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Middle Kingdom and Empire
of the Rising Sun
Middle Kingdom and Empire
of the Rising Sun
Sino-Japanese Relations,
Past and Present
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
1
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Dreyer, June Teufel, 1939– author.
Title: Middle kingdom and empire of the rising sun : Sino-Japanese relations,
past and present / June Teufel Dreyer.
Description: New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015043811 (print) | LCCN 2016006841 (ebook) |
ISBN 978–0–19–537566–4 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 978–0–19–970490–3 (E-book) |
ISBN 978–0–19–060359–5 (E-book)
Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations—Japan. |
Japan—Foreign relations—China.
Classification: LCC DS740.5.J3 D74 2016 (print) | LCC DS740.5.J3 (ebook) |
DDC 327.51052—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015043811
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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For Edward, Always
Contents
Part One
1. Getting to the Present 3

Introduction 3
The Establishment of the Chinese World Order 4
The Establishment of the Japanese State 6
Early Sino-Japanese Contacts 7
China Gains Influence over Japan 8
The Taika Reforms 9
Eighth-Century Reforms 11
Nativist Elements Return 12
Not Quite Separate, Whether or Not Equal 14
The Ming, the Fall of the Ashikaga, and the
Reunification of Japan 19
Sino-Japanese Relations in the Early Tokugawa Era 21
The Sakoku Period 24
Arai Hakuseki’s Proposed Reforms 25
Fall of the Ming Dynasty 28
Kokugaku 29
Conclusions 32
2. China, Japan, and the Coming of the West, 1835–1945 33

The West Intrudes 33
The Macartney Mission 34
viii Contents
The Opium War and the Unequal Treaties 35

The Tongzhi Restoration, 1862–1874 36
Matthew Perry Arrives in Japan 38
The Meiji Restoration, 1868–1912 40
Sino-Japanese Relations During the Restorations 41
Sino-Japanese Tensions Build 43
Japan Ponders Its Relationship with China and Korea 44
The Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895 45
The Effect of Defeat on China 50
Sino-Japanese Relations after the 1895 War 52
Sino-Japanese Diplomacy, 1898–1911 55
The Russo-Japanese War 57
A New Balance of Power 59
The Siberian Intervention 64
Shidehara Diplomacy 65
Sino-Japanese Relations in the Post-Sun Yat-sen Era 66
The Mukden Incident 68
Expansion in North China 70
A Chinese Communist-KMT Alliance against Japan 71
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937 72
Wang Jingwei 75
The Second Sino-Japanese War 77
The Chinese Civil War 79
Conclusions 80
3. Wary Engagement, 1945–1969 82

Finding a Place in the Post-War Balance of Power 82
The New Japanese Government Regards China 82
The New Chinese Government Regards Japan 86
Negotiations for a Post-World War II Settlement 87
Sino-Japanese Relations during the Korean War 88
The Bandung Era 95
The Nuclear Issue 98
Resurgence on the Left 99
Irritants Continue 100
The Communist Monolith Splinters 106
The French Connection 111
Intra-Left Disputes 112
Contents ix
China Becomes a Nuclear Power 114

Satō Takes the Helm 115
Chinese Foreign Relations during the Cultural Revolution 119
The LDP Reassesses Its China Policy 121
U.S. Concerns 124
4. The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1969–1972 127

Satō Tries to Engage China 127
The Soviet Connection 130
Chinese Reaction 131
The Okinawa Reversion Agreement 132
Business as Usual 132
Denouement of the Normalization Issue 148
5. The Golden Age of Sino-Japanese Relations, 1972–1989 156

Negotiating the Details 156
The Peace and Friendship Treaty 159
Friendship and Friction 166
The Euphoria Ends 166
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Issue and the Yasukuni Shrine 167
Great Power Politics 169
The Textbook Issue 171
Strains Accumulate 172
Hu Yaobang Reestablishes Amicable Relations 173
The Kokaryo/Guanghua Dormitory Case 176
The Demise of Hu Yaobang 177
Insensitive Remarks by Japanese Officials 179
The Tiananmen Demonstrations and Sino-Japanese Relations 182
Aftermath of the Tiananmen Demonstrations 184
6. Tarnished Gold, 1990–2006 188

Returning to the Status Quo Ante 188
Familiar Tensions Return 191
Maritime Issues 193
The Asian Currency Crisis 195
Jiang Zemin Visits Japan 196
Trade Difficulties 200
The Koizumi Era 201
Mutual Distrust Grows 203
x Contents
Voices of Moderation in China 205

New Frictions Are Added to Old Irritants 207
The Japanese View 209
Anti-Japanese Riots in China 211
Rivalry for Energy Resources 213
7. Contradictions Deepen, 2006–2015 215

Efforts to Mend Bilateral Relations 215
Fukuda Takes the Helm 223
Asō as Prime Minister 226
Hatoyama 231
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Issue Redux 233
Japan’s Triple Disaster and New Pressures from China 235
The Islands Controversy Intensifies 236
Chinese Domestic Factors 239
Abe Returns to the Prime Ministership 240
Efforts to Manage Tensions 244
Part Two
8. Economic Rivalry 249

Economic Relations before Normalization 249
Economic Consequences of Normalization 255
Japanese Concerns Grow: Rivalry Rekindled 261
Trade Imbalances 262
Japan as Number One 263
Effect of the Tiananmen Incident 267
The Chinese Economy Recovers 268
And the Japanese Economy Falters 268
The Search for an Explanation 271
Official Development Assistance to China Is Terminated 272
Koizumi’s Attempts at Restructuring Fall Short 273
Current Economic Relations 274
9. Mutual Military Apprehensions 281

The Demilitarization of Japan 281
The Korean War 283
China Rearms … and Regresses 285
Cautious Security Steps in Japan 287
Contents xi
The Sword Reemerges in Japan 288

China Complains 292
Tiananmen Square Incident and Its Aftermath 294
Effect of the Gulf War 295
North Korean Missile Tests 296
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait 297
New Japanese Defense Legislation 300
The North Korean Military Issue Resurfaces 302
Dueling Defense White Papers 304
New Powers for the SDF 305
Effect of the War Against Terrorism 305
The Third National Defense Program Outline 308
Beijing Responds 312
Abe’s Defense Program 313
The Debate on Amending the Constitution 315
The Nuclear Debate Rekindled 316
Conclusions 318
10. Taiwan between Two Powers 320

Multicultural Influences and the Qing/Manchu Annexation 320
Taiwan under Japanese Rule 324
The Kuomintang Assumes Control 329
The De-Recognition of the ROC and Sino-Japanese Relations 335
Restoration of Japanese Influence in Taiwan 337
Taiwan Politics Poised between China and Japan 339
Conclusions 352
Part Three
11. Conclusions 357
Acknowledgments 381
Notes 383
Bibliography 431
Index 445
Part One
1
Getting to the Present
INTRODUCTION
Sino-Japanese tensions have gone through several turbulent peri-

ods since the end of World War II. The Beijing government has
attributed the problems to the Tokyo government’s insufficient
expressions of remorse over Japan’s responsibility for the war and
to politicians’ persistent refusal to foreswear visits to the Yasukuni
Jinja, Japan’s shrine to its war dead. Relations will not improve,
they warn, unless China receives adequate apologies and visits to
the shrine cease.
The central theme of this book is that these issues are merely
symptoms of an underlying problem that stretches back to the
beginning of relations between the two states: the unwillingness
of either China or Japan to accept the other as an equal, and the
refusal of either to accept a position of inferiority to the other. The
roots of this tension can be found as early as the seventh century,
in some of the earliest contacts between the two cultures. China
treated Japan, as it did all of its neighbors, as a cultural and political
inferior. Although Japan had indeed borrowed its written language,
its institutional structure, and parts of its philosophical tenets from
China, this assertion of superiority engendered anger and resent-
ment in Japan. However, in the premodern era, the ocean that sep-
arated the two, the relatively minor interest of each in trade and
commerce, and the fact that when one of the two was strong the
other was generally not, served to mitigate these tensions.
4 Middle Kingdom and Empire of Rising Sun
By the mid-nineteenth century, the shrinking distances afforded by

advances in technology and the intrusion of Western powers brought the
two into closer proximity in ways that alternately united and divided them,
with adversarial relationships frequently outweighing ties of amity. The
current Chinese government regards the period from the late nineteenth
to the mid-twentieth century, when Japan was clearly stronger, as part of
its “century of humiliation.” In the immediate aftermath of World War II,
both sides were weak. Japan quickly developed into an economic power,
but rejected concomitant military capabilities, preferring to rely on secu-
rity commitments from the United States. China, after emerging from the
shadow of Stalin’s Soviet Union, began a tortuous journey toward modern-
ization hindered by ideological and leadership struggles that lasted until
the death of revolutionary leader Mao Zedong in 1976.
When the Japanese economic bubble deflated at the same time as the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) experienced a period of strong economic
and military growth, the Beijing government again began to treat Japan in
an apparently condescending manner, to the intense annoyance of influ-
ential members of the Tokyo establishment. A very different situation has
taken shape. In the PRC, as communist ideology declined, Chinese nation-
alism became more important. At the same time, latent nationalism was
rekindled in Japan. Both China and Japan are now interested in commerce.
With the two currently the world’s second and third largest economic pow-
ers and possessing potent military forces, rivalries have intensified. They
compete for energy sources, raw materials, markets for their goods, and both
regional and international stature. Each is an important international actor.
Unless China and Japan can learn to co-exist, either as co-equals or with one
accepting the primacy of the other, the stability of both regional and global
systems will be jeopardized.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER
The entity currently known as China, and hereafter referred to by that

