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Captivity in War During The Twentieth Century The Forgotten Diplomatic Role of Transnational Actors 1St Ed 2021 Edition Eds Marcel Berni Full Chapter
Captivity in War During The Twentieth Century The Forgotten Diplomatic Role of Transnational Actors 1St Ed 2021 Edition Eds Marcel Berni Full Chapter
Edited by
Marcel Berni · Tamara Cubito
Captivity in War during the Twentieth Century
Marcel Berni · Tamara Cubito
Editors
Captivity in War
during the Twentieth
Century
The Forgotten Diplomatic Role of Transnational
Actors
Editors
Marcel Berni Tamara Cubito
Military Academy Military Academy
ETH Zurich ETH Zurich
Birmensdorf, Switzerland Birmensdorf, Switzerland
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
We dedicate this book in loving memory to Prof. Arnold Krammer
(1941–2018) who, on his last intercontinental journey, attended our
conference on captivity in war, held in Bern, Switzerland, in March 2018.
Goodbye, Arnold, and thank you for inspiring the next generations of
historians studying wartime captivity. Your brilliant teaching, writing
and, above all, generosity and true kindness will be sorely missed. May you
rest in peace.
Contents
vii
viii CONTENTS
Index 175
List of Contributors
ix
CHAPTER 1
Among the Austrian prisoners, some were terrified because someone had
thought fit to tell them that the French, and especially the Zouaves
[soldiers from French North Africa], were merciless demons. Some of
them, indeed, when they arrived in Brescia and saw trees bordering a
walk in the town, asked in all seriousness whether those were the trees
from which they would be hanged. Several, on being shown kindness by
French soldiers, repaid them in the strangest ways—poor blind, ignorant
fellows! … However, for the most part, with very few exceptions, the
feeling of the French toward their prisoners was nothing but goodwill;
thus, some Austrian officers were permitted to keep their swords or sabres,
through the courtesy of French Army commanders. They were given the
same food as the French officers, and their wounded were treated by the
same doctors.… Many French soldiers shared their rations in a brotherly
way with prisoners who were dying of hunger; others carried wounded
men of the enemy army to field hospitals on their backs and gave them all
sorts of care, showing remarkable devotion and profound sympathy.1
avoiding established state structures.4 Its main mission was the setting
up of decentralised National Red Cross Societies which acted as neutral
intermediaries during wars. However, these national aid societies became
closely intertwined with established nation states and governments from
the 1880s onwards.5 Dunant thus became an idealistic transnational
pioneer, campaigning for public support during “a period of reform and
philanthropy” in both the public and private sphere.6 Subsequently, the
International Standing Committee for Aid to Wounded Soldiers became
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1880.
During the twentieth century, the ICRC significantly expanded its
activities on a global scale and gained trust internationally. Most impor-
tantly for this book, the organisation increasingly became recognised for
its role in taking care of prisoners of war and other persons captured
during wars. Thus, when the First World War broke out in 1914, it
was the ICRC that established an international prisoners of war agency
within weeks of the beginning of the conflict and with the help of
eventually thousands of volunteers. This agency was not only respon-
sible for restoring contact between captives and their families but also
for ensuring in many locations throughout the globe that prisoners were
treated humanely.7 Thus, the ICRC had an impact on the lives of millions
of soldiers and civilians less than four decades after its foundation. Hence,
it would not be a stretch to argue that Solferino became a central mile-
stone in the history of transnational actors in wartime, giving rise to
a slowly expanding spirit of global activism and “a rise of non-state
humanitarianism.”8
legal regime. As Matthew Hilton and Rana Mitter argue, “war itself is
an extreme force of coercive transnationalism.”11
This book purposely proposes a very loose definition of the term
“transnational actor,” sharply diverging from fixed criteria and schemata
established by social scientists.12 A broad understanding of the concept
allows for the historical comparative study of transnational actors across a
geographically and chronologically diverse spectrum. Only such a defini-
tion can bring together the wide range of case studies contained in this
collection, which look at transnational diplomatic actors who were active
in big and small wars, over a timespan of over fifty years, across all five
continents, from New Caledonia to Bolivia. They focus on issues such
as forms of negotiations, informal processes and transnational, transre-
gional, translocal and transcultural practices in handling captives. Some
of the protagonists looked at were affiliated with or dependent upon
states, whereas others operated completely independently. Those with
close connections with states nevertheless often acted autonomously in
practice, whereas those who seemingly acted free from being part of state
structures nevertheless had to rely on these in numerous instances. Many
of the transnational actors operated in grey areas, but no matter what
their allegiances were, their own initiative often proved utterly central.
