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Memory: A Self-Referential Account
Jordi Fernández
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Memory
P H I L O S O P H Y O F M E M O RY A N D I M AG I NAT IO N
Series Editors
Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College
Kourken Michaelian, University of Otago
*
Advisory Board
Sven Bernecker, Greg Currie, Christoph Hoerl, Bence Nancy, Kathleen Stock,
John Sutton
*
The philosophies of memory and imagination are two of the most exciting new areas
in philosophy. This series exists to publish cutting-edge work in both areas and to
encourage interaction between them.
Memory
A Self-Referential Account
J O R D I F E R NÁ N D E Z
1
3
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ISBN 978–0–19–007300–8
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Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
To Zoe and Abby,
who help me form beautiful memories every day
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
PA RT I . T H E NAT U R E O F M E M O RY
1: Problems of Memory 3
1.1 Introduction 3
1.2 Scope of the Project 4
1.3 Explanandum 8
1.4 Available Strategies 14
1.5 Approach 23
1.6 Summary 27
2: The Metaphysics of Memory 32
2.1 Introduction 32
2.2 The Causal Theory of Memory 33
2.3 The Narrative Theory of Memory 40
2.4 Functionalism about Memory 47
2.5 Narratives, Causal Histories, and Functional Roles 51
2.6 Conclusion 53
3: The Intentionality of Memory 57
3.1 Introduction 57
3.2 Mnemonic Content 58
3.3 Methodology 60
3.4 The Objective View 62
3.5 The Subjective View 64
3.6 The Conjunctive View 67
3.7 The Causal Self-Reference Approach 72
3.8 The Reflexive View 78
3.9 Conclusion 80
PA RT I I . T H E P H E N OM E N O L O G Y O F M E M O RY
4: The Experience of Time 85

4.1 Introduction 85
4.2 Temporal Phenomenology 86
viii Contents
4.3 Mental Time Travel and Re-Presentation 89

4.4 Mental Time Travel and Representation 94
4.5 Temporal Locations and the Feeling of Pastness 99
4.6 Temporal Distances and the Feeling of Pastness 103
4.7 Beyond Time: The Experience of Origin 106
4.8 Conclusion 109
5: The Experience of Ownership 112
5.1 Introduction 112
5.2 Disowned Memory 114
5.3 Ownership as Identification 117
5.4 Ownership as Endorsement 119
5.5 The Appearance of Memory 123
5.6 The Ownership of Phenomenal States 127
5.7 Conclusion 134
PA RT I I I . T H E E P I S T E M O L O G Y O F M E M O RY
6: Immunity to Error through Misidentification 139

6.2 Memory and IEM 140
6.3 Quasi-Memory and IEM 144
6.4 Observer Memory and IEM 150
6.5 A Defense of IEM in Memory 157
6.6 The Perceived Self 160
6.7 An Account of IEM in Memory 167
6.8 Conclusion 168
7: Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source 171
7.2 Varieties of Preservativism 173
7.3 Attention in Memory 177
7.4 Abstraction in Memory 181
7.5 The Recorder Model of Memory 188
7.6 Reconstruction in Memory 191
7.7 Mnemonic Content and Generativism 199
7.8 Conclusion 202
Conclusion 206
References 209
Index 217
Preface
This book is a philosophical investigation of memory. It is, in a nutshell, an

attempt to answer the question of what memory is. There are many philo-
sophically interesting aspects of memory. Memory is interesting, as far as the
philosophy of mind is concerned, because memory is a mental capacity; a
capacity which is different from introspection, perception, and imagination
in ways which are difficult to specify. Memory is interesting for epistemology
too because, among other reasons, memory seems to provide us with a spe-
cial knowledge of the past. Memory is also interesting for metaphysics due,
for instance, to the connections between memory and personal identity and
between memory and time. Furthermore, memories involve some character-
istic feelings and, for that reason, memory is interesting for phenomenology.
Moreover, there is a normative dimension to memory. We seem to think
that, in some cases, we have the obligation to remember some things and the
right to forget others. So, memory has important ramifications into ethics as
well. It is, in fact, difficult to find an area of philosophy for which memory is
irrelevant.
The fact that memory has multiple aspects which are interesting from a
philosophical point of view presents a challenge for the project in this book.
For the project is to offer a philosophical account of memory; an account of
the philosophically interesting aspects of memory. And this means that the
project should ideally have an all-encompassing scope. But there is a certain
trade-off between the scope of a philosophical investigation of a mental ca-
pacity such as memory and how informative the investigation turns out to be.
The broader the investigation, the less informative it tends to be. Thus, in this
book, I have tried to select a few philosophical issues concerning memory,
and I have attempted to investigate them in some depth. The goal has been to
achieve a delicate balance. On the one hand, hopefully the selected issues on
memory are all philosophically interesting and sufficiently diverse. On the
other hand, hopefully the selection is not so ambitious that one cannot say
much, informatively, about each of the issues separately, and about how they
are related to each other.
x Preface
The different issues on memory that I will target for explanation are
specified in c hapter 1. The book discusses one issue on the metaphysics of
memory, one issue on the intentionality of memory, two issues on the phe-
nomenology of memory and two issues on the epistemology of memory. In
chapter 1, I also address some methodological matters. I consider different
ways in which one could tackle the project of accounting for the metaphysics,
the intentionality, the phenomenology, and the epistemology of memory,
and I highlight the different assumptions that one would need to make,
depending on which of those aspects of memory are taken to be basic and
which of those are taken to be more derivative. My own approach, outlined
in chapter 1, is to regard the metaphysics and the intentionality of memory as
the basic aspects of memory and to try to shed some light on the phenome-
nology and the epistemology of memory based on my views about those two
basic aspects.
Chapter 2 puts forward a view about the metaphysics of memory; a view
about the facts in virtue of which a mental state qualifies as a memory. The
view is that no intrinsic property of the mental state makes it qualify as
such. What makes a mental state qualify as a memory is the functional role
of the mental state within the subject’s cognitive economy. Chapter 3 puts
forward a view about the intentionality of memory; a view about the con-
tent of memories. The view is that memories are self-referential in the fol-
lowing sense. Memories represent the fact that they have a causal origin in
the subject’s past experiences. Put together, these two proposals constitute
the core of the account of memory offered in this book. These are, in my view,
the main elements of the nature of memory.
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the phenomenology of memory. Specifically,
chapter 4 deals with the feeling of pastness involved in memory; the feeling
that what one is remembering is in the past. It also deals with a certain
feeling of familiarity in memory; the awareness of what it was like for one
to experience, in the past, what one is remembering in the present. And
chapter 5 deals with the feeling of ownership in memory; the feeling that the
memory that one is having, when one remembers something, is one’s own.
I try to explain these feelings by appealing to the content that memories
have. In all three cases, the thought is that the relevant feeling is the way in
which one experiences some of the things that one is representing when
one is having a memory. This account of the phenomenology of memory,
then, will rest on the account of the intentionality of memory to be offered
in chapter 3.
Preface xi
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the epistemology of memory. More

specifically, they are concerned with two aspects of the special kind of epi-
stemic justification which is afforded by our memories. Chapter 6 discusses
the fact that memory judgments are protected from errors of misidentifi-
cation, whereas chapter 7 discusses the fact that the epistemic justification
enjoyed by some of those judgments is generated, and not merely preserved,
by the faculty of memory. I try to explain both epistemic aspects of memory
judgments by appealing to the content that memories have as well. Thus, in
both cases, the thought is that the key to why memory judgments enjoy the
kind of epistemic justification which has the relevant feature is to be found
in the contents of the memories on the basis of which those judgments are
formed. Once more, then, what we will have is an account of the epistemology
of memory which rests on the account of the intentionality of memory to be
offered in the first part of the book.
There are a number of directions one could go from there. Perhaps the
functionalist view of the metaphysics of memory to be offered in c hapter 2
can tell us something interesting about personal identity, and perhaps the
explanation of immunity to error through misidentification to be offered
in chapter 6 can tell us something interesting about our sense of personal
identity over time. Likewise, it is possible that the conception of mental time
travel proposed in chapter 4 can shed some light on whether memory needs
to be oriented toward the past or, by contrast, it can be oriented toward the
future as well. And it may be that the proposal about the feeling of ownership
of our memories to be put forward in c hapter 5 can be generalized to other
mental states in ways which illuminate a variety of mental disorders wherein
the subject disowns some of their mental states. By the time we conclude the
project in this book, all of these avenues will remain open. Nonetheless, the
hope is that, at the completion of the project, we will have achieved a suffi-
ciently comprehensive understanding of what memory is and why it matters
to us so much.
This project began 15 years ago, when I was a post-doctoral fellow at
Macquarie University, in Sydney. I was very fortunate to be able to dis-
cuss various issues on memory with John Sutton and Tim Bayne while
I was there. Thanks to those interactions, I was able to put together some
ideas about memory which turned out to be the kernel for c hapters 3 and
4 of this book. The rest of the chapters in the book originate in more recent
work. Chapter 5 is closely related to an article I have written on the sense of
mineness; an article for which I received very valuable feedback from Manuel
xii Preface
García-Carpintero and Marie Guillot. Chapter 2 and c hapter 6 are based on

