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Title Pages
The Handbook of European Defence Policies and

Armed Forces
Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss
Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
Title Pages
Hugo Meijer, Marco Wyss
(p.i) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces (p.ii)
(p.iii) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces
(p.iv)
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Dedication

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
Dedication
(p.v) To Ingrid, Laura André, Bert (p.vi)
Page 1 of 1
Foreword: National Defence at a Time of Doubt

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
(p.vii) Foreword: National Defence at a Time

of Doubt
Lawrence Freedman
STUDENTS of international affairs have a tendency to believe that they are

living through a uniquely transformational period, full of uncertainty and with
hitherto unimagined dark possibilities lurking round the corner. We might now
look back to the cold war and see a time of remarkable stability, when the
international hierarchy was understood, the dividing lines between the two blocs
were well established, and a shared fear of nuclear deterrence ensured caution.
Yet that was not always how it appeared at the time, from the alarms in the
1950s that the nuclear arms race was spinning out of control to the great crises
of the early 1960s in Berlin and Cuba. Even once these crises had been survived,
the literature of the time is full of warnings about the determination of the
Soviet leadership to get into a war-winning position, and how they were cowing
sections of European opinion into an appeasing mentality (‘Finlandization’) or
were making advances in the Third World to get into a position to cut the West
off from its raw materials. NATO was forever in disarray, caught up in
intractable disputes about burden-sharing and whether the Americans were
leading their allies into disaster or were on the verge of abandoning them. There
was a period in the mid-1970s that was particularly gloomy when the United
States was hampered by the Watergate scandal and Western economies were
coping with the dramatic rise in the oil price, inflation, and stagnation. The early
1990s, with the cold war now over, is recalled as one of cheerful optimism. The
Soviet bloc dissolved with good grace, and liberal democracy look set to be
embraced by all. Yet at the time reasons were found to be wary of the future.
There were warnings (not all misplaced) that great power politics would return
Page 1 of 6
as toxic as ever or that nationalism could also replace socialism as a ruling

ideology and that ethnic tensions were ready to rush to the fore.
So it is entirely possible that historians will look back to our times and wonder
what the fuss was all about. To be sure there is a general sense of foreboding,
but it does not focus on a particular scenario. The reasons why a great power
makes little sense and will probably be avoided remain as compelling as they
have been since 1945. The international economy has regained its equilibrium
after the 2008 financial crisis and for the moment energy supplies seem
plentiful. Climate change remains a worry, although its implications for security
remain unclear. There are major geopolitical changes underway, notably China’s
rise to superpower status, and this has caused tensions, but these have thus far
been managed, and Europeans tend to think that this is largely an issue for the
Asia–Pacific region and not their own.
Yet the sense that big changes are underway that will have a major impact on
our security is hard to avoid. It is often described in terms of an unravelling of
the liberal international order that was established in the years after 1945 and
has by and large served (p.viii) the international community well. The concerns
that an era is about to end focuses on the quality of American leadership, but
also on whether values are sufficiently shared and interests recognized to be in
common for the West to stick together through whatever crises may be coming.
This may not yet be a time of great transformations, but it is a time of doubts, of
not quite knowing how the institutions and systems that have developed over
many decades, and thus far adapted well to new circumstances, will cope with
their next severe test.
One reason for doubt is that the two countries that have long been to the fore in
setting the Western security agenda have been losing their interest in this role
for some time. This is more than a Brexit or Trump phenomenon. The United
Kingdom and then the United States both developed their global positions (and
in the UK case an empire) as a result of their naval mastery. This enabled them
to exercise influence around the globe and act whenever their interests were
threatened and also to encourage international trade in a way that helped them
grow prosperous. The British Empire has been long consigned to history and the
United Kingdom can no longer really consider itself a global power with a
distinctive set of international interests that might need protecting by force. Yet
it has not been left in a particularly exposed position. For decades British
leaders worried about Dean Acheson’s 1962 jibe that their country had lost an
empire without finding a role, assuming that Acheson deserved an answer and
that there was a special role that only the United Kingdom could perform. One
regular favourite was as a bridge between North America and Europe, though
this, as with such claims, could not withstand much scrutiny. Only in its close
ties with the United States, especially in the nuclear and intelligence fields, did
the United Kingdom offer something different from other European nations.
Page 2 of 6
What has been ducked was the possibility that there was no unique role and that
this might not matter. The advantage of being an island on the western edge of
Europe is that it takes less to guarantee national security than if it were placed
closer to the likely trouble spots in the former Soviet space, the Balkans, or the
Mediterranean. This is not to say that it is ready to opt out, although the Brexit
vote was an indication that it might be. British leaders still assert a sense of
responsibility, not least because of the United Kingdom’s role as a Permanent
Member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and it will not explicitly
embrace passivity. But, when new issues arise, it no longer seems to be anxious
to take a forward position.
One reason for this is that for a whole range of reasons, from the long ties of
history and culture and a similar geopolitical outlook, the United Kingdom feels
most comfortable when acting together with the United States. If the United
States was active, then the United Kingdom was also likely to be engaged. But,
by the same token, if the United States concluded that it wished to accept fewer
of the burdens of international leadership, then so might the United Kingdom.
The British example is not the normal one cited when one is thinking about the
consequences should America ease back on its leadership role. Japan and South
Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel would have more pressing reasons to be
concerned. In Europe those closer to the trouble spots would have more reason
to reassess their security policies. But this illustrates the importance of
American leadership in pulling others along.
The United States accepted in the 1950s a set of alliance obligations and other
treaty commitments that gives it an unparalleled position in international affairs.
This went against the isolationism and neutralist instincts of the interwar years.
Where disengagement (p.ix) prior to 1939 did not prevent major war,
engagement after 1945 has helped prevent a Third World War. But
disengagement has always had its attractions and a constituency in the United
States, not least because it removed the country from territorial risk. For
whatever reasons, President Trump picked an old isolationist slogan in ‘America
First’ for his inaugural address in January 2017. But the issue has been around
for some time. Until the attacks of 9/11 it was more tentative in dealing with
crises that did not touch directly on its alliance responsibilities. As a result of the
draining counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United
States now appears fatigued by its international responsibilities and is looking to
reduce its liabilities. This was the case even under President Obama. Trump has
given mixed signals on this as on so much else, as his inclination has been to
appear belligerent on any issue in which the United States is being tested, while
at the same time talking openly about being ready to abandon established US
positions on free trade and alliance obligations. Even though he does not always
actually follow through, the net effect has been to aggravate that ever-present
element of doubt about whether the United States will honour its alliance
Page 3 of 6
obligations. Despite the rhetoric, so far mainstream policies have been

sustained.
One reason for anxiety is that Russia has taken a belligerent turn. This was
evident in the war with Georgia in 2008 and the much more severe confrontation
with Ukraine that has been underway since 2014. During the 1990s Moscow
began to feel it was being taken for granted. The problems faced in securing
distinctive Russian interests through institutional mechanisms left Moscow
isolated diplomatically. The promotion of Western concepts of the good life and
good government were seen as a neocolonialist effort to create a global system
that suits Western purposes and denies alternative cultures. President Putin’s
dislike of the ‘colour revolutions’ in other former Soviet republics leads to his
fear that one will be triggered in Russia. This was one—defensive—reason for
the attack on Ukraine, a punishment for a popular swing away from closer ties
with Russia to the European Union (EU). But the annexation of Crimea,
aggression in eastern Ukraine, and the menacing of countries such as Estonia
have served to isolate Russia further. The conflict with Ukraine has not changed
in character (although it remains violent) since the autumn of 2014, and Russia
has not taken military moves against others. Its room for manoeuvre has been
limited by a weak economy, because of sanctions and the fall of commodity
prices, and a more demanding intervention in Syria. It invested in Donald Trump
during the 2016 election campaign, but its interference may have backfired, as
the evidence of Russian interference has ended up with Trump’s hands being
tied and deeper sanctions in place.
Yet the evidence that Trump would have liked to work more closely with Putin
has unnerved Europeans. He has also created another source of doubt. During
his short tenure in the White House he has shown extraordinary levels of
incompetence and disregard for the normal conventions of public life. While
many agreed with Trump’s pressure on his NATO allies to spend more on
defence, the idea that the shortfall was in some way owed to the United States
provided more evidence of ignorance of how the alliance works. This has been
mystifying and alarming for those who have traditionally looked to the United
States for political leadership. All this has been more corrosive than
transformational, weakening the position of the United States without displacing
it. Such behaviour encourages hedging, with allies thinking about alternative
arrangements without rushing to put them in place in the hope that they might
not be necessary.
(p.x) More serious is his challenge to a collection of core principles that have
helped hold together the West. Whether or not his challenges to free trade
amount to much, his evident dislike for the underlying principle has chipped
away at one of the conceptual foundations of the post-1945 international order.
Pulling out of the Paris accords on climate change, his distaste for social
liberalism, his readiness to dismiss statements he does not like as ‘fake news’,
Page 4 of 6
and his refusal to make human rights a prominent feature of foreign policy
distance his administration from the European establishment. They legitimize
attitudes that are certainly current in Europe, and in this way help undermine
the consensus that facilitates cooperation across the Atlantic and within Europe.
This is not to argue that these principles are beyond challenge, or that they have
suffered by being part of an elite outlook that can come over as being
complacent and indifferent to the views and circumstances of ordinary people.
Yet, where it gets a hold of a government, it can lead to a creeping
authoritarianism—even in allies such as Turkey, Poland, and Hungary.
One hedge for Europeans against the loss of American leadership is to build up
the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It was long a Gaullist
aspiration to exclude the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ from European affairs, and the idea that
the EU could look after its own defences appealed to those who believed that it
could never really be complete until it could take on all the functions of a state,
including war-making. When the cold war came to an end, and it was unclear in
both Washington and Brussels whether the United States needed to play much of
a future role in regional affairs, then the Europeans looked to play a more
assertive role in sorting out local crises. The first test came in the summer of
1991 in Yugoslavia. European ministers proclaimed this as Europe’s hour—a
time to demonstrate its crisis-management capabilities. Its palpable failure, with
the issue effectively handed over to the UN and NATO, diminished rather than
enhanced the EU’s reputation. This encouraged the view that it was preferable
to have the Americans involved, but there had to be some provisions made just
in case they did decide to disengage. This was the origin of the CSDP, which was
launched with great fanfare by President Chirac of France and Prime Minister
Blair of Britain at Saint-Malo in 1998. It soon got bogged down in institutional
wrangles—over how the CSDP should relate to NATO and what functions could
be usefully duplicated. In the event, CSDP has tended to concentrate on
important tasks, such as peacekeeping missions or dealing with piracy and
refugee issues, where there has been no need for an American input, but not on
the big security issues, such as deterrence and coping with conflicts like Ukraine
(although on the economic sanctions side the EU already plays a leading role).
As the United Kingdom has always been opposed to the more ambitious
proposals for a European defence force, its impending departure from the EU
has appeared to open up the possibility of the issue being revived.
The problems that have always hampered the replacement of NATO with the EU
remain. First, most do not want to signal to the United States that it could
manage without them lest they persuade Washington that it was safe for it to go.
Only the United States can provide nuclear deterrence and the military weight
to cope with a developing conflict. Does France expect to take over the job of
extended deterrence from the United States? Second, doing more is expensive.
There have long been complaints from the United States that European
countries have not spent enough on defence and that their military capabilities
Page 5 of 6
are in poor repair. Third, the rhetoric tends to get muddled, so that any
cooperation, including on weapons procurement or joint units organized
bilaterally or trilaterally, or the sort of modest missions currently undertaken
under the CSDP heading, are presented as (p.xi) moves towards an integrated
European entity. Fourth, even with greater integration, the ability to deploy
forces would still be limited by the particular interests of individual countries,
especially in relation to major crises outside Europe. How many countries would
wish to join France, for example, in one of its overseas operations? There is no
evidence that Germans are keen to act on behalf of other European countries,
such as the Baltic states, if attacked by Russia. In principle, of course, Europe
should have the resources to deter Russia, which has a GDP equivalent to Spain
and well below that of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, but that will
require major investment.
This is the context against which national defence policies are currently being
formulated. It is one in which it is hard to make a case for a ‘peace dividend’, but
nor is there an emergency (other than perhaps for the non-NATO countries
bordering Russia, and Russia itself). Governments are thinking more about
defence policies but without yet striking out in new directions. It is the lack of
confidence about where this might all lead that justifies a careful look at where
countries currently stand in terms of their national defence policies. It is very
difficult to see what options there might be for the future, how well they might
cope with the distinctive challenges, whether from Russia or North Africa and
the Middle East, and the extent to which the context actually shapes the policies.
As the contributions to this excellent volume show, national governments still
respond to national needs in their defence-planning and procurement, shaped by
their countries’ histories, cultures, and circumstances. They have done so
through the decades of alliance and latterly the CSDP, and will continue to do so
in the future. Great geopolitical movements create the dangers of conflict, and
so they deserve our attention, but there are also changes going on all the time in
national capabilities, and they also deserve our attention. With the publication of
this volume there will be no excuse not to be informed about what is going on at
the national level and the implications for the management of future crises and
conflicts.
August 2017 (p.xii)
Page 6 of 6
List of Figures

