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Volume 1: Beginnings to 1996 A. J.

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A. J. Jacobs
The Korean
Automotive Industry,
Volume 1
Beginnings to 1996
The Korean Automotive Industry, Volume 1
A. J. Jacobs
The Korean
Automotive Industry,
Volume 1
Beginnings to 1996
A. J. Jacobs
Department of Sociology
East Carolina University
Greenville, NC, USA
ISBN 978-3-030-86346-3 ISBN 978-3-030-86347-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86347-0
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Acknowledgments
I would like to dedicate this book to my friend Dr. Seongjin Jeong, whose
invitation to present a paper at Gyeongsang National University in Jinju,
South Korea, sparked the writing of this book. I also would like to give
special thanks to Letizia Imbres and Thorsten Wiechmann at the Tech-
nische Universitat Dortmund for including me in their special “Traveling
Conference Ulsan” in November 2019.
Next, I would like to acknowledge: Hyung-Je Jo of the University of
Ulsan for helping me better understand Korean automakers; Jennifer E.
Jones of East Carolina University’s Joyner library for her relentless pursuit
of interlibrary loan materials on my behalf (during a pandemic no less);
Minzy Koh for organizing my travel to Jinju; and Scott Jacobs for his
review of two chapters.
I also would like to recognize: Marcus Ballenger at Palgrave for his
continued confidence in my work (three books and counting); June
Thomas for introducing my research to Dr. Imbres; and Richard Child
Hill for preparing me to write such a book. Dr. Hill introduced me to the
auto industry in the 1980s and Korean political economy in the 1990s. I
also met Dr. Jeong in his course.
Finally, I am eternally grateful to my daughter, Ruiko Mei Kimura
Jacobs, for her stellar proofreading of this manuscript.
v
Contents
Part I The Rise of South Korea’s Auto Industry:

Beginnings to 1996
1 Introduction and Overview: The Rise of the Korean
Auto Industry 3
2 The State and Development in South Korea: From Yi
to Early Park 25
3 Park’s Engineering of a South Korean Auto Industry:
Beginnings to 1979 59
4 The Korean Auto Industry’s Post-Park Emergence
Between Crises: 1980–1996 97
Part II Korean Carmaker Stories, 1962–1996

5 Daewoo, Shinjin, and the Forerunners of GM Korea:
6 Kia Motors, from Bikes to Cars: Beginnings to 1996 201
7 Hyundai Motor Part I: From Construction to Cars,
8 Hyundai Motor Company Part II—Rapid Growth
and Internationalization: 1987–1996 271
vii
viii CONTENTS
9 Dong-A and Shinjin Jeep Beget Ssangyong Motor:

10 The Origins of Samsung Motors: Beginnings to 1996 343
Part III Volume 1—Conclusion and Summary

11 The Korean Auto Industry, 1962–1996: Summary,
Conclusion, and Prelude to Volume 2 369
Index 409
About the Author
A. J. Jacobs is a Professor of Sociology at East Carolina University. His

other recent books include: The Automotive Industry and European Inte-
gration: The Divergent Paths of Belgium and Spain (2019), Automotive
FDI in Emerging Europe: Shifting Locales in the Motor Vehicle Industry
(2017), and The ‘New Domestic’ Automakers in the U.S. and Canada:
History, Impacts, and Prospects (2016).
ix
Abbreviations
4WD/4x4 Four-wheel drive vehicle

AMC American Motors Corporation
CAD or C$ Canadian Dollar(s)
captive imports Cars built abroad by the Big Three
Automakers that are sold in North America.
These vehicles generally are imported duty-
free.
CBU Completely built units or fully assembled
vehicles
Chosen Pre-Colonial Korea under the Yi Dynasty,
aka Choson or Joseon
CIH Cam-in-head engine
CKD Complete Knockdown Kit—The manufac-
turing of most or all of the parts and
components for a specific vehicle by one
factory, which then packages and ships them
to a second plant which assembles them
into a motor vehicle (usually in a different
country). This is usually done to avoid
import taxes on finished vehicles
CMOS Complementary metal oxide semiconductors
CUSFTA Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
DHI Daewoo Heavy Industries
xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS
DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DOHC Double overhead Camshaft engine
DRAM Dynamic Random-Access Memory
East Sea Also known as the Japan Sea
EPB Economic Planning Board
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FSD Fabryka Samochodow Dostawczych or
“Delivery Vehicle Factory”
FSL or FSC Lublin Fabryka Samochodow w Lublinie or “Vehicle
Factory in Lublin”
FSO Fabryka Samochodow Osobowych or “Pas-
senger Car Factory”
FWD Front-wheel drive vehicle
GM General Motors
Goryeo Ancient name for part of Korea (aka Koryeo)
Gukmincha People’s Car, aka kukmincha or kookmincha
Gyeonggi Province “Area Surround the Capital”
Gyeongseong Seoul’s name under Japanese occupation
in the Korean reading (aka Kyungsung ),
meaning capital city. Formerly known as
Hanyang and Hansong
HACI Hyundai Auto Canada, Inc.
Hankook Jadongcha Korea Motors (aka Han’guk Jadongcha)
Hansong Seoul during the Yi Dynasty (Hanseong ) or
“Castle on the Han”
Hanyang Capital of Silla Dynasty. Name of Seoul prior
to the Yi Dynasty, meaning “Northside of
the Han River”
HCI Heavy and Chemical Industry Plan
HDH Motors Ha Dong-hwan or Hadonghwan Motors
HMA Hyundai Motor America
HMMA Hyundai Motor Manufacturing America
hp Horsepower
Hyeondae Jadongcha Hyundai (“Modern”) Motor
I-4 Inline four-cylinder engine
IMF International Monetary Fund
JPY Japanese Yen
Jusik Hoesa (JH) Company, Limited or Corporation
ABBREVIATIONS xiii
KCIA Korean Central Intelligence Agency

