GioVanni Catapano

Augustine’s Treatise De Immortalitate Animae

and the Proof of the Soul’s Immortality in his Soliloquia*

1. it is well-known to modern augustine scholars that in his Retractationes

(retr.) the bishop of Hippo links the composition of De immortalitae animae (imm.
an.) to that of Soliloquia (sol.)1. augustine informs his readers that he wrote imm.
an. after writing sol., which would be once he returned from the country to Milan.
then, augustine adds that he had wanted imm. an. only for himself, as a sort
of memorandum (commonitorium) in order to complete sol., a still uninished
work. the passage runs as follows :

« post libros soliloquiorum iam de agro Mediolanum reuersus scripsi librum

de immortalitate animae, quod mihi quasi commonitorium esse uolueram
propter Soliloquia terminanda, quae imperfecta remanserant » (retr., 1, 5, ed. a.
Mutzenbecher, CCSL 57, pp. 15, 2 - 16, 5).

in augustine’s time, the term ‘commonitorium’ referred to a brief text attached

to a letter containing conidential information or instructions2. Various examples
of commonitoria sent or received by Augustine are found in his correspondence,
especially among the letters discovered by Johannes Divjak3. By comparing imm.
an. to a commonitorium addressed to himself, augustine wants to stress that in

*
I presented a irst version of this paper at the international workshop « philologische,
philosophische und theologische Probleme von Augustins Schrift De immortalitate animae », which
was held in Kloster Bronnbach bei Wertheim on July 8-10, 2010. I would like to thank the organizer
of the workshop, Prof. Dr. Christian Tornau, and all the participants for their valuable comments. A
German translation of my Kloster Bronnbach paper will be published in Augustinus, De immortalitate
animae ; De animae quantitate, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar von C. tornAu, Schöningh, paderborn
- München - Wien - Zürich (forthcoming).
1
To my knowledge, the medieval readers of imm. an., on the contrary, overlooked its relationship
with sol. : cf. G. cAtApAno, De immortalitate animae, in K. pollMAnn ed.-in-chief, W. otten ed., The
Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine, 3 vols., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013,
vol. I, pp. 325-328.
2
Cf. e.g. R. lizzi testA, Un’epistola speciale : il commonitorium, in F. E. consolino ed., Forme letterarie
nella produzione latina di IV-V secolo, Herder, Roma 2003 (Studi e testi tardoantichi, 1), pp. 53-89.
3
Cf. J. DivjAk, Commonitorium, in C. MAyer ed., Augustinus-Lexikon, 4 vols., Schwabe, Basel
1986-2012, vol. I, coll. 1077-1079.
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« Documenti e studi sulla tradizione ilosoica medievale » XXV (2014)
68 giovAnni cAtApAno

origin, contrary to what eventually happened, imm. an. was not intended for the
reading public. additionally, he says that imm. an. had to remind him to bring
sol. to a conclusion and to suggest to him how to do it. Here i will focus on this
aspect and will make an attempt at answering questions like these : in which
sense does imm. an. give instructions that can be useful for inishing sol. ? What
is the relationship between the contents of the two works ? to what extent does
imm. an. really reach its goal4 ?

2. I have found two reasons to suggest that sol. are uninished. First, as
augustine rightly states in retr., Book 2 of sol. includes a long discussion on
the immortality of the soul, but the discussion does not come to a proper end5.
Since imm. an. deals with the same subject, the connection of our treatise with
sol. seems absolutely self-evident. We still have to understand, however, to what
degree the arguments of imm. an. improve those of sol.
in the second place, the demonstration of the soul’s immortality in sol. is only
the irst of two tasks that ought to be performed, according to a work plan the
author drew at the beginning of Book 2. as the character named ‘Reason’ points
out, ‘Augustine’ already knows that he is, that he lives and that he understands
(intellegere), but he still desires to know whether he will be, live and understand
forever. If it is proved that ‘Augustine’ is always to live, ‘Reason’ adds, it will follow
that he is also always to be, but the question of understanding will still remain6.

4
i deliberately refrain from dealing with the complex question of the sources of imm. an. and
refer the reader to the status quaestionis i made in Aurelio Agostino, Tutti i dialoghi, introduzione
generale, presentazioni ai dialoghi e note di G. cAtApAno, traduzioni di M. bettetini, G. cAtApAno,
G. reAle, Bompiani, Milano 2006, pp. cxxxiv-cxliv, and to my footnotes in Agostino, Sull’anima :
L’immortalità dell’anima ; La grandezza dell’anima, testo latino a fronte, introduzione, traduzione,
note e apparati di G. cAtApAno, Bompiani, Milano 2003 (Testi a fronte, 83), pp. 315-349. Cf. also V.
H. Drecoll, Die Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1999 (Beiträge
zur historischen Theologie, 109), pp. 49-83 ; n. cipriAni, El ‘De immortalitate animae’ y sus fuentes,
« augustinus », 55, 2010, pp. 445-462 ; L. kArfíková, Das Verhältnis von Seele und ratio in Augustins
Abhandlung De immortalitate animae, in F. kArfík, E. song eds., Plato Revived. Essays on Ancient
Platonism in Honour of Dominic J. O’Meara, De Gruyter, Berlin 2013 (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde,
317), pp. 117-137 ; C. tornAu, Ratio in subiecto ? The sources of Augustine’s proof for the immortality of
the soul in the Soliloquia and its defense in De immortalitate animae, in M. vorwerk ed., Augustine and
Augustinianism : Contributions on Augustinian Philosophy and Its Reception, The Catholic University
of america press, Washington, D.C. (forthcoming).
5
Retr., 1, 4, 1 (CCSL 57, p. 14, 10-11) : « in secundo autem de immortalitate animae diu res agitur
et non peragitur ».
6
Sol., 2, 1-2 (ed. W. hörMAnn, CSEL 89, p. 47, 9-20) : « Ergo esse te scis, uiuere te scis, intellegere
te scis. Sed utrum ista semper futura sint an nihil horum futurum sit an maneat aliquid semper et
aliquid intercidat an minui et augeri haec possint, cum omnia mansura sint, nosse uis. — A. ita est.
— R. Si igitur probauerimus semper nos esse uicturos, sequetur etiam semper futuros. — A. Sequetur.
— R. Restabit quaerere de intellegendo. — A. Manifestissimum ordinem uideo atque breuissimum ».
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 69

as augustine himself will subsequently make clear in De libero arbitrio, every

living being exists, but not every living being understands7. the most important
thing for the character ‘Augustine,’ however, is not to be or to live forever, but
rather to continually increase in understanding. He does not enjoy living for the
mere sake of living, but for the sake of knowing, since what is now making him
unhappy is his ignorance of things8. a discussion de intellegendo was, therefore,
to follow the inquiry de semper uiuendo as the second task to be fulilled.
One example of the issues to be tackled in the planned but never written section
on understanding is given at the end of sol., Book 2. it is the distinction between
« the true igure, which is contained in intellect (intellegentia), and that which
thought (cogitatio) moulds to itself, which in Greek is called either phantasia or
phantasma »9. a point like this, ‘Reason’ says, « will be treated more elaborately
and subtly once we begin to approach the topic of understanding (de intellegendo).
We have proposed not to carry out this part of our work before dissecting and
discussing, as far as we can, whatever troubles us about the life of the soul (de
animae uita) »10.
From such an example, we can educe that the part of the work concerning
understanding was to include both a theory of knowledge and a metaphysical
account of the intelligible beings. actually, imm. an. does not lack remarks on both
these subjects11, but apparently all of such remarks in imm. an. aim at proving