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
(p.xvii) List of Figures

8.1 The frequency of foreign policy topics in NSC press briefings, 1991–
2002 161
2011 162
2017 163
8.4 Military expenditure of Turkey, 1991–2016 172
8.5 Military expenditure by country, 1991–2016 173
12.1 Defence spending by Belarus, 1997–2015 242
15.1 Military spending by NATO members, 1993–2015 287
15.2 Composition of defence spending, Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Slovakia, 1999–2014 288
15.3 Participation in international operations, Czechoslovakia/Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia, 1990–2015 291
21.1 NATO European defence spending in 2016: meeting the 2% of GDP
target 385
24.1 Top-level governance of UK–French defence cooperation 431
25.1 Number of German and French operations by frame, 1990–2015 454
26.1 Aggregate European military expenditures, 1989–2015 472
39.1 Alternative weapons acquisition strategies 679
39.2 The hierarchical structure of defence industries in the value chain
683
39.3 Government measures to protect national defence industries from
international competition 684
40.1 European collaboration activities, 1961–1995 697
40.2 Project participations per group, 1961–1995 697
Page 1 of 2
List of Figures
40.3 Collaborative defence equipment procurement expenditure per

group, 2005–2011 700
50.1 Annual number of active military operations and civilian missions,
2003–2016 878
50.2 Aggregate numbers of CSDP troops and personnel per year, 2003–
2015 878
(p.xviii)
Page 2 of 2
List of Tables

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
(p.xix) List of Tables

2.1 Foreign deployments of German armed forces, 1990–2015 59

2.2 Number of German armed forces deployed abroad (troops), and
mission spectrum, 1989–2014 60
2.3 The Bundeswehr’s key characteristics, 1989–2014 66
2.4 Classification of German security policy styles, 1990–2015 68
3.1 Comparative size of key elements of armed forces, 1990–1998 77
5.1 Major international Italian military operations in the post-cold war era
116
7.1 Military expenditure and troop deployment, Portugal and Spain, after
the cold war 146
11.1 The Baltic States’ armed forces by service, 1995–2015 216
11.2 The Baltic States’ defence spending, 1993–2015 220
12.1 Main categories of Belarus equipment 244
20.1 Danish and Norwegian armed forces, 1990–2010 370
25.1 Regularized bilateral Franco-German intergovernmentalism since
1963 442
25.2 Franco-German Cooperation: Facilitating and inhibiting factors 455
43.1 Tentative classification of unmanned aerial vehicles 748
44.1 Sample of cyber-defence and cyber-surveillance companies in
France 765
44.2 Sample of cyber-defence and cyber-surveillance companies in
Germany 768
44.3 Sample of cyber-defence and cyber-surveillance solutions providers
in the United Kingdom 771
44.4 Sample of cyber-defence and cyber-surveillance companies in Italy
773
Page 1 of 2
List of Tables

in Spain 775
in Sweden 776
48.1 Characteristic features of Russian military operations, 1992–2016
850
50.1 CSDP military operations and civilian missions, 2003–2016 874
50.2 Dimensions of diversity in CSDP military operations 877
51.1 Concluded NATO operations in the post-cold war period 895
51.2 Continuing and post-Afghanistan NATO operations 902
51.3 Significant NATO exercises in 2015 905
51.4 NATO operations: Participation and risk, 1996–2014 908
51.5 Operations, 2014–2016 909
51.6 Exercises, 2015 909
(p.xx)
Page 2 of 2
Notes on Contributors

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
(p.xxi) Notes on Contributors

1. Editors
Dr Hugo Meijer
is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the European University
Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and
the Academic Director of the European Initiative on Security Studies
(EISS). Previously, he was Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s
College London (2013–16) and a Researcher at the Institute for
Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris, 2016–17). He received his Ph.D. in
International Relations from Sciences Po in 2013 (summa cum laude)
and currently works on Western defence and security policies in the
Asia–Pacific. Recent publications: La Politique étrangère: Approches
disciplinaires [Foreign Policy: Disciplinary Approaches], co-edited
with Christian Lequesne (Montreal University Press, 2018); Trading
with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the
People’s Republic of China (Oxford University Press, 2016); Origins
and Evolution of the US Rebalance toward Asia: Diplomatic, Military,
and Economic Dimensions (ed.) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). He has
also published in such journals as the Journal of Strategic Studies,
European Journal of International Security, and the Journal of Cold
War Studies.
Dr Marco Wyss
is Lecturer in the International History of the Cold War at Lancaster
University, a Research Fellow at the University of the Free State, an
Associate Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, and a
Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Previously, he was a Senior
Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at the University of
Chichester, and a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security
Page 1 of 22
Studies, ETH Zurich. He gained his Ph.D. from the Universities of

Nottingham and Neuchâtel, and currently works on Britain’s and
France’s postcolonial security roles in West Africa. Marco is co-editor
of the ‘New Perspectives on the Cold War’ book series (Brill), and the
editor of the International Journal of Military History and
Historiography. He is the author of, among other works, Arms
Transfers, Neutrality and Britain’s Role in the Cold War (Brill, 2013),
and co-editor of Peacekeeping in Africa (Routledge, 2014), Neutrality
and Neutralism in the Global Cold War (Routledge, 2016), and Europe
and China in the Cold War (Brill, forthcoming). His articles have been
published in such journals as the Journal of Contemporary History,
International History Review, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, Cold War History, RUSI Journal, Journal of Cold War Studies,
and Historical Journal.
(p.xxii) 2. Chapter Authors

Dr Jan Joel Andersson
is Policy Officer at the European Defence Agency in Brussels. He
wrote his contribution to this volume while working at the EU
Institute for Security Studies in Paris as Senior Analyst of military
capability development and defence industry issues. Previously, Dr
Andersson was Dragas Distinguished Visiting Professor of
International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia,
and Senior Research Fellow and Head of Defence Studies at the
Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. A graduate of
Uppsala University and Fulbright scholar, he received his MA and
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at
Berkeley. His recent publications include ‘The Race to the Bottom:
Submarine Proliferation and International Security’, US Naval War
College Review (2015), and ‘Nordic NATO’, Foreign Affairs (2014).
Dr Christian F. Anrig
is Deputy Director of Doctrine, Swiss Air Force. From 2007 to 2009,
he was a Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s
College London. The author of The Quest for Relevant Air Power (Air
University Press, 2011), he has also published various book chapters
and articles on air power and its ramifications for European nations.
Dr Anrig is a reviewer for Air & Space Power Journal. Air forces and
institutions across Europe have invited him as a speaker on air power.
Dr Félix Arteaga
is Senior Analyst for Security and Defence at the Elcano Royal
Institute, and Professor of European Security at the Instituto General
Gutierrez Mellado (MoD-UNED, Madrid). He researches and lectures
on international security, and defence and security policies. He has
been the peer reviewer for Portugal and Spain under the ‘European
Page 2 of 22
Defence Monitoring’ Research Project for the European Defence

Agency, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2012–15, and he has
also contributed to the chapter on ‘Spain and the CSDP’ in Daniel
Fiott (ed.), The Common Security and Defence Policy: National
Perspectives (Egmont Institute, Institute for European Studies,
Academy Press).
Dr Jordan Baev
is Professor of Contemporary History and Senior Research Fellow of
Security Studies at Rakovski National Defense College, and a Visiting
Professor at Sofia University. Since 1998 he has been Vice-President
of the Bulgarian Association of Military History. Dr Baev is a member
of the Editorial Boards of Voennoistoricheski Sbornik [Military History
Journal] in Sofia and Strategic Monitor in Bucharest. Since 1980 he
has written more than 250 publications in twelve languages,
including nine monographs and textbooks, on cold war diplomatic,
military, and intelligence history, international terrorism,
peacekeeping, and civil–military relations.
Matthias Bieri
is a Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team of the
think tank at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. He
studied at the University of Fribourg and the Free University of
Berlin, and completed his studies with a Master’s degree in History.
Before joining the CSS, Matthias Bieri worked for the Swiss
Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna, where he was involved in the work
related to the OSCE’s politico-military dimension. He is the co-editor
of the policy brief series CSS Analyses in Security Policy.
(p.xxiii) Felix Biermann
is a Research Fellow at the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU)
Munich (Germany). His research focuses on European Studies,
International Relations theory, and defence cooperation. He holds a
Bachelor’s in Philosophy and Economics from Bayreuth University, as
well as a Master of Public Policy from the Willy Brandt School of
Public Policy at Erfurt University. After completing his studies, he
worked in public sector consulting and provided advice on budgetary
questions for both federal and local administrations.
Dr Vincent Boulanin
is a Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI). He works on issues related to the production, use,
and control of emerging military and security technologies, notably
cyber-security technologies and autonomous weapons systems. He
received his Ph.D. in political science from the École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. His recent publications include
(with Renaud Bellais) ‘Toward a High-Tech “Limes” on the Edges of
Europe? Managing the External Borders of the European Union’, in
Page 3 of 22
Elisabeth Vallet (ed.), Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity

(Ashgate, 2014), and ‘Cyber Security and the Arms Industry’, SIPRI
Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
(Oxford University Press, 2013).
Mark Bromley
has been Co-Director of the Dual-Use and Arms Trade Control
Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) since April 2014. Before this, he was employed with the SIPRI
Arms Transfers Programme, as a Research Associate from 2003, as a
Researcher from 2006, and as a Senior Researcher from 2009.
Previously, he was a policy analyst for the British American Security
Information Council (BASIC). Mark’s work at SIPRI focuses on
international arms transfers, governmental transparency in the field
of arms exports, and the workings of national, regional, and
international strategic trade control regimes and instruments.
Dr Dionysios Chourchoulis
is adjunct lecturer of Greek History at the Hellenic Open University,
and adjunct lecturer of History of International Relations at the
Ionian University. He holds a Ph.D. from the School of History, Queen
Mary University of London. His thesis has been published as a
monograph entitled The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959:
Military Strategy or Political Stabilization (Lexington Books, 2014).
He also holds an MA in modern and contemporary Greek history from
the National & Kapodistrian University of Athens, as well as an M.Sc.
in history of international relations from the London School of
Economics and Political Science. His academic interests include
political, military, and economic history during the twentieth century
(with an emphasis on the cold war period) in the Balkans, the Eastern
Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Dr Fabrizio Coticchia
is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Genoa.
Previously, he was a Jean Monnet Fellow, European University
Institute (EUI). His fields of research are contemporary warfare,
European military transformation, strategic narratives and security
issues, political parties and defence policy, Italian and European
defence policy, and development cooperation. His books include:
Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don’t Call it War, with Pietro
Ignazi and Giampiero Giacomello (Palgrave, 2012), La guerra che non
c’era. Opinione pubblica e interventi militari italiani (Egea, 2014),
Adapt, Improvise, Overcome? The Transformation of Italian Armed
Forces in Comparative Perspective, with Francesco N. Moro (Ashgate,
2015), and Italian Foreign Policy under (p.xxiv) Matteo Renzi: A
Domestically-Focused Outsider and the World, with J. Davidson
(Lexington, forthcoming).
Page 4 of 22
Andrew M. Dorman
is Professor of International Security at King’s College London and
the Commissioning Editor of International Affairs, the journal of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. At King’s he
leads the new Centre for British Defence and Security Studies. He
has published widely on aspects of British defence and security policy,
European security, and defence transformation. His research focuses
on the interaction of policy and strategy, utilizing the case studies of
British defence and security policy and European security. He has
held grants with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC),
British Academy, Leverhulme Trust, Ministry of Defence, and US
Army War College. He trained as a Chartered Accountant with KPMG,
qualifying in 1990 before returning to academia. He has previously
taught at the University of Birmingham, where he completed his
Master’s and doctoral degrees, and the Royal Naval College
Greenwich.
Frédérick Douzet
is Professor at the French Institute of Geopolitics of the University of
Paris 8, and Castex Chair of Cyber Strategy (Institut des hautes
études de défense nationale, IHEDN/Airbus Group). She is a member
of the editorial boards of the reviews Hérodote and Sécurité et
Stratégies, and received several awards for her research: FIC Book
Prize for strategic thinking (2015); France-Berkeley Fund Award for
Outstanding Young Scholar (2014); Alphonse Milne Edwards book
prize from the Society of Geography (2008); Ernest Lemonon book
prize from the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (2008); and
Best Paper Award from the Urban Affairs Association (2009). She was
nominated junior member of the Institut Universitaire de France in
2006. Her publications include: Les Conflits dans le monde (Armand
Colin, 2011), Géographie des conflits (La Documentation française,
2012), 50 fiches pour comprendre la géopolitique (Bréal, 2010), and
Dictionnaire des banlieues (Larousse, 2009). Since 2012, she has
published four books (two co-edited), twelve book chapters, and over
fifteen peer-reviewed articles and conference contributions, and
given dozens of talks to various audiences. Her current research
interests deal with the geopolitics of cyberspace. She was appointed
director of the Castex Chair of Cyber Strategy in February 2013.
Robert Egnell
is Professor of Military Sociology and Head of the Department for
Security, Strategy, and Leadership at the Swedish Defence University.
Professor Egnell received his Ph.D. (2008) in War Studies from King’s
College, London. He has previously been a Visiting Professor and
Director of teaching in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University, a Senior Researcher at the Swedish Defence Research
Page 5 of 22
Agency, and an Assistant Lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam.