These disparities make it difficult to find an all-encompassing defini-
tion that fits all of these actors. Thus, we describe and outline, rather
than narrowly define, what we mean by “transnational actors.” In the
context of wartime captivity, we regard organisations such as the afore-
mentioned ICRC as transnational actors. But at the same time, we also
regard intermediaries of any nationality—often playing a diplomatic or
humanitarian role in conflicts their own country of origin was not directly
involved in—as transnational actors. Individuals, groups and organisations
alike had much room to shape the space they operated in and chose to
work together with firmly established structures often at their own will
and where it suited them best. In some instances, however, they were
hindered by these same structures, for example, if states were unwilling
to accept or refused their interference. Transnational actors often flour-
ished when they were allowed to operate fairly independently. Often,
they made use of official, semi-official and private diplomacy alongside
each other in order to improve the situation of war captives. Their own
interests and agency, “autonomous from central government funding and
control” were therefore vital in many instances.13 These transnational
actors often fitted into a wider contemporary framework of international
and sub-national human rights standards, customs and procedures devel-
oped in relation to the treatment of captives, be it military or civilian,
during wars.14 The diplomatic actors looked at in the subsequent chapters
had wide-ranging roles. Some, for instance, had the task of negoti-
ating the release of captives, whereas others set themselves the aim of
ensuring the good treatment of these latter while they were being held in
captivity. What all these transnational intermediaries had in common was
that they were trying to improve the circumstances the captives found
themselves in. The intermediaries were often the only ones who made
the captives and their plight visible and known to international audi-
ences. Thus, they often initiated and inspired other activist efforts around
the globe. Their initiatives could be an important factor in giving the
captives’ relatives at home hope and assured them that their loved ones
were being looked after and cared for. For many of the intermediaries,
improving the situation of war captives seemed to be an honourable
task. Particularly for those who saw themselves as neutral observers not
directly involved in the conflict, it was a chance to make a meaningful
and valuable contribution and prove their international importance and
13 Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-State Actors in World Politics: A Frame-
work,” in Non-State Actors in World Politics, eds. Daphné Josselin and William Wallace
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 3.
14 Of course, transnational actors did not have to be agents of, or endorsed by a state.
They could also act on a purely private basis or even be employed by private companies,
partly pursuing their own interest. However, since there are no such examples in this
book, perhaps bar the oil companies mentioned in Chapter 7, this topic and all the
unique problems that come with it are not pursued further in this introduction.
1 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS … 7
15 Christoph Jahr and Jens Thiel, “Prolegomena zu einer Geschichte der Lager: Eine
Einführung,” in Lager vor Auschwitz: Gewalt und Integration im 20. Jahrhundert, eds.
Christoph Jahr and Jens Thiel (Berlin: Metropol, 2013), 7–19.
16 Rüdiger Overmans, “‘In der Hand des Feindes:’ Geschichtsschreibung zur Kriegs-
gefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in In der Hand des Feinds:
Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Rüdiger Overmans,
(Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 20.