7
Lib. arb., 2, 7 (ed. W. M. green, CCSL 29, p. 240, 21-30) : « Quia cum tria sint haec, esse uiuere
intellegere, et lapis est et pecus uiuit, nec tamen lapidem puto uiuere aut pecus intellegere ; qui
autem intellegit, eum et esse et uiuere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius iudicare
cui omnia tria insunt quam id cui uel unum desit. nam quod uiuit, utique et est, sed non sequitur ut
etiam intellegat, qualem uitam esse pecoris arbitror. Quod autem est, non utique consequens est ut
et uiuat et intellegat, nam esse cadauera possum fateri, uiuere autem nullus dixerit. iam uero quod
non uiuit, multo minus intellegit ».
8
Sol., 2, 1 (p. 46, 24 - p. 47, 9) : « R. non igitur uiuere propter ipsum uiuere amas, sed propter
scire. — A. Cedo conclusioni. — R. Quid, si eadem ipsa rerum scientia miserum faciat ? — A. nullo
id quidem pacto ieri posse credo. Sed si ita est, nemo esse beatus potest ; non enim nunc aliunde
sum miser nisi rerum ignorantia. Quod si et rerum scientia miserum facit, sempiterna miseria est.
— R. iam uideo totum quod cupis. nam, quoniam neminem scientia miserum esse credis, ex quo
probabile est ut intellegentia eficiat beatum, beatus autem nemo nisi uiuens et nemo uiuit qui non
est : esse uis, uiuere et intellegere ; sed esse ut uiuas, uiuere ut intellegas ».
9
Sol., 2, 34 (p. 93, 17 - 94, 2) : « Sed illud saltem impetrem, antequam terminum uolumini statuas,
ut quid intersit inter ueram iguram, quae intellegentia continetur, et eam, quam sibi ingit cogitatio,
quae Graece siue phantasia sive phantasma dicitur, breuiter exponas ».
10
Sol., 2, 36 (p. 97, 12-15) : « Haec dicentur operosius atque subtilius, cum de intellegendo disserere
coeperimus, quae nobis pars proposita est, cum de animae uita quicquid sollicitat, fuerit, quantum
ualemus, enucleatum atque discussum ».
11
Cf. e.g. imm. an. 10 (ed. W. hörMAnn, CSEL 89, p. 110, 20 - 111, 2 ; see footnote 30 below) on
the difference between what is perceived by the senses and what is grasped by intellect, and especially
imm. an. 17 (pp. 118, 12-17 ; 119, 3-14) on the intelligibles and the way the soul knows them.
70 giovAnni cAtApAno

only the soul’s immortality and not knowledge improvement post mortem. in imm.
an., 17, for instance, the fact that the soul is not able to grasp intelligible things
unless it turns away from the body is merely produced as evidence against the
theory that the soul is a ‘balanced constitution’ (temperatio) of the body.
i, therefore, suggest that we assume that imm. an. is like (quasi) a commonitorium
that gives instructions for completing sol. solely with respect to the problem of
immortality, and not with respect to the theme of understanding. in other words,
imm. an. served the purpose of concluding one part of sol., but not the entire work.

3. now let us see why the proof of the immortality of the soul (animus, i.e.,
the rational soul)12 given in sol. is incomplete. in sol., 2, 24, ‘Reason’ sums up the
argument as follows :

« [p1] omne, quod in subiecto est, si semper manet, ipsum etiam subiectum maneat
semper necesse est. [p2] Et omnis in subiecto est animo disciplina. [p3] necesse est
igitur semper animus maneat, si semper manet disciplina. [p4] Est autem disciplina
ueritas [p5] et semper, ut in initio libri huius ratio persuasit, ueritas manet. [p7]
Semper igitur animus manet [P8] nec <umquam> animus mortuus dicitur. [P9]
inmortalem igitur animum solus non absurde negat, qui superiorum aliquid non
recte concessum esse conuincit » (ed. W. hörMAnn, CSEL 89, p. 79, 1-9).

We can formalize the proof in this way :

Since [P1] if a thing in a subject lasts forever, then the subject
in which that thing is lasts forever, too13,
and since [P2] every discipline is in the subject soul,
ergo, [P3] if a discipline lasts forever, the soul lasts forever (=
p1+p2).
Moreover, since [P4] a discipline (i.e., dialectic) is truth,
and since [P5] truth lasts forever,
ergo [P6] a discipline (i.e., dialectic) lasts forever
(= P4+P5).
Now, since [P7] the soul lasts forever (= P3+P6),

12
i take it that, both in sol. and in imm. an., the word ‘animus’ is usually synonymous with
‘<hominis> anima’ and does not refer to a part of man’s soul, but rather to the human soul qua human
soul as a whole. Cf. Agostino D’ipponA, De immortalitate animae : L’immortalità dell’anima, testo latino
a fronte, introduzione, traduzione, note e appendice di G. bAliDo, Editrice Domenicana italiana,
napoli 2010 (patristica, 1), p. 67 (footn. 4) ; kArfíková, Das Verhältnis, pp. 123-125.
13
the ordo uerborum of p1 suggests that the expression « omne, quod in subiecto est » does
not refer to the whole set of accidents that are in a certain subject, but rather opens a universally
quantiied statement. So, to my mind, P1 does not mean : « if all the properties that inhere within a
subject S last forever, then the subject S lasts forever ».
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 71

and since [P8] the soul is not dead as long as it lasts,

ergo, [P9] the soul is immortal (= P7+P8).

