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Can Artificial Intelligence Do Better Than Humans at Leadership M A P Willmer Full Chapter
Can Artificial Intelligence Do Better Than Humans at Leadership M A P Willmer Full Chapter
Can Artificial Intelligence Do Better Than Humans at Leadership M A P Willmer Full Chapter
In small organisations where the leader and his subordinates operate on the same
site people are able to get to know one another reasonably well. For larger
organisations especially as they develop and establish branches in many diverse
places a leader and his subordinates may know very little about one another as
individuals. They may meet only infrequently and subordinates in particular may
be very much on their guard, trying to make a good impression. It is only human
nature that the more powerful the leader, the more influence he has on the lives
of those who work for him and the more they will tend to tell him what they think
he wants to hear. Indeed, as so many powerful people have found to their cost,
although they may have power the truth is something that often eludes them, see
Lucas (1938).
Under these circumstances the leader is faced with many pr0blems associated with
the complexities of controlling and motivating staff and with the distortion of
information. Of particular interest are those where subordinates have a large
measure of influence over the information that is needed by their superiors to
make decisions concerning
1. the internal control of the organisation, and
2. s t ra teg i c policy.
strategic po 1icy.
These problems become more acute when there is only infrequent contact between
the leader and his subordinates: the scope for frank communications and the
establishing of meaningful relationships tends to become restricted. Thus the
leader may appear remote to his subordinates and his personal qualities may
remain obscure. Previous papers have explored the questions of system uncertainty
and leadership, and subordinate behaviour and management control in such
situations, see Willmer (1978 & 1980). This paper examines the leadership
question in greater depth and considers whether it is possible that some form of
artificial intelligence could be more effective as a leader than humans in con-
trolling and motivating subordinates as well as in minimising the effects of
distortion in information flows.
Unreliability of Management Control Information
Revans (1969) noted that any information system may suffer from faults of design
and operation and he listed those that occur most frequently. Difficulties in
human systems arise with respect to the collection and interpretation of data
as well as with the transmission of information from one part of the system to
another. At each link of the communication process information is received,
processed and transmitted and with humans involved there is always a possibility
that the message will become lost, distorted or misunderstood. As noted by
Miller (1972) distortions occur in command messages flowing downwards and in
reports flowing upwards. In connection with the former, Rogers and Agarwala-
Rogers (1976) suggest that: "Such distortion seems to have been responsible for
the My Lai massacre of Vietnam civilians by American troops in 1968". It would
seem that an order "On no occasion must hamlets be burned down" became "Do not
burn down any hamlets unless you are absolutely convinced that the Vietcong are
in them" to "If you think there are any Vietcong in the hamlet, burn it down"
to "Burn down that hamlet" as it passed from divisional headquarters to the
troops on duty.
Although much has been learnt about the design of good management information
systems, there is no guarantee that the causes of error will be entirely elimina-
ted. Leaders will find it prudent therefore to remember that, since their
communication channels are unlikely to be completely reliable, they may be more
uncertain about a particular situation than they should be. This increase in
uncertainty can be thought of as noise and it has been found convenient to
distinguish between two types; (see Willmer, 1970).
Can Artificial Intelligence
Can Intelligence Do Better than
Do Better than Humans?
Humans ? 243
243
a) Internally
a) Internally generated
generated noise
noise which
which is
is due
due to
to information
information becoming
becoming lost
lost or
or
distorted inside
distorted inside an
an organisation
organisation or
or because
because insufficient
insufficient use
use is
is made
made of
of
information already
information already obtained,
obtained, and
b) Background
b) Background noise
noise which
which is
is due
due to
to the
the organisation
organisation not
not receiving
receiving the
the appropri-
appropri-
ate information in
ate in the
the first
first place.
place.
Similarly, leaders
Similarly, leaders maymay feel
feel more
more certain
certain about
about the
the true
true situation
situation than
than they
they
should be,
should be, bearing
bearing in in mind
mind the
the data
data available.
available. This
This effect
effect can
can be
be thought
thought of
of
as "pseudo-certa
as "pseudo-certa ii nty".
nty".
Distortions may
Distortions may occur
occur accidentally or or be
be caused
caused deliberately
deliberately especially when
when
there are
there are major
major differences
differences of of objective
objective between
between people
people in
in an
an organisation.
organisation.