17 Mahon Murphy, Colonial Captivity During the First World War Internment and
the Fall of the German Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Karl
Hack and Kevin Blackburn, eds., Forgotten Captives in Japanese-Occupied Asia (London:
Routledge, 2011); Reinhard Nachtigal, Rußland und seine österreichisch-ungarischen
Kriegsgefangenen 1914 bis 1918 (Remshalden: B.A. Greiner, 2003); Oliver Wilkinson,
British Prisoners of War in First World War Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2017); Brian K. Feltman, The Stigma of Surrender: German Prisoners, British
Captors, and Manhood in the Great War and Beyond (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2015); Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich, The British Empire and its
Italian Prisoners of War 1940–1947 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Marianne Neerland
Soleim, ed., Prisoners of War and Forced Labour: Histories of War and Occupation
(Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010); Panayi Panikos, Pris-
oners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees During the First World War
(Oxford: Manchester University Press, 2018); Rafael Scheck, French Colonial Soldiers in
German Captivity during World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014);
Heather Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France
and Germany, 1914–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
18 William C. Latham, Jr., Cold Days in Hell: American POWs in Korea (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2012); Charles Young, Name, Rank, and Serial
Number: Exploiting Korean War POWs at Home and Abroad (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014); Stuart I. Rochester and Frederick T. Kiley, Honor Bound: American
1 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS … 9
These new studies have provoked wider debates, expanded our knowledge
of everyday life in camps,19 memories, issues of gender, archaeology and
post-war stories,20 as well as violence against captives.21 Similar existing
historical studies typically examine the treatment of enemy captives by
studying one side in one conflict. Apart from some case studies—mostly
from a national point of view—broader works have been written by legal
historians who have, for instance, looked at the evolution of humanitarian
treatment and conventions concerning captives.22 While transnational
actors are frequently mentioned in these studies, they are rarely placed at
the centre. This despite the fact that they undoubtedly played an essential
role in the everyday experiences of captives during what some political
Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999);
Michael J. Allen, Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending
Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Marcel Berni,
Außer Gefecht: Leben, Leiden und Sterben “kommunistischer” Gefangener in Vietnams
amerikanischem Krieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2020).
19 Matthew Stibbe, British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–
1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); Jeffrey L. Littlejohn and Charles
Howard Ford, eds., “The Enemy Within Never Did Without:” German and Japanese
Prisoners of War at Camp Huntsville, 1942–1945 (Huntsville: Texas Review Press, 2015).
20 Anne-Marie Pathé and Fabien Théofilakis, eds., Wartime Captivity in the 20th
Century: Archives, Stories, Memories (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016); H. C. Mytum
and Gillian Carr, eds., Prisoners of War: Archaeology, Memory, and Heritage of 19th- and
20th-Century Mass Internment (New York: Springer 2013); Bob Moore and Barbara
Hately-Broad, Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory
in World War II (Oxford: Berg, 2005); Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs
and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2006); Christiane Wienand, Returning Memories: Former Prisoners of War in Divided and
Reunited Germany (Rochester: Camden House, 2015).
21 Jones, Violence Against Prisoners of War; Geoffrey P. R. Wallace, Life and Death in
Captivity: The Abuse of Prisoners during War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015);
Berni, Außer Gefecht.
22 Joan Beaumont, Protecting Prisoners of War: 1939–1995, in Prisoners of War and
Their Captors in World War II , eds. Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich (Oxford: Blooms-
bury 1996), 277–297; Jean Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims
(Leyden, Geneva: A.W. Sijthoff/Henry-Dunant-Institute, 1975); Allan Rosas, The Legal
Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts (Helsinki: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia, 1976); Howard S. Levie, Prisoners
of War in International Armed Conflict (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1978); Emily
Crawford, The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Nigel S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners
under International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
10 M. BERNI AND T. CUBITO
role between the internees and the local colonial authorities, investi-
gating alleged mistreatment and documenting living conditions while
those interned had to spend years of their lives in great uncertainty. In
contrast to intermediaries looked at in later chapters which had a far more
institutionalised role, these consuls were mainly “hobby diplomats.”
Traditionally, histories of prisoners of war have been male-dominated.
However, as Brian K. Feltman demonstrates in his chapter, women could
also act as transnational actors. Looking at German women’s activism
seeking to liberate their captured fathers, husbands and sons, Feltman
shows how women’s organisations became paramount in the campaign
to affect their release after the First World War when the Allies insisted
on keeping their German prisoners after the armistice. This is the only
example in this book where those campaigning for the prisoners were
personally acquainted with them. By addressing their demands not only
to the former enemy states who still kept German prisoners of war, but
also to exponents of the Weimar Republic, these groups of mothers,
wives, daughters, fiancées and sisters adopted what we would today call
a transnational approach. Interestingly, the focus of their campaign was
not the suffering of the captives still being held by the Allies, but the
plight of their families at home. The women sent letters and complaints
to important politicians not only in Europe but even in the United States,
conducted public protests and put direct pressure on neutral countries
such as Norway, Denmark or Sweden. Moreover, they also appealed to
transnational, international and national organisations such as the ICRC,
the YMCA or the American Women’s League. Eventually, this “wom-
en’s crusade” contributed to the prisoners’ repatriation. Feltman’s chapter
demonstrates how intermediaries could successfully put on diplomatic
pressure, even if they had no official function and did not see themselves
as political activists. However, in order to achieve their aims, they had
to work alongside established diplomatic channels and organisations and
exploit formal and informal networks.