KD Knockdown kits used to assemble cars, see
CKD and SKD
KDB Korean Development Bank
Keijo The Japanese reading for Gyeongseong
(Seoul) under Japanese Occupation,
meaning capital city. Formerly Hanyang
and Hansong
KiaJadongcha Kia (“Rising out of Asia”) Motors
Kia Saneob Jusik Hoesa Kia Industries Co., Ltd, precursor to Kia
Motors
KOSPI Korea Composite Stock Price Index
KRH Korean Hwan, currency prior to June 1962
KRW Korean Won
Kukje Charyang Jejak Kukje (“International”) Vehicle Manufac-
turing
Kuksan Jadongcha Kuksan (“National”) Motors
Kyungsung Precision The former name of Kia Motors
L Engine size in liters, as in 2.0L
LDV the renamed Leyland DAF Vans
LSI Large-scale integration—A technology for
creating memory chips with thousands of
transistors
MDA Manufacturing Development Act, some-
times also known as Industrialization Devel-
opment Law (IDL)
MMC Mitsubishi Motors
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFE Ministry of Finance & Economy
MOTIE Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy
mpg Miles per gallon
MPVs Multi-purpose vehicles and minivans
MTI Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI), some-
times called the Ministry of Commerce &
Industry and later MOTIE
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAND Not-And flash memory
NEDP National Economic Development Plan
xiv ABBREVIATIONS
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development
OFDI Outward FDI by Korean enterprises
OHC engine Overhead camshaft engines
OHV engine Overhead value engines
R&D Research and development
ROM Read-only memory
RWD Rear-wheel drive vehicle
Samsung Samhoe Samsung (“Three Stars”) Trading Company
SCNR Supreme Council for National Reconstruc-
tion
SCNSM Special Committee for National Security
Measures
Segyehwa Internationalization policies of President
Young-sam Kim
SHI Samsung Heavy Industries
SHIC Ssangyong Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.
SKD Semi-knockdown kits—The breaking down
and packaging of certain vehicle parts for
shipment to another plant for final assembly.
This is usually done to avoid import taxes on
finished vehicles, and allows for more some
local content than CKD
SOHC Single Overhead Camshaft Engine
South Sea Also known as the Korea Strait
SPVs Special-purpose vehicles
SRAM Static Random-Access Memory
Ssangyong “Twin Dragons” Motors
UAW United Auto Workers
UNKRA United Nations Korean Reconstruction
Agency
USD, $US or $ U.S. Dollar(s)
USITC U.S. International Trade Commission
UVs Sport-utility vehicles, aka CUVs for
crossover utility vehicles
V-6 or V-8 Six- and eight-cylinder engines arranged in a
V shape
VER Voluntary Export Restraint, forced, the
American and Canadian Governments
ABBREVIATIONS xv
pushed Japanese automakers to accept

self-imposed quotas on imported of their
vehicles into the two countries.
VLSI Very Large-Scale Integration—a technology
used to create microprocessors and memory
chips
VW Volkswagen
West Sea Known in China as the Yellow Sea
WTO World Trade Organization
Yen Japanese Yen
Administrative Divisions of South Korea

Do Province
dong Neighborhood within a municipality
eup Town
Gu Special autonomous administrative wards or
boroughs of Seoul
gu Ward of a Metropolitan city
gun County
Gwangyeok-si Metropolitan City
Jikhal-si Directly Governed City, became Gwangyeok-si in
1995
Korean English
myeon Township
ri Village
si or shi City
Teukbyeol-jachido Special self-governing province status given to Jeju
Teukbyeol-jachisi Special status given to Sejong as the new national
capital
Teukbyeol-si Special City status given to Seoul as the national
capital
List of Figures
Fig. 3.1 Finished vehicles assembled in South Korea, 1962–1979 70

