Democracy after Virtue: Toward

Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

Sungmoon Kim
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Democracy after Virtue
ii

Studies in Comparative Political Theory

Series editor: Diego A. von Vacano,Texas A&M University

Consulting editors: Andrew March, Harvard University,

and Loubna El Amine, Northwestern University

Democracy after Virtue: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

Sungmoon Kim
Democr acy
after Virtue
Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

Sungmoon Kim

1
iv

1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Kim, Sungmoon, author.
Title: Democracy after virtue : toward pragmatic Confucian democracy / Sungmoon Kim.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2018] |
Series: Studies in comparative political theory |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017046496 (print) | LCCN 2017060211 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190671242 (Updf) | ISBN 9780190671259 (Epub) |
ISBN 9780190671235 (hardcover : acid-free paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Democracy—Philosophy. | Democracy—Religious
aspects—Confucianism. | Democracy—East Asia. | Confucianism—Political aspects. |
East Asia—Politics and government.
Classification: LCC JC423 (ebook) | LCC JC423 .K4727 2018 (print) | DDC 321.8—dc23
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In memory of
Benjamin R. Barber (1939–​2017)
vi
CONTENTS

Preface  ix

Introduction: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy   1

PART I: Democracy
1. Political Participation   23
2. Value of Democracy   50
3. Procedure and Substance   79

PART II: Justice

4. State Coercion and Criminal Punishment   111
5. Sufficiency and Equality   136
6. Humanitarian Intervention   165

Conclusion: The Future of Confucian Political Theory—​A Methodological

Suggestion  189

Notes  197
Bibliography  235
Index  247
vi
P R E FA C E

After the publication of my first book Confucian Democracy in East

Asia: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2014), I received two
sets of comments from my critics. On the one hand, my fellow Confucian
political theorists—​scholars philosophically inspired by the (mainly pre-​
Qin) Confucian classics—​raised questions regarding the Confucian creden-
tial of my idea of Confucian democracy, wondering if the Confucianism in
my theory is not playing merely an auxiliary role, like a “cheerleader,” for
otherwise liberal democratic constitutional structures. The most frequent
question I received was how distinctively “Confucian” my Confucian dem-
ocratic theory is. My second book Public Reason Confucianism: Democratic
Perfectionism and Constitutionalism in East Asia (Cambridge University
Press, 2016) was motivated to offer a rejoinder to this pressing question
by articulating my normative vision of democratic Confucianism in a way
that is not only philosophically appealing but also socially relevant in con-
temporary East Asia. I presented this vision in terms of public reason
Confucianism, a particular style of democratic perfectionism in which (par-
tially) comprehensive Confucianism is connected with perfectionism via a
distinctive form of public reason that is permeated by, among other things,
Confucian moral sentiments.
On the other hand, my democratic critics, who are largely unfamiliar
with Confucianism, raised a question of a different nature. While noting
significant differences between my Confucian democratic theory and main-
stream liberal democratic theory (thus acknowledging the distinctively
Confucian nature of my theory), these scholars pressed me, as a demo-
cratic theorist working in the East Asian Confucian context, to clarify
whether there is any generic mode of democracy in my idea of Confucian
democracy, be it Schumpeterian minimal democracy, Habermasian delib-
erative democracy, Rousseauian populist democracy, or Lockean constitu-
tional democracy. This book aims to answer this question by presenting
pragmatic democracy (roughly in the Deweyan sense) as a conception of
x

democracy that best describes the nature of Confucian democracy offered

here. In offering pragmatic Confucian democracy as my normative concep-
tion of Confucian democracy and, as shall be shown, further exploring its
implications for criminal, distributive, and international justice, my hope
is to place Confucian democratic theory on firmer normative ground, thus
without suffering internal incoherence, philosophical laxness, or practical
irrelevance. Readers who have read my earlier books will also find this book
fully engaging in several important normative questions that were previ-
ously left either untouched or insufficiently treated.
In writing this book, I have incurred numerous debts. As was the
case with my earlier works, I benefited immensely from intermittent
daily conversations with my colleagues at the Center for East Asian
and Comparative Philosophy and the Department of Public Policy
of City University of Hong Kong. They include P. J. Ivanhoe, Ruiping
Fan, Eirik Harris, Hsin-​wen Lee, Youngsun Back, Lawrence Yung, Shea
Robinson, Daniel Stephens, and Ellen Yan. Some colleagues in neigh-
boring universities of Hong Kong made themselves available for con-
versation, and I am especially grateful to Joseph Chan, Jiwei Ci, and
Yong Huang, for their open-​mindedness and generosity. Jung In Kang
at Sogang University in South Korea invited me twice to hold special
seminars on Confucian political theory both for faculty and especially
for graduate students in the Department of Political Science, and I am
grateful to him and those who attended my seminars, especially for
helping me to think more deeply on the justifiability of Confucian de-
mocracy to non-​Confucians. Brooke Ackerly kindly invited me to present
an earlier version of Chapter 1 at Vanderbilt University’s social and polit-
ical thought workshop, and I would like to thank her and her colleagues
and students including Emily Nacol and Kristin Michelitch for raising
several important questions and making suggestions. A slightly different
version of the same chapter was also presented in the mini-​workshop or-
ganized at City University of Hong Kong on “Confucianism and political
participation” as well as in the international conference on “Equality,
Freedom, and Governance in the Making of Modern Democracy and
Market Economy” organized by the Institute for Advanced Studies in
Humanities and Social Sciences at National Taiwan University, and
I am grateful to Rogers Smith, Joseph Chan, P. J. Ivanhoe, Chun-​chieh
Huang, Kiril Thompson, Alan Wood, John Tucker, and Alan Patten
for their written or oral comments on my paper and Confucian polit-
ical theory in general. An earlier version of Chapter 2 was presented at
Harvard University’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, where I spent a

[x] Preface
sabbatical year (2016–​2017) as a Berggruen fellow and completed signif-
icant portions of this book, and I am grateful to both Melissa Williams
and LaGina Gause, who formally discussed my paper, and those who
participated in the seminar including, among others, Jenny Mansbridge,
Meira Levinson, Tomer Perry, Tongdong Bai, Mathias Risse, and Danielle
Allen. I deeply appreciate many useful suggestions and construc-
tive criticisms offered by them. Chapter 4 was presented at the Neo-​
Confucianism seminar at Columbia University, and I am grateful to Tao
Jiang, Ari Borrel, Yung Kun Kim, and Zach Berge-​Becker for their invita-
tion and helpful comments. Versions of Chapter 6 have been presented
at various institutions or academic venues such as University of
Pennsylvania’s Department of Political Science, University of Toronto’s
Department of Political Science, the Berggruen inaugural workshop at
the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, an international conference on
“Democracy in Global Politics” held in Academia Sinica, and an interna-
tional conference on “Political Theory in the East Asian Context” held
at City University of Hong Kong. I am grateful to Rogers Smith, Anne
Norton, Jeffrey Green, Loren Goldman, Juman Kim, Ronald Beiner,
Joseph Carens, Ryan Balot, Ruth Marshall, Chia-​Ming Chen, Jung In
Kang, Brook Ackerly, Mathias Risse, Hui Wang, and Anna Sun, for their
helpful comments and suggestions. The general philosophical framework
and core claims of this book were also presented at the Berggruen fellow
workshop at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences of
Stanford University and Fordham University’s social and political philos-
ophy workshop. I thank Owen Flanagan, Chaihark Hahm, Robin Wang,
Fenrong Liu, Jonathan Jansen, Johan van Benthem, Wenqing Zhao, Jeff
Flynn, Nick Tampio, and Sam Haddad for their valuable comments and
hospitality.
I am also grateful to many others who have read or discussed various
parts of the manuscript and offered valuable comments, suggestions, or
observations. These include Steve Angle, Eric Beerbohm, Daniel Bell, Elton
Chan, Thomas Christiano, Joyce Dehli, Lisa Ellis, Archon Fung, Wenkai He,
Nien-​he Hsieh, Jimmy Hsu, David Kim, Richard Kim, Tae Wan Kim, Franz
Mang, Frank Michelman, Sam Moyn, Andrew Nathan, Shaun O’Dwyer, Henry
Richardson, Susan Shim, and Stephen Soldz. Special thanks go to Jenny
Mansbridge and Melissa Williams (though mentioned earlier) who never
grew tired of discussing my ideas and specific arguments during my stay at
Harvard. I deeply appreciate their comments and suggestions. My gratitude
also goes to Diego von Vacano, the editor of Oxford Studies in Comparative
Political Theory, and Angela Chnapko, my editor at Oxford University Press.

Preface [ xi ]
xi

As noted, several chapters of this book were completed during my

fellowship year at Harvard University’s Edmond J. Safra Center for
Ethics, and I am grateful for a viable intellectual environment that Safra
provided in which I could fully immerse myself in reading and writing.
I am also grateful to the Berggruen Institute for financial support. City
University of Hong Kong does not have a year-​long leave policy, but
I was able to take the Berggruen fellowship and spent nearly a year at
Harvard thanks to the provost’s special approval. I am deeply grateful
to the provost, the dean of College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences,
and the head of the Department of Public Policy for approving this
special arrangement. Lastly, I acknowledge that in writing this book,
I was partly supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea
Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-​2017S1A3A2065772).
Slightly different versions of Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 were previously
published in the journals under different titles: “Pragmatic Confucian
Democracy: Rethinking the Value of Democracy in East Asia,” Journal
of Politics 79:1 (2017), pp. 237–​ 249 and “Confucian Humanitarian
Intervention? Toward Democratic Theory,” Review of Politics 79:2 (2017),
pp. 187–​213. I am grateful to the University of Chicago Press and the
University of Notre Dame (via Cambridge University Press) for permis-
sion to reproduce these essays.
On April 25, 2017, I was notified that Benjamin R. Barber, one of the
most vigorous champions of strong democracy of our time and my former
teacher, mentor, and friend, had passed away a day before, after a four-​
month battle with cancer. I am deeply saddened by Ben’s sudden death. It
was Ben who introduced me to democratic theory, and it is upon his en-
dorsement and encouragement that I found my first job at the University
of Richmond and later decided to move to Hong Kong. I even worked as
his research associate at Demos, a New York-​based liberal think tank, for
about ten months during the hiatus between my PhD defense and moving
to Richmond, working on what we called “the paradigm paper” on global
democracy and interdependence, which became the groundwork for his
book If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities (Yale
University Press, 2013). Ben’s death was shocking news for me especially
because I had just visited him in early December 2016 at his new office in
Fordham University—​which, as it turned out, was only several days be-
fore his diagnosis of cancer—​and, as always, we had jovial conversations
on many issues: my life in Cambridge, his upcoming book (now published
by Yale University Press as Cool Cities: Urban Sovereignty and the Fix
for Global Warming), the Trump presidency, and Global Parliament of
Mayors, which was his last fascination. During that meeting we agreed to

[ xii ] Preface
spend several days together at his summer house when my family joined
me from Hong Kong the following June. And now, June has come and
my family is about to depart from Hong Kong but, alas, Ben is no longer
here. Though Ben is gone, I am sure that his passion for democracy, civic
education, and global interdependence will always remain with us. I am
proud of having had Ben Barber as my teacher and friend who helped me
to grow as his fellow democrat. I dedicate this book to him with love and
deep gratitude.

