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T H E OX F O R D H I S T O RY O F P H I L OS O P H Y
The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy

T H E O X F O R D HI S T OR Y O F P H I L OS OP H Y
French Philosophy, 1572–1675

Desmond M. Clarke
The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700
Jonardon Ganeri
American Philosophy before Pragmatism
Russell B. Goodman
Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy since 1960
Gary Gutting
British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing
Thomas Hurka
British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century
Sarah Hutton
The American Pragmatists
Cheryl Misak
The Golden Age

of Indian Buddhist
Philosophy
Jan Westerhoff
1
3
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In the world and world-transcendent,

Beyond the Wisdom Gone Beyond,
In ten-perfected form resplendent,
Wisdom-goddess, praise to you!
(From a hymn to the Perfection
of Wisdom, Pandey 1994: 125)
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to my teachers, colleagues, and friends,

from whom I have learned much about the history of Indian Buddhist thought,
in particular to David Seyfort Ruegg, Jay Garfield, Mattia Salvini, Dan Arnold,
Jonathan Gold, Jonardon Ganeri, Tom Tillemans, Greg Seton, and Parimal
Patil. Special thanks are due to the Buddhist Studies Research Seminar at
King’s College London, where some of the material was presented, and to
Mark Siderits, who provided me with detailed comments on the fourth chapter.
Their comments have helped me greatly in improving this book; while
I cannot claim that the remaining mistakes are completely original, they are,
however, wholly my own work.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Yuka Kobayashi and our daughter
Sophie for their support and patience while I was writing this book.
Contents
Analytical Table of Contents xiii

Diagrams of Schools and Thinkers xxiii
Introduction 1
1. Buddhist Philosophy in India: A Wheel Ever Turning 1
2. Philosophy as a Game 2
3. Factors Determining the Game 4
a. Arguments 6
b. Sacred texts 7
c. Meditative practice 8
4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure the Material 9
5. The Sources of the Game 11
a. The bases of Buddhist philosophy 11
b. Debates 13
c. Commentaries 15
d. Doxographies 21
6. The Game’s View of the Game 24
1. Abhidharma 35
1. Introducing the Abhidharma 35
a. Matrices 37
b. Question-and-answer format 38
c. Providing a comprehensive theory 39
2. The Question of Authenticity 41
3. The Abhidharma Schools 43
:
a. Mahāsamghika 45
b. Sthaviranikāya: Theravāda 49
c. Sthaviranikāya: Pudgalavāda 53
d. Sthaviranikāya: Sarvāstivāda 60
e. Sthaviranikāya: Sautrāntika 73
2. Madhyamaka 84
1. The Rise of the Mahāyāna and Its Relation to Buddhist Philosophy 84
2. The Madhyamaka School 89
3. The Teachings of the Perfection of Wisdom 99
a. Criticism of the Abhidharma project 99
b. The doctrine of illusionism 101
c. An explicit acceptance of contradictions 104
x CONTENTS
4. Key Themes of Nāgārjuna’s Thought 107

a. Nāgārjuna and the criticism of the Abhidharma project 107
b. Illusionism in Nāgārjuna’s thought 115
c. Contradictions and Nāgārjuna’s thought 117
5. The Commentators 120
a. Buddhapālita 121
b. Bhāviveka 123
c. Candrakīrti 131
6. The Great Synthesizers: Śāntaraks: ita and Kamalaśīla 139
7. Madhyamaka and Nyāya 142
3. Yogācāra 147
1. Five Stages of Yogācāra’s Development 147
a. Stage 1: The early Yogācāra sūtras 148
:
b. Stages 2 and 3: Maitreya and Asanga 150
c. Stage 4: Vasubandhu 154
d. Stage 5: Later Yogācāra 160
2. Proofs of Buddhist Doctrines 161
a. Rebirth 161
b. Other minds 164
c. Momentariness 166
3. Key Yogācāra Concepts 168
a. cittamātra 168
b. ālayavijñāna and the eight types of consciousness 179
c. trisvabhāva 182
:
d. svasamvedana 184
e. Three turnings 186
f. tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra 186
4. Factors That Shaped Yogācāra Philosophy 193
a. Argumentative factors 193
b. Textual factors 193
c. Meditative factors 194
5. Yogācāra and Other Schools of Buddhist Philosophy 200
6. Yogācāra and Vedānta 212
:
4. The School of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti 217
:
1. The lives of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti 217
2. Epistemology 220
3. Inference 225
4. Metaphysics 231
5. Language 235
6. Scriptural Authority and Yogic Perception 238
a. Scriptural authority 238
b. Yogic perception 247
CONTENTS xi
:
7. How to Classify Dinnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy 250
:
8. The School of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti and Its
Relation to Mīmāmsā : 259
a. Mīmāmsā: epistemology 261
b. Mīmās: ā philosophy of language 263
:
c. Mīmāmsā, historiography, and history 267
9. The End of Buddhist Philosophy in India 270
a. Śāntideva 271
:
b. Atiśa Dīpamkaraśrījñāna 276
Concluding Remarks 282
Bibliography 287
Index 308
Analytical Table of Contents
Introduction 1
1. Buddhist Philosophy in India: A Wheel Ever Turning 1
The wheel: metaphor for the Buddhist doctrine · Buddhist thought in India:
permanence and change
2. Philosophy as a Game 2
The game as a heuristic device for understanding philosophy · Four factors
shaping a game · Narrating the game · Sources the narration is based
on · Foundational texts and commentaries · Philosophical debates in
ancient India · Doxographical works · The game’s view of the game
3. Factors Determining the Game 4
Histories of Buddhist philosophy as partial pictures · Period covered:
Abhidharma up to Dharmakīrti · Social, economic, political factors
a. Arguments 6
Arguments as driving the history of philosophy · Development of Buddhist
philosophy: three stages · Debates with non-Buddhist schools
b. Sacred texts 7
Interpretable/definite distinction as source of variation in Buddhist
philosophy
c. Meditative practice 8
The need to classify meditative experiences · Three factors as gravitational
forces · Exaptation of philosophical concepts
4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure the Material 9
Challenges in structuring a history of Indian philosophy · A hybrid
structure · Four schools · Buddhist–non-Buddhist debates · Key
thinkers · Key texts · Key concepts
5. The Sources of the Game 11
a. The bases of Buddhist philosophy 11
Early discourses and Mahāyāna sūtras · The ‘original teachings’ of the
Buddha · Different ways of construing
‘original teachings’ · Frameworks of philosophical activity:
debates, commentaries, doxographies
b. Debates 13
Public debates · Debate manuals · Nyāya: three kinds of
debate · Influence on philosophical works · Debate and
:
Vasubandhu’s Vimśikā · Texts as responses to philosophical rivals
c. Commentaries 15
Characteristics of a sūtra · Different types of commentaries · vivarana
: ·
bhās:ya · vārttika · kārikā · Buddhist commentaries · Buddhist
kārikās and their auto-commentaries · Commentarial practice and
authorial intent · Conflicting commentarial interpretations · Sterility
and arbitrariness? · The text’s true intent? Example of the
Abhidharmakośa · Commentary as connecting past and
present · Commentarial activity as a creative enterprise · Buddhist
philosophy as a commentary on the sūtras
xiv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
d. Doxographies 21
List of objections vs. doxographies · Buddhist interest in
doxography · Establishing uniqueness · Anti-substantialism · Types
of doxographies · a. Defender and interlocutors · b. Exposition and
refutation · c. Non-hierarchical presentation · Example of b:
Bhāviveka · Doxographic hierarchy · Example of c:
Haribhadra · Doxography and soteriology
6. The Game’s View of the Game 24
Conflicting assumptions about the existence of the past · Maxim
of charity · Nāgārjuna’s lifespan · The Nālandā tradition · ‘the
way it really was’ · Canon formation · 4 criteria for authenticity ·
Historical and hermeneutic understanding of buddhavacana · Buddhist
philosophy and the existence of the past · 1. Presentism · The past as a
conceptual superimposition · 2. Absence of a common perception of the
world · Perception depends on karmic conditioning · 3. Trans-historical
activities · Mystical manifestations of teachers · 4. History as
teaching · Examples from Tibetan authors · Accounting for different
versions of the same events · Avoidance of relativism · Tension between
charity and naturalism · Bracketing naturalist assumptions · Soteriological
purpose of histories of Buddhism · Existence of the past as a theoretical posit
1. Abhidharma 35
1. Introducing the Abhidharma 35
Abhidharma: the 3rd basket · Systematizing the sūtras · The
term ‘abhidharma’ · Motives for composing the Abhidharma
a. Matrices 37
Matrices as mnemonic devices · Matrices as maps of
meditative states · Matrices and oral culture
b. Question-and-answer format 38
Q&A and debate · Q&A as an aid to understanding
c. Providing a comprehensive theory 39
Analysis as an end in itself ? · The Buddha’s omniscience · Abhidharma
as representing the Buddha’s omniscient mind · View of the supernatural
status of the Buddha & its consequences · Motives for composing the
Abhidharma & three factors
2. The Question of Authenticity 41
Why is the Abhidharma buddhavacana? · Strategies for
establishing authenticity · Supernatural origin of the Abhidharma
3. The Abhidharma Schools 43
The 18 schools · Five Abhidharma schools discussed here · Reasons
for the division · Division at the second council · Monastic rules ·
Nature of the arhat
:
a. Mahāsamghika 45
Limitations of the arhat · Consequences of this
idea · The omniscient Buddha · The Buddha as
supramundane · The illusory Buddha · Two kinds of
emptiness · Mahāsamghika: and Madhyamaka · Mahāsamghika
:
and Yogācāra · Foundational consciousness · Luminosity of
consciousness · Buddha-nature · Source of innovations in
Buddhist philosophy
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xv
b. Sthaviranikāya: Theravāda 49
Kathāvatthu · Refutation of views opposed to Theravāda · A defence
of orthodoxy? · Additions to the text · The Kathāvatthu as a
pedagogical tool · The Kathāvatthu as a depository of philosophical
concepts · Docetism · Illusory teaching · Dreams and
reality · tantra · Orthodoxy and deviation
c. Sthaviranikāya: Pudgalavāda 53
Reductionism about the self · Special case of mereological
reductionism · Origins of the non-self theory: doctrinal
and meditative · Non-self theory: argumentative support · Soteriology vs.
theory-building? · Mutual support of meditation and argument · The
personalists · Their status amongst the other schools · The notion of the
pudgala · Its theoretical use · Inexpressibility of the pudgala · The
pudgala as accounting for the apparent existence of persons · Challenge for
the Abhidharma’s network view · Pudgala explained as a special
causal connection · An alternative solution · Maximally connected causal
networks · Ethical considerations · Substitute selves? · Foundational
consciousness · Buddha-nature
d. Sthaviranikāya: Sarvāstivāda 60
The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma · Jñānaprasthāna · Vibhās:ā · sarvam
asti & arguments for this position · 1. Testimony · 2. Consciousness
needs a presently existent object · 3. Karmic responsibility · 4. Three times
as mutually interdependent · Possible responses · The notion of
karitrā · Present existence without efficacy? · Different interpretations of
‘everything exists’ · 1. Dharmatrāta · 2. Ghos: aka · 3. Vasumitra ·
4. Buddhadeva · sarvāstitvā as a form of substantialism · Substantialism as
a rhetorical strategy · Substantialism and inclusivism · Centrality
of causation · Causation and existence · Simultaneity of cause
and effect · Epistemology · Momentariness and
representationalism · Variable speed of moments · Simultaneity and
realism · Sautrāntika criticism of simultaneous causation · Sarvāstivāda
response · Direct perception and self-cognition · svabhāva · The
Abhidharma notion of dharmas · 1. Mereological independence ·
2. Conceptual independence · dravya and prajñapti · Existential status
of prajñapti
e. Sthaviranikāya: Sautrāntika 73
Emphasis on sūtra over śāstra · Limited information available · Rejection
of Sarvāstivāda view of time · The Dārs: t:āntikas · Momentariness ·
Cinematographic conception of reality · Vasubandhu’s argument for
momentariness · Criticism of Sāmkhya
: · Three kinds of arguments for
momentariness · Doctrinal reasons for momentariness · Meditative
factors influencing the theory of momentariness · Soteriological implications of
realizing momentariness · Belief vs. realization · Theory
of perception · Perceiving non-existent objects · The ākāra and its
functions · Perceiving past and future · Sautrāntika view of
:
nirvāna · Mental continuity and karma · Similarities between
Sautrāntika and Yogācāra · Yogācāra as continuation of
Sautrāntika? · Sautrāntika as bridging Abhidharma and
Mahāyāna
xvi ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. Madhyamaka 84
1. The Rise of the Mahāyāna and Its Relation to Buddhist Philosophy 84
Mahāyāna: new developments · What the Mahāyāna was not · Mahāyāna
as a textual movement · An alternative vision of the Buddha · Connection
between Mahāyāna, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra · Philosophical consequences
of the Mahāyāna view · De-ontologizing of reality · Illusionism as constituting
a link · Illusionism and meditative practice · Sight of the
Buddha in the present world · The world as mentally constructed
2. The Madhyamaka School 89
Nāgārjuna’s life · The prophecy · The biography · Magical
elements · Nāgas and the Perfection of Wisdom · The Perfection of Wisdom
sūtras · Different lengths of these texts · Contents of the Perfection of
Wisdom texts · Practices of a bodhisattva · Emptiness · Development
of the Perfection of Wisdom literature · 1. The early phase · 2. The phase
of expansion · 3. The phase of contraction · Significance of the texts for
all Mahāyāna schools · 4. The tantric phase · Multiple Nāgārjunas? ·
Nāgārjuna the philosopher · Other Nāgārjunas · Advantages of the ‘multiple
Nāgārjunas’ account · Coherence of the traditional claims made about
Nāgārjuna’s life · Nāgārjuna’s works is with Homer · Philosophical works:
the yukti-corpus · Letters · Nāgārjuna and the Sātavāhana dynasty · Hymns
3. The Teachings of the Perfection of Wisdom 99
a. Criticism of the Abhidharma project 99
Criticism of the soteriological ideals of early Buddhism · Criticism of
the metaphysical assumptions of early Buddhism · Rejection of
Abhidharma’s ontological foundations
b. The doctrine of illusionism 101
Comprehensive illusionism applicable to all
entities · Illusionism and meditative experience · Ontologizing
meditative phenomenology · Meditative phenomenology need not be
grounded in ultimate reality · Illusionism and the development of different
Buddhist schools · Illusionism and the bodhisattva ideal · Consistency
of the Prajñāpāramitā’s position
c. An explicit acceptance of contradictions 104
Non-existence of bodhisattvas · Developing arguments for Prajñāpāramitā
positions · Was Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist? · Nāgārjuna did not see himself
as a philosophical innovator · Salutary verses of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
4. Key Themes of Nāgārjuna’s Thought 107
a. Nāgārjuna and the criticism of the Abhidharma project 107
Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the Abhidharma · Emptiness of persons and
dharmas · svabhāva · svabhāva and causation · The causal argument
against svabhāva · Causation essentially involves
conceptualization · Abhidharma and Madhyamaka views of svabhāva
and causation · The mereological argument against svabhāva · Are
dharmas the same as their conceptual parts or different? · dharmas as property-
particulars · How are property-particulars told apart? · The argument
from change · Change as arising and ceasing · Change as
recombination · Argumentative support for the claims of the Perfection
of Wisdom texts
b. Illusionism in Nāgārjuna’s thought 115
Not a view of ‘appearance vs. reality’ · The charge of
ontological nihilism · svabhāva is not required for functionality · The
charge of moral nihilism
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii
c. Contradictions and Nāgārjuna’s thought 117