Many instances
Many instances of
of errors being
being deliberately
deliberately introduced
introduced have
have been
been noted
noted in
in the
the
literature. For
literature. For example,
example, with
with regard
regard to
to the
the budgetary
budgetary process,
process, Williamson
Williamson (1964)
(1964)
and Schiff
and Schiff and
and Lewin
Lewin (1970)
(1970) found that
that managers
managers understated revenues and and over-
over-
stated costs
stated costs in
in attempts
attempts toto obtain
obtain slack
slack budgets.
budgets. Lowe
Lowe and
and Shaw
Shaw (1968)
(1968) found
found
that line
that line managers
managers introduced
introduced bias
bias into
into their
their sales forecasts. These
These examples
examples
are characterised
are characterised by by the
the superior
superior and
and his
his subordinates
subordinates having
having different
different object-
object-
ives, and
ives, and information
information being
being biased byby subordinates
subordinates inin order
order to
to achieve
achieve their
their
own goals,
own goals, aa type
type of
of conflict
conflict in in which
which the
the parties
parties develop
develop "ploys"
"ploys" and
and "counter-
"counter-
ploys", see
ploys", see Anthony and
and Herzlinger
Herz 1i nger (1975).
(1975).
One factor
One factor which
which tends
tends to
to exacerbate
exacerbate the
the internal
internal deliberate
deliberate distortion
distortion situation
situation
is the
is the assessment
assessment ofof the
the performance
performance ofof an
an individual
individual by
by the
the leader
leader using
using informa-
informa-
tion supplied
tion supplied by the subordinate
subordinate under
under review.
review. The
The leader
leader by
by rewarding
rewarding aa subor-
subor-
dinate inappropriately
dinate inappropriately cancan affect
affect not
not only
only that
that person's
person's attitude
attitude but
but also
also the
the
attitude of
attitude of others.
others. Afterall
Aftera11 it it is
is basic
basic human
human nature
nature that
that some
some employees
employees will
will
try to
try to make
make it
it look as
as though
though they
they are
are better
better performers
performers than
than their
their efforts
efforts
genuinely merit.
genuinely merit. It should
should not
not therefore
therefore bebe thought
thought that
that this
this is
is a contemporary
contemporary
problem brought
problem brought about
about byby modern
modern management
management methods
methods and
and technology.
technology. Some
Some fifty
fifty
years ago
years ago that
that great
great London
London detective
detective FF.B.
.B. Wensley
Wensley (1931)
(1931) warned: "there
"there are
are men
men
... with
... with aa streak
streak ofof vanity
vanity that
that impels
impels them
them toto adopt
adopt aa pose
pose at
at the
the expense
expense ofof
those who
those who have
have really
really done
done the
the work.
work. They
They like
like to
to bask
bask in
in the
the limelight
limelight ...
...As
As
Chief Constable
Chief Constable II was
was always
always on
on my
my guard
guard against
against this
this sort
sort of
of thing
thing and
and made
made itit
my business
my business toto see
see that
that credit went
went in
in the
the right
right direction.
direction. Unless
Unless kept
kept in
in
check it
check it breeds
breeds resentment
resentment and
and checks
checks energy".
energy".
For many
For many of
of the
the leadership
leadership situations
situations being
being considered
considered in this
this paper,
paper, opportuni-
opportuni-
ties may
ties may arise
arise where
where the
the information
information flows
flows affecting
affecting the
the assessment
assessment ofof
subordinates can be manipulated
subordinates can manipulated byby the
the subordinates
subordinates themselves.
themselves. Where
Where an
an organi-
organi-
sation operates
sation operates branches
branches in
in several
several very
very different
different environments
environments and
and where
where the
the
managers of
managers of each
each branch know that
branch know that they
they are competing
competing with
with one
one another forfor
promotion is
promotion is one
one example.
example. InIn circumstances
circumstances such
such as
as these
these one
one may
may wonder
wonder where
where
control in
control in the
the organisation
organisation really lies!
lies! IsIs it
it with
with those
those with
with nominal
nominal authority
authority
or with
or with those
those who
who are
are able
able to
to affect
affect the
the information
information that
that is
is used
used in
in the
the
decision-making process?
decision-making process?
Who controls
Who controls Whom?
Whom?
Much of
Much of our
our thinking
thinking about
about management
management control
control problems
problems is
is strongly
strongly influenced
influenced by by
the fundamental
the fundamental control
control model
model of
of cybernetics.
cybernetics. Essentially
Essentially the
the controller
controller has
has an'
an'
objective for
objective for the
the system
system under
under his
his command.
command. HeHe also
also knows
knows the present
present state
state of
of
this system
this system and
and can
can thus
thus determine
determine an
an error
error signal.
signal. AtAt his
his command
command are
are a number
number
of options
of options and
and he
he can
can select
select that
that option
option which eliminates
eliminates oror minimises
minimises the
the error.
error.