Preface [ xiii ]
xvi
Democracy after Virtue
xvi
Introduction
Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

IN SEARCH OF NORMATIVE CONFUCIAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

In the past two decades contemporary Confucian political theory has been
propelled by the dialectical conversation between Confucianism and de-
mocracy—​Confucian values, ethics, and social practices on one side and
democratic ideals, principles, and institutions on the other. The result has
been a vigorous search for “Confucian democracy” as a form of democracy
best suitable for East Asia’s Confucian societal context and a cultural al-
ternative to Western-​style liberal democracy.1 Even those who assert that
Confucian democracy should not only be a cultural alternative to liberal
democracy but, more crucially, its formidable political rival, thus framing
their normative position in terms of “(Confucian) political meritocracy,”
never completely dismiss the (albeit limited) value of democracy. Often
they incorporate certain democratic institutional components (election
in particular) into their otherwise meritocratic political system and justify
the hybrid system in terms of, as Daniel Bell aptly calls it, “democratic mer-
itocracy.”2 Despite recent meritocratic challenges to democracy by some
Confucian theorists (whom I call Confucian meritocrats in this book), which
sometimes go beyond not just liberal democracy but democracy in toto,3
contemporary Confucian political theory largely revolves around democ-
racy, more specifically what kind or how much of democracy is desirable
in East Asian countries of Confucian heritage. Arguably, the main thrust
of contemporary Confucian political theory has been democratic theory
broadly construed.4
2

What is worth noting is that Confucian political theory has recently

bifurcated into two competing political positions—​one embracing dem-
ocratic principles such as popular sovereignty, political equality, and the
right to political participation as constitutive of its normative theory, and
the other attempting to decouple selectively chosen democratic institutions
and practices from democracy’s underlying moral principles. In addition
to their contrasting attitudes to core democratic principles, it is also their
differing orientations in theory building—​moral perfectionism versus in-
stitutional reform—​that characterize this bifurcation, although the latter
contrast has not always been clear-​cut. It is hard to deny that the emer-
gence of these two competing normative positions has not only signifi-
cantly reshaped the contemporary landscape of Confucian political theory,
with all of its methodological differences and substantive disagreements,
but it has enriched contemporary political theory in general by adding
comparative perspectives.5
The mushrooming of new visions and ideas in Confucian democratic
theory, however, did not come without cost. For one, the absence of a
shared point of reference in developing Confucian democratic theory
(encompassing its democratic-​meritocratic critiques) has made it ex-
tremely difficult to understand the precise points of disagreement be-
tween Confucian democrats and Confucian meritocrats, or whether the
disagreement is merely a political one or is also of philosophical sig-
nificance. Confucian democrats, generally inspired by John Dewey as
much as by Confucius, stress the importance of the good community in
which individual and society are in a harmonious relationship, the latter
growing symbiotically with the former, immersed in a ceaseless process
of moral self-​cultivation, of which political participation, in their view,
is an important part.6 This communitarian account of Confucian democ-
racy, however, says nearly nothing about the institutional structure of
democracy. Moreover, centrally concerned with the intimate connection
between ritual/​ role practice and moral empowerment, Confucian
democrats do not pay sufficient attention to social equality or common
citizenship, the gist of which lies in objection to all sorts of social dis-
crimination or political domination based on gender, race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, or economic class.7
Equally reticent about social equality, and actively opposing political
equality expressed through the one person one vote principle, Confucian
meritocrats in principle have no objection to the communitarian proj­
ect suggested by Confucian democrats. Not only do most Confucian
meritocrats enthusiastically support building of harmonious local
communities, but they, at least some of them, also value rituals’ potential

[2] Introduction
contribution to both the constructing of social identity and the allevia-
tion of economic inequality that threatens social harmony.8 Furthermore,
Confucian meritocrats are increasingly persuaded that full democratic
participation may be acceptable in the context of local politics. In short,
the Confucian meritocratic critique of democracy is generally concen-
trated on democratic authority exercised in the central government and
on a national level as it works through what they deem to be the universal
and mechanical implementation of popular sovereignty by means of one
person one vote.9
Then, what exactly is the disagreement? One problem with Confucian
democrats is that it is far from clear whether the community they have in
mind refers to a local community in rural areas, where some Confucian-​
style rituals have survived, or whether it extends to an entire political
community with a moral requirement that the polity’s constitutional-​
political structure be completely reconstructed into a democracy, which
in turn calls for a transformation of the polity’s public culture into a
democratic civic culture. In the former case, Confucian democrats’ core
argument is perfectly compatible with that of Confucian meritocrats,
whereas in the latter their lack of interest in democracy as a political
system, on top of a communitarian way of life, is hardly justified. Equally
unclear is the Confucian democrats’ attitude toward political meritoc-
racy, especially in its relation to democracy, which they advocate whole-
heartedly, as they sometimes seem inclined toward rule by virtuous
people without illuminating how such an inclination, if not an active
espousal, can cohere with their underlying commitment to democratic
equality.10
Confucian meritocracy, too, is exposed to similar challenges insomuch
as it presents itself in terms of democratic meritocracy. On what moral
ground can election, operating on the one person one vote mechanism, be
taken apart from its underlying moral principles such as political equality
and popular sovereignty? How can one justify meritocratic institutional
apparatuses such as the nondemocratically selected upper house in the leg-
islature while simultaneously valorizing the good effects commonly asso-
ciated with democratic institutions such as transparency, accountability,
and reciprocity? And, most importantly, can a new mode of public life and
its associated social norms, which follow from the institutionalization of
even partially democratic decision-​making processes and related social
practices, be compatible with political meritocracy? Put differently, is it
possible for democracy and meritocracy to be mixed in a philosophically
non-​arbitrary manner so that Confucian meritocracy can enjoy the merits
of both democracy and meritocracy?

Introduction [3]
4

That being said, one important reason that a productive conversation

between Confucian democrats and Confucian meritocrats toward theory
building is frequently baffled, and both parties are often driven to the infe-
licitous state of cross-​purposes, has to do strongly with their widely different
understandings (and in some cases, their less than principled usage) of the
term democracy. As I elaborate later in this book (Chapter 2 more precisely),
while Confucian democrats understand democracy almost exclusively as a
way of life and tend to identify it in terms of what Dewey calls the “Great
Community,” Confucian meritocrats hold to a minimal and overtly institu-
tional definition of democracy with glaring focus on election, hence without
any salient interest in the mode of public life or that of citizenship. Neither
camp, however, has paid (due) attention to the normative dimension of de-
mocracy understood as collective self-​government by free and equal citizens, as
well as the questions that this capacious normative definition of democracy
naturally entails: What does collective self-​government mean? Why does
it matter? Under what circumstances does it matter more, both practically
and normatively? How can collective self-​government be (more) effective
and (more) legitimate? What does “citizens being free and equal” mean,
especially in the Confucian societal context? These questions can hardly
be answered intelligently unless, first, democracy’s two dimensions—​as a
way of life and as a political system—​are analytically distinguished, then
reintegrated coherently into a single conception of democracy.
This book attempts to address, though not resolve, these critical nor-
mative and philosophical challenges for Confucian democratic theory by
constructing an overarching theoretical framework—​what I call pragmatic
Confucian democracy—​that can enable us to identify a deeper normative
ground of disagreement between Confucian democrats and Confucian
meritocrats, which undergirds their practical disagreement with regard
to institutional design and political leadership. By “an overarching frame-
work” I mean a comprehensive philosophical account of Confucian democ-
racy that (1) identifies the social circumstances that require a democracy
as a political system in a Confucian society in the first place, (2) explains
the internal connection between two dimensions of democracy that are
commonly presented in political science as being at odds with one an-
other, (3) makes sense of the value of democracy with reference to its two
dimensions, (4) illuminates the theoretical connection between democratic
procedures and the outcomes they produce, and (5) articulates distinc-
tively Confucian-​democratic principles of justice in criminal punishment,
economic distribution, and international relations (humanitarian inter-
vention in particular) from a pragmatic standpoint.

[4] Introduction
 In proposing pragmatic Confucian democracy as a new point of ref-
erence in Confucian democratic theory, I have no presumption that its
approach and substantive arguments are neutral, especially vis-​ à-​
vis
Confucian meritocratic theory, as it is clearly predisposed to advance-
ment of a more robust democratic theory of Confucian democracy than
the existing proposals. In fact, as far as its specific contents are concerned,
pragmatic Confucian democracy may be found quite controversial even
among Confucian communitarian democrats similarly inspired by Dewey.
Nevertheless, I believe that the merit of constructing a comprehensive
normative framework that is thoroughly democratic and develops and
integrates within it democratic accounts of criminal, distributive, and in-
ternational justice, outweighs whatever problems that might be associ-
ated with this approach.11
On the one hand, when recast from the normative questions en-
gaged by pragmatic Confucian democracy, such as democracy’s intrinsic
and instrumental values and democratic procedures and their substan-
tive outcomes, Confucian meritocratic theory can be understood not
so much as the direct opponent of democracy—​a problematic view,
given its qualified democratic dimension—​but as a kind of democratic
theory that takes a distinctive normative stance with regard to (1) the
(instrumental or intrinsic) value of democracy, (2) the (instrumental or
non-​instrumental) relationship between democratic procedure and its
outcomes, and (3) the (individualistic or social) conception of desert
or merit in relation to criminal and distributive justice. In this way, we
can come to better grips with what kind of democratic theory Confucian
meritocracy is as a democratic meritocracy, whether this concept as em-
ployed by Confucian meritocrats is philosophically meaningful (or pre-
cisely in what respect it is undemocratic), and whether its democratic
and nondemocratic components are connected in a philosophically plau-
sible and normatively compelling manner.
Confucian democratic theory, on the other hand, would be given a
firmer normative ground not only for its controversial (from the traditional
Confucian perspective) embracing of key democratic principles such as
popular sovereignty, political equality, and the right to political participa-
tion, but also for its endorsement of the substantively democratic concep-
tion of justice. As will be demonstrated in this book, pragmatic Confucian
democracy offers not merely a cultural and communitarian alternative to
liberal rights-​based democracy but a morally attractive model of democracy
under the circumstances of modern politics marked by value disagreement
and moral conflict.

Introduction [5]
6

PRAGMATIC CONFUCIAN DEMOCRACY

Then, what is pragmatic democracy, of which pragmatic Confucian democ-

racy is a particular cultural instantiation? Throughout this book I define
pragmatic democracy as a mode of democracy whose political institutions
and social practices, which together make democracy a way of life, are justified
on pragmatic grounds under the circumstances of modern politics. Pragmatic
Confucian democracy is a pragmatic democracy suited for a pluralist society
whose civic culture remains characteristically Confucian. Since pragmatic
Confucian democracy has both institutional and cultural components,
however, its pragmatic justification has two dimensions accordingly.
First, so far as its institutional structures are concerned, which consti-
tute democracy as a distinct political system, pragmatic Confucian democ-
racy is justified on moderately consequentialist grounds, that is, on the
grounds of good consequences that democratic political institutions bring
about. Here “good consequences” do not mean the good life or specific
moral or cultural goods typically associated with Confucianism. Rather,
they refer to political goods such as legitimacy and order acquired through
an effective and sustained coordination of complex social, economic, and
political interactions among citizens who have profound moral and eco-
nomic disagreement among themselves. Being most effective in authorita-
tively coordinating social interactions under the circumstances of modern
politics among existing sociopolitical arrangements, democracy holds, be-
fore anything else, an instrumental value for citizens who are publicly
governed by its institutions. In this book, following Jack Knight and James
Johnson, I call this instrumental value of democracy that works through
its institutions democracy’s second-​order value.12 I will offer more clarity on
the nature of democracy’s second-​order value later.
The second component of pragmatic Confucian democracy is con-
cerned with various sorts of social practices that express an equal social
relationship among citizens and enable collective self-​determination on
equal terms. Together with democracy’s formal political institutions, such
social practices make democracy a distinct way of life. However, there is
no fantasy route to a democratic way of life, which according to political
scientists requires not only constitutional but, more critically, behavioral
and attitudinal changes13 to be wholeheartedly embraced and cherished
by the people upon democratic transition, whose social life is still soaked
in Confucian culture despite their strong desire for a new political life.
A series of tensions arise inevitably between democratic practices, which
would render citizens’ participation in formal democratic institutions so-
cially meaningful, and the existing cultural way of life that is replete with

[6] Introduction
undemocratic elements including, most notably, gender inequality. In the
absence of a long process of cultural communication between democratic
and Confucian social practices that facilitates their mutual accommoda-
tion, thereby transforming the otherwise abstract ideal of democracy into
a Confucian democracy, democracy can hardly become the citizens’ way
of life in the genuine sense, and so-​called democratic practices in which
they routinely engage can never be made intelligent to them. Such a pro-
cess of mutual accommodation in civil society is pragmatic in nature be-
cause it is subject to numerous sorts of social experiments and multiple
rounds of public deliberation under no antecedent rule or pre-​politically
given authority that would dictate its mode or direction. For Confucian
democratic citizens, the incongruence between formal democratic political
institutions, introduced chiefly on pragmatic-​consequentialist grounds,
and ongoing social practices that still define the character of their social life,
is a problem, which should be solved provisionally or pragmatically at each
stage of their public life through “social inquiry” informed by Confucian
public reasoning.14 When thusly made intelligent to citizens, democracy
then becomes intrinsically valuable to them.
Thus understood, one of the most important philosophical aims of this
book is to investigate how these two kinds of pragmatic justifications that
simultaneously endorse democracy’s instrumental and intrinsic values can
be coherently integrated within a single normative political theory. Part
I is generally devoted to this question. Here I offer a preliminary expla-
nation for three key background assumptions that underpin pragmatic
Confucian democracy. This will help illuminate the distinctive features of
pragmatic Confucian democracy as a political theory relative to the existing
proposals of Confucian democracy.15 Those background assumptions are
(1) circumstances of modern politics, (2) second-​order value of democracy,
and (3) democracy as a social experience.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF MODERN POLITICS IN EAST ASIA