Proposition P9, i.e., the thesis of the soul’s immortality, follows from propositions
P7 and P8. Proposition P7 follows from propositions P3 (which follows from P1
and p2) and p6 (which follows from p4 and p5). So, the propositions on which
the proof is ultimately based are ive, namely : P1, P2, P4, P5 and P8. Let us see
how these propositions are justiied in sol.
Proposition P1 presupposes the notion of ‘being-in-a-subject’. Properly said,
to be in a subject is to be in another thing inseparabiliter, which is to say that the
thing cannot exist without that subject14. in sol. 2, 22, ‘augustine’ says he has learnt
this notion — the origin of which is obviously found in Aristotle’s Categories15 —
during the early years of his youth16. Most likely, he is referring to « the so-called
Ten Categories » augustine studied on his own at the age of twenty, as we know
from his famous account in Confessiones, Book 417. This reference is conirmed
by a much later text where Augustine, addressing Julian of Aeclanum, admits
that « things being in a subject cannot exist without the subject in which they
are », and then goes on to say that this is a doctrine that Julian has learnt from

14
Sol., 2, 22 (p. 75, 4-10, 15-18) : « Esse aliquid in aliquo, non nos fugit duobus modis dici : uno,
quo ita est, ut etiam seiungi atque alibi esse possit, ut hoc lignum in hoc loco, ut sol in oriente ; altero
autem, quo ita est aliquid in subiecto, ut ab eo nequeat separari, ut in hoc ligno forma et species
quam uidemus, ut in sole lux, ut in igne calor, ut in animo disciplina, et si qua sunt alia similia. […]
Quid illud ? nonne concedis, quod in subiecto est inseparabiliter, si subiectum ipsum non maneat,
manere non posse ? – A. Hoc quoque video necessarium ». The adverb inseparabiliter — on which
cf. C. Tornau’s note on CSEL 89, p. 102, 20, in Augustinus, De immortalitate animae — occurs eight
times in imm. an. (pp. 102, 20 ; 103, 2.9.12 ; 106, 18 ; 109, 2 ; 118, 21 ; 119, 2).
15
Cat., 2, 1a, 24-25 : ejn uJpokeimevnw/ de; levgw o} e[n tini mh; wJ~ mevro~ uJpavrcon ajduvnaton cwri;;~ ei\nai tou`
ejn w|/ ejstivn.
16
Sol., 2, 22 (p. 75, 11-14) : « ista quidem uetustissima nobis sunt et ab ineunte adulescentia
studiosissime percepta et cognita ; quare non possum de his interrogatus quin ea sine ulla deliberatione
concedam ».
17
Conf., 4, 28 (ed. L. verheijen, CCSL 27, p. 54, 1-17) : « Et quid mihi proderat, quod annos natus
ferme uiginti, cum in manus meas uenissent aristotelica quaedam, quas appellant decem categorias
— quarum nomine, cum eas rhetor Carthaginiensis, magister meus, buccis typho crepantibus
commemoraret et alii qui docti habebantur, tamquam in nescio quid magnum et diuinum suspensus
inhiabam — legi eas solus et intellexi ? Quas cum contulissem cum eis, qui se dicebant uix eas
magistris eruditissimis non loquentibus tantum, sed multa in puluere depingentibus intellexisse,
nihil inde aliud mihi dicere potuerunt, quam ego solus apud me ipsum legens cognoueram ; et satis
aperte mihi uidebantur loquentes de substantiis, sicuti est homo, et quae in illis essent, sicuti est
igura hominis, qualis sit et statura, quot pedum sit, et cognatio, cuius frater sit, aut ubi sit constitutus
aut quando natus, aut stet aut sedeat, aut calciatus uel armatus sit aut aliquid faciat aut patiatur
aliquid, et quaecumque in his nouem generibus, quorum exempli gratia quaedam posui, uel in ipso
substantiae genere innumerabilia reperiuntur ».
72 giovAnni cAtApAno

dialectic, and more precisely from aristotle’s Categories18. So, since what is in a
subject cannot last if the subject itself does not last, the conclusion is that the
subject of any everlasting thing will likewise last forever (= P1).
an antecedent to proposition p2, too, is found in the Categories, where aristotle
mentions the science of grammar as an example of things which are said to be
in a subject, and states that the subject of grammar is precisely the soul19. the
author of the pseudo-augustinian Categoriae decem speaks more generally of
scientia or disciplina20, whereas Martianus Capella instances in particular another
art., i.e., rhetoric21. Now, at irst sight it would seem obvious that any discipline
must be in a subject and that such a subject cannot but be a soul. Proposition
P2, however, will turn out to be the most dificult to justify. In fact, in order to
show that every soul is immortal, P2 must be valid for all souls. — this is to say
that the real meaning of p2 in this argument should be that any discipline exists
in every soul, but experience seems to contradict such a statement. i will take up
this crucial problem later.
proposition p4 is demonstrated in sol. 2, 19-21 through the following argument.
It is by virtue not of its contents but of its form that a discipline is a true discipline,
i.e., is really a science. — that is, a discipline is a discipline only inasmuch as
it treats its subject matter by means of deinitions and divisions or, generally
speaking, by following a logical method. Such a method is theorized by dialectic,

18
C. Iul., 5, 51 (PL 44, col. 812, 24-41) : « Sed magnum aliquid te dialectica docuit, “rem quae
in subiecto est, sine illa re esse non posse, in qua subiecta est. Et ideo” putas “malum quod est in
parente, utique in subiecto, alii rei, id est proli, ad quam non peruenit, reatum non posse transmittere”.
Recte hoc diceres, si malum concupiscentiae de parente non perueniret ad prolem : cum uero sicut
sine illo nemo seminatur, ita sine illo nemo nascatur ; quomodo dicis eo non peruenire, quo transit ?
non enim aristoteles, cuius categorias insipienter sapis, sed apostolus dicit : per unum hominem
peccatum intrauit in mundum ; et per omnes homines pertransiit (Rm 5 :12). nec sane tibi dialectica
illa mentitur, sed tu non intelligis. Verum enim est quod ibi accepisti, ea quae in subiecto sunt, sicut
sunt qualitates, sine subiecto in quo sunt, esse non posse, sicut est in subiecto corpore color aut
forma ; sed aficiendo transeunt, non emigrando ».
19
Cat., 2, 1a, 25-26 : oi|on hJ ti;~ grammatikh; ejn uJpokeimevnw/ mevn ejsti th/` yuch/` ; 1b, 8-9 : hJ ga;r ti;~ grammatikh ;
tw`n ejn uJpokeimevnw/ ejstivn.
20
AnonyMi Paraphrasis Themistiana (pseuDo-Augustini Categoriae decem), 33, ed. L. Minio-pAluello,
Aristoteles Latinus, 1.1.5, Desclée de Brouwer, Bruges 1961, pp. 140, 24 - 141, 2 : « Sunt igitur ex iis
[scil. accidentibus] alia quae et in subiecto sint e de subiecto signiicentur, ut est scientia uel color
(sunt enim in subiecto aliquo, id est in animo uel corpore ; neque enim scientia potest esse nisi sit
anima subiecta qua contineatur, nec signiicari scientia possit nisi de subiecta grammatica ; uel color
quisquam esse possit nisi in subiecto corpore, nec signiicari possit nisi de subiecto aliquo colore ;
ita it ut et in subiecto sint et de subiecto signiicentur) ».
21
MArt. cAp., nupt., 4, 362 (ed. J. willis, p. 117, 13-15) : « in subiecto est, quod neque nomen
neque deinitionem dat subiecto, sed in ipso subiecto ita esse intellegitur, ut sine eo esse non possit,
ut rhetorica ; nam nec nomen eius potest subiectum recipere nec deinitionem ».
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 73