name, had a concept of state (guo) from the beginning of the Zhou dynasty,
which is traditionally dated from 1122–256 B.C. but actually commenced
around 1000 B.C. As defined by Confucius’s disciple Mencius, the three
treasures of a state ruler were land, people, and government. It was the
duty of the king (wang) to align the three levels of heaven, earth, and man
Getting to the Present 5
through his righteous example, as can be seen in the ideograph for king of
a vertical line connecting three horizontal lines. According to this tradi-
tion, a dynasty was founded by a righteous man designated by Heaven.
Should his successors prove unworthy, the Mandate of Heaven would be
removed and pass to another dynastic founder designated by Heaven.
A distinction was made between inner and outer realms: China was
the central state, Zhongguo, with others regarded as populated by uncivi-
lized barbarians. Properly speaking, Confucian society did not conceive
of a China, or of a Chinese civilization: there was only civilization and
barbarism, with one defining another. What was not civilized was bar-
baric. The emperor, huangdi as he was called after the founding of the Qin
dynasty (221 b.c.e.), was not simply the ruler of one state among many,
but the mediator between heaven and earth, the apex of civilization, and
a being who was unique in the universe. As the son of heaven, the rituals
he performed were not particularistic but universal. As the embodiment
of virtue, the emperor carried out the rites (li) that were necessary for the
continuing harmony of the universe. In this capacity, he ruled All under
Heaven (tianxia). Should the rituals not be properly performed, this was an
indication that the emperor had betrayed his role as the son of heaven; the
result would be disharmony in the universe.1
Although Confucianism was elaborately hierarchical, it contained ele-
ments of egalitarianism as well. In theory, the Mandate of Heaven could fall
on any male, depending in part on his ethical standards. Indeed, mythical
sage rulers of antiquity such as Yao and Shun did not choose to pass the man-
date to their own sons. And uncivilized barbarians could become civilized
barbarians, with proper observance of the rites. Presentation of tribute to the
emperor was the ritual appropriate to acknowledging the universality of the
Sinitic world order and one’s place in it. Entry into the emperor’s presence
required proper obeisance, as exemplified by the performance of the kowtow
(ketou)—the three kneelings and the nine prostrations. Since this entailed not
only bowing but hitting one’s head repeatedly on the floor, it can be presumed
to induce the feelings of humility that were considered appropriate to the situ-
ation. Refusal to carry out this act would not have been regarded as mere lese-
majesté, or an insult to the emperor’s person, as Western tradition would see
it, but as an affront to the preordained order of the universe.
The proper rituals having been performed, envoys from these less civi-
lized states presented tribute in the form of local products, and received
gifts from the emperor in return. Typically, the gifts exchanged were of the
finest workmanship and often quite rare in the society of the recipient. Some
scholars have speculated that the exchange constituted trade in disguise,
since Confucius had great contempt for commerce, and also since it was
difficult for an entity that considered itself the apex of civilization to regard
the products of barbarian lands as having intrinsic value. They had interest
as curiosities, but little more. It is probably more accurate to say that the
tribute–gift exchange was neither purely ceremonial nor purely commer-
cial. One analyst opines that, by the time of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911),
the two had become so intertwined as to be separable only analytically.2
The barbarian ruler might also receive a patent of office, biao, from the
emperor, thus confirming the legitimacy of his administration, and would
receive a title that was deemed consonant with his status. The more impor-
tant of these rulers received the title of king, wang. The enfieffment process
involved acceptance of the Chinese dynasty’s calendar to date letters and
official documents; this indicated that the ruler had accepted vassal status
as well. During the Qing, the vassal state was required to send embassies to
Beijing at regular intervals to “receive the calendar” (fengshuo), a term that
can also be translated “receiving the commands of the Son of Heaven.”3
It should not be assumed that all who participated in the tribute sys-
tem did so from the same motives. The various Korean kingdoms seem to
have been the most sincere in their acceptance of a position of inferiority
in the Sinitic hierarchy, with Vietnam much less so. Thailand’s motiva-
tion might best be described as pragmatic. That country’s longstanding
foreign policy was to accommodate to the dominant outside power in the
region that, until the arrival of the West in the mid-nineteenth century,
was generally China. With its civilization deriving from Indic rather than
Sinitic roots, Thailand could accommodate Confucian concepts without
accepting them.4 While other states may have accepted the system either
sincerely or cynically, Japan, as will be seen, participated episodically, but
was never entirely comfortable with, and sometimes openly defiant of, it.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE STATE
In contrast to the Chinese polity, with its early development of a written lan-
guage, we know very little about early Japan, and much of that is contained
in records compiled later using the Chinese language. These are assumed
to have been influenced by Chinese categories of thought and philosophical
concepts, rather than accurate accounts of the events and conditions of the
times they describe. Additionally, the narratives differ somewhat in their
account of events. Even taking these factors into account, the picture that
emerges is of a polity very different from China.
In contrast to the down-to-earth descriptions of early Chinese records,
supernatural and cosmological features play an important part in Japanese
narratives, as does the aristocratic theme.5 The Japanese islands are said to
have been created through the union of the god Izanagi and the goddess
Izanami, who stand on a floating bridge of heaven. They produced the sun
goddess Amaterasu, who invested Ninigi, the immediate ancestor of the
imperial line, with the sacred regalia: the three treasures of the mirror,
the jewel, and the sword. Amaterasu also endowed Ninigi with the explicit
charge, according to some accounts, that his dynasty should endure for-
ever.6 Ninigi, in turn, endowed his own progeny, the first human emperor,
Jinmu Tennō, with the regalia and the responsibilities of office.
In this narrative, the human emperor is a direct descendant of the
gods rather than, as in China, the holder of a mandate from heaven that is
contingent on proper performance of his duties. While there seem to have
been not one but three different Japanese dynasties, early compilers of the
legends wove together the rulers thereof into one single lineage extending
back from those ruling at the time they wrote to the age of the gods.7
EARLY SINO-JAPANESE CONTACTS
Archaeological evidence indicates similarities between stone tools that

may have made their way from China to Japan 20,000 years ago.8 Chinese
bronze culture reached Japan by about 200 B.C., modifying the exist-
ing Neolithic civilization. Bronze culture itself was soon supplanted
by the Iron Age. The presumptive channel to Japan was not direct, but
through Paekche, one of the three Korean kingdoms of the time. The earli-
est Japanese mission mentioned in Chinese records came to China in 57
A.D. According to the records of the Later Han, the Guangwu emperor
presented a seal with a decorative ribbon to the envoys of a king of Wa
as a token of investiture. In 1784 a peasant redigging an irrigation ditch
in Shinkanoshima Island on the northwest coast of Kyushu accidentally
unearthed such a golden seal inscribed to a “[Vassal of] Han,” which has
been accepted as the object referred to in the Chinese record.9
Because of its proximity of access to the Korean peninsula, the

northwest coast of Kyushu was a traditional contact point in that era.
Some immigrants from what are now China and Korea arrived as well.
Collectively known as the Toraijin, they brought cultural influence and
serve as a partial refutation to later nationalist claims of Japanese racial
homogeneity. What we now know as Japan was not at that time unified, but
rather divided up into a number of small tribal units, each under the rule
of a hereditary high priest or priestess. While it is reasonable to assume
that the king of Nu was one of these, there is no way of knowing whether
he was an ancestor or relative of the hereditary line of chieftains that by
the fifth or sixth century had evolved into the Japanese imperial family.10
Again according to Chinese records, the next Japanese embassy arrived
in 107 A.D. It is said to have presented 160 slaves. The Later Han fell in 220,
after a period of disruption, and the next embassies are recorded in the first
half of the third century, visiting the court of the Wei dynasty that ruled
in the north of a divided entity. A mirror found in Luoyang, capital of the
Wei, in 2009 confirms written records of contact between emissaries of
the Wa queen Himiko and the court.11 Missions also appeared in Nanjing in
the fifth century, at the court of the Liu-Song (429–479), southern dynasties
that were based there. The records do not reveal which of these embassies
actually represented the group that was in the process of establishing itself as
the central government of Japan. Nor is it certain which, if any, were official
missions at all: it was not unknown for groups of private businesspeople to
represent themselves as emissaries from a foreign ruler in order to obtain the
imperial recognition that would afford them better trading opportunities.
Chinese travelers also on occasion visited Kyushu, though one expert
opines that it is likely that they did not see very much, and perhaps did not
understand all that they saw and heard.12 Still, accounts of the strict disci-
pline of the people, the signs of respect paid by inferiors to superiors, their
impressive martial spirit, and the emphasis on cleanliness and ritual purifi-
cation are all consonant with Japanese culture as it existed in later centuries.
CHINA GAINS INFLUENCE OVER JAPAN
By the time China had been reunited under the Sui dynasty in 589, mis-
sions were being recorded in Japan’s own records as well as those of China.
The Japanese seem never to have been comfortable in their relations with
China, resenting the subservient attitude expected of them and regarding
themselves as the center of their own diplomatic order.13 In behavior con-

sidered beyond shocking at the time, Prince Shōtoku, as regent for Empress
Suiko (554–628; r. 593–628), wrote to the Sui emperor in 607 on her behalf,
saying, “The emperor of the land where the sun rises sends a letter to the
emperor of the land where the sun sets.”
This tacit assumption of equality between the barbarian empress and
the son of heaven greatly upset the Sui emperor and his court. According to
the understated language of the Sui dynastic history, “When the emperor
read this he was not pleased, and he said to the President of the Court of
Diplomatic Reception, ‘This letter from the barbarians contains impropri-
eties. Do not call it to my attention again.’ ”14
Note, however, that Shōtoku is using a name for his country that could
only have been bestowed by the Chinese or by orienting Japan with reference
to China, given the position of the sun. Nihon (Riben in Chinese), whose ideo-
graphs signify “origin of the sun,” is still the name both countries use to des-
ignate Japan today. The Sui, however, typically referred to Japan as woguo, or
“country of the dwarves,” rather than the state of Yamato, Great Peace, as the
Japanese would have described themselves at the time. Despite this awkward-
ness, Japanese missions to China continued because they brought back mate-
rial goods and, more importantly, useful information about Chinese culture.
It is interesting to speculate on what Prince Shōtoku might have done
had an early death not cut short his career. Not a nativist by any means,
he had supported the introduction of Buddhism from Korea against the
opposition of clans who did not approve of foreign ideas and wanted to
adhere to indigenous Shintō practices—as well as because they wanted
to preserve a certain degree of autonomy from the imperial court. Power
and religion were, as is often the case in other cultures, intertwined.
Additionally, while Prince Shōtoku refused to acknowledge that Japan
was subservient to China, he clearly believed that his country should learn
from it. There was a strongly pragmatic element to his desire to do so. The
major challenge confronting Shōtoku was the establishment of the central
power of the imperial court, and the teachings of Confucianism were very
helpful in that regard.15
THE TAIKA REFORMS
In 645 a coup overthrew the dominant Soga clan. The coup’s leaders, a
future emperor assisted by the founder of the powerful Fujiwara lineage
of future imperial consorts and regents, proclaimed direct imperial rule.

645 was designated the first year of Taika, meaning Great Transformation.
Significantly, this represented the first use in Japan of the Chinese-style
dating system.
The new rulers proceeded to transform Japanese institutions along the
model of China’s Tang dynasty (618–907), then at the peak of its power.
While useful in consolidating the rule of the new Japanese leaders, the
Taika reforms were also a response to a perceived danger from abroad. In
the nineteenth century, the Meiji reforms would be impelled by a similar
perception of external threat.
In this case, the threat was from the Korean peninsula, where the three
kingdoms of Silla, Koguryǒ, and Paekche contended. One of these, Silla,
was backed by the powerful Tang dynasty. Another, Paekche, had close ties
to Japan. After a combined Silla–Tang force conquered the Paekche capi-
tal, the Japanese responded by dispatching a force whose mission was to
restore the Paekche kingdom. It was decisively defeated in 663. Silla went
on to conquer Koguryǒ,16 thus creating the first unified Korean kingdom.
A twentieth-century analyst deemed the sense of crisis in Japan occa-
sioned by its defeat in the wars of Korean unification to be comparable
in magnitude only to the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and
the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s black ships in the nineteenth.17
Heightening the sense of danger, the Tang sent five separate embassies to
Japan in less than a decade, the last of which included over 2,000 men. It is
conceivable that the missions were intended to placate Japan and perhaps
gain its acquiescence to China’s control of the Korean peninsula. But it is
clear from both Japanese sources and the feverish defensive preparations
taken during this period that the Japanese considered their purpose to be
hostile.18
Silla and its successors, the Wang dynasty Koryǒ (935–1392) and Yi
dynasty Chǒson (1392–1916), adopted a deferential posture toward China
that, as will be seen, enabled Korean states to call on China for assistance
against Japan in the 1590s and again in the decade before 1894. Korea,
in addition to its role in transmitting Chinese culture to Japan, was to
continue to be the object of competition between the two for power and
influence, as well as an active participant in the rivalries between them.
Japan viewed a Korea unified under Silla and backed by Tang dynasty mili-
tary might as threatening its own security. This was a major factor in the
Japanese desire to emulate the institutions that produced Tang power.19
EIGHTH-CENTURY REFORMS
The early eighth century saw three important developments in this bor-
rowing from China. In the first of these, in 701, the country’s first compre-
hensive criminal and administrative codes were promulgated. Called the
Taihō ritsuryō, they were based on Chinese theories and, with minor revi-
sions, remained the basis for civil administration for centuries to come.
A seventeen-point document conceived by Prince Shōtoku was promul-
gated. Although generally referred to as a constitution, it would not be
recognizable as such by today’s standards. Second, in 710, a new capital
was built at Nara. It was laid out in accordance with the Chinese ideal of
symmetrical architecture for administrative centers. A successor capital
established at Heian, later known as Kyōto, in 794 also used this plan.
The third project was the compilation of Japan’s first national history,
the Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of Japan), according to Chinese historiograph-
ical models. Completed in 720, the Nihon Shoki was written in stylistically
proper Chinese. It attempted to establish the legitimacy of the imperial
family and the recently Sinified court government. By contrast, the earlier
Kojiki (Records of Ancient Matters), completed in 712, focused more on
ancient legends and was written in a hybrid language that interspersed
Chinese with Japanese elements. About this time also, the Japanese began
to refer to their country as Nihon, the land of the rising sun, as Prince
Shōtoku had done in his sixth-century letter.
While the new administrative system was in most respects a copy of
that of the Tang dynasty model, there were small but important differ-
ences. The Department of Worship, for example, outranked the Council
of State, such that precedence was given to the priestly functions of the
sovereign over secular administrative matters. In essence, this indicated
the unwillingness of the reformers to abandon their national tradition that
the claim to the throne is established solely on the basis of descent, in favor
of the Chinese notion that the mandate of heaven is given on the basis of
moral worthiness. The hierarchy of offices also depended far more on birth
than, as Chinese theory had it, talent. An edict of 682 said bluntly that,
when selecting men for office, the consideration must be birth first, then
character, and, lastly, capacity.20
In the educational area, the influence of Korea in the transmission of
Chinese ideas was also important. Many of the professors at the Confucian
academy were émigrés from the destroyed Paekche kingdom or their
descendants. So as well were many of those who sat for the civil service
examinations. Japan’s first university admitted students from higher and
lower ranks of noble families as well as commoners. In this sense, it was
actually more egalitarian than its Chinese counterparts in the same era,
since the Tang system was highly aristocratic and hereditary. However,
this changed over time. As Japanese court offices became increasingly
hereditary, the examination system, which had never functioned on
more than a limited scale, atrophied into insignificance. Meanwhile, the
Chinese examination system was evolving into the normal path for selec-
tion to high office.21
NATIVIST ELEMENTS RETURN
In the eighth and ninth centuries, the Japanese court attempted to pre-
serve its Sinified appearance, though in practice, as seen above, elements
of Chinese and native culture co-existed. In poetry, which has enjoyed
an honored place in Japanese culture, the Kaifusō (Fond Recollections of
Poetry) was published in Chinese in 751, and the Man’yōshū (Collection for
Ten Thousand Generations), containing what many Japanese consider the
most pristinely pure of their native poetry, in 759. In general, for a period
of two centuries, the court attempted to govern according to Chinese prin-
ciples, somewhat modified by nativist ideas. Court culture was Sinified.
Beginning in the mid-ninth century, the court gradually abandoned
this commitment to functioning in the Chinese manner. Politically, a single
lineage from the northern house of the Fujiwara family came to dominate
high court offices. Lesser posts became hereditary preserves as well, in con-
trast to the Confucian ideal of a bureaucratically organized meritocracy.
Economically, land that was supposed to be controlled by the government
and distributed to peasants increasingly accumulated into large, privately
managed estates known as shōen. The revenue from these shōen went to
powerful court families rather than into the government treasury, thus
decreasing the dependence of these families on the central government.
Although the ritsuryō codes were not revoked and interest in Chinese cul-
ture remained, they gradually lost their positions of preeminence.22
Despite the slow diffusion of power away from the court, the imperial
capital at Kyōto remained the unrivaled center of culture. Interest in Chinese
forms declined. Japanese literature, which had almost disappeared after the
publication of the Man’yōshu, began to flourish again. When the imperially