This model
This model of
of control
control has
has its
its origins
origins in
in the
the physical
physical sciences
sciences where
where it
it has
has
enabled mankind
enabled mankind toto exert
exert considerable
considerable authority
authority over
over natural
natural systems.
systems. However,
However,
where human
where human organisations
organisations are
are concerned
concerned many ofof its
its underlying
underlying assumptions
assumptions are
are
far from val
far valid. Its appl
id. Its application management control
ication to management control systems
systems has
has been
been severely
severely
criticised by
criticised by Hofstede
Hofstede (1978):
(1978): "A
"A distinction
distinction isis made
made between
between routine
routine industrial-
industrial-
244
244 M.A.?
M. A. P. Willmer
type processes for which a homeostatic paradigm is more suitable, and non-routine,
type
non-industrial-type processes, for which a political paradigm is recommended.
Attempts at enforcing a cybernetic paradigm on the latter process, like Program-
Planning-Budgeting Systems (PPBS) and Management-By-Objectives (MBO) are bound to
fa i 1."
1."
The question of who really is in control in those organisations where subordinates
have many opportunities for manipulating information flows is a very interesting
one. The nominal superior may have all the outward trappings of authority - the
thick piled carpet in the large office, the luxurious car and the key to the
executive loo. He may be able to call for data and may be the person who formally
workforce.
announces his decisions to the work force. On the other hand, his subordinate may
know how his superior's mind works, his weaknesses and pet theories, and then
feeds him the information that ensures a particular decision is made. A leader
may set objectives, discuss targets with his subordinates, tell them how they will
be rewarded and later give them the rewards he deems appropriate. Nevertheless,
when they massage and manipulate information flows, he can have very real problems
in making his authority felt and ensuring that he is in command. One well-known
(1972)..
way of viewing an organisation is to compare it to the human body, see Beer (1972)
However, as Morris has warned: "The Big Toe can think". Clearly, therefore, when
subordinates can affect the information flows-the usefulness of the cybernetic
approach and models derived from it is limited.
The target setting and reward systems found in many budgetary control processes
illustrate these limitations well. To avoid causing trouble leaders should be
sure whether they are using budgets for planning or for control since trying to
use for both purposes can encourage subordinates to play the numbers game, see
Churchill (1984). Similarly Carruth and McClendon (1984) warn accountants to be
aware of the behavioural implications of using budgets for control and evaluation:
"Using budgets as a pressure device by over-emphasizing 'meeting the budget' can
1limit for business growth."
imit the autonomous actions necessary for
For both planning and control purposes, statistics have tended to be relied upon
in preference to qualitative information. Perhaps this is because decision-
makers, who in the words of Meal (quoted in Brown, 1970), " .. want to think of
themselves as individuals whose greater grasp of the available information and
whose greater insight remove the uncertainty from the situation", have greater
faith in numbers than in other data. Afterall, as Rapoport (1965) noted:
"Numbers are the simplest and most universal linguistic invariants".
Nor is this belief in the authority of statistics a modern phenomena, brought
about by the power of contemporary computers generating an attitude of "what the
Ksander (1980) and Graham (1982) quote
computer says must be true". Bogdan and Ksander
Stamp (1929) as saying: "The Government are very keen on amassing statistics -
they collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and
prepare wonderful diagrams. But what you must never forget is that everyone of
.... (village watchman), who
these figures comes in the first instance from the ...•
just puts down what he damn pleases."
Indeed, as has been pointed out by Willmer (1984), some people view numbers not as
objective data but as strategic acts used to achieve specific objectives. This
reference also outlines the standard techniques of those who use numbers to achieve
strategic objectives. An example of their use in practice is given by Lipsey
(1985) in relation to the British Government's handling of the unemployment figures.
The prudent executive should not forget that, as Graham notes: "data reflect what
most people wish was reality or what people want you to believe is reality".
The ingenuity that humans have shown in finding ways of manipulating and massaging
data to meet their objectives means that, in most situations involving groups of
human beings, the power of the control system is derived from the leadership that
executives breathe into it! To explore more thoroughly the question of leadership
Humans??
Can Artificial Intelligence Do Better than Humans 245
under these circumstances and to give insights into the different aspects of the
superior/subordinate interface and the effects of various methods of performance
data, a
appraisal on both the motivation of employees and the manipulation of data.
business simulation representing a production situation was created.
So You Think That You Would Make a Managing Director
50
This simulation represents a large multi-national company whose subsidiaries are
engaged in a wide variety of activities and is concerned with the management of
people and machines in a production environment. Attention is focussed on one of
these subsidiaries called International Castings Ltd. which produces "clunks".
This company has two factories both situated a long way from head office in
unpleasant surroundings so that it is rarely convenient for top level staff to
visit them.
The situation is simplified by assuming that the organisation has two levels of
authority. At the superior level there is the leader who has two subordinates
each of whom is the manager of a clunk factory reporting directly to him. Part-
icipants engage in decision-making at both the subordinate and the superior
levels. First, they are asked to imagine that they are the manager of one of the
factories. Here their task is to become familiar with the problems of manufactur-
ing clunks and to understand the superior's style of leadership. They have
therefore to operate in a socio-technical
socio-technica1 environment where the technical
decisions are concerned with the way in which men, money and machines under their
control are used. The factory, its machines and workforce, are described more
fully by Willmer (1978). At the social level they have to persuade their
superior that they are competent, capable and dependable.