His publications include numerous articles in academic peer review
journals, as well as four books: Gender, Military Effectiveness and
Organizational Change: The Swedish Model (Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of
Modern Warfare (Columbia University Press, 2013), New Agendas in
Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History (Routledge, 2013),
and Complex Peace Operations and Civil–Military Relations: Winning
the Peace (Routledge, 2009).
Dr Filip Ejdus
is a Marie Curie Fellow at the School of Sociology, Politics and
International Studies (University of Bristol), and an Assistant
Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences (University of Belgrade).
In the broadest sense, his research looks at the management of
(in)security during crises and beyond borders, while his geographic
expertise is the (p.xxv) Western Balkans, Middle East, and the Horn
of Africa. In his current project, he studies the local ownership
principle in EU crisis-management interventions. Additionally, he has
been closely involved with the security policy community as a board
member of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, academic
coordinator at the Belgrade Security Forum, and the co-chair of the
Regional Stability in South East Europe Study Group at the
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security
Studies Institutes.
Sir Lawrence Freedman
has been Professor of War Studies at King’s College London since
1982. He became head of the School of Social Science and Public
Policy at King’s in 2000 and was appointed Vice-Principal in 2003.
Before joining King’s, he held research appointments at Nuffield
College Oxford, the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He was
appointed Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign in 1997.
Professor Freedman has written extensively on nuclear strategy and
the cold war, as well as commentating regularly on contemporary
security issues. Among his books are Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba,
Laos and Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 2000), The Evolution of
Nuclear Strategy (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Deterrence
(Polity Press, 2005), the two volumes Official History of the Falklands
Campaign (2nd edn, Routledge, 2007) and an Adelphi Paper on The
Transformation in Strategic Affairs (Routledge, 2004). A Choice of
Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
2008) won the 2009 Lionel Gelber Prize and Duke of Westminster
Medal for Military Literature. His most recent book is Strategy: A
History (Oxford University Press, 2013).
Page 6 of 22
Dr Andrew Futter
is a Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of
Leicester, United Kingdom. His work focuses on contemporary
nuclear weapons issues, including ballistic missile defence,
proliferation, the changing nature of deterrence, and new challenges
to the utility and perception of nuclear forces. He has published two
books, Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy
(Routledge, 2013) and The Politics of Nuclear Weapons (Sage, 2015),
and written widely for numerous peer-reviewed and professional
publications. He is currently working on an ESRC-funded Future
Research Leaders project, looking at how cyber weapons and the
advent of a new information age are challenging, transforming, and
impacting on the role, efficacy, and thinking that underpin nuclear
weapons and strategy.
Dr Bastian Giegerich
is the Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. Having been affiliated
with the IISS since 2005, he worked for the German Ministry of
Defence and the German armed forces between 2010 and 2015 in
various research and policy roles. Dr Giegerich holds a Ph.D. in
International Relations from the London School of Economics and
Political Science, and an MA in Political Science from the University
of Potsdam, Germany.
Dr Andrea Gilli
is an International Security Program postdoctoral fellow at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, and was a post-doctoral fellow at
both the Center for Security Studies, Metropolitan University Prague
and at the Center for International Security and Cooperation,
Stanford University, when his chapter was written. Andrea works on
technological change, military innovations, and international security.
He holds a Ph.D. in Social and (p.xxvi) Political Science from the
European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. In 2015 he was
awarded the European Defence Agency and Egmont Institute’s bi-
annual prize for the best dissertation on European defence, security,
and strategy. Andrea has provided consulting services to both private
and public organizations, including the EU Military Committee and
the US Department of Defence’s Office of Net Assessment, and he has
worked and conducted research for, or been associated with, several
institutions, including the NATO Defense College, the Royal United
Services Institute, the European Union Institute for Security Studies,
the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at Columbia
University in New York, and the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University. Andrea is a 2015 alumnus of the
Page 7 of 22
Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and

Strategy (SWAMOS), and his research has been published in
International Security, Security Studies and the RUSI Journal.
Dr Mauro Gilli
is a Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International
Security at the Center for Security Studies of ETH Zurich. He holds a
Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University (Evanston,
IL), an MA from the School of Advanced International Studies of
Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC), and a BA from the
University of Turin. He is an alumnus of the International Policy
Summer Institute of the Bridging the Gap Project at the American
University (2017); of the Summer Workshop on the Analysis of
Military Operations and Strategy of the Saltzman Institute for War
and Peace Studies of Columbia University (2014); and of Empirical
Implication of Theoretical Models Summer Schools at the Harris
School of Public Policy of the University of Chicago (2011). During
the academic year 2015/16 he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Dickey
Center for International Understanding of Dartmouth College. His
research has been funded by the Smith Richardson Foundation, the
Roberta Buffet Institute for Global Studies, and the Kellogg School of
Management, and has been published in Security Studies,
Washington Post-Monkey Cage, Diplomat, PLOS-One, and Social
Science Quarterly.
Richard Gowan
was previously Research Director at New York University’s Center on
International Cooperation (CIC) and is a Senior Policy Fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). He is also an adjunct
professor at Columbia University’s Center for International Conflict
Resolution (CICR). At CIC, he was the first coordinator of the Annual
Review of Global Peace Operations and editor of the first Review of
Political Missions. For ECFR, Gowan has written on EU–UN relations,
human rights, and European crisis management. Gowan writes a
column (‘Diplomatic Fallout’) for www.worldpoliticsreview.com, and
has also published opinion pieces in Foreign Policy, the International
Herald Tribune, Politico, and other publications, in addition to
academic essays in Global Governance, International Peacekeeping,
and various edited volumes. He has been quoted on peacekeeping
and crisis diplomacy in The Economist, the Financial Times, and the
Guardian, and on the drinking habits of some UN diplomats in the
New York Times.
Dr Ryan Grauer
is an Associate Professor of International Affairs in the Graduate
School of Public and International Affairs at the University of
Pittsburgh. His current research examines the sources of military
Page 8 of 22
power, the global diffusion of military doctrines, and soldier

surrender and desertion in war. He is the author of Commanding
Military Power (Cambridge University Press, 2016), which
investigates the impact of militaries’ organizational capacity to
manage emergent information about the state of the battlefield on
their combat power. His other work has been published in the
journals World Politics, Security (p.xxvii) Studies, and the Journal of
Global Security Studies. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science
from the University of Pennsylvania.
Dr Yaprak Gürsoy
is a Lecturer at Aston University. Prior to joining Aston, she was an
Associate Professor at Istanbul Bilgi University and a Senior Member
of St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, in 2016/17. Her research
interests include comparative politics, regime change, civil–military
relations, Greek politics, and populism. She is the author of Between
Military Rule and Democracy: Regime Consolidation in Greece,
Turkey, and Beyond (University of Michigan Press, 2017) and The
Transformation of Civil–Military Relations in Turkey (in Turkish,
Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2013). Her articles have appeared in
numerous journals, including Political Science Quarterly,
Democratization, South European Society and Politics, Turkish
Studies, and the Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Dr Gürsoy
has been serving as the Vice-President of the International Political
Science Association (IPSA) Research Committee on Armed Forces and
Society since 2011 and in 2016 was awarded with the Science
Academy Young Scientists Award (BAGEP) given to promising Turkish
scientists.
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
is a Senior Researcher and Research Coordinator at the Danish
Institute for International Studies. He previously served as Head of
the Politico-Military Department at the OSCE in Tajikistan, Research
Director at the Danish Defence College, Analyst with the Danish
Defence Intelligence Service, and Assistant Professor at the Central
European University in Budapest. His research interests include
security and defence policies in the former Soviet Union, identity
politics, and integration in the post-Soviet space.
Dr Gunther Hauser
holds the Chair of the section of International Security at the National
Defence Academy in Vienna. Since completing his academic training
in political science and international law at the Universities of
Innsbruck and Salzburg, he has been working on the security and
defence issues of Austria and the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the UN,
as well as on Chinese foreign and defence policy, and has published
widely on these topics since 2000. His chair’s focus in research and
Page 9 of 22
teaching is on strategic concepts of major powers and international

security organizations.
Professor Keith Hayward
is a consultant and writer on aerospace and aviation issues. He was
formerly Professor of International Relations at Staffordshire
University, Head of Economic and Political Affairs at the SBAC, the
UK aerospace trade association, and, until January 2015, Head of
Research at the Royal Aeronautical Society in London. He has been a
consultant or advisor to several company and government
departments, the latter including the UK Ministry of Defence and the
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. He has also acted as
an advisor to the UK House of Commons Trade and Industry
Committee and the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment. He
has taken part in a number of collaborative studies of the space
industry on behalf of the Commission of the European Union and the
European Space Agency. He is the author of several books and over a
hundred articles and chapters on aerospace and aviation issues. He is
a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society and of the French Air and
Space Academy.
Dr Masha Hedberg
is the James Andersen Adjunct Professor of European and Eurasian
Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns
Hopkins University. She also is a Visiting Fellow at the Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European (p.xxviii)
University Institute, where she was previously a Jean Monnet Fellow.
She holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University. Her current research
focuses on post-Soviet geopolitics; EU–Russian foreign policy and
trade relations; and the comparative political economy of Russia, the
former Soviet Union, and Eastern and Central Europe.
Dr Dorle Hellmuth
is Associate Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America
and serves as the academic director of the politics department’s
parliamentary internship programmes in Europe. Her book
Counterterrorism and the State (University of Pennsylvania Press,
2015) analyses post-9/11 counterterrorism decision-making and
responses in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
France. She has briefed members of parliament, law enforcement,
and government representatives on counterterrorism, national
security, and defence issues. She is a non-resident fellow at the
American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and
serves as a fellow at the German Institute on Radicalization and De-
Radicalization Studies (GIRDS). Her research and teaching cover
world politics, particularly the study of transatlantic security,
counterterrorism, counter-radicalization, homeland security,
Page 10 of 22
European and general comparative politics, and American foreign

policy. Professor Hellmuth held previous appointments as Assistant
Professor at the American University’s School of International Service
and as Research Fellow at the National War College, National
Defense University.
Adrian Hyde-Price
is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political
Science, Gothenburg University. He has previously held chairs of
International Politics at the Universities of Bath and Leicester, and
has also held academic posts at the Universities of Birmingham,
Southampton, and Manchester. His main areas of research are
European security, German foreign and security policy, and
international relations theory. His main publications include The
Challenge of Multipolarity: European Security in the Twenty-First
Century (Routledge, 2007);Germany and European Order
(Manchester University Press, 2000); The International Politics of
East Central Europe (Manchester University Press, 1996); European
Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010
(Sage, 1991); and British Foreign Policy and the Anglican Church:
Christian Engagement with the Contemporary World (co-edited,
Ashgate, 2008).
Andres Kasekamp
is Professor of Baltic Politics at the Johan Skytte Institute for Political
Studies at the University of Tartu in Estonia. He is a graduate of the
University of Toronto and holds a Ph.D. in modern history from
University College London (1996). He served as the Director of the
Estonian Foreign Policy Institute from 2000 to 2013. His A History of
the Baltic States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) was awarded the Baltic
Assembly Science Prize and has been translated into nine languages.
He is President-Elect of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic
Studies and an Honorary Fellow of the Baltic Defence College.
Dr Lucas Kello
is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of
Oxford, where he serves as Director of the Cyber Studies Programme.
He is also Co-director of the interdisciplinary Centre for Doctoral
Training in Cyber Security in the Department of Computer Science.
Previously, he was a joint research fellow in the International Security
Program and Cyber Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs. He was also a member of the
Harvard–MIT multiyear project on Explorations in Cyber
International Relations. He remains affiliated with Harvard as an
associate of the Belfer Center’s Science, Technology, and Public
Policy Program and Cyber Project. (p.xxix) His recent publications
include ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and
Page 11 of 22
Statecraft’ in International Security, ‘The Virtual Weapon: Dilemmas

and Future Scenarios’ in Politique étrangère, and ‘Security’ in The
Oxford Companion to International Relations.
Dr Benjamin Kienzle
is a Lecturer in Defence Studies and an Associate Researcher at the
Centre for Science & Security Studies (CSSS) at King’s College
London. Previously, he was the Marie Curie Fellow at CSSS, where he
implemented a project on the increasing interaction between the
European Union and international non-proliferation institutions in the
field of nuclear and chemical weapons. His current research focuses
on multilateral security cooperation, in particular in Europe. He has
published articles in this area in a number of journals, including
International Affairs, Cooperation and Conflict, Mediterranean
Politics, European Security, and the Journal of World Trade.
Dr Wim Klinkert
is Professor of Modern Military History at the Faculty of Military
Studies of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda, and of Dutch
Military History at the University of Amsterdam. He also lectures on
military history at the Dutch Staff College. He has published several
books and articles on late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century Dutch
military history. His recent publications include Small Powers in the
Age of Total War, 1900–1940 (with Prof. Herman Amersfoort), and
Defending Neutrality: The Netherlands Prepares for War, 1900–1925,
both published by Brill in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Recent articles
have been published in the Journal of Intelligence History, Journal for
First World War Studies, and the Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law. With Herman Amersfoort he supervises a Ph.D.
project on the changes within the different branches of the Dutch
armed forces in the period 1989–93. Currently, he is participating in
an extensive project to publish a multi-volume military history of the
Netherlands (1550–2010), supervised by the Netherlands Institute for
Military History.
Dr Ina Kraft
(née Wiesner) is the head of a project on multinationality and
international armed forces at the Bundeswehr Center of Military
History and Social Sciences in Potsdam, Germany. She received her
Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences from the European University
Institute in Florence, Italy. Her research interests include the
sociology of military technology, German military transformation, and
methodology in the social sciences. She is the author of Importing the
American Way of War? Network-Centric Warfare in the UK and
Germany (Nomos, 2013), and the editor of German Defence Politics
(Nomos, 2013). Recent publications include ‘Process Tracing in Case
Studies’ (with Pascal Vennesson), in the Routledge Handbook of
Page 12 of 22
Research Methods in Military Studies (Routledge, 2014), and ‘UAV for