Fig. 4.1 South Korean vehicles produced, domestic vehicle sales,
and exports, 1979–1996 101
xvii
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Progression of Korea’s vehicle plants, 1955–1979 62

Table 3.2 South Korean vehicle capacity and production by plant,
December 1979 87
Table 5.1 Daewoo motors existing and planned domestic vehicle
plants, December 1996 151
Table 5.2 Daewoo group domestic finished vehicle production,
sales, exports, 1962–1996 153
Table 5.3 Daewoo existing and planned foreign vehicle plants,
December 1996 186
Table 6.1 Kia-Asia Motors existing and planned domestic vehicle
Table 6.2 Kia-Asia domestic finished vehicle production, sales,
exports, 1962–1996 205
Table 6.3 Kia Motors existing and planned foreign KD vehicle
Table 7.1 Hyundai group existing and planned domestic vehicle
Table 7.2 Hyundai group domestic finished vehicle production,
sales, and exports, 1968–1996 246
Table 8.1 Hyundai existing and planned foreign vehicle plants,
December 1996 295
Table 9.1 Ssangyong Motor domestic vehicle plants and foreign
KD assembly, December 1996 319
Table 9.2 Ssangyong & predecessors domestic vehicle production,
sales, exports, 1974–1996 320
xix
xx LIST OF TABLES
Table 10.1 Samsung Group existing and planned vehicle plants,

December 1996 355
Table 11.1 Finished vehicles assembled in South Korea by type,
1965–1996 372
Table 11.2 Finished vehicles assembled in South Korea by group,
1965–1996 373
Table 11.3 Korean KD kits produced and sold by vehicle group,
1989–1996 376
Table 11.4 South Korean finished vehicle exports by group,
1975–1996 377
Table 11.5 Korean domestic vehicle sales market share by group,
1965–1996 383
Table 11.6 Korean domestic car sales share by group, 1965–1996 384
Table 11.7 Existing and planned domestic plants by vehicle group,
January 1997 389
PART I
The Rise of South Korea’s Auto Industry:

Beginnings to 1996
CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Overview: The Rise

of the Korean Auto Industry
Introduction
In 1962, the Republic of Korea (South Korea or Korea) assembled just
1167 new motor vehicles. This total slowly increased to 49,545 in 1975,
then jumped to 378,162 in 1985, before soaring to 2,812,714 in 1996.
In the latter year, the Hyundai Motor Group produced 1,341,990 of
these vehicles, the Kia Motor Group 756,773, and Daewoo Motors
632,674. This growth transformed Korea from the globe’s 15th ranked
vehicle producing nation in 1985 into the seventh largest in 1996.1
Hyundai and Kia would internationalize their production bases, merge
in 1998 in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and finally together
become the world’s fifth largest automotive group during the 2010s. In
the process, Korea’s vehicle plants would go on to assemble 3,950,614
vehicles in 2019, retaining the nation’s position as the world’s seventh
largest producer in that year. South Korea also ranked fifth among all
nations in terms of vehicles assembled per capita in 2019, at 78 per 1000
inhabitants. At that time, it trailed only the small countries of Slovakia,
Czechia, and Slovenia, and the mighty Japan.2
1 Ward’s (1972–2020), KAMA (1990–2018).

2 Calculated by author from OICA (2021) production figures and World Bank (2021)
population data.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

Switzerland AG 2022
A. J. Jacobs, The Korean Automotive Industry, Volume 1,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86347-0_1
4 A. J. JACOBS
What explains this remarkable growth? The answer is complex, and