For the guidance of its managers the company has established a number of rules
which should theoretically be adhered to in the running of each factory. However,
the simulation has been designed so that the subordinate is the main source of
information about how his factory is being run and how well it is performing.
Thus, as the superior rarely visits the factory, subordinates may violate these
rules without fear of immediate exposure. The extent to which production is
affected by rule violations depends on which ones are broken and the impact that
some violations can have both in the short and long term on the state of the
equipment and the morale of the workforce. The information flow within the
organisation is illustrated diagrammatically in fig.l.
After a period playing the role of subordinate, participants are promoted to the
position of leader. Here their objective is to handle subordinates in such a
way that:
(i) output is increased
(ii) the managing director is aware of the way his factories are being
managed.
The computer programmes in both parts of the simulation are based partly on
assumptions and partly from the analysis of data obtained from the behaviour of
managers who have been participants. Most of this behavioural data relates to
production managers from multi-national companies who have attended Operational
Management Courses at the Manchester Business School. Thus during the first part
of the simulation the computer represents the equipment, the workforce and the
leader. At the start each subordinate is told that his leader has believed for
some time that clunk production is too low, and that the previous manager was
sacked for incompetence. However, the simulation has been designed so that the
subordinate cannot normally meet the initial aspirations of his boss by totally
obeying the rules. Each month starts with the subordinate being told his
leader's primary objective. There are three possibilities:
246 M.A.P. Willmer
briefest of messages and without attempting to get to know them personally, there
is no possibility of any human relationship being established. In such circum-
stances is it feasible that some form of artificial intelligence could be more
successful than humans at the art of leadership?
Results: Humans vs. Artificial Intelligence
By Artificial Intelligence I am thinking of a mechanism which, given the informa-
tion available to the Managing Director, tells a subordinate his rating for the
previous month, the main objective for the coming month, the initial target, the
agreed target, as well as estimating the number of rule violations committed.
The results for several groups attending Operational Management courses at the
Manchester Business School are given in figs. (3a) & (3b). In fig. (3a) the
fig.(3a)
variation of production is shown with time and it can be seen that the overall
average rises steadily over the year. Also shown are the variations for the top
and bottom ten subordinates. The wide spread shows clearly that some subordin-
ates were not being controlled or motivated effectively by their superiors.
Fig(3b) shows the error level over the same time period, where
error level =
= actual - perceived number of violations
The figure shows that for most of the range the bosses in the case of the "bottom
ten" appear to have a better appreciation of what is happening in the factory
than those in the "top ten" group. However, when the error rate is plotted
against production, see fig.(3c), it can be seen that increased production tends
to lead to an increased error rate in both cases. When this trend is taken into
account it follows that, at a given production level, the error rate for the
"bottom ten" is greater than that for the "top ten".
To explore the differences between the performance as the Managing Director of
humans with that of some form of Artificial Intelligence, it will be assumed that
the boss is programmed to operate according to the following rules:
Strategy A
1) On taking command the work of both subordinates is assessed as satisfactory.
Subsequently their assessments will be determined by the rating the boss is
given for his own activities, i.e. they are told that, if he does badly, he
will reward them badly and vice-versa.
2) Production is always the main objective.
3) The initial target in the first two months is set at 31800 clunks.
Thereafter the target is increased by 500 if in two consecutive months the
recorded production is within 300 clunks of the agreed target up to a
maximum of 35,000 clunks.
4) The agreed target is always midway between the initial target suggested by
the boss and the value offered by the subordinate.
5) The subordinate is always believed.
Stra tegy B
Strategy
As strategy A except that the boss is assumed to be more of a "hawk". The
differences are:
3) The initial target in the first two months is set at 31800 clunks.
Thereafter the target is increased by 800 if in two consecutive months
the recorded production is within 300 clunks of the agreed target up to
a maximum of 36,000 clunks.
4) The agreed target is only reduced by 10% of the difference between the
initial target suggested by the boss and the value offered by the
subordinate.