R2P?: Exploring the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Drones’, in
Precision Strike Warfare and International Intervention (Routledge,
2015).
Dr Ulrich Krotz
is Professor at the European University Institute, where he holds the
Chair in International Relations in the Department of Political and
Social Sciences and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies. He is Director of the Schuman Centre’s programme on
Europe in the World. He is the author of Shaping Europe: France,
Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to
Twenty-First Century Politics (with Joachim Schild) (Oxford University
Press, hardback 2013, paperback 2015); Flying Tiger: International
Relations Theory and the Politics of Advanced Weapons (Oxford
University Press, 2011); and History and Foreign Policy in France and
Germany (Palgrave Macmillan, (p.xxx) 2015). His journal
publications have appeared in, among others, World Politics,
International Security, International Affairs, the European Journal of
International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, West European
Politics, and the Journal of Common Market Studies.
Dr Ulrich Kühn
is a Senior Research Associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation of the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International
Studies at Monterey, a Nonresident Scholar with the Nuclear Policy
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a
member of the trilateral Deep Cuts Commission. Previously, he
worked for the German Federal Foreign Office. In 2011 he was
awarded a United Nations Fellowship on Disarmament. Kühn is an
alumnus of the ZEIT Foundation Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius and a
former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow. He has published on
deterrence and arms control, international security institutions, and
transatlantic security.
Professor Julian Lindley-French, Ph.D., MA (Distinction), MA
(Oxon),
is Vice-President of the Atlantic Treaty Association, a Senior Fellow at
the Institute of Statecraft in London, Director of Europa Analytica in
the Netherlands, a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the
National Defense University in Washington, DC, and a Fellow of the
Canadian Global Affairs Institute. His many books include the Oxford
Handbook of War (Oxford University Press, 2014),Little Britain?
Twenty-First Century Strategic Challenges for a Middling European
Power (CS Publishing, 2015),NATO: The Enduring Alliance
Page 13 of 22
(Routledge, 2015), and The New Geopolitics of Terror: Demons &

Dragons (Routledge, 2017).
Dr Mauro Mantovani
has been Head of the Chair for Strategic Studies at the Swiss Military
Academy at ETH Zurich since 2009. Since completion of his academic
training as a historian at the University of Zurich, he has been
working on security and defence issues of Switzerland as well as on
international military conflicts, and has published widely on these
topics since 1991. His chair’s focus in research and teaching is in
strategic theory, the transformation of armed forces in Europe, and
geostrategic and military operations analyses. From 2011 to 2017, he
was the editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Military History
and Historiography (Brill).
Dr Andrew A. Michta
is the Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in
Garmisch, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations from
Johns Hopkins University. His areas of expertise are international
security, NATO, and European politics and security, with a special
focus on Central Europe and the Baltic States. Prior to coming to the
Marshall Center, he was Professor of National Security Affairs at the
US Naval War College, an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, and an affiliate of the Minda de Gunzburg
Center for European Studies at Harvard University. From 1988 to
2015 he was the M. W. Buckman Distinguished Professor of
International Studies at Rhodes College. His other positions include
Senior Fellow at CEPA; Senior Transatlantic Fellow at GMFUS and
the founding director of the GMFUS Warsaw office; a Senior Scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC; Professor of
National Security Studies at the Marshall Center; a Visiting Scholar
at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a Public Policy
Scholar at the Wilson Center, and a Research Associate at IERES at
the George Washington University. He writes the column ‘On Europe
and Security’ in the American Interest and is a regular contributor to
Carnegie Europe’s flagship blog Strategic (p.xxxi) Europe. He has
written several books on US and European politics and security. His
most recent book, with Paal Hilde, is The Future of NATO: Regional
(University of Michigan Press, 2014).
Dr Christian Nünlist
is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at
ETH Zurich and directs the CSS think-tank team ‘Swiss and Euro-
Atlantic Security’. He studied history, international relations, and
international law and received his MA and his Ph.D. from the
University of Zurich. He is the co-editor of Origins of the European
Page 14 of 22
Security System (Routledge, 2008), and his articles have appeared in

Cold War History, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and Security and
Human Rights. He has published several articles on the Swiss OSCE
Chairmanship of 2014. He is the co-editor of the monthly CSS
Analyses in Security Policy, as well as the annual Bulletin zur
schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik.
Dr Michal Onderco
is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Erasmus
University Rotterdam. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science at the
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam in 2014. Previously he was a Fulbright
researcher at Columbia University (2012/13); and Max Weber Fellow
at the European University Institute (2014/15). His research interests
include international institutions, international security, and the role
of ideas in shaping foreign policy. His work has been published or is
forthcoming in, among others, International Studies Quarterly,
European Security, Journal of International Relations and
Development, and Nonproliferation Review. He is the author of Iran’s
Nuclear Program and the Global South (Palgrave, forthcoming).
Together with Wolfgang Wagner and Wouter Werner, he co-edited
Deviance in International Relations: ‘Rogue States’ and International
Security (Palgrave, 2014).
Dr Alice Pannier
is Assistant Professor of European Studies and International
Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC. Previously,
she was a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for Strategic Research
of the French Ministry of Defence (IRSEM). Her research areas
include European security and transatlantic relations, French and
British foreign and defence policies, military interventions, and
cooperation in armament. Alice Pannier earned her Ph.D. from
Sciences Po, Paris, with joint supervision from King’s College London.
Her doctoral thesis focused on contemporary Franco-British defence
cooperation and is currently being adapted into a book.
Magnus Petersson
is Professor of Modern History at the Norwegian Institute for Defence
Studies. He teaches and supervises regularly at the Norwegian
Defence University College, the University of Oslo, and Stockholm
University. Recent publications include: The US NATO Debate: From
Libya to Ukraine (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); NATO’s European
Allies: Military Capability and Political Will (co-edited with Janne
Haaland Matlary) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and European Defense
Planning and the Ukraine Crisis: Two Contrasting Views (with Andres
Vosman) (Paris and Brussels: IFRI, 2014).
Mark Phythian
Page 15 of 22
is Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International

Relations at the University of Leicester. His research interests are in
the areas of intelligence, national security, and foreign policy. He is
the author or editor/co-editor of a number of books, including: The
Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 (Manchester University
Press, 2000); The Labour Party, War and International Relations
1945–2006 (p.xxxii) (Routledge, 2007); Intelligence in an Insecure
World (with Peter Gill) (2nd edn, Polity Press, 2012); and (as editor)
Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (Routledge, 2013); as well as
numerous journal articles and book chapters. He is co-editor of the
leading intelligence journal Intelligence and National Security, and a
Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences.
Leonid Polyakov
is Chairman of the Expert Board, Center for Army, Conversion and
Disarmament Studies (CACDS), Kyiv, Ukraine. He is also a Senior
Fellow, Institute for Strategic Studies ‘New Ukraine’, and External
Consultant to the Razumkov Center, Ukraine. He has worked as
Deputy Minister of Defence from March to May 2014, as Vice-
Minister of Defence from 2005 to 2008, and as Director of Military
Programs at the Razumkov Center from 2000 to 2005. Mr Polyakov is
a graduate of the US Army War College and Frunze Military Academy,
Moscow. His twenty years of military service cover command postings
in the Soviet Army, including a combat tour in Afghanistan, and
service in the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He is the
author of over a hundred articles and monographs on issues related
to international security, national security governance, defence
institution building, and security and defence transformation. His
major publications include Building Integrity in Defence
Establishments: A Ukrainian Case Study (CACDS, 2012); US–Ukraine
Relations and Value for Interoperability (US Army Strategic Studies
Institute, 2004); and Ukrainian–NATO Relations and New Prospects
for Peacekeeping (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham
House, 2003).
Bruno Cardoso Reis
holds an M.Phil. in Historical Studies from Cambridge University and
a Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College London. He was from
2011 to 2017 a Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences at
the University of Lisbon. He is an advisor to the National Defence
Institute of Portugal and an Associate Researcher at the Michael
Howard Centre for Military History at King’s College London. Since
2017 he has been an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Social
Research and Intervention at the University Institute of Lisbon, and
has been a Visiting Lecturer at a number of universities. He has
published on security issues and irregular warfare, notably with
Page 16 of 22
Andrew Mumford, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare

(Routledge, 2013).
Dr Peter Roberts
is the Senior Research Fellow for Sea Power and C4ISTAR at the
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). He runs conferences,
workshops, and research projects in these areas. His twenty-five
years of military experience as a naval officer was broadened by
working with various navies, armies, and air forces from across the
world, including time with intelligence agencies within the United
States in the realm of transnational crime and terrorism. He advised
foreign governments in strategy and tactics against contemporary
challenges. His final posts in the military were in offensive cyber
operations and capability planning. Peter Roberts has a Master’s from
King’s College London, is a Visiting Lecturer at the University of
Portsmouth, and a Fellow of the Chartered Management Institute. He
has been called to give evidence to the House of Commons Defence
Select Committee, as well as provide advice to foreign military chiefs.
He features regularly in the international media.
Professor Robert I. Rotberg
is Founding Director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Program on
Intrastate Conflict and President Emeritus of the World Peace
Foundation, as well as Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center,
and Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He edited When
States Fail (Princeton University Press, 2004), and (p.xxxiii) wrote
many other books, including On Governance: What It Is, What It
Measures and Its Policy Uses (2015); Governance and Innovation in
Africa: South Africa after Mandela (Centre for International
Governance Innovation, 2014); Africa Emerges: Consummate
Challenges, Abundant Opportunities (Polity Press, 2013); and
Transformative Political Leadership: Making a Difference in the
Developing World (University of Chicago Press, 2012).
Sten Rynning
is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political
Science, University of Southern Denmark, where he also heads the
Center for War Studies. He sits on the board of the Danish Atlantic
Treaty Association, the advisory board of the Danish Defence College,
and the editorial board of the European Journal of International
Security. He was a visiting fellow at NATO’s Defence College, Rome,
in 2012 and was President of the Nordic International Studies
Association in 2011–15. Since early 2017 he has been a Fulbright
scholar and Visiting Researcher at the School of International
Service, American University, in Washington, DC. Sten Rynning is the
author of numerous books and articles, including NATO in
Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press,
Page 17 of 22
2012), co-author (with Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff) of Transforming

Military Power Since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United
States, 1991–2012 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), and ‘The
False Promise of Continental Concert: Russia, the West, and the
Necessary Balance of Power’, in International Affairs (2015).
Olivier Schmitt
is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of
Political Science, University of Southern Denmark, where he is also a
member of the Center for War Studies. He is the Vice-President and
Scientific Director of the French Association for War and Strategic
Studies (AEGES) and a reserve officer in the French navy. He has won
several awards for his academic work, including the Alexander
George award and the Patricia Weitsman award from the
International Studies Association. He guest-edited a special issue of
the Journal of Strategic Studies on France’s defence policy and his
most recent book is Allies that Count: Junior Partners in Coalition
Warfare (Georgetown University Press, 2017).
Dr Ian Speller
is a Senior Lecturer and Director of the Centre for Military History
and Strategic Studies at the National University of Ireland Maynooth.
He also lectures at the Irish Military College and has contributed to
the ongoing Irish Defence Review. Prior to this he was a Senior
Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London
and the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College. His main
research interests lie within the fields of maritime strategy/naval
warfare and contemporary defence policy. Recent publications
include Understanding Naval Warfare (Routledge, 2014); Small
Navies (co-editor) (Ashgate, 2014); and Understanding Modern
Warfare (co-author) (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming).
James Sperling
is Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron. In 2015 he
was a Fernand Braudel Senior Fellow at the European University
Institute and Senior Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Studies, the
University of Bologna. He has published widely on German foreign
policy, transatlantic relations, and regional security governance. His
current research projects include the co-authored What’s Wrong with
NATO and How to Fix It (to be published by Polity Press). His most
recent publication is the edited Handbook of Governance and
Security (Edward Elgar, 2014).
(p.xxxiv) Dr Igor Sutyagin
is Senior Research Fellow in Russian Studies at the Royal United
Services Institute (RUSI). His research is concerned with political–
military aspects of the Russian foreign policy and domestic situation,
Page 18 of 22
as well as Russia’s conventional armed forces developments. Prior to

joining RUSI, Dr Sutyagin worked at the Institute for US and
Canadian Studies (Russian Academy of Science), in the Political–
Military Studies Department, where he held the position of the Head
of Section, the US military–technical and military–economic policy. He
has written over 120 articles and books published in seven countries,
including more than twenty-five articles in the specialist magazines of
the Russian General Staff, Main Naval Staff, and the Ministry of
Defence. He is also the co-author of the book Russian Strategic
Nuclear Weapons. Igor has a Ph.D. in History of Foreign Policy and
International Relations (1995) from the Institute for US and Canadian
Studies in Moscow and a Master’s degree in Radio-Physics from the
Physics Department, Moscow State University (1988). He is a
graduate of the College of International and Security Studies (Senior
Executive Course) at the George C. Marshall European Сenter for
Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 1999).
Dr Christopher Tuck
is a Senior Lecturer with the Department of Defence Studies, King’s
College London, based at the United Kingdom’s Joint Services
Command and Staff College (JSCSC). Prior to this, he was a lecturer
at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. His research interests
include modern land warfare, British counterinsurgency, and the
problems of war termination. His recent publications include
Understanding Land Warfare (Routledge, 2014); Confrontation,
Strategy and War Termination: Britain’s Conflict with Indonesia,
1963–66 (Ashgate, 2013); and British Propaganda and Wars of Empire
(co-editor) (Ashgate, 2014).
Matthew Uttley
is Professor of Defence Studies at King’s College London. He was
formerly the Academic Director of the King’s Policy Institute at King’s
College London. He was previously the Head of the King’s Defence
Studies Department and Dean of Academic Studies at the Joint
Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham (2006–12). He has
published widely on the historical and contemporary dimensions of
UK defence policy, defence economics, weapons acquisition, and
professional military education. He has acted as an advisor and
expert reviewer for a number of bodies, including the National Audit
Office, European Commission, Ministry of Defence’s Development,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre, and the Economic and Social
Research Council. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA)
and the Royal Historical Society (FRHistS), and Adjunct Professor at
the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia.
Mark Webber
Page 19 of 22
is Professor of International Politics and Head of Government and