Explaining the tetralemma · Non-classical logic · The theory of the
two truths · The interpolation procedure · Ultimately real simulacra
5. The Commentators 120
Commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
a. Buddhapālita 121
The Akutobhayā · Its relation with Buddhapālita’s
commentary · Buddhapālita’s life · Buddhapālita’s commentary
b. Bhāviveka 123
:
The Prajñāpradīpa · prasanga methodology · Supplementing
destructive by constructive reasoning · An example: absence of
self-causation · Absurd consequences of self-causation ·
Three-membered syllogisms · A syllogism establishing absence of self-
:
causation · Misunderstanding prasanga as reductio · Two kinds of
negation · Nāgārjuna as employing non-implicative negations ·
Absence of syllogisms in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā · Madhyamaka
arguments and philosophical theses · Preventing the wrong positive
thesis · svabhāva-free theses · Different kinds of conventional
truth · Theses and debates · The Madhyamaka thesis about the nature
of reality · Theses and doxography
c. Candrakīrti 131
Legends about Candrakīrti: their philosophical significance · Candrakīrti’s
works · His status in Tibet · His status in India · Connection between
argumentative procedure and philosophical content · Syllogisms and epistemic
instruments · Madhyamaka and debate · svabhāva at the level of
conventional reality? · Ontological disagreement between Candrakīrti and
:
Bhāviveka · No stratification of conventional reality · The Prāsangika–
Svātantrika distinction · The distinction as a doxographic
fiction · Candrakīrti’s rise from obscurity · Candrakīrti and
tantra · Tantric works by Mādhyamikas · Madhyamaka and
tantra · A backwards reflection of popularity?
6. The Great Synthesizers: Śāntaraks: ita and Kamalaśīla 139
Śāntaraks: ita’s main works · The Tattvasamgraha
: · Śāntaraks: ita
and the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet · Kamalaśīla and the council of
bSam yas · Gradual vs. sudden conceptions of enlightenment · Unclarities
about the council of bSam yas · Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama · Criticism
of the absence of mental activity · Later development of Madhyamaka ·
Waning of the synthetic approach · Madhyamaka beyond India
7. Madhyamaka and Nyāya 142
Nāgārjuna and Nyāya · Mutual influence of the two systems ·
Pervasive influence of the Nyāya system · Criticism of Nyāya
logic and epistemology · Negation · Problems with negating
svabhāva · Nyāya syllogisms · No discordant example for
emptiness · Reference to non-existent objects · Use of logic without
accepting its ontological implications
3. Yogācāra 147
1. Five Stages of Yogācāra’s Development 147
a. Stage 1: The early Yogācāra sūtras 148
xviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
: :
Lankāvatārasūtra · Date of the Lankāvatārasūtra ·
Introducing key Yogācāra concepts · Samdhinirmocanasūtra
: ·
The opening of the text · Magic and illusion · Mental nature
of the world and of the Buddha’s teachings
:
b. Stages 2 and 3: Maitreya and Asanga 150
:
Asanga and his brothers · Yogācāra and
: :
Abhidharma · Asanga and the Perfection of Wisdom · Asanga’s
propitiation of Maitreya · Maitreya’s five treatises · Connection of
wisdom and compassion · Role of karma in perception · The nature
of Maitreya · Maitreya as a ‘real person’ · Questionable assumptions ·
:
Asanga’s own works
c. Stage 4: Vasubandhu 154
Diversity of his works · Vasubandhu’s life · Composition
of the Abhidharmakośa · Its bhās: ya · Vasubandhu and
the Mahāyāna · The philosopher vs. the meditator · Vasubandhu’s
Mahāyāna works · Multiple Vasubandhus? · The split between the
Ābhidharmika and the Mahāyāna scholar · Problems with the hypothesis
of multiple Vasubandhus · The main force behind the
hypothesis · Difficulties with doxographic frameworks
d. Stage 5: Later Yogācāra 160
: :
Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti · Dinnāga’s Ālambanaparīks: ā · Conditions
for supporting a perceptual state · Representations as supports
2. Proofs of Buddhist Doctrines 161
a. Rebirth 161
Arguing for the Buddha’s epistemic authority · Infinite
compassion during infinitely many lives · Conditions for the arising
of consciousness · Infinite regression of consciousness · Cārvāka
materialism · Two challenges · Proof of past lives, not of
rebirth · Accounting for unconsciousness
b. Other minds 164
Solipsism as problematic for Buddhism · Dharmakīrti’s
Santānāntarasiddhi · Our knowledge of other minds is
inferential · Ratnakīrti’s Santānāntaradūs: ana
: · Solipsism at the
level of ultimate reality
c. Momentariness 166
Argument from the momentariness of cognition · Mental momentariness
inherited from momentariness of percepts · The argument from
change · Ratnakīrti’s indirect argument · Ratnakīrti’s direct argument
3. Key Yogācāra Concepts 168
a. cittamātra 168
Arguments against material objects · 1. Inferring material objects ·
Dream example · Postulating matter as explanatorily idle · Example of
the ‘three cups of liquid’ · Restriction to invariable co-cognition · 2.
Scriptural authority and the existence of material objects · Interpretable
vs. definite teachings · Atomism as internally contradictory · Lining up
three atoms · Atoms and optics · Atomism cannot be a basis
for epistemology · 3. Perceiving material objects · Representationalist
argument · Reality of representational forms · sākāravāda vs.
nirākāravāda · satyākāravāda vs. alīkākāravāda · Representational forms
and the three natures · Is Yogācāra a form of idealism? · Ontology vs.
epistemology · The ‘lack of evidence’ principle · The principle of
lightness · Non-idealist interpretations and philosophical
zeitgeist · Wrong appeal to the maxim of charity · Absence of explicit
denial of material objects · Ultimate reality only knowable
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
through meditation · Yogācāra arguments clearing away the wrong

belief in matter
b. ālayavijñāna and the eight types of consciousness 179
Disappearance of consciousness in meditative states · The
defiled mind · The foundational consciousness: explanatory
benefits · 1. Meditation and the continuity of consciousness ·
The ‘bi-polar bīja-model’ · 2. Transmigration and karma
c. trisvabhāva 182
Mirage example · Three kinds of absence · Three natures
and two truths · Three natures from a Madhyamaka
perspective · Two truths from a Yogācāra perspective
:
d. svasamvedana 184
:
No fundamental division between minds · Dinnāga’s
:
regress argument · Dinnāga’s memory argument
e. Three turnings 186
Historical and philosophical sequence
f. tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra 186
Conceptual predecessors of the concept of
tathāgatagarbha · Natural purity of mind · ‘transformation of the
basis’ · tathāgatagarbha as a substitute self · The tathāgatagarbha
and the acceptance of an ātman · Positions that appear to conflict
with the Buddha’s teachings · Substantial self · Nihilism · Antinomian
injunctions · Hermeneutic strategies for restoring consistency · The
tathāgatagarbha in different modes: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra ·
Madhyamaka: tathāgatagarbha as a conventional teaching · tathāgatagarbha
as potential · Yogācāra: tathāgatagarbha as emptiness of defilements · Self-
emptiness vs. other-emptiness
4. Factors That Shaped Yogācāra Philosophy 193
a. Argumentative factors 193
b. Textual factors 193
c. Meditative factors 194
The ‘practice of yoga’ · The nature of meditative
experiences · Their merely mental nature · Generalization
of this claim to include other objects · Meditative cognition as an epistemic
instrument · Superiority of meditative perception over other epistemic
instruments · Meditative perception and the dissolution of
objects · Yogācāra position based on meditative experience · Yogācāra
and tantra · Yogācāra as explaining the efficacy of tantric techniques
5. Yogācāra and Other Schools of Buddhist Philosophy 200
Yogācāra and Abhidharma · Mind-only · Foundational
consciousness · anudhātu · bījabhāva · Yogācāra and
Madhyamaka · Fundamental divide in Mahāyāna philosophy? · Bhāviveka
and the Yogācāra/Madhyamaka distinction · Yogācāra and Madhyamaka
as inconsistent · Foundationalism vs. non-foundationalism · Mutual
accusations of realism and nihilism · Yogācāra as part of
Madhyamaka · Śāntaraks: ita’s synthesis · Madhyamaka as part of
Yogācāra · The 2nd and 3rd turnings as not differing in
content · ākāra, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka · Śāntaraks: ita rejects
both accounts of representational forms · Ratnākaraśānti on
ākāra · alīkākāravāda and Madhyamaka · Progressive evaporation of
ontological content · The four stages of yoga: Ratnākaraśānti · The four
stages: Kamalaśīla · Tibetan developments
of alīkākāravāda · Mutual subsumption and the unity of Mahāyāna
xx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
thought · Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as aiming at the same inexpressible

truth · Different conceptions of inexpressibility
6. Yogācāra and Vedānta 212
Early Vedānta and Yogācāra · Dreams and illusions · Identity of knower
and known · vijñāna-spandita · asparśayoga · Vedānta criticism of
Yogācāra · How can mental objects be like external objects? · Our
arguments must not undermine the epistemic instruments · Qualified and
qualifier must differ · Foundational consciousness and momentariness are
:
incompatible · Madhva on momentariness · Reasons for Śankara’s
attitude towards Yogācāra
:
4. The School of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti 217
:
1. The Lives of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti 217
: :
Dates of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti · Dinnāga’s
:
Pramānasamuccaya · Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavārttika
: · Dharmakīrti
:
and Kumārila · Dharmakīrti and Śankara · Increased importance of debate
with non-Buddhists · Focus on logic and epistemology · More arguments
for Buddhist claims
2. Epistemology 220
svalaks: ana
: and sāmānyalaks: ana: · Relation
to the Abhidharma project · Perception and ultimate reality ·
How can perception access the impartite non-conceptual? ·
Not a singular entity, but a singularity of effect · Dropping
realism about external objects · Perception, conceptualization,
and Madhyamaka · Epistemic foundationalism? · Perception as immune
from error · What still counts as perception? · Connection with Nāgārjuna’s
criticism of epistemic instruments · Nāgārjuna does not pursue a sceptical
agenda · Three kinds of perception
3. Inference 225
Inference and conceptual construction · Inference and debate · Characteristics
of inferences · The triple mark · Pervasion · anumāna is not formal
logic · Inference for oneself and others · Mental models · Ways of
formulating ‘inference for others’ · Inferences as tokens · The role of examples
in inferences · Logical and epistemological dimension of anumāna · Positive
example · Negative example · Pseudo-reasons · Fallibilism and
externalism · ‘good reasons’ and validity
4. Metaphysics 231
Causal efficacy · Momentariness and causal
efficacy · Dharmakīrti’s arguments for momentariness · Argument from
cessation · Argument from existence · Consequences of rejecting objects
in general · ātman · The creator god · Caste · The bifurcation
of knowledge
5. Language 235
apoha theory · Absences as less real than presences · apoha and two kinds
of negation · The two negations do not cancel each other out · apoha and
causal power · Causal power relativized to human desires · The role of
conceptualization
6. Scriptural Authority and Yogic Perception 238
a. Scriptural authority 238
:
Authority of texts arising from their source · Dinnāga’s
praise of the Buddha · Scriptural authority arising from
internal characteristics · Three degrees of epistemic distance · Inductive
argument for long-distance reliability · Scripture as subsumed under
inference · A different kind of inference? · Scepticism about appealing
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi
to the Buddha’s authority · Scepticism about appealing to the internal

characteristics of texts · Conventionality of language · Scepticism about
induction · Scripturally based inferences cannot be objective · Practical
necessity of relying on scriptures · No necessity for a leap of
faith · Historical context of the critical view of scriptural authority · Purpose
of the arguments for the Buddha’s authority · Imperfect access to a perfect
source of knowledge · Coherence with externalist outlook · The
double nature of the logico-epistemological school · Interpenetration
of philosophical schools · Maximizing impact on non-Buddhist
audience · ‘double reading’ of Dharmakīrti’s arguments · Apologetic
character of Dharmakīrti’s writings · Negative reactions · Neutrality
vs. orthodoxy
b. Yogic perception 247
Its characteristics · Yogic perception as epistemic
super-power · Dharmakīrti: directed at concepts · Yogic perception and
deluded states of mind · Mīmāmsā : criticism of yogic perception · Yogic
perception as validated through its goal · Yogic perception needs to be
properly directed
:
7. How to Classify Dinnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy 250
:
Did Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti form a distinct school? · What kind of thinker
was Dharmakīrti? · Sautrāntika? · Dharmakīrti and the Mahāyāna
schools · The Abhidharma consensus · ‘sliding scales of analysis’ · Graded
teaching · Four levels of philosophical analysis · 1. Ordinary
beings · 2. Reductionism · 3. Particularism · 4. Idealism · Historical
and systematic significance of the four levels · The neither-one-nor-many
argument · Specific features of the ‘sliding scales of analysis’ model’ ·
Particularism is not Dharmakīrti’s final view · Heuristic use of particularism ·
Dharmakīrti on the reality of causation · Criticism of the causal
relation · Dharmakīrti and Madhyamaka · Denial of the ultimate reality
of causation · Motivation for reading Dharmakīrti in a Madhyamaka way ·
Lack of final level of analysis · Philosophical development rather than
doxographic categorization
:
8. The School of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti and Its Relation to
:
Mīmāmsā 259
Debate between the two schools · Mīmāmsā’s
: aim · dharma and the Vedas
: epistemology
a. Mīmāmsā 261
: cannot be established by other pramānas
pramānas : · Possible responses to
the regress · pramānas : as intrinsically authoritative · pramānas: produce
justification, not knowledge · Fundamental trust in pramānas :
: philosophy of language
b. Mīmāmsā 263
Vedas as authorless · Primordial connection between words
and referents · How could conventions ever have begun? · Convention
needed for knowing word–world link? · Possibility of misunderstanding
the Vedas · Mīmāmsā : and efficacy of rituals · Why the truth of the
Vedas is implied · Dharmakīrti: truths need to be backed
by speakers · Connection of Mīmāmsā: epistemology and philosophy
of language · arthāpatti
:
c. Mīmāmsā, historiography, and history 267
The (ahistoric) Vedas as a model of excellence · Mīmāmsā
: and Buddhist
thought: the big picture · Epistemic optimism vs. pessimism · Historical
xxii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
background of this disagreement · Brahmins and Buddhists at

royal courts · Different degrees of philosophical emphasis on the status quo
9. The End of Buddhist Philosophy in India 270
The last 500 years · A decline in quality? · Continuing performance but
no new characters
a. Śāntideva 271
Śāntideva’s life · The Bodhicaryāvatāra · Śāntideva and Nālandā ·
Nālandā’s curriculum · Nālandā and its patrons · Nālandā and the
Bodhicaryāvatāra
:
b. Atiśa Dīpamkaraśrījñāna 276
Atiśa’s early life · His studies · Teacher at Vikramaśīla · The
voyage to Tibet · His work in Tibet · Indian Mahāyāna’s ambivalence
towards tantra · Atiśa’s connection with tantra · Tantra in Tibet ·
Atiśa on the suitability of tantric practices · Political dimension of the status
of tantra · Buddhist scholasticism beyond India · Looking back from Tibet
Concluding Remarks 282