which is the disciplina disputandi, ‘the art of disputing’. Disciplines other than
dialectic are, therefore, made ‘true’ disciplines by dialectic, whereas dialectic is
a true discipline in and of itself. now, what makes other things true and is true
in and of itself, is nothing but truth. So, there exists a discipline which is truth,
and this is dialectic.
a famous proof ab absurdo is adduced to demonstrate proposition p5. Let us
suppose that truth has perished. it would therefore be true that truth has perished.
now, there is nothing true without truth. So, in no way does truth perish22.
P8 is held to be self-evident. As a matter of fact, this proposition is ‘analytic’
in a Kantian sense, for the predicate ‘alive’ is already contained in the concept
of ‘soul’. It is noteworthy, however, that for ‘Augustine’ such a proposition is
not by itself suficient to prove the immortality of the soul, pace those « great
philosophers » according to whom « that thing which, wherever it comes, provides
life, cannot admit death into itself » (sol., 2, 23). this is clearly a reference to
Socrates’ argument in Phaed., 105 C-E, of which Augustine may have had indirect
knowledge via Porphyry23. ‘Augustine’ acutely objects this fact : that although a
light wherever it comes makes that place luminous and cannot admit darkness
into itself, yet such a light can be extinguished. in a similar way, from the fact
that the soul coming into a body provides life to that body, it does not follow
that the soul cannot die24. it is certainly true that as long as the soul exists, it is
alive, but this does not prove that the soul always exists and, hence, always lives.

22
Sol., 2, 2 (p. 48, 17-22) : « R. Quid ? Si ipsa ueritas occidat, nonne uerum erit ueritatem occidisse ?
— A. Et istud quis negat ? — R. Verum autem non potest esse, si ueritas non sit. — A. iam hoc paulo
ante concessi. — R. nullo modo igitur occidet ueritas ». Cf. sol., 2, 28 (pp. 82, 21 - 83, 3) : « Ex eo,
quantum memini, ueritatem non posse interire conclusimus, quod non solum, si totus mundus
intereat, sed etiam si ipsa ueritas, uerum erit et mundum et ueritatem interisse. nihil autem uerum
sine ueritate ; nullo modo igitur interit ueritas ». on augustine’s arguments for p4 and p5 see t. uhle,
Truth and Dialectics in Augustine’s Soliloquies, in J. bAun, a. cAMeron, M. eDwArDs, M. vinzent eds.,
Studia Patristica, XLIX, Peeters, Leuven - Paris - Walpole, MA 2010, pp. 223-227.
23
Cf. D. Doucet, Soliloques 2, 23 et les magni philosophi, « Revue des études augustiniennes », 39,
1993, pp. 116-119 ; G. cAtApAno, Il concetto di ilosoia nei primi scritti di Agostino. Analisi dei passi
metailosoici dal Contra Academicos al De uera religione, institutum patristicum augustinianum,
Roma 2001 (Studia Ephemeridis augustinianum, 77), pp. 252-254.
24
Sol., 2, 23 (pp. 76, 16–77, 13) : « A. iamne ergo liquido constat animum esse inmortalem ? — R. Si
ea, quae concessisti uera sunt, liquidissime ; nisi forte animum dicis, etiamsi moriatur, animum esse. —
A. numquam equidem hoc dixerim ; sed eo ipso, quo interit, ieri ut animus non sit, dico. Nec me ab hac
sententia reuocat, quod a magnis philosophis dictum est, eam rem, quae, quocumque uenerit, uitam praestat,
mortem in se admittere non posse. Quamuis enim lumen, quocumque intrare potuerit, faciat id lucere
tenebrasque in se propter memorabilem illam uim contrariorum non possit admittere, tamen exstinguitur
locusque ille exstincto lumine tenebratur. ita illud, quod tenebris resistebat, neque ullo modo in se tenebras
admisit et sic eis intereundo locum fecit, ut poterat etiam discedendo. itaque timeo, ne mors ita contingat
corpori ut tenebrae loco, aliquando discedente animo ut lumine, aliquando autem ibidem exstincto ».
74 giovAnni cAtApAno

4. As I have already said, the proposition ‘Augustine’ has most dificulty in

understanding is P2. He seems to take it for granted that P2 has a universal
meaning, according to which any discipline exists in every soul as in its subject,
i.e., cannot be separate from any soul. on the contrary, we know by experience
that very few people exhibit competence in dialectic (to say nothing of the other
disciplines). it would seem, therefore, that dialectic does not exist in all, but only
in a few souls. Moreover, from P2 and P6 it follows that

[p10] dialectic always exists in the subject soul,

whereas competence in dialectic seems to be acquired through education and

learning during time. As far as we can see, everybody is born ignorant of dialectic
as well as of any other discipline. and since it seems nonsense to say that the
soul of an unlearned person is not a soul, or that a discipline exists in the soul
of a person who is actually ignorant of that discipline, one is forced to conclude
that there was a time during which dialectic was absent even from the souls of
the happy few who are now in possession of it.

« (A.) Deinde non uideo, quomodo in animo semper sit disciplina, praesertim
disputandi, cum et tam pauci eius gnari sint et quisquis eam nouit, tanto ab infantia
tempore fuerit indoctus. non enim possumus dicere aut imperitorum animos non
esse animos aut esse in animo eam quam nesciant disciplinam. Quod si uehementer
absurdum est, restat, ut aut non semper <in animo> sit ueritas, aut disciplina illa
ueritas non sit » (sol., 2, 25, pp. 79, 16 - 80, 2).

the state of ignorance and incompetence in which most adults and all children
are seems to prove P10 wrong. But if P10 is wrong, then either it is wrong to
conclude that

Truth is always (and inseparably) in the soul (= P11, a conclusion following

from p4 and p10),

or P4 is false if P11 is true. ‘Reason’’s reply to this objection takes up the inal
section of Book 2, but appears to be weak and unsatisfactory. After conirming
P5 through the same argument used before, ‘Reason’ endeavours to maintain P4
by taking advantage of the inquiry into the notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ that was
made in the irst part of Book 2 (§§3-18). In bodies, ‘Reason’ argues that there is
not a kind of truth like that which is found in the disciplines — that is, a truth
that is completely exempt from falsehood. as a matter of fact, there are (bodily)
things that are true from one side only inasmuch as they are false from the other,
and, more precisely, inasmuch as they imitate that in the image of which they are
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 75

made. For instance, a picture of a horse is a true picture by the very fact that it
is a false horse. a discipline, on the contrary, is true without imitating anything
else. now, were the bodies true in the same sense as the disciplines are, it would
follow that the truth by virtue of which all things are true does not coincide with
dialectic. it is not dialectic, in fact, that makes any body a true body.