articles which greatly benefited from Kourken Michaelian’s comments. And
chapter 7 is built on an article that I have been able to discuss, very help-
fully (for me), with Sven Bernecker. In fact, John, Kirk and Sven belong to a
group of philosophers who seem to have been sharing their work on memory
informally for the last 10 years or so. This group also includes Felipe De
Brigard, Dorothea Debus, Christoph Hoerl, Chris McCarroll, Denis Perrin,
Sarah Robins, and Markus Werning, and I am grateful to all of them for their
feedback on drafts of the chapters of this book delivered at conferences and
workshops over the years. I also want to thank, collectively, my colleagues at
the Philosophy Department of the University of Adelaide for the research
environment in which the book was written. Many thanks, in particular, to
Garrett Cullity, Antony Eagle, and Philip Gerrans for a number of helpful
conversations on memory, and to Matthew Nestor and Laura Bottrill for
their valuable assistance with various research and editorial tasks.
My editor, Peter Ohlin, and the series editors, Kourken Michaelian and
Amy Kind, along with the helpful staff at Oxford University Press, made the
process of publishing this book a pleasure, for both their patience and their
diligence. Three anonymous referees for Oxford University Press (two of
whom turned out to be Sven Bernecker and Sarah Robins) read whole drafts
of the book and provided remarkably thorough and insightful comments,
for which I am very grateful. I particularly want to thank Uriah Kriegel, who
has maintained a keen interest in the project over the years. He provided
comments on versions of most of the chapters in the book and, on more than
one occasion, those comments allowed me to see the way around some se-
rious objection to my account. Other times, the serious objection actually
came in his comments. Either way, the process was always really helpful.
Many friends, inside and outside of the profession, provided other kinds of
support while this book was written, and I cannot mention all of them here.
But I do want to thank my brother and my sister. And most of all, I want to
thank my two daughters. They are too little to know it now, but the fact is
that, without them, this book would never have been written.
Acknowledgments
My work on this book was supported by a semester’s Special Studies Leave

from the University of Adelaide. This research was also funded by two
grants from the Australian Research Council for projects DP130103047 and
FT160100313 under the Discovery Scheme.
Most of the chapters are based on articles that have appeared else-
where. Chapter 2 is based on “The Functional Character of Memory,” in
(2018) K. Michaelian, D. Debus, and D. Perrin (eds.) New Direction in the
Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge, 52–72. Chapter 3 is based on
(2006) “The Intentionality of Memory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
84: 39–57. Chapter 4 is based on (2008) “Memory and Time,” Philosophical
Studies 141: 333–356. Chapter 6 is based on (Forthcoming) “Observer
Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” in Synthese, and
(2014) “Memory and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Review
of Philosophy and Psychology 5: 373–390. Chapter 7 is based on (2016)
“Epistemic Generation in Memory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 92: 620–644. I am grateful to the publishers concerned for their per-
mission to make use of material from these pieces.
PART I
THE NAT U R E OF M E MORY
1
Problems of Memory
1.1 Introduction
The goal of this book is to understand a cognitive capacity which is central

to our mental lives; the capacity for remembering. Specifically, the goal is to
offer an account of four different aspects of memory, all of which are philo-
sophically interesting.1 This chapter is devoted to setting up the discussion
that will lead to such an account, and addressing a number of preliminary
methodological issues. What kind of memory are we going to focus on ex-
actly? What are the philosophically interesting aspects of the relevant type of
memory? What types of explanations of those aspects of memory are avail-
able? These are some of the questions that we will need to address before an
account of memory can be offered.
I will proceed as follows. In section 1.2, I will specify the kind of memory
on which we will concentrate. In section 1.3, I will spell out the four aspects
of memory that we will target for explanation. In section 1.4, I will distin-
guish several ways in which we can approach those aspects of memory. In
section 1.5, I will make explicit the approach that I will be adopting, and
I will offer an overview of how the discussion will be structured over the
coming chapters. Finally, in section 1.6, I will review how the discussion has
been set up, and I will highlight the assumptions which have been made as
part of the set-up.
1 In what follows, I will use both “remembering” and “memory” non-factively. Thus, on the use of
the two terms that I will adopt here, it is possible to remember something falsely, and it is possible to
have a false memory of something. This may be a philosophically unorthodox use of the two terms.
But there are some reasons for thinking that “remembering” and “memory” are not factive. After all,
we commonly use the expression “false memory,” and this does not strike us as a deviant use of the
term “memory.” Which it should, if “memory” was factive. Likewise, claims of the kind “nothing false
can be remembered” do not strike us as obviously true. In fact, as pointed out in (Hazlett 2010), they
strike us as false. This should not happen if “remembering” was factive either.
4 The Nature of Memory
1.2 Scope of the Project
We commonly speak of memory as if it was directed at either facts, events,