248 M.A.P. Willmer
The results are shown in figs4(a,b,&c). With regard to production it can be seen
from fig.4(a) that strategy A gives a result very close to that of the "Top Ten"
- there is a rise from about 30,700 to 33,000 clunks per month. Strategy B on
the other hand has a faster rate of growth but peaks at month 6 leading to a
steady decline. Fig.4(b) shows the variation of the error level with time and
it can be seen that strategy A is less successful than the "Top Ten" over the
whole of the year. Strategy B on the other hand is less successful during the
early months but later gives a lower error level. When these results are
compared on an Error level production graph a number of interesting points arise,
see fig.4(c). First, the success of the "Top Ten" over both strategies can be
clearly seen. Secondly, all curves show a kind of hysteresis effect, i.e. the
error level when production is rising tends to be less than that when production
is decreasing. This effect is most marked in the case of strategy B. As far as
humans are concerned one explanation could be that, when production is increasing
the superior feels good and adopts an optimistic view of his subordinates
activities. In contrast, when production is falling, he becomes more cynical or
realistic.
rea 1i sti c. In view of the fact that the phenomena occurs for both the humans
and the computer-based strategies it is more likely that it is caused by a change
in the attitude of the subordinates to reporting rule violations. Could it be
that doing better leads to more information distortion whilst doing worse
produces more reliability?
Both strategies A and B assume some knowledge of the maximum number of clunks
that can be built each month at the factories regardless of whether rules are
violated or not. Determining this limit is a key issue in the control of many
managerial problems. When faced with such situations it is helpful to bear
in mind two levels of production performance suggested by Beer (1972):
1. the capabi 1ity level - that which a completely efficient subordinate could
achieve with existing resources and operating under existing restraints.
2. the potentiality level - that which could be achieved by fully utilising
existing resources and optimally relaxing the restraints.
Thus, if one asks a subordinate to work above the capability level, he must
violate the regulations whilst asking someone to exceed the potentiality level
is requesting the impossible. In the case of strategy A the target was set at
roughly the potentiality level whereas in strategy B it was comfortably exceeded.
This explains the failure of this strategy to maintain high production, see fig.
4(a) - the target set is impossible and the subordinate 'switches off'.
To explore the effect of the superior having no prior knowledge of the potential-
ity level and thus compelling him to estimate it from the data given to him by
his subordinate, several further strategies will be considered.
Strategy Cl
This is the same as strategy A except that:
3) The initial target in the first two months is set at 31800 clunks. Thereafter
the target is increased by 500 if in two consecutive months the recorded
production is within 300 clunks of the agreed target. On each month after
the first two an additional factor is also added to the initial target. This
amount is equal to the mean of the difference between the recorded and the
agreed target for the previous two months.
4) The agreed target is only reduced by 10% of the difference between the
initial target suggested by the boss and the value offered by the subordinate.
Strategy C2
This strategy is similar to strategy Cl except that the initial target is
Can Artificial Intelligence
Can Intelligence Do Better
Better than
than Humans?
Humans ? 249
249
instead of
increased by 1000 instead of 500 when
when the
the recorded
recorded production is within 300
300
clunks of the agreed target in the previous two months.
and 02
Strategy 01 and
except that only 20%
Similar to strategy Cl except 20%of the
the mean of
of the
the difference between
the recorded and the
the the agreed target for the
the previous
previous two
two months
months is
is added
added to
to the
the
initial target.
The results from these strategies are are compared
compared with those of the "Top Ten" in
and 6(a&b). The variation of production with
figs.5(a&b) and with time is
is given
given in
in figs.
figs.
strategies Cl and
5(a&b) where the sensitivity of strategies and C2 to differences between
clearly seen. When
recorded production and agreed target can be clearly When the
the smaller
basic increment of 500 clunks is in operation production starts to fall off
after month 2 but later recovers to
after to reach a level
level slightly less than that
achieved by the "Top Ten". On the other hand, the
achieved the higher basic
basic increment of of
1,000 clunks leads to a smaller initial drop but produces a peak after after about six
six
corresponds to
months. This point again corresponds to the
the subordinate being
being asked
asked to operate
beyond the potentiality level and is followed by a collapse in production as he
pronounced in the case
becomes "switched-off". These effects are not nearly so pronounced
the strategies
of the strategies 01 and 02.02. Here the tighter control overover the way
way the initial
account of
target is modified to take account of deviations from
from the
the target in earlier
months is evident. TheThe strategies are compared on an errorerror level
level / Production
graph in figs.6(a&b). FromFrom fig.6(a)
fig.6(a) it is interesting
interesting toto note that the hystere-
sis effect does not occur for strategies Cl and C2 Indeed the error level level tends
tend s
to rise to aa plateau in both cases. However,
However, when tighter control is exercised
way the
over the way the initial target
target is modified
modified (strategies 01 andand 02) the hysteresis
fig.6(b).
effect returns, see fig.6(b).
Figs . 7(a,b&c) give the results when the
Figs.7(a,b&c) the reward criterion is changed to put
greater emphasis on increased production. Thus strategy Cl is modified as
follows:
Strategy El
1. The subordinate's performance is assessed as satisfactory in the first two
months. Thereafter an increase in production of more than 400 is deemed to
good whereas
be good whereas aa fall in production
production is
is deemed to be
be poor.
poor.