sponsored Kokinshū (Collection of Ancient and Modern Times) was com-
piled in 905, the native poetic tradition was given the official recognition that
had previously been given to Chinese literature alone. As a general statement,
during the middle and late Heian periods, from about 900 to 1185 A.D., a
more noticeably Japanese culture arose. A native script that was better suited
to writing the Japanese language was developed. Novels such as the still pop-
ular classic Tale of Genji employed this script, as well as exemplifying traits
that later developed into a distinctively Japanese aesthetic tradition.
The divide between China and Japan should not be overstated. Certain
accommodations were made by each to the other. For example, the Japanese,
regarding the requirement to bring tribute and make obsequious oaths of
fealty to be offensive, had taken to dispatching their embassies with gifts
but not documents. This was apparently accepted at certain ports of entry
where Chinese officials were familiar with Japanese customs, although not
at others. The records of a court scholar named Kiyokimi state that, when he
arrived at the inland Tang capital of Chang’an in 804, he found that his com-
patriots who had traveled on another ship were absent. His inquiries revealed
that they had been detained because their ship had been blown off course
and landed at a port where Japanese customs were not understood.23 And,
complaints about the distasteful nature of Chinese attitudes aside, when a
scholar/poet named Ono no Takamura wrote a tract attacking the whole
purpose of embassies to China, he was deemed to have insulted the memo-
ries of the emperors who had dispatched them, and banished forthwith.24
However, the dispatch of embassies began to decline. The last, in 838,
on which Ono no Takamura had served as second in command, is the best
known, since Ennin, a Buddhist monk who participated in it and traveled
widely in China over a period of nine years, kept a meticulous diary of his
observations. Part of the reason for the lesser number of missions was that
the Tang dynasty itself was in decline. Members of Kiyokimi’s embassy
had reported unstable conditions at the turn of the ninth century; these
can also be inferred from Ennin’s diary, though what is more remarkable
are his descriptions of the impressive attention to organization and the
observance of ritual even in a period of dynastic deterioration.25 Other
reasons for the decline in embassies were their expense and the dangers
inherent in the treacherous journey across the sea. But most important
may have been the conviction that the purposes of the embassies could
better be achieved by other means.
Here again, the role of Korea is important. In the view of the Japanese
court, the primary reasons for sending missions to China were political
and cultural. They were intended to demonstrate that the country was a
civilized member of the East Asian community of nations, and to bring
back additional learning from China. At least in theory, the exchange of
goods was a secondary concern. If, therefore, the economic functions of
the missions were taken over by private traders, then the more important
political and cultural functions could be fulfilled by relations with Parhae,
a newly arisen kingdom that included ethnic Korean and Manchurian,
non-Han Chinese, peoples. Japan could add substance to its claim of
equality with, or even superiority to, China, using Parhae as a surrogate.
Since Parhae was willing to place itself in a nominally inferior posi-
tion to Japan, the Kyōto court’s ties with it were more gratifying than with
China, where Japanese envoys had several times run into problems for their
refusal to take a properly subservient posture. Since Parhae also contin-
ued to have regular contacts with China, its missions were a way, although
possibly not the best one, to follow developments in China. Moreover, the
Parhae government was willing to send embassies to Japan even when these
were not reciprocated, thus reducing the danger and the expense involved
in mounting missions to that kingdom.26 Between 794 and 929, Parhae sent
twenty of its thirty-three missions to Japan, whereas Japan sent only two
embassies to China. By 894 no official missions had been sent to China for
more than half a century,27 although some merchants and members of the
Buddhist clergy continued contacts. The cessation of the missions is consid-
ered a major turning point in early Japanese history.
NOT QUITE SEPARATE, WHETHER OR NOT EQUAL
In Japan, the gradual devolution of power away from the imperial court
led to a struggle among the major clans for actual power, as opposed to
the titular power of the emperor. A bloody contest for military ascendancy
between the Taira and Minamoto lineages ended in 1192 with the estab-
lishment of a military government in Kamakura that effectively terminated
rule by the court at Kyōto. Minamoto Yoritomo wielded power with the
title of shōgun (meaning “general”). Yoritomo’s headquarters, the bakufu,
literally translated as (military) tent government, is also referred to by later
English-language scholars as the shōgunate. As commander-in-chief of the
entire warrior class, the shōgun ordered that all disputes from members of
this class be submitted to him, rather than to the imperial court. Clearly,
this endowed the shōgun with immense power that went far beyond the lit-
eral translation of his title. The separation of rule between bakufu and court
was geographic as well: the largely powerless court remained in Kyōto, with
the bakufu in Kamakura and, later, Edo. At that time, the warrior class
would even be prohibited from entering the imperial capital. This develop-
ment was to have profound significance not only for the future of Japan, but
also for Japan’s relations with China.
In China, a period of internal division and invasions by less civilized
neighbors culminated in conquest by one of the least civilized, the Mongols,
in the thirteenth century. Ruling as the Yuan dynasty, the Mongols con-
quered all of China, as well as a number of contiguous territories. Although
consciously resisting pressures toward adopting Han Chinese practices, even
changing the location of the capital city and repairing to a more northern
location in the summer months in the fashion of their nomadic forebears,
the Mongols/Yuan were interested in receiving both tribute and the sub-
mission of their neighbors. Unlike the Han Chinese dynasties, they actively
sought out both. A Mongol envoy appeared in Japan in 1268 to demand trib-
ute, but was rebuffed. The Mongols retaliated by mounting an invasion in
1274, which the Japanese fought off. A second, and stronger, force was sent
in 1281, but was destroyed just off the coast by a typhoon. Collectively, the
invasions reinforced national consciousness in Japan. Shintō clerics fostered
the belief that the winds were divinely sent (kamikaze), interpreting them
as evidence of the protection that the indigenous deities, principally the sun
goddess Amaterasu, and Hachiman, the god of war, afforded to Japan.
Less than a half century later, a political leader and scholar named
Kitabatake Chikafusa wrote the Records of the Legitimate Succession of Divine
Sovereignty, in which he proclaimed the superiority of Japan over China, as
well as India, because of Japan’s single line of emperors descended from the
gods. At approximately the same time or even a bit earlier, there appeared
the Five Classics of Shintō, forgeries that were supposedly set in remote antiq-
uity that attempted to provide a Shintō philosophy and ethics. Since Shintō,
which has been compared to nature worship, had not actually possessed these
attributes, Kitabatake’s argument borrowed extensively from Buddhism.
Advocates of what came to be called primal Shintō would later contend,
based on these classics, that the Japanese gods were the original substance
and Buddha and the boddhisattvas merely the manifested traces.28
Although the Mongol invasions had a positive effect on Japanese con-

sciousness of national solidarity, this did not accrue to the benefit of the
Kamakura bakufu. Repelling the intruders had been extremely expen-
sive and, in contrast to previous struggles, which had been among and
between factions within Japan, there were no lands to distribute to the
victors in return for their services. The Kamakura bakufu was badly
weakened. Meanwhile, in Kyōto, Go-Daigo became the first adult male
to become emperor in over a hundred years. Eager to reclaim the glory
of his ancestors, Go-Daigo proclaimed the restoration of direct imperial
rule. Some warriors joined him, and in 1333, the Kamakura bakufu was
overthrown.
Ashikaga Takauji was the most prominent of the warriors who sup-
ported Go-Daigo, doing so with the expectation that he would be named
shōgun. When Go-Daigo did not award him the office, Takauji seized
Kyōto and installed a puppet emperor on the throne who granted him
the coveted title. Go-Daigo, however, took the imperial regalia and fled to
Yoshino, in the southern part of the country. From then until 1391, there
were two rival emperors. In 1392 an agreement was reached under which
the southern emperors were declared to have been legitimate, but yielded
the regalia and the throne to the northern claimants.
The Yuan dynasty fell in 1368, and was replaced by an indigenous
Han Chinese dynasty, the Ming. There were pressures to resume relations
with China. Even unofficial trips had been difficult under Mongol rule,
and merchants and Buddhist leaders on both sides were in favor of resum-
ing contact. Coming to agreement on the circumstances under which this
could be effected was another matter. Ming envoys who arrived prior to
1392 took note of unsettled conditions, prompting a letter from the founder
of the dynasty, the Hongwu emperor that intended to convey support for
the legitimate ruler and condemn the rebels. Hongwu appeared, however,
to be unsure which was which.
The Japanese officials who read the letter were offended by phrases
such as “it is the common rule of propriety that barbarians should respect
the Middle Kingdom.” Hongwu, in turn, was offended by their response,
which was not phrased in a sufficiently deferential manner, and was more-
over dated according to Japanese chronology, rather than employing a
calendar based on the founding of the Great Ming. Successive correspon-
dence became more overtly rude. A letter from the Ming emperor, dated
1376, contained an explicit threat if compliance were not forthcoming:
[Y]‌ou … make it clear that you do not obey the order of Heaven
… The distance which separates us from Japan is nothing but the
high seas. It takes only five days and nights to sail with favorable
winds. It would be a great advantage for you to respect Heaven’s will
by practicing a benevolent rule in order that you may escape the
disaster of an invasion by China.29
Another letter, written by the Hongwu emperor himself, reads in part:
You stupid eastern barbarians! Your king and courtiers are not
acting correctly; you have disturbed neighboring countries in all
directions. In former years, you created dissensions with ungrounded
statements. … [T]‌his year your people come … and want to deter-
mine which of us is the stronger. Oh! living so far across the sea, you
are unmindful of the wonderful land that Heaven has given you; you
are haughty and disloyal. … [W]ill this not inevitably bring disaster
upon you?30
A Japanese reply of 1382 was defiant and provocative, openly denying