Pre-​modern politics in both West and East are characterized by broad social
acceptance of the moral-​political authority over the matters concerning
people’s moral conduct and political decision making, be it God or Heaven
(tian 天), their human delegates, or traditions, rituals, and customs that
are believed to embody sacred authority. In pre-​modern politics where
politics is often inextricably intertwined with religion or morals, the re-
lationship between the ruler, whose mandate to rule is neither subject to
authorization by nor accountable to the people via any formal institutional

Introduction [7]
8

mechanisms, and the ruled, who are not politically organized as citizens
equipped with civil and political rights, is both epistemic and moral—​not
so different from the relationship between teacher and student.
In the Confucian world in particular, the ideal kings, called sage-​kings
(shengwang 聖王), were routinely envisaged as teachers (shi 師) who had
discovered the right Way (dao 道) toward which to educate the people
mainly by means of rituals (li 禮) and to bring them, otherwise stuck in
a boorish situation either because of their bad human nature (as Xunzi
claimed) or adverse external conditions (as Mencius contended), to
a refined civil culture (wen 文) in which they can live a materially suffi-
cient and morally flourishing life.16 Although religious persecution rarely
happened throughout East Asian history since the firm establishment of
Confucianism as the state ideology, and the ruling elites (the king and the
members of the royal house in particular) in otherwise Confucian East Asia
were occasionally drawn to more overtly religious traditions such as Daoism
and, especially, Buddhism, Confucian orthodoxy in state and society were
seldom challenged by such so-​called “popular religions.” For instance, when
Cheng-​Zhu Neo-​Confucianism had been permeated deep into every nook
and cranny of the Korean society by the late eighteenth-​century, both
as state ideology and intellectual orthodoxy,17 lingering Buddhist social
practices were strictly prohibited among the yangban elite class, although
social and religious practices associated with popular religions were implic-
itly condoned as long as they did not pose an eminent threat to Confucian-​
based moral order and sociopolitical harmony.18 Therefore, in pre-​modern
Confucian East Asia, value pluralism, which neither posits a hierarchy be-
tween values nor accepts a higher moral standard by which to harmonize
them,19 was never acknowledged as the basic social condition to which po-
litical authority ought to be adapted.20 Not surprisingly, moral conflict, the
natural accompaniment of value pluralism, was also never taken seriously
by the ruling elites as something for them to have to address in order to
make sure political power and authority was justified to the ruled.21 For
them, any presence of moral conflict only signified their failure to rule
according to the Way, which would naturally achieve social harmony, and
thus their failure to rule authoritatively.22 As singularly committed to one
right Way, Confucians valued only one particular conception of the good
life—​a life toward Confucian sagehood—​that is incommensurable with
other conceptions of the good life, and this ethical monism was strongly
vindicated by a specific mode of politics that the Confucians pursued,
namely, “virtue politics” (dezhi 德治).23
Virtue politics, as classical Confucians understood it, is propelled by the
ruler’s moral virtue, while aiming at the people’s moral cultivation. What

[8] Introduction
is central to virtue politics is its monistic nature and structure: not only
are all the targeted virtues such as benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi
義), ritual propriety (li 禮), and the ability to tell right from wrong (zhi
智) understood to be essential to realization of Confucian sagehood,24
but in principle there is no qualitative difference between the virtues
with which the ruler pulls the people toward the gambit of his “benevo-
lent government” (ren zheng 仁政) and the virtues at which the people are
to arrive through the process of moral cultivation.25 This latter aspect of
Confucian virtue monism makes it possible that ordinary people, if mor-
ally cultivated, can participate in government by transforming themselves
from passive to active subjects. In fact, all three ancient Confucian mas-
ters (Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) were unswervingly convinced that
virtue is the most important criterion of merit by which to select public
officials and that there exists a morally noncontroversial way to distinguish
the virtuous from those who are not. All three Confucians agreed that
only if the king—​who has a Heaven-​bestowed mandate (tianming 天命) to
reign all under Heaven (tianxia 天下)—​is virtuous, hence called “the son
of Heaven” (tianzi 天子), can he then identify those who are best qualified
for public service (starting with the prime minister, who will then carry
out the actual selection of public officials)26 and establish political meri-
tocracy understood as, as Bell puts it, the rule in which “political power [is]
distributed in accordance with ability and virtue.”27 In the most profound
sense, the recent proposals for Confucian meritocracy are an attempt to re-
habilitate the traditional Confucian ideal of virtue politics in modern East
Asia by separating the vision of political meritocracy implied in Confucian
virtue politics from its underlying metaphysical and political-​theological
assumptions.28
However, the modern context in which a Confucian alternative to liberal
democracy is being pursued is dramatically different from that in which
traditional Confucian political perfectionism premised on virtue monism
was devised, then eventually prevailed. Today, very few East Asians believe
in Heaven as the bastion of human morality or its mandate as the ultimate
source of political authority and legitimacy, even when their social lives are
still significantly shaped by Confucian values, rituals, and social practices.29
Confucianism no longer enjoys the status as a dominant state ideology or
state religion, nor is it affiliated with one-​man monarchy, the visible car-
rier of the Mandate of Heaven and the institutional backbone of Confucian
virtue politics. With the collapse of the monistic moral-​political basis of
Confucianism, the moral and political hierarchy between Confucianism
and other religious and social values has also been completely dismantled,
rendering Confucianism as traditionally formulated and practiced to be just

Introduction [9]
01

one of many philosophical or moral comprehensive doctrines available

to individuals. And the same is true of traditional Confucian ritual-​based
role ethics that buttressed a deeply gendered social harmony.30 As modern
East Asia is increasingly characterized by value pluralism and moral con-
flict is becoming pervasive throughout its societies, thus giving rise to the
circumstances of modern East Asian politics,31 it has become virtually impos-
sible to support a political meritocracy of the kind undergirded by virtue
monism because the standard by which to identify merit or the merito-
rious has itself become the subject of moral contestation.
The virtual irrelevance of the traditional paradigm of Confucian political
perfectionism in modern East Asia has encouraged some recent Confucian
political theorists to search for a version of Confucian perfectionism that
is completely severed from comprehensive Confucianism, one that is com-
patible with various sorts of comprehensive doctrines.32 However, none of
these scholars have paid due attention to the impact of modernity on the
circumstances of politics, which, as I argue in this book, call for democracy
both as a political system and as a way of life. Largely preoccupied with
constructing modern Confucianism that can accommodate value pluralism,
human rights, and other progressive values, even those most philosophi-
cally innovative in Confucian political theory have yet to embark on a thor-
ough philosophical investigation on the implications of the circumstances
of modern politics in East Asia for a normative theory of Confucian democ-
racy. They tend to regard democracy as merely one of the components of
modern Confucianism that makes it progressive or moderate.33
Pragmatic Confucian democracy is not about Confucianism as such
that is best suited for modern East Asian society, even though in practice
Confucian democracy and democratic Confucianism are two sides of the
same coin.34 As a political theory, pragmatic Confucian democracy explores
a democracy under the circumstances of modern politics in East Asia with
special attention to Confucian civic culture that continues to shape citi-
zens’ shared way of life, notwithstanding their increasing subscriptions
to diverse values as private individuals and the society’s overall liberaliza-
tion. Therefore, it takes for granted a world in which a political theology of
Heaven, the political ideal of sage-​king, the moral metaphysics of virtue,
and traditional Confucian political perfectionism are all no longer in force
or plausible—​a world wherein people meet as equal citizens, values are
plural, and interests are diverse and often in conflict. Pragmatic Confucian
democracy aims to offer a political theory of democracy that is uncon-
strained by and goes beyond various philosophical stipulations affiliated
with traditional Confucian virtue monism—​hence the title of the book,
Democracy after Virtue.35

[ 10 ] Introduction
DEMOCRACY’S SECOND-​O RDER VALUE

Arguably, the most foundational question in normative democratic theory

revolves around the value of democracy or on what basis the value of de-
mocracy is justified. Surprisingly, though, this is one of the least probed
topics in Confucian democratic theory. The virtual absence of the philo-
sophical investigation of the value of democracy in Confucian democratic
theory is all the more surprising against the backdrop of the common per-
ception, widespread in East Asia, that democracy and Confucianism are
incompatible, or in light of the undeniable fact that democracy has never
been developed from Confucianism’s internal social self-​transformation in-
dependent of the encounter with the West. After all, it should be reminded,
Confucian democracy as a political theory and social discourse as we now
engage in is one of the by-​products of the global resurgence of democracy
after democratization’s third wave, originally prompted for political and
socioeconomic but hardly cultural reasons, to which I will return shortly.36
Since the question of the value of democracy will be thoroughly examined
in Chapter 2, here let us briefly survey various accounts on the value of
democracy and discuss why pragmatic Confucian democracy pays special
attention to democracy’s second-​order value as much as to the intrinsic
value of democracy. In doing so, we can see clearly the key features of prag-
matic Confucian democracy that distinguish it not only from Confucian
political meritocracy but also from Confucian communitarian democracy.
Now, I understand, albeit roughly, the geography of the accounts on the
value of democracy as the following.

(1) Democracy is good in itself.

→ First-​Order Value: Democracy is the only way to organize a good po-
litical life. (Democratic Absolutism)
(2) Democracy is good in itself.
→ Intrinsic Value: There may be plural and mutually incommensurable
ways to organize a good political life, of which democracy is one with
its distinctive moral ideals such as collective self-​determination and
public equality. (Democratic Autonomy)
(3) Democracy may not be good in itself but can be valuable for reasons
external to it.
→  Instrumental Value: Democracy is good to the extent that it
contributes to the good life predicated on values independent of
democratic values. (Perfectionism of the Good Life)
(4) Democracy may not be good in itself but can be valuable for reasons
internal to its institutional efficacy.

Introduction [ 11 ]
21

→ Second-​Order Value: Democracy is good relative to alternative polit-

ical arrangements because it is more effective in coordinating com-
plex social interactions among citizens under the circumstances of
modern politics. (Institutional Consequentialism)
(5) Democracy is bad in itself.
→ Intrinsic Disvalue: Democracy is nothing more than a mob rule that
inevitably leads to a tyranny of the majority and thus is never good.
(Pure Political Meritocracy)

Since Confucian meritocrats, at least those discussed in this book, do not

dismiss the value of democracy wholesale, none of them subscribes to
statement (5). Again, even the strongest champions of political meritoc-
racy in Confucian political theory such as Tongdong Bai and Daniel Bell
present themselves as democratic meritocrats rather than pure political
meritocrats. Though being wary of moral and political problems that in
their view are intrinsic to democratic principles of popular sovereignty, po-
litical equality, and the right to political participation (thus rejecting not
only (1) but also (2)), Confucian meritocrats generally agree upon a cer-
tain instrumental value of democracy. And to the extent that they regard
Confucian values as goods that democratic institutional mechanisms can
be instrumental in bringing about, they embrace democracy not only on in-
strumental but also on Confucian perfectionist grounds. That is, Confucian
meritocrats’ shared normative position is best described by (3).37
In marked contrast, Deweyan Confucian democrats who envision their
normative projects largely in communitarian terms tend to valorize de-
mocracy as an end in itself, as a particular way of life in which individual
and community are in a symbiotic ethical relationship. However, as
Confucians they also recognize the crucial instrumental roles that demo-
cratic participation can play in helping individuals morally grow, which is
the telos of Confucian virtue politics. So, insomuch as Deweyan Confucian
democrats pay more attention to moral growth and ritually ordered social
harmony than to equal social relationships among citizens, the central aim
of Deweyan (liberal) democracy, their normative position interestingly
straddles between (1) and (3), leaving their attitude toward (2) quite am-
biguous.38 As we will see in Chapters 1 and 2, this interesting connection
between democratic absolutism and ethical perfectionism in the project of
Confucian communitarian democracy results from Deweyan Confucians’
unique methodology that renders Confucius’s thought in a Deweyan lan-
guage, thus blurring the analytical distinction between Confucianism and
democracy. Despite its hermeneutical originality, I think that this concep-
tion of Confucian democracy has its own costs, as it takes our attention