Strategy E2
Strategy E2
El except that only 20% of the mean of the difference between
Similar to strategy El
the recorded production and the agreed target for the previous two months is
the initial target.
added to the
The figures show that the "Top Ten" still
still achieves better
better results although
in the
strategy El does end up in the same area of the Error level/Production space
after 12 months.
In all
In all the above cases
cases it has been assumed
assumed that
that the subordinate will
will tell the
truth about the number of violations
truth violations of the
the regulations
regulations that he has
has made.
made. Except
Except
making his reward correlation with
for strategies El and E2 the hope was that, by making
be recognised as the
the superior's score, honesty would be the best policy. The
comparisons noted above indicate
indicate that changing
changing the emphasis to production leads
some cases. Nevertheless
to an improvement in some Nevertheless asas has already
already been noted, the
a 11 the computer
"Top Ten" humans seem to do better than all computer based strategies
s tra tegi es
considered so far.
250 M.A.P. Willmer
Strategy F
If the design of the Artificial Intelligence is allowed to include some knowledge
of the capability and potentiality levels use can be made of the fact, noted by
Willmer and Berry (1976), that the superior's uncertainty about the state of his
factory is greatest at these levels and reduces to a minimum in between. To
incorporate this finding strategy A will be modified thus:
5. If production is less than 31,800 clunks and the deviation from the target is
less than 400, it is assumed that the subordinate has committed one more
violation than he admits. If the production is greater than 33,000 clunks,
it is again assumed that he has committed an extra violation. Otherwise he
believed.
is be 1i ev ed.
The results are given in figs.8(a,b&c) where it can be seen that production is
less than both strategy A and the "Top Ten". Also the error level is lower than
that of strategy A and when plotted on an Error level/Production graph the
improvement achieved by strategy F can be clearly observed. However, the "Top Ten"
humans were still able to obtain lower error levels over a wider production range
than the computer-based strategies.
The results show that humans are able to cope with the problem of distorted
information a little more successfully than the Artificial Intelligence models
used. Although the development of more sophisticated models may lead to improved
performances, it must be remembered that executives have to cope with messy situa-
tions. Often the first hurdle that the decision-maker has to overcome is to
formulate his problem in a meaningful manner. It is the human mind that creates
the basic order. Pym(1984) warns that we should be careful not to abdicate to
information technology the responsibility for creating such order and suggests
that it could be a liberating force if the part played by the human mind is
explicitly recognised. There are already some who feel that the role of
Artificial Intelligence is limited. Alexander(1984) quotes an expert as saying
that the proper application for expert systems are structured selection problems
and
a nd expressed the view that: "expert systems
sys tems that can routinely
routi nely outperform human
experts will be much rarer than the hoopla suggests".
Some thirty years ago Boolean's algebra was the latest tool for solving the
problems of managers. However, little is heard of it today. To prevent
Artificial Intelligence suffering a similar fate when applied to the broad
problems of management, its supporters must not forget that the data on which
it has to work are the result of a social process, that humans sometimes do not
obey the rules, and that people's personal objectives often differ from those
of the organisation and they act accordingly.
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Better than
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251
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R.W.(1968),
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(1970), "Crime
"Crime andand Information
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(25 ) Willmer,
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A.J. (1976),
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"Managerial Performance
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M.A.P. (1978),
(1978), "System
"System Uncertainty
Uncertainty and and Leadership
Leadership Strategy",
Strategy",
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the European
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Systems Research,
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Vol.III,
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(27) Willmer,
(27) M.A.P. (1980),
(1980), "Subordinate
"Subordinate Behaviour
Behaviour and and Management
Management Control",
Control",
Proceedings of
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the 5th
5th European
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Cybernetics and and Systems
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Resea rch, Vienna,
Research, Vi enna, 1980.
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(28) Willmer,
(28) Willmer, M.A.P.
M.A.P. and and Keiser,
Keiser, J. J. (1982),
(1982), "The"The Ethics
Ethics ofof Deviousness",
Deviousness",
Manchester Business
Manchester Business School
School Review, Vol.6, No.2,
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Summer/Autumn.
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(29) Willmer,
(29) Willmer, M.A.P.
M.A.P. (1983)
(1983) "The
"The Contribution
Contribution of of the
the Cybernetic
Cybernetic Approach
Approach toto
Management Control",
Management Control", New New Perspectives
Perspectives in in Management
Management Control,
Control, Ed.
Ed. A.
A. Lowe
Lowe
and J.L.J.
and J.L.J. Machin,
Machin, Macmillan,
Macmillan, 1983.
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(30) Willmer,
(30) Willmer, M.A.P.
M.A.P. (1984),
(1984), "Freedom
"Freedom in in aa Numerate
Numerate World",
World", Paper presented at
Paper presented at
the Orwe11ian
the Orwellian Symposium,
Symposium, Baden-Baden,
Baden-Baden, August.