Diagrams of Schools and Thinkers
The following two diagrams are intended to provide the reader with a synoptic
survey of the main schools and thinkers discussed in this book. For the sake of
simplicity I have omitted schools and thinkers that only play a subsidiary role
in the following pages. Both diagrams take the form of a ‘subway map’, each
line represents a school, and each stop or circle its approximate date of origin.
Connections between lines represent linkages between individual schools. Even
where there is no explicit ‘interchange’, spatial proximity indicates conceptual
affinity; it is no accident that tantra and tathāgatagarbha run on either side of
the Yogācāra line.
The first diagram simply identifies the different lines in terms of the different
schools they represent. In the second diagram all the names of schools are
omitted for the sake of simplicity; instead, the names of thinkers and of some
key texts associated with these schools are superimposed on the respective
lines. A section at the right-hand side lists names of the main non-Buddhist
thinkers that make an appearance in the following pages.
These diagrams are supposed to supplement the discussion in the following
pages, not to replace it. Given the considerable uncertainty about the dates of
individual thinkers, about what constitutes a ‘school’, how these schools are
interconnected, and which thinkers are supposed to be associated with which
schools the pieces of information provided by the diagrams should be taken as
pointers, not as facts. Unfortunately, the history of Indian Buddhist thought is
considerably more complicated than what can be summarized in two diagrams.
Nevertheless, I hope that the simplified picture they represent will help the
reader to navigate the complexities of the development of Buddhist philosophy
in India.
The Main Schools of Indian Buddhism
· ghika
Mahāsam Sthaviranikāya
–300
Sarvāstivāda Pudga- Vibhajya-

–200 lavāda vāda
Theravāda
–100
Mahāyāna
0
Madhyamaka Sautrāntika
100
Yogācāra
200
300
Tathāgata-
garbha
400
Yogācāra-
Sautrāntika
Svātantrika Prāsan·gika
500
Madhyamaka-
600 Yogācāra
700 Tantra
800
900
1000
Diagram of philosophical schools

Major Indian Buddhist Philosophers and Texts Non-Buddhist

philosophers
–300
Dharmatrāta
Ghosaka
· Vasumitra
–200 Buddhadeva
–100
Prajñā-
pāramitā-
sūtra
0
·
Lankāvatārasūtra
100 Nāgārjuna
Samdhinir- Aksapāda
·
Āryadeva · (Nyāya)
mocana-
sūtra
200
Maitreyanātha
·
Asanga
300 Buddhaghosa
·
Ratna-
Vasu- Vātsyāyana
gotra-
bandhu (Nyāya)
vibhaga
400
Buddhapālita
·
Dinnāga Kumārila
Dharmakīrti (Mīmāmsā)
·
500 Bhāviveka
Candrakīrti Uddyotakara
(Nyāya)
Śānta- Gaudapāda
600 raksita
· (Vedānta)
Kamalaśīla
Hevajra- ·
Śankara
Śāntideva tantra (Vedānta)
700
800
Ratnā
Atiśa kara-
900 śānti
1000 Ratnakīrti
Diagram of thinkers and texts

Introduction
To the modern historian, Buddhism is a phenomenon which must exas-

perate him at every point, and we can only say in extenuation that this
religion was not founded for the benefit of historians.¹
1. Buddhist Philosophy in India:

A Wheel Ever Turning
One of the most famous of all Buddhist metaphors is, without doubt, the The wheel:
description of the Buddha’s teaching, the dharma, as a wheel. The very first metaphor for the
Buddhist doctrine
teaching of the Buddha, after all, came to be known as the ‘discourse turning
the Wheel of the Doctrine’ (dharma-cakra-pravartana-sūtra). Why precisely
the teaching should be compared to a wheel might not be altogether obvious to
us, and it was also not obvious to some of the Buddhist scholastics, who
discussed the matter in considerable detail. Vasubandhu describes a specific
realization of the teaching as the wheel of dharma, namely the so-called ‘path of
seeing’ (darśana mārga), the first direct, non-conceptual insight into empti-
ness.² This is considered to be like a wheel because it moves quickly,³ conveys
the meditator to further spiritual realization, and crushes the defilements under
it. The Sarvāstivāda master Ghos: aka considers the noble eightfold path to be a
wheel, because some of its parts correspond to the spokes, others to the hub
and to the rim.⁴ Later Tibetan commentators explain the wheel metaphor by
reference to the universal monarch (cakravartin), whose attribute is a wheel.⁵
¹ Conze 1980: 15.

² Abhidharmakośa 6: 54c: dharmacakram : tu d:rṅmārgah,: which the bhās:ya explains as tatsādhar-
myāddarśanamārgo dharmacakram, Pradhan 1975: 371: 4–5, Poussin and Pruden 1988–90: 3. 995.
³ According to Sarvāstivāda theory, the path of seeing lasts only for fifteen moments, being
followed in the sixteenth moment by the ‘path of meditation’ (bhāvanā mārga). See Poussin and
Pruden 1988–90: 3. 996; Bhikkhu Dhammajoti 2009: 451.
⁴ Pradhan 1975: 371: 7–9, Poussin and Pruden 1988–90: 3. 996.
⁵ This idea derives probably from the image of the wheels of the monarch’s chariot rolling over
the territories of his realm. Such a monarch is also said to be born with the mark of the wheel on his
hands. See Stutley and Stutley 1977: 58.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
As the king’s dominion extends from country to country, so the Buddha’s

teaching extends from master to successive disciples.⁶
Buddhist thought A fairly obvious feature of a wheel is its combination of the static and the
in India: dynamic. After a 360-degree revolution a wheel returns to its original position
permanence
and change while also having moved to another place. In this respect it resembles the
development of Buddhist thought in India. In one sense it stays always the
same, to the extent that all of its manifold developments can be traced back to
some element of the Buddha’s original teaching (though not necessarily a very
explicit one); in another sense it is continuously changing, varying the way the
Buddhist message is conveyed relative to different audiences and different
times. Our discussion in the following pages attempts to be faithful to both
aspects, giving an account of the changing manifestations of Buddhist philoso-
phy while also examining the extent to which it is a coherent enterprise drawn
from the single source of the Buddha’s insight.
2. Philosophy as a Game
The game as a The development of Buddhist philosophy in India is a complex phenomenon
heuristic device for that stretched over more than one millennium and a half, and consists of an
understanding
philosophy intricate web of schools, thinkers, texts, and concepts, all embedded in the
wider context of Indian philosophical and cultural history. In order to under-
stand complex phenomena, humans need simple models. One such a model is
a game. Philosophy is occasionally compared to a game,⁷ and indeed there are a
number of parallels between the two: there are players and teams (philosophers
and their schools), rules (the canons of argumentation), matches (encounters
between thinkers or schools), wins and losses (successful and unsuccessful
arguments), and there is development through a series of games. While it is
easy to list the ways in which philosophy is not like a game (in games it is
usually clear who has won, unlike in philosophy; philosophy is about funda-
mental features of the world, while games are not about anything; and so on),
the similarities are sufficiently numerous to employ the example of a game as a
heuristic device for explaining the structure of my exposition of Buddhist
philosophy in India.
Four factors I am first going to describe a number of factors that shape the dynamics
shaping a game of philosophical developments. We can distinguish four: arguments, texts,
meditative practices, and historical background. Arguments correspond to
the techniques players use in the game, while thinkers may be compared
to the players, and their debates to the games played. The influence of medi-
tative techniques may be compared (somewhat crudely) to the inner states of
⁶ Cabezón 1994: 37. ⁷ Huizinga 1949: 146–57.

INTRODUCTION 
the players and how these affect their playing techniques, while the historical
background functions like the condition of the pitch, the temperature, humid-
ity, and so on.
Once we have the factors in place, we can begin narrating the game. Our Narrating the
narrative will be largely one of the performance of different teams (philosoph- game
ical schools), and within this larger frame we will be looking at individual
players (particular philosophers), their own accounts of games they played
(texts), and at distinctive moves in those games (concepts characteristic of the
individual schools).
Before beginning the actual narrative, it is important to give some consid- Sources the
eration to the sources it is going to be based on. The history of a game may be narration is
based on
based on recordings or descriptions of famous matches, comparisons of sets of
rules, interviews with players, and so on. In the context of a history of Buddhist
philosophy our resources are largely⁸ text-based. These texts are, on the one
hand, foundational texts like the Buddhist sūtras (and, in the context of
our present investigation, these are to a large extent Mahāyāna sūtras)⁹ and, Foundational texts
on the other hand, commentarial texts that in some way explicate or expand on and commentaries
the meaning of the foundational texts. These can be direct commentaries, or
works that attempt to explicate the meaning of a group of foundational texts in
a more summative manner. All of these then can give rise to further comments
and explications, forming the basis of an inverted scholastic pyramid of more
and more commentarial layers.
Of course the description of a match is considerably different from the Philosophical
match itself, and if the commentary may correspond to the description of a debates in ancient
India
match, the actual matches correspond to the philosophical debates that took
place in ancient India. In this context the comparison with games is quite apt
for describing what constituted a kind of ancient Indian intellectual spectator
sport. Unfortunately we do not have any transcripts of these debates, but
commentarial works are often structured in the debating mode, written as if
the explicator was giving his interpretation of the text in front of an audience of
heckling interlocutors. The author will present his view of what a specific
passage means, and then suggest answers to objections from (real or imagined)
opponents trying to undermine his interpretation. Gaining an understanding
⁸ I say ‘largely’ because, unlike other ancient philosophical traditions (such as those of ancient
Greece and Rome), the Buddhist philosophical tradition is a living one. The game continues to be
played, and while this is helpful for the scholar of Buddhist philosophy in many respects, we must
not forget that while present practice can give us some pointers towards what philosophical practice
in ancient India was like, it is necessary to keep in mind that about a millennium of intellectual
development and conceptual history separates the current philosophical tradition from its ancient
Indian ancestor.
⁹ As a matter of fact the Buddhist tantras should be included amongst these foundational texts
as well. However, the philosophical foundation of Buddhist tantra is not very well researched at
present, and our exposition will only make occasional references to tantric texts.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
of the debating context helps us to understand what doing philosophy in

ancient India really amounted to.
Doxographical Apart from the foundational texts and their commentaries there is one
works further set of sources that is useful for our present discussion. These are
doxographical works, expositions of a variety of Buddhist or non-Buddhist
views that give us an insight into the way the ancient Indians made sense of the
diversity of philosophical ideas that surrounded them. These texts did not
present a historical narrative, a story of how philosophical views developed
successively, but arranged thinkers, texts, and concepts into groups of philo-
sophical schools and usually set out their discussion in opposition to a specific
position that was deemed correct and superior to all of these. This could take
place by simply pitching the different schools against each other, or by arran-
ging them in a hierarchy, where different schools are taken to approach the one
true theory more or less closely. Doxographic presentations provide us with a
bird’s eye view of matches between different philosophical ‘teams’, even though
we have to take into account that they are always composed with a specific
philosophical agenda in mind.
The game’s view After looking at what kind of sources are at our disposal for narrating the
of the game game, a final thing to consider is the game’s view of the game. When we narrate
the history of a complex game with a long history, we do so from our own
perspective, and from our own historical position—indeed, how else could we
possibly narrate it? Yet the players of the game will have had their own view of
the nature of the pursuit they were engaged in, and if their assumptions
differed considerably from those we use in narrating the game, it is worthwhile
to make them explicit and to determine whether this discrepancy leads to
problems for our narrative.
3. Factors Determining the Game

Histories of There are various histories of Buddhist philosophy currently available in
Buddhist Western languages, some of them composed by eminent scholars in the
philosophy as
partial pictures field.¹⁰ What, then, is the purpose of writing yet another one? The most
obvious reason is that Buddhist philosophy is a vast topic spanning two-
and-a-half millennia and the cause of significant intellectual developments in
practically every country in Asia. As such, any monograph of the topic can at
best be a partial snapshot, delineating some of the major developments, and
barely mentioning or leaving out countless others. Such a snapshot is invari-
ably the result of what appears most salient to its author, and different histories
will thereby present different facets of the complex history of Buddhist
¹⁰ See e.g. Conze 1962, Zotz 1996, Guillon 1997.