actions, experiences, objects, or abilities. Thus, we self-ascribe memories with
expressions of the form “I remember that p” (where “p” stands for a fact, as in
“I remember that team T lost the game”), “I remember e” (where “e” stands for
an event, as in “I remember team T’s defeat”), “I remember ψ-ing” (where “ψ”
stands for an action, as in “I remember playing with team T”), “I remember
what it was like to have P” (where “P” stands for a property, as in “I remember
what it was like to lose that game”), “I remember x,” or “I remember some x”
(where “x” stands for an object, as in “I remember my team T jersey”), and “I
remember how to ψ” (where “ψ” stands for an action, as in “I remember how to
play the game”).
For some of these types of memory, the question of whether the relevant
type can be reduced to a combination of some other types of memory arises.
One might wonder, for example, whether remembering my team T jersey is
something over and above remembering a number of facts about that jersey,
remembering what it was like to wear it and remembering actions such as my
putting the jersey on. Similarly, one might wonder whether remembering
playing with team T is just a combination of remembering my team mates,
remembering the playing field, remembering some facts about the games in
which team T was involved and remembering what it was like to play with the
team. The project of determining which types of memory are, as it were, basic
and which types can be reduced to other types is a challenging and interesting
project. However, it is not a project in which we will engage here. For our discus-
sion of memory will not be concerned with all of the various types of memory
just distinguished. In fact, it will only be concerned with two of them. In this
discussion, we will concentrate on memory for facts and memory for perceptual
experiences.
Memory for facts is the type of memory that we express in propositional
form. The account of memory that I will propose below, however, is meant to
be neutral on the metaphysics of both facts and propositions. It will be con-
venient, for expository purposes, to assume that both facts and propositions
are identical with sets of possible worlds.2 However, no substantial claim
2 On this view, a proposition is identical with the set of possible worlds with respect to which it is
true. For instance, the proposition that my team T jersey is blue and red is identical with the set of
possible worlds with respect to which it is true that my team T jersey is blue and red. For this view
on the nature of propositions, see (Stalnaker 1976). Since I will be assuming this view, I will speak
Problems of Memory 5
in the coming chapters should hinge on this view about the nature of
propositions and facts. For the sake of simplicity, we will be mainly con-
cerned with facts involving objects of a particular kind; objects which are
perceivable through the sensory modality of vision.3 However, the account of
memory to be proposed is meant to have a broader scope. It should equally
apply to memory for facts involving objects perceivable through sensory
modalities other than vision.
Memory for perceptual experiences, on the other hand, is a type of
memory that we express by using locutions of the what-it-was-like form.
The account of memory that I will propose will assume that perceptual
experiences are properties of subjects; properties with phenomenal, or qual-
itative, features. The experience of seeing team T’s jersey, for example, will be
construed as a property such that, in virtue of having the property, the subject
feels in a particular way; a way which is visually characteristic. The account
of memory to be proposed here will also assume that perceptual experiences
are properties with intentional, or representational, features. The experience
of seeing team T’s jersey, for example, will be construed as a property such
that, in virtue of having that property, the subject represents certain things
(such as the jersey). In what follows, given the emphasis on memory for facts
which involve visible objects, the perceptual experiences that we will often
find ourselves discussing will be perceptual experiences of the visual kind.
However, the account of memory to be proposed is also intended to apply to
memory for perceptual experiences associated with sensory modalities other
than vision.
Let us specify the scope of the project a bit further. Consider, first of all,
propositional memory or memory for facts. Two forms of memory seem to be
lumped together into this category. There seems to be a distinction between
the type of memory that you have when you remember, for example, that
Columbus arrived to America in 1492 and the type of memory that you have
when you remember, for example, that the stove in your kitchen was on when
you were leaving the house. The distinction is hard to formulate, but it is intu-
itively clear. In the former case, when you remember, you are having a belief;
of possible worlds as “belonging to” propositions, and I will speak of propositions as “containing”
possible worlds. Also, I will be somewhat loose in my use of the terms “possible situation” and “pos-
sible world,” which I will use interchangeably. Strictly speaking, talk of a possible situation should be
understood as referring to a possible world where the situation is the case.
3 Why “mainly”? In chapter 3, we will see that facts of a different kind will also be important for
the account of memory to be developed here. These are facts about the causal histories of memories
themselves.
a belief which has been preserved from some time in the past, that is, the time
at which you originally learnt the remembered fact. Let us call this form of
remembering “semantic memory.” In the latter case, when you remember,
you are having an experience; an experience that typically originates in a past
perceptual experience of the fact. Memory experiences seem to be similar to
perceptual experiences in one respect. Memory experiences have phenom-
enal features. There seems to be such a thing as what it is like to remember,
for example, that the stove was on at the time that you were leaving the house.
Memory experiences are similar to perceptual experiences in a different re-
spect too. Memory experiences have intentional features. It seems that, in
virtue of having the kind of experience that you have when you remember
that the stove was on, you are able to represent certain things. You can, for
example, visualize your kitchen, the stove, and the flame in it. Since memory
experiences allow you to visualize facts or, equivalently, to picture them in
your mind, we can think of those experiences as mental images. Let us call the
form of remembering which involves such experiences “episodic memory.”4
It is possible for us to remember a fact by having both an experience of,
and a belief about, that fact. Suppose that I ask you, for example, whether
Mary was at the party last month, and you have an experience wherein you
are able to visualize a scene from the party. You may be able to direct your
attention at different objects represented by your experience and eventually
find Mary among them. In this case, you are remembering that Mary was at
the party in the episodic sense. However, it may also be the case that, at the
time that you saw Mary during the party, you formed the belief that Mary
was there, and your belief has been preserved up to the time at which I am
asking my question. In that case, you are remembering that Mary was at the
party in the semantic sense. Thus, it is possible for episodic and semantic
memory to be in play at the same time.
It is also possible for the two kinds of memory to come apart. You may
remember that Mary was at the party by having an experience which allows
you to visualize Mary even though, at the time that you were at the party,
your attention was focused on someone else and, as a result, you saw but
did not notice (and therefore did not form the belief) that Mary was there.
4 I am borrowing the terms “episodic” and “semantic” from (Tulving 1972) to refer to two sorts of
memory. I will also use “episodic memory” to refer to an experience in virtue of which a subject re-
members episodically. Notice that the characterization of episodic memory above makes it a type of
memory for facts, just like semantic memory is a type of memory for facts as well. What differentiates
episodic remembering from semantic remembering is not the sort of entity being remembered. It is
an independence from belief that episodic remembering enjoys and semantic remembering lacks.
Conversely, you may remember that Mary was at the party in that, at the time
that you were at the party, you formed the belief that Mary was there and your
belief has been preserved up to the present time. But you may not have an ex-
perience which allows you to visualize Mary. Perhaps you did not see Mary
during the party, and you formed your belief that Mary was there because, at
some point during the party, someone else told you that Mary was there.
It is hard to tell whether the distinction between semantic and episodic
memory cuts across the distinction between memory for facts and memory
for perceptual experiences. For, whereas it seems clear that one can re-
member one’s past perceptual experiences episodically, it is not equally clear
that one can remember them semantically. The episodic sense seems to be
the sense in which we understand locutions of the form “I remember what
it was like to have P.” And, in particular, it seems to be the sense in which
we understand those locutions when “P” stands for, specifically, a percep-
tual experience. When someone claims to remember what it was like to see
the sea for the first time, for instance, it seems natural to understand them as
saying that they are having an experience which represents their past percep-
tual experience; their perceptual experience of the sea. But it is also possible
to understand their claim as saying that, at the time that they saw the sea for
the first time, they formed, reflectively, a number of beliefs about the per-
ceptual experience that they were undergoing (such as the belief that it was
an overwhelming experience), and those beliefs have been preserved up to
the present time. Would the latter be semantic memory for past perceptual
experiences? In this situation, we may be more inclined to think that the sub-
ject is remembering certain facts about their past experience, as opposed to
the experience itself. And, if this is correct, then there is no such thing as se-
mantic memory for perceptual experiences. In any case, the issue of whether
a subject, in the situation described, is having memories for facts about their
past experience or, by contrast, they are remembering their past experi-
ence semantically will not be of great significance for our discussion in what
follows. The reason is that the object of our investigation will be episodic
memory and, thus, the scope of semantic memory will not be our concern
here. In what follows, we will be concerned with several aspects of episodic
memories for facts and of episodic memories for perceptual experiences.5
Let us turn to the relevant aspects of those memories now.
5 As I have assumed that the experiences in virtue of which we episodically remember facts
involving visible objects are mental images, I will be assuming that episodic memories for such facts
1.3 Explanandum
We have just seen that remembering facts episodically involves having cer-
tain experiences. When the facts being remembered involve visible objects,
I have proposed to construe such experiences as mental images. However,
the occurrence of mental imagery is not exclusive to memory. When we im-
agine the fact that the stove is on in the kitchen, for example, we are also ca-
pable of visualizing it in much the same way in which we visualize it when we
remember it episodically. Similarly, the occurrence of experiences wherein
we are able to mentally represent a different experience of ours is not exclu-
sive to memory either. When we imagine having a perceptual experience of
the sea, for example, we are capable of representing what it would be like
for us to have that perceptual experience, in much the same way in which
we represent it when we remember having the experience. An interesting
question which arises at this point, then, is what makes certain experiences
qualify as episodic memories and what makes other experiences fall outside
of the memory domain.
This is a metaphysical question. It is a question about the conditions
under which an experience qualifies as an episodic memory and not a ques-
tion about, for example, how we identify certain experiences as episodic
memories. The metaphysics of memory includes other interesting questions
as well. It is an area which has been explored in detail in connection, for in-
stance, with the topic of personal identity. Consider the question of what
makes you the same person over time. In virtue of what fact is a subject, ex-
isting at a time, the same person as a subject existing at an earlier time? One
might think that it is in virtue of the fact that the former subject remembers
experiences, or actions, which belong to the latter subject. And, for that
reason, memory has been thought to be central to the topic of personal iden-
tity.6 The metaphysics of memory has also been explored in connection with
the nature of time. There is, for example, the issue of whether some views
about the nature of time sit more easily than others with certain facts about
episodic remembering which are commonly accepted by us. Suppose, for
are mental images. I intend to remain neutral on the nature of episodic memories of other types,
other than for the above-made claims that they are experiences with phenomenal and intentional
features.
6 The view that memory constitutes personal identity has often been attributed to John Locke
based on Locke’s discussion of personal identity in book 2, chapter xxvii, of the Essay (1975). See,
however, (Behan 1979) for a different reading of Locke.
example, that there is an ontological difference between the past and the pre-
sent and, whereas the present is real, the past is no longer real. Then, past
facts are not real. But if past facts are not real, then what makes some of our
episodic memories true? It seems prima facie plausible to think that our
memories are true or false in virtue of, precisely, past facts. For that reason,
memory has been thought to be relevant to the nature of time too.7
In chapter 2, we will investigate the metaphysics of memory. However, we
will not be pursuing the connection between memory and personal identity.
We will not be pursuing the connection between memory and the nature of
time either. Instead, we will be concerned with the issue of what conditions
an experience must satisfy in order to qualify as an episodic memory. For the
sake of simplicity, we will concentrate on memory for facts involving visible
objects. (The outcomes of our investigation will easily generalize to memory
for perceptual experiences.) Thus, the question which will occupy us while
we discuss the metaphysics of memory will be a question about, specifically,
mental images. However, the broader formulation of the question that we
will try to answer will remain the following:
i. Metaphysics
What are the conditions under which an experience qualifies as an epi-
sodic memory?
In section 1.2, we have seen that episodic memories, like perceptual

experiences, have intentional features. When we have an episodic memory,
we thereby represent certain things. An interesting question which arises,
then, is what things we represent in virtue of having episodic memories. This
is a question about the intentionality of memory. It is a question about the
conditions under which some things are represented by an experience which
qualifies as an episodic memory and other things are not. Notice that it is dif-
ferent from the question of how the subject themselves would express their
having the relevant experience. Consider, for example, memory for facts.
Depending on one’s views about self-knowledge, one might think that if a
subject represents that some proposition p is the case in virtue of having an
episodic memory, then this is a fact which must be cognitively available to
them. And, for that reason, if the subject’s memory represents that p, then
they must be able to express their memory with claims of the sort “I remember
7 On memory and the nature of time, see (Le Poidevin 2017).