« (R.) Quare iam illud ultimum uideamus, utrum corpus non sit uere uerum, id
est non in eo sit ueritas, sed quasi quaedam imago ueritatis. nam si et in corpore,
quod satis certum est recipere interitum, tale uerum inuenerimus, quale est in
disciplinis, non continuo erit disputandi disciplina ueritas, qua omnes uerae sunt
disciplinae. Verum est enim et corpus, quod non uidetur disputandi ratione esse
formatum. Si uero et corpus imitatione aliqua uerum est et ob hoc non liquidum
uerum, nihil erit fortasse, quod impediat disputandi rationem, quominus ipsa
ueritas esse doceatur » (sol., 2, 32, p. 90, 9-19).

a brief argument is then adhibited to demonstrate that bodies cannot be true

without being false at the same time. a body, ‘Reason’ argues, would not be a
body if it were not contained (teneatur) in a certain igure (igura). The igures of
the bodies, however, are different from those igures that are taught in geometry.
As ‘Augustine’ said in Book 1, in fact, geometric igures cannot be perceived by
the senses25. Additionally, the bodily igures imitate the geometric ones and thus
are ‘false’, whereas the geometric igures are true since « either they dwell in the
truth, or the truth dwells in them »26. the bodies are, therefore, true for the same
reason for which they are false, i.e., because their igures imitate intelligible forms.
Such an argument presupposes heavy metaphysical assumptions, which
Augustine never renders explicit in sol., concerning the ontological status of

25
Sol., 1, 9 (p. 16, 4-11) : « R. Quid ? Haec sensibusne percepisti an intellectu ? — A. immo sensus
in hoc negotio quasi nauim sum expertus. nam cum ipsi me ad locum quo tendebam peruexerint,
ubi eos dimisi et iam uelut in solo positus coepi cogitatione ista uoluere, diu mihi uestigia titubarunt.
Quare citius mihi uidetur in terra posse nauigari quam geometricam sensibus percipi, quamuis primo
discentes aliquantum adiuuare uideantur ».
26
Sol., 2, 32 (p. 91, 1-23) : « nam ego puto corpus aliqua forma et specie contineri, quam si non
haberet, corpus non esset, si ueram haberet, animus esset. an aliter putandum est ? — A. adsentior in
parte, de cetero dubito. Nam, nisi teneatur aliqua igura, corpus non esse concedo. Quomodo autem,
si eam ueram haberet, animus esset, non satis intellego. — R. nihilne tandem de primi libri exordio
et de tua illa geometrica recordaris ? — A. Bene conmemorasti ; recordor prorsus ac libentissime.
— R. Talesne in corporibus igurae inueniuntur, quales illa disciplina demonstrat ? — A. immo
incredibile est, quanto deteriores esse conuincuntur. — R. Quas ergo istarum ueras putas ? — A. ne,
quaeso, etiam istuc me interrogandum putes. Quis enim mente tam caecus est, qui non uideat istas,
quae in geometrica docentur, habitare in ipsa ueritate aut in his etiam ueritatem, illas uero corporis
iguras, siquidem quasi ad istas tendere uidentur, habere nescio quam imitationem ueritatis et ideo
falsas esse ? ».
76 giovAnni cAtApAno

sensible forms and their relationship with intelligible ones27. What is more, this
argument surprisingly ends by making superluous the very proposition P4 that
it was adduced to substantiate. in point of fact, now conclusion p11 is no longer
deduced from p4 and p10, but rather from two new premises, which i will call
p12 and p13.

P12 implicitly states that geometric igures and Truth are inseparable, whether
the geometric igures are (inseparably) in Truth or Truth is (inseparably) in
them ;
P13 asserts that the geometric igures are contained in our intellect and hence
in our soul.

Here are ‘Reason’’s words :

« Quid ergo iam opus est, ut de disciplina disputationis requiramus ? Siue enim
igurae geometricae in ueritate siue in eis ueritas sit, anima nostra, id est intellegentia
nostra, contineri nemo ambigit ac per hoc in nostro animo etiam ueritas esse
cogitur » (sol., 2, 33, p. 92, 1-5).

Now, if Truth exists in our soul as in its subject (= P11), and if Truth lasts
forever (= P5), then the conclusion that our soul lasts forever (= P7) is demonstrated
independently of the equation Truth = dialectic (= P4) and of the idea that dialectic
is always present in the soul (= P10).
However, propositions P12 and P13, from which P11 should immediately
follow, are far from evident. As far as P12 is concerned, it is not clear what it
means that either the geometric igures « dwell in the truth, or the truth dwells
in them »28. As for the inner presence of geometric igures in the soul, which P13
afirms, both ‘Reason’ and ‘Augustine’ seem to regard it as a doubtless fact that
needs no explanation. However, it would be rash to make such an assumption.
Geometric science does exist in the soul, but it does not follow from this that the
objects of geometry, too, are in the soul. Even if we admit that geometric objects
qua known are in the soul of people knowing them, it does not follow from this
that the Truth connected with these objects is in the soul as in a subject from
which it cannot be separated — which is to say, p11 does not follow. From the
presence of geometric objects in the soul of those who know geometry, we can

27
Augustine seems to be under the inluence of a Neo-Platonic theory of immanent forms as
copies of transcendent ideas. according to D. Doucet, La vérité, le vrai et la forme du corps. Lecture de
Saint Augustine : Soliloques 2, 32, « Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques », 77, 1993,
pp. 547-566, here augustine is following a porphyrian pattern of thought.
28
See footnote 26 above.
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 77

merely conclude that truth, too, is somehow present in certain souls. But this
conclusion is not enough to conclude that those souls (not to speak of all souls !)
are immortal.
Such a dificulty will be clearly raised and tackled in imm. an., 10-11. actually,
these two paragraphs of imm. an. not only complete the arguments of sol., but
also rectify those arguments. « the great question is », we read in imm. an. 10,
« whether that truth (uerum), which the soul contemplates without the help of the
body, exists per se and is not in the soul, or whether it instead cannot be without
the soul »29. the soul, augustine argues, could not contemplate the intelligibles
by itself were it not conjuncted with them in some way, for the intelligibles are
not understood as being anywhere but in the understanding soul itself30. In §11,
however, Augustine adds that « the conjunction between the seeing soul and the
truth that is seen is such that either [i] the soul is the subject and the truth is
in the subject, or vice versa [ii] it is the truth which is the subject and the soul
is in the subject, or instead [iii] both the soul and the truth are substances »31.
In other words, the contemplative conjunction between truth and the soul does
not imply that truth is in the soul as in its subject, for this is only one of three
possible relations between the soul and truth.
Apart from this problem, which would ultimately require a closer investigation
de intellegendo that is lacking in both sol. and imm. an., the same question
concerning geometry arises as for dialectic. Even supposing that geometry contains
imperishable truth, how is it possible to afirm that geometry is always in every
soul ? With regard to geometry as well as to dialectic, it can be objected that only
a few people possess this discipline and do not possess it until they reach the age
of reason. augustine, therefore, makes the following demand for an explanation :

« Sed, quaeso, illa quae restant expedias, quomodo in animo imperito — non enim
eum mortalem dicere possumus — disciplina et ueritas esse intellegantur » (sol.,
2, 33, p. 93, 7-10).