the primacy of the Chinese emperor, with such statements as
[H]‌ow should only the Middle Kingdom have its master while
the barbarians do not have their rulers? Heaven and earth are vast;
they are not monopolized by one ruler. The universe is great and
wide, and various countries are created each to have a share in its
rule. … [T]he world does not belong to a single person.
Its author, Prince Kanenaga, says that he has heard that the emperor
is planning to invade “my territory” and warns that China might receive
an unpleasant surprise if such action were taken.31 In this vein, Kanenaga
notes that “this small country” possesses the literary works of Confucius
and Mencius as well as the military works of Sun Zi and Wu Qi. How
would the Japanese kneel to pay respect to China’s best generals?32 The
implication is that, although the Japanese had enormous respect for the
sages named, this did not translate into feelings of subservience to the state
that had produced them.
The Chinese emperor, perhaps mindful of the fate of Mongol attempts to
invade Japan, apparently decided against invasion, but he remained angry.
In 1386 Hongwu refused to receive a Japanese envoy, and a break in rela-
tions occurred between the two countries. There was an additional irritant
to the Ming court’s pique over Japanese arrogance in claiming a position of
equality: the more concrete issue of raids on the Chinese coast by Japanese
pirates. Since the common, and disparaging, name for Japan was land of the
dwarves, the sea raiders were known as dwarf pirates, wokou.
In 1398 the Jianwen emperor succeeded to the throne after his grand-
father, Ming Hongwu’s, death. The new ruler apparently looked favorably
on a memorial to him from Ashikaga Yoshimitsu in 1401. Couched in sub-
missive language, it resulted in Jianwen’s ordering that Chinese Buddhist
monks accompany the embassy on its return voyage to Japan. Jianwen’s
favorable attitude toward Japan may have been influenced by the civil
war he found himself embroiled in and ultimately lost. He was killed by
his uncle, who became the third Ming emperor, Yongle. In 1405 Yongle
accepted Yoshimitsu as a vassal of Great Ming.
Although this act of submission would later cause Yoshimitsu to be heav-
ily criticized, there were tangible immediate benefits. The Ashikaga bakufu
received a monopoly on legal trade with China, as regulated by tallies issued
by the Chinese authorities. These consisted of slips of paper numbered to
whatever level had been decided upon—typically one hundred—with the
first half of the Chinese name for Japan written at the top and the other
at the bottom. The papers were then torn and placed in stub books, one
for each side. If they fit, the ship’s cargo was deemed legitimate. Persons
without valid tallies were regarded as unauthorized and subject to arrest.33
Although the agreement provided for only one tribute-bearing voyage per
decade and put limits on the number of ships, their crews, and their pas-
sages, all these restrictions eventually came to be disregarded.
In return for this recognition of his legitimacy, at least from the Chinese,
and trade arrangements that would enrich his treasury, Yoshimitsu agreed
to suppress piracy. This was a more nuanced issue than surface appear-
ances might indicate. Particularly after the Ming sea voyages ceased in
1433,34 the dynasty’s attentions were internally focused and official exter-
nal contacts were carefully regulated. Ming Hongwu had gone so far as to
decree that no Chinese should be permitted to go overseas, and that those
who sailed abroad on ships of more than two masts—presumably mean-
ing that fishing boats would be allowed to practice their trade—would be
executed.35 However, local interests in coastal areas were frequently eager to
trade. These included not only merchants and their wealthy customers, but
also officials, quite a few of whom were willing to support the wokou activi-
ties in return for a share of the profits. Ming sources indicate that Chinese
craftsmen, with their superior maritime engineering skills, helped Japanese
seamen to improve the quality of their ships. They also reveal that some
Chinese joined the wokou, as did a few Portuguese. In time, Chinese pirates
would become more numerous than Japanese. Some merchants and wealthy
families became heavily indebted to the pirates, whose raids might there-
fore have the aim of retribution for defaulted debts.36 The collusion between
vested interests on China’s coast and the pirates complicated the difficulties
of apprehending and suppressing them. Nonetheless, Yoshimitsu appeared
to undertake the task with some relish. He presented a group of captives to
the Ming emperor, who politely returned them to Yoshimitsu. Yoshimitsu
then boiled them alive. According to a Chinese document of 1402, the cop-
per cauldron used therein was preserved in situ.37
As restrictions on trade eased, piracy declined. In the words of one
Ming official,
The pirates and the traders were the same people. When trade
flourished, the pirates became traders; when trade was banned, the
traders became pirates. At first it was trade that was banned, later it
was piracy that was suppressed. The more strictly enforced was the
ban [on trade], the fiercer piracy became.38
In the fifteenth century, as would occur again 500 years later, when there
were profits to be made, merchants would find ways to forge ties despite the
obstacles imposed by their respective governments.
Frictions between the highest levels of government continued, as
did at least some level of pirate activity. In a 1418 imperial rescript, the
Yongle emperor complained that since pirates continued to invade, “we do
not know whether your conduct is virtuous or not.” He carefully distin-
guished the Ming military from the Mongols, “who were strong in riding
and shooting but weak in seamanship,” averring that the Ming forces were
skilled in both.39 Several decades later, the Japanese government would
discover that this was not an idle boast.
THE MING, THE FALL OF THE ASHIKAGA,

AND THE REUNIFICATION OF JAPAN
Gaining Ming recognition of its legitimacy and consequent control of

trade revenue did not sustain Ashikaga rule for very long. As members of
the Ashikaga family and their generals engaged in intrigues in the capital,
power drifted away from the central government. In the provinces, war-
lords of the great families, daimyō, were becoming increasingly autono-
mous. Such control as the Ashikaga possessed, which was never as much
as it desired, disappeared after the Ōnin War of 1467–1477. A period of
disunity extended from the mid-fifteenth to the early seventeenth century.
It is known as the Sengoku, or Warring States, era, in conscious imitation
of the 200-year period before China was unified by Qin Shi Huangdi in
221 b.c.e. An important difference with China, however, is that in Japan
conflict was not among states or even provinces, but among the daimyō
warlords. The Ashikaga shōguns became puppets of the most powerful of
these families, even as previous shōguns had made puppets of emperors.
As might be expected, little that could be called Japanese foreign rela-
tions occurred in this time frame. In 1547 licensed trade lapsed. Japanese
were excluded from China, and Chinese were forbidden by Chinese law from
going to Japan.40 But the daimyō of the western regions were able to conduct
foreign relations of their own with neighboring states, including China. The
same areas were also visited by Christian missionaries from the Western
Hemisphere. Of the so-called three unifiers of the period, Oda Nobunaga,
the first, was able to seize Kyōto and, a few years later, in 1573, abolished the
shōgunate. He was assassinated by one of his own generals in 1582.
Nobunaga was succeeded by the second unifier, and arguably the out-
standing figure of this period, Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi was able to
establish control over all of Japan, although he never assumed the title of
shōgun. In 1592 he invaded Korea. Fleeing Seoul in the face of advancing
Japanese troops, the Korean king appealed to the Ming emperor for help. A
Chinese force, fielding heavier cannon than the Japanese possessed, defeated
the invaders at Pyǒngyang, though it did not pursue the retreating Japanese. A
truce was arranged, with Hideyoshi demanding an imperial daughter as con-
sort; resumption of licensed trade between China and Japan; Korean princes
to be sent to Japan as hostages; and sworn promises from high Korean office-
holders that they would never attack Japan. In return, Japan would promise
to return the four northern provinces and the capital of Korea to the king.
Implicitly, therefore, the southern provinces would belong to Japan.
These were amazing terms from a defeated leader, and the Ming court
either was unaware of the conditions or decided to ignore them. In the
closing days of 1596, a Chinese ambassador reached Kyōto for the inves-
titure ceremony of Hideyoshi as king of Japan and vassal of the emperor.
When the envoys read a patronizing letter from the court rather than
the submissive document Hideyoshi expected, he became abusive and, a

few hours later, announced his intention to declare war on China. Again,
the fighting took place in Korea, with the outnumbered Japanese, mostly
from the western domain of Satsuma, inflicting enormous destruction.41
Japanese naval forces did not fare nearly as well. The Koreans had devel-
oped “turtle boats,” so named because their sides were covered with iron
plates and spikes. These thwarted Japanese skills at grappling and board-
ing. Korean ships were also equipped with cannon on all sides, whereas
the Japanese ships had very few. Although the Koreans did not have many
turtle boats, other Chinese and Korean ships proved more maneuverable
than their Japanese counterparts, which were essentially merchant vessels
that had been pressed into wartime service. And the square sails used by
the Japanese were less effective than Chinese and Korean designs with fore
and aft sails.42
Despite the bravery with which its military fought, the Japanese posi-
tion on land may not have been sustainable. Hideyoshi, whose health was
failing, appears to have been considering a withdrawal. When he died, in
1598, a peace agreement was quickly concluded. Rivalry for preeminence
on the Korean peninsula had again brought China and Japan into conflict.
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY

TOKUGAWA ERA
The third unifier, Tokugawa Ieyasu, defeated his adversaries in the epic
battle of Sekigahara in 1600 and set about establishing control over all
of Japan. Even after his success at Sekigahara, Ieyasu’s legitimacy was in
doubt due to the existence of Hideyoshi’s son and designated heir. On his
deathbed, Hideyoshi had had his generals swear allegiance to the boy.
Ieyasu maneuvered carefully. He rewarded the daimyō, mostly from east-
ern Japan, who had fought on his side; took the title of shōgun; and estab-
lished his headquarters at Edo. Ieyasu also cultivated good relations with
the imperial court. He installed a deputy in Kyōto to serve as a channel
of communication between the court and the shōgun, also charging the
official with keeping a close eye on the daimyō of western Japan, in which
area Kyōto is located.
The ability to control foreign relations was a major building block in
establishing the legitimacy of the new shōgun’s government. Reestablishing
control was not as simple as it might sound. The revival of relations with
China was fraught with familiar difficulties. Ieyasu could have petitioned
the Chinese emperor for vassal status, thereby opening the way for trade
that could be used to reward the loyalty of his retainers. But doing so would
have made Ieyasu vulnerable to the same kind of criticism that Ashikaga
Yoshimitsu had been subjected to. In any case, the Ming court, with mem-
ories of Hideyoshi’s invasion fresh in mind, was understandably wary of
Japan. Piracy problems, though not exclusively attributable to Japanese,
much less to the Japanese government, continued to be an irritant.
There were internal pressures to resume trade. The lord of Tsushima,
a poor island whose prosperity depended heavily on trade with Korea,
needed an agreement between Ieyasu and the Korean king to conduct the
trade. Knowing that Korea, as a vassal state of China, would insist that the
letter be phrased in ways that Ieyasu would not accept, the lord in 1606 took
the unusual step of forging one. Since the missive was dated according to
the Ming calendar and referred to Ieyasu as king, a title he had rejected, the
Korean king saw through the ruse immediately. In due course, word of
Tsushima’s ruse reached Ieyasu.
Appropriate punishments were meted out, with all the daimyō pres-
ent in Edo ordered to attend the sentencing so that neither they nor their
descendants would be tempted to engage in similar conduct.43 Ieyasu had
learned a lesson as well. He responded by establishing the sankin kōtai, or
alternate residence system, which required daimyō to spend part of the
year at the shōgun’s castle in Edo and leave their families in the area when
they returned to their domains. This formed an important part of the
Tokugawa system of control.
A series of exchanges between China and Japan covering the years 1611
and 1625 might best be characterized as shadow-boxing. The first letter,
written by an adviser rather than Ieyasu himself, was dated according to the
Japanese calendar, not signed by the shōgun, and did not take the form of a
petition. Its statement that the Ryūkyūan kingdom calls itself Japan’s vas-
sal, whereas the Chinese consider Ryūkyū its vassal state, implies that Japan
has taken China’s place in the celestial order. A reply of sorts, not from the
Ming court but from the military governor of Zhejiang province, offered
direct trade in return for the suppression of piracy. But it was discovered
that this letter to the shōgun was worded identically to a letter to his dep-
uty at the trading port of Nagasaki, thus violating the distinction between
superior and inferior. Further, it addressed the shōgun in a manner deemed