[ 12 ] Introduction
away from the institutional dimension of democracy and, by implication,
from democracy’s second-​order value.
As such, democracy’s second-​order value has been given no attention,
let alone been engaged, in contemporary Confucian political theory. And
this in part has contributed to the current landscape of Confucian dem-
ocratic theory as marked by a division between moral cultivationists
(Deweyan communitarian democrats) and institutionalists (political
meritocrats), when democracy, properly understood, incorporates both
aspects. The result has been a lack of a Confucian political theory that
integrates (2), (3), and (4) into a coherent philosophical system—​a theory
that mediates between democracy’s two dimensions as a political system
and as a way of life, between democracy’s instrumental and intrinsic
values, and between democratic autonomy and Confucian perfectionism.
Pragmatic Confucian democracy attempts to fill this important lacuna in
Confucian democratic theory.
Specifically, pragmatic Confucian democracy offers a distinctive norma-
tive Confucian democratic theory in two respects. First, it is unambiguously
committed to (2). Pragmatic Confucian democracy cherishes collective self-​
determination by equal citizens, namely democratic autonomy, as intrin-
sically valuable.39 The second distinctive feature of pragmatic Confucian
democracy lies in the fact that, though taking democratic autonomy to be
its ultimate moral goal, it gives priority to democracy’s second-​order value.
Otherwise stated, unlike a Deweyan Confucian communitarian democrat,
a pragmatic Confucian democrat understands democracy primarily as a po-
litical system, that is, as a unique mode of institutional coordination of
social interactions among citizens under the circumstances of modern pol-
itics. Without institutional entrenchment of the democratic-​constitutional
structure, neither an effective and legitimate coordination of complex so-
cial conflicts—​especially those around moral questions, often the most im-
portant reason that citizens want to have a democracy—​nor democratic
autonomy can be realized.
For a pragmatic Confucian democrat, then, democratic autonomy is un-
derstood as the good whose intrinsic value is something that ought to be ac-
quired in the course of both participating in formal democratic institutions
and, more importantly, exercising democratic social practices in civil society
in ways that make sense to their Confucian moral sentiments and public
reason. Or, combining them together, in a pragmatic Confucian democracy,
democratic autonomy is made intelligent and cherished in the course of
living a Confucian-​democratic way of life. As will be discussed in Chapter 3,
the fact that in a pragmatic Confucian democracy the truest sense of dem-
ocratic autonomy is possible only when it is exercised in mediation of

Introduction [ 13 ]
41

Confucian public reason (which in turn is grounded in Confucian mores,

rituals, civilities, and moral sentiments) has profound implications for its
perfectionist structure. To put it briefly: in a pragmatic Confucian democ-
racy, democratic institutional mechanisms do not function merely as an in-
strument for achieving Confucian goods; rather, they are deeply penetrated
by Confucian values and programmed to produce rights, justice, and citi-
zenship that are harmonious with such values.

DEMOCRACY AS A SOCIAL EXPERIENCE

The third and last assumption of pragmatic Confucian democracy is that

democracy is not so much an abstract moral ideal but rather a series of so-
cial experiences. In a sense, this assumption is already implied in the other
assumptions of pragmatic Confucian democracy that we have examined
thus far. That pragmatic Confucian democracy explores a democratic way
of life under the circumstances of modern politics marked by value plu-
ralism and moral conflict implies that democracy is an outcome of the
people’s sustained collective action in search of a more effective and le-
gitimate coordination of their social, political, and economic interactions,
through which they can exercise coercive power on equal terms and de-
velop an equal social relationship among themselves. Thus democracy in
this understanding is a never-​ending social project, and it is a social expe-
rience precisely in this sense.
That said, in developing a political theory of Confucian democracy best
suitable for the modern East Asian societal context, it is important to rec-
ognize that the circumstances of modern politics, inherent to modernity,
do not exist in East Asia independent of an institutionalized political envi-
ronment that specifically conditions them, which in turn characterizes the
“modern politics” in East Asia as a specific form. And, admittedly, the dom-
inant political environment in the region has been an authoritarian regime
and still is for some countries, including China, be it one-​man dictatorship,
one-​party dictatorship, or military rule. So, as long as a political theory of
Confucian democracy is addressed to citizens, and to the extent that it is
meaningful for citizens in East Asia, it cannot afford to sideline the aspect
of democracy as a new political regime transitioning or having recently
transitioned from the (previous) authoritarian regime. It also cannot lose
sight of how democracy, initially a mere set of formal political institutions
of Western origin, gets consolidated as its institutions are reconstructed,
its social practices are accommodated, and its guiding norms and ideals are
localized and then internalized. In short, by understanding democracy as a

[ 14 ] Introduction
series of social experiences, pragmatic Confucian democracy aims to com-
bine the insight from the political science of democracy, focused on demo-
cratic transition and consolidation, with that from traditional democratic
theory, pivoted around the ideals of democratic autonomy and common
citizenship, thereby contributing to a normative democratic theory that
I hope is more socially relevant in the non-​Western society.
Although it is not this book’s main aim to break a new methodological
ground in political theory by bridging empirical political science and nor-
mative political theory, and while it deals with normative questions more
so than empirical issues, its core argument, especially with regard to the
value of democracy, is premised on the assumption of democracy as a social
experience that involves regime transition, institutional consolidation, so-
cial learning, and internalization of new values and norms. Put differently,
pragmatic Confucian democracy is concerned not only with building new
institutions but, more critically, with new citizenship formation. Both in-
trinsic and second-​order values of democracy can be captured holistically
only against the backdrop of this dynamic and pragmatic understanding
of democracy. As will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5, it is on this ground
that pragmatic Confucian democracy embraces public equality despite its
critical importance not as the foundational moral value that it is in liberal
democratic theory but as the side-​constraint that balances democratic jus-
tice and Confucian values.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

This book consists of two parts, each comprising three chapters. In Part I,
I construct a theoretical skeleton of pragmatic Confucian democracy, first
by justifying the right to political participation in reference to democracy’s
second-​order value, second by illuminating the complex relationship be-
tween the instrumental and intrinsic values of democracy in pragmatic
Confucian democracy in relation to democracy’s two dimensions as a po-
litical system and as a way of life, and finally by articulating the perfec-
tionist connection between democratic procedures and their substantive
outcomes in pragmatic Confucian democracy.
In Confucian political theory there is notable disagreement with re-
gard to the value and right of popular political participation: while
Confucian participatory democrats, many of whom are Deweyan commu-
nitarian democrats, are strongly convinced of the value of political par-
ticipation in terms of its critical contribution to personal moral growth,
Confucian meritocrats, equally committed to traditional Confucian ethical

Introduction [ 15 ]
61

perfectionism, refute this so-​called “participation argument” by claiming

that the same result can be achieved equally or even more effectively by
means of nonpolitical social participation. Chapter 1 provides a philosoph-
ical justification for the right to political participation in Confucian democ-
racy by critically examining the philosophical conundrum surrounding it in
Confucian democratic theory from the perspective of democracy’s second-​
order value and with special attention to the circumstances of modern
politics. I argue that the theoretical framework furnished by pragmatic
Confucian democracy can show us a way to look at the conundrum from
a different angle and to potentially resolve it without forfeiting our per-
fectionist commitment to Confucian values. I conclude by stressing that
the conundrum regarding political participation in the modern Confucian
constitutional polity, be it fully or only partially democratic, was caused
by a combination of the strong influence of traditional Confucian ethical
perfectionism on contemporary Confucian political theorists and their in-
complete understanding of democracy either as a political institution (or
simply election) or as a communitarian way of life.
Having laid out the key tenets of pragmatic Confucian democracy and
establishing the right to political participation as its integral component
in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 then turns to the value of democracy and ulti-
mately that of Confucian democracy in East Asia from the perspective of
citizens who care about both an effective coordination of their complex
social, economic, and political interactions and their Confucian-​based cul-
tural way of life under the circumstances of modern politics. The chapter
begins by critiquing two dominant models of democracy in political
science—​namely, the Schumpeterian model and the Deweyan model—​as
each model only partially captures the meaning of democracy and there-
fore the value of democracy as well. Presenting pragmatic Confucian
democracy as encompassing both models, equally concerned with two in-
separable dimensions of democracy, I argue that democracy as a social ex-
perience has both instrumental and intrinsic values, and to the extent that
Confucian democracy is a kind of democracy, it too has and ought to have
both instrumental and intrinsic values. Central to my claim in this chapter
is that once introduced and justified as a political system on instrumental
and consequential grounds, democracy attains its non-​instrumental value
as it gets consolidated as a way of life, in the course of which democratic
institutions, rights, and practices are socially mediated by and negotiated
with existing Confucian values, habits, mores, and moral sentiments. It is
through such a complex process of social and cultural negotiations, I argue,
that democratic institutions, rights, and practices (i.e., a democratic way
of life) can be made intelligent to and further cherished by citizens who

[ 16 ] Introduction
share Confucianism as their civic culture, notwithstanding deep diversity
and pervasive moral conflict among themselves.
In Chapter 3, the last chapter of Part I, I investigate the perfectionist
nature of democratic procedures and the perfectionist connection be-
tween democratic procedures and substantive outcomes that they pro-
duce in pragmatic Confucian democracy. This chapter begins by pointing
out deep ambiguities in existing Confucian political theories that tend to
focus exclusively on the perfectionist ends of the Confucian (democratic or
meritocratic) polity without articulating their internal connection to dem-
ocratic procedures. I argue that the pragmatic understanding of Confucian
democracy not only establishes the inextricable intertwinement between
democracy’s institutional-​instrumental and moral-​intrinsic values but fur-
ther creates an equally intimate connection between Confucian substance
and democratic procedure in a Confucian democracy. At the heart of my ar-
gument is that in Confucian pragmatic democracy, democratic procedures
exist not so much as formal institutional mechanisms that are neutral
to or independent of Confucian values but as the value-​laden conduit
through which Confucian democratic substances are produced in the forms
of Confucian democratic rights, Confucian justice, and Confucian demo-
cratic citizenship, thereby reinforcing a congruence between Confucian
democracy’s instrumental and intrinsic values. I explain this double con-
gruence that pragmatic Confucian democracy enables between substance
and procedure and between intrinsic and instrumental values in terms of
Confucian democratic perfectionism.
After establishing pragmatic Confucian democracy as a robust norma-
tive democratic theory, in Part II I discuss the normative implications of
pragmatic Confucian democracy on the idea of justice in criminal punish-
ment, economic distribution, and international relations (humanitarian
intervention in particular).
Although criminal justice is directly concerned with the citizen’s moral
standing as a free and equal person and works through the coercive power
of the state, there is virtually no philosophical discussion about this impor-
tant moral and political question in Confucian political theory, especially
in relation to democracy. Chapter 4 attempts to address this critical deficit
in Confucian political theory by proposing a novel normative framework
for criminal punishment, called the value theory of criminal punishment, as
an alternative to desert-​based retributivism that is most dominant in lib-
eral legal and political theory and to which some Confucian meritocrats
implicitly subscribe. Contrary to retributivists who see criminal desert
as pre-​social and purely individualistic, the value theory of punishment
understands it as embedded in communal values and social norms and

Introduction [ 17 ]
81

thus sees crime not in virtue of its pre-​socially evaluated wrongness but
in terms of a “normative blow” to the political community undergirded by
such values and norms. In the Confucian society in particular, I argue, a
normative blow to the community complexly implicates both the wrong-
doer and the victim, as they are thought to exist (or have existed until the
crime) not as independent rights-​bearing individuals but as quasi-​family
members of the community with their selves heavily related with one an-
other. From the perspective of the Confucian value theory of criminal
punishment, I then turn to one particular normative question in criminal
justice—​whether enhanced punishment for crimes committed against
family members, or simply family crimes, can be morally justified. I argue
that in a constitutional democracy in which Confucian values such as filial
piety, ritual propriety, ancestor worship, and harmony within the family
inform both the substance and the procedure of democracy, family crimes
fundamentally threaten the polity’s moral foundation and constitutional
integrity, and this justifies enhanced punishment for such crimes. The
chapter concludes by drawing attention to an important role that public
equality plays as a side-​constraint in making sure that enhanced punish-
ment for family crimes, though paternalistic, nevertheless contributes to
democratic justice.
Extending the preceding discussion on desert and public equality in rela-
tion to justice to the domain of economic distribution, Chapter 5 explores a
distributive principle—​what I call Confucian democratic sufficientarianism—​
that is integral to pragmatic Confucian democracy (as well as to Confucian
democratic perfectionism). One of the notable features in Confucian polit-
ical theory of late is that, following Harry Frankfurt, an increasing number
of scholars (mostly Confucian meritocrats) present the Confucian concep-
tion of distributive justice in terms of “the doctrine of sufficiency,” with
special attention to the doctrine’s negative thesis, which stipulates that
inequalities of wealth and income beyond the threshold of sufficiency do not
matter if they reflect different degrees of desert. In formulating an alternative
Confucian distributive principle, I critically embrace the doctrine’s posi-
tive thesis stipulating the threshold of sufficiency but roundly reject the
negative thesis because it not only reflects the deepest liberal commitment
to distinctive individuality, which Confucianism does not share, but more
importantly violates the spirit of the Confucian benevolent government.
After deriving four propositions from classical Confucianism (namely, equal
sufficiency, objectively high threshold standard, deserved inequalities, and
constrained inequality) and presenting them as constituting the classical
Confucian doctrine of sufficiency, I then reconstruct it into Confucian dem-
ocratic sufficientarianism by installing public equality as a side-​constraint