From 1932 to 1935, Bolivia and Paraguay fought one of the blood-
iest conflicts on South American soil during the twentieth century, over
a territorial dispute in the Gran Chaco region. Today, often forgotten,
the Guerra del Chaco not only pitted two of the poorest states in Latin
America against each other, but also saw the involvement of diverse
non-governmental groups, transnational relief organisations and welfare
associations. Robert Niebuhr links these efforts to a tradition of transna-
tional involvement which had predated the Chaco War. For instance, he
1 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS … 13
became increasingly important, and how they were labelled had a deci-
sive impact on their treatment. It could thus become increasingly difficult
for intermediaries to visit the imprisoned and get hold of accurate infor-
mation on them, since military and civilian authorities could hide behind
legal definitions and terms. Hence, more international recognition and
more detailed international laws did not necessarily mean that captives
were looked after better—often, quite the opposite was true.
Another hot conflict in the Cold War period broke out in West Africa
in the late 1960s. In the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerian government
fought the secessionist Republic of Biafra in a brutal two-and-a-half-
year conflict, on which the West African state’s future depended. In his
chapter, Onianwa Oluchuchukwu Ignatus looks at the capture of eigh-
teen western oil workers by Biafran troops, which led to an international
outcry, followed by an extensive negotiation process for their release. The
diplomatic back and forth saw the involvement of important transnational
players such as the Vatican, Catholic missionary orders, European diplo-
mats, African presidents, the Western European Union and private oil
companies. Despite many officials getting involved, this chapter again
shows how much the personality and personal contact of the interme-
diaries involved could matter. Oluchuchukwu Ignatus argues that the
international repercussions of this “oilmen incident” and the eventual
release of the captives essentially weakened Biafra’s claim to sovereignty
rather than strengthening it, as the Biafrans had hoped. The chapter
further illustrates that intermediaries always operated within an interna-
tional framework characterised by a certain balance of power, as well as
indicating what this often-fragile structure looked like and its significance
for the negotiations led by diplomatic intermediaries.
case studies like the ones contained in this volume. Unless they have such
research as their basis, it will be impossible to expand upon these much
broader themes.
Firstly, it is worth studying the broader global connections and the
relationships between the various intermediaries, that is to say, their inter-
dependencies, the competition between them and how they have been
collaborating with each other. This is of particular interest considering
that for many organisations, mediation and ensuring the humane treat-
ment of captives in war has become a business. Many have become
professionalised charities that depend on donations and have to publi-
cise their impact in order to remain financially viable. Thus, to be the first
organisation to visit a large detention camp and report about it to the
whole world can make a great difference; but this also means that similar
organisations have to be kept in check. At the same time, many of these
organisations pursue similar interests, have the same humanitarian ideals
and can achieve much from working together. For nation states who see
themselves as “traditional” negotiators, a lot of prestige is attached to
them concluding successful negotiations. Particularly for smaller coun-
tries like Switzerland, this remains an area of expertise for which they are
internationally well-known—a renown which they would like to retain.
In order to do so, they often have to work together with transnational
organisations and actors, each with their own aims and interests.
Secondly, a disentanglement of the global political dimensions behind
the negotiations surrounding captives in war would shed light on many
of the hidden (diplomatic) interests, intentions and agendas of transna-
tional intermediaries like the ones looked at in this volume. What was
their place and what role did they play in big power politics? Were they
used for propaganda purposes by the belligerents involved in order to
further their interests? Or did the intermediaries cleverly use their involve-
ment to pursue their own aims and goals? Where did these actors stand
against the backdrop of ideological conflicts such as the Second World
War or the Cold War? Were they truly neutral and did they only have the
captives’ well-being at the forefront of their minds? Or did they believe
that by getting involved they were aiding one of the opposing sides? How
much agency did they have on the ground, in light of these constellations?