INTRODUCTION 
philosophical thought. This book is no different. What, then, are the key
aspects of the history of Buddhist philosophy that this books seeks to describe?
First of all, I am not attempting to cover the whole development of Buddhist Period covered:
thought from the historical Buddha up to the present through all Buddhist Abhidharma up
to Dharmakīrti
cultures, but focus on a specific, seminal place and period: the golden age of
Buddhist philosophy in India, from the composition of the Abhidharma texts
(about the beginning of the first millennium CE) up to time of Dharmakīrti
(sixth or seventh century CE), with some, albeit limited, consideration of its
history between Dharmakīrti and the end of the Buddhist scholastic tradition
on the Indian subcontinent at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Within
these temporal and spatial parameters, I want to describe how the development
of Buddhist philosophy was influenced primarily by three key factors: argu-
ments, texts, and meditative practice.¹¹ Each of these three factors determined
the shape of Buddhist philosophy in important ways.
We will only occasionally mention the fourth factor mentioned above, Social, economic,
historical background. This is not because I believe that considerations of political factors
social, economic, and political factors are of no importance for understanding

the history of Buddhist philosophy in India. There is no doubt that such factors
contributed to shaping the history of Buddhism as a whole,¹² even though the
danger that the political flavour of the day may influence or distort the
conception of India’s intellectual past presented in histories with a strong
emphasis on the political dimension is not to be underestimated. Two particu-
larly clear examples are Frauwallner’s theories of the Aryan basis of Indian
philosophy,¹³ and Ruben’s history of Indian philosophy along Marxist lines.¹⁴
In addition, how relevant the social, economic, and political events that
might have had an effect on the development of the Buddhist religion in general
are for explaining the history of Buddhist philosophy in particular is frequently
difficult to determine. Even for times and places where we have plenty of
information about social, political, and economic factors (say, post-Enlightenment
Europe), writing the history of philosophical ideas of this period in terms of
these factors seems hardly straightforward and possibly of limited importance
for illuminating their contents. In the case of ancient India our knowledge of
these matters is extremely limited and fragmentary, and while it would be
¹¹ We can line these up with the three epistemic instruments (pramāṇ a) distinguished by
Buddhist authors such as Vasubandhu (Gold 2015a: 100): inference (anumāna), scriptural testimony
(āgama), and perception (pratyaks: a) understood as perception arising as the result of meditative
practice (yogipratyaks:a). Note that there is no overall consensus within Buddhist thought on the
number of the epistemic instruments. Candrakīrti appears to accept the set of four epistemic
instruments given by Nyāya, Diṅnāga restricts them to two, perception and inference, while
Nāgārjuna seems to reject all of them (at least if understood in a substantialist sense).
¹² See e.g. Ling 1973. ¹³ Frauwallner 1939.
¹⁴ Ruben 1954. See Franco 2013: 6–16 for a good discussion of the background of both of
Frauwallner’s and Ruben’s approaches.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
foolish to deny that society, economics, and politics did influence the history of
philosophy in India to some extent, it is hard to establish potential correlations
with a high degree of certainty.¹⁵ As any influence they might have had also
appears to be less decisive than that of arguments, texts, and meditative
practices, we will only mention connections with these historical factors in a
few instances.
a. Arguments
Arguments as When thinking about the history of philosophy we might be forgiven for
driving the history thinking that it is the arguments that drive its entire development. There are
of philosophy
certain answers to certain philosophical questions, and philosophers come up
with arguments to back up some of these answers. Whoever has the most
successful argument, the story goes, will create the most successful philosoph-
ical theory, which then attracts various refutations and counter-arguments, the
best of which will then become the most notorious, and so on. This picture
is certainly too simplistic to account for the history of any philosophical
tradition, but it contains the fundamental insight that arguments and the
competition between them is one of the key driving forces of philosophical
development. In the context of Indian Buddhist philosophy it is also important
not to focus solely on the argumentative exchanges within the Buddhist
tradition, but also on the debates Buddhists had with exponents of the different
schools of classical Indian philosophy, as there are numerous instances where
the expository framework and also the contents of Buddhist philosophy are
Development of influenced in important ways by its interaction with non-Buddhist schools.
Buddhist Roger Jackson proposed a three-stage model of the development of Buddhist
philosophy:
three stages thought in India.¹⁶ During the first stage (roughly the first three centuries of
Buddhism’s existence) Buddhism participated in inter-sectarian discussion
with various non-Buddhist schools (such as the Jains, Cārvāka, and Ājīvika
schools), thereby making its own doctrinal position more precise. This was
followed by a second stage (beginning around the time of Aśoka in the third
century BCE) during which Buddhists were primarily debating with Buddhists.
At this time of mainly intra-sectarian debate the bases of the four Buddhists
schools distinguished in traditional doxographies were established; the aim of
the game was not so much to establish the truth of Buddhism in the face of its
detractors, as to refute interpretations of the Buddha’s words that were con-
ceived as erroneous. In the third stage the Buddhists appear to be turning
outwards again. Over the centuries Indian philosophical schools had developed
a plethora of more advanced philosophical techniques which could be used to
¹⁵ For recent interesting work on potential correlations between ancient Indian philosophy and
political factors see Bronkhorst 2011a, Eltschinger 2013, Walser 2015.
¹⁶ Jackson 1993: 99–107.
INTRODUCTION 
address old disputes once again, but this time from a new perspective.¹⁷ They Debates with non-
began to argue with each other in a manner that did not presuppose the validity Buddhist schools
of any one of their particular worldviews, and tried to base their entire
argumentative exchanges on premisses that both opponents could accept,
together with a set of shared logical and epistemological assumptions.¹⁸ The
influence of non-Buddhist arguments on the development of Buddhist phil-
osophy was obviously most pronounced during stages 1 and 3. Given the focus
of this work on the first millennium CE, I will be looking primarily at phase 3 to
find out how the interaction with non-Buddhist arguments influenced the
development of Buddhist philosophy. After a period of intra-Buddhist debate
of considerable complexity, which could, nevertheless, take all of the familiar
Buddhist assumptions as agreed upon, Buddhists
suddenly found themselves defending the existence of past and future lives against
Cārvāka materialists, the possibility of liberation against both materialists and
:
Mīmāmsākas, :
their denial of universals against the Vaiśesikas, their rejection of a
:
creator God against the Naiyāyikas, the theory of momentariness against the Sāmkhyas
and Jainas—and the theory of no-self (anātman) against virtually everybody.¹⁹
This necessity to provide arguments for claims that were previously simply
assumed is a clear example of how the dynamics of argument acts as a driving
force behind Indian Buddhist philosophy. But arguments are not everything,
and especially for forms of philosophy developed against a religious back-
ground, sacred texts are another key factor that influences the way their history
takes shape.
b. Sacred texts
In an important sense the sacred texts—in this case, the Buddhist canon—
provide the goal of philosophical argumentation. The claims made in the
canon are the claims which are to be argued for, analyzed, and expanded on
in Buddhist philosophical texts. However, that does not mean that the Bud-
dhist philosophical enterprise is simply trying to provide arguments for already
established conclusions. First of all, which texts are to be regarded as canonical
is far from straightforward, as the multiplicity of Buddhist canons testifies.
Secondly, even within the context of a set of texts that are regarded as
authoritative, the Buddhist hermeneutic distinction between the interpretable
¹⁷ It is interesting to note that once Indian Buddhism is translated to Tibet we find a resurrection
of phase 2, with a nearly exhaustive dominance of intra-sectarian disputes, because there are
virtually no proponents of other schools to debate with.
¹⁸ Of course this did not work quite as smoothly as the participants might have hoped. Compare,
for example, the Nyāya and Madhyamaka disagreements about the status of rules used in debates
discussed in Nāgārjuna’s Vaidalyaprakaraṇ a (Westerhoff 2018).
¹⁹ Jackson 1993: 105.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Interpretable/ (neyārtha) and the definite (nītārtha) texts allows for a surprising amount of
definite distinction
as source of
variation amongst Buddhist positions. If there are specific utterances of the
variation in Buddha that are to be taken literally, and others that require interpretation,
Buddhist variations of which ones are to be put in which category can produce a
philosophy
considerable divergence between different interpretative positions. The fore-
grounding of specific texts or sets of texts to support particular interpretations
of the Buddhist doctrine is therefore to be understood (alongside the dynamics
of argumentative exchanges) as a second key factor that shaped the course of
Buddhist philosophy in India.
c. Meditative practice
Finally, we have to keep in mind that Buddhist texts are not just meant to be
read, but supposed to be practised. In particular, they constitute a set of
instructions to bring about a gradual (or perhaps sudden) cognitive shift that
is indicative of the mind changing from the unenlightened to the enlightened
state. It is sometimes pointed out that the formation of the Buddhist canons
was frequently open-ended, insofar as during the development of Buddhism
new texts appeared that were later regarded as canonical.²⁰ This, together with
the natural open-endedness of argumentative exchanges, contributed in an
important way to the dynamic development of Buddhist thought. But there is
yet another source of open-endedness involved. The Buddha (and subsequent
The need to Buddhist masters) taught a set of meditative techniques which their disciples
classify meditative
experiences
were supposed to put into practice in order to develop certain insights into
their teaching at the experiential level. These techniques generated a plethora
of inner experiential states in the practitioners, and the ensuing phenomen-
ology needed to be conceptualized within a suitable framework, answering
such questions as what these states were, how they were related to ordinary
experiences, what the reason for their soteriological efficacy was, and so forth.
As the set of meditative techniques Buddhist practitioners employed was
elaborated and enlarged during the development of Buddhism, the philosoph-
ical frameworks employed to account for these kept developing too. As such, a
significant part of the development of Buddhist philosophy can be understood
as responding to the need to account for a phenomenology of meditative states.
Three factors as It is usually impossible to draw very precise distinctions between the three
gravitational factors of arguments, texts, and meditative practice, claiming, for example, that
forces
a given position solely arose because it was a response to a specific non-
Buddhist argument, or because if featured dominantly in a text that had just
become popular, or because it was needed to a account for some particular item
²⁰ Whether these were in fact authored later, already composed at the Buddha’s time and then
hidden, or were somehow produced in a realm other than the world we inhabit is a complex
question which we need not settle here.
INTRODUCTION 
of meditative phenomenology. These factors overlap and influence each other,

and it may therefore be best to think of them as three bodies with different
strengths of gravitational attraction, and of the trajectory of Buddhist philoso-
phy as corresponding to that of a particle moving between them, approaching
closer to one, and thereby being attracted more by it, then moving more into
the gravitational field of another, and so on.
It is also helpful to think of the relation of these three factors in terms of the Exaptation of
evolutionary concept of exaptation. Exaptation describes a case where a feature philosophical
concepts
was evolutionarily developed for one purpose (such as the bird’s plumage for
temperature regulation) but subsequently served another (in this case, flight).
In the same way, a specific concept might originate from a particular doctrinal
position, argument, or meditative experience, and may later prove useful to
elucidate another textual passage, underpin a quite different argument, or help
to conceptualize further forms of meditation. It is not implausible to suggest
that the concepts that proved to be especially successful in the development of
Buddhist philosophy were those that displayed the greatest degree of exaptive
functionality, that is, concepts that, though originating from a specific doctri-
nal, dialectical, or meditative context could be usefully employed in quite
different contexts. Understood in this way, it will be easier to see how reference
to each of the three factors allows us to get a better grasp of the different twists
and turns of the development of Buddhist philosophy in India over the course
of time.
4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure

the Material
There are various possible ways of structuring a history of philosophy. We can Challenges in
understand it as a succession of thinkers (as is frequently done in histories of structuring a
history of Indian
Western philosophy), or as a series of philosophical texts, or as a progression of philosophy
philosophical schools, or as a sequence of philosophical ideas.
Each approach has its drawbacks. When dealing with ancient Indian
thinkers it is frequently unclear when they lived, what they wrote, and even
in some cases how many of the same name there were in the first place.²¹
Focusing exclusively on the texts makes establishing a historical progression
not necessarily easier, since dating the texts and establishing their mutual
temporal relations is often far from straightforward. The doxographical
²¹ Dasgupta (1922: 1.62) notes that ‘it is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian
Philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been written.’
Dasgupta’s methodological reflections are still pertinent, though his view that ‘all the independence
of their [i.e. the Indian philosophers’] thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school
to which they were attached’ (63) needs to be reconsidered in the light of the contemporary
discussion we find e.g. in Ganeri 2011.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
approach that divides the history of Buddhist thought by schools, a device

favoured by Indian and Tibetan historians, faces the challenge that much of the
seemingly clear division between the different schools is an ex post facto
arrangement, and that the individual thinkers concerned would have been
unlikely to ascribe themselves to the specific schools they are supposed to
have belonged to quite so readily. We certainly find numerous Indian Buddhist
philosophers who cross the supposed doxographical divides. Vasubandhu
made key contributions to the Abhidharma and to Yogācāra, Diṅnāga and
Dharmakīrti were important Yogācāra thinkers but also form what is usually
considered to be a separate logico-epistemological school. Kambala, a lesser-
known author from the sixth century, seems to occupy a position straddling
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Finally, writing a history of Buddhist thought
organized solely by concepts, a Begriffsgeschichte, would be a fascinating
enterprise, but it is an undertaking that presupposes much more philological
and philosophical groundwork than is available at present.
A hybrid structure Being aware of the drawbacks and advantages of each organizational prin-
ciple, our history opts for a hybrid approach. We will structure the history of
Buddhist thought according to the traditional and plausible historical sequence
Four schools Abhidharma—Madhyamaka—Yogācāra—Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, while
paying attention to their mutual interrelations,²² and discuss the difficulties
in clearly differentiating between them.²³ No account of Buddhist thought in
India would be complete without discussing the manifold philosophical inter-
Buddhist–non- actions between the schools of Buddhist thought and non-Buddhist classical
Buddhist debates Indian philosophy. The amount and scope of their debates is vast, and in the
limits of a concise history such as this our approach has to be selective. We will
look in more detail at three sets of debates between Buddhist and non-Buddhist
schools: between Madhyamaka and Nyāya, between Yogācāra and Vedānta,
and between the school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and Mīmāmsā. :
Key thinkers Within the general doxographic and historical framework of the four schools
we discuss the key thinkers of each school. It is clear, however, that many of these
have produced work crossing the doxographical divisions, and that we might
sometimes be dealing with two or more historical personalities that have been
Key texts merged in the traditional view. While looking at individual thinkers it is also
necessary to provide accounts of key works, of philosophical treatises (śāstras)
²² We discuss the relation between Madhyamaka and Abhidharma in Chapter 2 (pp. 99–101,
107–15), that between Yogācāra and Abhidharma and Madhyamaka in Chapter 3 (pp. 200–16),
and that between the theories of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and those of the other three schools in
Chapter 4 (pp. 259–70).
²³ Questions of differentiation become particularly interesting when considering attempts to
combine Madhyamaka and Yogācāra approaches (see e.g. the essays by Westerhoff, Shulman, Gold,
and Blumenthal in Garfield and Westerhoff 2015) and when investigating the relation of the
theories of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti with those of the other three schools.
INTRODUCTION 
with clearly identified authors, and of important sūtras associated with the
different philosophical traditions, texts which are supposed to comprise the
essence of philosophical views subsequently elaborated in the more technical
treatises. Unfortunately the dating, authorship, mutual relationship, and some-
times scope of the individual texts is often far from clear. Finally, we will need
to provide substantial discussion of the key concepts indispensable for under- Key concepts
standing the philosophical outlook of each school. Our aim is to make the
limitations of each organizational principle evident while ensuring that an
informative account of the history of Buddhist thought emerges through
their joint presence.
5. The Sources of the Game