disrespectful to his status. The effort to reestablish relations failed.
The Tokugawa, in essence, sought to establish a separate world order
centered around itself rather than China. Relations with the Korean and
Ryūkyūan kingdoms thus took on special significance. Early shōguns
took care to entertain their foreign embassies lavishly on Japanese soil, to
establish not only their international but also domestic legitimacy. They
attempted to lure Korea out of the Chinese ambit and subordinate itself
to Japan. The Koreans were resistant, as evidenced by their insistence on
using the Ming calendar. However, as the Manchu presence on their bor-
ders increased and the decline of the Ming dynasty left their protector state
less able to defend them, Korean leaders were understandably reluctant to
antagonize Japan. When the Manchus displaced the Ming in 1644, so did
Korea’s use of the Chinese dating system. It was never resumed.
In general, missions from Korea were treated as peers of the bakufu,
whereas those from Ryūkyū were addressed as vassals, received less elegant
lodgings than the Koreans, and, unlike the Koreans, did not receive lav-
ish ceremonial banquets. The Dutch were received at Edo in a still simpler
fashion, since they were not regarded as representing a king or country.
Having rejected official government-to-government relations with China
in 1621, the bakufu relegated the Chinese to the lowest level of its foreign
relations. The Chinese were not allowed to visit Edo at all: matters con-
cerning them were handled by the Nagasaki magistrate’s office in Kyūshu.
As explained by a shōgunal adviser,
Dealing with barbarians is like dealing with slaves, which is

the reason why these matters [of correspondence with China] were
handled by low-ranking vassals like [Hasegawa] Fujihiro and [Gotō]
Mitsutsugu.44
Chinese merchants calling at Nagasaki were required to present a

kind of passport issued by the Nagasaki Office of the Chinese Interpreters
that used language demeaning to the Chinese, was dated according to the
Japanese calendar, and bore what was called a split seal that was reminis-
cent of the trading tallies that the Ming dynasty had required of Japanese
vessels wishing to trade on the China coast. A seal was stamped such
that it overlapped the passport and the Office of the Interpreters’ registry,
enabling the edges to be compared for authenticity. Documents referred to
China as “Tang,” which had vulgar connotations, rather than Great Ming
or, later, Great Qing, as the Chinese would have referred to their coun-
try.45 The obvious intent was to force the appearance of subordination—for
example, if the “Tang” merchants accepted the use of the Japanese calen-
dar, they were implicitly accepting Japan’s central role in the world.
It is clear that the merchants did not lightly accept this interpretation.
When, in order to reduce the number of Chinese ships calling at Nagasaki,
some were sent home empty, the merchants complained to their Japanese
handlers not that they were being excluded from the trade, but that if they
accepted the calendar of the foreign barbarians, meaning Japan, this was
tantamount to subordinating themselves to Japan. Since that was precisely
the intent of the regulations, the merchants’ protests received little sympa-
thy from the Nagasaki authorities.46
THE SAKOKU PERIOD
In a conscious attempt to achieve separation, the shōgun issued three sets of

orders, in 1633, 1635, and 1639, respectively, that closed Japan to most foreign
interaction. No vessel without a valid license could leave Japan for a foreign
country, no Japanese could leave for a foreign country unless he or she had
received approval, and Japanese who resided abroad were to be executed if
they tried to return. An exception would be made if the returnee had been
held abroad against his or her will, had lived in a foreign country for less
than five years, and would agree to never attempt to leave Japan again.
A few Dutch, whose shipbuilding skills the Tokugawa recognized their
need for in view of the problems the Japanese naval forces had encountered
in their invasion of Korea, were allowed to stay, but they were confined
to tightly controlled areas that included the artificial island of Deshima.
Likewise, the shōgun granted some privileges to the Portuguese, whose
arms and ships were also of interest. He had noted the rivalry between
the two European groups, and was able to play one off against the other,
the better to receive foreign goods and knowledge.47 In consequence of the
three decrees, Japan became known as a “closed country” sakoku. Although
it has been convincingly argued that this term arose later and implies far
more closure than actually existed, given trade through Nagasaki and con-
tacts with the Dutch and Portuguese,48 the exclusions did provide space for
the Japanese government to refine its worldview.
A number of protocol problems arose in the course of constructing this

Japan-centric world order. One of the more intractable was what the Tokugawa
ruler should be called in terms of external relations. Clearly, “king” was unac-
ceptable, since it not only implied subordination to the Chinese emperor, but
would also put the shōgun on the level of the ruler of Korea, whom it was
trying to induce to accept vassal status. Shōgun, since it meant only “general,”
was a title even less prestigious in the Chinese world order. Obviously, the
shōgun could not use the title “emperor,” since there was already an indi-
vidual with that title installed in Kyōto, and one who moreover was believed
to be the direct descendant of the gods. The solution finally arrived at, in
the 1630s, was Great Prince of Japan, Nihon-koku Taikun, which became the
standard diplomatic title for the shōgun in foreign relations. Parenthetically,
it is also the origin of the English-language word “tycoon.” Japanese scholars
have argued that the establishment of Great Prince diplomacy represented a
declaration of independence from the Sinocentric world order that had domi-
nated East Asia, and that it was a major factor in Japan’s ability, alone among
the nations of East Asia, to escape colonization or being parceled out among
the European powers in the nineteenth century.49
A Western scholar goes further, believing that the choice of Great Prince
of Japan was more than a declaration of independence from the Sinocentric
world order: it represented the articulation of a Japan-centric world order.
This new, self-sufficient domestic legitimacy structure was henceforth willing
to meet with others autonomously in the diplomatic arena. There were prob-
lems in explicating this structure, not least among which was that it relied on
Chinese norms and terms. There was also the difficulty of rationalizing the
Confucian notion of one ruler under heaven with the Japanese reality of a
ruler that was bifurcated between emperor and shōgun. While the imperial
house was endowed with the symbolism of national authority, it was almost
devoid of power. The opposite was true of the institution of shōgun.
ARAI HAKUSEKI’S PROPOSED REFORMS
A Confucian scholar of the era, Arai Hakuseki, attempted an ambitious

synthesis of the imperial and military institutions, in order to prove that
the authentic ruler should exercise comprehensive authority and that, in
the situation of the time, the shōgun was the authentic person. One of the
first problems he encountered was dealing with the cosmological origins
of the imperial house as described in accounts of the Kamiyo, or Age of the

Gods. Hakuseki tried to establish that this age actually existed historically,
in the manner of the beginnings of Chinese rulership found in the revered
classic Book of History (Shu Jing).
He did this by arguing that the meaning of words does not remain
constant, but rather evolves continuously. Hence, given the fact that Japan
did not at first have its own written language but employed the Chinese
system instead, the original meaning of Japanese words had become over-
laid with Chinese connotations that distorted the written accounts. Also,
Hakuseki pointed out, early compilers were not consistent. Sometimes
they chose characters for their phonetic value, and sometimes for their
meaning. Later commentators built on these errors, providing fanciful
interpretations of the kamiyo accounts solely on the meaning of the char-
acters and ignoring the original Japanese terms that these characters had
been intended to transcribe. Since there are multiple accounts of partic-
ular incidents in the Kojiki, Nihon Shoki, and other accounts, Hakuseki
believed that none should be regarded as definitive.
While this is a plausible argument, Hakuseki chose only those inter-
pretations that fit the conclusions he wanted to reach. The view of the kami
as deities is mistaken, he says: they were actually quite human. Due to a
misconstruction of the sound of a word used in the early compilations, the
floating bridge of heaven that Izanagi and Isanami stood on was not actu-
ally a bridge but a line of warships on the sea. Similarly, the establishment of
a pillar on the island of Onogorojima represented the posting of a symbol of
sovereignty. And the intercourse that Izanagi and Isanami are said to have
engaged in was in reality a pledge to join their armies in battle. According
to this reasoning, the two were human beings who extended civilized rule
over the realm in much the same way as Yao, Shun, and Yü had, according
to the Book of History, brought the regions of China under their rule.
Hakuseki also downplayed the significance of the regalia in order to
weaken those elements of the Ninigi myth that bolstered the idea that sov-
ereignty was legitimately exercisable only in the imperial line. Hence, he
extrapolated, the emperors were neither endowed with an eternal man-
date to rule Japan nor exempt from accountability to heaven. Hakuseki
believed that the imperial line had lost heaven’s trust because the emperors
had proved themselves unworthy. From the mid-fourteenth century on, he
pointed out, the court existed only as a façade. The mandate had passed
to the shōgun. Having established the shōgun as the appropriate holder
of the mandate, however, created another conceptual problem: successive

shōguns had accepted the legitimacy of bifurcated sovereignty.
Hakuseki attempted to solve this problem by referring to the pre-
Tokugawa shōguns as ha, or hegemons, rather than shōgun. Here, he bor-
rows from Chinese history again: in the Spring and Autumn period of
the middle Zhou dynasty, the hegemons showed the legitimate rulers the
respect that subjects owe to their sovereign, but, in fact, they transformed
kingly authority into a hollow shell, thus contributing to further decline
of kingly government and opening themselves to charges of usurpation.
Clearly, Hakuseki’s intent was to establish the philosophical basis for the
legitimacy of the Tokugawa as possessors of the Mandate of Heaven. It is
somewhat ironic that Chinese history is used as the model for a Japanese
world order that its proponents felt to be far superior to the original. The
Chinese court, inwardly oriented and confident in its own superiority,
took no notice.
That Hakuseki believed Japan to be at least the equal of China is
beyond doubt. He avoided referring to the country as Chūgoku, with its
literal meaning of Central Kingdom and associated overtones of superior-
ity. Hakuseki employed a variety of other designators, including a dynasty
name, as in “Great Ming”; “the foreign court”; “the other country”; or—in
the first usage of what was regarded as a derogatory term—Shina.
There were, he believed, great sages in Japan, too. Therefore, it was
absurd that China should be referred to as the Central Kingdom or the
Central “Flowery” (meaning civilized) Kingdom, as if Japanese civiliza-
tion were somehow less civilized. He asserted that China and Japan were
equal in their sovereign status, and that the shōgun was equal in status to
the Chinese emperor. And that, despite China’s claim to exemplify civi-
lization, many of the authentic rites of antiquity were better preserved in
Japan than in China.
Even in antiquity, Hakuseki continued, people in China had noticed
that Japan had maintained rites that had been lost in the decadent days of
the later Zhou dynasty. Moreover, authentic forms of weapons and armor
that were lost after the Qin conquered the Zhou had survived in Japan, as
had items of clothing. In China, said Hakuseki, clothing had changed to
reflect barbarian influence. Although the word “barbarian” was also fre-
quently used to refer to Chinese, Hakuseki obviously had in mind groups
like the Tangut and Jurchen, who conquered parts of China in past history
as the Xixia and Jin dynasties, respectively.
Hakuseki also initiated construction projects whose aim was to make

