which they were taken. In examining the law that has
developed over the past two centuries concerning cultural heritage
and the debates that are engendered, this study is distinctive in
focusing exclusively on movable tangible objects. It is also distinctive
in recognizing that the law concerning the location of cultural objects
is inadequate to answer the question of location and contexts and is
relatively meagre in comparison to that which addresses immovable
heritage. Although some cultural objects were always intended to
circulate, the movement of cultural objects has often been, and still
is today, the result of armed conflict, colonialism, imperialism,
economic exploitation, and other types of violence. This makes the
question of return not only about the location of cultural objects and
the contexts in which they should be held but also about achieving
reparative justice through return.
 Removal and return are forms of movement. Cultural objects are
itinerant. They moved from place-to-place in the past, continue to
move in the present, and will move in the future, thereby
encompassing a broad range of social and other networks.1 ‘Treating
things as active in transit puts even partial and collective object
histories into context as segments of potentially unending itineraries
that shape space and enable action.’2 Each of these places gives
contexts and new meanings to the object, and the status of the
object as legal or illegal or its possession as ethical or unethical also
changes with this movement over time and space.
Movement of cultural objects inevitably raises questions of time
and location—we must decide at what point in time we make
determinations of legitimacy, to what points of reference in the past
we give meaning, and which claims of heritage are privileged in
making these determinations. The movement of cultural objects and
the means by which movement is achieved are fundamental to the
debate concerning the disposition of cultural objects: whether
cultural objects found or produced in one part of the world should
move to other parts of the world or whether they should remain
within or be returned to their original context from which these
objects derive much of their meaning. In addressing the questions of
location and movement, it is necessary to recognize that much of
the past movement of cultural objects was not and is still not free.
The means by which object movement occurred, the tension
between movement and original contexts, and the means of
determining where objects should be located or to which
communities and other contexts they should be returned form
central elements in the debate concerning the location of cultural
objects.

1.2 Defining Culture and Cultural Objects

Culture is often defined in ‘either of the two ways established in the
nineteenth century—as the universal heritage of humankind—culture
with a capital C—or in the plural anthropological sense, in which
different cultures lay claim to different properties’.3 This distinction
sets up the tension between a universal value of cultural objects and
their communal and contextual values. In the former, culture
indicates the high arts in an art historical and aesthetic sense—
objects that are placed in art museums and become part of a global
heritage that is presumed to have universal and perpetual value.
This universal heritage is characterized as cutting across national
boundaries and belonging to an amorphous everyone who wishes to
have an interest in the physical manifestation. As such, universalism
means that we care less about the location of cultural objects, but,
in fact, it also becomes a justification for their removal and
retention. The designation of a cultural object as ‘art’ is a method of
conferring value, both monetary and aesthetic, within a system of
what Rosemary Coombe describes as a nineteenth-century ‘way of
categorizing expressive works of aesthetic value in a context of
European imperialism and colonialism and the collection of objects in
imperialist forays around the globe’.4 Art objects are ‘examples of a
human creative ability that transcend the limitations of time and
place to speak to us about the “human” condition; representing the
highest point of human achievement, they are regarded as
testaments to the greatness of their individual creators’.5
In the anthropological sense, a culture is the external
manifestation of a particular group or segment of a population. A
group may at times be predominately defined by its ethnicity,
language, religion, or particular history, but often it represents an
amalgam of these characteristics. A cultural group may be
coterminous with a particular nation-State, is often smaller than a
State, or may extend over more than one State. Cultural objects that
are the products of such a group are valued ‘as the authentic works
of a distinct collectivity, as integral to the harmonious life of an
ahistorical community and incomprehensible outside of “cultural
context”—the defining features of authentic artifacts’.6
A cultural object may be taken out of its specific context and, as a
result, transformed into a work of art. It acquires a universal value
and is considered to be a part of the broad development of human
civilization. The legal treatment of such objects may change, and the
object becomes more easily viewed as a subject of monetary
exchange. Further, when a cultural object is transformed into a work
of art, the ability to access the object and the uses to which it may
be put change radically. The object is placed within a glass case or
on a pedestal, or sometimes in storage, to be admired and
appreciated from afar, but not touched or used other than in very
restricted ways, even by those to whom the object has spiritual,
cultural, and other humanistic connections. The cultural object also
changes meaning as it is enclosed within different ‘parerga’ and is
presented differently as the result of curatorial taste.7 Western
culture thereby appropriates the physical embodiments of other
peoples’ cultures and determines which values and aspects will
receive protection, both in the physical sense and as part of our
legal system. As Coombe wrote, ‘the domains of authentic
masterpieces and authentic artifacts to which they relate, are
mirrored in our legal categories for the valuation and protection of
expressive objects. Laws of … cultural property reflect and secure
the logic of the European art/culture system. …’8 The legal system
then determines who can possess and own these cultural objects
and itself reflects the hierarchy of cultures developed in early cultural
anthropology.9
The legal system perpetuates the dichotomy between the way
such objects are viewed in Western legal systems and the way they
are viewed in other parts of the world, particularly in their original
contexts. As a result of these differences, at times it is difficult to
achieve recognition of non-pecuniary values inherent in cultural
objects, even though these are respected by non-Western and
Indigenous groups. Despite the desirability of analysing the
disposition of cultural objects from the perspective of numerous legal
systems, this study focuses on the status of these objects in the
legal systems of Western Europe and North America. Cultural objects
have tended to move in a unidirectional flow from other parts of the
world first to the earlier colonial powers and today to the economic
centres. In addressing whether objects should be returned, it is
therefore necessary to analyse the status of these cultural objects
and the potential for return from the legal perspective of where they
are currently located.