that p.” Conversely, one might think that if a subject represents that some
proposition p is the case in virtue of having an episodic memory, then this
is a fact about which they cannot easily be wrong. And, for that reason, if a
subject expresses one of their episodic memories with a claim of the kind “I
remember that p,” then their episodic memory must represent the fact that
p. I will not be making either of those two assumptions here. In fact, I will be
assuming that both of those conditional claims are false.8 Admittedly, I will
sometimes speak of an episodic memory as a memory that the subject would
express by saying that they remember such-and-such. However, by singling
out the memory by reference to the claim that the subject themselves would
make in order to express it, I intend to leave the question of what the memory
represents open. For what a memory represents does not need to be fully, or
manifestly, available to the subject for report.
If the notion of representation that we will be employing does not cor-
respond to the claims that the subject would make in order to express their
memories, then, one might ask, what will be the operative notion of repre-
sentation? In chapter 3, we will investigate the intentionality of memory.
We will pursue the question of what episodic memories represent or, equiv-
alently, what the content of memories is.9 The relevant notion of content
will involve the truth-conditions of memories. For that reason, I will con-
strue the contents of memories as propositions; propositions which capture
those truth-conditions. And, as a result, the question that will concern us
with regards to the intentionality of memory will be the question of which
types of propositions constitute the contents of our episodic memories.
What propositions capture the conditions with respect to which our episodic
memories are correct and the conditions with respect to which they are in-
correct? Let us highlight this aspect of our explanandum now:
ii. Intentionality
What are the contents of our episodic memories?
In section 1.2, we have seen that, in addition to intentional features, epi-

sodic memories have phenomenal features. This is another respect in which
8 On the broad topic of the limits of self-knowledge, see (Fernández 2013). On some of the ways
in which some contents of memory, more specifically, may not be available in self-knowledge, see
(Fernández 2015).
9 Hereafter I will use several expressions equivalently to refer to the intentionality of memory.
These include, for any memory M, “the content of M,” “the intentional object of M,” “what M repre-
sents,” and “what M is about.”
episodic memories and perceptual experiences are similar. When we have an

episodic memory, there is such a thing as what having that episodic memory
is like. An interesting question which arises, then, is what it is like for us
to have episodic memories. This is a question about the phenomenology
of memory. The phenomenology of memory is a particularly interesting
and puzzling area. On the one hand, it seems quite clear that, in normal
circumstances, having episodic memories feels quite differently from having
other mental states, such as perceptual experiences or episodes of imagina-
tion. On the other hand, it is quite hard to put one’s finger on the specific
aspects of the phenomenology of memory which distinguishes it from the
phenomenology of perception, or that of imagination.
One way in which, when we have episodic memories, we feel differently
from the way in which we feel when we have perceptual experiences or
episodes of imagination seems to involve an experience of time. More spe-
cifically, it seems to involve an experience of the past. It is unclear, how-
ever, exactly what is being experienced as being in the past in virtue of
having an episodic memory. Consider, for example, the episodic memory
that I would express by saying that I remember that Mary was at the party
last month. Arguably, the presence of Mary at the party is a fact which is
experienced by me as being in the past in virtue of having this episodic
memory. But is my past perceptual experience of Mary as being at the
party also experienced by me in virtue of having the memory? This is an
issue that we will need to address in order to clarify the phenomenology
of memory.
Another issue that we will need to address is whether (and if so, in what
sense) the phenomenology of memory involves some awareness of the self.
After all, one might argue that, when I have the episodic memory that Mary
was at the party, the presence of Mary at the party is not only experienced
by me as being in the past, but it is also experienced by me as being in my
past. Relatedly, one might also argue that, when I have the episodic memory
that Mary was at the party, the memory at issue is presented to me as being
mine, or as belonging to me. These ideas, which seem prima facie plausible,
suggest that, in some sense yet to be determined, we are aware of ourselves
in memory. This sort of awareness will also need to be addressed while we
clarify the phenomenology of memory; a project that will occupy us in the
second part of the book. In c hapter 4, I will attempt to explain the aspects
of the phenomenology of memory which involve the experience of time,
whereas in c hapter 5, I will address the sense of ownership for our episodic
memories. Our investigation of memory will therefore be concerned, in

those chapters, with the following issue:
iii. Phenomenology
What is it like for us to have episodic memories?
Episodic memories are not only similar to perceptual experiences in that

they have intentional and phenomenal features. They are also similar
in that, usually, mental states of both types elicit beliefs in us. Just like, in
normal circumstances, when we have a perceptual experience, we trust that
experience and we are inclined to believe what the experience presents to
us, it is also the case that, in normal circumstances, when we have an epi-
sodic memory, we trust that memory and we are inclined to believe what
the memory presents to us. Let us refer to those beliefs which we form on
the basis of our episodic memories as “memory beliefs.” (I will reserve the
term “memory judgment” for the narrower category of occurrent memory
beliefs.) There are a number of interesting questions about the epistemic
status of memory beliefs.
The question which most naturally arises is that of whether, in general,
memory beliefs are justified. Assuming that justified beliefs are more likely to
be true than those which are not justified, the question of whether, in general,
memory beliefs are justified turns on that of whether episodic memory is
generally reliable. To be clear, the fallibility of memory is not in dispute here.
We are all familiar with instances in which we misremember things. In fact,
cognitive psychology provides us with relatively specific parameters within
which misremembering is more likely to occur.10 But, given this kind of ev-
idence, one might wonder whether we are generally entitled to believe what
our episodic memories present to us.
Suppose, for a moment, that memory is generally reliable and, thus, we
are entitled to believe what our memories present to us. Then, at least two
other questions about the epistemic status of memory beliefs seem to arise.
One of them is the question of whether, despite the fallibility of memory,
there is a certain kind of error from which memory beliefs are protected. As a
rough approximation, we may say that this is the kind of error which occurs
10 The so-called misinformation effect constitutes an example of this. It seems that if, after per-
ceiving a fact, we acquire false information about that fact, then our being in possession of that in-
formation can make our episodic memories of the perceived fact less accurate. On this effect, see
(Loftus 2005).
when we accurately remember something happening to someone, but we

mistakenly assume that the remembered person is ourselves and, as a result,
we wrongly believe that what we remember happened to us. The property
of being protected from such errors has been labeled “immunity to error
through misidentification” in the philosophical literature.11 The question of
whether memory beliefs are immune to error through misidentification is
interesting because if memory beliefs do have this peculiar property, then
memory beliefs are endowed with a sort of epistemic justification which is
special. But the epistemic justification that memory beliefs enjoy may be spe-
cial in other respects as well.
Another interesting question about the epistemic status of memory
beliefs is that of whether their justification derives from, or reduces to, the
justification that beliefs formed through other faculties, such as perception
or introspection, enjoy. If episodic memory merely maintains, over time,
the epistemic justification that beliefs formed through other faculties ac-
quired in the past, then the justification of memory beliefs must derive from
the justification afforded by those faculties. But if memory is capable of pro-
viding justification for a belief regardless of whether, in the past, the subject
was justified in forming that belief through some other faculty, then it seems
that the justification of memory beliefs does not depend on the justifica-
tion afforded by any of our other faculties. For that reason, the question of
whether the justification enjoyed by memory beliefs derives from the justi-
fication that beliefs formed through other faculties, such as perception or
introspection, enjoy has been discussed in the philosophical literature as the
question of whether episodic memory “preserves” or “generates” epistemic
justification.12
In the third part of the book, we will engage with the epistemology of
memory. In chapter 6, I will try to show that memory beliefs are immune to
error through misidentification, and in chapter 7, I will contend that memory
generates epistemic justification. The issue that will concern us in the third
part of the book, therefore, is the broad issue of whether our justification for
memory beliefs is special in any way:
iv. Epistemology
What kind of epistemic justification do our episodic memories afford?
11 On immunity to error through misidentification, see (Prosser and Recanati 2012).