the shōgunal premises in Edo the equivalent of the imperial court in Kyōto.
At the same time, he attempted to fuse the lines of authority. Drawing on
the model of the Chinese sage Yao voluntarily choosing Shun rather than
his own son to succeed him, and Shun, in turn, choosing Yü, Hakuseki
arranged for the retired emperor Reigen to present Ietsugu, the son and
heir of the recently deceased shōgun Ienobu, with his cap of adulthood.
The intent was to establish a symbolic father–son relationship that implied
Ietsugu might act as the emperor’s heir in other ways as well.
Hakuseki also arranged the marriage of an imperial daughter to a mil-
itary leader. This was unprecedented. Although the daughters of military
leaders had previously married emperors, and the children of such unions
had succeeded to the throne, never before had the daughter of an emperor
married down into a military household.50
The court was in other ways loath to cooperate with Hakuseki’s efforts,
however. The emperor most assuredly did not volunteer to transfer power to
the shōgun in the manner attributed to Yao and Shun, and could not have
been happy with Hakuseki’s analysis that imperial decadence had caused
his lineage to forfeit the Mandate of Heaven. In the end, Hakuseki’s reforms
were almost completely overturned when a new shōgun, Yoshimune,
restored traditional norms. The bifurcation of sovereignty remained, with
the shōgun, at least in theory, exercising power by a grant from the emperor.
At a later date, the bifurcation of sovereignty would be challenged again, in
the direction of restoring power to the emperor.51
FALL OF THE MING DYNASTY
As these events were taking place in Japan, in China, the Ming had from the
early seventeenth century on been exhibiting the classic signs of dynastic
decline. The costs of defending Korea from Japan had sapped the imperial
treasury, and Chinese scholars of the time described the Wanli emperor as
selfish and inattentive to affairs of state. Barbarian enemies, in this case,
the Manchus, were attacking. All of these were considered indications that
the Mandate of Heaven was being lost. Japanese officials were aware of this,
and watched developments in China with growing apprehension. Though
referring to the Chinese as “barbarians,” they were obviously aware of dis-
tinctions among barbarians, and ranked the Manchus significantly below
the Chinese. There were also vivid memories of the attempted Mongol inva-
sions. Although their failure was interpreted as a manifestation of the com-
mitment of Japanese gods to protect the territory of the sun goddess, no one
appeared anxious to test the willingness of the gods to protect the country
from a Manchu repeat of the Mongol actions.
In the forty-year period following the fall of the Ming in 1644, the
bakufu received a series of letters from Ming loyalists requesting help. At
least one argued that the “Tatars” had been enemies of Japan from ancient
times, and pointed out that it was the Ming who had defeated the Mongols/
Tatars. The author thereby implied that there was a debt to be paid and rea-
soned that, in light of “historic friendship” an alleged between Japan and
the Ming, it was only proper for troops to be dispatched to help restore the
dynasty. These requests were rejected on various grounds, including the
facts that no formal relations had existed between the countries for a hun-
dred years, and that Japan had formally adopted a policy of exclusion.
An equally important reason may have been that the numerous letters
came from different individuals, each claiming to represent the true Ming
claimant to the throne. Although there was considerable support for send-
ing troops, the shōgun and his advisers could not be sure to whom they
should be sent. Moreover, the various claimants appeared to be as eager to
fight each other as the Manchus.52 There seemed little serious hope that a
restoration was feasible; one of the last of the pretenders, seemingly oblivi-
ous to the erosion of his position, was described as “madly singing in a leaky
boat.”53 In hindsight, the decision not to send troops was a wise one: the
Manchus, ruling as the Qing dynasty, did not attack or even harass Japan.
KOKUGAKU
Under the Tokugawa, Japan experienced an unusually long respite from

war, either internal or external. A kind of proto-industrialization evolved.
The transportation infrastructure that had been improved to meet the
needs of the sankin kōtai system was used by many others besides lords
and their retinues. It facilitated the circulation of merchants and their
wares, books, theatrical performances, and works of art among the dif-
ferent areas of the country. With relatively high literacy rates, rising
prosperity, and a highly urbanized population—Edo, at over a million
people, has been described as the largest city in the world at the start
of the eighteenth century, with Kyōto and Ōsaka comparable in size to

London and Paris—a vibrant popular culture developed. Since Japan was
relatively isolated from the outside world, this culture developed with
very little external influence.
One of the manifestations of this synergy of literacy, urbanity, pros-
perity, infrastructure, and isolation was the development of a keen interest
in the past. This included a rethinking of the relationship between nativ-
ism and Confucianism, which had co-existed reasonably comfortably
throughout the seventeenth century. Japanese scholars of Confucius found
verification for the sage’s premises in Japanese history, tried to harmo-
nize Confucian truths with the native truths of Shintō, and attempted to
apply Confucian political principles to their government’s structure. They
might even, as Arai Hakuseki had done, argue that Japanese history had
respected such Confucian virtues as loyalty and obedience in a way that
was superior to China.
Nativists and Confucianists shared a number of basic tenets: that
there was a Way; that conformity to it yielded blessings to both individu-
als and their communities; and that life in the past was preferable to life
in the present. Therefore, one should seek to resurrect the elements of
this ancient perspective within the present. However, with the develop-
ment of kokugaku, or national studies, in the mid-and late eighteenth
centuries, scholars tended to hold the introduction of foreign doctrines
such as Confucianism and Buddhism responsible for the disruption of
this ancient perfection. They argued that these alien doctrines had dis-
turbed the spiritual harmony that existed in the distant past and con-
tinued to do so. Different schools of analysis, and differences of opinion
within each school, compound the difficulties of summarizing kokugaku.
For example, some kokugaku scholars believed that it was acceptable to
study Confucianism, but only after one had properly purified one’s mind
of the unconscious accretions of its categories of thought. Others felt that
Confucianism should be ignored as dangerous and misleading. Some
argued that an indigenous written language had existed prior to the intro-
duction of Chinese characters, others that the ancient Japanese had no
need for a writing system, relying instead on their powers of memoriza-
tion, while developing superior intellects in the process.54
Nonetheless, one common theme was the desire of kokugaku schol-
ars to ascertain the character of the society before the intrusion of foreign
doctrines, to probe what was purely Japanese. The ambiguities inherent
in doing so have been discussed above, and kokugaku scholars had the
same tendency as Arai Hakuseki to find justification for what they wanted
to through selective interpretation of the available texts. As the move-
ment progressed, there was a tendency to cast foreign doctrines in more
of an antagonistic relationship to what was typically portrayed as a naive,
unlettered, and purer past. This had been guided by Shintō, the Way of the
Gods, that was sufficient for all their needs, from ordering both daily lives
and the governance of the realm.
As a case in point, writing in the late seventeenth century, Tokugawa
Mitsukuni (1628–1701), daimyō of Mito and patron of kokugaku, could say
merely that, although it was natural for the people of China to call their
country “central flower [civilization],” Japanese should speak of their own
land as the central flower,55 positing an equality between the two countries.
Later scholars, however, would assert that Japanese civilization was not
only equal but also superior to Chinese civilization. Shintō revival was a
common feature of kokugaku scholarship as the eighteenth century pro-
gressed. One of its advocates argued that Shintō should not be known by
that name, a Chinese-derived pronunciation of the characters that caused
confusion with the Way of the Chinese sages, but as “kami no michi,” the
Way of the [Japanese] Gods. This was not so much an attempt at Shintō
revival as Shintō restoration, since its central concern was to return the
doctrine to its original form— unaffected by interaction with foreign
thought systems. 56
One of the most renowned of the kokugaku scholars, Kamo no Mabuchi,

writing in the mid-eighteenth century, posited the existence of a “true heart,”
magokoro, or ancient Japanese heart, yamatogokoro, juxtaposing it with the
Chinese heart, karagakoro, that had corrupted it. Reminding later scholars
of French postmodernist thinker Michel Foucault, Mabuchi and others felt
that, through careful analysis of ancient texts, the true Way could be intu-
ited.57 However, they would have differed sharply with Foucault in his rejec-
tion of the notion that norms and standards existed, and that there was a
preordained order to the right governance of human beings.
Mabuchi’s true Way of Heaven and Earth believed Buddhism to be evil,
since it “made men stupid,” but felt Confucianism to be far worse. It was a
human invention that reduced the spirit of heaven and earth to something
exceedingly trivial. Another prominent scholar, Sadao Miyahiro, believed
that many of the ills that had befallen Japan were due to the wrath of the
kami in protest against the malevolent influence of Buddhism. Among its
bad effects was the stagnation of population growth, since so many people
had entered monasteries or nunneries.58
As kokugaku developed, there was a tendency to look down upon and
reject Chinese civilization as a whole. China had had a succession of dynas-
ties; Japan—putatively, at least—only one. Moreover, whereas Japan had
always been ruled by Japanese, China had many times been conquered and
administered, in whole or in part, by barbarians. A cultural chauvinism
developed that would exacerbate Chinese–Japanese relations. Kokugaku
would also lead to calls to restore the emperor. In an era when the quality of
the reigning shōgun tended to decline, scholarship that supported a return
to the original, pre-Chinese influenced Way could and was used to return
to a putatively superior time when the emperor ruled supreme. Since one of
the evidences that Japan was superior to China was the assertion that Japan
had had only one line of emperors, descending directly from the sun god-
dess, a return to first principles demanded a return to imperial rule.
A Japanese scholar has described kokugaku as Japan compensating
for feelings of inferiority by defining itself through its relationship with
the “unforgettable other” of China in order to achieve parity.59 A Western
scholar of Japan characterizes the background against which this intel-
lectual discourse took place as the working out of oedipal feelings about
Chinese civilization.60
CONCLUSIONS
China and Japan had constructed essentially similar worldviews, save that
each was at the center of its own world order, regarding the other as inferior.
Since Qing China and Tokugawa Japan essentially ignored each other, and
since certain countries such as Korea and Ryūkyū were willing to main-
tain relations with each, separately, this caused little conflict. This smug
self-satisfaction and splendid isolation were about to be challenged by a
different set of newcomers with a very different concept of world order, the
Westphalian notion of numerous sovereign states interacting on the basis of
equality. Initially regarded by the Chinese as barbarians who came by sea,
the newcomers would neither allow themselves to be ignored nor acknowl-
edge a position of inferiority to China or Japan. The two countries reacted
very differently to their presence, with consequences of immense magnitude
to the Asian balance of power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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proposal originated.
57. If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law,

and the Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
amendments to which the House of Representatives will not
agree, and if after an interval of three months the House of
Representatives, in the same or the next session, again passes
the proposed law with or without any amendments which have
been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the
Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
agree, the Governor-General may dissolve the Senate and the
House of Representatives simultaneously. But such dissolution
shall not take place within six months before the date of the
expiry of the House of Representatives by effluxion of time.
If after such dissolution the House of Representatives again
passes the proposed law, with or without any amendments which
have been made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate, and the
Senate rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with
agree, the Governor-General may convene a joint sitting of the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. The
members present at the joint sitting may deliberate and shall
vote together upon the proposed law as last proposed by the
House of Representatives, and upon amendments, if any, which
have been made therein by one House and not agreed to by the
other, and any such amendments which are affirmed by an
absolute majority of the total number of the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives shall be taken to have
been carried, and if the proposed law, with the amendments, if
any, so carried is affirmed by an absolute majority of the
total number of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it shall be taken to have been duly passed by
both Houses of the Parliament, and shall be presented to the
Governor-General for the Queen's assent.
58. When a proposed law passed by both Houses of the

