PEOPLE V.

GERVERO
G.R. No. 206725

FACTS:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 1991, in the Municipality of Lemery, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with deliberate intent and decided
purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they were then provided, through treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault, shoot and hit HERNANDO VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLEGAS and BENITO
BASUG, JR. with said firearms inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and
Benito Basug, Jr. numerous gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused
their deaths immediately thereafter. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge. The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. It found the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses straightforward, credible, and in accord with the physical evidence. The court
further held that the defense of misencounter due to mistake of fact was unbelievable. It
noted that just a few hours before the incident happened, Bafies, Castigador, and two other
unidentified CAFGU members came to the house of Hernando to ask for money, indicating
that they knew each other; and that Gervero was likewise bound by his testimony that he
knew Hernando. Lastly, the RTC concluded that the suddenness of the attack and the lack
of opportunity for the victims to defend themselves constituted treachery. However,
aggrieved, the accused elevated its appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the conviction of
the accused but modified the amount of damages awarded. It pronounced that even in
cases of arrest, the use of unnecessary force, the wantonly violent treatment of the offender,
and the resort to dangerous means, when such apprehension could be done otherwise,
were not justified acts. The appellate court opined that the accused were entirely careless in
not first verifying the identities of the victims; such negligence diminished the defense of
mistake of fact. It added that if self-defense could be negated by the manner it was allegedly
employed, the sheer number of gunshot wounds demonstrated the accused's mens rea.

ISSUES:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY QUALIFIED THE KILLING TO MURDER.

RULING:
Yes. Accused-appellants are guilty of murder qualified by Treachery. That Hernando, Jose,
and Benito died and that the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide have already been
established by the trial and appellate courts. Moreover, that accused-appellants killed the
three victims remain undisputed considering that they had admitted the act of shooting the
victims, but raised the defense of a mistake of fact. However, as previously mentioned,
neither mistake of fact nor fulfilment of duty is applicable to exculpate accused-appellants
from criminal liability. Thus, what remains to be resolved is the appreciation of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Pursuant to Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63(2) of the RPC, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties,
i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed upon the accused-appellants in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the killing of Jose,
Hernando, and Benito. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The 31 March 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00674 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Danilo Castigador, Celso Solomon, and Eduardo
Bafies are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER for the killing of Hernando
Villegas, Jose Villegas, and Benito Basug, Jr. and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages; Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
exemplary damages; and Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00) as temperate damages. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

PEOPLE V. ROY
G.R. No. 225604 July 23, 2018

FACTS:

That on or about June 30, 2010, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one [AAA],3 a minor, 9 years
of age, by then and there pulling her inside a building at Intramuros, this City, covering her
mouth so she could not shout for help, removing her shorts and panty, make her sit on his
lap, kissing her on the lips and forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina against her will and
consent. Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. In a Decision8 dated December 16, 2013, the RTC held that the prosecution was
able to discharge its burden of proving the culpability of appellant for statutory rape,
particularly, that AAA was only nine years old at the time of the rape incident; that appellant
was the perpetrator of the crime; and that the accused had carnal knowledge of AAA. The
RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA which was validated by the
medical findings of Dr. Tan and corroborated by Bartulay's testimony. The RTC found
unavailing appellant's defense of imbecility as there was no clear and competent proof that
he had no control over his mental faculties immediately prior to or during the perpetration of
the crime. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), on the other hand, asserted that the guilt of appellant was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The OSG argued that proof of force, intimidation, and consent is not
necessary for the conviction of statutory rape. It also opined that rape was consummated
despite AAA's testimony that there was no full penetration of her genital organ. Furthermore,
appellant cannot plead the exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility as he failed to
overcome the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the carnal act.

ISSUES:
Whether the existence of force, violence, and intimidation had become moot for, in statutory
rape, the prosecution only has to prove that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
offended party who was under 12 years of age and incapable of giving consent.

RULING:
After a careful review of the records of the case, we find the appeal to be devoid of merit.
The Court finds no reason to reverse the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. However, the amount of
exemplary damages awarded should be modified, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed February 27, 2015 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06582, finding appellant Dionesio Roy y Peralta
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the victim AAA civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages is increased to
P75,000.00 and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Llave v. People
G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006

FACTS:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor 12 years of age
but acting with discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN
SANTOS, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent. Debbielyn testified
that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes
and proceeded to her mother’s store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the
container with the unsold quail eggs.11 Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she
neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of
hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp
post.12 She resisted to no avail.13 Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement.
Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He
got on top of her.14 She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.15 She
felt pain and cried.16 She was sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant
house at the time. At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgement convicting Neil of
the crime charged. he Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave
y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the vacant
lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and
consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted
with the Death penalty. The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution
that petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner
acted with discernment. It also considered petitioner’s declaration that he had been a consistent
honor student. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA.
.

ISSUES:
WON he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. WON he acted with
discernment. WON the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and WON he is
liable to pay moral damages to the private complainant.
RULING:

On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation
before the Information against him was filed. es. Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the
Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: "the discernment that constitutes an exception to
the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine
(9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong" (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). whether a
minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, which may be known and should be determined by considering all
the circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his
behavior and conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra). In
the instant case, petitioner’s actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as his
behavior during the trial showed that he acted with discernment. The fact appears
undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecution’s witness, Teofisto
Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents
became aware of the charges against him and that private complainant’s father was looking
for him, petitioner went into hiding. During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary
evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student and has, in fact, garnered several
academic awards. This allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full
knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient of several academic
awards and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed of
intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors
of his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although
appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his
age. It cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. Third, Yes. The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted
with discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA
cannot be faulted for affirming the trial court’s ruling. Fourth, No. Under Article 2231, of the
New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged
in the Information and proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.

CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
complaining witness the amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages and ₱20,000 by way of
exemplary damages. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.