[ 18 ] Introduction
that prevents deserved inequalities beyond the threshold of sufficiency
from eroding an equal social relationship among citizens. Confucian dem-
ocratic sufficientarianism is distinguished importantly from liberal demo-
cratic sufficientarianism as well, because its main currency of distribution
is not so much equal public standing or freedom (as non-​domination) as
such, but the well-​being of the people.
The Confucian concern with the well-​being of the people, however, is
not limited by territorial boundary. Classical Confucians thought that a
virtuous ruler is responsible for the well-​being of all people under Heaven,
and this responsibility was the ground on which they could justify a pu-
nitive expedition of a virtuous ruler against the immoral ones during the
Warring States period. Inspired by this classical Confucian (especially
Mencian) authorization of punitive expedition, many Confucian political
theorists, including Daniel Bell, claim that the Confucian theory of pu-
nitive expedition has strong relevance in modern international relations
as it, with all its emphasis on specific procedural steps and qualifications,
can easily lend itself as the Confucian equivalent of humanitarian inter-
vention. Contrary to this line of optimism, I argue in Chapter 6 that for
it to be relevant to the modern international world and to be the theory
of humanitarian intervention in its truest sense (focused on the suffering
of the people rather than the moral qualification of the intervening ruler)
Mencius’s political theory of punitive expedition, which is predicated on
the paradigm of Confucian virtue politics, must undergo a democratic re-
construction with full attention to the circumstances of modern politics
on both national and international levels. More specifically, I argue that
applying Mencian virtue politics, as it is, to the modern pluralist world as
a form of political meritocracy is difficult to justify due to both internal
and external obstacles posed by value pluralism, domestically as well as in-
ternationally. At the center of my pragmatic-​democratic reconstruction of
Mencius’s virtue-​based theory of punitive expedition lies the stipulation
that intervention be morally justified domestically—​that is, to the people
of the intervening state, who may disagree with one another with regard
to justifiability of the intervention—​and internationally, first to those who
are intervened, whose lives are directly and profoundly affected by the in-
tervention and second to the international community, which has a moral
duty to protect the well-​being of the people in the world. I conclude by
revisiting my disagreement with Bell in the larger philosophical context, in
which the disagreement is essentially between Confucian political meritoc-
racy and pragmatic Confucian democracy.
I conclude the book by emphasizing the critical importance of Confucian
political theory’s acceptability to ordinary men and women actually living

Introduction [ 19 ]
02

in East Asia, many of whom are not ready to accept or even actively re-
ject the self-​validating moral authority of Confucianism while struggling
with their public standing as “citizens.” I argue that unless Confucian po-
litical theory aims to be the political theory for and of the people, it will
likely only remain the business of a few self-​claimed Confucians in aca-
demia having no meaningful contact with the real political world. The re-
sult may be a fantastic work of modern Confucianism, but it can hardly be
a Confucian political theory.

[ 20 ] Introduction
PART I

Democracy
2
CHAPTER 1

Political Participation

T he recent development of Confucian democratic theory has shifted our

attention from whether Confucianism is compatible with democracy
to what kind of Confucian democracy is best suited for East Asia. Previous
scholarship was largely preoccupied with reconstructing Confucianism
into a form of communitarian democracy, with special focus on ritualism,
role ethics, and social harmony, and thus did not challenge core democratic
principles such as popular sovereignty, political equality, and the right to
political participation.1 However, Confucian theorists of late seem to be far
more interested in philosophical and political implications of Confucianism,
the source of their cultural and philosophical inspiration, for their substan-
tive political theory of democracy. The result is an emergence of two dis-
tinct perspectives of Confucian democracy: one that either rejects or puts
significant constraints on the aforementioned democratic principles,2 and
one that embraces such principles as integral to its vision of Confucian de-
mocracy.3 It is through critical engagement between advocates of the first
position, called Confucian meritocrats, and those of the second position,
Confucian participatory democrats, that much innovation is taking place in
contemporary Confucian political theory.
What is interesting is that despite their important differences, all
Confucian democratic theorists generally subscribe to what Joseph Chan
calls Confucian perfectionism by upholding the following two premises: (1)
there are objectively good Confucian values or virtues such as benevolence
(ren 仁), filial piety (xiao 孝), righteousness (yi 義), and ritual propriety (li
禮); and (2) the state can promote these (and other related) values/​virtues
publicly as long as such promotion does not involve a serious violation of
individual rights or suppression of social pluralism.4 Based on these shared
42

premises, each position then builds its distinctive (i.e., meritocratic or par-
ticipatory) democratic theory by seeking the mode of democracy that can
best serve the higher moral goal of Confucian perfectionism. Generally
speaking, Confucian meritocrats assert that a minimal democracy, cen-
tral to which are limited political participation and a nondemocratically
selected upper house composed of the “best and brightest,” is most suit-
able for realizing the telos of Confucian perfectionism. On the other
hand, Confucian participatory democrats are strongly convinced that
with the collapse of the sage-​king paradigm in contemporary East Asia,
the Confucian perfectionist goal—​namely, moral growth in key Confucian
virtues—​can be attained only if people are individually able to participate
in political decision-​making processes.
Both positions, however, seem vulnerable to some challenges. For in-
stance, the following questions can be raised to Confucian meritocrats: if
the nondemocratic upper house is specifically required to serve the
Confucian perfectionist aims (i.e., wise public decisions and moral edu-
cation of the people), why is popular political participation necessary at
all, even if it is limited?5 And why struggle to justify political participation
philosophically, while simultaneously stressing that its moral value was
never recognized in the Confucian tradition?6 That said, since Confucian
meritocrats do not believe active political participation is essential to their
political theory, the force of the above challenges is surely limited. In fact,
insomuch as “democracy” in Confucian democracy is understood as an in-
stitutional apparatus instrumental to higher Confucian moral goals, it is
advocates of Confucian participatory democracy who face a more serious
challenge: what if the kind of moral growth they valorize as the ultimate
goal of Confucian democracy can be achieved equally or better without ro-
bust democratic political participation? In such a case, what is the distinc-
tive Confucian moral value of political participation?
This chapter aims to provide a robust philosophical justification for polit-
ical participation in Confucian democracy, first by critically examining the
philosophical conundrum surrounding political participation in Confucian
democratic theory from the perspective of democracy’s second-​order value
with special attention to “the circumstances of modern politics,” then
by presenting pragmatic Confucian democracy as an alternative mode
of Confucian democracy that can address the conundrum in a fresh way
without diluting the theory’s perfectionist commitment to Confucianism.
The chapter concludes by stressing that the conundrum was caused by a
combination of the strong influence of traditional Confucian virtue-​ethical
perfectionism on contemporary Confucian political theorists and their

[ 24 ] Democracy
incomplete understanding of democracy either as a political institution or
as a way of life.

VIRTUE, RITUAL, AND POLITICS: THE CLASSICAL ACCOUNT

OF CONFUCIAN PERFECTIONISM

Though perfectionism, especially in liberal political theory, is generally un-

derstood as the view that “the state should promote valuable conceptions
of the good life,”7 its long history tracking back to Aristotle and Aquinas
affirms that its more fundamental premise consists in the existence of an
objective conception of the human good and concern with the develop-
ment of human nature. Often committed to state neutrality, liberal theory
understandably rejects or simply brushes away this classical premise of
perfectionism focused on human nature, human excellence, and other
metaphysical beliefs, and instead shifts its attention to the moral permis-
sibility of the state’s nonneutral promotion or prohibition of particular
values and activities.8
Classical Confucianism, by which Confucian meritocrats and Confucian
participatory democrats are equally inspired, subscribes to both premises of
perfectionism, stipulating that the state nonneutrality premise is naturally
derived from the moral development premise. That is, from the Confucian
perspective, the ultimate purpose of the state lies in helping the people
become morally good, which justifies state-​centered moral education, and
the state’s other important (especially economic) policies are mainly to se-
cure socioeconomic conditions that enable a virtuous life.9 Traditionally,
Confucians called this mode of government, in which the telos of politics
is inextricably intertwined with moral development of the people, rule by
virtue (dezhi 德治). Mencius illustrates the kernel of Confucian virtue poli-
tics when he famously says: “It is only a gentleman who will be able to have
a constant mind despite being without a constant means of livelihood. The
people, lacking a constant means of livelihood, will lack constant minds,
and when they lack constant minds there is no dissoluteness, depravity, de-
viance, or excess to which they will not succumb. . . . Therefore, an enlight-
ened ruler will regulate the people’s livelihood so as to ensure that, above,
they have enough to serve their parents and, below, they have enough to
support their wives and children.”10 Confucius was also convinced that
when guided by virtue (de 德) and ordered by means of ritual (li 禮), rather
than by penal law and punishment, people will be able to develop a critical
moral sense, thereby correcting themselves in goodness.11

P ol i t i c a l Pa r t i c ipat i o n [ 25 ]
62

These classic accounts of Confucian virtue politics inform us that there

are two dimensions of it, namely the ruler’s transformative moral virtue
on the one hand12 and moral self-​cultivation of the ruled on the other.
They also help us understand that Confucian virtue politics is undergirded
by the following interrelated assumptions: (1) the ruler can acquire trans-
formative moral virtue by conducting himself properly (zheng 正),13 which
practically means to follow rituals;14 (2) there is no qualitative difference
between the ruler’s transformative moral virtue and the virtue that the
people, transformed by the virtuous ruler, are to acquire;15 and there-
fore (3) there is no distinction, conceptual or practical, between moral
virtue and political virtue (as understood in the Western republican tra-
dition).16 Because of this monistic structure, traditional Confucians de-
voted themselves not only to the people’s moral development, which is
perfectionism’s main concern, but, just as enthusiastically, to the moral
self-​cultivation of the ruler who ascends the throne by hereditary right,
not by means of virtue.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the slogan “rule by virtue” does not per-
fectly capture Confucian virtue politics because it only speaks to its
statecraft dimension, in which people are understood as passive subjects
of moral development while in principle the ruler is also subject to se-
vere moral constraints and equally requires moral development, perhaps
more than ordinary people.17 The simultaneous emphasis on the ruler’s
transformative moral virtue (or moral rulership) and his own moral de-
velopment importantly distinguishes Confucian perfectionism from its
Western counterparts, which are concerned mainly with the people’s
moral perfection.
Though Confucius offered the skeleton of Confucian virtue politics piv-
oted around virtue and ritual, it was Mencius and Xunzi who fully developed
the theory of Confucian virtue politics with a sophisticated philosophical
account of human nature. Casually regarded in the Confucian tradition as
arch-​rivals, Mencius and Xunzi held radically different, almost opposing,
accounts of human nature and moral self-​cultivation. Briefly put, Mencius
believed that human nature is good in the sense of everyone possessing
incipient moral inclinations toward goodness (such as feelings of com-
passion, righteousness, propriety, and the sense of right and wrong), and
thus upheld a developmental model of moral self-​cultivation. Xunzi, on
the other hand, convinced that human nature is bad in the sense of being
disorderly and recalcitrant to moral correction, advocated a reformation
model of moral self-​cultivation.18
Such critical differences notwithstanding, Mencius and Xunzi both
adhered to Confucius’s original insight that “if there are people who do have

[ 26 ] Democracy
robust character traits and are resistant to situational variation, they can
design and reliably maintain the broad range of institutions and situations
that facilitate good behavior for everyone else.”19 The following statement
by Xunzi most powerfully represents the core proposition of Confucian
virtue politics:

Thus, rules cannot stand alone, and categories cannot implement themselves.
If one has the right person, then they will be preserved. If one loses the right
person, then they will be lost. The rules are the beginning of order, and the
gentleman is the origin of the rules. And so, with the gentleman present, even
if the rules are sketchy, they are enough to be comprehensive. Without the
gentle­man, even if the rules are complete, one will fail to apply them in the
right order and will be unable to respond to changes in affairs, and thus they
can serve to create chaos.20