Parliament is presented to the Governor-General for the
Queen's assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion,
but subject to this Constitution, that he assents in the
Queen's name, or that he withholds assent, or that he reserves
the law for the Queen's pleasure. The Governor-General may
return to the house in which it originated any proposed law so
presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments
which he may recommend, and the Houses may deal with the
recommendation.
59. The Queen may disallow any law within one year from the
Governor-General's assent, and such disallowance on being made
known by the Governor-General by speech or message to each of
the Houses of the Parliament, or by Proclamation, shall annul
the law from the day when the disallowance is so made known.
60. A proposed law reserved for the Queen's pleasure shall not
have any force unless and until within two years from the day
on which it was presented to the Governor-General for the
Queen's assent the Governor-General makes known, by speech or
message to each of the Houses of the Parliament, or by
Proclamation, that it has received the Queen's assent.
CHAPTER II. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT.
61. The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the

Queen and is exerciseable by the Governor-General as the
Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and
maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the
Commonwealth.
62. There shall be a Federal Executive Council to advise the

Governor-General in the government of the Commonwealth, and
the members of the Council shall be chosen and summoned by the
Governor-General and sworn as Executive Councillors, and shall
hold office during his pleasure.
63. The provisions of this Constitution referring to the
Governor-General in Council shall be construed as referring to
the Governor-General acting with the advice of the Federal
Executive Council.
64. The Governor-General may appoint officers to administer

such departments of State of the Commonwealth as the
Governor-General in Council may establish. Such officers shall
hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General. They
shall be members of the Federal Executive Council, and shall
be the Queen's Ministers of State for the Commonwealth. After
the first general election no Minister of State shall hold
office for a longer period than three months unless he is or
becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives.
{160}
65. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Ministers of

State shall not exceed seven in number, and shall hold such
offices as the Parliament prescribes, or, in the absence of
provision, as the Governor-General directs.
66. There shall be payable to the Queen, out of the

Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Commonwealth, for the
salaries of the Ministers of State, an annual sum which, until
the Parliament otherwise provides, shall not exceed twelve
thousand pounds a year.
67. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the appointment

and removal of all other officers of the Executive Government
of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the Governor-General in
Council, unless the appointment is delegated by the
Governor-General in Council or by a law of the Commonwealth to
some other authority.
68. The command in chief of the naval and military forces of

the Commonwealth is vested in the Governor-General as the
Queen's representative.
69. On a date or dates to be proclaimed by the

Governor-General after the establishment of the Commonwealth
the following departments of the public service in each State
shall become transferred to the Commonwealth:—Posts,
telegraphs, and telephones: Naval and military defence:
Lighthouses, lightships, beacons, and buoys: Quarantine. But
the departments of customs and of excise in each State shall
become transferred to the Commonwealth on its establishment.
70. In respect of matters which, under this Constitution, pass

to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, all powers
and functions which at the establishment of the Commonwealth
are vested in the Governor of a Colony, or in the Governor of
a Colony with the advice of his Executive Council, or in any
authority of a Colony, shall vest in the Governor-General, or
in the Governor-General in Council, or in the authority
exercising similar powers under the Commonwealth, as the case
requires.
CHAPTER III. THE JUDICATURE.
71. The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in

a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of
Australia, and in such other federal courts as the Parliament
creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal
jurisdiction. The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice,
and so many other Justices, not less than two, as the
Parliament prescribes.
72. The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts
created by the Parliament—
(i.) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:

(ii.) Shall not be removed except by the Governor-General in
Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in
the same session, praying for such removal on the ground of
proved misbehaviour or incapacity:
(iii.) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may

fix; but the remuneration shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
73. The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such

exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament
prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments,
decrees, orders, and sentences—
(i.) Of any Justice or Justices exercising the original

jurisdiction of the High Court:
(ii.) Of any other federal court, or court exercising federal

jurisdiction; or of the Supreme Court of any State, or of any
other court of any State from which at the establishment of
the Commonwealth an appeal lies to the Queen in Council:
(iii.) Of the Inter-State Commission, but as to questions of

law only: and the judgment of the High Court in all such cases
shall be final and conclusive. But no exception or regulation
prescribed by the Parliament shall prevent the High Court from
hearing and determining any appeal from the Supreme Court of a
State in any matter in which at the establishment of the
Commonwealth an appeal lies from such Supreme Court to the
Queen in Council. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the
conditions of and restrictions on appeals to the Queen in
Council from the Supreme Courts of the several States shall be
applicable to appeals from them to the High Court.
74. No appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in Council from

a decision of the High Court upon any question, howsoever
arising, as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional
powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States,
or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of
any two or more States, unless the High Court shall certify
that the question is one which ought to be determined by Her
Majesty in Council. The High Court may so certify if satisfied
that for any special reason the certificate should be granted,
and thereupon an appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council on
the question without further leave. Except as provided in this
section, this Constitution shall not impair any right which
the Queen may be pleased to exercise by virtue of Her Royal
prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High
Court to Her Majesty in Council. The Parliament may make laws
limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked, but
proposed laws containing any such limitation shall be reserved
by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's pleasure.
75. In all matters—
(i.) Arising under any treaty:
(ii.) Affecting consuls or other representatives of other

countries:
(iii.) In which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being

sued on behalf of the Commonwealth, is a party:
(iv.) Between States, or between residents of different

States, or between a State and a resident of another State:
(v.) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or an

injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth:
the High Court shall have original jurisdiction.
76. The Parliament may make laws conferring original

jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter—
(i.) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its
interpretation:
(ii.) Arising under any laws made by the Parliament:
(iii.) Of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction:
(iv.) Relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the

laws of different States.
77. With respect to any of the matters mentioned in the last

two sections the Parliament may make laws—
(i.) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal court other than

the High Court:
(ii.) Defining the extent to which the jurisdiction of any

federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or
is invested in the courts of the States:
(iii.) Investing any court of a State with federal

jurisdiction.
{161}
78. The Parliament may make laws conferring rights to proceed

against the Commonwealth or a State in respect of matters
within the limits of the judicial power.
79. The federal jurisdiction of any court may be exercised by

such number of judges as the Parliament prescribes.
80. The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of

the Commonwealth shall be by jury, and every such trial shall
be held in the State where the offence was committed, and if
the offence was not committed within any State the trial shall
be held at such place or places as the Parliament prescribes.
CHAPTER IV. FINANCE AND TRADE.
81. All revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive

Government of the Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated
Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for the purposes of the
Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges and
liabilities imposed by this Constitution.
82. The costs, charges, and expenses incident to the

collection, management, and receipt of the Consolidated
Revenue Fund shall form the first charge thereon; and the
revenue of the Commonwealth shall in the first instance be
applied to the payment of the expenditure of the Commonwealth.
83. No money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the

Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law. But until
the expiration of one month after the first meeting of the
Parliament the Governor-General in Council may draw from the
Treasury and expend such moneys as may be necessary for the
maintenance of any department transferred to the Commonwealth
and for the holding of the first elections for the Parliament.
84. When any department of the public service of a State

becomes transferred to the Commonwealth, all officers of the
department shall become subject to the control of the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth. Any such officer who
is not retained in the service of the Commonwealth shall,
unless he is appointed to some other' office of equal
emolument in the public service of the State, be entitled to
receive from the State any pension, gratuity, or other
compensation, payable under the law of the State on the
abolition of his office. Any such officer who is retained in
the service of the Commonwealth shall preserve all his
existing and accruing rights, and shall be entitled to retire
from office at the time, and on the pension or retiring
allowance, which would be permitted by the law of the State if
his service with the Commonwealth were a continuation of his
service with the State. Such pension or retiring allowance
shall be paid to him by the Commonwealth: but the State shall
pay to the Commonwealth a part thereof, to be calculated on
the proportion which his term of service with the State bears
to his whole term of service, and for the purpose of the
calculation his salary shall be taken to be that paid to him
by the State at the time of the transfer. Any officer who is,
at the establishment of the Commonwealth, in the public
service of a State, and who is, by consent of the Governor of
the State with the advice of the Executive Council thereof,
transferred to the public service of the Commonwealth, shall
have the same rights as if he had been an officer of a
department transferred to the Commonwealth and were retained
in the service of the Commonwealth.
85. When any department of the public service of a State is

transferred to the Commonwealth—
(i.) All property of the State of any kind, used exclusively

in connexion with the department, shall become vested in the
Commonwealth; but, in the case of the departments controlling
customs and excise and bounties, for such time only as the
Governor-General in Council may declare to be necessary:
(ii.) The Commonwealth may acquire any property of the State,

of any kind used, but not exclusively used in connexion with
the department: the value thereof shall, if no agreement can
be made, be ascertained in, as nearly as may be, the manner in
which the value of land, or of an interest in land, taken by
the State for public purposes is ascertained under the law of
the State in force at the establishment of the Commonwealth:
(iii.) The Commonwealth shall compensate the State for the

value of any property passing to the Commonwealth under this
section; if no agreement can be made as to the mode of
compensation, it shall be determined under laws to be made by
the Parliament:
(iv.) The Commonwealth shall, at the date of the transfer,

assume the current obligations of the State in respect of the
department transferred.
86. On the establishment of the Commonwealth, the collection

and control of duties of customs and of excise, and the
control of the payment of bounties, shall pass to the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth.
87. During a period of ten years after the establishment of

the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise
provides, of the net revenue of the Commonwealth from duties
of customs and of excise not more than one-fourth shall be
applied annually by the Commonwealth towards its expenditure.
The balance shall, in accordance with this Constitution, be
paid to the several States, or applied towards the payment of
interest on debts of the several States taken over by the
Commonwealth.
88. Uniform duties of customs shall be imposed within two

years after the establishment of the Commonwealth.
89. Until the imposition of uniform duties of customs—
(i.) The Commonwealth shall credit to each State the revenues

collected therein by the Commonwealth.
(ii.) The Commonwealth shall debit to each State—
(a) The expenditure therein of the Commonwealth

incurred solely for the maintenance or continuance, as at
the time of transfer, of any department transferred from
the State to the Commonwealth;
(b) The proportion of the State, according to the
number of its people, in the other expenditure of the
Commonwealth.
(iii.) The Commonwealth shall pay to each State month by month

the balance (if any) in favour of the State.
{162}
90. On the imposition of uniform duties of customs the power

of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise,
and to grant bounties on the production or export of goods,
shall become exclusive. On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs all laws of the several States imposing duties of customs
or of excise, or offering bounties on the production or export
of goods, shall cease to have effect, but any grant of or
agreement for any such bounty lawfully made by or under the
authority of the Government of any State shall be taken to be
good if made before the thirtieth day of June, one thousand
eight hundred and ninety-eight, and not otherwise.
91. Nothing in this Constitution prohibits a State from

granting any aid to or bounty on mining for gold, silver, or
other metals, nor from granting, with the consent of both
Houses of the Parliament of the Commonwealth expressed by
resolution, any aid to or bounty on the production or export
of goods.
92. On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade,

commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means
of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely
free. But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods
imported before the imposition of uniform duties of customs
into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the goods
remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into
another State within two years after the imposition of such
duties, be liable to any duty chargeable on the importation of
such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty paid in
respect of the goods on their importation.
93. During the first five years after the imposition of

uniform duties of customs, and thereafter until the Parliament
otherwise provides—
(i.) The duties of customs chargeable on goods imported into a

State and afterwards passing into another State for
consumption, and the duties of excise paid on goods produced
or manufactured in a State and afterwards passing into another
State for consumption, shall be taken to have been collected
not in the former but in the latter State:
(ii.) Subject to the last subsection, the Commonwealth shall

credit revenue, debit expenditure, and pay balances to the
several States as prescribed for the period preceding the
imposition of uniform duties of customs.
94. After five years from the imposition of uniform duties of

customs, the Parliament may provide, on such basis as it deems
fair, for the monthly payment to the several States of all
surplus revenue of the Commonwealth.
95. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the