a. The bases of Buddhist philosophy
The main source from which all of Buddhist philosophy flows is, unsurpris- Early discourses
ingly, the teaching of the Buddha. In the context of the history of Indian and Mahāyāna
sūtras
Buddhism during the first millennium CE, ‘the teaching of the Buddha’ is not
just taken to comprise the discourses of early Buddhism, but also a variety of
other texts, such as the Mahāyāna sūtras, as well as the tantras. All of these are
traditionally considered to have been authored by the Buddha in some form or
other, whether in his physical form during the present world-age (kalpa) as
Buddha Śākyamuni during the time of his life in ancient India, or in another
manifestation, or in another space and time altogether. These texts became
known gradually over time as Buddhism developed in ancient India; the first
Mahāyāna sūtras appeared around the beginning of the Common Era, and the
first Buddhist tantras around the third century CE. The Mahāyāna Buddhist
tradition does not see the later origin of these texts as detracting from their
claim to authenticity. It argues that these teachings were indeed all authored by
the Buddha, though not all were made public at the very beginning, as some
doctrines would only be beneficial for beings that lived a considerable time
after the Buddha’s death. As such, the teachings were hidden until a suitable
time for their propagation arose.
Some parts of contemporary Buddhist studies are very interested in determin- The ‘original
ing the ‘original teachings’ of the Buddha,²⁴ and separating them from the teachings’ of the
Buddha
historical overlay that later generations have added as embellishment, distinguish-
ing supposedly earlier hard conceptual substance from later fluffy pious fiction.²⁵
²⁴ Gombrich 2009, Siderits 2010.

²⁵ This approach finds its counterpart in attempts to extract the ‘historical core’ of hagiograph-
ical accounts, such as the traditional accounts of the Buddha’s life or biographies of later Buddhist
luminaries. This strikes me as particularly problematic in the Buddhist case; see pp. 24–34 below for
further discussion.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
This is not an approach the Buddhist tradition itself adopted, and although not
every Buddhist thinker would consider every text as genuine, the conception of
the later development of Buddhism as an obscuring force that is somehow
clouding the original clarity of the Buddha’s teachings is not one we find in
ancient Indian texts.²⁶ For the purpose of discussing the history of Buddhist
philosophy, attempting to distinguish which philosophical positions form part
of the ‘original thinking of the Buddha’ and which are later scholastic develop-
ments that depart from his original message is not very helpful. This distinction is
Different ways of therefore not one we are attempting to draw in the following pages. It is in fact
construing
‘original teachings’
questionable whether this distinction makes sense at all. As will be seen from
various examples in our following discussion, the Buddha’s teachings contain a
variety of conceptual seeds that later germinate in the development of different
philosophical traditions, with different traditions placing different emphases on
specific concepts.²⁷ Each tradition creates its own image of ‘what the Buddha
really taught’ by focusing on those concepts that feature prominently in the
philosophical approach the tradition under consideration develops. The different
emphases of the different traditions were shaped by the intellectual needs and
circumstances of the times in which these traditions developed, and given the
importance the Buddha accorded to teachings being suitable for the time, place,
and audience that receives them, arguing against the authenticity of later teach-
ings because they go beyond the discussions found in the early sūtras is hardly
satisfactory. This approach overlooks how much the exposition of the dharma
needs to be shaped by the beliefs and preconceptions of the audience in order to
be soteriologically effective.
Frameworks of The sūtras therefore form the basis on which the activity of doing philosophy
philosophical in the Buddhist context took place. It is worthwhile to spend some time consid-
activity: debates,
commentaries, ering the different forms of intellectual presentation that shaped both the outward
doxographies appearance and the contents of the activity that constituted ancient Indian
philosophical works. We will look at three main frameworks in which
Indian philosophizing took place: debates, commentaries, and doxographies.
²⁶ The modern distrust of the scholastic Indian commentarial tradition is not confined to
commentaries on the teachings of the historical Buddha. Kalupahana (2008: 517) believes that
central subsequent commentators misunderstood the meanings of Nāgārjuna’s, Vasubandhu’s, and
Diṅnāga’s works, and that their messages need to be rediscovered by a direct reading of their text
unencumbered by the conceptual frameworks of the commentarial tradition.
²⁷ This fact needs to be taken into account when considering the development of the different
schools of Buddhist philosophy, and the association of particular thinkers with specific schools.
Each school created its own ‘conceptual lineage’, rooted in the Buddha’s teaching, by tracing its
specific ideas backwards through a selection of sūtras and commentarial material. We need,
therefore, to be aware that the association of specific authors and texts with a given school might
be primarily the outcome of such a retrospective process of lineage creation, and that the authors
themselves might not have identified themselves with that specific school. While a useful device for
classifying Buddhist philosophers in terms of the main ideas they defend, the idea of a determinate
association of each one with a specific school is in many cases a doxographical fiction.
INTRODUCTION 
To some extent these are all present in the current form of Western
philosophy most readers will be familiar with. The questions after a philo-
sophical lecture can often be best described in terms of a debate: they are
objections put forward by the audience, the speaker responds by a defence of his
position. Major works in the history of philosophy (such as Kant’s first Critique
or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus) give rise to works of secondary literature calling
itself ‘Commentary on . . . ’, and histories of philosophy can often be under-
stood as doxographies organized by thinkers who held the respective doxa.
In ancient Indian philosophy these forms of presentation are both more
elaborate and more influential than their contemporary Western variants,
which may sometimes appear somewhat anaemic. In order to understand
what ancient Indian philosophers did and how they did it, it is important to
have some understanding of the structure of these forms of presentation, and
of the purpose they are supposed to serve.
b. Debates
It is hard to overestimate the importance of debates in Indian intellectual life.
Public debates constituted the most important and most visible forms of Public debates
philosophical exchange. They were an intellectual spectator sport, sometimes
held in the presence of a ruler,²⁸ that attracted considerable audiences. The
stakes were high: not only could they make or break a scholar’s career; they
could also have important consequences for their followers. We frequently read
about scholars defeated in debates who not only have to adopt their opponent’s
position, but have to make all their disciples convert as well. Sometimes even
more is at stake (though we have to take these accounts perhaps with a pinch of
salt): the defeated debater is expected to cut out his tongue or even to kill
himself.²⁹ Xuanzang (玄奘), a Chinese scholar who travelled through India at
the beginning of the seventh century, has this to say about Indian debates:
Assemblies for discussion are often held to test the intellectual capacity of the monks, in
order to distinguish the superior from the inferior, and to reject the dull and promote
the bright. Those who can deliberate on the subtle sayings, and glorify the wonderful
theories with refined diction and quick eloquence, may ride richly caparisoned ele-
phants with hosts of attendants preceding and following behind them. But those to
whom the theories are taught in vain, or who have been defeated in a debate, explaining
few principles in a verbose way, or distorting the teachings with language that is merely
pleasant to the ear, are daubed with ocher or chalk in the face, while dust is scattered
²⁸ For further discussion of the royal patronage of debates see Bronkhorst 2011a: 175–9.
²⁹ Eckel 2008: 10, 13–14. A variety of historical documents informs us that tortures reportedly
inflicted on the loser of debates were equally gruesome and inventive. In addition to the cutting out
of tongues and banishment they include the defeated opponent being ‘bruised to death in oil-mills
of stone’ (Verardi 2014: 26), being boiled in oil (211), having their heads cut off with axes, and
being thrown into a wooden mortar and ground to powder (209).
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
over the body, and are expelled into the wilderness, or discarded into ditches. In this way
the good and the evil are distinguished, and the wise and the ignorant are disclosed.³⁰
Reading accounts such as these, we indeed get the impression that ‘debaters
were the rock stars and sports heroes of classical India’.³¹
Debate manuals Around the first century CE the first explicit manuals for conducting debates
were composed. Debates were no informal exchange of ideas where two
contestants had a discussion until one gave up, but highly formalized affairs
with rules about what responses could be made, what reasons could be given,
what unfair tricks an opponent might employ, and, most importantly, how to
Nyāya: three tell when a debater had lost a debate. The Nyāyasūtra, a highly influential text
kinds of debate
on logic and debate composed in its first form during the first century CE,
distinguishes three forms of debate: debate proper (vāda), which does not have
winning as its main objective, but aims at determining the truth about some
disputed matter; tricky debate (jalpa), where desire for victory is the main goal
:
for both parties; and destructive debate (vitaṇ dā), where the aim is only to
prove the opponent wrong, without attempting to prove one’s own position.
Only debates proper end in the determination of a true conclusion; tricky
debates and destructive debates are over as soon as the opponent has nothing
left to say. It is only the first, debate proper, which is to be regarded as a
philosophical tool; the other two are merely degenerated versions that occur
when debates are primarily considered as public performances. Yet debate
proper is not only a means for a joint inquiry, but also a tool for teaching
philosophy. In this form it continues in Tibetan monastic education (drawing
directly on Indian models) up to the present day.³²
Influence on We find that the practice of debate has influenced the structure of Indian
philosophical philosophical works to a considerable extent. A very clear example of this is
works
:
Vasubandhu’s Vimśikā. It begins by a verse in which Vasubandhu states that
Debate and all things are only mental in nature. But instead of elaborating this point
Vasubandhu’s
further and supplying arguments for the position, the text goes immediately
:
Vimśikā
into objections the opponent makes against this counterintuitive position;
Vasubandhu then develops this point further by responding to these objec-
tions. Even though not all Indian philosophical texts of the first millennium CE
show their connection with the debating ground so clearly, in virtually all of
them, be they independent works or commentaries, we find some space given
to an opponent (or a sequence of opponents that will not necessarily agree with
one another); the author then uses the opportunity to explain his account
further by answering the opponents one by one.
The influence of debates on the development of Indian Buddhist
philosophy is a clear example how the first of the three factors distinguished
³⁰ Li 1996: 58. ³¹ Eckel 2008:15. ³² Perdue 1992, 2014.

INTRODUCTION 
above—arguments—shape its contents. Buddhist philosophical texts from the

first millennium CE are not just expositions of the words of the historical Texts as responses
Buddha, but are responses to the claims of its philosophical rivals. While to philosophical
rivals
their aim is to establish the truth of the Buddha’s fundamental insight,
they do so in a way that replies to actual or hypothetical criticisms that were
brought forward by the proponents of the non-Buddhist schools. Buddhist
philosophy would not be what it is today if it had not developed in a complex
interplay with opposing positions that defended radically different views
of the world.
c. Commentaries
Commentaries form an immensely important part of the philosophical texts of
ancient India. The interrelations between Indian philosophical texts can be
visualized in the form of a tree, with a small number of ‘root texts’ at the
bottom, and an ever-expanding structure of commentarial stems, branches,
and foliage on top. At the bottom of the tree are the sūtras, texts that attempt to Characteristics
of a sūtra
exemplify the ideals of exceeding conciseness (laghutā), as well as completeness
(k:rtsnatā) in the treatment of a particular subject matter, though often doing so
at the expense of clarity (vaiśadya), the third ideal traditionally associated with
theoretical texts in ancient India.³³ A sūtra presents material in a series of short,
often metrically structured sentences, a format that aids memorization of
frequently very large conceptual structures. In fact, calling sūtras short is a
considerable understatement, and ‘even so laconic a document as a telegram
would be prolix compared to a sūtra’.³⁴ What a sūtra has gained in compact-
ness and completeness it loses in clarity, and a text in sūtra format is decidedly
not intended to be understood on its own. We can compare a sūtra to a
computer file that needs to be decompressed before it can be read, or to
bullet-points on a lecture handout. In the latter case the bullet-points are
meant to be accompanied by the speaker’s oral presentation, and a sūtra may
be elucidated in the same way by the teacher’s verbal explanation, often after
the student has committed the text of the sūtra itself to memory. The explana-
tory expansion of the compressed sūtra format can also be provided by a Different types of
written commentary. Within the Indian scholastic context a variety of different commentaries
types of commentary are distinguished. It is indicative of the often cryptic

style employed in the sūtra genre that one type of commentary, called viv:rti
³³ Ganeri 2010: 192–3. The Buddha’s discourses, though also called sūtras, do not fall under this
notion of what a sūtra is.
³⁴ Maurer 1981: 8–9. A well-known saying states, with reference to authors of grammatical
treatises, that if they can save as much as half a syllable in the formulation of their sūtras they
rejoice as they would at the birth of a son (ardha-mātrā-lāghavena putrotsavam : manyante
vaiyākaraṇ āh).
: Kielhorn, Abhyankar, and Abhyankara 1960–2: 122.
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
vivaraṇ a or vivaraṇ a, focuses almost exclusively on grammatical issues. Such a com-