involves a combination of supportive State intervention, timely tech-
nology alliances with foreign firms, a skilled, diligent, and historically
low-paid labor force, aggressive vehicle pricing, the gumption of a
handful of entrepreneurs, and fortuitous global circumstances. Nonethe-
less, despite the amazing ascent of Hyundai–Kia and its nation’s industrial
prowess, comparatively little has been written in English about Korea’s
automakers or its vehicle factories. Although there have been a number
of fine doctoral dissertations, there have been only a handful of books
published in English that chronicle the history of the Korean automobile
industry.3 In addition, almost all of the works that do exist focus upon
Hyundai Motor, with very coverage of the country’s other automakers.
The first of a two-volume set, this 11-chapter book seeks to help
fill this void by providing in-depth examinations of all six of Korea’s
automakers—Hyundai, Kia, Asia, Daewoo, Ssangyong, and Samsung—
from their beginnings through 1996. These case-study narratives are
bookended by chapters that outline Korea’s historical development
context, the institutional environment for the auto industry’s emergence
(1962–1979) and rapid growth (1979–1996), and the future prospects
for each automaker at the start of 1997 (1997–2010). These chap-
ters, as well as each of the automaker case-study essays, are purposefully
written from the perspective of industry analysts at the time (i.e., without
knowledge of the impending Asian Fiscal Crisis).
To start this process, this introductory overview chapter draws upon
some of the most important English-language scholarship on the topic
to delineate the Korean auto industry’s four historical stages of devel-
opment between 1962 and 1996. It then offers brief summaries of the
ten remaining chapters of the book and some background information
regarding the research conducted to complete this manuscript.
Overall, the two-volume set’s historical approach seeks to expand the
English-language knowledge of Korea’s domestic auto industry and its
automakers. It is hoped that its content will not only help Western
scholars better understand the factors driving Korea’s rapid growth, but
also aid governments in their decisions to support their own domestic
3 For some fine English-language dissertations on the topic, see: Lew (1992), Lee
(1993, 1997), Chae (1999), Hong (2000), Lee (2001, 2002). The six books are: Kirk
(1994), Steers (1999), Hyun (2003), Jeong (2004), Lansbury et al. (2007), Chung
(2019).
1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: THE RISE OF THE KOREAN … 5
industries and to forge more insightful international trade pacts. In

the process, both volumes should prove informative to practitioners,
scholars, and students interested in automotive history, international
political economy, domestic economic development, governance, regional
planning, and Asian studies.
The Four Stages of the Korean

Auto Industry, 1962–1996
Although they may have disagreed on terminology and/or the purposes
motivating government actions, the English-language scholarship gener-
ally has concluded that South Korea’s rapid economic growth of 1960s
to the early 1990s was driven by a state-led, export-oriented, late indus-
trializer development approach that was greatly influenced by prewar and
postwar Japan. As discussed in Chapter 2, after the fall of Syngman Rhee’s
crony capitalist regime in 1960, President Chung-hee Park embarked
upon his “Look East” agenda. This framework melded prewar Japan’s
authoritarian and conglomerate-led “catch up to the West” industrial-
ization (i.e., “rich country, strong army”) with postwar Japan’s export-
oriented economic nationalism and income doubling strategy. The result
was the incredibly rapid economic growth that came to be known as
the “The Miracle on the Han,” which unfortunately was accompanied
by tight controls on political opposition, civil liberties, and labor power.4
Although much sparser, the literature on Korea’s auto industry has
generally categorized its emergence and rapid growth in similar terms.
According to these studies, the government policies introduced at the
sector’s launch drew inspiration from Japan’s 1936 Automobile Manufac-
turing Industry Law. Within this framework, Park’s Ministry of Trade and
Industry (MTI) determined which firms could enter the domestic motor
vehicle industry, assemble and sell which type of vehicles, and produce
at what scale. Then, under Park’s Heavy and Chemical Industrialization
4 I deliberately do not get into the scholarly argument here as to whether Korea had a
developmental-state or not. This is discussed to some degree in Chapter 2. For some of
the many important examples of this scholarship in English, see Kim and Roemer (1981),
Deyo (1987), Petri (1988), Amsden (1989), Haggard (1990), Lee and Yamazawa (1990),
Song (1990), Wade (1990), Cho and Kim (1991), Vogel (1991), Woo (1991), Woronoff
(1992), World Bank (1993), Kohli (1994), Shin (1996), Leipziger (1997), Sakong and
Koh (2010), and Kim and Vogel (2011).
6 A. J. JACOBS
(HCI) drive of the 1970s, it attempted to rationalize its automakers as