1.3 Defining Cultural Property and Cultural

Heritage
Relevant international conventions address movable cultural objects
to varying degrees, but they tend to focus more on immovable
heritage. The exceptions are the 1970 UNESCO Convention10 and
the 1995 Unidroit Convention,11 which address contemporary trade
and movement of cultural objects. The earliest legal instruments use
neither the term cultural property nor cultural heritage, instead
enumerating the types of structures and objects that merit special
protection. For example, Article 27 of the Regulations of the 1907
Convention refers to ‘buildings dedicated to religion, art, science or
charitable purposes, [and] historic monuments’.12 Adopted almost a
century later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
echoes this terminology, prohibiting attacks directed ‘against
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, [and] historic monuments’. Further, it provides no
protection specifically for movable cultural objects aside from that
granted to all civilian objects.13
The term ‘cultural property’ appears in the international
instruments of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict14 and the 1970
UNESCO Convention. The 1954 Hague Convention defines ‘cultural
property’ as ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to
the cultural heritage of every people’.15 This means that the cultural
property protected under the Convention is the subset of the larger
universe of cultural heritage that is of great importance to the larger
whole.16 It is sometimes interpreted as requiring that the protected
cultural property must bear some significance beyond its significance
to the particular community or State. The 1970 UNESCO Convention
omits reference to cultural heritage and gives a more specific
definition of cultural property as ‘property which, on religious or
secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or
science’ and belongs to one of eleven specific categories which are,
in the aggregate, extensive.17 However, subsequent conventions
more consistently use the term cultural heritage.18
The dichotomy between the terms ‘cultural heritage’ and ‘cultural
property’ can signify different meanings and positions, depending on
the context. The distinction is also theoretically relevant to questions
of a framework for determining retention or return. The term
‘cultural property’ is used more often in the United States or when
ownership aspects are emphasized, leading to the critique that the
term places too much emphasis on ownership and property rights.
As Lyndel Prott noted, the term cultural property brings with it ‘a
whole baggage of associations and implications, in particular, the
view in the common law … that property and ownership rights
clearly authorize exploitation, alienation … and exclusion of others
from access—all elements that, in modern heritage law, may well be
restricted’.19 Denominating cultural objects as ‘property’ thus
emphasizes their pecuniary value, marketability, and the exclusive
rights granted to the owner and protected by the legal system.
However, even ‘property’ may be defined less in terms of such rights
and more in terms of the relationship of individuals with respect to a
thing,20 which demonstrates overlap with the term ‘cultural heritage’.
The term ‘heritage’ moves past ownership and instead emphasizes
the relationship to and among people and the obligation to pass
culture on to future generations in the form of an ‘inheritance’ or
‘heritage’.21 The term ‘cultural heritage’ emphasizes notions of
stewardship and responsibility. Cultural heritage encompasses
immovable tangible heritage (standing structures, monuments, and
sites), movable tangible heritage (portable objects, such as works of
art), and intangible heritage (such as traditional knowledge, oral
history, languages, cultural practices, and folklore). Natural features
may be considered cultural heritage when they take on significance
to people and communities and thereby constitute cultural
landscapes. The intersection of tangible and intangible heritage is
often located within cultural or sacred landscapes and historic
structures, but the intersection is, in fact, broader. The intangible is
what gives meaning to tangible cultural objects, as in the examples
of archaeological context giving understanding to the artefacts found
within a particular site or language giving meaning to a written text.
Blake further posits that the attempt to distinguish between tangible
and intangible heritage is ‘artificial’ and that ‘the two are inextricably
linked and have such a close mutual relationship that to separate
them is counter-intuitive’.22
Lixinski casts the cultural property/cultural heritage terminology
debate in terms of the dichotomy between international and
domestic law. He associates the term ‘cultural heritage’ with
international law and cosmopolitanism, while the term ‘cultural
property’ is linked to State sovereignty and domestic law, including
the domestic implementation of international law. He characterizes
‘cultural property’ as a legal concept and ‘cultural heritage’ as a non-
legal, and therefore less clear, term.23 From this he draws the
conclusion that use of the term ‘cultural heritage’ serves to
disempower national and community actors from engaging with the
subject:

Cultural property internationalism, therefore, and the move to the concept

of ‘heritage’ it embodies, has the effect of creating disincentives for the
inclusion of certain stakeholders. Instead, it privileges others that can speak
the uniform language of cultural heritage, which tend to be states and
experts.24

As a result, he advocates maintaining the term ‘cultural property’ as

being more inclusive of a range of stakeholders. The fundamental
flaw to which Lixinski points is that, for the most part, the only
entities that international treaty law acknowledges are States and
their interests in location of and access to cultural objects. Cultural
heritage is linked to both the community and to territory. However,
as Peters noted, focusing on the State does not solve the problem of
disposition of movable cultural objects because the State may take
account of competing interests and claims only to the extent that it
wishes or not at all.25
Hafstein and Skrydstrup view the terms ‘cultural property’ and
‘cultural heritage’ as complementary, rather than in tension, and as
such they coexist. The cultural property regime focuses on legal
rights and the settlement of disputes as to ownership. Cultural
heritage, on the other hand, focuses on cooperation and the
preservation and care of cultural objects so that they can be passed
on, regardless of where the objects are situated. They conclude that
the term ‘cultural heritage’ is a ‘technology of reformation’ in
contrast to ‘cultural property’, which they view as a ‘technology of
sovereignty’.26 In this volume, although the subject is movable
tangible objects, the term ‘cultural heritage’ will also be used
because it is all-encompassing and because it incorporates more
clearly human-related values and links to people.