12 For an overview of this debate, see (Senor 2017).
A question that I will not be addressing, then, is that of whether memory

is generally reliable or not. Instead, I will assume that memory is indeed
generally reliable. Notice that if the outcomes of our discussion on the epis-
temology of memory are correct, then making such an assumption will be
vindicated as having been the correct strategy all along. For if the epistemic
justification enjoyed by our memory beliefs does not reduce to the justifi-
cation enjoyed by beliefs that we have formed through other faculties, then
memory is a basic source of epistemic justification. And it seems that the
reliability of basic sources of epistemic justification cannot be established
without circularity.13 Any argument for the general reliability of memory
will rest on premises which we are only entitled to accept if we assume, in
the first place, the general reliability of memory. Thus, the general relia-
bility of episodic memory will be treated as an assumption throughout this
discussion.
1.4 Available Strategies
To recapitulate, this investigation of memory will touch on four aspects of

it; the metaphysics of memory, the intentionality of memory, the phenom-
enology of memory and the epistemology of memory. The issues to be
addressed will be the following:
i. Metaphysics
What are the conditions under which an experience qualifies as an ep-
isodic memory?
ii. Intentionality
iii. Phenomenology
iv. Epistemology
The project of addressing these four issues can be tackled in different ways,
depending on one’s position with regards to which of the four aspects of
13 On the challenge of demonstrating that a basic source of justification is reliable without commit-
ting circularity, see (Alston 1986).

memory concerned is more fundamental. In order to clarify the approach

that I will adopt here, it may therefore be helpful to distinguish several
ways in which the relation between the metaphysics, the intentionality, the
phenomenology, and the epistemology of memory may be conceived,
and how each conception of that relation leads to a different approach to
addressing (i–iv).
One way in which the relation between the four aspects of memory can be
conceived is by taking the metaphysics of memory to be the fundamental as-
pect among them. Let us call this conception of the relation between the four
aspects of memory, the “primacy of metaphysics.” If one endorses this con-
ception, then the approach that one will take regarding how to address (i–iv)
will be to think that, whatever one’s answer to (i) is, it should account for one’s
answers to (ii), (iii), and (iv). The challenge for the advocate of the primacy
of metaphysics is that their answer to question (i) cannot rely on any pre-
conceived answers to questions (ii–iv). In order to determine which mental
states qualify as memories, the advocate of the primacy of metaphysics
cannot appeal to the intentional properties, the phenomenal properties, or
the epistemic properties that memories typically have. Otherwise, their sub-
sequent answers to questions (ii), (iii), and (iv) will be infected with circu-
larity. The advocate of the primacy of metaphysics may try to avoid the threat
of circularity by offering an answer to question (i) which does not appeal
to the intentional properties, the phenomenal properties, or the epistemic
properties which characterize memories. Instead, they may want to restrict
themselves to the use of notions such as causation, realization, constitution,
and other purely metaphysical notions. The challenge, of course, is to come
up with an answer to question (i) which illuminates questions (ii–iv) within
such constraints.
Suppose, for example, that the facts in virtue of which a mental state
qualifies as a memory are, let us say, purely causal facts. Explaining how
those facts would also account for the kind of intentional, phenomenal,
and epistemic properties that memories have seems quite a difficult task.
Nevertheless, there is an avenue that the advocate of the primacy of meta-
physics may want to pursue. In order to explain the contents that memories
have, for example, the advocate of the primacy of metaphysics may want
to help themselves to causal theories of mental content.14 If a memory
represents a fact in virtue of some causal relations which obtain between the
14 For an account of mental representation which relies on causal relations, see (Dretske 1986).
fact and the memory, then perhaps the causal relations in virtue of which the
mental state in question qualifies as a memory include the relations in virtue
of which the memory has a certain content. In this way, the advocate of the
primacy of metaphysics may attempt to extract an answer to question (ii)
from their answer to question (i). What about question (iii) though?
One possible way of understanding the relation between the phenome-
nology and the intentionality of memory is to think that the phenomenal
properties of memories depend on their intentional properties. The thought
is that memories have the phenomenal properties that they have because
they have certain intentional properties.15 On this picture, it makes sense for
one to ask which aspects of the contents of episodic memories explain the
fact that memories have a phenomenology of a certain kind. Thus, it seems
that if one endorses the primacy of metaphysics, one may appeal to the view
that the phenomenology of memory depends on its intentionality in order to
address question (iii) based on one’s answer to question (ii).
As far as question (iv) is concerned, it seems that at least two strategies
are available to the advocate of the primacy of metaphysics. One strategy is
to offer an answer to question (iv) based on their answer to question (ii) by
appealing to the notion of evidence. The idea would be to appeal to the con-
nection, on the one hand, between content and evidence, and, on the other
hand, between evidence and epistemic justification. On some conceptions
of epistemic justification, being justified in believing something depends on
having evidence for one’s belief.16 If this is correct, then, once we are clear
on the kind of content that episodic memories have, this should shed some
light on the kind of epistemic justification that memories provide us with.
For, at that point, we should have an understanding of the kind of evidence
for belief that memories give us. Thus, if one subscribes the primacy of met-
aphysics, one may address the intentionality of memory first and then use
the outcomes of one’s investigation in order to address the epistemology of
memory.
A different strategy for answering question (iv) is to appeal, not to the
connection between evidence and epistemic justification, but to the connec-
tion between causation and epistemic justification. On some conceptions
of epistemic justification, the issue of whether a belief is justified or not
15 This is a particular instance of the broader view that, for any type of mental state, the phenomenal
properties of mental states of that type depend on their intentional properties. Representationalists
about qualia endorse the broader view. On representationalism about qualia, see (Dretske 1995).
16 See (Feldman and Conee 1985) for a defence of this view.
depends on how the belief was produced.17 Essentially, the idea is that a be-
lief is justified if it has been caused by an appropriate causal process; a pro-
cess which, in normal circumstances, would take the fact that constitutes
the truth-maker of the belief as input and would deliver the belief as output.
If this is correct then, once we are clear on which causal facts need to obtain
for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory, this should shed some
For, at that point, we should have an understanding of whether forming
beliefs on the basis of our memories constitutes (given the causal conditions
that memories must satisfy to qualify as such) an appropriate process for the
production of beliefs or not.
An alternative way in which the relation between the four aspects of
memory can be conceived is by taking the intentionality of memory to be the
fundamental aspect among them. Let us call this conception, the “primacy of
intentionality.” If one endorses this conception, then the approach that one
will take regarding how to address (i–iv) will be to think that, whatever one’s
answer to (ii) is, it should account for one’s answers to (i), (iii), and (iv). The
idea with regards to question (i), for example, would be that the contents of
memories are essential to them. And, for that reason, the intentionality of
memory should be our guide to the metaphysics of memory. Once we have
a clear understanding of what kind of content memories have, we will have
a firm grasp on what kinds of mental states qualify as memories: Memories
are those mental states which have mnemonic contents. This way of tackling
question (i), however, runs into a certain difficulty. The difficulty is that it
is hard to see how one could determine which contents memories enjoy if
one does not have, in the first place, a firm grasp on the issue of what mental
states qualify as memories.
What about question (iii)? The advocate of the primacy of intentionality
can appeal to a way of understanding the relation between the phenome-
nology and the intentionality of memory that we have considered above. If
one subscribes the primacy of intentionality, it seems natural to think that the
phenomenal properties of memories depend on their intentional properties.
And if such dependence does obtain, then it should be possible to shed some
light on what it is like for us to have memories once we are clear on the kinds
of contents that memories have. Thus, it seems that if one endorses the pri-
macy of intentionality, one may appeal to the view that the phenomenology
17 See (Goldman 1979) for an example of this view. We will revisit this view in chapter 7.
of memory depends on its intentionality in order to address question (iii)

based on one’s answer to question (ii).
A natural way of tackling question (iv) if one endorses the primacy of
intentionality is by appealing to the above-mentioned connections be-
tween content, evidence, and epistemic justification. The idea, once again,
is that, if we have an understanding of the kinds of contents that episodic
memories have, then we will be able to understand what kind of evidence
for belief episodic memories give us. And this, in turn, should shed some
Thus, it seems that if one takes the intentionality of memory to be the fun-
damental aspect of it, one may address question (iv) based on one’s answer
to question (ii) as well.
It is also possible to take the phenomenology of memory to be the fun-
damental aspect of it. Let us call this conception of the different aspects of
memory, the “primacy of phenomenology.” If one endorses this conception,
then the approach that one will take regarding how to address (i–iv) will
be to think that, whatever one’s answer to (iii) is, it should account for one’s
answers to (i), (ii), and (iv). The idea with regards to question (i), for example,
would be that the phenomenal features of memories are essential to them.
And, for that reason, the phenomenology of memory should be our guide to
the metaphysics of memory. Once we have a clear understanding of what it
is like for us to have a memory, we will have a firm grasp on the issue of what
kinds of mental states qualify as memories: Memories are those mental states
which have the phenomenal features which are characteristic of memories.
This way of tackling question (i), however, runs into a difficulty. The diffi-
culty is that it is unclear how one could determine what those phenomenal
features are if one does not have, in the first place, a clear understanding of
what mental states qualify as memories.
Consider question (ii) now. A natural way of understanding the re-
lation between the phenomenology and the intentionality of memory, if
one endorses the primacy of phenomenology, is to think that the inten-
tional properties of memories depend on their phenomenal properties.18
The thought is that memories have the intentional properties that they
have because they have certain phenomenal properties. On this picture, it
18 This is a particular instance of the broader view that, for any type of mental state, the intentional
properties of mental states of that type depend on their phenomenal properties. Philosophers within
the phenomenal intentionality research program are sympathetic to the broader view. See (Kriegel
2013), for example.
makes sense for one to ask which aspects of the phenomenology of having
episodic memories explain the fact that memories have contents of a par-
ticular kind. Thus, it seems that if one subscribes the primacy of phenom-
enology, one may appeal to the view that the intentionality of memory
depends on its phenomenology in order to address question (ii) based on
one’s answer to question (iii).
How would one tackle (iv) if one endorses the primacy of phenome-
nology? One possibility is the following. There is a view according to which
some of our feelings can play a grounding role for some of our beliefs. Such
feelings are labeled “epistemic feelings” in the relevant literature.19 An ex-
ample of an epistemic feeling, for example, is the feeling associated with the
tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon.20 When we experience this phenomenon,
we are unable to produce an answer to some question. And yet, we believe
that we know the answer, and we believe that we would be able to produce it if
given enough time. On the basis of which grounds do we form such beliefs? It
is hard to see what constitutes our grounds for those beliefs if not the charac-
teristic feeling that we experience when we are trying to answer the relevant
question. If one endorses the primacy of phenomenology, then, one could
help oneself to the notion of epistemic feelings in order to address question
(iv) based on one’s answer to (iii). The idea would be that, once we are clear on
the phenomenology of memory, we may be able to identify, among the phe-
nomenal features which are characteristic of remembering, some epistemic
feelings. And, once we are clear on what the relevant epistemic feelings are,
we may be able to account for what kinds of beliefs we are entitled to form on
the basis of such feelings and, thus, for what kind of epistemic justification
memory provides us with. This strategy, however, has obvious limitations.
For one thing, even if we grant that, in the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon,
one remembers the answer to the question, it seems that the kind of memory
involved would be semantic, and not episodic, memory. More importantly,
the types of beliefs that epistemic feelings are able to support seem to be
beliefs about one’s own epistemic state. (This is why epistemic feelings are
thought to be relevant for metacognition.) These are beliefs such as the be-
lief that one knows, or does not know, a proposition, the belief that one has
committed a mistake, or the belief that one has achieved understanding.21
19 On the nature of epistemic feelings, see (Arango-Muñoz 2014).