part of a strategy to promote the rapid increase in vehicle exports and
to create a national champion automaker that could compete on the
world stage. Although the forging of a monopolistic producer was never
realized, with MTI having to settle for an oligopoly of Hyundai, Kia,
and Daewoo, the government managed to prevent its largest chaebol,
Samsung, from producing passenger cars until after 1996 (see Chapters 3
and 4).5
A review of the literature also suggests that the Korean auto industry
experienced four stages of development between 1962 and 1996. It
is important to point out, however, that the nation’s three largest
automakers progressed through these stages at their own pace. In the
first, nascent stage, low volume, licensed knockdown (KD) kit vehicle
assembly was undertaken solely for the domestic market. Commencing
with Korea’s Automobile Industry Promotion Plan and Automobile
Industry Protection Law in 1962, production was strictly regulated
by MTI and heavily subsidized by the State and overseas automakers.
Domestic firms were completely dependent upon foreign technology and
instruction during this stage. Whereas Kia (Mazda), Saenara (Nissan),
and Shinjin (Isuzu, Mitsubishi, and then Toyota) relied upon Japanese
automakers, Asia Motors turned to Fiat of Italy and Hyundai to Ford of
America, with total domestic output during this emerging phase peaking
at 30,994 in 1970.6
In the second, periphery production stage, foreign automakers were
attracted to Korea by its relatively skilled, inexpensive, and government-
harnessed labor force and a tradition of manufacturing that dated back to
the Japanese colonialization period. These attributes made the nation the
perfect production base for foreign automakers seeking to find an indirect
sales channel into the heavily protected domestic market and/or export
their vehicles to Asian locales. On the flip side, Korean automakers and the
government viewed these moderately sized joint ventures as a means of
5 For more on this, see: Kim and Lee (1983), KAMA (1990–2018), Green (1992),
Lew (1992), Lee (1993, 1997), Watanabe (1993), Kirk (1994), Rhee (1994), McDermott
(1995), Stern et al. (1995), Hong (2000), Chung (1998, 2003, 2009), Lee (2001, 2002),
Jeong (2004), Lansbury et al. (2007), Jacobs (2016), Lee and Mah (2017), and Hyun
(2020).
6 Ibid. While similar in name, these four stages are not meant to match Rostow’s
(1960) five stages of economic growth.
acquiring technology and knowhow from the far more advanced foreign
firms.7
Phase two began with the dissolution of the Shinjin–Toyota and
Hyundai–Ford alliances and their replacement by more extensive part-
nerships between Shinjin and General Motors of America in 1972, and
Hyundai and Mitsubishi in 1973. It was propelled by the promulgation
of President Park’s Long-Term Plan for the Development of Heavy and
Chemical Industry (HCI Plan), which supplied the framework for the
country’s rapid export-led economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s.8
Among the policies evolving concurrent to the HCI initiative and
the subsequent Long-Term Development Plan for the Auto Industry of
1974, were the government’s pronouncements that the nation would
build 500,000 cars per year by 1980 and export 75,000 vehicles annu-
ally by 1981. Related to this, MTI directed domestic automakers to focus
their efforts on developing an affordable/$2000 “People’s Car,” of which
they were to produce 50,000 units per year and equip with 95% domestic
content. This was an ambitious agenda considering the country assem-
bled only 26,314 vehicles in 1973, none of which were exported abroad
during that year.9
To foster the achievement of these milestones, the Korean Govern-
ment waived import tariffs on raw materials utilized to create domestically
produced parts and offered special financing and greater access to foreign
loans to automakers directly investing in the native parts sector. In addi-
tion, MTI began cultivating a core group of Tier-I, II, and III automotive
suppliers that could work closely with vehicle manufacturers. Finally,
between 1978 and 1979, it set a new production target of two million
vehicles in 1986, selected the automotive industry as one of its ten
strategic export industries eligible for special government assistance, and
introduced a new plan promoting the development of locally designed
mid-size sedans by 1982.10
The Korean auto industry’s periphery phase lasted through 1982, with
annual output during this stage hitting a zenith of 204,447 in 1979.
7 Ibid. For other discussions of periphery stage auto production, see Ellingstad (1997),
Pavlinek (1998, 2002, 2017), and Humphrey et al. (2000).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
8 A. J. JACOBS
Final vehicle assemblies then fell to 123,135 in 1980 and 109,837 in

1981, before rebounding to 162,590 in 1982. These contractions would
be Korea’s last production declines for 17 years. Similar to the stalled
growth of the mid-1970s, the 1980–1981 back-pedaling was induced
by the 1979 global energy crisis and an ensuing worldwide economic
recession. In response to these periods of stagnation, MTI rationalized its
automotive sector, first pushing Kia to takeover Asia Motors in 1976 and
then by terminating Kia’s permit to produce passenger cars in 1981. A
government-directed merger of Hyundai and Shinjin’s failing successor,
Saehan Motors, however, was blocked by GM, which held a 50% stake in
the venture.11
In the third, export-led takeoff stage, Korean automakers began to
make significant in-roads in both domestic and foreign markets, with
rapid production growth initially spurred by overseas sales and then by
expanding local demand. Phase three officially commenced in February
1983, with the opening of Hyundai’s first North American sales office
in Toronto, Canada. With the U.S. and Canadian Governments having
forced Japanese automakers to accept a so-called Voluntary Export
Restraint (VER) quota on their vehicle imports in May 1981 and June
1982, respectively, a new opportunity was created for Korean automakers.
The largest producer, Hyundai, was first to capitalize on this, aided by the
technological support of Mitsubishi Motors of Japan.12
This effort began with the export launch of the Hyundai Pony II to
Canada in late 1983, with the first 19 dealer sales coming that December.
Purchases of the bargain-priced Pony jumped to 56,000 in 1985, pushing
Korean vehicle exports to 123,110 in that year. In addition to the
Japanese VER, the Pony’s low sticker price (C$5795/$4640) and sales
growth were made possible by Canada’s tariff rules of origin program,
which recognized Korea as a lesser developed country until January 1,
1987. This enabled Hyundai to import its cars into the country duty-
free. In contrast, due to its outdated emission system, sales of the Pony
were prohibited in America.13
11 Ibid.
12 Jacobs (2016).
13 Ward’s (1972–2020), Hyun and Lee (1989), Lee (1993), and Jacobs (2016).
Vehicle deliveries at home also began to ascend briskly during this