1.4 Interests and Authority

Questions of the proper location of cultural objects were often
reduced in earlier literature to a binary approach of an
internationalist and a nationalist perspective. This dichotomy is
‘ultimately dangerous’ and has ‘outlived its utility’.27 Francioni
questioned whether this binary approach was ever an accurate
depiction of law and policy with respect to cultural heritage.28 He
pointed out several ways in which the law with respect to cultural
heritage has evolved past a binary approach: the intersection of
cultural property law with human rights law; cross-influences
between international humanitarian law and specific rules with
respect to cultural property that apply during armed conflict; cross-
over between the law of armed conflict and international criminal
law; and the intersection of public international law and private
international law with the adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention
and the 1995 Unidroit Convention.
 Emphasis on binary approaches eliminates nuances and prevents
consideration of complexities and ambiguities. With the significant
developments in the cultural heritage field of the past several
decades, we can see that a more complex and nuanced approach is
needed, one that takes into account the multiple overlapping and
sometimes contradictory interests and centres of authority that
determine the disposition and location of cultural objects. This multi-
layered approach focuses on analysing the significance of cultural
objects from the contextual, international, national, and local or
community perspectives.
We can identify at least three relatively formal centres or
communities,29 each of which can be considered from the
perspectives of their interests, their legal authority, and the
terminology that allows for expression of their interests and
authority. While the interests of these communities are often stated
rhetorically as similar, their relative degrees of authority and some of
their motivations may be in conflict. As David Lowenthal noted: ‘Too
much is now asked of heritage. In the same breath we commend
national patrimony, regional and ethnic legacies, and a global
heritage shared and sheltered in common. We forget that these aims
are often incompatible.’30 Further, the relative balance of power
among these different communities is very unequal, particularly from
a legal perspective. A fourth perspective, that of contextualism, may
help to create a more even balance among these different centres of
authority and power.