Thus far we have examined, albeit briefly, the central purpose of Confucian
virtue politics as well as its philosophical assumptions and moral
propositions. This brief recapitulation offers a necessary intellectual back-
ground against which to evaluate the “Confucian” aspect of the particular
versions of Confucian democratic theory, meritocratic or participatory,
in spite of the theory’s engagements with non-​Confucian philosophical
ideas and political theories, especially those of the Western-​liberal tradi-
tion. In other words, in pursuing democratic theory it can help us to judge
under what sorts of philosophical parameters or constraints we should
pursue democratic theory if it can be reasonably called “Confucian.” This
examination also informs us that any attempt to reconstruct traditional
Confucian perfectionism radically, that is, in ways plausible in the pluralist
societies of contemporary East Asia, has to wrestle with such parameters
or constraints.
Confucian meritocrats derive their argument for minimal democracy
and rule by the best and the brightest directly from the classical ideal of
Confucian virtue politics. It is debatable whether or not Confucian meri-
tocracy, premised on classical Confucian virtue monism, indeed offers the
most attractive mode of government in contemporary East Asia.21 But if
this practical (and politically significant) question can somehow be put
aside, the Confucian character of recent proposal(s) of Confucian meri-
tocracy can hardly be questioned. And insomuch as classical Confucian
virtue politics does not (explicitly) acknowledge the moral value of polit-
ical participation, Confucian meritocrats seem to be justified in denying
or only partially embracing this critical democratic value and practice, if
they can convincingly show that their proposed Confucian meritocracy

P ol i t i c a l Pa r t i c ipat i o n [ 27 ]
82

can effectively protect individual rights and reasonably well accommodate

social pluralism without active political participation by citizens. Joseph
Chan’s moderate Confucian perfectionism is one important attempt to
achieve the balance between Confucian meritocracy and human rights via
limited democracy, to which I will turn shortly.
The heavier burden of justification rather falls on Confucian participa-
tory democrats. Unless they radically revamp and go beyond the classical
paradigm of Confucian virtue-​ethical perfectionism, an attempt which begs
justification in itself, they should be able to offer a reason for their valoriza-
tion of political participation in Confucian terms. For Confucian meritocrats,
Confucian democracy is a partial democracy, the democratic dimension
of which is significantly curtailed by classical Confucian perfectionism.
Precisely in this sense, for Confucian meritocrats, Confucian democracy,
which they understand as a kind of hybrid regime, is clearly distinguished
from a Western-​style liberal democracy predicated on the principles of pop-
ular sovereignty and political equality.22 How then can Confucian partici-
patory democrats uphold political participation without altering classical
Confucian perfectionism? Even if they have a practical reason to do so, can
it be justified in light of classical Confucian perfectionism?

THE CONFUCIAN VIRTUE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Confucian participatory democrats such as Sor-​hoon Tan and Stephen Angle

are strongly convinced that political participation should be integral to the
political theory and practice of Confucian democracy, although there are
notable differences in the ways they advance this argument. Both Tan and
Angle believe that moral growth is the telos of Confucian ethics and poli-
tics. Finding striking similarity between John Dewey’s democratic pragma-
tism and Confucius’s ethical and political thought, Tan presents political
participation as an essential element of Confucian moral self-​cultivation.
Tan says, “Political participation is part of personal growth. . . . A person
functions better (i.e., grows) when she attains better control over, interacts
better with, her environment—​political participation is an important part
of this endeavor.”23 Echoing Tan but not associating his judgment with
Dewey, Angle, equally convinced that the telos of Confucianism consists
in personal and relational moral growth,24 asserts that “[a]‌fter all, if a state
were to make all the major decisions for its citizens, leaving them space for
decisions only about personal matters, it would be infantilizing its citizens.
That is, it would be denying them access to situations crucial for developing
moral maturity.”25

[ 28 ] Democracy
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
sea could no longer bear the strain, and so had parted in this sudden
and demonstrative way. In brief, it was an earthquake—just such an
one as is peculiar to this region, and such as caused the incoming
wave which overwhelmed Hiro-mura in 1855. This, however, was
only a small quake; although the building shook under the first blow
upon its foundations. Nor was there any perceptible disturbance of
“Peaceful Bay” to follow. And if there had been, it would not easily
have surmounted the high and broad earth-works, with their avenue
of stately trees, which were a half-century ago made the guardians
of the future safety of the village.
After tiffin it was necessary almost immediately to return to the
school for the address to the teachers of Hiro-mura, Yuasa, and the
country districts far around. Nearly five hundred of these teachers
were present at the afternoon meeting. The subject of the address
was “The Ideals of the Teacher.” Here, as quite uniformly in the
country at large, the speaker’s heart went out to the audience with
warm feelings of respect, sympathy, and even pity.
I have been in more or less familiar intercourse for nearly twenty
years with thousands of this class in Japan. In spite of the sincere
and largely intelligent interest which both Government and people
take in matters of education, the public-school teachers of the
country are heavily overworked and lamentably underpaid. But the
ideal of His Majesty’s celebrated Imperial Rescript is steadily held up
before them—namely, that there shall be no household in the land,
and no member of any household, to whom the benefits of education
shall not have been supplied in liberal measure. To realise this ideal,
Japan must have an entire generation or more of peace and of
peaceful development. At present its Normal Schools, Higher
Schools (those of the so-called Koto grade), and Universities, can
scarcely provide for more than one-tenth of those who are desirous
of fitting themselves for advanced positions and larger influence in
the service of the nation. As a result, in many of the country places
the scholastic training of the teachers cannot be of a high grade. But
the eagerness with which these humble men (for, unlike-the case
with us, the great majority of the common-school teachers are
males,—many of them in middle life and beyond) avail themselves of
every opportunity to see and hear anything which may help them in
their work, is both encouraging and pathetic. Where in the United
States, for example, could a voluntary class of more than eight
hundred teachers be held together for twenty hours of lectures on
education,—each session more than filling up the period between
four and six o’clock of the afternoon, during the busiest part of term-
time? Yet—as I have already said—this was readily done in Kyoto,
the ancient capital, in the Winter of 1907.

“THE BEAUTIFUL GROUNDS IN FULL SIGHT OF THE BAY”

Nowhere else, therefore, in Hiro-mura, not even in the strong
protecting dyke, is the spirit of Hamaguchi, with its affectionate
interest in the welfare of his fellow villagers, more prominently and
powerfully displayed than in the planting of the school on the
beautiful grounds in full sight of the bay which is called Nagi, or “The
Peaceful.” The dyke shall continue to push back the sea; and the
school, under its protection, shall continue to push back the forces of
ignorance and immorality.
After the lecture and the inevitable photographing of the group—a
species of photographing in which the Japanese peculiarly excel—a
considerable party accompanied the guests to a grove, high up upon
the hillside, from which the fields, and school and villages, and bay,
could be overlooked. There chocolate and cake were served. And
from there, after the descent to the plain was made, we walked to
the house of our host along the dyke, under the shadow of the pine-
trees, and looking down upon the waters which had once deluged
the place—all speaking to the memory, sympathetic with Japanese
ideas, of the spirit of Hamaguchi Gōryo.
The plan had been to start our jinrikisha ride back to Wakayama not
later than half-past six the following morning. But things in the
country places of Japan have not yet learned to occur at the
expected hour. Or rather, the experienced traveller has learned not
to expect to start his journey exactly at the promised time. We were
doing well when we bade our friendly host and hostess good-bye an
hour later than the one appointed. The return ride was indeed
pleasant; but it lacked the charms of brightness and of novelty; for
the sky was overcast and the air was that of March rather than of
May. We changed kurumas at Kuroé, as before, but did not stop
there; and making the run of some eight miles without a single
pause, we arrived at Waka-no-Ura about half-past eleven o’clock.
Now Waka-no-Ura, as the very name signifies, is the “coast” (Ura)
for which the old feudal town, the capital of the Province of Kishu,
Wakayama, is the “mountain” (Yama). It is one of the most notable
for its beauty of all the sea-coasts of Japan. The picturesque
features of the landscape, which have been celebrated in
innumerable poems by centuries of poets and poet-asters, were all
in evidence on that day. There were the storks standing on one leg in
the water, or flying low above the rushes. There were the rocks and
the pines—not straight, of course, like ours, but by their knarled and
knotty shapes, irregularities and eccentricities of outline, provoking in
the mind of the Japanese all manner of sentimental expressions and
similes touching human life. There were the boats of the fishermen,
at sea or lying in the offing; and nearer by were the boats of the
women who were gathering sea-weed for their food or for sale.
A regular “shore dinner” of fish and birds was somewhat hastily
concluded, in the company of the Governor of the Ken, the Mayor of
the City, and a representative of the Educational Societies.
Immediately after this, the Governor excused himself and, mounting
his bicycle, went on ahead of us, who followed in jinrikishas. The
highway along which we passed rapidly, was, for much of the three
miles between the coast and the city, made picturesque with its
shading of pines; and once within the more thickly settled streets of
Wakayama it circuited the castle walls and brought us to the
Government-building where the afternoon’s lecture was to be given.
Here, as everywhere, the audience, which numbered about eight
hundred teachers and officials, many of whom had come from
considerable distances away, bore convincing testimony to the
interest of the Japanese people at large in questions of education
and ethics. But we were not to carry out the plan of seeing more of
the sights and of the people of Wakayama. For a telegram informed
me that Marquis Ito had already left Oiso and would reach Kyoto that
evening, where he would plan to see me the next morning. Directly
from the hall, therefore, we were taken in haste to the station, and by
late evening we had reached our hotel in Kyoto.
But Hiro-mura and Hamaguchi Gōryo cannot be dismissed with
propriety from our present thought, however pleasant its purely
personal reminiscences may be, without recurring to the more
impersonal and important impressions, such as are made by
Lafcadio Hearn’s story of “A Living God.” In a little book published in
England about five years ago, the son, Mr. Tan Hamaguchi, tells us
of the following incident: He had been reading a paper on “Some
Striking Female Personalities in Japanese History,” before the Japan
Society of London; following which a lady in the audience raised the
question of a possible relationship between the reader of the paper
and the hero of Mr. Hearn’s tale. The question led, not only to the
exposure of the intimate character of this relation, but also to the
correction and amplification of the more fanciful of the points
emphasised by the celebrated foreign romancer of Japan’s
characteristic ideals and forms of behaviour. It was admitted that “Mr.
Lafcadio Hearn throws around the facts a golden aureole of fancy.”
But it was justly claimed that, although the long list of posts held, and
services rendered, by a good patriot to his country may “lack the
glamour of a single action, which has the fortune to attract the genius
of a sympathetic writer, and so carry his name and fame on words of
English eloquence across the world,” discerning readers will none
the less see in these offices and services “so many fresh titles to
veneration and regard.” There was—we have already said—no
shrine built to the hero during his life-time by the villagers of Arita.
The shrine was “metaphorically erected in their hearts and on their
lips.”
In at least two important respects, however, the facts are more
honourable to Hamaguchi Gōryo and to his countrymen than are the
fancies of Mr. Hearn. For it was not one seemingly supernatural
deed of heroism, but a life-time of service such as all may try to
perform, which constituted this hero’s claim to immortality; and the
time, instead of being more than a hundred years gone by, was in
the generation of yet living men. It is, therefore, thoroughly
representative, both of the spirit which still animates many of the
leaders and principal citizens of Japan, and also of the kind of
recognition and grateful remembrance which Japan accords to those
who serve her in this spirit. Thus much, which tends to foster the
“worship of ghosts” and the multiplication of “living gods”—to borrow
phrases from Mr. Hearn—is a fairly effective and most praiseworthy
force in the country down to the present hour.
Nor is this force evanescent, ineffective, and limited to politicians and
promoters of large business enterprises, as is for the most part the
case at present with us. It is the “ghosts” of great “rulers and
teachers,” as well as of warriors and heroes; of those “who lived and
loved and died hundreds and thousands of years ago,” as well as of
the successful and influential man of the passing hour. And the hope
of being numbered among the innumerable host that have served
their country, and that are regarded as all of one band, whether here
on earth or members of the “choir invisible,” is no impotent factor in
that spirit with which Japan met its enemy (now its friend) in the war
of 1904-’05. As one of her generals said to me: “It is the spiritual
training of the soldier which we find most difficult and on which we
place the greatest emphasis.” This worshipful attitude toward the
great and the good of the past, which is something more than
admiration and even something more than mere reverence, and yet
is not quite what we call “worship,” it is that binds the living and the
dead together in a peculiar bond of unity; that fills the actor of to-day
with an inspiration and a hope which takes a hold upon the universal
and the eternal; and that makes the sacrifice of what is temporal and
selfish more prompt, cheerful, and easy to bear. And who shall say
that there is not something admirable and eminently hopeful for the
nation in this? Or, at least, such are the thoughts connected in my
mind with the visit to Hiro-mura and with the facts, even when
stripped of the pleasing but not veritable fancies of Mr. Hearn,
concerning the history of Hamaguchi Gōryo.
 CHAPTER XII
COURT FUNCTIONS AND IMPERIAL AUDIENCES