20 For details, see (Brown 1991).
21 See (Arango-Muñoz and Michaelian 2014) for a helpful inventory of epistemic feelings.
It is unclear, then, how epistemic feelings could make a contribution to the

justification of memory beliefs about past objective facts.
It seems more promising, then, for the advocate of the primacy of phe-
nomenology to approach question (iv) through a different route; a route that
will be quite familiar by now. Recall the connection, on the one hand, be-
tween content and evidence and, on the other hand, between evidence and
epistemic justification. If being justified in believing something depends on
having evidence for one’s belief, and if memories provide us with evidence
for belief in virtue of their contents, then it seems that the advocate of the
primacy of phenomenology should try to answer question (ii) first. Once
this task has been accomplished, the advocate of the primacy of phenom-
enology can try to use their answer to question (ii) in order to shed some
light on question (iv), just like the advocate of the primacy of intentionality
tried to do.
There is, finally, the possibility of taking the epistemology of memory as the
fundamental aspect of it. Let us call this conception of the relation between
the four aspects of memory, the “primacy of epistemology.” If one endorses
this conception, then the approach that one will take regarding how to ad-
dress (i–iv) will be to think that, whatever one’s answer to (iv) is, it should
account for one’s answers to (i–iii). The idea would be to figure out, first, what
kind of epistemic justification memory provides us with. And, then, to tackle
questions (i–iii) by pursuing a sort of transcendental enquiry: What must the
metaphysics, the intentionality, and the phenomenology of memory be like
in order for memory to deliver the kind of epistemic justification that it does?
This is also a challenging project. It is challenging because of a certain threat
of circularity; a recurring threat in this discussion. While addressing ques-
tion (iv), the advocate of the primacy of epistemology may not explain the
kind of epistemic justification that memories provide us with by appealing to
the fact that memories have, for example, contents of a particular kind or by
appealing to the fact that they have certain causal histories. Otherwise, their
subsequent answers to either question (ii) or question (i) will be infected
with circularity.
The project is also challenging because it is difficult to see how the kind
of epistemic justification that memories provide us with could tell us much
about the phenomenology or the intentionality of memory. Nevertheless,
there is an avenue that the advocate of the primacy of epistemology may
want to pursue. In order to address question (ii), they could exploit, once
again, the connection between content and evidence and the connection
between evidence and epistemic justification. The idea would be to assume,

first of all, that being justified in believing something requires having ev-
idence for one’s belief. Suppose, now, that one has been able to show that
memory provides our memory beliefs with a particular kind of epistemic
justification. At that point, one may ask what type of evidence memories
must give us in order for them to confer that kind of epistemic justification
on our memory beliefs. Since having a certain content seems to be the most
natural way for memories to give us evidence, this inquiry should eventually
shed some light on the content of memories. By contrast, in order to address
question (iii), the advocate of the primacy of epistemology could exploit,
once more, the dependence of the phenomenal properties of memories
on their intentional properties. The idea would be to assume, first of all,
that the phenomenal properties of memories depend on their intentional
properties. Suppose, now, that one has been able to show that memories
have contents of a particular kind. At that point, one may ask how the phe-
nomenal properties of memories are explained by the fact that memories
have contents of that kind.
What about question (i) though? Illuminating the metaphysics of memory
by an appeal to the epistemic properties that memories have seems especially
challenging. There is, however, a conception of the nature of memory which
seems quite agreeable with the primacy of epistemology. This is the so-called
epistemic conception of memory.22 The epistemic conception of memory is
formulated in terms of knowledge, not epistemic justification. According
to it, for every proposition p, one remembers that p if and only if one has a
certain knowledge that p: One knows that p in the present because, in the
past, one knew that p. In order to address the question of which mental states
qualify as memories, the advocate of the primacy of epistemology may put
forward an analogous proposal which makes use of the notion of epistemic
justification: For every mental state M, M is a memory if and only if there is
some proposition p such that, if one has M, then one is justified in believing
that p because, in the past, one was justified in believing that p. If the ad-
vocate of the primacy of epistemology can make a compelling case for this
version of the epistemic conception of memory, then their answer to ques-
tion (iv) may illuminate the correct answer to question (i). For, once we are
clear on the kind of epistemic justification that our memories provide us
with, this should allow us to determine which sorts of mental states qualify as
22 For a discussion of the epistemic conception of memory, see (Bernecker 2010).

memories. Memories are, on this view, those mental states which allow us to
form beliefs with the relevant kind of epistemic justification because, in the
past, we were able to form those very same beliefs with precisely that kind of
epistemic justification.
This catalogue of available strategies for addressing the metaphysics, the
intentionality, the phenomenology, and the epistemology of memory is,
of course, not exhaustive. One could take, for example, two of those four
aspects of memory to be more basic relative to the remaining two, which
would result in a hybrid approach to questions (i–iv). The hybrid ap-
proach would then inherit some of the virtues and challenges of some of
the approaches just considered. To be sure, all four of those approaches face
some challenges. For instance, both the primacy of phenomenology ap-
proach and the primacy of intentionality approach have trouble with the
metaphysics of memory. The former involves, furthermore, the assumption
of the dependence of the intentional properties of memories on their phe-
nomenal properties whereas the latter involves, conversely, the assumption
of the dependence of the phenomenal properties of memories on their in-
tentional properties. Both the primacy of metaphysics approach and the pri-
macy of epistemology approach have trouble with the intentionality and the
phenomenology of memory. The former may involve, depending on how we
pursue it, a commitment to causal theories of mental content whereas the
latter could involve, on some versions of it, a commitment to the epistemic
conception of memory.
It is perhaps not surprising that, no matter which approach we eventually
decide to follow in order to address questions (i–iv), there will be a theoret-
ical cost involved. After all, the project of accounting for the metaphysics,
the intentionality, the phenomenology, and the epistemology of memory is,
despite the limitations of scope stipulated in sections 1.2 and 1.3, an ambi-
tious project. I propose to adopt a hybrid approach which will combine some
aspects of the primacy of metaphysics approach with some aspects of the pri-
macy of intentionality approach. Is this the best possible approach? I am in-
clined to think that we should evaluate a philosophical approach to memory
based on the balance of, on the one hand, the explanatory benefits delivered
by the approach and, on the other hand, the theoretical cost that we incur
by adopting the approach. The approach that I propose to adopt here will be
specified in section 1.5. In section 1.6, I will disclose the assumptions which
make up the theoretical cost of the proposed approach. The case for the ex-
planatory benefits delivered by it will be made in the coming chapters.
1.5 Approach
In what follows, I will adopt a hybrid approach which is, in some respects,
similar to the primacy of intentionality approach. I will take the intention-
ality of memory to be more basic than the phenomenology and the episte-
mology of memory. Thus, I will try to account, first, for the intentionality of
memory, and then, I will try to use the outcomes of that inquiry to explain
the phenomenology of memory and the epistemology of memory. The hy-
brid approach that I will adopt here is, in other respects, similar to the pri-
macy of metaphysics approach. For I will take the metaphysics of memory
to be more basic than the phenomenology of memory and the epistemology
of memory. For that reason, I will try to account, first, for the metaphysics of
memory, and then, I will use the outcomes of that inquiry to illuminate some
aspects of the epistemology of memory. The difference between the strategy
to be followed here and both the primacy of metaphysics approach and the
primacy of intentionality approach is the following. I will not take the inten-
tionality of memory to be more basic than the metaphysics of memory, and
I will not take the metaphysics of memory to be more basic than the inten-
tionality of memory. Accordingly, I will not try to account for either of those
two aspects of memory by appealing to the other one. In that sense, the whole
investigation of memory to be constructed here is intended to rest eventually
on two independent pillars; an account of the metaphysics of memory and
an account of its intentionality. Let us look at the architecture of the project
more closely now.
The first part of the book is concerned with the nature of memory; those
aspects of memory which will be assumed to be more basic. For that reason,
it deals with the metaphysics of memory and the intentionality of memory.
Specifically, in chapter 2, I will offer an account of what kinds of mental states
qualify as memories. To avoid the threat of circularity which threatens the
primacy of metaphysics approach, the account to be proposed will not ap-
peal to the idea that memories have a certain content, it will not appeal to the
idea that memories have a certain phenomenology (either involving time or
involving ownership), and it will not appeal to the idea that memories pro-
vide a special kind of knowledge (either in terms of grounding beliefs which
are protected from misidentification errors or in terms of generating epi-
stemic justification). The account will rely, instead, on some ideas borrowed
from the framework of functionalism. Accordingly, I will refer to it as the
“functionalist theory” of memory. In chapter 3, I will offer an account of the
kinds of contents that memories have. The account of mnemonic content to