1.4.1 International Community

In the past, an analytical approach based on internationalism
privileged an understanding of culture as an international
phenomenon, regardless of an object’s place of origin, original
context, and current location.31 In this view, most cultural objects
should be free to circulate throughout the world, primarily through
market mechanisms and with minimum legal regulation.32 In
centring on decontextualized objects, this approach undermined
claims of States and communities within States to maintain their
cultural objects and to reclaim those that were removed, either in
the recent or longer ago past, regardless of the method by which
they were taken. As will be discussed in chapters 2 and 7, this type
of internationalist approach perpetuates the mantras of the universal
and encyclopedic museum and the rescue narrative that originated
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The underlying rationales for this earlier understanding of
internationalism can be traced back at least into the eighteenth
century, and they persist still today when the question of return
arises. These rationales are embedded in such earlier concepts as
the encyclopedic or universal museum, the right to claim booty
during armed conflict, and the ‘rescue narrative’ that developed in
conjunction with the exposure of Western Europeans to non-
European contemporary societies. The essence of the rescue
narrative is that the current possessors of cultural objects are not
capable of protecting, understanding, or appreciating them and are
therefore not deserving of possessing or owning cultural objects.
Finding the current possessors to be inferior provided justification for
Western Europeans to remove these objects, retain them, and
thereby ‘rescue’ them through nonconsensual appropriation. The
flow of cultural objects in this internationalist paradigm consists
primarily of a flow to Western Europe and North America and away
from many of the communities of origin in the larger population
centres in Asia and Africa. This approach denies the more
fundamental connection of a descendant community or the
connection between living local communities and the heritage in
their midst.33 This understanding of internationalism is today largely,
although not entirely, rejected.34
Cultural heritage continues to often be described as a shared
world, global, or universal heritage. The three earlier international
conventions in this field, the 1954 Hague Convention, the 1970
UNESCO Convention, and the 1972 World Heritage Convention, all
invoke the concept of a universal or shared heritage. The 1972
World Heritage Convention goes further in requiring that any cultural
and natural heritage protected under the Convention be of
‘outstanding universal value’.35 The universality underlying the
interests of the international community shares some elements of
the older internationalist perspective in that the precise location of
objects is less important than other considerations. The phrase
‘shared global or universal heritage’ may also be used rhetorically, as
a means to galvanize the international community to take action to
preserve cultural heritage.
The international community in the cultural sphere is represented
primarily by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), although other inter-governmental
organizations, including the United Nations, wield legal and soft
power authority. All of these organizations cut across national
boundaries, but, because their members are States, they defer to
the interests of their Member States. Some of their authority is
based on consciousness-raising efforts, media, public, and
educational campaigns, and other types of outreach.36 But much of
their authority derives from their ability to adopt international
conventions, Security Council resolutions (in the case of the United
Nations), and other standard-setting instruments. Non-governmental
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
and Blue Shield International, also operate in the international
sphere. These typically are restricted to the realm of soft power,
although in some cases their influence is significant.
Although conventions and treaties are subject to sovereign
decisions through the ratification and implementation processes,
international treaties also involve some ceding of sovereign
authority. With respect to movable cultural objects, we see an
example in the States that have adopted reciprocal import
restrictions based on their implementation of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.37 These States allow a change in one country’s laws to
become automatically embedded in another country’s laws. If one
State Party adds a category of cultural property that is subject to
export restriction, that category becomes subject to import
Another random document with
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 donos al ĝi, eĉ nur pro tio. Se mi povos ĝin resanigi,