mentary would indicate the division of the words of the sūtra (word-breaks are
not indicated by spaces in Sanskrit written in devanāgarī script), explain the
meaning of obscure or technical terms by synonyms, analyse grammatical
compounds, in particular long nominal compounds beloved by authors of
Indian scholastic literature, and explain how the meaning of the sūtra is to
be construed on the basis of this analysis.³⁵
bhās:ya A second kind of commentary, a bhās:ya, operates at a somewhat higher level of
abstraction. Its purpose is to connect the individual sūtras so that they form a
coherent argumentative whole. It does so by imposing an overall structure on the
sequence of the sūtras. This involves grouping the sūtras into smaller units that
belong together, and establishing breaks between the discussions of different topics.
On the basis of this division into thematic groups it is then possible to give more
specific explanations of the individual sūtras according to the way in which they fit
into these groups. In addition, the bhās:ya will attempt to structure the sūtras
according to a dialectical narrative, specifying some sūtras as the text’s own
assertions (siddhānta), others as objections raised by the opponent (pūrvapaks: a)
or hypotheses only entertained for the sake of argument. It is evident that there is
considerable flexibility in the way a structure may be imposed on a very concise set
of sūtras. A text will usually not indicate when the author himself is speaking,
stating his own views, and when he is giving voice to his opponent’s position, which
he does not share. Such identifications will most often be carried out by commen-
taries, and a difference in opinion about who is speaking in different sections of the
text is obviously going to give rise to very different readings of a single text.
It is therefore the very terseness of the root texts, lacking indication of
divisions or structuring, or of objection and reply, that makes it possible to
structure them in more than one way, making very different commentarial
approaches possible.
It is at this stage that the necessity of a third kind of commentary, a vārttika,
vārttika arises. This is a commentary on a commentary (i.e. a bhās:ya) and presupposes the
presence of a variety of commentarial approaches to the underlying sets of sūtras.
The vārttika’s role as a subcommentary is to assess and compare the specific
interpretative choices of the different commentaries to each other, and to establish
the superiority of the bhās: ya it is a subcommentary on over the others.
The hierarchy of commentaries can obviously be extended beyond the level
of subcommentaries. The range of commentarial activities all fundamentally
³⁵ These four, together with the answering of objections that one might raise against the points
made in the sutra, constitute the five functions usually attributed to ‘commenting’ (vyākhyāna)
texts (Tubb and Bose 2007: 3–5). Note that there is nothing in these five functions that entails a
restriction to philosophical texts. A commentary on a poetical text, for example, would be expected
to provide information on these five topics as well.
INTRODUCTION 
concerned with a single text (i.e. the underlying set of sūtras) will, one might
expect, eventually obtain an equilibrium, a balanced position where the various
interpretative possibilities of the text raised so far have been explored, and
where some sort of consensus about how to understand it has been reached.
Nevertheless, at this stage we may also find authors who are dissatisfied with
the conclusions obtained at this stage, who will compose an entirely new
commentary on the root text, bypassing the accumulated rhetorical layers
and attempting to establish a fundamentally new reading of the text.³⁶
The sūtra-commentary style genre appealed to Indian philosophical writers kārikā
so much that they composed new texts, called kārikās, that were formally very
similar to the received sūtra texts, and which presented a new, concise, and
complete discussion of a philosophical topic. In some cases they would then
compose their own commentary on this new sūtra, using this opportunity to
expand in prose on the points made in the compressed sūtra format.
The framework of root texts and commentaries which is so central to Buddhist
classical Indian philosophy was adopted by Buddhist philosophers as well. commentaries
The Buddhists did not, of course, have foundational sūtras of the kind that
formed the basis of the six orthodox darśanas, like Patañjali’s Yogasūtra,
Kaṇ āda’s Vaiśes:ikasūtra, and so on. The foremost textual basis of Buddhism
are the Buddha’s discourses, also called ‘sūtra’ (or sutta in Pāli); despite the fact
that they are formally very different from the compressed telegraph style of the
sūtras of classical Indian philosophy, they became the subject of considerable
commentarial activity.³⁷ More important for the present discussion, however, Buddhist kārikās
are the independent, sūtra-style works, the Buddhist kārikās that later philo- and their auto-
commentaries
sophers composed in order to express in concise form what they took to be
the philosophical message of specific sūtras (often Mahāyāna sūtras). These
kārikās were frequently supplied with auto-commentaries. We know very little
about the way these kārikā-commentary compounds were composed. One
historical account, however, relates the way that Vasubandhu composed his
famous Abhidharmakośa,³⁸ describing how he would lecture during the day,
and then sum up the day’s teaching in a verse, the sequence of which became
the Abhidharmakośa. In this case, the detailed oral exposition would have
preceded the succinct expression in a series of sūtras, and it is not unlikely
to assume that Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary on the sūtras expressed the
content of the very lectures they are supposed to have summarized.³⁹
³⁶ In early modern India, for example, new interest arose in composing fresh commentaries on
some of the most ancient of all Indian philosophical texts, the Nyāyasūtras and the Vaiśes: ikasūtras
(Ganeri 2011).
³⁷ Ganeri 2011: 113. ³⁸ See below, pp. 155–6.
³⁹ The matter is slightly complicated by the doctrinal tension between the root text and the
commentary (see below, p. 156). Whether Vasubandhu first interpreted the root text in one way in his
oral explanation and in another way in his subsequent commentary in the Abhidharmakośabhās: ya is
 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
Even though there are accounts where teachers are supposed to have composed
a sequence of sūtras directly (this, for example, is the way Śāntideva is said to
have first taught the Bodhicaryāvatāra),⁴⁰ it seems generally plausible to
assume that the order in which a text/commentary compound is studied
(first sūtra, then commentary) is the inverse of the order in which the two
were composed.
Commentarial The very conciseness of the sūtra style makes raises the probability that
practice and different commentators come up with very different interpretations. Jonardon
authorial intent
Ganeri discusses a telling example of two different commentaries on two verses
from the Vaiśes:ikasūtra.⁴¹ The first commentary reads the first verse as
Conflicting expressing the view of a Vedānta opponent, and the second verse as presenting
commentarial the text’s own view, while the second commentary understands the first verse
interpretations
as the sūtra’s own view, and the second verse as that of a Buddhist opponent!
Such examples of divergence underline the need for vārttika-style commen-
taries that evaluate the different conflicting interpretations and select the best
one. Eventually, it would seem at least, that such evaluation leads to an
interpretative consensus on how a specific text is to be best understood, a
consensus that in the best possible case manages to approach as closely as
possible the meaning that the author originally wanted to convey in the text.
Understood in this way, a philosophical tradition that places as much
Sterility and emphasis on the production of commentaries may be considered as instanti-
arbitrariness? ating a peculiar combination of sterility and arbitrariness. It is sterile because
the primary aim of the philosophical enterprise is not any kind of conceptual
discovery or innovation, but to understand and faithfully reproduce the mean-
ing of a set of texts handed down from the past, whether these are the
foundational sūtras of the schools of classical Indian philosophy or the
Buddha’s discourses. It is arbitrary because in the process of doing so it
produces a set of very divergent, sometimes contradictory readings of the
same texts, a divergence that is caused largely by the opacity of the very texts
the tradition tries to elucidate. This opacity makes it impossible to decide
which, if any, of the different interpretations suggested expresses the ‘true
meaning’ of the root text, so that we are left with an enterprise that unsuc-
cessfully navigates between what is—in all likelihood—a vast array of differ-
ent misunderstandings of a text, with little hope of ever finding out what the
author really wanted to say.
something we do not know. In any case, apart from being in tension with the historical narrative of
the composition of the Abhidharmakośa, the idea that all of the verses of the Abhidharmakośa were
first composed as an independent work would also not cohere well with the fact that some verses do
not seem to be comprehensible without the commentary provided by the Abhidharmakośabhās:ya.
⁴⁰ See Paul Williams’s introduction to Crosby and Skilton 1995: ix–x, and above, pp. 271–2.
⁴¹ Ganeri 2011: 111.
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magnificently staged; livelier pieces such as Clorise, by Baro, a very
popular play-writer; other fashionable plays; ballets in which young
Royalties danced—Mademoiselle, Gaston’s daughter, Mademoiselle
de Bourbon, Mademoiselle de Longueville, Mademoiselle de
Vendôme, the Duc d’Enghien; his future wife Mademoiselle de
Maillé-Brézé, and other nieces and cousins of the Cardinal. These
gay fantastic ballets, even more than regular plays, were the delight
of society, young and old. All the courtiers and great ladies joined in
them; Louis XIII. himself often composed both the words and the
music of lutes, spinets, violins, and forgot his gloomy stiffness in
dancing.
In the intervals of the performances the Cardinal’s guests enjoyed
rare fruits and dainty sweetmeats, handed round by his pages in
baskets tied with English ribbons of gold and silver tissue. When
comedy and dance were over the company was offered a gorgeous
supper on the great service of plate which the Cardinal left to the
King.
The entertainments at the Palais-Cardinal reached their zenith in
January 1641, with the representation of Mirame. Richelieu, to quote
a contemporary, “témoigna des tendresses de père pour cette
pièce”; and it seems actually to have been in great part his work, in
collaboration with the academician Desmarets. The larger of his two
theatres, holding three thousand persons, was used for the first time
and decorated with special magnificence. It was rather a vast saloon
than a theatre, with gilded galleries for the most distinguished
guests; the ordinary admiring crowd finding place on the floor. His
Eminence, happy and triumphant, was near the Queen: the Abbé de
Marolles, once a timid student, now a critical spectator, describes
him as dressed in a long mantle of flame-coloured taffeta over a
black soutane, with collar and facings of ermine.
The scenery of the play, with the new machinery which astonished
all eyes, had been ordered from Italy by Cardinal Mazarin, now a
familiar figure in Paris and Richelieu’s right hand. There was a long
perspective of palaces and gardens, with terraces, grottos, fountains,
statues, all looking out over the sea, “with agitations,” says the
Gazette, “which seemed natural to the waves of that vast element,
and two large fleets, one appearing two leagues distant, both of
which passed in sight of the spectators.”
Over this lovely scene night gradually fell, and all was lit up by the
moon. Then, just as naturally, day dawned and the sun rose, taking
his turn in this “agréable tromperie.”
The majority of the guests were amazed and transported beyond
measure. A few critics, among whom was the Abbé de Marolles, did
not particularly care for all this “fine machinery and grand
perspective.” He found it fatiguing to the eyes and the mind: in his
opinion a comedy should depend for success on story, poetry, and
fine acting. “Le reste n’est qu’un embarras inutile.”
There were other more malicious critics who saw in the story of
the play—the love of Princess Mirame, daughter of the King of
Bithynia, for the daring sailor Arimant, commanding the fleet of
Colchos, with all the tragical events which at last brought about a
happy ending—a veiled allusion to the old romance of Queen Anne
and the Duke of Buckingham. It is very improbable, to say the least,
that Richelieu, who had at this time ceased to persecute the Queen,
should choose to offend her afresh by stirring up grievances fifteen
years old. His object, never indeed attained, was to live at peace
among princes and nobles who had learnt their lesson. What really
annoyed him in connection with this performance of Mirame was the
discovery by his watchful enemies of various disreputable persons
among the invited guests. The King was displeased; Monsieur
enjoyed the incident; and the Cardinal could only revenge himself on
an unlucky official who had been too free with his cards of
admittance.
In spite of fault-finders Mirame was a triumph. Standing up in his
place, the Cardinal joyfully acknowledged the constant thunders of
applause, then waving his hand for silence, that none of his fine lines
might be missed. When the play was over, and the Queen had
passed on a golden bridge drawn by peacocks to a silver throne
prepared for her beyond the lifted curtain of the stage, to preside
over a grand ball that ended the evening, there was no prouder man
in Europe than her host—the weary, sickly statesman who had
already given provinces to France and made her paramount in Italy
and Spain.
CHAPTER IX
1633-1637
Conquests in Lorraine—The return of Monsieur—The fate

of Puylaurens—France involved in the Thirty Years’ War—
Last adventures of the Duc de Rohan—Defeat, invasion, and
panic—The turn of the tide—Narrow escape of the Cardinal—
The flight of the Princes.
From the year 1630, Richelieu had employed historians and