August.
252 M.A.P. Willmer
!!AlIAGING
MANAGING DIRECTOR
THE LEADER
!BE
View of Tar,at
Own Viev Target Aasea,mant ot subordia.ace
Aa.e. ••mant of subordinate
aecord.4
Recorded. Production MAia Obj
Main Objective
active
Number of violation. Lnitial Targot
Initial Tugot
of rSlulatioDI
relulacions Aanod Target
Agreed
FACTORY !!AlIAGER
MANAGER
TI!E SUl!ORDlNAl'Z
THE SUBORDINATE
THE rNFOllMAIION
1'lll rNFOlI!!AIION LINKS AT !N1'!RNAnONAL
rNTERNATIONAL CASTINGS LTD
Figu~o
Fisu~o 1
NH --
HH subordinate who tells the truth and gives an hone81
A naive lIubordinate honesl view of
90
X"
><
)(
N
8~
85 .,(
AVERAGE
~VfRAGE ><
SCORE
SCORE
80
l<
75
30,000
30,000 31,000
31,000 32,000
)2,000 33,000
)),000 34,000
34,000 AVERAGE ~LUNJ(
AVERAGE l:LUNK PRUDUCTION
PRODUCTION
THE VAlUATION
THE VARIATION 01' AVERAGE SCORE
O~ AVERAGE SCORE WITH
WITH CLUNK
CLUNK PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION :: A
A COMPARISON
COMPARISON BETWEEN
BETWEEN A
A NAIVE
NAIVE
SUBORDINATE AND
SUBORDINATE AND SOME
SOHE EXPERIMENTAL
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
RESULTS
Figure
Fillure
Art'I)rlcwl
Can Art'i" l'elal
,. hltell'
Illteir1gence Do BBetter th an H
etter than Humans
umans'? 253
Managers)
(58 Managers) TOP TEN
33,000
33,000
PRODUCTION
PRODIICTJON
32,000
12,000
/r
31,000
11,000 8OTTOH TEN
BOTTOH TEN
x
30,000
30,000
-)( k ~ , I~ I
f;.
t ~
6 12
12
I«lNTH
I«)NT"
V~RIATlON OF
VARIATION OF PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION WITH
WITH TIME
TIME
1.5
(58 ~nog.r!)
(58 M.lnogerl)
ERROR
ERROR
LEVEL
LEVEL
1.0
0 .5
-~
10
10 12
I«)NTH
I«lNTH
V~RI~TlON OF
VARIATION LEVEL WI
OF ERROR LEVEl WITH TIME
TH TIME
FIg. 3(b)
Fig. 3(b)
X TOP TEN
o BOTTOM TEN
ERlmR
ERROR
LEVEL
LEVEL
)(
)(
o x
x
x x
0o x
o
x
0
°0 °0
0o
x
X
0
x
0o ~,OOO----------13~I,~ooOio~-----------:JzJmo------------~~~----
31,Odo 32,000
32,dOo 33:000
---~
~
31),000
PROOUCTlON
PRODUCTION
YAR1~TlON OF ER ROR
THE VARIATION
THE ROR LEVEL
LEVEl WITH
WITH pnoN~
PRODUCTION
u~TlON
Fig. 3(e)
Fig. 3(e)
254
254 M.A.P. Willmer
M.A.P. Willmer
33,000
PRODUCT ION
3Z ,000 -
31,000
31,000
30 ,O~~
JO ,ODD
no.. 4(.1
Flo ~(a)
1.5
ERROR
ERROR
LEVEl
LEVn 1.0
1.5
1.5
--+
-4-- 1 - - - j__ _Ji..- -
~L--~
10
,
12
;)
C~PARISON
COMPARISON BETWEEN' TOP TEN' HlJ1
A•
BETWEEN
B
ANS BANO
'TOP TEN' Hl.f1 ANS AND TWO
T\IO
10 "'NTH \-7
IIlN12
" . 1. STRATEGIES TH
.1. STRATEGIES
•I STRATEGY lA
STltAnGY
oo STRATtGY!I
SnAT!GT I
Qv (0f'1[1I
109 T["
,,001
lUtL
lO ....
JII,'" Jl,ooo
31,000 ", ...
It.OctO
----~l).MO
.
)),000
'MfATlOf' Of [
OOUU.llSOll . . l[Y(L !lInt I'tlOtIIJC
MTWU 'lor TU' T1Of11, STlAncu:s
!!J..:......!.!
IMWIS NfD TWO A.I . ntAn:CllS
Intelligence Do Better than Humans ?