be proposed will not appeal to the idea that memories have a particular phe-
nomenology (either involving time or involving ownership), and it will not
appeal to the idea that memories provide us with a special kind of knowledge
(either in terms of grounding beliefs which are protected from misidentifica-
tion errors or in terms of generating epistemic justification). The account will
rely, instead, on some intuitions regarding the truth-conditions of memories,
and it will put forward the idea that memories are, in a certain sense, self-
referential. Accordingly, I will refer to this account as the “reflexive view” of
mnemonic content.
The functionalist theory of memory and the reflexive view of mnemonic
content are meant to be independent from each other. Suppose, for example,
that the functionalist theory of memory turns out to be false, and the kinds
of mental states which, in c hapter 2, will be claimed to qualify as memories
are not, in actual fact, memories. Then, it may still be true that the mental
states which do qualify as memories have self-referential contents. In other
words, if the functionalist theory of memory falls, it does not need to take the
reflexive view of mnemonic content with it. Conversely, if the reflexive view
of mnemonic content falls, it does not need to take the functionalist theory
of memory with it either. If memories have contents which, contrary to what
will be argued in chapter 3, are not self-referential, then it may still be true
that those mental states which qualify as memories are the states which will
be characterized along functionalist lines in c hapter 2.
The second part of the book deals with the phenomenology of memory.
Specifically, it deals with the temporal phenomenology of memory and the
sense of ownership involved in having memories. The first aspect of the
phenomenology of memory will be discussed in c hapter 4. First, I will sep-
arate two aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory; the feeling
that the remembered fact obtained in the past and the feeling that the sub-
ject perceived it in the past. Then, I will relate the latter feeling to the pop-
ular notion that memory involves a sort of mental time travel to the moment
at which the subject originally perceived the remembered fact. And, finally,
I will try to explain both aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory
by appealing to the kind of content that memories have. The broad idea will
be that the temporal phenomenology of memory is the way in which we ex-
perience some of the things that we represent in memory. The second aspect
of the phenomenology of memory will be discussed in chapter 5. First, I will
make a case for the view that having memories involves the feeling that those
memories are the subject’s own by appealing to the condition of disowned

memory; a condition which can best be explained by the absence of such a
feeling.23 Then, I will offer a proposal about the nature of the feeling that our
memories are our own by appealing to the kinds of contents that memories
have. The broad idea will be, once again, that the phenomenology of owner-
ship in memory is the way in which we experience some of the things that
we represent in memory. Accordingly, I will propose that the lack of the
feeling of ownership involved in the condition of disowned memory is the
way in which the subject experiences having memories whose contents have
been, in a certain sense, disrupted. Other mental disorders in which subjects
disown some of their mental states will also be discussed along similar lines.
The third part of the book deals with the epistemology of memory.
Specifically, it deals with the issue of whether memory beliefs are immune
to error through misidentification and with the issue of whether memories
generate epistemic justification or merely preserve it over time. In chapter 6,
I will discuss immunity to error through misidentification with regards to
memory. First, I will consider some potential counter-examples to the view
that memory beliefs are immune to error through misidentification, and
I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, they do not show that the view
is false. In some cases, my argument will rely on the claim that the relevant
counter-examples do not involve, strictly speaking, memories. Thus, the
line of reasoning in c hapter 6 will partly rely on the functionalist theory of
memory offered in chapter 2. It will also rely on the reflexive view of mne-
monic content defended in chapter 3, since it will be on the basis of that view
that I will argue, more positively, that memory beliefs are immune to error
through misidentification. In the process of discussing the potential counter-
examples to the view that memory beliefs are immune to error through mis-
identification, some ideas about the intentionality of perception, and about
the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory,
will emerge. Having made the case that memory beliefs are immune to error
through misidentification, I will then try to use those ideas in order to ex-
plain why memory beliefs have this peculiar epistemic property. In c hapter 7,
I will tackle the debate on whether memories generate, or merely preserve,
epistemic justification. I will defend a version of “generativism”; the view that
memories generate epistemic justification. I will first consider some versions
of generativism and some ways in which one could potentially make a case
23 On disowned memory, see (Klein and Nichols 2012).

for them. As we will see, some of the relevant defenses of generativism are
built within a picture of memory according to which memories may not gen-
erate content relative to the perceptual experiences in which they originate.
I will refer to this picture as the “recorder model” of memory. Other defenses
of generativism are built within a more liberal picture of memory according
to which memories do have the power to generate content. I will refer to this
picture as the “reconstructive” conception of memory. I will not subscribe
any of the defenses of generativism considered, but I will suggest that the
idea of content generation, to be found within the reconstructive concep-
tion of memory, puts us on the right path toward a successful defense of
generativism. I will make a case for the view that memory involves a certain
kind of content generation by appealing, not to the reconstructive concep-
tion of memory, but to the reflexive view of mnemonic content defended in
chapter 3. And, on the basis of the relevant kind of content generation, I will
argue that memories do generate epistemic justification, and not merely pre-
serve it over time.
This outline of the investigation that we will pursue reveals an interesting
aspect of it. The interesting aspect is that the heavy lifting in the project will
be done by the proposal about mnemonic content to be offered in chapter 3.
The account of the metaphysics of memory to be put forward in chapter 2
does play a role in the discussion of the epistemology of memory, but it is a
fairly minor role. Mostly, the functionalist theory of memory serves as the
background against which questions about the intentionality, the phenom-
enology and the epistemology of memory will be discussed. It is necessary,
since it would be hard to determine, for example, what the temporal phe-
nomenology of memories involves without knowing exactly what we are
supposed to count as memories. And it is interesting, since the received view
about what counts as a memory is now hotly contested within philosophy.
But it does not play a substantial explanatory role in the overall investiga-
tion of memory. Thus, even though the investigation is, to continue with the
metaphor introduced earlier, built to rest on two main pillars, the weight of
the investigation is not equally distributed between the two pillars. It is more
like an edifice tilted toward one of them; the account of the intentionality of
memory. To that extent, this is a broadly representationalist project. And, for
that reason, it involves some crucial assumptions; assumptions which should
be clearly disclosed. Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the plan which has
been put in place for the coming discussion and of the assumptions which
have been made in the process of designing that plan.
1.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have seen that the investigation of episodic memory that
we are about to pursue will cover the following four questions about the met-
aphysics, the intentionality, the phenomenology, and the epistemology of
memory:
i. Metaphysics
What are the conditions under which an experience qualifies as an ep-
isodic memory?
ii. Intentionality
iii. Phenomenology
iv. Epistemology
We have seen that chapter 2 will be concerned with question (i). Accordingly,
the discussion in c hapter 2 will deliver an account of the metaphysics of
memory. Chapter 3 will be concerned with question (ii), and for that reason,
it will deliver an account of its intentionality. Chapters 4 and 5 will deal with
different elements of an answer to question (iii). Thus, they will offer accounts
of different aspects of the phenomenology of memory. Likewise, chapters 6
and 7 will deal with different elements of an answer to question (iv), and
hence, they will offer accounts of different aspects of the epistemology of
memory. The way in which these outcomes are meant to hang together is
that if all goes well, then the proposed answers to question (iii) and question
(iv) will rest on the proposed answers to both questions (i) and (ii), but es-
pecially on the answer to question (ii). Thus, it seems that if the outcomes of
our discussion of memory in the coming chapters are correct, the benefits of
this investigation will be many. For it will provide an overall picture of several
philosophically interesting aspects of memory and of the relations between
them. In sum, this investigation will bring them together into a unifying ac-
count of memory. The ultimate benefit of the investigation, therefore, is an
answer to a question which encompasses (i–iv) above; the question of what
our capacity for remembering episodically amounts to.
What about the costs of this inquiry though? In the process of organizing
the discussion around questions (i–iv), I have made a number of assumptions.
And, while adopting a particular approach for tackling questions (i–iv),