antiquaries in hunting up documents to justify his plans for the
greater glory of France. Amazing were the pretensions that these
learned persons encouraged him to make for his King. According to
them, Louis XIII. might claim sovereign rights over England, Spain,
Milan, Naples, and Sicily, not to mention Flanders, Artois, Franche-
Comté, Lorraine, and other frontier provinces. How far Richelieu’s
dreams of conquest really extended, it is difficult to say. But the year
1633 found him resolved at least, in his own words, to “re-establish
the monarchy in its original greatness” by asserting “the ancient
rights of the Crown”; and Duke Charles of Lorraine soon gave him
his desired opportunity of annexing a large part of the old Austrasian
province.
Relying on imperial support and on his sister’s marriage with the
heir-presumptive of France, the Duke had broken treaties and had
neglected to pay homage for his French fief, the duchy of Bar. In the
summer of 1633 the Parliament of Paris was directed by Richelieu to
declare that duchy confiscated to France. In August a French army,
led by the King and the Cardinal, marched once more upon the
frontier of Lorraine.
The Duke tried to gain time, hoping for the help of a Spanish army
under the Duke of Feria, which was advancing from Italy. He sent his
brother, Cardinal Nicolas-François, to negotiate with the French,
offering not only to consent to the dissolution of his sister’s marriage,
but that the Cardinal, who had taken only minor orders, should ally
himself with Richelieu by marrying Madame de Combalet. This
proposal was coolly put aside by Richelieu, who observed that he
had not advised the King to enter Lorraine with a powerful army for
his private family ends. He insisted that Nancy, the capital, with
Princess Marguerite in person, should be placed in the King’s hands
as a pledge of submission.
As to his sister, Duke Charles was willing enough, being painfully
aware that the alliance with Gaston was a mistake which might ruin
him; but he would not consent to surrender his capital, protesting,
with oaths, that he would rather burn it down. Nevertheless, the city
did not stand a long siege; but when Louis XIII. and Richelieu made
their entry, their promised captive had escaped. By the help of her
brother the Cardinal, and with great spirit and courage on her own
part, Madame Marguerite had slipped out of Nancy at the beginning
of the blockade, and in a page’s disguise had joined her husband at
Brussels. There she was formally received as Duchess of Orléans by
the Queen-mother and the Infanta, and the marriage was confirmed
by the Archbishop of Malines.
Richelieu was not altogether displeased. Well convinced of his
power to separate Monsieur from his new wife as soon as the Prince
himself should return to France and his duty, he was not sorry to
have an honourable excuse for going to extremes with the Duke of
Lorraine. No hostage, no capital. Duke Charles was helpless; his
sister was no longer in his hands; his Spanish allies, checked on
their way by a Protestant army, failed to come to his aid. He had to
see a parliament established in Metz and almost the whole of his
province garrisoned by French troops. When the King returned to
Paris the lilies of France were flying over Lorraine. Town after town
submitted, fortress after fortress. In January 1634 Charles abdicated
for the time in favour of his brother the Cardinal, and with the small
remains of his army took service under the Emperor.
Then Cardinal de Richelieu bent all his energies to forcing on
Gaston’s return to France and reconciliation with his brother. He
regarded this as a necessity of State, and he was equally resolved
that the Queen-mother, who had made some overtures on her own
account, should never again set foot in France. Both Marie and
Gaston, while quarrelling between themselves, played the Minister’s
game by their own foolishness. A murderer, caught at Metz, was
suspected with reason of being sent from Brussels by Chanteloube,
Marie’s unwise counsellor, to attempt the life of Richelieu: he lost his
own. The same fate befell others, in Lorraine and elsewhere,
charged with the same designs; and while this secret campaign went
on, Gaston and his favourite Puylaurens made an independent treaty
with Spain, promising to invade France with a foreign army to be
supplied by the Imperial generals in the Low Countries.
Well served by spies, Richelieu knew all this. He replied to
Monsieur’s treason by representing to the King that such a prince,
who could promise French fortresses to the enemy, was not fit to
wear the crown; and with a bold decision before which, at such a
crisis, not even the hereditary monarchy was sacred, he proposed a
league of nobles and princes of the blood who should pledge
themselves, in case of Louis’ death, against the unconditional
succession of his brother. France after all, in the eyes of Richelieu,
was greater than her kings.
By the autumn of 1634 Puylaurens and his master knew that they
had made a huge mistake in allying themselves with Spain. No
troops were forthcoming, and it began to be evident that the prospect
was not one of triumph and revenge, but of ruin and perpetual exile.
All through September M. de Puylaurens was negotiating secretly
with Cardinal de Richelieu, promising for Monsieur, among other
things, the renunciation of his marriage, and also making a good
bargain for himself.
Gaston left Brussels one day in October, and galloped hard to the
frontier. He had been an exile for two years, and was enchanted to
see France again. His little daughter, Mademoiselle, now seven
years old, met him at Limours, and flew joyfully into the arms of a
gay and fascinating father.
As to Madame, left behind in Flanders, her marriage was solemnly
declared null and void by an assembly of French clergy, as having
been contracted against the civil law. In this decision, however, the
clergy acted on Gallican lines, independently of the Pope, who was
of a different opinion; and although, after long resistance, Monsieur
formally submitted, he had protected himself in advance by a letter to
Urban VIII. refusing to be bound by any extorted promise. The
consequence was, that Richelieu’s apparent triumph in this affair of
the Lorraine marriage only lasted his life. Gaston and Marguerite
remained faithful to each other; and the stiff Madame who reigned in
after years at Blois and at the Luxembourg was the same Princess,
the heroine, in her adventurous girlhood, of a secret marriage and a
romantic escape.
It was that private letter of Gaston’s to the Pope which brought
about the ruin of the unlucky Puylaurens. He had gained high favour
with Richelieu, who had purchased his faithful service, as he
thought, by making him a duke and a peer of France and by
marrying him to his own first cousin, Mademoiselle Philippe de
Pontchâteau, younger daughter of his aunt, Louise du Plessis, his
father’s sister. The marriage took place in Paris at the end of
November 1634, and on the same day the Duc de la Valette, son of
the Duc d’Épernon and widower of Henry IV.’s daughter,
Mademoiselle de Verneuil, was married to the elder sister, Marie de
Pontchâteau, and the Comte, afterwards Maréchal, de Guiche to
another cousin, Mademoiselle du Plessis de Chivray. The Cardinal
celebrated the triple wedding by a magnificent fête. At this time the
first nobles in France found it politic to quarrel for the honour of his
alliance, and it was matter of general talk in society that he meant to
marry Monsieur to Madame de Combalet, the Lorraine marriage
being set aside. This report even reached the ears of Monsieur’s
little daughter, and filled her with just indignation.
A few weeks after the wedding the Cardinal’s spies brought him
not only the secret, well kept by Puylaurens, of Monsieur’s letter to
Rome, but proofs of a fresh treasonable correspondence carried on
by the new Duke with Spain. Swiftly fell Richelieu’s vengeance.
Puylaurens, with several of his friends, was arrested at the Louvre
on February 14, and carried off by royal order to Vincennes. The
entreaties of Monsieur, newly reconciled at Court, delayed his trial,
but he died after four months of prison. “His good fortune,” says
Richelieu, “withdrew him from this world, and saved him from the
infamy of a shameful death, which he could not have escaped.”
Whether the fatal atmosphere of the dungeons of Vincennes was
assisted by poison of a more active kind, will never be known. That
suspicion hung about the deaths of many of the Cardinal’s prisoners.
Richelieu consoled the young widow of Puylaurens by marrying her
to the Comte d’Harcourt, of the House of Lorraine, younger brother
of the Duc d’Elbeuf, a queer personage, but a fine soldier. He had
fought a successful duel with Bouteville, in itself a distinction. He
proved himself worthy of the Cardinal’s favour by serving His
Eminence faithfully for the rest of his life.
But for Richelieu, the Thirty Years’ War might have ended with the
death of Wallenstein and the imperial victories which followed it.
Even the Protestant princes of Germany were ready for a
compromise with the Emperor. But Richelieu had no intention of
accepting a general peace which would leave his Swedish friends
weak and dissatisfied, his own conquests incomplete, Spain and
Austria easily predominant in Italy and the Low Countries. He
resolved that France, as an ally of Sweden, Holland, and the
German Protestants, should now take an active part in the war, and
he prepared for the actual declaration by a treaty with the Dutch for
the partition of the Spanish Netherlands, to be followed by one with
the Dukes of Savoy, Parma, and Mantua, for the conquest and
division of the Milanese.
In May 1635, after some military provocation on the part of Spain,
Louis XIII. sent his herald-at-arms to Brussels—a noble Gascon,
Jean Gratiollet, Captain of Abbeville—and solemnly declared war
against his brother-in-law, Philip IV., while publicly inviting the Low
Countries to rebel against Spain. “Europe was amazed,” says a
modern French writer, “to see Richelieu suddenly take up arms for
those same Huguenots whom he had crushed with such good will at
La Rochelle.”
Europe was amazed: and what of the French nation, flung
unconsulted into the struggle with Catholic Europe which might
easily have become a fight for its own existence? The three Estates
of the realm had each its own separate point of view. The princes
and nobles loved war; but the majority, Catholic and hating
Richelieu, were rebels at heart. However, each man had his orders:
content or malcontent, each governor found himself dispatched to
his own province, each commander to his post, while generals
dashed hither and thither in pursuit of armies which had to be hired,
recruited, disciplined, poured in half-a-dozen directions over the
frontier—Germany, Flanders, Lorraine, Switzerland, Italy. Richelieu,
the directing brain, at this moment of high energy, moved the
members even against their will.
To most of the clergy, again, the war was of the nature of
sacrilege; and still more so, later on, the demand of an enormous
payment of arrears for lands held under the Crown, which had been
suffered to go free for nearly a hundred years. But at a time when
the taxes of France had rolled up to more than a hundred million
francs a year, a gigantic and as yet unheard-of sum, Richelieu could
no longer grant the clergy the privilege of paying no tax but their
prayers, which he had himself claimed for them at the States-
General of 1613.
“The people give their goods, the nobles their blood, the clergy
their prayers.” As ever, the patience of the most heavily taxed
seemed almost inexhaustible; and it was not till France was deeply
engaged in the war, her middle class and her peasantry crushed by
Richelieu’s intendants and financiers under burdens every week
more enormous, that in the south and the north populations made
some effort to save themselves; made it by rioting, their only
resource, and found themselves—Croquants in Guienne, Va-nu-
pieds in Normandy—in a last state worse than the first.
In spite of all these discontents there were ways in which
Frenchmen now realized the national unity which was Richelieu’s
dream. The famous leader, Duke Henry de Rohan, was again in
arms, not now as a Huguenot chief, but commanding an army
against the Duke of Lorraine, fighting for his duchy with imperial
troops behind him. In the spring of 1635, it was to Rohan that
Richelieu committed the task of preparing for his designs on Milan by
a new occupation of the Valtelline, thus once more playing the old
game of blocking the chief military road between Austria and Spain.
All went well at first, the Duke proving himself a loyal subject and a
good general. The cause that finally discomfited him and drove him
at last to throw up his command and to retire to Geneva was the
failure of Richelieu’s government to pay a promised indemnity to the
Grisons, rightful possessors of the valley, who after two years’
French occupation, secretly encouraged by Spain, rebelled suddenly
against Rohan and insisted on the evacuation of their territory.
Blamed by Richelieu for a failure which was no fault of his, and
broken by severe illness, the Huguenot hero was still ready to bear
arms for France. In the spring of 1638 he volunteered to serve under
Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar—the great soldier who, if actually
fighting for his own hand, nevertheless gave Alsace to France—and
died of his wounds after the siege of Rheinfeld, having lived long
enough to know with what swift brilliance Bernard had turned defeat
into victory.
For many months, as readers of history know, the fortune of war
went against Richelieu. The ravages of the French and the Dutch
armies in the Netherlands, under the Prince of Orange and the
Marshals de Châtillon and de Brézé, did not incline the population to
change masters. In Germany, one town after another fell into
imperialist hands, and it was only with difficulty that the French held
their own in Lorraine. The invasion of the Milanese failed; and later
on the deaths of the Dukes of Savoy and of Mantua deprived France
of two important allies.
The French fleet, though making a fine show for those days—
forty-seven men-of-war—wasted its strength in vainly flourishing
about the coast; and owing to the quarrels of its commanders, the
Comte d’Harcourt and the Archbishop of Bordeaux, with M. de Vitry,
governor of Provence—the slayer of Concini—did not for a long time
succeed in even recovering the Isles of Lérins, seized by Spain at
the opening of the war.
And then, in July 1636, a terrible disaster threatened France.
Imperial troops crossed the frontier, and had taken two strong places
in Picardy, La Capelle and Le Catelet, before the French
commanders were ready to oppose them. Imperial cavalry crossed
the Somme and advanced to the Oise, the Comte de Soissons
retreating before them, and spread a very natural terror throughout
the country. They were mostly Croats and Hungarians, fierce and
savage men, whose road was marked by robbery, fire, and
slaughter. Their leader was the Bavarian, John of Werth, a name of
fear in the campaigns of his day.
Paris was in a state of terror and fury. The black shadows of the
streets, in the sweltering heat of late July and early August, were
loud with raging men and women, whose voices taught the Cardinal-
Duc his unpopularity. Paris was ill fortified, ill defended, and part of
her strong old walls had been destroyed by him for the sake of his
Palais-Cardinal. They cried against him because of that; because of
his ingratitude to the Queen-mother, his failure, so far, in the war he
had undertaken, his alliance with heretics. And Richelieu knew that
their fear, if not their hatred, was too well justified. The Comte de
Soissons, whose army, camping in the forests and holding the fords
of the Oise, protected Paris, was not above suspicion as to his
loyalty; the Duc de Chaulnes, governor of Picardy, was lazy and
negligent; money and men were lacking for the defence of a divided,
discontented, panic-stricken country.
The first news of the invasion found the King and the Cardinal
absent from Paris as usual in the heat of summer. They returned at
once to the stifling, frantic city.
Then “the great Armand” showed the stuff he was made of.
“Remember, I pray you,” he wrote to the Comte de Soissons, “on
such occasions as these, moments are worth years.” Paris being
always and before all things a Catholic city, he appealed to her
religion. All the bishops in the kingdom were commanded to hold
processions within and without their cathedrals, with the special
devotions of the Forty Hours. From every church in Paris and in the
whole of France, with every chapel of convent or monastery, the
bells clanged out, calling the faithful to pray for their country. In his
own person, the Cardinal vowed to the Paris convent of the Filles du
Calvaire, in the Marais, Père Joseph’s favourite foundation, a large
sum of money and a silver lamp to burn perpetually before Our
Lady’s altar.
Whatever his own personal faith may have been, he knew the
spiritual needs of the people. That he did not fear their angry voices
he proved by driving alone, “at a foot’s pace, without suite and
without guards,” through the wild crowds in the streets, from the
Palais-Cardinal to the Hôtel de Ville, bearing the royal order that the
city trades and companies should assemble for the purpose of giving
their help to the King. His courage triumphed. The people, says
Montglat, “dared not say a word to him.”
Royal decrees followed thick and fast; their succession was like
the sending round of the Fiery Cross, summoning men to serve their
country. Those Parisians who had planned to escape John of Werth
and his pillaging horde by flying with all their movable goods to
Orléans or some other city of the west, found the gates of Paris shut
against them. All privileges and exemptions were abolished in the
city. All men capable of bearing arms were ordered to present
themselves for enrolment, either at the Hôtel de Ville, where the old
Maréchal de la Force sat on the steps to receive them, or mounted
and armed at Saint-Denis. All the workshops of Paris were closed; all
building stopped; no master of a trade, excepting bakers, butchers,
armourers, gun-makers, saddlers, and the like, might keep more
than one apprentice; the rest, with masons, stone-cutters,
carpenters, artisans of every sort, must serve the King. From each
owner of a coach, a horse was demanded; and every house in Paris
was expected to furnish a man with belt and sword. The peasants of
the surrounding villages were set to work on new fortifications at
Saint-Denis.
A day sufficed to change terror into enthusiasm. On August 5
representatives of all the trade guilds and syndicates were received
by Louis XIII. in the great gallery of the Louvre, “and offered him their
persons and their goods with so great gaiety and affection, that most
of them embraced and kissed his knees.” Louis rose to the occasion
and kissed them all, not excepting the chief of the cobblers, whose
guild made the noble gift of 5,000 francs. The Parliament—not
without grudging conditions—the municipality, the colleges,
monasteries, and other bodies, poured money at the King’s feet:
there was enough to pay and keep, for three months at least, twelve
thousand foot and three thousand horse.
In the meanwhile, the news that the enemy had taken Corbie on
the Somme, thus drawing alarmingly near to Amiens, on the direct
road to Paris, fanned the flame so fiercely that “tout le jeune
bourgeois,” says Montglat, “à toute force, vouloit aller à la guerre.”
Not many days later, the King and the Cardinal advanced to Amiens,
and a strong army, commanded by Monsieur and the Comte de
Soissons, held the enemy in effectual check along the banks of the
Somme. By the middle of September, all the actual danger of
invasion was past, though the Imperialists still held Corbie. John of
Werth and his merry men, loaded with booty, had galloped back
across the frontier of Artois.
Corbie was not retaken till November, but the Cardinal Infant, his
aunt’s successor as ruler of the Netherlands, with the other Spanish
and Imperialist generals, discouraged by the advance of the French
army, had already withdrawn from French territory; and it seemed, as
the autumn advanced, as if the fortune of war was changing in
Richelieu’s favour. The enemy was repulsed everywhere: in
Burgundy, by Weimar, Condé, and the Cardinal de la Valette; on the
Spanish frontier, where St. Jean de Luz was taken, but further
advance was resisted by the old Duc d’Épernon and the Comte de
Grammont, governors of Guyenne and of Béarn; on the Morbihan
coast, where a Spanish force, disembarking near Vannes, attacked
the Abbey of Prières. The sturdy monks defended themselves so
gallantly that the country-side had time to rise against the invaders,
who fled back in disorder to their ships.
At this moment of danger, the two young men whom Richelieu had
called to the command of the King’s armies were busily plotting his
destruction. To them and their like the death of the Minister and the
anarchy that must follow were not only desirable for their own ends,
but the best medicines for the ills of France.
Monsieur and the Comte de Soissons were seldom friends, except
when they joined hands against Richelieu, and it happened that at
this time each was nursing special grievances: Monsieur, as to his
forbidden marriage and the death of Puylaurens; Soissons, because
the Cardinal had dared to offer him his niece in marriage, had
refused him the command of the army in Alsace, and more recently
had shown distrust by setting Monsieur over him as Commander-in-
Chief of the army on the Oise. There were not wanting faithful friends
who pointed out to both princes that now was the moment to
revenge themselves. The army was theirs; the Cardinal was at
Amiens; the King, staying at the Château de Demuin, a few miles
away, rode constantly into the city to hold council with his Ministers.
It was natural that the princes in command of the army should attend
the council. The rest was easily thought out, with the help of M. de
Montrésor, a follower of Monsieur, M. de Saint-Ibal, in M. le Comte’s
confidence, and two “solid men,” Varicarville and Bardouville. These
six conspirators fixed a day on which the Cardinal should be stabbed
to death after the King had left the council.
All went well for their purpose. On the appointed day, “the council
being ended, the King went away with all his guards, and the
Cardinal remained alone in the courtyard with Monsieur and the
Comte de Soissons. Immediately,” writes the Marquis de Montglat,
“Varicarville, who knew the secret, stationed himself behind the
Cardinal, expecting the signal which Monsieur was to give, while
Saint-Ibal and Bardouville took their stand, one on the right, the other
on the left. But instead of commanding that the projected deed
should be done, Monsieur, seized with fear, remounted the staircase
without a word; while Montrésor, surprised at the change, followed
him, telling him that his enemy was in his power, and that he had
only to speak.”
It was not the first time that Richelieu had owed his life to Gaston’s
temperament. So éperdu was the Prince, so utterly had his nerve
failed him, that he could only mutter something about “another time,”
and escaped as quickly as possible, leaving the Comte de Soissons,
“dans la dernière confusion,” face to face with Richelieu. Unaware of
his danger, and the King’s brother having disappeared, the Cardinal
bade his other enemy farewell and retired to his lodging. The fingers
of Saint-Ibal, Varicarville, Bardouville, relaxed on their dagger-hilts,
and one may imagine that these three gentlemen stared rather
blankly on each other as their doomed victim walked away.
When the story became known, which was not immediately, many
persons blamed the Comte de Soissons that he had not made up for
Monsieur’s weakness by finishing the affair. “He excused himself,”
says Montglat, “by the respect he owed Monsieur, so that he dared
undertake nothing in his presence without his command.” He was
too wise to act alone in such a matter: the position of Gaston’s cat’s-
paw, to be disclaimed and forsaken and left to the King’s justice, was
not attractive. The army might rally round the heir to the throne in
sudden rebellion; the Comte de Soissons was not equally secure.
Three days later there was another chance, for Richelieu visited
the camp; but he was attended by his own guards, and the
assassination was “judged impossible.” On this occasion a whisper
of the plot reached his ears, and with his usual fearlessness he
spoke of it to the Comte de Soissons, haughtily reprimanding him.
The princes were frightened, for their plots had gone beyond the
death of Richelieu. They had disloyally done their best to delay the
relief of Corbie; they had attempted to draw the Duc d’Épernon into
the project of a rising, already favoured by the Duc de Bouillon and
others, the object of which was to lay hold on the government, to
reinstate the Queen-mother, and to make peace with Spain. They
failed; the various successes of the autumn were against them; the
Duc d’Épernon, though two of his sons were on their side, refused to
listen to them. After the re-taking of Corbie, having returned from the
army to Paris, they were seized with a great fear of the Cardinal. He
was certain to know all; he was of a temper that never forgave; the
Court, they felt assured, was not a safe place for them. They took
counsel with each other and resolved to fly, at once, on a dark
November night, while Paris was singing and rejoicing over the good
news of victory.
Both princes, before leaving Paris, paid a separate visit to the
Tuileries. There, under the care of M. de Montglat’s mother, Madame
de Saint-Georges, lived Mademoiselle de Montpensier, Gaston’s
daughter, now nine years old, a person of decided character, and
one of Richelieu’s most hearty haters. The Comte de Soissons paid
great court to this little lady, the richest heiress in France if not in
Europe. Though four years older than her father and twenty-three
years older than herself, and having failed ten years earlier to run
away with her mother, he proposed to marry her, and Gaston was
ready to consent. This plan was one of the links that now united
them. Mademoiselle herself liked Monsieur le Comte, and accepted
his compliments and sugar-plums with satisfaction: but at this time
she did not understand his object.
It is doubtful if the royal consent would ever have been given to
this marriage. But a curious little passage in the Cardinal’s own
Memoirs shows how keenly he noticed every detail in the lives of the
princes, and on what slight if sure grounds he accused them of
conspiracy.
“The next day at evening, which was the night of the 19th to the
20th, Monsieur and he (M. le Comte) left Paris; and that it was
plotted between them is shown by this: Monsieur having arrived in
Paris, and visiting Mademoiselle his daughter, Madame de Saint-
Georges told him that M. le Comte had but just gone out. He leaned
his head against a chimney-piece, remained long thoughtful, then
said, and repeated several times, ‘What! Monsieur le Comte is here?
What! He has not gone to Champagne!’ Which showed plainly that
there was a plot between them.”
Disguised and almost alone, the princes retired in different
directions: Monsieur to his castle of Blois, the Comte de Soissons to
neutral ground at Sedan, held by its sovereigns of the House of
Bouillon for more than a hundred years. From these retreats they
sent their demands and remonstrances to Louis XIII., while on the
other hand they corresponded with the Queen-mother and with
Spain.
Richelieu seems to have treated the discontents of the Comte de
Soissons with some scorn. He allowed negotiations with him to drag
on for some months, and then advised the King not only to forgive
him, but to allow him to remain four years at Sedan unless he chose
to return to the Court: a leniency for which the Cardinal has been
blamed; dangerous to the State and fatal to Soissons himself.
As to Monsieur, a mixture of threats and entreaties, the advance of
royal troops to Orléans, the clever management of M. de Chavigny,
the Cardinal’s most trusted agent, soon brought about a change in
his weathercock mind. He met the King at Orléans in February 1637,
“with many demonstrations of friendship.” Indeed, “dissimulation
went so far, that there appeared to be a sincere reconciliation
between Monsieur and the Cardinal.”
CHAPTER X
1637-1639
Palace intrigues—Mademoiselle de Hautefort—