29
Imm. an., 10 (p. 110, 14-16) : « De tertio magna quaestio est, utrum uerum illud, quod sine
instrumento corporis animus intuetur, sit per seipsum et non sit in animo aut possitne esse sine animo ».
30
Imm. an., 10 (pp. 110, 17–111, 2) : « Quoquolibet modo autem se habeat, non id posset
contemplari animus per seipsum nisi aliqua coniunctione cum eo. nam omne, quod contemplamur
siue cogitatione capimus, aut sensu aut intellectu capimus. Sed ea, quae sensu capiuntur, extra nos
etiam esse sentiuntur et locis continentur, unde ne percipi quidem posse adirmantur. Ea uero, quae
intelleguntur, non quasi alibi posita intelleguntur quam ipse qui intellegit animus ; simul enim etiam
intelleguntur non contineri loco ».
31
Imm. an., 11 (p. 111, 3-6) : « Quare ista coniunctio intuentis animi et eius ueri, quod intuetur,
aut ita est, ut subiectum sit animus, uerum autem illud in subiecto ; aut contra subiectum uerum et
in subiecto animus ; aut utraque substantia ».
78 giovAnni cAtApAno

5. « Your question », ‘Reason’ replies, « requires another volume, if you would

have it treated carefully »32. Imm. an. seems to have been written just in order to
compose such further volume, which should likely have become Book 3 of sol.
It was, irst of all, expected to give a solution to the problem posed by the souls’
imperitia, and hence to fully justify proposition P10 and, more in general, the
universal validity of P2. As a matter of fact, such a solution is given in imm. an.,
6, introduced by the following remarks :

« At enim si [P18] ars aliquando est, aliquando non est in animo, quod per obliuionem
atque imperitiam satis notum est, nihil ad eius inmortalitatem adfert argumenti
huius conexio, nisi negatur antecedens [= P18] hoc modo : aut [P19] est aliquid in
animo, quod in praesenti cogitatione non est, aut [p20] non est in erudito animo
ars musica, cum de sola geometrica cogitat. Hoc [= P20] autem falsum est ; illud
[= P19] igitur uerum » (imm. an., 6, ed. w. hörMAnn, CSEL 89, p. 107, 3-9)33.

in this passage, the expression ‘argumenti huius conexio’ refers to the argument
proposed in imm. an., 5, where the thesis of the soul’s immortality is deduced
from four premises, namely :

[p14] if there remains something unchangeable in the soul that cannot be

without life, sempiternal life must also remains to the soul ;
[p15] now, art exists in the soul, and
[p16] art is unchangeable, for it is based on unchangeable reasons, and
[p17] art cannot be without life34.

Actually, the soul’s immortality can be proved by these premises only if P15
means that art always remains in the soul. In other words, P15 must be equivalent
to P10. Propositions P15 and P10, however, seem to be falsiied not only by
ignorance, as we already know, but also by oblivion, for it would appear that
some souls, owing to their ignorance, do not posses art/discipline/science yet,

32
Sol., 2, 33 (p. 93, 11-12) : « aliud ista quaestio uolumen desiderat, si eam uis tractari diligenter ».
33
Giuseppe Balido gives a useful analysis of the arguments of imm. an. with the methods of
modern formal logic in Agostino D’ipponA, De immortalitate animae.
34
Imm. an., 5 (p. 106, 3-16) : « Si enim manet aliquid inmutabile in animo, quod sine uita esse non
possit, animo etiam uita sempiterna maneat necesse est. nam hoc prorsus ita se habet, ut, si primum
est, sit secundum. Est autem primum. Quis enim, ut alia omittam, aut rationem numerorum mutabilem
esse audeat dicere ; aut artem quamlibet non ista ratione constare ; aut artem non esse in artiice,
etiam cum eam non exercet ; aut eius esse nisi in animo ; aut, ubi uita non sit, esse posse ; aut quod
inmutabile est, aliquando esse non posse ; aut aliud esse artem, aliud rationem ? Quamuis enim ars
una multarum quasi quidam coetus rationum esse dicatur, tamen ars etiam una ratio dici uerissime
atque intellegi potest. Sed siue hoc siue illud sit, non minus inmutabilem artem esse conicitur ».
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 79

whereas some other souls, owing to their oblivion, do not possess art/discipline/
science any more. Ignorance and oblivion seem, therefore, to prove P18 (= art
sometimes is and sometimes is not in the soul), which is the negation of p15.
Unlike sol., where no justiication of P10 is provided, §6 of imm. an. defends p15
by refuting P18.
First of all, augustine shows that an unconscious knowledge in the soul can
exist. Suficient proof of this lies in the fact that P20 (= music is not in the soul of
the one who is thinking only about geometry) is false because the art of music does
exist in a learned soul even when this soul is solely thinking about geometry. So,

something (a certain art, for example) can exist in the soul that is not present
in the current thinking of the soul (= P19).

and since the soul is not aware that it has something in itself unless such a
thing comes to the soul’s thought, it is possible that some knowledge exists in
the soul that the soul is not aware of. Ignorance and oblivion of a certain art are,
therefore, no obstacle to p15, since they can be explained as lack of awareness
of the inner presence of that art. this happens when « the soul has been busy
with other things for too long a time to be capable of turning back its attention
without dificulty to what it had been thinking before »35.
augustine then shows that the presence of unconscious knowledge in the
soul is not only possible, but also real. The evidence here is the particular way
we learn eternal truths such as the properties of a geometric igure. As a matter
of fact, when reasoning with ourselves or being questioned by someone else in
the proper way, we ind things like these nowhere else but in our soul. And since
these truths are eternal, our soul neither creates nor generates them, but rather
discovers the contents of liberal arts as already existing in ourselves36. the only
sense in which we may be said to not know the disciplines is that before such