Can Artificial Intelligence 255
• TOP TU
TEll
"o ~T1tATEGY
~T1IATEGY Cl - rull
Full Allowance
Allowanc ••, Bute inc.--nt SOO
IInic tnc.--nt 500
34 ,000
34.000 cz -- rull
STRATEG'r CZ
oG STRATEG'r Full AIl"".nee,
AllllW.nce. 80s te Incr_t
Suic lncr...."t 1,000
1.000
Il TOP nR
TOP TIN
oo 5T11ATroI' DI - lO!
staAT1!GT DI AII_........
20% All_ne., B.. I. Incr~nt SOO
Ie In.r~ftt 500
D2 - 201
!TaAnC! b2
mATtm' 201 A
AllOtMllce, ... le htcr.-ettt
1l0W'llc.. ...lc irtere.mc l,
1,000
000
)6,000
)6.000
)),000
)].000
n.ooo
n,ooo
Pr_tIo.
)[,000
Jl.OOO
10.000
»,000
oo 10 U
_t~
90\1.[0\T1011
VAl.1AtlOll or WITII TlKI
PIOOUCTIOll IftT8 TIMI -- 110
110 TAIlGIT
TO\IlGIT LIK1TS
L1!f1TS
Fig.5 (b)
Fig,S(b)
256 M. A. P. WilImer
M.A.P. Willmer
I STltATtGY
X STlIAltGY Cl - Full All .... nu. 'ule
All_flu, lule ltne.--t
n e _ t 500
f1 STUTtGY CZ
STRAltGY C2 All_net, lule
- Full All.-net. Ills le lne ....ftt 1,000
flt 1.000
EIHIOR
EIIIIOII
LEnt
LOn
V~.V=-4
0L-____________-r____________-T____________ ~~-)
~----------~~----------~------------~-)
lG,OOO
lO.OOO 31,000
31.000 32,000
32.000 33,000
33.000
PIIOIICICTI011
PIIOIJOCTl
tl STRATEIlY
II STUTEOY 01 - ZIS
ZOS All ....ne •• aule
All_nee, 1II.le l n e _ t 500
tne_t
STlIATEGY OZ
• STltATt6Y DZ - 201 All
All_ne., Bule Inc.--t
.... net. Bule: lne.--t 1.000
',000
ERROR
EIlIIOR
LEYn
LUtt
o ~lG~,~000~--------~31~,~~-----------~~,~-------------,-3~,~-OO----~)
lO.ooo Jl. 32.000 33.000
PROOUCTlOtI
PIIOOUCTlOII
YARIATlOII or E1tROR
YAIIIATlOII ERROR LOn
LOa !lITN
vIm PIIOIJOCTlOII
PIIOOUCTlOtl - 110 TAIIIltT
TAIIG(T LIMITS
liMITS
Can Artificial
Can Artificial Intelligen
Intelligence Do Better than Humans?
ce Do Humans ? 257
srhnGT £1[1
ICI snATEG' 'ull Al1o-..rlCe
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oo STUT(Gt:
STUTt":UU lH Al1twaftCe
lH AlIOIIMftCt
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n,.
ll,ooo
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258 M.A .P. Willm
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Another random document with
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were unsatisfactory to several of the concerted Powers, and
were sharply criticised in the British and German press. The
German government, especially, was disposed to insist upon
stern and strenuous measures in dealing with that of China,
and it addressed the following circular note, on the 18th of
September, to all the Powers:
On the same day on which the above note was written the
American government announced its recognition of Prince Ching
and Li Hung-chang, as plenipotentiaries appointed to represent
the Emperor of China, in preliminary negotiations for the
restoration of the imperial authority at Peking and for a
settlement with the foreign Powers.
{140}
{141}
"We have a full knowledge of the present trouble from the very
beginning, and therefore, though no impeachment has been brought
by Chinese officials at home or abroad against Princes Yi,
Tsai Lien and Tsai Yung, we order them to be punished in the
same manner as those who have been impeached. All who see this
edict will thus perceive our justice and impartiality in
inflicting condign penalties upon these officials," It was not
until the 20th of December that the joint note of the
plenipotentiaries of the Powers, after having been submitted
in November to the several governments represented, and
amended to remove critical objections, was finally signed and
delivered to the Chinese plenipotentiaries. The following is a
precis of the requirements set forth in it:
"(8) The Ta-ku forts and those between Peking and the sea are
to be razed.
{142}
"Within the large new Legation area all the private property
of Chinese owners who years before sought the advantages of
vicinity to the Legations has been seized by the foreign
Legations. France and Germany, with a view to subsequent
commercial transactions, have annexed many acres of valuable
private property for which no compensation is contemplated,
while the Italian Legation, which boasts a staff of two
persons, carrying out the scheme of appropriation to a logical
absurdity, has, in addition to other property, grabbed the
Imperial Maritime Customs gardens and buildings occupied for
so many years by Sir Robert Hart and his staff."
{143}
{144}