Everything important connected with the Imperial Court of Japan is

regulated by law in the most careful manner. These regulations
include, not only the Peerage of all ranks, but also those natives who
belong to the civil service or who have been judged deserving of
recognition on account of some special contribution to the public
welfare. The latter system of nominal honours is called “ikai,” or
more commonly “kurai”; but it has no outward badge to represent it.
The holder of a fourth or higher grade of “ikai,” however, even when
he is no longer in Government service, receives an invitation on the
occasion of certain state festivals,—as for example, the Birthday
evening party. The heir of a Peer is entitled to the fifth-grade junior
“ikai” as soon as he reaches his majority. A number of wealthy
merchants possess this nominal honour, which they have gained by
contributions of money to public purposes. Besides these, there are
those who have been “decorated,” both natives and a few foreigners,
all of whom have their court rank prescribed according to the Order
and the Degree of the decoration conferred. Of these decorations,
the six grades of “The Order of the Rising Sun” are the most
coveted; because this Order is bestowed only for “conspicuous
personal merit”; and hitherto it has been only sparingly bestowed.
When the Grand Order of Merit and The Grand Cordon of the
Chrysanthemum are added to the First Class of the Rising Sun, the
fortunate person has been invested with the highest honour
accessible to a Japanese subject. Only eight personages, exclusive
of Imperial Princes, and mentioning only those who are still alive,
have attained so high an honour. At the head of this list stood Prince
Ito; and following him are such well known names as Yamagata,
Oyama, Matsukata, and latest of all, Admiral Togo.
It can easily be imagined that fixing the order of precedence at the
Imperial Court of Japan is not a matter in which the inexpert
foreigner can intermeddle safely, whether by way of his own
proposed conduct, or even of the expression of wishes or of opinion.
The actual arrangement, as given in the “Japanese Year Book” for
1908, mentions by name about eighty gentlemen and twenty “court
ladies,”—the precedence of all other persons who have either the
occasional or the regular privilege of attending court being fixed, by
general rules, according to their rank. Foreigners having decorations
come in the same position as natives of the same Order and Class
of decoration. For example, those who have the 2nd Class Order of
the Rising Sun have with it a court rank between the Counts and the
Viscounts; and those who have the 3d Class of the same Order fall
between the Viscounts and the Barons.
Holders of the 3d and higher classes of the “Orders of Merit” have
the right to request cards of invitation to certain of the Court
functions, attendance at which is a much coveted privilege. To some
of these a few foreigners may obtain invitations, either through the
official representative of the country to which they belong, or through
some influential native friend; but for certain other of these functions
such a thing is very difficult or impossible. This fact is not infrequently
the occasion of much heart-burning and complaining on the part of
the foreign tourist; and of no small embarrassment to foreign
Ambassadors and Ministers, and even to the Departments of “The
Household” and of Foreign Affairs, of the Japanese Government.
Perhaps the citizens of the United States are no more unreasonable
in this matter than are the citizens of other countries; but I am
inclined to think that they are. At any rate, it is well to remind
ourselves that, while our sentiment which exalts personal worthiness
above court rank is quite justifiable, both on moral and on political
grounds, it is an essential effect of this very sentiment, when sincere
and refined, not to wish to go where one is not desired, or where
one’s presence is not in every way an appropriate part of the social
or ceremonial occasion. From the point of view of those who issue
the invitation it is also to be remembered that to summon everybody
who might wish to attend would not only deprive the particular
function of all meaning, but would be to face a physical impossibility.
Besides, no one who is not either actually invited or unintentionally
overlooked, can lay any slightest claim to a “right,” in the case of any
similar engagement. The accredited representatives of foreign
countries are, indeed, entitled to be treated, not only politically but
socially, with a deference which is something more than personal;
and to certain others—as has already been said—a similar social
distinction has been conceded as a “right.” But as for the rest of us, I
fail to see how either ethics or etiquette prescribes to courts any
other obligations than those which we, ourselves, as private persons,
choose to follow. We invite only those whom we, for one reason or
another, want to have come; and, if we are truly self-respecting, we
do not ourselves want to go where we are not wanted.
The two most conspicuous of the ceremonial occasions which are
open to a selected few among the foreign residents or visitors in
Japan, and to which invitations are especially coveted, are, perhaps
the Court Ball given by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, on
the evening of the Emperor’s birthday, and the Audience given by
both Their Majesties, on New Year’s morning, in the throne-room of
the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.
The annual Court Ball on the night of the third of November, 1906,
was given by Viscount and Viscountess Hayashi, at the official
residence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The daylight hours had
fully justified the Japanese impression with regard to the “regulation”
weather for His Majesty’s birthday. It was delightfully clear and cool,
without being in the least uncomfortably chilly. We had risen at six
o’clock, and had left the house soon after seven in order to reach, on
time, the parade-ground, at Oyama, where the Emperor was to
review about thirty thousand picked troops, of the different branches
of the service. After His Majesty had once made the circuit of the
large field on horseback, he sat on his horse, while the entire force,
—first, the infantry, then the artillery, and, finally, the cavalry, passed
in review before him. The rain of the night before had laid the dust so
that it was not difficult to take in a view of the entire field at once. The
order of the troops was, indeed, excellent, but they did not make at
all so brilliant a display as the fifteen thousand Turkish troops which I
had seen called out to guard the now dethroned Sultan, Abdul
Hamid, at a Selamlik, in the Spring of 1900. Japan’s Emperor needs
no guard, however, to protect him against his own subjects.
When we reached the outer gate of the residence of the Minister we
found the driveway to the entrance so blocked with a crowd of
carriages and jinrikishas that it was only by a succession of jerks
forward and sudden stoppages that any approach whatever was
possible. And when we were still several rods away, something—we
were unable to ascertain just what—about the harness appeared to
give way, leaving us glad to complete the journey, by dodging the
jinrikishas and ducking under the horses’ heads, on foot. On
entering, we found that the accommodations of the mansion, in order
to provide for the more than fifteen hundred guests (of whom rather
more than one hundred were foreigners), had been greatly enlarged
by temporary structures built out over the nearer parts of the
surrounding garden. The principal rooms added in this way were a
large salon, or assembly hall, and a refreshment hall. Both these
rooms were beautifully decorated, with that mixture of lavishness
and reserve in which the best Japanese art of decoration so much
excels, with silks, flags of the nations, artificial cherry trees in full
bloom, and real pomegranate and persimmon trees loaded with fruit.
All these were still further decorated and illuminated by concealed
electric lights.

“THEY TOOK PART IN OUTDOOR SPORTS”