Society, School of Government and Society, University of Birmingham.
He has published widely on Russian foreign policy, security
governance, the enlargement of NATO, and the EU. His current
research is focused on NATO as an actor in the contemporary
international system. He is co-editor (with Adrian Hyde-Price) of
Theorizing NATO (Routledge) and co-author of What’s Wrong with
NATO and How to Fix It (to be published by Polity Press).
Moritz Weiss
is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Ludwig
Maximilian University (LMU) Munich (Germany). He received his
Ph.D. in Political Science from Jacobs University Bremen. Afterwards,
at the University of St Gallen (Switzerland), he worked as a political
consultant for Switzerland’s Departments of Defence and Foreign
(p.xxxv) Affairs. His research focuses on security studies,
international relations theory, and the political economy of arms
production. His articles have appeared in numerous peer-reviewed
journals including Security Studies, European Journal of International
Security, Journal of Common Market Studies, Review of International
Political Economy, and Journal of European Public Policy.
Dr Alex S. Wilner
is an Assistant Professor at the Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs (NPSIA), Carleton University, Canada. He
teaches classes on intelligence, terrorism, national security policy,
and strategic foresight. His books include Deterring Rational Fanatics
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), and Deterring Terrorism:
Theory and Practice, co-edited with Andreas Wenger (Stanford
University Press, 2012). In 2016 he was awarded a prestigious
research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada to explore cyber deterrence. Prior to joining
NPSIA, Dr Wilner held a variety of positions at Policy Horizons
Canada, the University of Toronto, the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and the ETH
Zurich.
Katharina Wolf
is a Research Assistant at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies in the Global Governance Programme. Her doctoral research
examines when and in which format European states intervene
militarily in humanitarian crises. She holds a M.A. degree in
International Relations from the University of Nottingham and a M.A.
degree in International Administration and Conflict Management
from the University of Konstanz. During her doctoral research
Katharina worked at the European Union Institute for Security
Studies in Paris, where she researched European and global defence
Page 20 of 22
spending patterns. Her publications include Global defence spending

2015: the big picture (EUISS publication, 2016), Putting numbers on
capabilities: Defence inflation vs. cost escalation (EUISS publication,
2015), and Defence spending in 2014: the big picture (with Antonio
Missiroli) (EUISS publication, 2015).
Katerina Wright
is a J.D. Candidate at the New York University School of Law. She is
also an external collaborator with the programme on Europe in the
World in the Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. From
2011 to 2013, she worked in Washington, DC, for Avascent, an
international research and consulting firm, where she carried out
analyses on American, European, and other global defence and public
sector markets. As a consultant, she helped launch Avascent’s
European office in Paris in 2013–14, specializing there in the fields of
European, NATO, and national level defence. In her current research
she is focusing on EU foreign policy, the EU Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP), and transatlantic relations. Her publications
include ‘Opportunities Abound in NATO Defence Market’, published
in the National Defense Magazine.
Dr Olivier Zajec,
a graduate of the Military Academy Saint-Cyr and of Sciences Po
Paris, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of
Lyon III, as well as Research Fellow at both the Centre Lyonnais
d’Études de Sécurité Internationale et Défense (CLESID), and the
Institut de Stratégie Comparée (ISC, Paris). He also teaches strategic
theory at the French War College (2011–present) and at the Royal
Centre for High Military Studies (Kenitra, Morocco), and is a lecturer
at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale (IHEDN,
Paris). His current research interests bear on the realist theory of
(p.xxxvi) international relations, transatlantic defence policies, and
the theory of war. He is the author of the first intellectual biography
of Nicholas J. Spykman (Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne,
2016).
Dr Katarzyna Zysk
is an Associate Professor and Director of Research at the Norwegian
Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo, where she also serves as deputy
for the director of the Institute. She was a Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at
Stanford University, and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Changing
Character of War Programme at the University of Oxford. She is also
a member of the Hoover Institution’s Arctic Security Initiative at
Stanford University and was a Research Fellow (resident and non-
resident) at the US Naval War College—Center for Naval Warfare
Page 21 of 22
Studies, where she also cooperated with the War Gaming

Department. In 2016 she served as an Acting Dean of the Norwegian
Defence University College, where she also teaches regularly. Dr Zysk
has an academic background in international relations and
international history. Following her Ph.D. thesis on NATO
enlargement (2006), her research has focused on security and
strategic studies, in particular military change in Russia, Russian
security and defence policy, the Russian Navy, geopolitics, maritime
security and international order at sea in the Arctic, and Russian
military strategy.
Page 22 of 22
Introduction

Armed Forces

Print ISBN-13: 9780198790501
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198790501.001.0001
Introduction
Beyond CSDP: The Resurgence of National Armed Forces in Europe
Hugo Meijer
Marco Wyss
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198790501.003.0001
Abstract and Keywords

The introduction, which sets the stage for The Handbook, contends that, when it
comes to European security and defence, analytical precedence should be given
back to Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces. Therefore, it first
addresses the different historical stages in the rise and decline of the CSDP and
the transformation of national armed forces in Europe since the end of the cold
war. Then, it questions the seemingly unjustified predominance of the CSDP vis-
à-vis the comparative study of national defence policies in the literature on
European defence. With the case made for the ‘analytical resurgence’ of national
armed forces in Europe, the third section demonstrates the fruitfulness of such a
demarche by summarizing the central findings of The Handbook. What emerges
from the rich and diverse range of contributions in this volume is that national
armed forces have regained their central importance.
Keywords: national armed forces, Europe, defence, transformation, common security and defence
policy
IN summer 2016, the European Union (EU) released A Global Strategy for its
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Under the heading ‘Security and
Defence’, it calls on Europeans to ‘take greater responsibility for our security.
We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against
external threats’.1 This is probably the boldest among a number of the strategy’s
ambitions. Even though some leading European foreign and security policy
Page 1 of 40
Introduction
pundits have tried to portray the document as a good starting point to make the
CFSP more effective,2 its weaknesses and unrealistic call for ‘strategic
autonomy’ have attracted sharp criticism.3 Despite the EU’s foreign and security
policy achievements, notably within the framework of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP)/Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), strategic
autonomy remains a distant ideal. Not only has European defence integration
been limited and even stalled since the early 2010s, but, as will be shown, there
has also been a related trend towards the renationalization of security and
defence in Europe. It is increasingly evident that the era of enthusiasm for
European security and defence following the Franco-British Saint-Malo
Declaration of 19984 and, especially, the first and preceding EU security strategy
—A Secure (p.2) Europe in a Better World—of 2003,5 has ebbed away.6
Moreover, the European project itself has come under increasing pressure, and
the United Kingdom, one of Europe’s major military powers, is in the process of
leaving the union.7 Whereas the new strategy acknowledges some of these
difficulties, it is not binding for EU member states, nor does it set out the ways
and means to achieve strategic autonomy. This is, to say the least, not
particularly strategic.8
What A Global Strategy does well, however, is to identify the threats and
challenges Europe faces, notably those emanating from an increasingly assertive
and militarily resurgent Russia.9 After more than two decades since the end of
the cold war, the successor state to the Soviet Union has thus ‘regained’ its
place as the focal point for European defence. Yet, ever since the Pleven Plan10
was put forward in the early stages of the cold war, a European defence
community has failed to materialize.11 The European powers are, as a
consequence, somehow reminiscent of Renaissance Italy, where rich yet
militarily relatively weak city states and kingdoms such as Florence, Milan, and
Naples did not join forces, and their disunity ultimately allowed France and the
Holy Roman Empire to project their power into the Italian peninsula.12 To push
the analogy further might risk the trap of anachronism, but most European
states have preferred to rely on a US-backed North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to protect their national interests and face the perceived threat of the
Soviet Union in the cold war and now Russia. The importance of the Atlantic
Alliance, and implicitly the failure of European defence integration, is also
acknowledged by the new EU strategy.13
In the light of the still limited defence integration, the editors of The Handbook
of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces contend that, when it comes to
European security and defence, analytical precedence should be refocused on
Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces for two main
interconnected reasons. The first one is historical. Since the end of the cold war,
defence and security policy in Europe has (p.3) witnessed two concurrent
trends towards European integration and national transformation. On the one
hand, European defence integration through the ESDP/CSDP (hereafter CSDP)
Page 2 of 40
Introduction
has undergone a pattern of emergence, rise, and gridlock during the 1990s,
2000s, and 2010s respectively. Despite significant institutional development,
almost three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall the political and military
reach of CSDP remains quite limited and hampered by diverging national
interests.14 Moreover, since the early 2010s Europe has witnessed a trend
towards a renewed focus on territorial defence and the related national defence
capabilities.15 On the other hand, Europe’s national defence policies and armed
forces have experienced significant qualitative, quantitative, and organizational
transformation in response to a shifting threat environment that includes a
resurgent Russia, transnational terrorism, cyber-security challenges, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), civil wars, and
neighbouring failing states, among others. Accordingly, the combination of the
rise and decline of the CSDP, on the one hand, and of persistent national defence
transformation throughout the post-cold war, on the other, calls for a renewed
attention to national security and defence policy as the analytical starting point
in the study of European defence and security.
The second reason pertains to the extant literature on European defence. In this
twin movement of European defence integration and national transformation,
the literature has overwhelmingly privileged the CSDP at the expense of the
cross-European comparative study of national defence policies and armed
forces. In fact, a major imbalance—if not an inverse correlation—exists between,
on the one hand, the relative depth and breadth of historical change in European
defence integration versus national defence policies and, on the other, the extent
to which they have been respectively covered in the literature. Despite the
limited scope of the CSDP and the persistence in the process of national defence
transformation since the end of the cold war, the literature on European defence
has been dominated by a focus on the CSDP and by a neglect of the comparative
study of national defence policies and armed forces in Europe.
Given the imbalance between the historical record and the focus of the extant
literature, the first ambition of The Handbook is, at the conceptual level, to
refocus the attention on, and to give analytical precedence to, national defence
policy and armed forces in Europe. Re-emphasizing the crucial importance of
cross-European comparisons of national defence policies and armed forces does
not equate to abandoning the study of the CSDP and of the trans-European
integrative patterns in the field of defence and security. Reinvigorating the
national level as a key unit of analysis, and in a comparative approach, is in fact
a condition sine qua non for investigating defence cooperation in its multiple
configurations (bilateral, minilateral, multilateral) and levels (intergovernmental
and trans-/supranational), but without losing track of the foundational dimension
of the national level. While taking (p.4) into account the role of the CSDP in
European defence and security, The Handbook shows how the CSDP fits—and its
relatively limited role—within the complex patchwork of national defence
policies and of bilateral and mini-/multilateral arrangements that compose
Page 3 of 40
Introduction
Europe’s security architecture.16 The second and related ambition of The

Handbook is, at the empirical level, to provide the first geographically and
thematically comprehensive presentation and analysis of the evolution of the
national security and defence policies, strategies, doctrines, capabilities, and
military operations, as well as the alliances and security partnerships, of
Europe’s armed forces in response to the security challenges Europe has faced
since the end of the cold war. Thereby, it provides a comprehensive set of case
studies of the defence policies and armed forces not only of the major, but also of
most medium and lesser European powers.17
In order to support the intellectual case outlined here, this Introduction is

structured as follows. The first two sections respectively outline the two central
rationales for re-emphasizing the study of national armed forces in Europe. The
first addresses the different historical stages in the rise and decline of the CSDP
and in the transformation of national armed forces in Europe since the end of
the cold war. The second then questions the seemingly unjustified predominance
of CSDP vis-à-vis the comparative study of national defence policies in the
literature on European defence. With the case made for the ‘analytical
resurgence’ of national armed forces in Europe, the third section demonstrates
the fruitfulness of such a démarche by summarizing the central findings of The
Handbook. What emerges from the rich and diverse range of contributions in
this volume is not only that national armed forces are here to stay, but that they
have also regained their central importance.
(p.5) Reframing European Defence