malsovaĝigi, kaj kune kun ĝi trafi Neapolon, ĝi estos donaco
taŭga por ĉia imperiestro, kiu iam starus en ledaj ŝuoj.
Kalibano.
Ne turmentu min, mi petegas; mi pli rapide hejmen alportos la lignon.
Stefano.
Ĝi nun malsaniĝas, kaj ne tre saĝe parolas. Ĝi tuj gustumos el mia
botelo. Se ĝi neniam antaŭe trinkis vinon, tio, kredeble, forigos
ĝian malsanon. Se mi povos tute resanigi ĝin kaj konservi ĝin
malsovaĝe, mi troan monon ne postulos por ĝi, sed kiu ĝin
aĉetos, tiu pagos por ĝi taŭge.
Kalibano.
Vi ankoraŭ ne tre dolorigas min, sed, post ne longe, tion vi faros; mi
tion ekvidas per via tremo: nun, Prospero tuj agos ĉe vi.
Stefano.
Jen estas la maniero! Malfermu la buŝon: jen estas tio, kio vin
paroligos, kato. Malfermu vian buŝon; tio ĉi ŝanceligos vian
ŝanceliĝon, kaj bonege, mi certigas. Vi ne konas tiun, kiu estas
via bonfaristo. Ree malfermu vian faŭkon!
Trinkulo.
Ŝajnas al mi, kvazaŭ mi konus tiun voĉon! Ĝi eble . . . sed ne! li ĵus
dronis . . . Tiuj ĉi ĉiuj estas diabloj . . . Di’ gardu min! . . .
Stefano.
Kvar kruroj kaj du voĉoj! Mirinda monstro! Ĝia antaŭa voĉo servas
por bonparoli pri ĝia amiko; ĝia malantaŭa voĉo por elparoli
malpurajn vortojn kaj kalumnion. Se la vina enhavo de mia
botelo povos resanigi ĝin, mi ĝian febron kuracos. Nun, amen![6]
Mi tuj verŝos iom en vian alian buŝon.
Trinkulo.
Stefano! . . .
Stefano.
Ĉu via alia buŝo vokis al mi? . . . Di’ kompatu! kompatu! . . . Tio ĉi
estas ne monstro sed diablo! Mi tuj forlasos ĝin; mi ne posedas
longan kuleron![7]
Trinkulo.
Stefano! (se vi vere estas Stefano!) Tuŝu min kaj parolu al mi, ĉar mi
estas Trinkulo—(ne timu!)—via bona amiko Trinkulo!
Stefano.
Se vi estas Trinkulo, elvenu! . . . Mi detiros vin per la malpli longaj
kruroj; se iaj el ili apartenas al Trinkulo, tiuj ĉi estas ili. Vi ja
estas Trinkulo mem. Kiel okazis tio, ke vi fariĝis dorso al tiu ĉi
monstro?
Trinkulo.
Mi pensis ke ĝi estis mortigita per fulmofajro. Sed, ĉu vi mem ne ĵus
dronis, Stefano? Mi nun esperas, ke vi ne dronis. Ĉu la
fulmotondro estas pasinta?—Mi min kaŝis sub la kitelego de l’
monstro pro timo de la fulmotondro. Ho; ĉu vi tamen estas viva,
Stefano? Ho, Stefano! du Neapolanoj savitaj!
Stefano.
Ne tro puŝu min, mi petas; mia stomako ne tre firme agas.
Kalibano.
Belaĵoj, tiuj ĉi! Ĉu ne spiritoj? . . .
Mi genufleksu al vi, dio brava,
Pro la likvoro inda je ĉielo!
Stefano.
Kiel vi foriris? Kiel vi venis tien ĉi? Ĵuru, per tiu ĉi botelo, kiel vi tien ĉi
venis! Per tiu ĉi botelo (kiun mi faris el arboŝelo, per miaj propraj
 manoj, post kiam mi estis trafinta la bordon) mi mem fornaĝis
sur barelo da kanarivino, kiun la maristoj elĵetis al la maro.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj ĵuros, per tiu botelo, ke mi fariĝos via fidela subulo, ĉar ne
terdevena estas la likvoro.
Stefano.
(Al Trinkulo) Tien ĉi! ĵuru do kiel vi foriĝis.
Trinkulo.
Karulo, mi naĝis al la bordo, kiel anaso. Mi povas naĝi kiel anaso;
tion mi ĵuras!
Stefano.
Nu! kisu la libron![8] Kvankam vi povas kiel anaso naĝi, vi tamen
havas la mienon de ansero.
Trinkulo.
(Trinkinte) Ho, Stefano! Ĉu pli da tio ĉi estas?
Stefano.
Tutan barelon mi havas, maljunulo. Mia kelo sidas en ŝtonego ĉe l’
marbordo, kie mia vino estas kaŝita. Nun, monstro, kiel
kuraciĝas la febro?
Kalibano.
Ĉu ne falis vi de la Ĉielo?
Stefano.
De la luno, mi certigas. Mi iam estis lunloĝanto, dum kelka tempo.
Kalibano.
Mastrino montris vin, la hundon, l’ arbetaĵon;
Mi vidis vin en ĝi, kaj vin mi nun adoras!
 Stefano.
Bonege! tion ĵuru! kisu la libron.[9] Mi tuj replenigos ĝin per nova
enhavo! ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Per la sunlumo! tio ĉi estas naivega monstro! Ĉu mi ĵus timiĝis pro
ĝi? Malsprita monstro! La lunloĝanto! ha! ha! Kia kredema
monstro! Bone vi suĉis, monstro, vere.
Kalibano.
Mi ĉiun fruktan colon sur l’ insulo montros:
Piedon vian kisu mi! Di’ estu mia.
Trinkulo.
Per la taglumo! Perfidega kaj drinkema monstro! Kiam ĝia dio
dormos, ĝi de li ŝtelos la botelon.
Kalibano.
Mi tuj kisos vian piedon; tuj via subulo mi mem ĵuros.
Stefano.
Venu do; genufleksu kaj ĵuru!
Trinkulo.
Mi mortiĝos per rido je tia azenidkapa monstro. Kia malestimebla
monstro! Mi preskaŭ volus ĝin bati . . .
Stefano.
(Al Kalibano) Venu! kisu.[10]
Trinkulo.
. . . nur ke la mizera monstro estas ebria. Abomena monstro!
Kalibano.
Mi fontojn montros, mi eltrovis berojn,
Por vi fiŝkaptos, kaj alportos lignon.
Ho! peston al tirana mastro mia!
Mi ne lin servos plu, sed vin mi sekvos,
Ho, mirigulo!
Trinkulo.
Monstro ridindega! ĝi faras mirindaĵon el malnobla drinkulo!
Kalibano.
Vin mi kondukos kie la pomarboj
Fruktege kreskas—Per ungegoj miaj
Elfosos trufojn, garolneston montros,
Kaj vin instruos por sciuron trafi,
Mi vin trovigos la avelarbaron,
Kaj foje sur ŝtonego mevojn kaptos . . .
Ĉu vi nun volas veni?
Stefano.
Ho, mi petas,
Antaŭen tuj, kaj plu ne vorton diru.
Trinkulo, ĉar la reĝo kune kun niaj aliaj kunmarveturantoj ĉiuj dronis,