In this, nonetheless we should be careful not to project too much power
onto transnational actors; rather, we should see them as one small part of
a much bigger picture.
1 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS … 17
26 On the connection between moving actors and ideas, see Margrit Pernau, Transna-
tionale Geschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 72.
18 M. BERNI AND T. CUBITO
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20 M. BERNI AND T. CUBITO
Tamara Cubito
1 Howard S. Levie defined “protecting power” as “a state which has accepted the
responsibility of protecting the interests of another state in the territory of a third, with
which, for some reason, such as war, the second state does not maintain diplomatic
relations.” See Howard S. Levie, “Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power,” The
American Journal of International Law 55, no. 2 (1961): 374.
T. Cubito (B)
Swiss Military Academy, ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf, Switzerland
e-mail: tamara.cubito@vtg.admin.ch
2 For an example of how this “protecting power system” continued in the Second
World War, see the chapter by Rowena Ward in this collection.
3 Levie, “Prisoners of War.” Of course, protecting powers can also be installed without
there being a state of war, such as, for example, Switzerland acting as protecting power
for the United States in Iran.
4 This means that this chapter does not look at Britain itself. Ireland, the dominions and
India are not taken into consideration either. In these locations, in contrast to the British
colonies looked at in this chapter, protecting powers did not bear the sole responsibility
for the supervision of conditions in camps. Instead, they were supported, or their efforts
even dwarfed by, various other organisations such as the Quakers or the International
Committee of the Red Cross. For more on this, see for example: Matthew Stibbe, “The
Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World War and the Response
of the International Committee of the Red Cross,” Journal of Contemporary History 41,
no. 1 (2006): 5–19.
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 25
5 United States Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the
United States, 1914. Supplement, The World War, US State Department to all diplomatic
and consular agents, August 17, 1914, accessed November 8, 2019, http://digicoll.lib
rary.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1914Supp.
6 Richard B. Speed III, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the
Diplomacy of Captivity (Westport: Greenwood, 1990).
26 T. CUBITO
appointed, and partly of doing certain acts on its behalf which are impor-
tant to it or to its subjects, but to which the foreign country is indifferent,
it being either unaffected by them, or affected only in a remote and indirect
manner.7
7 See William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1890), 314.
8 This was, for example, the issue in Barbados, where the Swiss officially acted as
protecting power but there was no Swiss consul on the island. Over a year after the
last visit of the US consul, it could finally be arranged for the acting Swedish consul in
Barbados to visit the internees. See: TNA, FO 383/347/191349, CO to FO, October 3,
1917; TNA, CO 28/294/4308, FO to CO, January 24, 1918; TNA, CO 28/293/4633,
Probyn to CO, January 25, 1918; TNA, CO 28/294/6906, FO to CO, February 7, 1918
and TNA, CO 28/293/15729, Probyn to CO, March 1, 1918.
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 27
island in order to inspect its internment camp. Once there, the Swiss
commission even met up with US consul Carl R. Loop who had visited
the camp once a month prior to the United States entering the war in
order to hear about his experiences and impressions first-hand.9 Camp
reports on internment camps in the colonies after the spring of 1917 are,
therefore, very sparse. Thus, the following section will, by and large, focus
on the experiences of American consuls representing the United States
while that country acted as protecting power.
grand, global scale.12 As the war went on, in some colonies such as Malta,
they were joined by regular prisoners of war. Allegations of mistreatment,
which made their way to Europe, were soon made by those held in British
colonies.
Hence, it quickly became apparent that these camps would have to
be inspected by neutral observers. Perhaps not surprisingly, paralleling
the practice established in Europe, the task fell to local US officials,
namely, consuls.13 In practically all colonies where there was an intern-
ment camp as well as an American consul, he was instructed to visit
these camps within months of the outbreak of war by the US State
Department. Officially, the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empires’ Foreign Offices had to ask the US State Department whether
American representatives could visit the internment camp in a British
colony. The US State Department would forward this request to the
British Foreign Office, which then sent this on to the British Colo-
nial Office which was responsible for forwarding these requests to the
colonial governor. In practice, this complicated protocol was not always
followed and there were instances of American consuls arranging camp
visits directly with the local colonial governors since the official process
would have taken months. The British Colonial Office instructed the
colonial governors to “afford every facility” to the visiting American
consuls and were very much in favour of their inspections, as internal,
handwritten comments show.14 In the periphery, the consuls’ visits to
internment camps and subsequent reports were seen by the local colonial
authorities as a welcome opportunity to showcase their direct contribu-
tion to the war to their superiors in London. Thus, American consuls took
care of internees in Bermuda, Hong Kong, Malta, Gibraltar, Trinidad,
Jamaica, Barbados, North Borneo, Ceylon and the Straits Settlements.