period, increasing from 140,942 in 1982 to 246,282 in 1985.14 To capi-
talize on this rising demand at home and abroad, and heavily subsidized
by the policies and programs implemented under the umbrella of the HCI
Plan, Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo all commenced construction on new
integrated vehicle assembly complexes. Hyundai again was first, launching
its new 300,000-capacity Passenger Car Plant #1 in Ulsan in February
1985, and dedicating it to the production of its new Excel subcompact.15
The Excel would become a popular at home, but make its biggest
splash in America, where Hyundai established its first sales office near
Los Angeles in April 1985. Four months later, in hopes of limiting
potential trade friction, the automaker also announced plans to construct
a 100,000-capacity east of Montreal, Quebec, Canada; as mentioned
before, South Korea also was set to lose its special developing nation status
in Canada on January 1, 1987. Mitsubishi Motors and the Mitsubishi
Corporation again supported these endeavors, expanding their combined
stake in Hyundai Motor to 15% and agreeing to purchase 30,000
Ulsan-built Excel in Japan and sell them as the re-badged Mitsubishi
Precis.16
After registering its first sales in March 1986, the Excel would register
a phenomenal 168,882 retail deliveries in America in 1986, well above
Hyundai’s expectations of a combined 100,000 over the first three years.
This time, the Korean automaker not only greatly benefitted from the
Japanese VER, but also by a rapidly rising Japanese Yen (JPY) versus
the US Dollar, which enabled the Excel to be priced $1500 to $3000
lower than comparable Japanese models. Re-authorized to produce cars
in alliance with Mazda and Ford, Kia followed with exports to America of
the Ford Festiva mini-compact at its upgraded Sohari Plant in early 1987;
the car was sold as the Kia Pride in Korea. Not to be outdone, Daewoo
Motors, which had replaced Shinjin’s creditors as a 50/50 partner with
GM in Incheon, next introduced its Pontiac LeMans to the U.S. in June
1987; it was marketed as the Daewoo LeMans at home. Classified by
North American Governments as “captive imports” of Ford and GM, the
14 KAMA (1990–2018).
15 Hyun and Lee (1989), Chung (1998, 2003), and Jacobs (2016).
16 Ibid.
10 A. J. JACOBS
Festiva and LeMans both were imported to the U.S. and Canada duty-
free, keeping their costs down as compared with competitor imports (see
Chapters 5–7).17
Over the remaining four years of the takeoff stage, finished vehi-
cles assembled in Korea expanded to more than one million in 1988,
before ballooning to nearly 1.5 million in 1991. Meanwhile, domestic
sales peaked at 1,104,184 in the latter year. In contrast, after soaring
to 576,134 in 1988, including 480,119 units shipped to America and
407,719 delivered by Hyundai, vehicle exports fell to 342,372 in 1991.18
Trade friction, stemming from Korea’s nearly $9 billion trade surpluses
with the U.S. in both 1988 and 1989, put the brakes on the growth.
More than half of this imbalance was generated by the automotive
industry, particularly related to the 288,895 U.S. dealer sales of the Excel
and Precis in 1988. Hyundai’s stalled and then sputtering launch of its
first overseas plant in Quebec did not help matters. Conversely, to support
the Canadian factory, Hyundai became the first Korean automaker to
export KD kits of its own designed cars in 1989. This advancement,
coupled with expanding exports to Europe, would help nudge the Korean
auto industry toward its next stage of development.19
In the fourth, early maturation and internationalization stage, Korea’s
domestic vehicle sales continued their upward trajectory, export desti-
nations began to diversify significantly, and native automakers made
substantial financial commitments to expand their production footprints
both at home and abroad. This stage began in 1992, when finished
vehicle exports rebounded to 417,708 and deliveries to Western Europe
surpassed 100,000 for the first time. The following November, Korea’s
six existing automakers—Hyundai and its affiliate Hyundai Precision
Industries, Kia and its subsidiary Asia Motors, Daewoo, and Ssangyong—
separately announced plans to invest a combined $20 billion and double
annual domestic capacity to 6.5 million in 2000.20
In addition to their declared greenfield projects at home, Hyundai
and Kia planned to launch a series of small foreign KD joint ventures
17 Ward’s (1972–2020), and Jacobs (2016).