35
Imm. an., 6 (p. 107, 10-15) : « non autem quicquam se habere animus sentit, nisi quod in
cogitationem uenerit. potest igitur aliquid esse in animo, quod esse in se animus ipse non sentiat.
id autem quamdiu sit, nihil interest. namque si diutius fuerit in aliis animus occupatus quam ut
intentionem suam in ante cogitata facile possit relectere, obliuio uel imperitia nominatur ».
36
Imm. an., 6 (p. 107, 16-26) : « Sed cum uel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes uel ab alio bene
interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea, quae inuenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro
inuenimus — neque id est inuenire, quod facere aut gignere ; alioquin aeterna gigneret animus
inuentione temporali. nam aeterna saepe inuenit. Quid enim tam aeternum quam circuli ratio uel
si quid aliud in huiuscemodi artibus ? nec non fuisse aliquando nec non fore comprehenditur —,
manifestum est etiam inmortalem esse animum humanum et omnes ueras rationes in secretis eius
esse, quamuis eas siue ignoratione siue obliuione aut non habere aut amisisse uideatur ».
80 giovAnni cAtApAno

a discovery, we are not yet aware of their inner presence. As a consequence, to

learn is to recollect, as ‘Reason’ already said at the end of sol. :

« tales sunt, qui bene disciplinis liberalibus eruditi, siquidem illas sine dubio in
se obliuione obrutas eruunt discendo et quodam modo refodiunt » (sol., 2, 35, p.
95, 14-16).

Augustine is likely to have known this famous Platonic doctrine through Cicero,
Tusculanae disputationes, 1, 57-58, but he may also have been inluenced by Neo-
platonic theories37. In any case, we can conclude that the irst ‘instruction’ imm.
an. really gives for completing sol. is to use some version of the reminiscence
theory in order to justify P2, i.e., to prove the everlasting presence of disciplines
in the soul.

6. For all that, proposition p2 has not yet been fully demonstrated. it remains
to show that the way a liberal art like dialectic is present in the soul is not only
everlasting, but also inseparable, just as light is in the sun and heat is in ire (cf.
sol., 2, 2238). Were it not so, it would be impossible to deduce from p1 that the
soul lasts forever. In other words, it has to be shown that, ontologically speaking,
the soul is indeed the real subject of the disciplines.
the paragraphs of imm. an. which precede §6 already provide arguments in
this connection. In §1, Augustine argues that if no discipline were in our soul, we
would not be able to reason correctly, for correct reasoning is a thought process
(cogitatio) in which one tries to investigate what is uncertain on the basis of what
is certain. Since there is nothing certain in the soul that the soul does not know,
reasoning presupposes preliminary knowledge (scientia), and hence the presence
of disciplina in the soul39. Moreover, Augustine adds in §5 that not only does art
exist in the soul of the artifex, but it can neither exist elsewhere nor be separate
from the soul. art, in fact, must be somewhere, as must any other thing, and the
being in which it exists must be alive (cf. P17 !) and rational. Further, one cannot
think that art goes from one soul to another, for if it went from the teacher’s
soul to the pupil’s soul, one could not possibily teach any art without losing it40.

37
Cf. Tornau’s commentary on CSEL 89, p. 107, 15 (relectere), in Augustinus, De immortalitate
animae.
38
See footnote 14 above.
39
Imm. an., 1 (p. 102, 8-13) : « item nemo sine disciplina recte ratiocinatur. Est enim recta
ratiocinatio a certis ad incertorum indagationem nitens cogitatio nihilque certum est in animo quod
ignorat. omne autem, quod scit animus, in sese habet nec ullam rem scientia complectitur, nisi quae
ad aliquam pertineat disciplinam. Est enim disciplina quarumcumque rerum scientia ».
40
Imm. an., 5 (p. 106, 16 - 107, 2) : « Artem autem non solum esse in animo artiicis, sed etiam
nusquam esse nisi in animo manifestum est, idque inseparabiliter. nam si ars ab animo separabitur,
aut erit praeter quam in animo aut nusquam erit aut de animo in animum continuo transibit. at ut
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 81

Such arguments do strengthen proposition P2, but do not solve the problem
of its justiication. In §2, in fact, Augustine states a principle that makes P2 even
more questionable. it is a principle that makes explicit another implication of
being-in-a-subject than the one expressed in P1, that is :

[p21] nullo modo autem potest mutato subiecto id, quod in eo est inseparabiliter,
non mutari (imm. an., 2, p. 103, 8-9).

So, according to P21, what is inseparably present in a subject cannot but

change if the subject itself changes. Now, we have seen that the soul changes, for
it becomes aware of its hidden knowledge. How, then, can the soul be the subject
of art, which, according to p16, is unchangeable ? in my opinion, all paragraphs of
imm. an. following §6 can be read as an attempt at answering this very question.

7. A fundamental premise is made in §§7-9, which is that essentially only two

kinds of changes exist, which we may call substantial changes and unsubstantial
changes. Take, for instance, a piece of wax. Even if its shape changes, the wax
nevertheless remains wax. This is an example of unsubstantial change. But if the
wax volatilizes by the heat of a ire, it becomes air and is no longer wax ; that is,
it undergoes a substantial change. Now, proposition P21 is valid exclusively for
substantial changes. It is only when the wax volatilizes, in fact, that its essential
properties no longer persist. When the wax is moulded into another shape, on
the contrary, its essential properties stay unchanged. in order to maintain that
the soul is the subject of unchangeable knowledge, we must, therefore, show that

[p22] the soul undergoes no substantial change,

i.e., that it cannot be destroyed nor changed into something else.

« prorsus enim nullo pacto non exsistente subiecto suo inmutabilis ratio maneret.
Quod eueniret, si tanta accideret animae mutatio, ut eam non animam faceret,
id est mori cogeret. nulla autem illarum mutationum, quae siue per corpus siue
per ipsam in anima iunt […], id agit, ut animam non animam faciat » (imm. an.,
9, 109, 19 - 110, 3).

sedes arti nulla sine uita est, ita nec uita cum ratione ulli nisi animae. nusquam porro esse, quod est,
uel, quod inmutabile est, non esse aliquando qui potest ? Si uero ars de animo in animum transit, in
illo mansura, deserens istum, nemo artem docet nisi amittendo aut etiam non nisi docentis obliuione
it aliquis peritus siue morte. Quae si absurdissima et falsissima sunt, sicuti sunt, inmortalis est
animus humanus ».
82 giovAnni cAtApAno

It seems to me that justifying P22 is the very target of all the arguments
Augustine develops in imm. an. from §10 on. More precisely, from §11 to §19
augustine argues that the soul cannot be destroyed, i.e., that it can neither be
annihilated nor cease to exist, while from §20 to §25 he attempts to prove that
the rational soul cannot be altered into something inferior, such as a body or an
irrational soul. We can schematize the contents of these two sections of imm.
an. as follows :

§§11-19 : Arguments against the soul’s destruction

§11 : The soul does not cease to exist unless it is separated from (divine) Reason,
but such a separation is not possible.
§12 : the soul does undergo a decrease in being when it turns away from
Reason and thus becomes foolish, but such a decrease does not lead to the
soul’s annihilation, since no decrease in mass can reduce a body to nothingness,
and the soul is superior in being to the body.
§§13-15 : the body — and for all the more reason the soul — cannot be
annihilated by privation of its form.
§§16-17 : Life cannot leave the soul, because the soul itself is life, and nothing
is able to leave itself.
§§18-19 : If the soul receives its being from (divine) Truth, nothing can deprive
the soul of its being because falsity, which is the opposite of truth, is not
able to kill the soul (not to mention the opposite of Being, which is nothing).