They received access whenever they wanted to most internment camps
and could move about freely, speak to all internees, or the spokespersons
elected by the internees, without supervision by the British authorities.
12 See, for example, Stefan Manz, Panikos Panayi and Matthew Stibbe, eds., Internment
during the First World War. A Mass Global Phenomenon (London: Routledge, 2019).
13 See various documents in: United States Department of State, Papers relating to
the foreign relations of the United States, 1914. Supplement, The World War, accessed
November 8, 2019, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=hea
der&id=FRUS.FRUS1914Supp.
14 TNA, CO 137/729/16344, FO to CO, April 3, 1918.
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 29
They were, in most cases, allowed to receive letters from those interned,
which indicates that the British authorities had nothing to hide and were
genuinely trying to maintain good conditions.15 In the tiny colony of
Gibraltar, internees were at times even allowed to pay personal visits to the
American consul.16 Where British local authorities attempted to infringe
this right of access, the consuls usually protested successfully. They took
very seriously the internees’ right to speak to a neutral representative.
When the internees in Hong Kong, for instance, complained to US consul
George Anderson that some of the letters they had written to him had
been withheld by the camp officials with the excuse that they “violated
rules of censorship,” Anderson was quick to tell the camp authorities
that this was unacceptable and that the internees “should be allowed free
access to me in all such matters as they had desired to present to me.”17
The majority of the consuls took their new tasks, which they had no
prior experience in, extremely seriously and visited the internment camps
regularly until the United States entered the war in 1917. American
consuls, in many instances, proactively made suggestions for improve-
ments and many of them seem to have taken a genuine interest in
improving the situation of the internees. The US consul in Bermuda,
for example, was so committed to ensuring the well-being of each indi-
vidual internee that he even visited them if they were in hospital.18 The
American consul in Barbados, C. Ludlow Livingston, personally sent the
internees reading material since, in his opinion, what the local authorities
provided was not sufficient. Livingston even went as far as sending the
internees boxes of cigars for Christmas.19 For a number of US consuls,
15 See for example TNA, CO 129/424/56940, May to CO, October 28, 1915,
enclosed camp report by Anderson.
16 TNA, CO 91/458/17104, Miles to CO, March 31, 1915, enclosed report by
Sprague.
17 TNA, CO 129/424/56940, May to CO, October 28, 1915, enclosed camp report
by Anderson. In contrast to camps elsewhere, the camp commandant did not agree to this,
claiming that this “would give rise to an unnecessary amount of correspondence. I think
that the Prisoners of War may well be left under direct and absolute British management
without interference by the United States of America’s Consul General […].” See: TNA,
CO 129/424/56940, May to CO, October 28, 1915, enclosed camp report by US
consul Anderson and statement by GOC (General Officer Commanding) Ventris.
18 TNA, CO 37/259/55921, FO to CO, November 21, 1916, enclosed camp report
by Loop.