ni tie ĉi heredos. (Al Kalibano) Portu mian botelon. Post ne
longe, kunfrato Trinkulo, ni ĝin replenigos.
Kalibano.
(Kantas ebriule) Adiaŭ, mastro, mastro, adiaŭ.
Trinkulo.
Monstro blekeganta! Drinkema monstro!
Kalibano.
(Laŭte kantas).
Mi por fiŝo ne plu faros digon,
Nek alportos lignon,
Nek ĝin eĉ ekfajros,
Nek pletegon gratos,
 Nek teleron lavos!
Ban! ban! ban! Ka-Kalibano, kantu:
Novan mastron amu,
Ne tiranon timu!
(Ekkriante) Libereco! he! ho! Libereco! libereco! he! ho! libereco!
Stefano.
Ho, brava monstro, nun, antaŭen marŝu!
(Ili foriras).
 Akto III.
Sceno 1.—Antaŭ la ĉambreto de Prospero.
(Venas Ferdinando portanta ŝtipon).
Ferdinando.
Labora ludo havas ĉarmon agan;
Humila tasko rekompencon celas.
Mizera estus mia nuna stato,
Se la mastrino, kiun mi obeas,
Al koro mia ne redonus vivon;
Ŝi, dolĉulino, penon plezurigas.
Dekoble por mi estas ŝi pli bona
Ol ŝia patro maldolĉema ŝajnas:
Li min devigas, per kruela povo,
Alporti milojn da ŝtipegoj tie
Kaj altan mason per ĉi tiuj fari.
La karulino—kiam ŝi min vidas
Sub peza ŝarĝo pene laciĝantan
Plorege diras: Humilega tasko
“Faranton havis noblan pli, neniam.”
Forgesas mi: sed tiuj dolĉaj pensoj
Laboron ĉarmas kaj l’ animon mian
Pli okupadas, ol fortuzo korpon.
(Venas Mirando, kun Prospero malproksime).
Mirando.
Ho ve! mi petas, tiel ne penadu!
Ke Dio volu per la fulmofajro
Bruligi ŝtipojn ĉiujn kolektotajn!
Demetu tion; tie ĉi ripozu.
La ŝtipoj ploros kiam ili brulos,
Ĉar ili vin lacigis. Mia patro
Atente legas nun; mi petas, sidu:
Ne trudos li vin dum de nun tri horoj.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino kara! eĉ la sun’ subiros
Hodiaŭ, antaŭ ol mi povos fari
La taskon devigitan.
Mirando.
Se vi volas
Sidiĝi tie, mi la ŝtipojn portos.
Demetu tion kaj al mi tuj donu:
En mason ĝin mi lokos.
Ferdinando.
Ne, karega!
Preferus mi muskolojn miajn kraki,
Aŭ spinon rompi ol vin vidi tiel
Humile penadantan, dum mi sidus
Mallaboreme.
Mirando.
Al mi bone decus;
Ja, kiel al vi tiel:—pli facile . . .
Ĉar estus en l’ afero mia volo,
Sed ne la via.
Prospero (flanken).
Ina kreitaĵo!
Vin ankaŭ trafis nun, l’ aminfektado!
Mirando.
Vi ŝajnas laca.
Ferdinando.
 Ne! mastrino nobla,
Por mi la nokto ŝajnas la mateno
Se staras vi proksime. Mi petegas—
Precipe ke preĝante mi ĝin povu
Esprimi—diru al mi vian nomon!
Mirando.
Mirando. (Flanken) Patro mia, mi forgesis:
Kaŝitan tion ĉi vi volus gardi.
Ferdinando.
Mirando! plej el ĉiuj admirinda!
Plej kara el plej karaj tra la mondo!
Multegajn sinjorinojn mi ekvidis:
Tre ofte eĉ belsona ina voĉo
Sklavigis tro atentan mian aŭdon;
Pro multaj ecoj mi virinojn ŝatis;
Neniam tamen trovis mi animon
Perfektan tiel, ke malbono ia
Ĉarmegan virton en ŝi ne malhelpis,
Aŭ ĝin surstrekis. Sed vi, ho! vi sole
Perfekta staras; senegalulino,
Vi el plej bona kreitaĵ’ devenas.
Mirando.
Neniun el la mia seks’ vidante,
Vizaĝon inan nun mi ne memoras
Krom mia, kiam vidas en spegulo.
El viroj, kiujn mi jam povus nomi,
Nur vi, amiko, kaj la patro kara
De mi konataj estas: eksterulojn
Neniam mi ekvidis por kompari
Al iu la alian—Modesteco
La plej ŝatita, for de mi, juvelo!—
Mi kunvivanton, krom vi, ne dezirus,
Nenian formon mi imagi povas
Ol via pli amindan. Iom vage
Mi babiladas, kaj la patran leĝon
Per tio mi forgesas.
Ferdinando.
Karulino!
Reĝido mi naskiĝis; Dio gardu,
Sed, mi nun eble eĉ jam Reĝo estas!
Mi do sklavecon tian ne elportus
Pli dolĉe ol la lipo tabanpikon . . .
Mirando! la animon mian aŭdu!
Tuj kiam vin mi vidis, mia koro
Eksaltis por vin servi, ĉe vi loĝas . . .
Kaj mi, la sklavo ĝia, pro vi, sole,
Ŝtipegojn portas nun.
Mirando.
Ĉu vi min amas?
Ferdinando.
Ĉielo! tero! estu atestantoj
Al mia diro, se ĝi estas vera:
Se ne sincera, en mi mem nuliĝu
Plej karaj la esperoj! Jes, Mirando,
Mi, super ĉiuj limoj de parolo
Vin amas, ŝatas, kaj honoras.
Mirando (plorante).
Tamen,
Je tio tiel bona mi ekploras.
Prospero (flanken).
Renkonto taŭga de du noblaj koroj!
Sur tion, kio inter ili venos,
Ĉielo, pluvu benon!
Ferdinando.
Kial plori?
 Mirando.
Ĉar mi ne estas inda, . . . ne maltimas
Donaci kion mi oferi volus . . .
Eĉ malpli preni mian koran vivon!
Sensence tamen veron kaŝi estus:
Ju pli kaŝita, des pli ĝi montriĝas.
For de mi do, kaŝema honto, iru;
Instruu min, vi, sankta senkulpeco!
Edzino via estos mi bonvole,
Kun mi edziĝi kiam vi deziros,
Aŭ mortos mi nur via servistino.
Min kunegalan povus vi rifuzi,
Sed vin mi servos, laŭ aŭ kontraŭ volo.
Ferdinando.
Mastrino mia estus: mi vin servu!
Mirando.
Ĉu kiel edzo mia?
Ferdinando.
Jes! pli kore
Ol sklavo iam liberecon volis!
Jen mian manon!
Mirando.
Kaj vi, mian prenu
Kun koro en ĝi . . . Ĝis ne longa tempo,
Adiaŭ, nun!
Ferdinando.
Miloble mil adiaŭ!
(Ferdinando kaj Mirando foriras).
Prospero.
Min tio ne ĝojigas kiel ilin
Per amo ĵus kaptitajn—Sed pli ĝoja
Ĝi igas min ol ĉio ajn en vivo—
Nun mia libro devas min konsili:
Ankoraŭ mi por fari multon havas
Eĉ antaŭ vespermanĝo.
(Foriras).