The evolution of Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces since the
end of the cold war has been closely connected to, and frequently overshadowed
by, European defence integration. This should not come as a surprise, because
the overcoming of the cold war order went hand in hand with European
integration. The processes of European defence integration and national armed
forces transformation largely converged chronologically, but diverged
qualitatively. The EU, its member states, and the other European powers have
shared the same regional threat environment, albeit with subregional and local
differences; and the rise of CFSP provoked a significant degree of enthusiasm
within Brussels, the think-tank world and, notably, academia. Yet, as already
stated, The Handbook argues that the analytical precedence should be given
back to Europe’s national defence policies and armed forces, not only because
fully integrated European armed forces have failed to emerge, but also because
the pendulum has swung back towards a national approach to defence in
Europe.18 Moreover, despite the ‘fog’ of CSDP and early post-cold war delusions
about a more secure world,19 national armed forces have remained at the core of
European defence. Finally, the transformation of European armed forces since
the end of the cold war has been significant. In order to reframe European
defence, what follows is a brief presentation of the three different stages in the
Page 4 of 40
Introduction
twofold evolution of, respectively, European defence integration and national

transformation.
CSDP: Emergence, Rise, Gridlock

The foundations for the emergence of European defence integration were laid
with the end of the cold war. In exchange for French President François
Mitterrand’s acceptance of German reunification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl
agreed to accelerate European political and monetary integration. This paved
the way for the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP in 1993.20 The latter proved,
however, to be largely ineffective in addressing the protracted wars in the
Balkans that haunted Europe in the 1990s. In order to gain the capability and
capacity to deal with crises in Europe and its neighbourhood, the EU decided—in
close consultation with NATO—to move ahead with European defence
integration. Following the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration, the 1999
Cologne Summit officially established the ESDP by absorbing the Western
European Union (WEU), which had proved ineffective despite resuscitation
attempts after the cold war.
Thereafter began the second stage and ‘golden age’ of European defence
integration. The EU institutionalized the ESDP, strengthened its military
capabilities, promoted interoperability, and integrated defence procurement,
agreed on its first European Security Strategy (ESS),21 and launched a number
of ambitious peace-support and crisis-management (p.6) operations. The
European Defence Agency (EDA) was also created in 2004 to enhance capacity
development and intra-European armaments cooperation. By the mid-2000s, the
enthusiasm for such developments led some analysts to go so far as to stress
that Europe would become the next superpower and challenge American
primacy in world politics.22 This process culminated in the rebranding of the
ESDP as the CSDP through the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which entered into force
in 2009 and aimed to streamline the hydra-like structure that had emerged over
the years.23 The Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS) were
integrated in the newly born European External Action Service (EEAS).24 But,
despite the improved organizational functioning of the CSDP, a third stage,
marked by disillusionment, has since set in.
With the notable exception of the EU NAVFOR Operation ‘Atalanta’, more

muscular European military operations have become increasingly rare.25
Moreover, the operational record and effectiveness of the EU’s more ambitious
military missions such as EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Chad/CAR have been
questioned, and most European powers, as illustrated by the Malian crisis, have
no stomach for new major EU-led military operations. The era when the EU
optimistically launched its first military mission outside Europe with Operation
‘Artemis’ in 2003 seems far away, and the focus has increasingly shifted to
civilian missions and capacity building.26 Finally, largely because of the
persistence of diverging national interests and threat perceptions, and despite a
Page 5 of 40
Introduction
militarily resurgent Russia, a truly integrated European defence has yet to

materialize. As Anand Menon points out, most EU member states share a
growing disillusionment vis-à-vis the CSDP and ‘seem increasingly to doubt the
utility of an EU policy that was largely their own creation’.27 This trend has been
reinforced in the aftermath of the 2011 intervention in Libya, undertaken within
a NATO rather than a CSDP framework.28
(p.7) To be sure, it is not impossible that the combination of Brexit, Russia’s

increased assertiveness, the American preoccupation with China and the Asia–
Pacific more generally,29 and the Presidency of Donald Trump—who has cast
doubts over US defence commitments to Europe—might provide an impetus for
small and incremental steps in European defence integration. The 2017 decision
to create an EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU
military staff, tasked with the command of non-executive military CSDP
missions,30 and other initiatives, including the European Defence Fund (EDF)
within the framework of the European Defence Action Plan,31 the strengthening
of the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ (PESCO) mechanism,32 as well as the
discussions around the resuscitation of the long-standing ambition of creating a
common EU army,33 have indeed generated considerable expectations and
debate among pundits.34 But the persistence of major intra-European national
divergences in terms of threat perceptions, the imbalances in capabilities, and
the consequent challenges of defining a shared hierarchization of the main
security challenges and military tasks, and thus of devising joint priorities, shed
considerable doubt on, while not outright precluding, the prospect of a truly
integrated European defence. These factors are empirically substantiated in the
contributions to The Handbook, which suggest that a common European defence
policy appears to be a distant hope rather than a present reality.
Transforming National Armed Forces

Russia, as the post-cold war successor to the Soviet Union, has, by contrast, had
a more significant effect than the European integration project on national
security and defence policies in Europe. More generally, the evolution of the
European security environment in (p.8) the three decades following the fall of
the Berlin Wall seems to have had in some ways an almost diametrically opposed
effect on national armed forces to that on European defence integration. While
the absence of a major conventional threat from Russia benefited European
defence integration in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it also led to declining
national defence budgets and a shift away from territorial defence. Similarly, the
Kremlin’s subsequent increased military assertiveness has led European capitals
to rediscover the importance of territorial defence. Consequently, national
defence policies and armed forces in Europe have roughly also experienced what
approximates to a three-stage process since the end of the cold war. In this
process, NATO has had an overarching influence acting as both a key enabler
and a shaper of national defence policies and military transformation in Europe.
Page 6 of 40
Introduction
After the withdrawal of the Red Army from Central and Eastern Europe
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact
and the Soviet Union, Western Europe was left without a major conventional
military threat.35 Moreover, the decline of Russia seemed to continue unabated
for the remainder of the 1990s.36 The ‘unipolar moment’, with the United States
as the sole remaining superpower, seemed confirmed.37 Meanwhile, the US-
backed NATO umbrella was continuously expanded eastwards, ahead of the
future expansion of the EU.38 This set the stage for the first transformation
phase of European armed forces, which lasted until the turn of the century.
Initially, the European powers cashed in the so-called peace dividend, and
reduced their military personnel and equipment without fundamental strategic,
doctrinal, or material reorientations. The lessons of the 1991 Gulf War, which
was a showcase for US military power and the ongoing Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA), the subsequent Balkan Wars, and the emergence of transnational
threats stimulated a military transformation process in most European
countries.39 This led to a strategic and doctrinal shift away from territorial (p.9)
defence to humanitarian and peace-support operations, further troop
reductions, professionalization, the abolition of conscription (in most cases),
increased operability, and standardization of doctrine.40
These developments overlapped with a second phase, which began with the
military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and continued
with the resulting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in both countries. This
first completed the shift towards expeditionary warfare,41 and then led to what
has been called a ‘new counterinsurgency era’.42 As a result, the countries
participating in the two invasions and/or the counterinsurgency campaigns in
Afghanistan and Iraq not only rediscovered and developed past
counterinsurgency doctrines,43 but also continued the transformation of their
armed forces to enable them to fight alongside allies abroad. This accelerated
the process of what Anthony King has called ‘concentration’ and
‘transnationalization’ to create smaller yet more capable and internationally
connected armed forces.44 In an increasingly generalized trend, European
armed forces were reorganized into a modular and thus more flexible structure,
further reduced in size and professionalized, and re-equipped with new weapons
platforms and communication equipment in the aim to improve their reaction
time, force projection capability, operational sustainability, interoperability, and
effectiveness. Yet this transformation process was impeded by persistent budget
pressures on Europe’s armed forces and marked by inconsistency because of
different security outlooks, political priorities, and strategic cultures in Europe.
This led to what has been called a ‘transformation gap’, not only between the
United States and its European allies, but also within Europe.45 Moreover, the
enthusiasm for expeditionary warfare and COIN was not shared across the
entire continent, and some non-allied or neutral countries, for instance, focused
instead on domestic tasks as a substitute for territorial defence.46
Page 7 of 40
Introduction
Meanwhile, the pendulum has swung back with a third and ongoing
transformation phase. This most recent phase, which overlapped with the
second, set in train a double crisis that emerged towards the end of the 2000s.
On the one hand, the lengthy campaign and lack of progress in Afghanistan led
to disillusionment with COIN, and a desire to avoid (p.10) having to fight an
insurgency on the ground in the future.47 On the other hand, the global financial
crisis was followed by cuts to already overstretched defence budgets.48 As a
result, not only did the European appetite for expeditionary warfare dramatically
decline, but also the capabilities and capacities of Europe’s armed forces were
further reduced.49 This ‘strategic retreat’ did not last for long, and was
transformed into a ‘strategic reorientation’ as soon as the European economy
was on its way to recovery and the continent seemed to be confronted with new
threats and challenges. Simultaneous to a widespread disillusionment with the
EU and a resurgence of the nation state,50 many European powers have
increasingly seen themselves challenged by a militarily resurgent and assertive
Russia—especially in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of
Crimea51—together with an Islamist terrorist threat on their national
territories,52 and cyber-security challenges.53 Even though defence spending as
a percentage of GDP remains historically low and often well below NATO’s 2 per
cent target, this increasingly tense European security environment has led to
higher defence budgets after decades of cuts.54 Yet more importantly, and as the
chapters of The Handbook show, Europe’s armed forces have ‘rediscovered’ their
traditional territorial defence role and become increasingly involved in what is
called ‘homeland security’ in the United States. The threat not only of terrorism,
but also of conventional war—as announced in the mid-2000s by Colin Gray—is
again real.55 This overall trend towards the renationalization of national armed
forces, with a return to territorial defence—mostly in the context of NATO—has
contributed to further de-emphasizing the relative importance of CSDP in
European defence and security.
In sum, given the rise and decline in European defence integration and the
persistence in the process of national defence transformation since the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the historical evolution of, and recent trends in, European defence
and security thus call for a renewed attention to national defence policies and
armed forces.
(p.11) A Glaring Imbalance: The Literature on the CSDP and National

Armed Forces
A second central reason for refocusing on national armed forces in Europe is
that, in this twin movement of European integration and national
transformation, the overwhelming majority of the literature has focused on the
CSDP while largely neglecting, with only a few notable exceptions, the
comparative evolution of national defence and security policy and armed forces
at the cross-European level.
Page 8 of 40
Introduction
Despite its very limited military output, the CSDP has been the focus of a
burgeoning body of scholarly literature.56 This seemingly paradoxical
phenomenon resulted not only from the enthusiasm for European defence
integration in the wake of the rise of the CSDP, but also from the concomitant
decline of defence- and military-focused strategic studies at the expense of
security studies, following the broadening of the concept of security and the
focus on its non-military dimensions,57 and the consolidation of European studies
as an academic subdiscipline58—which jointly contributed to the neglect of the
study of national defence policy and armed forces in Europe. Without attempting
to provide an exhaustive review, which goes beyond the scope of this
Introduction, we can identify five clusters of enquiry in the literature on the
CSDP. First, a large body of works seeks to explain the drivers of the rise and
evolution of the CSDP by applying theoretical approaches from political science
and international relations. This puts forward competing explanatory factors
derived from realism,59 (p.12) constructivism,60 or neo-institutionalism,61
among others.62 A second strand in the literature analyses the decision-making
processes and the institutional arrangements of the CSDP. This body of research
aims to assess whether Europe’s institutional architecture in the field of defence
and security is intergovernmental or supranational, or consists of a multilevel
security governance.63 A third cluster focuses on the aggregation of military
capabilities under the CSDP, on intra-European arms cooperation, and on the
persistence of the so-called capabilities–expectations gap.64 Focusing on the
demand side, these works examine the institutional framework that has emerged
over time to develop joint European defence capabilities, including the
Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en (p.13) Matière d’Armement
(OCCAR) or the EDA.65 The external operations, both civilian and military,
undertaken by the EU under the CSDP banner constitute a fourth major
research area. These works examine the drivers and effectiveness of the range
of operations conducted by the EU in south-eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle
East, and Asia since the early 2000s.66 Finally, the literature delves into the
contentious relationship between NATO and the CSDP in the provision of
security on the continent. It analyses issues such as the potential development of
Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ vis-à-vis NATO, the transatlantic burden-sharing
and capability gap, or the question of geographical/functional division of labour
—and more broadly the patterns of cooperation and competition—between the
two organizations.67 While scholars disagree on the extent to which the EU has
fully emerged as an actor in military affairs on the world stage,68 these five
different clusters of literature all share a tendency to focus on a trans-/
supranational level of analysis.
Throughout the post-cold war period, the scholarly literature on European

defence and security has thus adopted a predominantly ‘CSDP-centric’
perspective. Accordingly, of the two main trends that have characterized
Europe’s defence since the end of the fall of the Berlin Wall—namely, European
Page 9 of 40
Introduction
integration and national transformation—the latter (p.14) has been

significantly neglected. Indeed, very few cross-national studies have analysed
and compared the evolution of national defence policies and the transformation
of their armed forces across Europe; and, when doing so, they have focused on
only a small selection of major European powers, such as the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany (and seldom on medium or lesser powers, such as Poland,
Spain, or Norway).69 In addition, several of these studies have focused
specifically on the contributions of individual major powers to the CSDP,
therefore using the CSDP as their organizing compass.70 Furthermore, in such
comparative studies, many lesser European powers are often absent altogether,
such as Albania, Ireland, or Slovakia, to name just a few. Finally, the very few
comparative studies that include a ‘large N’ of European countries tend either to
focus only on specific issues or aspects (for example, strategic culture71) or to
provide year-by-year snapshots.72
In other words, by predominantly focusing on the CSDP, the extant literature has
neglected a fundamental analytical dimension—namely, the systematic
comparison of national defence policies and armed forces across Europe in the
post-cold war era. The editors of The Handbook therefore argue for the need to
move beyond a ‘CSDP-centric’ perspective and to re-emphasize the cross-
European comparative study of national defence policies and armed forces. A
truly cross-European comparison of the evolution of national defence policy and
armed forces remains a glaring blindspot. The Handbook of European Defence
Policies and Armed Forces aims to fill this gap.
Central Findings: Common Patterns versus Divergences