It was a curious misnomer to speak of this assembly as a “Court
Ball.” Many of the nobility of high, and some of Imperial, rank were
indeed there; and the official world, both Japanese and foreign, was
very fully represented. But few cared to dance; and few could have
danced, if they had desired to do so. Japanese ladies, in general, do
not enjoy dancing; although in olden time they took part in out-door
sports, such as polo: but they cannot dance in foreign style when
dressed in the native costume, which is appropriate to them and in
which many of them appear very attractive and even beautiful when
judged by Occidental standards. Dressed in foreign costume,
however, very few of them look well; almost all of them are
uncomfortable, both because the clothing is physically irksome and
also because they are conscious that they do not look well. Besides
this, the ball-room was small and from the first insufferably crowded
with those who, in the carefully regulated order of their court rank,
were somewhat languidly and even wearisomely doing their duty
solemnly, in honour of His Majesty’s birthday. But most of the men of
middle age and older, the men of mark in the army and navy, in the
state, and in business enterprises, still consider dancing as unmanly
and unworthy of a dignified gentleman.
At the Court Ball there were none of those forms of entertainment
which make the garden-parties and other less stately social functions
of the Japanese so enjoyable to the foreign guest. In spite of this
fact, however, the evening was far from being dull. The sight of the
brilliantly lighted and beautifully decorated rooms, and of the crowd
of notable persons gathered in them, afforded in itself a rare species
of instructive entertainment. Besides this, it gave the opportunity of
meeting many friends and of hearing kindly and encouraging words
from them. Among these was Baron M——, the Minister of
Education, Mr. Z——, who spoke definitely about the plans of
Marquis Ito for having us visit him in Korea; and the Japanese
Minister to Siam, with whom we had become well acquainted, seven
years before, while on the same ship from Kobé, Japan, to
Singapore.
The most interesting interview of all, however, came latest in the
evening. For as the Japanese friend who had consented to be our
escort on this occasion was gathering his party together for a return
home, and we were in his company passing through the refreshment
salon to the cloak-rooms, a party of Japanese gentlemen, seated at
a table by themselves near the place of exit, called to him to bring us
to them that we might be introduced. These gentlemen proved to be,
Marquis Saionji, then Prime Minister, our host, Viscount Hayashi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Kosai Uchida, then of the Peking
Legation, and Admiral Shimamura. The latter was jestingly
introduced to us as “a very destructive man,” having sunk no fewer
than thirteen Russian ships, but as being now “a man of peace.”
Whereupon the Admiral gravely said: “Let us drink to peace,” a toast
which was heartily responded to by all present. I take this occasion
to say again, that of the greater men in the army and navy of Japan,
—many of whom I have met in a friendly way, and with some of
whom I have become rather intimately acquainted,—I have never
seen one who gave the slightest sign of a pugnacious temper or of
desire for war. Of this brave and loyal, but eminently modest and
peaceful disposition, Admiral Shimamura is a conspicuous example.
He was staff-officer on board the flag-ship Matsushima in the Japan-
China war, and was wounded in the battle of the Yellow Sea. He was
Chief Staff of the Standing Squadron at the time of the Boxer
troubles in 1900. He was singled out by Admiral Togo as his chief
staff officer, when the latter was appointed Commander of the Fleet
at the outbreak of the war with Russia. At the time of my interview,
he was President of the Naval Staff College; and soon after was
ordered to represent his country at the Hague Peace Conference of
1907. In Japan, more emphatically than with us, it is not the men
who would have to do the fighting who are ready to engage in loose
“war-talk”; with us much more than in Japan, it is an unscrupulous,
and in certain instances, a subsidised press, and a body of ignorant
and selfish “promoters” of trade interests and labour unions, together
with the politicians whom they control, who are chiefly responsible
for propagating false impressions and stirring up feelings of strife
between the two countries. Should so deplorable an event ever
occur under existing conditions, I, for one, have little doubt that the
ultimate verdict of history would charge us with being the principal
criminal. But these are after thoughts, and quite different from those
which filled our mind as we went to sleep at the end of nineteen
hours of sight-seeing and of social converse in celebration of His
Majesty’s birthday on November 3, 1906.
The most stately, formal, and except for a carefully selected class,
unapproachable, of the regular functions of the Imperial Court of
Japan, are the New Year’s Audiences. On the morning of the first of
January, at the earliest hour of all, the Imperial Princes or princes of
“the blood,” go to the Palace to congratulate and felicitate His
Majesty, and to signify their continued and undiminished allegiance.
At a somewhat later hour follow the highest ranks of the Japanese
nobility; then in due succession, according to their court rank, come
to the Palace the Japanese diplomats, the higher officials in the
army, the navy, and the state, the holders of decorations of the Third
and higher Classes, and certain of the professors in the Imperial
University, and of the Shintō priests. In this way, four groups take
their turns at the Imperial Audience, during the successive morning
hours from nine o’clock onwards. The foreign diplomats are received
in audience in the early afternoon.
The drive to the Palace showed us the Capital City as it appears only
when it is decked out in characteristically Japanese fashion, on this,
Japan’s most notable gala time of the entire year. The weather of the
day was glorious, bright sunshine and soft dry air. There appeared
not to be a hut in Tokyo too small or too poor to be decorated with at
least two tiny pieces of pine boughs tied together with a bit of new
straw rope. Even the draught horses and the stakes to which the
scows were moored in the canals were ornamented with pine,
bamboo, and fern-leaves, and with little white Shintō “prayer papers”
fluttering in the gentle breeze. The larger houses and shops, the
banks and business buildings, had set into the ground at each side
of their doorways and gates young bamboo trees, of from four to
eight feet high, around which young pine trees were tied compactly
into a form resembling a huge bouquet. To this an added significance
is given by tying into the queerly knotted rope at its centre a
collection of fern leaves, strands of straw, stalks of rice, streamers of
Shintō paper, dried fish, and an orange or a boiled lobster. Peace,
plenty, long life, prosperity, and happiness,—everything that the
human heart can desire or hope for—are supposed to be symbolised
in this way. Along the narrower streets, where only native shops of
the smaller sort and of unfamiliar specialties abound, the line of the
projecting roofs, which was itself not more than six or eight feet
above the ground, was decorated with a deep fringe of plaited straw,
held together by a rope that carried little flags and gay lanterns. Not
at all a gorgeous or expensive style of decoration, surely! But
universal and expressive of thoroughly human sentiments, mingled,
indeed, with quaint ancestral beliefs and superstitions, it certainly is.
On arrival at the Palace, we were shown into a dressing-room to
remove our overcoats and wraps, where the ladies were assisted by
three Japanese maids, two of them in foreign dresses of silk with
trains, and the third more splendid in the old-style Japanese court
dress. When, about fifteen minutes later, the time for the Audience of
our “degree” had arrived, a Master of Ceremonies came and
ushered the party into a large and beautiful salon, where about one
hundred persons, with five or six exceptions all Japanese, were
waiting for the coming of their turn to enter the throne-room. All were
in court costume; the officers of the army and navy in full-dress
uniforms, wearing their decorations and cocked hats trimmed with
black or white ostrich tips; and the University professors decked out
in coats of antique style elaborately embroidered with gold, cocked
hats with feathers, and gold bands down their trousers. It was,
indeed, a sight to delight the eyes of those who are delighted with
such sights, and one that any person interested in brilliant colour
schemes and the human impulse to parade, might look upon for
once with a measure of keen enjoyment.
In good truth, there was an abundance of time to enjoy, and even to
sate one’s self with the brilliant spectacle; for it was fully three-
quarters of an hour before we were convoyed to the throne-room.
One was led anew to admire the superior physical endurance of the
ladies, who had trains weighing many pounds each to support and
manage all the meanwhile. It was a relief to know, however, that the
sum-total of suffering caused in this way could not have been great,
for there were not more than a half-dozen ladies in the whole
company.
The former custom of making the New Year’s Audiences more
particular and personal has now, for all except the Princes of the
Blood, the higher Japanese nobility, and the Diplomatic Corps, been
abandoned; it had become too seriously burdensome, especially
upon the Empress, who in her sincere and self-sacrificing devotion to
her manifold Imperial duties and benevolent enterprises, is
constantly tempted to exceed her strength. Instead, therefore, of
Their Majesties undertaking to stand for many hours, while those
received by them advanced and were introduced and made their
bows, the ceremony has been in a manner reversed. When, then,
we entered the throne-room, we found that it had been divided along
its entire length into two about equal parts by a thick cord of red silk.
Along the side of this cord, opposite the throne, the entire number,
which had now increased to about one hundred and seventy-five,
were allowed to arrange themselves as they chose. This
arrangement having been accomplished, and all having quieted
down, the Imperial party entered without flourish of any kind to
announce them, at one end of the side opposite to their guests; and
when they had reached its centre, right in front of the throne, they
stopped and bowed three times to those waiting in audience, all of
whom, of course, acknowledged the Imperial salutation by
themselves bowing as low as their somewhat more than ordinarily
stiff costumes would permit. The Imperial procession then passed
out of the throne-room at the other end from that at which it had
entered. This was all there was of the Audience at New Years, to
which the privilege of an invitation is so much coveted and which it is
so impossible for one outside the circle prescribed by court rules to
obtain.
Of late years a somewhat comic supplement has been added to the
ceremonial drama in the form of a function which bears the
suggestive but not euphonious title of “Tails and Tea.” It has become
the custom for some one of the foreign diplomatic corps, usually the
acting Doyen, to invite to his official residence for tea that same
afternoon a considerable number of those who have not attended
any of the audiences of the earlier part of the day, as well as all
those who have been in attendance. This function not only gives the
opportunity for much chat such as is customarily inspired by tea-
drinking on similar occasions, but it also has the added advantage
that it affords to some of the ladies the gratification of displaying their
trains to a larger circle of admiring or critical spectators, and to
others the consolation of seeing some of the elements of the pomp
of the morning, whose tout ensemble has been denied to them.
In 1899, the year of my second visit to Japan, audiences with the
Emperor for foreigners, not connected with royal families or
members of the diplomatic corps, were more rarely granted than
they are at the present time. Indeed, our Minister at that date, who
was greatly respected and beloved by the Japanese, told me that he
had ceased asking them for his own nationals, unless some
indication of favourable disposition toward any particular request
were first received from the other side. It was then toward the close
of my work in behalf of the educational interests of the nation, and
when the lectures in the University and before the Imperial
Educational Association had come to a successful end, that the
Department of the Household, moved by the representations of the
Department of Education, sent to our Minister the assurance he
desired. This was followed by the formal request for the Audience,
which was promptly granted. The date, however, could not be at
once definitely fixed; for His Majesty was suffering from a slight
indisposition which had led his physicians to forbid him every sort of
exposure. This indefiniteness of itself made indefinite the date when
we could leave Tokyo without a serious breach of politeness; or else
without Imperial permission granted for an imperative reason.
We were summoned back from Kamakura, where we were spending
a day or two as the guests of Baron Kuki, by a telegram from Colonel
Buck, which informed us that the time for the Audience had been set
for the morning of the next day, at ten o’clock. On our way from the
Legation to the Palace it was a real pleasure to hear the Minister say
—what my subsequent experiences have convinced me is strictly
true—that the friendly services and courtesies of educated men were
worth more for cementing relations of friendship between the two
nations than a great amount of what is called diplomacy. As to this, I
am inclined to insist once more upon the judgment that financial
greed and commercial rivalry have been of late, and still are, the
chief causes of war between nations. Witness the powerful influence
of the South-African gold and diamond interests in bringing about the
Boer war; and of the infamous procedure of Bezobrazoff’s Yalu River
Timber Company, with its issue in the Russo-Japanese war. A
vigorous but unscrupulous “trade policy” is almost certain ultimately
to lead to a war policy.
Arrived at the Palace, Minister Buck and I were taken through long
corridors to a drawing-room adjoining the audience chamber, where
Counts Toda and Nagasaki were, with other gentlemen, already in
waiting. Here we were kept engaged in conversation for perhaps ten
or fifteen minutes before being ushered into the audience chamber.
But before its doors were thrown open, Count Toda remarked that
“His Majesty was very gracious this morning and wished to shake
hands with Professor Ladd.”
When the Minister and I had entered the room in the prescribed form
—he, two or three steps in advance, and each of us bowing low
three times (at the threshold, about half way, and just in front of His
Majesty)—the Emperor, who was standing near the other end of the
chamber, addressed through his interpreter a few questions to
Colonel Buck. He particularly inquired after his health, and whether
the buildings or trees of the Legation had been injured by the severe
storm of the day before. I was next introduced, the Emperor cordially
extending his hand. His Majesty then inquired about my coming to
Japan, the time of my leaving; expressed his pleasure at seeing me,
and gratification at the work which had been done; and, finally, the
hope that he might some time see me again. This last utterance I
understood as a permission to withdraw. And this was promptly
done, by backing out and bowing the requisite three times in the
reverse order.
It was more than seven years later and on my third visit to Japan that
the honour of another private audience was accorded to me by the
Emperor. At this time, the newly arrived First and Second
Secretaries of our Embassy, with their wives, and Mrs. Ladd, were all
to be presented. The gentlemen would have audience with both the
Emperor and the Empress; the ladies with the Empress only. The
whole party, on arriving at the Palace, was rapidly conducted along
the corridors, past the waiting-room where my own deceased friend,
Minister Buck, and I had rested for a few minutes on the former
occasion, to the room of waiting set apart for the Empress’ guests.
There three of the gentlemen-in-waiting and three of the maids of
honour met us; and introductions followed. After twenty minutes of
chatting together, the men of the party were taken in front and to one
side of the door of the audience chamber, to await the summons of
His Majesty. They had not long to wait, for he makes it a point to be
very prompt in such matters. Here, to my no small surprise, I learned
that my decoration gave me precedence of the Secretaries of the
Embassy, and that I would therefore be presented first. Ambassador
Wright then led the way into the audience chamber, leaving the
others standing outside. After exchanging inquiries with the
Ambassador as to his health, on my being presented the Emperor
held out his hand and cordially welcomed me. I expressed my thanks
for the honour done in permitting me to see him again, and
congratulated His Majesty on the successful termination of the war
and on the apparently prosperous condition of his country. His
Majesty then said that he had heard with pleasure of the work which
I was doing for the moral education of his young men; that it would
prove very useful for Japan; and that he wished to thank me for it. I
expressed the great pleasure I was taking in the work, and my
sincere gratitude for so favourable an opportunity. Whereupon he
expressed the hope that I would continue it. I replied that it would be
an honour as well as a pleasure, if I might be permitted to continue
to be of service, however small, to Japan; since, next to my own
country, I had learned to love Japan best of all. When this was
interpreted to the Emperor, his face, which is ordinarily very
immovable—almost like a mask—showed a gleam of satisfaction
which was unmistakable; and he again thanked me and took my
hand for the second time.
After the two Secretaries had been presented, to both of whom these
conventional sentences were said: “Have you been before in
Japan?”; and “I am glad to see you,”—we all withdrew backward,
bowing in the customary fashion. We were then taken at once to the
audience-room of the Empress, before the door of which we were
asked to wait a moment. Here, too, the same order of precedence
was observed. On taking my hand, Her Majesty said, with an air of
great kindness, that Minister Makino had told of my work for the
moral education of Japanese young men, and that it would be of
great value to the country. Her Majesty also asked concerning my
plans; where I was going and how long I was expecting to stay. After
she had taken my hand again to dismiss me, the other two
gentlemen were presented, and the same two sentences said to
them which the Emperor had said. The ladies had already been
presented; and on rejoining them, we were all immediately ushered
out of the Palace. (I have always had a sly suspicion that the
gentlemen in waiting, at least, consider—and not altogether
unnaturally!—this sort of service toward foreigners to be something
of a bore.)
The last of my audiences with His Imperial Majesty of Japan was by
far the most notable, and, indeed, unique. At a “farewell meeting,”
held on Friday evening of the week preceding the date of my sailing
home, in September of 1907, I was confidentially informed to expect
a private audience on the following Monday. The more formal
summons, which came the next day through the private secretary of
the Minister of Education, was couched in the following quaint
language:
“Dear Sir:
“I have the honour to inform you that on the 30th at half-
past ten o’clock a. m. His Majesty, the Emperor, will be
graciously pleased to receive you in audience at the
Palace.
“On that day you are required to be present before that
hour, wearing swallow-tailed coat.”
(It should be explained that this sobriquet for the upper
garment of evening dress is a literal translation back into
English of a Japanese word which is itself derived by the
same literal rendering of its English original.)
The anxiety of my escort, who was the same person as the writer of
the letter, lest we might be unpardonably late in keeping the
appointment, was so great that our carriage arrived at the
designated gate (a comparatively private one) of the Palace, a full
half-hour before the time. But, leaving my Japanese friend at the
entrance room of the Department of the Household, I was conducted
along what seemed like endless corridors, by the state rooms of the
palace, whose elegant beauty of proportion and reserve in
decoration I thus had an excellent opportunity for admiring, to a
waiting-room at the other end of the Palace, which I at once
recognised as the one customarily assigned to those who were to
have an audience with the Emperor. Soon both the doors of this
room were closed and the occupant was left to his reflections in the
completest possible in-door solitude. The silence was impressive,
profound. At rare intervals, the distant cawing of a crow somewhere
in the Imperial grounds, or muffled footsteps in some far-off corridor,
were the only sounds to be heard. As I strove to occupy my mind
with recalling the memorable experiences of the past year, in Korea
as well as in Japan, my imagination persisted in dwelling upon the
comical problem: “What should I do; how explain my presence, with
my scanty knowledge of Japanese, to persons who know no English;
how escape from the Palace,—in case there should have been any
misunderstanding about the matter?”
Quite promptly at 10.25, however, the door of the waiting-room was
thrown open and I was motioned to follow the Palace attendant who
stood in front of it. Not a word was spoken by either of us. On
reaching the corridor in front of the audience chamber, two
gentlemen-in-waiting, dressed in frock coats, were there,—one in
front of the entrance and one in the corner nearest the waiting-room.
The latter motioned me to stand by his side. In a minute or two a
slight rustle announced the entrance of the Emperor into the
audience chamber; the gentleman-in-waiting who stood before its
entrance bowed low and drew back, beckoning me to come forward;
and I then first became aware that, this time, no one was expecting
to present me. Doubtless, it saved the chance of no little
embarrassment that previous experiences had left me precisely
informed as to what I ought to do. The Emperor was standing in his
accustomed place, in military undress; his interpreter was on his