Mademoiselle de la Fayette—The affair of the Val-de-Grâce—
The birth of the Dauphin—The death of Père Joseph—
Difficulties in the Church.
In Richelieu’s own mind his worst enemies were to be found

among his nearest neighbours. “Les intrigues de cabinet,” says M.
de Montglat, “donnèrent plus de peine au Cardinal de Richelieu que
toute la guerre étrangère.” Not only mischievous great ladies like the
Duchesse de Chevreuse, but every man or woman who had
anything to do with the Court, were objects of his watchful suspicion,
and to most of them, while they begged his favour and flocked to his
entertainments, he seemed the cruel ogre, the mysterious sphinx, so
long represented in history.
He never really trusted the King. Louis was fond of gossip, easily
amused by small things, and often attracted by persons undesirable
from Richelieu’s point of view. And even at his height of power he
found it impossible to carry out the ideal arrangement which would
have hindered any one not bound to his own service from
approaching the King at times such as the petit coucher, when
intimate talk was allowed, and men might even dare to tell a story
against the Eminentissime himself. They would probably repent; for
though Louis might laugh and enjoy such jokes, he had a way of
repeating them to the Cardinal, if only with a half-childish notion of
teasing him. The consequences to a chattering courtier might be
serious.
The influence of these gentlemen with the King was seldom really
dangerous, and yet the Cardinal was justified in his distrust, for the
majority hated him, and he went about always with his life in his
hand, not because of ambitious princes alone. Men’s consciences
were no protection to him. For instance, the Abbé de Retz,
afterwards Cardinal and Coadjutor of the Archbishop of Paris, felt
little doubt that he would have done a right action, socially and
politically, had he carried out a plan for killing Richelieu in the chapel
of the Tuileries, at the long-deferred christening of Mademoiselle de
Montpensier.
Over and over again Richelieu tried to confine the King’s special
favour to persons chosen by himself, and over and over again he
failed. It was not so much that people played him false, as that he
found them—men and women—too proud, too independent, and too
faithful to their order for the place he meant them to fill—that of the
King’s favourites and his own spies. There was Mademoiselle de
Hautefort, with whom Louis fell in love when she was a beautiful girl
of fifteen, brought to Court from her native province by her
grandmother, Madame de la Flotte, and appointed one of the Queen-
mother’s maids-of-honour. After the “Day of Dupes,” when Marie de
Médicis left France and her household was broken up, Madame de
la Flotte became lady-in-waiting to the young Queen in the place of
Madame du Fargis, whom Richelieu sent into exile; and
Mademoiselle de Hautefort, transferred at the same time, was
specially recommended by Louis to his wife’s favour.
At first, very naturally, Queen Anne was not pleased. Marie de
Hautefort was in every way a dazzling person. Madame de Motteville
declares that she made a greater effect at Court than any other
beauty. “Her eyes were blue, large, and full of fire; her teeth white
and even; her complexion had the white and red suitable to a fair
beauty.” Added to this, she had a sharp tongue; she was high-
spirited, “railleuse,” and by no means soft-hearted.
Louis XIII.’s love-affairs contrast curiously with those of his father.
Nothing could be more innocent, more purely platonic, than his
devotion to Mademoiselle de Hautefort. He hardly dared approach
her; his talk was of dogs and of birds; and yet he showed the stormy
jealousy and the sulks and humours of a passionate lover, and spent
hours in writing songs and music for his lady. She disputed with him
freely and laughed at him unmercifully.
At the beginning Richelieu encouraged this singular affection. But
after about three years he saw reason to change his mind.
Mademoiselle de Hautefort was not inclined to act as his political
agent, and she had soon given the loyalty of a warm and generous
nature to her mistress, the Queen, whom she saw neglected by
Louis and subject to the tyranny of the Cardinal. This is to say that
the woman most admired by the King had joined the Spanish party
at Court and was rightly counted by Richelieu among his enemies.
It cost him little trouble to drive Mademoiselle de Hautefort out of
favour—at least for a time. When Louis had become slightly tired of
his quarrels with the fair beauty and slightly chilled by her friendship
with the Queen, it was made easy for him to find consolation in the
dark eyes of Louise de la Fayette, a cousin of Père Joseph, whose
family was supposed to be devoted to the Cardinal.
Mademoiselle de la Fayette was as good and gentle as she was
lovely; in the varied records of the French Court there exists no
sweeter figure. During two years she and the eccentric King adored
each other with a tender affection and mutual confidence quite
absent from the Hautefort affair; yet this, like the other, never passed
the bounds of friendship. It went so far, however, that the girl’s
conscience was alarmed, and she began to think of taking refuge in
a convent.
The idea was not unwelcome to Cardinal de Richelieu. The Court
was full of his spies, who warned him that Mademoiselle de la
Fayette’s intimate talk with the King was not to his advantage; that
she was inspired by Père Caussin, the royal confessor, to speak to
Louis in favour of his mother, his wife, his brother, and all the other
victims of a warlike, heretical policy; that she was encouraged by her
uncle the Bishop of Limoges and her brother the Chevalier de la
Fayette, to set him against the Cardinal; that the Bishop had even
been heard to say, “When the Cardinal is ruined, we will do this and
that. As for me, I shall inhabit the Hôtel de Richelieu.”
The Court was buzzing with intrigues all through 1636, the “year of
Corbie,” while the King still enjoyed, as far as possible, the society of
the only woman who had ever loved him for his own sake.

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The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist

Philosophy Jan Westerhoff

The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy

French Philosophy, 1572–1675

The Golden Age

In the world and world-transcendent,

I would like to express my gratitude to my teachers, colleagues, and friends,

Analytical Table of Contents xiii

4. Key Themes of Nāgārjuna’s Thought 107

Analytical Table of Contents

xiv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xv

xvi ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii

c. Contradictions and Nāgārjuna’s thought 117

xviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xix

through meditation · Yogācāra arguments clearing away the wrong

xx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

thought · Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as aiming at the same inexpressible

ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi

to the Buddha’s authority · Scepticism about appealing to the internal

xxii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

background of this disagreement · Brahmins and Buddhists at

Concluding Remarks 282

Diagrams of Schools and Thinkers

The Main Schools of Indian Buddhism

Sarvāstivāda Pudga- Vibhajya-

Diagram of philosophical schools

Major Indian Buddhist Philosophers and Texts Non-Buddhist

Diagram of thinkers and texts

To the modern historian, Buddhism is a phenomenon which must exas-

1. Buddhist Philosophy in India:

¹ Conze 1980: 15.

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

As the king’s dominion extends from country to country, so the Buddha’s

⁶ Cabezón 1994: 37. ⁷ Huizinga 1949: 146–57.

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

of the debating context helps us to understand what doing philosophy in

3. Factors Determining the Game

¹⁰ See e.g. Conze 1962, Zotz 1996, Guillon 1997.

social, economic, and political factors are of no importance for understanding

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

of meditative phenomenology. These factors overlap and inﬂuence each other,

4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

approach that divides the history of Buddhist thought by schools, a device

5. The Sources of the Game

²⁴ Gombrich 2009, Siderits 2010.

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

³⁰ Li 1996: 58. ³¹ Eckel 2008:15. ³² Perdue 1992, 2014.

above—arguments—shape its contents. Buddhist philosophical texts from the

types of commentary are distinguished. It is indicative of the often cryptic

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

vivaraṇ a or vivaraṇ a, focuses almost exclusively on grammatical issues. Such a com-

 THE GOLDEN AGE OF INDIAN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Conquests in Lorraine—The return of Monsieur—The fate

From the year 1630, Richelieu had employed historians and

Palace intrigues—Mademoiselle de Hautefort—

In Richelieu’s own mind his worst enemies were to be found

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