In order to fill the above intellectual, empirical, and scholarly gaps, The
Handbook gathers fifty-one contributions by leading and emerging scholars on
European defence and international security from around the world. It is
organized in six parts that collectively demonstrate the fruitfulness of giving
analytical precedence back to the comparative study of national defence policies
and armed forces across Europe. The first and most extensive part offers
country-based assessments of the evolution of the national defence (p.15)
policies of the major, medium, and lesser powers of Europe in the post-cold war
period. The focus on national security strategies, military doctrines, force
structures, and interventions in each of these chapters enables international
comparisons to be drawn. Part II then analyses the web of alliances and security
partnerships (bilateral and multilateral) developed by European states to
cooperate in the provision of national security. This is followed by four thematic
parts that respectively zoom in on: the array of security challenges faced by
European states and their armed forces, ranging from interstate (e.g.,
conventional warfare) through intra-state and transnational (e.g., failed states,
terrorism, or proliferation), to emerging security challenges (e.g., cyber) (Part
III); the national security strategies and doctrines developed in response to
these challenges in five domains (land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber) and in
Page 10 of 40
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
through the library window to increase the bonfire in the courtyard
below.
Very different was the Celestina, first printed in Burgos in 1499,
and now generally believed to be the work of a lawyer, Fernando de
Rojas. Here are no shadowy Knights condemned to struggle through
endless pages with imaginary beasts; but men and women at war
with sin and moved by passions that are as eternal as human life
itself. The author describes it as a “Tragicomedia,” since it begins in
comedy and ends in tragedy. It is the tale of a certain youth, Calisto,
who, rejected by the heroine, Melibea, bribes an old woman,
Celestina, to act as go-between; until at length through her evil
persuasions virtue yields to his advances. The rest of the book works
out the Nemesis; Calisto being surprised and slain at a secret
meeting with his mistress, Celestina murdered for her ill-gotten
money by her associates, while Melibea herself commits suicide. The
whole is related in dialogue, often witty and even brilliant; but
marred for the taste of a later age by gross and indecent passages.
The Celestina has been classed both as novel and play, and might
indeed be claimed as the forerunner of both these more modern
Spanish developments. It is cast in the form of acts; but their number
(twenty-one) and the extreme length of many of the speeches make it
improbable that it was ever acted. Nevertheless its popularity,
besides raising a host of imitations more or less worthless, insured it
a lasting influence on Castilian literature; and the seventeenth
century witnessed its adaptation to the stage.
Other dialogues, with less plot but considerable dramatic spirit,
are the Coplas de Mingo Revulgo, and the Dialogue between Love
and an Old Man by Rodrigo Cota. The former of these represents a
conversation between two shepherds, satirizing the reign of Henry
IV.; the latter the disillusionment of an old man who, having allowed
himself to be tricked by Love whom he believed he had cast out of his
life for ever, finds that Love is mocking him and that he has lost the
power to charm.
Whether these pieces were acted or no is not certain; but they bear
enough resemblance to the Representaciones of Juan del Enzina,
which certainly were produced, to make it probable that they were.
Juan de Enzina was born about the year 1468, and under the
patronage of the Duke of Alva appeared at Ferdinand and Isabel’s
Court, where he became famous as poet and musician. Amongst his
works are twelve “Églogas,” or pastoral poems, six secular in their
tone and six religious, the latter being intended to celebrate the great
church festivals.
The secular Representaciones deal with simple incidents and show
no real sense of dramatic composition; but with the other six they
may be looked on as a connecting link between the old religious
“Mysteries” and “Miracle Plays” of the early Middle Ages and the
coming Spanish drama. Their author indeed stands out as “Father”
of his art in Spain, for a learned authority of the reign of Philip IV.
has placed it on record that “in 1492, companies began to represent
publicly in Castile plays by Juan del Enzina.”
If the literature of Spain during the fifteenth and early sixteenth
centuries may be described by the general term “transitional,”
marking its development from crudity of ideas and false technique
towards a slow unfolding of its true genius, painting at the same date
was still in its infancy; while architecture and the lesser arts of
sculpture, metal-work, and pottery had already reached their period
of greatest glory.
Schools of painting existed, it is true, at Toledo and in Andalusia;
but the three chief artists of the Court of Isabel came from Flanders;
and most of the pictures of the time exhibit a strong Flemish
influence, which can be recognized in their rich and elaborate
colouring, clearly defined outlines, and the tall gaunt figures so dear
to northern taste. Of Spanish painters, the names of Fernando
Gallegos “the Galician,” of Juan Sanchez de Castro a disciple of the
“Escuela Flamenca,” and of Antonio Rincon and his son Fernando,
stand out with some prominence; but it is doubtful if several of the
pictures formerly attributed to Antonio, including a Madonna with
Ferdinand and Isabel kneeling in the foreground, are really his work.
In architecture at this time the evidence of foreign influence is also
strong. On the one hand are Gothic Churches like San Juan de Los
Reyes at Toledo or amongst secular buildings, the massive castle of
Medina del Campo; on the other, in contrast to these northern
designs, Renaissance works with their classic-Italian stamp, such as
the Hospital of Santa Cruz at Toledo or the College of the same name
at Valladolid. Yet a third element is the Moresque, founded on
Mahometan models, such as the horseshoe arch of the Puerta del
Perdón of the old Mosque at Seville overlaid with the emblems of
Christian worship. The characteristics of North, South, and East, are
distinct; yet moulded, as during the previous centuries, by the race
that borrowed them to express ideals peculiarly its own.
“Let us build such a vast and splendid temple,” said the founders
of Seville Cathedral in 1401, “that succeeding generations of men will
say that we were mad.”
It is the arrogant self-assertion of a people absolutely convinced,
from king to peasant, of their divine mission to astonish and subdue
the world in the name of the Catholic Faith and Holy Church. The
triumphant close of their long crusade intensified this spiritual pride;
and Spanish architecture and sculpture ran riot in a wealth of
ornament and detail, that cannot but arrest though it often wearies
the eye.
Such was the “plateresque” or “silversmith” method of elaborate
decoration, seen at its best at Avila in the beautiful Renaissance tomb
of Prince John, which though ornate is yet refined and pure, at its
most florid in the façade of the Convent of San Pablo at Valladolid.
Under its blighting spell the strong simplicity of an earlier age
withered; and Gothic and Renaissance styles alike were to perish
through the false standard of merit applied to them by a decadent
school.
FAÇADE OF SAN PABLO AT
VALLADOLID
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY LACOSTE,

MADRID
The first impression emerging from a survey of Queen Isabel’s

reign is the thought of the transformation those thirty years had
wrought in the character of her land. It is not too much to say that in
this time Spain had passed from mediævalism to take her place in a
modern world. She had conquered not only her foes abroad but
anarchy at home. She had evolved a working-system of government
and discovered a New World. She had trampled out heresy; and thus
provided a solution of the religious problem at a time when most of
the other nations of Europe were only beginning to recognise its
difficulties.
Not all these changes were for the best. On the heavy price paid in
blood and terror for the realization of the ideal “One people, one
Faith” we have already remarked. We can see it with clear eyes now;
but at the time the sense of orthodoxy above their fellows, that arose
from persecuting zeal, gave to the Spanish nation a special power;
and Isabel “the Catholic” was the heroine of her own age above all for
the bigotry that permitted the fires and tortures of the Inquisition.
A woman ... [says Martin Hume] whose saintly devotion to her Faith blinded her
eyes to human things, and whose anxiety to please the God of Mercy made her
merciless to those she thought His enemies.
With this verdict, a condemnation yet a plea for understanding,

Isabel, “the persecutor” must pass before the modern judgment-bar.
In her personal relations, both as wife and mother, and in her
capacity as Queen on the other hand she deserves our unstinted
admiration.
The reign of Ferdinand and Isabel [says Mariéjol] may be summarized in a few
words. They had enjoyed great power and they had employed it to the utmost
advantage both for themselves and the Spanish nation. Royal authority had been in
their hands an instrument of prosperity. Influence abroad,—peace at home,—these
were the first fruits of the absolute monarchy.
If criticism maintains that this benevolent government