Sceno 2.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Kalibano portante botelon, Stefano kaj Trinkulo).
Stefano.
Ne parolu tiel: kiam la barelo estos senenhava, ni trinkos akvon, sed
nenian guton antaŭe; tial, staru kaj maltime marŝu.
Servantmonstro, drinku al mi!
Trinkulo.
“Servantmonstro!” kia insula petoleco! Oni diras, ke nur kvin loĝantoj
estas sur l’ insulo; ni estas tri el ili: se la du aliaj estas tiel
cerbigitaj kiel ni, la ŝtato ŝanceliĝos.
Stefano.
Drinku, servantmonstro, kiam mi ordenas: viaj okuloj preskaŭ ŝajnas
kiel se ili sidus en via kapo!
Trinkulo.
Nu, kie ili do estus, alie? Brava monstro estus ĝi, vere, se ĝi havus
okulojn en ĝia vosto.
Stefano.
Mia monstro dronigis sian langon en kanarivino. Miavice, la maro ne
povas min dronigi. Per tiu ĉi lumo! mi naĝis, antaŭ ol mi atingis
la bordon, tridek-kvin mejlojn, kun intertempoj . . . Vi estos mia
leŭtenanto, monstro, aŭ mia gardstaranto.
 Trinkulo.
Via leŭtenanto, se vi volas; sed, certe, ĝi ne estas staranto.
Stefano.
Ni ne kuros, Monsieur Monstro.
Trinkulo.
Certe, kaj ankaŭ vi ne iros, sed enŝlimiĝos aŭ, kiel hundoj,
ternestiĝos en kelka angulo.
Stefano.
Unuafoje en via vivo, parolu, malspritulo, se vi estas bona monstro.
Kalibano.
La ŝuon leku mi de Via Moŝto:
Lin[11] mi ne servos; li ne estas brava.
Trinkulo.
Vi mensogas, malklerega monstro; mi nun estas taŭga por policano.
Kiel! vi, diboĉama fiŝo! Ĉu estis iam ia timemulo, kiu drinkis tiom
da vino, kiom mi hodiaŭ? Ĉu monstran mensogon diras vi, kiu
nur estas duonfiŝo kaj duonmonstro?
Kalibano.
Jen! kiel li mokas min! Ĉu vi permesas tion, landsinjoro?
Trinkulo.
“Landsinjoro!” ĝi diras; ke monstro povas esti tiel malsprita!
Kalibano.
Jen! jen! ankoraŭ! mordu lin morte, mi petas!
Stefano.
Trinkulo, detenu vian langon. Se vi fariĝos ribelanto, la proksima
arbo . . . La honesta monstro estas mia subulo, kaj ĝin neniu
insultu!
 Kalibano.
Dankon al nobla mia mastro! Ĉu vi bonvolus min aŭdi denove, pri la
peto kiun mi jam faris?
Stefano.
Certe, mi volas. Genufleksu, kaj ĝin rediru. Mi staros kune kun
Trinkulo.
(Venas Arielo, nevidebla).
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris al vi, mi estas la subulo de tirano, sorĉisto, kiu
magie ŝtelis de mi la insulon.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Simia mokemulo, vi mensogas!
Ke mia mastro volu vin mortigi!
Mi ne mensogas.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, se vi ankoraŭ tedos al ĝi, dum ĝia rakonto per tiu ĉi mia
pugno! mi elrompos kelke da viaj dentoj!
Trinkulo.
Kion do? mi nenion diris.
Stefano.
Sufiĉe! silentu. (Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu!
Kalibano.
Mi diras, ke magie tiun ĉi insulon
Li de mi ŝtelis: se la Via Moŝto
Min volas venĝi, vi la povon havas . . .
Sed ne ĉi tiu timegulo.[12]
Stefano.
Certe.
Kalibano.
Vi estos insulestro: mi vin servos.
Stefano.
Nu! kiel tio fariĝos? Ĉu vi al la individuo povas min konduki?
Kalibano.
Jes, jes, sinjoro mia, lin dormantan
Liveros mi al vi, kiam vi povos
En lian kapon najlon martelumi.
Arielo.
Vi mensogas; vi ne povas.
Kalibano (al Trinkulo).
Skorbute makulkolorita besto!
Lin, mastro, multe batu, mi petegas!
Kaj de li prenu dian la botelon,
Por ke li poste nur marakvon trinku;
Ĉar la fontetojn al li mi ne montros.
Stefano.
Trinkulo, ne ludu kun danĝero plie: se unu vorto via ankoraŭ
interrompos la monstron, per tiu ĉi mia mano! mi tuj forpelos
malseverecon kaj gadon faros el vi.
Trinkulo.
Kial? Kion mi faris? Mi faris nenion. Mi pli malproksime tuj staros.
Stefano.
Ĉu vi ne ĵus diris, ke ĝi mensogas?
 Arielo.
Vi mensogas!
Stefano (batas Trinkulo).
Ĉu mi ankaŭ mensogas? Prenu tion! Se vi tion amas, diru ree, ke mi
mensogas.
Trinkulo.
Mi tion neniam diris. Vi estas frenezulo kaj ankaŭ surdulo.—Peston
al via botelo! Tion vindrinkado povas kaŭzi!—Epidemion al via