§§20-25 : Arguments against the soul’s degeneration

§§20-22 : the soul could be transformed into a body, only if it wished to become
a body or if it were forced to become a body, but both these conditions are
impossible.
§23 : a bodily alteration such as sleep cannot change the soul into a body.
§24 : The soul cannot receive the form of the body because it is the soul that
conveys such a form to the body.
§25 : The soul cannot lose its own form under the inluence of the body because
the soul is not spatially joined to the body.

8. The logic plan of imm. an., §§11-25 seems, thus, clear. Augustine aims at
excluding all possibility of substantial change of the soul, i.e., both full destruction
and essential degeneration. In this way, however, he achieves a wider result than the
justiication of proposition P22, and indirectly of P2. If he has really demonstrated
that in no way can the soul be destroyed nor become something inferior, then
proposition P7 turns out to be proved independently of propositions P1-P6. In
other words, it is no longer necessary to defend a proof of the soul’s immortality
 Augustine’s proof of the soul’s iMMortAlity 83

based on the idea of the soul as the subject of truth, i.e., a proof like the one put
forward in sol. and in imm. an., 1-9. The arguments given in imm. an. from §11
onwards show, in fact, that it would be true that the soul lasts forever, and so is
(according to P8, a proposition that is conirmed in §16) immortal, even in the
hypothesis that the soul is not the subject of Truth. Augustine expressely takes
such an hypothesis into consideration at the very beginning of the second part
of imm. an., in §§10-1141.
the paradox of imm. an. is, therefore, that the second part of this treatise
(§§10-25) makes superluous the irst one, in support of which the second was
intended to be. What is more, some arguments in the second part of imm. an.
call into question one of the propositions endorsed in sol., and, more precisely,
the identiication of Truth with a discipline (P4). The Truth by virtue of which
all things are true (imm. an., 19), in fact, is always the same (§18) and does not
change (§12). This means that Truth ‘is’ in the highest way (§§12, 19) and is the
supreme Being (essentia) to which all things that ‘are’ in some way owe their
being. Such the First Being (prima illa essentia)42 is to be ontologically regarded
as both prior to and independent of the soul, and hence it cannot be identiied
with the kind of truth that is in the subject soul, i.e., with a discipline, for truth
of this kind cannot exist without the soul. truth as the supreme Being, on the
contrary, is superior to the rational soul, for it is God Himself43, and God is above
all truths contained in the liberal arts as well, just like the sun is above the bodily
things on earth and makes them visible (cf. sol., 1, 11-12).
in conclusion, the outcome of imm. an. is a demonstration of the soul’s
immortality that implicitly challenges the proof of sol. instead of improving it.
Had Augustine eventually followed the instructions given in the ‘commonitorium’
imm. an., he would have had to rewrite sol. for a large part, rather than to bring
that work to a conclusion. this was, i suppose, a possible reason for him to
leave sol. uninished. I do not necessarily mean that he changed his mind on the
validity of the proof just during the composition of imm. an.44. it may well be that,

41
See footnotes 29 and 31 above.
42
Imm. an., 19 (p. 121, 12).
43
Cf. sol., 1, 3 (p. 5, 6-7), imm. an., 22 (p. 124, 8), and an. quant., 24. 74. 81 (ed. W. hörMAnn,
CSEL 89, pp. 161, 16-17 ; 222, 18-19 ; 31, 2).
44
phillip Cary thinks so. He asserts that « we can spot the precise moment when augustine stumbles
upon the necessity of changing his mind on this issue [scil. the possibility of a voluntary separation
between God and the soul, contrary to the idea of their inseparability] about midway in the treatise
On the Immortality of the Soul » (p. cAry, God in the Soul : Or, the Residue of Augustine’s Optimism,
« The University of Dayton Review », 22, 1994, p. 76), that is, in imm. an., 11. Cf. similar statements in
p. cAry, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self : The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, Oxford University
Press, New York 2000, pp. 107-109, in a chapter signiicantly entitled ‘Change of Mind’.
84 giovAnni cAtApAno

by the time of composing sol., 2, augustine was already aware of the untenable
implications of a strict identiication of Truth — and hence of God — with a
discipline, and that he planned to unmask those implications in the following
books of the work45. Whether augustine originally intended the arguments of imm.
an. to defend the proof of sol. or to correct and substantially revise it, however,
they nonetheless forced him to deal with such conceptual dificulties that he
inally became convinced that he was not heading in the right direction, so the
completion of sol. was no longer worth the trouble. if so, imm. an. may be seen
as the very ledge on which the project of sol. ran aground.

45
this is the opinion of Christian tornau. in his excellent essay Ratio in subiecto ?, he criticizes
the « strongly developmentalist approach » of Phillip Cary (see footnote 44 above) and argues that
the in subiecto proof of sol., 2 « was written only to be subsequently revised ». according to tornau,
augustine’s strategy was « to demonstrate that the truth or discipline inside and outside the soul
were distinct from one another and yet in some way uniied », for the transcendent truth (i.e., God)
is the cause of the immanent truth (i.e., knowledge). this solution presupposed the neoplatonic and
especially plotinian notion of causality through immediate presence — a notion that augustine, at the
time of composition of imm. an., was still unable to reconcile with the Christian doctrine of creation,
so he abandoned the project of sol.

aBStRaCt

This paper aims at clarying in what sense and to what extent Augustine of Hippo’s
treatise De immortalitate animae really gives instructions that can be useful for inishing
his Soliloquia, in accordance with what augustine himself says in Retractationes, 1, 5. on
the one hand, the irst half of the treatise strengthens the proof of the soul’s immortality
given in Book 2 of Soliloquia and based on the idea that the soul is the subject of truth. On
the other hand, the second half of the treatise makes this proof superluous and eventually
upsets it by maintaining that it is thanks to its immediate dependence on truth, now
conceived as the Supreme Being, that the soul always preserves its own being.

giovAnni cAtApAno, Università di Padova

giovanni.catapano@unipd.it