Parliament of the State of Western Australia, if that State be
an Original State, may, during the first five years after the
imposition of uniform duties of customs, impose duties of
customs on goods passing into that State and not originally
imported from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth; and such
duties shall be collected by the Commonwealth. But any duty so
imposed on any goods shall not exceed during the first of such
years the duty chargeable on the goods under the law of
Western Australia in force at the imposition of uniform
duties, and shall not exceed during the second, third, fourth,
and fifth of such years respectively, four-fifths, three-fifths,
two-fifths, and one-fifth of such latter duty, and all duties
imposed under this section shall cease at the expiration of
the fifth year after the imposition of uniform duties. If at
any time during the five years the duty on any goods under
this section is higher than the duty imposed by the
Commonwealth on the importation of the like goods, then such
higher duty shall be collected on the goods when imported into
Western Australia from beyond the limits of the Commonwealth.
96. During a period of ten years after the establishment of

the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise
provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any
State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks
fit.
97. Until the Parliament otherwise provides, the laws in force

in any Colony which has become or becomes a State with respect
to the receipt of revenue and the expenditure of money on
account of the Government of the Colony, and the review and
audit of such receipt and expenditure, shall apply to the
receipt of revenue and the expenditure of money on account of
the Commonwealth in the State in the same manner as if the
Commonwealth, or the Government or an officer of the
Commonwealth, were mentioned whenever the Colony, or the
Government or an officer of the Colony, is mentioned.
98. The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to

trade and commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to
railways the property of any State.
99. The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of

trade, commerce, or revenue, give preference to one State or
any part thereof over another State or any part thereof.
100. The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of

trade or commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the
residents therein to the reasonable use of the waters of
rivers for conservation or irrigation.
101. There shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such
powers of adjudication and administration as the Parliament
deems necessary for the execution and maintenance, within the
Commonwealth, of the provisions of this Constitution relating
to trade and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder.
102. The Parliament may by any law with respect to trade or

commerce forbid, as to railways, any preference or
discrimination by any State, or by any authority constituted
under a State, if such preference or discrimination is undue
and unreasonable, or unjust to any State; due regard being had
to the financial responsibilities incurred by any State in
connexion with the construction and maintenance of its
railways. But no preference or discrimination shall, within
the meaning of this section, be taken to be undue and
unreasonable, or unjust to any State, unless so adjudged by
the Inter-State Commission.
103. The members of the Inter-State Commission—
(i.) Shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council:
(ii.) Shall hold office for seven years, but may be removed
within that time by the Governor-General in Council, on an
address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session
praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour
or incapacity:
(iii.) Shall receive such remuneration as the Parliament may

fix; but such remuneration shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office.
{163}
104. Nothing in this Constitution shall render unlawful any

rate for the carriage of goods upon a railway, the property of
a State, if the rate is deemed by the Inter-State Commission
to be necessary for the development of the territory of the
State, and if the rate applies equally to goods within the
State and to goods passing into the State from other States.
105. The Parliament may take over from the States their public
debts as existing at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or
a proportion thereof according to the respective numbers of
their people as shown by the latest statistics of the
Commonwealth, and may convert, renew, or consolidate such
debts, or any part thereof; and the States shall indemnify the
Commonwealth in respect of the debts taken over, and
thereafter the interest payable in respect of the debts shall
be deducted and retained from the portions of the surplus
revenue of the Commonwealth payable to the several States, or
if such surplus is insufficient, or if there is no surplus,
then the deficiency or the whole amount shall be paid by the
several States.
CHAPTER V. THE STATES.
106. The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall,

subject to this Constitution, continue as at the establishment
of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment
of the State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance
with the Constitution of the State.
107. Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has

become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this
Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State,
continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at
the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may
be.
108. Every law in force in a Colony which has become or

becomes a State, and relating to any matter within the powers
of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this
Constitution, continue in force in the State; and, until
provision is made in that behalf by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State shall have such
powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law
as the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a
State.
109. When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the

Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall,
to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
110. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the

Governor of a State extend and apply to the Governor for the
time being of the State, or other chief executive officer or
administrator of the government of the State.
111. The Parliament of a State may surrender any part of the

State to the Commonwealth; and upon such surrender, and the
acceptance thereof by the Commonwealth, such part of the State
shall become subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth.
112. After uniform duties of customs have been imposed, a

State may levy on imports or exports, or on goods passing into
or out of the State, such charges as may be necessary for
executing the inspection laws of the State; but the net
produce of all charges so levied shall be for the use of the
Commonwealth; and any such inspection laws may be annulled by
the Parliament of the Commonwealth.
113. All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquids

passing into any State or remaining therein for use,
consumption, sale, or storage, shall be subject to the laws of
the State as if such liquids had been produced in the State.
114. A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament
of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military
force, or impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to
the Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on
property of any kind belonging to a State.
115. A State shall not coin money, nor make anything but gold
and silver coin a legal tender in payment of debts.
116. The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing
any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for
prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
117. A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not

be subject in any other State to any disability or
discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if
he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.
118. Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the

Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the
judicial proceedings of every State.
119. The Commonwealth shall protect every State against

invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government
of the State, against domestic violence.
120. Every State shall make provision for the detention in its
prisons of persons accused or convicted of offences against
the laws of the Commonwealth, and for the punishment of
persons convicted of such offences, and the Parliament of the
Commonwealth may make laws to give effect to this provision.
CHAPTER VI. NEW STATES.

121. The Parliament may admit to the Commonwealth or establish
new States, and may upon such admission or establishment make
or impose such terms and conditions, including the extent of
representation in either House of the Parliament, as it thinks
fit.
122. The Parliament may make laws for the government of any
territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the
Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen under
the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the
representation of such territory in either House of the
Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it thinks fit.
123. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent

of the Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority
of the electors of the State voting upon the question,
increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the limits of the
State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and
may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the
effect and operation of any increase or diminution or
alteration of territory in relation to any State affected.
124. A new State may be formed by separation of territory from

a State, but only with the consent of the Parliament thereof,
and a new State may be formed by the union of two or more
States or parts of States, but only with the consent of the
Parliaments of the States affected.
{164}
CHAPTER VII. MISCELLANEOUS.
125. The seat of Government of the Commonwealth shall be

determined by the Parliament, and shall be within territory
which shall have been granted to or acquired by the
Commonwealth, and shall be vested in and belong to the
Commonwealth, and shall be in the State of New South Wales,
and be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney.
Such territory shall contain an area of not less than one
hundred square miles, and such portion thereof as shall
consist of Crown lands shall be granted to the Commonwealth
without any payment therefor. The Parliament shall sit at
Melbourne until it meet at the seat of Government.
126. The Queen may authorise the Governor-General to appoint

any person, or any persons jointly or severally, to be his
deputy or deputies within any part of the Commonwealth, and in
that capacity to exercise during the pleasure of the
Governor—General such powers and functions of the
Governor-General as he thinks fit to assign to such deputy or
deputies, subject to any limitations expressed or directions
given by the Queen; but the appointment of such deputy or
deputies shall not affect the exercise by the Governor-General
himself of any power or function.
127. In reckoning the numbers of the people of the

Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth,
aboriginal natives shall not be counted.
CHAPTER VIII. ALTERATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
128. This Constitution shall not be altered except in the

following manner:—The proposed law for the alteration thereof
must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the
Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months
after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall
be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote
for the election of members of the House of Representatives.
But if either House passes any such proposed law by an
absolute majority, and the other House rejects or fails to
pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the first
mentioned House will not agree, and if after an interval of
three months the first-mentioned House in the same or the next
session again passes the proposed law by an absolute majority
with or without any amendment which has been made or agreed to
by the other House, and such other House rejects or fails to
pass it or passes it with any amendment to which the
first-mentioned House will not agree, the Governor-General may
submit the proposed law as last proposed by the
first-mentioned House, and either with or without any
amendments subsequently agreed to by both Houses, to the
electors in each State qualified to vote for the election of
the House of Representatives. When a proposed law is submitted
to the electors the vote shall be taken in such manner as the
Parliament prescribes. But until the qualification of electors
of members of the House of Representatives becomes uniform
throughout the Commonwealth, only one-half the electors voting
for and against the proposed law shall be counted in any State
in which adult suffrage prevails. And if in a majority of the
States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed
law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve
the proposed law, it shall be presented to the
Governor-General for the Queen's assent. No alteration
diminishing the proportionate representation of any State in
either House of the Parliament, or the minimum number of
representatives of a State in the House of Representatives, or
increasing, diminishing, or otherwise altering the limits of
the State, or in any manner affecting the provisions of the
Constitution in relation thereto, shall become law unless the
majority of the electors voting in that State approve the
proposed law.
----------CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRALIA: End--------
CONSTITUTION OF AUSTRIA: Parliamentary reform of, 1896.
See (in this volume)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: A. D. 1895-1896.

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Middle Kingdom and Empire of the

Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations,

Past and Present

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

1. Getting to the Present  3

2. China, Japan, and the Coming of the West, 1835–​1945 33

The Opium War and the Unequal Treaties  35

3. Wary Engagement, 1945–​1969  82

China Becomes a Nuclear Power  114

4. The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1969–​1972  127

5. The Golden Age of Sino-​Japanese Relations, 1972–​1989  156

6. Tarnished Gold, 1990–​2006  188

Voices of Moderation in China  205

7. Contradictions Deepen, 2006–​2015  215

8. Economic Rivalry  249

9. Mutual Military Apprehensions  281

The Sword Reemerges in Japan  288

10. Taiwan between Two Powers  320

11. Conclusions  357

Sino-​Japanese tensions have gone through several turbulent peri-

By the mid-​nineteenth century, the shrinking distances afforded by

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER

The entity currently known as China, and hereafter referred to by that

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JAPANESE STATE

EARLY SINO-​JAPANESE CONTACTS

Archaeological evidence indicates similarities between stone tools that

Because of its proximity of access to the Korean peninsula, the

CHINA GAINS INFLUENCE OVER JAPAN

themselves as the center of their own diplomatic order.13 In behavior con-

THE TAIKA REFORMS

of future imperial consorts and regents, proclaimed direct imperial rule.

NATIVIST ELEMENTS RETURN

publication of the Man’yōshu, began to flourish again. When the imperially

NOT QUITE SEPARATE, WHETHER OR NOT EQUAL

Although the Mongol invasions had a positive effect on Japanese con-

Another letter, written by the Hongwu emperor himself, reads in part:

A Japanese reply of 1382 was defiant and provocative, openly denying

THE MING, THE FALL OF THE ASHIKAGA,

Gaining Ming recognition of its legitimacy and consequent control of

the submissive document Hideyoshi expected, he became abusive and, a

SINO-​JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY

superior and inferior. Further, it addressed the shōgun in a manner deemed

Dealing with barbarians is like dealing with slaves, which is

Chinese merchants calling at Nagasaki were required to present a

THE SAKOKU PERIOD

In a conscious attempt to achieve separation, the shōgun issued three sets of

A number of protocol problems arose in the course of constructing this

ARAI HAKUSEKI’S PROPOSED REFORMS

A Confucian scholar of the era, Arai Hakuseki, attempted an ambitious

of the imperial house as described in accounts of the Kamiyo, or Age of the

of the mandate, however, created another conceptual problem: successive

Hakuseki also initiated construction projects whose aim was to make

FALL OF THE MING DYNASTY

1. Getting to the Present 3

2. China, Japan, and the Coming of the West, 1835–1945 33

The Opium War and the Unequal Treaties 35

3. Wary Engagement, 1945–1969 82

China Becomes a Nuclear Power 114

4. The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1969–1972 127

5. The Golden Age of Sino-Japanese Relations, 1972–1989 156

6. Tarnished Gold, 1990–2006 188

Voices of Moderation in China 205

7. Contradictions Deepen, 2006–2015 215

8. Economic Rivalry 249

9. Mutual Military Apprehensions 281

The Sword Reemerges in Japan 288

10. Taiwan between Two Powers 320

11. Conclusions 357

Sino-Japanese tensions have gone through several turbulent peri-

By the mid-nineteenth century, the shrinking distances afforded by

EARLY SINO-JAPANESE CONTACTS

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE EARLY