I have committed myself to a number of further assumptions. It will make for
clarity, then, if we can highlight those assumptions right from the start, and
we can bear them in mind throughout the coming discussion. We may dis-
tinguish five assumptions which have been made thus far.
To begin with, I have made two assumptions concerning episodic
remembering. The first one is that episodic memories should be identified
with experiences and not with beliefs. Experiences have been construed as
mental states with intentional and qualitative features. In particular, I have
assumed that those experiences have content, in the sense that they can be
correct or incorrect. The thought is that one may remember something in
virtue of having one of those experiences, and then, it is a separate matter
whether one is remembering it correctly or one is remembering it incorrectly.
In either of the two possible scenarios, one would episodically remember the
same thing by having the same experience.24
The second assumption regarding episodic remembering concerns the
nature of these experiences. Consider those cases in which one episod-
ically remembers a fact, and the fact in question involves objects perceiv-
able through the sense modality of vision. These are cases such as that in
which you remember that Mary was at the party last month. In those cases,
I have assumed, not only that one episodically remembers a fact by having
an experience but also that this amounts to holding a mental image in one’s
mind. I have assumed, that is, that episodic memory involves mental im-
agery. No assumption has been made, however, with regards to the nature of
those experiences wherein one episodically remembers facts which involve
objects perceivable through sense modalities other than vision. Likewise, no
assumption has been made with regards to the nature of those experiences
wherein one episodically remembers a past experience (and, in particular, a
past perceptual experience) of one’s own.
Furthermore, I have made two assumptions regarding the intentional
features of episodic memories. The first one is that the content of a memory,
or what the memory represents, does not need to correspond to the way in
which one would normally express the memory. More precisely, the content
of a memory does not need to match the content of the subordinate clause in
24 I am, in other words, assuming that there is such a thing as remembering falsely, or misre-
membering. Hence, I am assuming that disjunctivism for memory is false. On disjunctivism, see
(Soteriou 2016).
a claim of the form “I remember that p” that one would ordinarily make in
order to express the memory. One of the reasons for this is that there may be,
for example, more detail in the content of the memory than one is expressing
in one’s claim. This is not to say that we should ignore the way in which one
normally expresses one’s memories while trying to determine what the
contents of those memories are. As we will see, an important consideration
which will serve to evaluate theories of mnemonic content will be the con-
straint that, whatever the correct theory of mnemonic content turns out to
be, it should accommodate the way in which one expresses one’s memories in
normal circumstances. The assumption, at this point, is simply that the claim
whereby one expresses an episodic memory is not the best guide to the con-
tent of that memory and that we should be guided, instead, by our intuitions
regarding the truth-conditions of that memory.
The second assumption regarding the intentional features of episodic
memories is that the phenomenal features of episodic memories depend
on their intentional features. This assumption deserves some further clar-
ification. For there is a sense in which it is a strong assumption, and there
is a sense in which the assumption is rather weak. Consider the purposes
for which we made the assumption of the dependence of the phenome-
nology of memory on its intentionality. This assumption was made in
order to justify the expectation that we may be able to extract an answer
to question (iii) from an answer to question (ii). One might wonder, there-
fore, whether a commitment to the view that the phenomenal features
of episodic memories depend on their intentional features is enough for
those purposes. Or, conversely, one might wonder whether it is more than
we need.
For the purposes of tackling question (iii) based on our answer to ques-
tion (ii), all we need to assume is that the content of a memory will give us
some information about the way in which the memory feels to the subject.
To be sure, this will be the case if the way in which the memory feels to the
subject depends on its content. If the content of a memory is responsible for
the way in which the memory feels to the subject, then pointing to the con-
tent of the memory in order to explain what it is like for the subject to have
that memory does seem informative. But there does not need to be a rela-
tion of dependence between the way in which a memory feels to the subject
and the content of the memory in order for the latter aspect of the memory
to provide us with information about the former one. It seems that other,
weaker, relations between the two aspects of the memory will do. Imagine,
for example, that we discover that there is a one-to-one correlation between

contents and sets of phenomenal features of memories. However, it turns out
that the reason why such a correlation exists is that, for each pair of contents
and sets of phenomenal features of a memory, there is some other property
of the relevant memory which acts as a single common cause for both the
content and the set of phenomenal features in the pair. In that case, finding
out that the memory has a particular content does give us information about
the way in which the memory feels to the subject. It tells us that the memory
in question will have the phenomenal features that correspond to the rele-
vant content. But, in this scenario, the way in which the memory feels to the
subject does not depend on the content of the memory. Instead, it depends
on whatever property of the memory acts as the common cause for both the
way in which the memory feels to the subject and the content of the memory.
Thus, there is a sense in which the assumption that the phenomenal features
of memories depend on their intentional features is a strong assumption: It is
more than we need for our purposes here.
However, there is also a sense in which the assumption that the phenom-
enal features of memories depend on their intentional features is a weak as-
sumption. For the dependence of the phenomenal features of memories on
their intentional features leaves room for a number of possible relations be-
tween the two sets of features. The phenomenal features of memories may
depend on their intentional features because properties of the former kind
are caused by properties of the latter kind, for example. Alternatively, the
phenomenal features of memories may depend on their intentional features
because properties of the former kind are “realized by” properties of the
latter kind. One way of understanding the realization relation is the fol-
lowing: For any properties P and Q, and for any subject S, if S has P and Q,
then Q is realized by P in S if there is a condition C such that Q is the prop
erty of having some property or other which satisfies condition C in sub-
ject S, and P satisfies condition C in subject S.25 If the phenomenal features
of memories are realized by their intentional features in this sense, then the
phenomenal features of memories depend on their intentional features, but
they are not caused by them. Yet another possibility is that the phenom-
enal features of memories depend on their intentional features because they
25 See, for example, (Kim 2003). In c

hapter 2, we will revisit this relation, not with regards to
the intentional and phenomenal features of memories but with regards to the nature of memories
themselves.
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Memory A Self Referential Account Jordi Fernandez Full Chapter

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Memory: A Self-Referential Account

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2019

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

4: The Experience of Time 85

4.3 Mental Time Travel and Re-​Presentation 89

6: Immunity to Error through Misidentification 139

This book is a philosophical investigation of memory. It is, in a nutshell, an

Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with the epistemology of memory. More

García-​Carpintero and Marie Guillot. Chapter 2 and c­ hapter 6 are based on

My work on this book was supported by a semester’s Special Studies Leave

The goal of this book is to understand a cognitive capacity which is central

1.2 Scope of the Project

We commonly speak of memory as if it was directed at either facts, events,

In section 1.2, we have seen that episodic memories, like perceptual

7 On memory and the nature of time, see (Le Poidevin 2017).

In section 1.2, we have seen that, in addition to intentional features, epi-

episodic memories and perceptual experiences are similar. When we have an

memories. Our investigation of memory will therefore be concerned, in

Episodic memories are not only similar to perceptual experiences in that

when we accurately remember something happening to someone, but we

11 On immunity to error through misidentification, see (Prosser and Recanati 2012).

A question that I will not be addressing, then, is that of whether memory

1.4 Available Strategies

To recapitulate, this investigation of memory will touch on four aspects of

ting circularity, see (Alston 1986).

memory concerned is more fundamental. In order to clarify the approach

of memory depends on its intentionality in order to address question (iii)

19 On the nature of epistemic feelings, see (Arango-​Muñoz 2014).

It is unclear, then, how epistemic feelings could make a contribution to the

between evidence and epistemic justification. The idea would be to assume,

22 For a discussion of the epistemic conception of memory, see (Bernecker 2010).

kinds of contents that memories have. The account of mnemonic content to

memories are the subject’s own by appealing to the condition of disowned

23 On disowned memory, see (Klein and Nichols 2012).

And, while adopting a particular approach for tackling questions (i–​iv),

for example, that we discover that there is a one-​to-​one correlation between

25 See, for example, (Kim 2003). In c

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International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

4.3 Mental Time Travel and Re-Presentation 89

García-Carpintero and Marie Guillot. Chapter 2 and c hapter 6 are based on

19 On the nature of epistemic feelings, see (Arango-Muñoz 2014).

And, while adopting a particular approach for tackling questions (i–iv),

for example, that we discover that there is a one-to-one correlation between