19 TNA, CO 28/290/16171, FO to CO, April 4, 1916, enclosed report by Livingston.
30 T. CUBITO
tending to the internees in the colony consumed much of their free time
each month. It is unclear from the available sources whether they were
paid for this extra work and any expenses arising from it. Only rarely
was any reference to this point made. The US consul in Bermuda, Carl
R. Loop, mentioned in a report that “as in former cases no expense
was incurred in making the inspection.”20 However, what is undoubtedly
clear is that many of the American consuls must have spent hours, in many
cases each and every single month, visiting camps and compiling lengthy
reports on their observations. It seems that many of them thoroughly
enjoyed their camp visits and took pride in their new task.21 For instance,
the American consul at Bermuda, Carl R. Loop, occasionally remained
on the camp island to watch football games between the internees and
the camp guards.22 The US consul at Hong Kong, George Anderson,
assured his superiors that he was taking his task very seriously: “I am in
touch with the camp all the time and any unfavourable condition or unto-
ward circumstance will receive immediate attention.”23 Similarly, when
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) enquired about
conditions at the internment camp in Jamaica after receiving a complaint,
the American consul, Mr. Monaghan, was keen to stress that if conditions
were in fact as bad as alleged, there was no way the camp authorities could
have hidden this from him since he made an effort to visit “the camp at
all hours in the day, even in the evening time.”24 He stressed that his
vice-consul, Mr. Bundy, who bore the main responsibility for checking on
the internees as well as Mr. Dougan—an American national and personal
friend of theirs who had accompanied the consul on a camp visit out of
personal interest—thought conditions at the camp were excellent.25 How
regularly American consuls visited a camp depended on the colony. But
Most consuls who visited camps in the colonies stressed that they had
spoken to the prisoners without any supervision.28 Of course, the assess-
ments by the US consuls were based on the camp(s) in only one colony
and they could not compare them with conditions elsewhere. Also, it was
presumably in their interest to carefully word and balance their reports,
particularly when there was criticism, in order not to upset the local
colonial authorities which had to facilitate their visits.
From the sources available, it remains unclear how exactly the pris-
oners viewed the role of the consuls and what their exact relationship
with them was like. Unfortunately, hardly any letters or similar docu-
ments emanating from internees in the colonies making reference to the
consuls have survived. None of their letters to US consuls, of which there
must have been many, can be found in any archives. Only rarely are there
remarks in inspection reports of internees thanking the US consuls for
their support. One can only guess as to the reasons for this. It could be
the case that some US consuls preferred to remain in the background
and did not want to stress their own role too much since the well-being
of the prisoners was to be the central theme of the reports. Also, had
they hinted at too close a connection with the internees, their impar-
tiality would have been brought into question. Most probably, if they felt
grateful, it is likely the internees thanked the US consuls in person for
their support. Judging from the consuls’ reports, they were most defi-
nitely appreciated. The internees often eagerly awaited their visits and
made use of the opportunity to voice complaints and ask the consuls for
help. Another indication of the importance of the US consuls’ work is that
when in 1917, they could no longer act as protective power, numerous
internees as well as some colonial authorities were desperate for another
nation to fill the void. This would not have been the case had the US
consuls not been of importance and highly appreciated and valued.
29 See remark by the US consul of Bermuda, Carl Loop, in: TNA, CO 37/259/43710,
FO to CO, September 12, 1916, enclosed camp report by Loop.
30 See for example TNA, CO 129/424/56940, May to CO, October 28, 1915,
enclosed camp report by Anderson or TNA, CO 158/395/2925 FO to CO, June 21,
1916, enclosed report by Keblinger.
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 33
and then wildly exaggerated them.36 The only impartial actors on the
ground which were regarded to be suitable to investigate these claims
were representatives of the protecting powers. US consuls frequently
stressed how important it was to counter these reports if they were false.
As the US consul at Malta, Wilbur Keblinger explained:
Similarly, when there were reports in the German Empire that the
internees in Hong Kong were “forced to work like coolies,” both the
German and British governments as well as the local authorities were keen
for the local American consul to get to the bottom of this and stamp out
any misinformation once and for all.38
General complaints voiced by the internees, no matter in which of
the British colonies, were often of a similar nature. Food was probably
moaned about the most. It was usually the quality and variety rather
than the amount that was criticised by the internees.39 In defence of the
British authorities, it is highly likely that they and the mostly German and
Austro-Hungarian internees had entirely differing opinions and tastes as
to what constituted good food.40 In Trinidad and Tobago for example,
the internees complained about the bread they were given. While this
bread was probably not as good as what they were used to from home, it
was, according, to the US consul, much better than the average bread sold
36 See for example the newspaper article attached in: TNA, WO 154/324, war diary of
Provost Marshal on January 22, 1915 or complaint by former internee Theodor Nicolas
about the conditions in North Borneo after his return to the German Empire: TNA, CO
531/9/52011, BNBCo to CO, November 10, 1915.