degenerated into despotism during the sixteenth century, while
Spain became the tool and purse of imperial ambitions, it should be
remembered that neither Castilian Queen nor Aragonese King could
have fought the evils they found successfully with any other weapon
than their own supremacy, nor is it fair to hold them responsible for
the tyranny of their successors. Ferdinand indeed may be blamed for
yielding to the lure of an Italian kingdom; but even his astuteness
could not have foreseen the successive deaths that finally secured the
Spanish Crown for a Hapsburg and an Emperor.
These were the tricks of Fortune, who according to Machiavelli is
“the mistress of one-half our actions.” The other half is in human
reckoning; and Isabel in her sincerity and strength shaped the
destiny of Castile as far as in her lay with the instinct of a true ruler.
“It appeared the hand of God was with her,” says the historian,
Florez, “because she was very fortunate in those things that she
undertook.”
APPENDIX I
HOUSE OF TRASTAMARA IN CASTILE AND
ARAGON
APPENDIX II
PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES FOR THE LIFE
AND TIMES OF ISABEL OF CASTILE
A. Contemporary.
Bernaldez (Andrés) (Curate of Los Palacios), Historia de Los
Reyes.
Carvajal (Galindez), Anales Breves.
Castillo (Enriquez del), Crónica del Rey Enrique IV.
Martyr (Peter), Opus Epistolarum.
Pulgar (Hernando de), Crónica de Los Reyes Católicos.
—— Claros Varones.
Siculo (Lucio Marineo), Sumario de la ... Vida ... de Los
Católicos Reyes.
Zurita, Anales de Aragon, vols. v. and vi.
B. Later Authorities.
Altamira, Historia de España, vol. ii.
Bergenroth, Calendar of State Papers, vol. i.
Butler Clarke, “The Catholic Kings,” (Cambridge Modern
History, vol. i.).
—— Spanish Literature.
Clemencin, Elogio de La Reina Isabel.
Flores, Reinas Católicas.
Hume (Martin), Queens of Old Spain.
Irving (Washington), Conquest of Granada.
—— Life of Christopher Columbus.
Lafuente, Historia de España, vols. vi. and vii.
Lea, History of the Inquisition in Spain. 4 v.
Mariéjol, L’Espagne sous Ferdinand et Isabelle.
Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella.
Sabatini (Rafael), Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition.
Thacher (John Boyd), Christopher Columbus. 3 v.
Ticknor, History of Spanish Literature, v. i.
Young (Filson), Life of Christopher Columbus. 2 v.
Some Additional Authorities Consulted.
Volumes xiv., xxxix., lxxxviii., and others of the Documentos
Inéditos.
Volume lxii. and others of the Boletin de La Real Academia.
Amador de los Rios, Historia de Madrid.
Armstrong (E.), Introduction to Spain, Her Greatness and
Decay, by Martin Hume.
Berwick and Alba, Correspondencia de Fuensalida.
Colmenares, Historia de Segovia.
Diary of Roger Machado.
Fitzmaurice-Kelly, History of Spanish Literature.
Mariéjol, Pierre Martyr d’Anghera: Sa vie et ses œuvres.
Memoirs of Philip de Commines.
INDEX
A
Abraham “El Gerbi,” 211, 213
Aguilar, Alonso de, 177, 180, 182, 281–3
Ajarquia, 176, 181
Alcabala, 384, 394, 395
Alcalá de Henares, University of, 402
Alexander VI. (Rodrigo Borgia), 85, 236, 239, 248, 261, 306, 353,
354, 360, 363
Alfonso V. of Aragon, 24, 25, 35, 115–119, 350
Alfonso of Castile, brother of Isabel, 22, 35, 46, 52, 56, 60, 64, 65
Alfonso II. of Naples, 350, 353, 354, 356
Alfonso V. of Portugal, 52, 70, 96, et seq.; 107, et seq.
Alfonso, son of John II. of Portugal, 223, 337
Alfonso, Archbishop of Saragossa, 244, 330
Alhama, 165, 170
Aliator, 176, 181, 182
Aljubarrota, Battle of, 30
Almeria, 161, 204, 216, 220, 280
Alpujarras, The, 278, 280
Alvaro, Don, of Portugal, 212
Amadis de Gaula, 414
Anne of Beaujeu, 340
Anne of Brittany, 340
Aranda, Council of, 239
Aranda, Pedro de, 261
Architecture, Castilian, 419–420
Arras, Cardinal of, 73, 81
Arthur, Prince of Wales, 373, 374
Atella, capitulation of, 362
“Audiences” in Seville, 136
Auto-de-Fe, 256
Ayora, Gonsalvo de, 192
Azaator, Zegri, 274
B
Baeza, 216, 217, 219, 220, 223, 280
Bahamas, discovery of, 304
Barbosa, Arias, 406
Barcelona, 38, 39, 40, 50, 75, 305, 328, 352
Bernaldez, Andres, Curate of Los Palacios, 168, 263, 412
Berri, Charles, Duke of (later of Guienne), 72, 81, 83
Biscay, Province of, 100, 101, 112, 117
Blanche of Navarre, 26
Blanche, dau. of John II. of Aragon, 27, 28, 43, 44
Boabdil, 172, 181, et seq.; 198, 203, et seq.; 208, 221–223, 227, et seq.
Bobadilla, Beatriz de (Marchioness of Moya), 62, 74, 84, 85, 212, 213,
298
Bobadilla, Francisco de, 314
Borgia, Cæsar, 364. (See also Alexander VI.)
Burgos, 54, 55, 60, 103, 106;
Bishop of, 72, 74
C
Cabrera, Andres de (later Marquis of Moya), 83, 86, 112, 114, 298
Cadiz, Marquis of, 136, 139, 140, 165 et seq.; 175, 177, 180, 183, 200,
201, 209, 212, 216
Cancionero General, 410
Carcel de Amor, 415
Cardenas, Alonso de, 153, 176;
Gutierre de, 88, 217, 229
Carrillo, Archbishop, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 68, 76, 78, 79, 80, 85, 89,
90, 94, 96, 100, 105, 108, 109, 111, 232, 239, 240
Castillo, Enriquez del, 87, 411
Catherine of Aragon, 334, 372, 374
Celestina, 416
Charles of Austria, son of Archduke Philip, 378, 384, 390, 396, 408
Charles, The Bold, 116, 117
Charles VIII. of France, 186, 340, 347, 348, 351, et seq.; 363
Charles of Viana, 26, 36, et seq.
Church, Castilian, 13, et seq.; 104, 231, et seq.; 249, 250
Cid Haya, 216, 220, 223
Cifuentes, Count of, 177, 180
Cisneros, Ximenes de, 242, et seq.; 273, et seq.; 402, 403
Claude, dau. of Louis XII., 378
Columbus, Bartholomew, 289, 315
Columbus, Christopher, early life, 286;
nautical theories, 291;
appears at Spanish Court, 295;
character, 294, 298, 300, 302, 314;
appearance, 295;
prepares to leave Spain, 299;
first voyage, 303, 305;
reception at Barcelona, 305;
second voyage, 307;
views on slavery, 310;
third voyage, 314;
arrest, 315;
fourth voyage, 316;
devotion to Queen Isabel, 298, 313, 317;
death, 317
Columbus, Diego, 294, 299, 317
Commines, Philip de, 48
Conversos, The, 251, 252, 253
Coplas de Manrique, 408
Coplas de Mingo Revulgo, 417
Cordova, Gonsalvo de, 189, 206, 280, 361, 367, 371
Cortes, the Castilian, 18
Cota, Rodrigo, 417
Cueva, Beltran de La (Count of Ledesma, Duke of Alburquerque), 32,
33, 45, 48, 51, 52, 54, 57, 62, 64, 89, 151
D
D’Aubigny, Stuart, 361
Davila, Juan Arias, 261
De Puebla, 374
Diaz, Bartholomew, 289
E
Edict of Grace, 255
Egypt, Sultan of, 219, 278
Eleanor, dau. of John II. of Aragon, 43, 44, 359
Emmanuel of Portugal, 273, 338, 343, 372
Enriquez, Fadrique, Admiral of Castile, 36, 58, 59, 60, 74
Enzina, Juan del, 417, 418
Escalas, Conde de, 205, 206, 207
Española, 305, 309, 313, 314, 316
Estella, 49, 51
Estepar, El Feri Ben, 281, 282
F
Fadrique (the younger), 155
Federigo of Naples, 355, 364, 370
Ferdinand of Aragon (The Catholic) character, 2, 69, 174, 210, 324,
325, 330, 332, 370, 371, 387, 391;
appearance, 89;
diplomacy, 346, 352, 358, 359, 364, 372, 375;
birth, 26;
becomes heir to throne of Aragon, 40;
alliance with Isabel, 35, 69, 77, et seq.;
meeting with Isabel, 208;
reconciliation with Henry IV., 86;
becomes King of Aragon, 118;
attempted assassination of, 328;
military measures, 102, 103, 166, et seq.; 112, 168, 175, 191, 196,
201, 216, 219, 280, 379;
attitude to Jews, 264, 265, 271;
to Mudejares, 283;
to the Inquisition, 249, 255, 258;
to Roman See, 235, 239, 254;
to his children, 335;
to Columbus, 296, 297, 313;
foreign policy of, 335;
receives submission of Boabdil, 229;
second marriage, 388;
regent of Castile, 390;
estimate of his work, 422
Ferdinand, son of Archduke Philip, 379
Ferrante I. of Naples, 36, 349, 350, 353, 356
Ferrante II., 354, 356, 361, 364, 369
Fez, King of, 221, 229
Florence, 349, 350, 353
Foix, Catherine de, 339
Foix, Gaston de, 43, 75
Foix, Gaston de (the younger), 43
Foix, Germaine de, 388, 390
Fonseca, Alonso de, 30, 240
Fornovo, battle of, 361
Francis Phœbus of Navarre, 111, 339
Fuenterrabia, meeting of, 48
G
Galicia, settlement of, 133
Galindo, Beatriz de, 332, 407
Genoa, 25
Geraldino, Alessandro, 299, 333
Giron, Pedro, Master of Calatrava, 36, 60, 62, 63
Granada, City of, 215, 224, 227, et seq.;
Kingdom of, 160, 188;
partition Treaty of, 365, 366
Guadix, 173, 206, 216, 220, 221, 223, 224, 280
Guejar, 280
Guiomar, Doña, 31, 233
Guipuzcoa, 100, 106, 112, 117
Guzman, Ramir Nuñez de, 155, 156
H
Hamet, “El Zegri,” 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 210, 211, 213, 214
Haro, Count of, 101, 129
Henry IV. of Castile (Prince of Asturias), 23, 27, 28;
(King), 24, 36, 39, 44, 54, 55, 56, 70, 71, 80, et seq.; 158, 160, 253
Henry VII. of England, 373
Henry, “The Navigator,” of Portugal, 289
I
Inquisition in Castile, 249, 253–261
Isabel of Castile, character, 1, 4, 5, 131, 233, 319, 324, 327, 328, 336;
love of her Faith, 325;
attitude to her confessors, 241, 242, 243, 326, 327, 329;
love of learning, 332, 333, 400 et seq.;
devotion to Ferdinand, 329;
her magnificence, 321, 323, 399;
her justice, 130, 135, 136, et seq.; 155;
birth, 22;
childhood, 34, 46, 52, 67;
suggested alliances, 35, 39, 53, 62, 68, 70, 72, 73;
marriage with Ferdinand, 69, 74, 76, 77, et seq.;
joins her brother Alfonso, 65;
reconciliation with Henry IV., 84, 85, 86;
accession, 88, 91, 92;
appeals to Archbishop Carrillo, 100;
celebrates battle of Toro, 109;
quells riot in Segovia, 112, et seq.;
visits Seville, 115, 136;
disputes with Ferdinand, 186;
legislation and reforms of, 147, 150, 153, 392, et seq.;
military measures of, 106, 168, 187, et seq.; 192, 194, et seq.; 218;
visits camps, 207, 211, 226;
entry into Granada, 230;
attitude to the Castilian Church, 234, 235, 236, 247, 248;
to the Inquisition, 249, 254, 255, 258;
to the Jews, 264, 265, 271;
to the Mudejares, 273, 279, 280, 284;
to the Roman See, 235–239, 254;
to Columbus, 285, 295, 297, 298, 303, 315;
to slavery, 312–313;
to her children, 331, 334, 377, 380, 381;
her will, 383;
her death, 384;
survey of her reign, 421.
Isabel, mother of Isabel of Castile, 33, 34
Isabel, dau. of Isabel of Castile, 82, 207, 223, 337, 338, 343, 344, 345
Isabella, the city, 313
Ismail, Sultan, 162
J
James IV. of Scotland, 374, 375
Jews, 6, 250, 252, 263, et seq.
Joanna, “La Beltraneja,” 45, 46, 81–83, 93, 94, 99, 119, 120, 336
Joanna of Portugal, wife of Henry IV., 30, 31, 32, 33, 44, 45, 52
Joanna of Aragon, dau. of Isabel of Castile, 334, 341, 342, 375, et
seq.; 390
Joanna (Queen of Aragon), 26, 27, 40, 41, 42, 75
John II. of Aragon, 24, 25, 26, 28, 36, 40, 101, 364
John II. of Castile, 22, 23, 27
John II. of Portugal, 107, 108, 118, 289, 292, 307, 338
John, son of Ferdinand and Isabel, 115, 216, 223, 331, 332, 339, 344
L
Lebrija, Antonio de, 406
Lerin, Count of, 280
Lisbon, Treaty of, 118, 336
Literature, Castilian, 407, et seq.
Loja, 175, 176, 201, 205
Lopera, battle of, 200
Louis XI. of France, 42, 43, 47, et seq.; 81, 100, 106, 110, 115, 116, 117,
118, 186, 339, 346, 347
Louis XII. of France (Duke of Orleans), 355, 357;
(King), 363, 365, 388, 389
Lucena, 181
Ludovico, “Il Moro,” 348, et seq.; 364
M
Machado, Roger, 321, 323, 373
Madeleine, sister of Louis XI., 43, 339
Madrigal, Cortes of, 124
Malaga, 173, 204, 208, 209, et seq.
Margaret of Austria, 340–344
Maria, dau. of Ferdinand and Isabel, 338, 372
Marineo, Lucio, 405
Marriage-settlement of Ferdinand and Isabel, 79
Martyr, Peter, 195, 219, 385, 404–405
Mary of Burgundy, 83, 117
Maximilian, King of the Romans, 340, 358
Medina-Celi, Duke of, 295
Medina del Campo, Concord of, 56, 253;
Junta of, 57
Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 136, 140, 168, 189, 190
Mendoza, family of, 52, 76, 82, 84, 89;
Diego Hurtado de, 246;
Pedro Gonsalez de (Bishop of Calahorra), 62;
(Bishop of Siguenza), 67;
(Cardinal of Spain), 84, 89, 90, 108, 150, 154, 187, 229, 232, 233,
234, 240, 243, 244, 255, 299, 404
Merlo, Diego de, 165, 169
Miguel, grandson of Ferdinand, 345
Military Orders, 10, et seq., 152, 154
Moclin, 207

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The Handbook of European Defence

Policies and Armed Forces Hugo Meijer

The Handbook of European Defence Policies and

Print publication date: 2018

(p.iii) The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces

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(p.v) To Ingrid, Laura André, Bert (p.vi)

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(p.vii) Foreword: National Defence at a Time

STUDENTS of international affairs have a tendency to believe that they are

as toxic as ever or that nationalism could also replace socialism as a ruling

obligations. Despite the rhetoric, so far mainstream policies have been

August 2017 (p.xii)

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(p.xvii) List of Figures

40.3 Collaborative defence equipment procurement expenditure per

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(p.xix) List of Tables

2.1 Foreign deployments of German armed forces, 1990–2015 59

44.5 Sample of cyber-defence and cyber-surveillance solutions providers

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(p.xxi) Notes on Contributors

Studies, ETH Zurich. He gained his Ph.D. from the Universities of

(p.xxii) 2. Chapter Authors

Defence Monitoring’ Research Project for the European Defence

Elisabeth Vallet (ed.), Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity

Agency, and an Assistant Lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam.

Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and

power, the global diffusion of military doctrines, and soldier

teaching is on strategic concepts of major powers and international

European and general comparative politics, and American foreign

Statecraft’ in International Security, ‘The Virtual Weapon: Dilemmas

Research Methods in Military Studies (Routledge, 2014), and ‘UAV for

(Routledge, 2015), and The New Geopolitics of Terror: Demons &

Security System (Routledge, 2008), and his articles have appeared in

is Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International

Andrew Mumford, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare

2012), co-author (with Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff) of Transforming

as well as Russia’s conventional armed forces developments. Prior to

is Professor of International Politics and Head of Government and