18 KAMA (1990–2018).
19 Ward’s (1972–2020), Jacobs (2016), and Lee and Mah (2017).
20 McDermott (1995), Chu (1997), Chae (1999), Chung (1998, 2003), Lee (2001),
Hyun (2003), Jeong (2004), Lautier (2004), Lansbury et al. (2007), and Jacobs (2016).
with local actors, primarily in developing Asia. Hyundai latter committed

to build full-fledged vehicle manufacturing complexes in Turkey and
India. Conversely, Daewoo, outlined an extremely aggressive agenda for
acquiring existing vehicle factories in Eastern Europe and opening joint
venture assembly plants in emerging Asia. Matching Hyundai, the ulti-
mate goal of this strategy was to turn Daewoo Motors into one of the
world’s ten largest carmakers by 2000 (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8).21
The six automakers’ domestic and internationalization expansion drives
were highly incentivized by the neo-liberal and Segyehwa (international-
ization) policies introduced by newly elected President Young-sam Kim
in February 1993. Kim also approved Samsung’s application to build
passenger cars in 1993, after three prior presidents, Park, Chun, and Roh,
all had opposed granting permission to Korea’s second largest chaebol.
The sweetener swaying Kim was Samsung’s decision to locate its plant in
the City of Busan, the heart of the new leader’s political base.22
Scheduled to launch in 1998 through a technology tie-up with Nissan
of Japan, Samsung Motors’ foray in the industry was expected to both
shake up a domestic market that already was suffering from overcapacity
and help make the nation’s vehicles more internationally competitive.
Conversely, Kim’s initiatives did little to improve management–labor
relations, nor did they prevent the shuttering of Hyundai’s failed Cana-
dian plant in September 1993. By then, the factory had been overrun
by production process problems and product quality issues, a sign that
not even Hyundai, let alone the Korean auto industry, had reached full
maturity as a carmaker.23
Annual vehicle output roared past two million in 1994, on its way to
2,812,714 in 1996. Although slowing after 1993, domestic sales still had
advanced nearly 50% since 1991, to 1,644,132 in 1996. In the meantime,
exports would finally again near their 1988 peak levels in 1993, before
doubling to 1,210,157 in 1996. Predictably, Hyundai Motor captured
almost 50% of the domestic sales market and delivered roughly 45% of the
nation’s exports in that year. With Kia and Ssangyong Motor both badly
faltering financially, and Daewoo expanding everywhere, it appeared at the
21 Ibid.
22 Hong (2000), Lee (2001, 2002), Ravenhill (2003), Jeong (2004), and Lee and Lee
(2007).
23 Ibid.
12 A. J. JACOBS
start of 1997 that the Korean auto industry’s drive to maturity would be
led by the country’s three of largest conglomerates, Hyundai, Samsung,
and Daewoo. That was until something called the Asian Fiscal Crisis got
in the way.
Overview of Book
The remainder of this introduction provides an overview of its ten
proceeding chapters. As outlined in the Table of Contents, this volume
is presented in three parts: I. The Rise of South Korea’s Auto Industry:
Beginnings to 1996; II. Korean Carmaker Stories, 1962 to 1996; and
III. Volume 1—Conclusion and Summary. The body of the book and
Part I begins with Chapter 2, “The State and Development in South
Korea: From Yi to Early Park.” This essay provides a cursory histor-
ical outline of South Korea’s context for development through 1972. It
begins with brief discussions of its Koryo (936–1392) and Chosun/Yi
(1392–1910) periods, before introducing some of the pivotal events
connecting the Japanese colonization period (1910–1945) and the Rhee
Regime (1945–1960) with South Korea’s post-World War II economic
growth. Chapter 2 then concludes with some commentary regarding the
rapid transformation of the Korean economy during the early Park Era
(1961–1972). This sets the stage for the discussions in Chapters 3 and 4
reviewing the State’s role in the creation and development of a domestic
automobile industry.
Chapter 3, “Park’s Engineering of a South Korean Auto Industry:
Beginnings to 1979,” chronicles the emergence of the Korean auto
industry from its beginnings to 1979. It opens with a brief review of
the industry’s embryonic phase up until the Rhee Regime (1948–1960).
This is followed by two sections that discuss the Park Government’s
forging of the foundation for a domestic automobile industry (1961–
1967) and subsequent weaning of its native automakers (1967–1972).
The essay next examines Korea’s development of a gukmincha (“People’s
Car”) under the direction of Park’s Heavy and Chemical Industrial Drive
or HCI Plan (1973–1979). It then closes with a summary of the rise
of the Korean auto industry under Park. Chapter 3 also provides some
concluding thoughts regarding the development context at the end of
Park’s reign in 1979.
Serving as a continuation of the prior essay, Chapter 4, “The Korean
Auto Industry’s Post-Park Emergence between Crises: 1980 to 1996,”
examines the plight of the Korean auto industry from the second
global energy crisis through the end of 1996/just months prior to the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It begins with an overview of the political-
economic context for the auto industry’s development during the Chun
Regime (1980–1988). This includes discussions of the Park to Chun tran-
sition period, how growing trade friction between Japanese automakers
and Western nations created an opening for Korean exports, particu-
larly from Hyundai, and of the tumultuous end to the Chun Regime.
These sections are followed by brief examinations of the evolving context
under the Roh (1988–1993) and Young-sam Kim (1993–1996) Regimes.
During the former period, auto industry growth slowed, as Korean
vehicle exports began to confront trade friction of their own from North
America. In contrast, during the latter period, Korean automakers expe-
rienced a second takeoff, as Kim’s liberalization policies fueled capacity
expansions at home and abroad. This resulted in a more than doubling
of exports. Chapter 4 closes with a summary of the essay’s key points and
offers a look at the status of the Korean auto industry at the start of 1997.
Part II begins with Chapter 5, “Daewoo, Shinjin, and the Forerun-
ners of GM Korea: Beginnings to 1996.” The first of six case-study
essays, this chapter outlines the history of Daewoo Motors between 1937
and 1996. It begins with a section discussing the automaker’s nascent
period (1937–1966), when National Motors became Saenara Motors and
then was taken over by Shinjin Industries. This is followed by sections
reviewing Shinjin’s alliance with Toyota of Japan (1967–1972), Shinjin’s
failed alliance with GM (1972–1979), and GM’s early partnership with
the Daewoo Group (1979–1987). The chapter then offers sections chron-
icling Daewoo Motors’ divorce from GM and then blossoming during the
late 1980s and early 1990s (1987–1992), leading to its aggressive inter-
nationalization under the Daewoo Vision 2000 plan (1993–1996). The
latter strategy sought to turn the firm into one of the world’s ten largest
automakers. The chapter concludes with a summary of the automaker’s
history and status at the start of 1997.
Chapter 6, “Kia Motors, From Bikes to Cars: Beginnings to 1996,”
outlines the history of Kia Motors between 1944 and 1996. It begins with
a section discussing the firm’s early years as a maker of bicycles, licensed
Honda motorcycles, and then Mazda-based, three-wheel trucks (1937–
1971). This is followed by two sections that chronicle the launch of Kia
Industries’ Sohari vehicle plant and its first passenger car (1972–1976),
and that examine the firm’s takeover of Asia Motors and temporary loss of
14 A. J. JACOBS
its government permit to produce cars (1976–1981). The second half of