37 TNA, CO 158/395/2925, FO to CO, June 21, 1916, enclosed camp reports on
Malta by Keblinger.
38 TNA, CO 129/415/3941, May to CO, December 17, 1914, enclosed report by
Anderson. The consul concluded there was no truth in these claims.
39 See for example TNA, CO 129/424/56940, May to CO, October 28, 1915,
enclosed camp report by Anderson.
40 TNA, CO 129/415/3941, May to CO, December 17, 1914, enclosed camp report
by Anderson.
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 35
41 See for example TNA, CO 37/259/18443, FO to CO, April 17, 1916, enclosed
report by Loop or TNA, CO 37/262/22018, FO to CO, May 4, 1918, enclosed report
by Junod and Jenny.
42 TNA, CO 37/259/36737, FO to CO, August 3, 1916, enclosed camp report by
Loop. It is unclear whether the quality of the margarine had been improved just because
of Loop’s intervention.
43 TNA, CO 513/10/17519, Ridgeway to CO, April 11, 1916, enclosed report by
G.M. Hanson.
36 T. CUBITO
It is the duty of the coloured soldiers at the camp under their white offi-
cers to preserve discipline, but there seems no reason to believe that these
soldiers in any way go beyond their duties in preserving order and disci-
pline. I fail to see the point in the German Ambassador’s criticism of the
colour of these soldiers. All the policemen in Port of Spain are coloured,
and in case any one of them was obliged to arrest any Englishman because
of violation of law or regulation, I am sure that no local court would hold
that because the policeman was coloured, it was impudent of him to arrest
any white man who violated the law.46
44 This of course does not mean that there was any racial equality or harmony, as events
in numerous British colonies just after the end of the war show. For more on this, see
for example: Jacqueline Jenkinson, Black 1919: Riots, Racism and Resistance in Imperial
Britain (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009).
45 Whether the internees’ complaints were linked to wider debates and German criticism
of the Entente using black soldiers in the war is questionable since all the news the
internees received was censored. For more on this theme, see for example: Christian
Koller, “Von Wilden aller Rassen niedergemetzelt”. Die Diskussion um die Verwendung von
Kolonialtruppen in Europa zwischen Rassismus, Kolonial- und Militärpolitik (1914–1930)
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001).
46 TNA, CO 295/511/16436, Chancellor to CO, March 5, 1917, enclosed statement
by Baker. Linking the black prison guards which served at a handful of internment camps
in British colonies to debates on the First World War as a “white man’s war” would
probably be a stretch too far. These debates mainly centre on the direct participation of
black soldiers and labourers at or near the front. The guards discussed here mainly seem
to have regarded the watching of enemy internees as part of their everyday job which
they were paid for, many of them already having been regular prison guards or soldiers
before the outbreak of war. For more on this notion of the Great War as predominantly
2 “ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONDITION OR UNTOWARD CIRCUMSTANCE … 37
The whole staff of the camp including Mr. Fraser, Captain Commanding,
is from the Royal Gaol. All evidence of kindly and human feeling towards
us is lacking and we are not treated as honorable prisoners of war but as
criminals. Especially Mr. Fraser is treating us with the utmost disrespect.
Several of us have been grossly insulted and it is very seldom that he listens
to a complaint. […] The treatment by the guards, who are all negroes, is
not better. In two cases two of us have been struck by negro corporals.
[…] Many of the interned here are afraid to complain at all because they
a war of the “white man,” see for example; Gordon Douglas Pollock, Black Soldiers in
a White Man’s War. Race, Good Order and Discipline in a Great War Labour Battalion
(Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018). It would perhaps make more sense to
see the role of these guards in the wider context of the colonial homefronts. Unfortunately,
not much literature on this exists to date. An exception is: Glenford Howe, Race, War
and Nationalism. A Social History of West Indians in the First World War (Kingston, Ian
Randle Publishers, 2002).
47 TNA, FO 383/240/183458, US Chargé d’Affaires to FO, enclosed camp report by
Keblinger.
48 TNA, CO 91/458/17104, Miles to CO, March 31, 1915, enclosed report by
Sprague.
38 T. CUBITO
have seen, from cases of unjust punishment, which some of us have expe-
rienced after making complaints, that in consequence the treatment would
be worse than ever.49