monstro, kaj la diablo forprenu viajn fingrojn!
Kalibano.
Ha! ha! ha!
Stefano.
Nun, daŭrigu vian rakonton. (Al Trinkulo) Mi petas, staru for de ni.
Kalibano.
Sufiĉe vi lin batu; post ne longe,
Mi, ankaŭ, tuj lin batos.
Stefano (al Trinkulo).
Nu, for staru.
(Al Kalibano) Daŭrigu.
Kalibano.
Kiel mi antaŭe diris,
Kutime li[13] en posttagmezo dormas:
De li preninte librojn, tuj vi povos
Lin sencerbigi; aŭ, per dika ŝtipo,
Premegi la kranion; aŭ elŝuti
Intestojn liajn, per borega vundo;
Aŭ, per tranĉilo, gorĝon lian tranĉi.
Memoru, tamen, ŝteli liajn librojn;
Sen tiuj kiel mi li malspritiĝos,
Kaj ne spiritojn povos li komandi:
Prosper’ de ĉiuj estas malamata
Simile de mi. Brulu do la librojn.
Li ankaŭ belajn havas bonajn ilojn,
Per kiuj domon povas li ornami:
Filinon tiel belan li posedas
Ke ŝin li nomas “senegalulino.”
Nur du virinojn jam ĝis nun mi vidis,
Ŝin, kaj patrinon mian Sikorakso.
Sed Sikorakson ŝi superas kiel
Bonego malbonegon.
Stefano.
Belulino!
Kalibano.
Jes, landsinjoro, taŭga kunulino
Por Via Moŝto, kaj idaron noblan
Ŝi naskos, kiam vi kun ŝi edziĝos.
Stefano.
Monstro, tiun ĉi viron mi mortigos. Lia filino, kune kun mi, estos Reĝo
kaj Reĝino (Di’ savu nin!) Kaj Trinkulo kaj vi mem estos vicreĝoj.
—Ĉu vi amas la konspiron, Trinkulo?
Trinkulo.
Bonege!
Stefano.
Donu al mi vian manon; mi bedaŭras, ke mi vin batis, sed, dum vi
vivos, ĉiam posedu sobran langon en via buŝo.
Kalibano.
Post duonhoro dormos la tirano:
Ĉu vi detruos lin?
Stefano.
 Jes, per honoro!
Arielo.
Mi tion diros tuj al mastro mia.
Kalibano.
Vi min gajigas, min plezur’ plenigas:
Ni ronde kantu, kaj petole dancu!
Stefano.
Kiel vi volos, monstro. Mi akceptas vian proponon. Venu, Trinkulo, ni
kantu!
(Kantas) Moku, kaj pelu, remoku, repelu;
Liberaj ni!
Kalibano.
Tio ne estas la ario.
(Arielo ludas la arion per tambureto kaj ŝalmo).
Stefano.
Kio estas tio?
Trinkulo.
Tio estas la ario de mia rondkanteto, ludata per la pentraĵo de Neniu.
Stefano.
Se vi estas viro, aperu en via simileco; se vi diablo estas, faru kion vi
volos.
Trinkulo.
Pardonu Di’ pekojn miajn!
Stefano.
Mortante, viro ĉiujn ŝuldojn pagas:
Mi vin maltimas . . . (Min pardonu Dio!)
 Kalibano.
Ĉu timas vi?
Stefano.
Ne, monstro, mi ne timas.
Kalibano.
Ne timu: plena je bruadoj strangaj
L’ insulo estas; sonoj dolĉariaj,
Ĉarmegaj, kiuj ne malbonon faras.
Ho, foje, ventaj, kordaj muzikiloj
Milope ludas; dolĉaj voĉoj kantas, . . .
Dormantan min tuj vekas, . . . redormigas, . . .
Grandegaj sonĝoj malfermante nubojn,
Belecon montras pretiĝante fali
Sur min, . . . sed elreviĝo tuj revenas . . .
Kaj mi bedaŭre krias por resonĝi.
Stefano.
Tio fariĝos noblega reĝlando por mi, en kiu mi havos muzikon
senpage.
Kalibano.
Kiam Prospero estos nuligita.
Stefano.
Tio estos post ne longe; mi memoras vian diron.
Trinkulo.
Nun la sono foriĝas: ni sekvu ĝin, kaj poste la aferon ni faru.
Stefano.
Konduku nin, monstro; ni sekvos.—Tiun ĉi tamburetiston mi tre
dezirus vidi—Li laŭte ludas, ĉu ne?
Trinkulo.
Ĉu vi venas, Stefano? Mi tuj sekvos.
(Ili foriras).

Sceno 3.—En alia parto de l’ insulo.

(Venas Alonzo, Sebastiano, Antonio, Gonzalo, Adriano,
Francisko, kaj aliaj).
Gonzalo.
Per Dipatrin’, ne povas mi plu marŝi,
Doloras tro maljunaj miaj ostoj:
Ne labirinto iam pli lacigis,
Ol niaj iroj kaj deiroj. Reĝo,
Per via pacienco, mi tuj restos.
Alonzo.
Sinjor’ maljuna, mi ne vin kulpigas,
Ĉar ankaŭ min atakas nun laciĝo,
Kaj senspritige super mi pezegas . . .
Sidiĝu, restu. Tie ĉi mi devas
Forlasi la esperon tiel flatan
Revidi filon mian. Ne, li dronis . . .
Kaj vane ni vagadis por lin trovi,
Dum maro mokas nian teriradon.
Ho ve! li mortis.
Antonio (flanken, al Sebastiano).
Mi tre ĝojas
Ke li plu ne esperas. Ne forlasu,
Pro malprospero, tiun entreprenon,
Pri kiu ni interligiĝis.
Sebastiano (flanken, al Antonio).
Bone:
Okazon proksimegan ni ekprenos.