the chapter reviews how an alliance with Ford Motor of America enabled
Kia to reenter the car business (1982–1987). It then delves into the
renamed Kia Motors’ rapid plant expansion period at home and initial
efforts to establish an international footprint (1987–1996). The chapter
then closes with a summary of the automaker’s growth path through
1996 and a brief assessment of its future at the start of 1997.
Chapter 7, “Hyundai Motor Part I: From Construction to Cars,
Beginnings to 1987,” is the first of two chapters on Korea’s largest
automaker, Hyundai Motor. It begins with two sections outlining
the conglomerate’s origins as Hyundai Construction (1937–1960) and
the automaker’s creation and early alignments with Ford Motor and
Mitsubishi Motors (1961–1976). These are followed by two segments
that delve into the development of the Hyundai Pony (1977–1983) and
the immediate success of the Hyundai Excel in North America (1983–
1986). A fifth section then examines the impacts on Hyundai Motor
resulting from tumultuous social and labor unrest of 1987. The chap-
ter’s conclusion briefly summarizes the automaker’s record through 1987
and serves as a lead into Chapter 8.
Chapter 8, “Hyundai Motor Company Part II: Rapid Growth and
Internationalization: 1987–1996,” serves as the second of two chapters
on Korea’s largest automaker. It begins by describing how the Hyundai
“Excel Phenomenon” provoked trade friction with the U.S. and Canada
(1987–1988). This is followed by a discussion of the unsteady launch
of Hyundai’s Canadian Plant in Bromont, Quebec (1988–1992). The
third through fifth sections chronicle the automaker’s rapid expansion
and internationalization during the first half of Young-sam Kim’s national
regime (1993–1996). This includes discussions of Hyundai’s substan-
tial domestic plant construction activities at the time, including major
enlargements in Ulsan, and the openings of its Jeonju commercial vehicle
and Asan sedan plants. In addition, the sudden demise of its Canadian
factory and the automaker’s new overseas production initiatives, primarily
in the Developing World, are reviewed. The chapter concludes with a
summary of Hyundai’s growth path and future at the start of 1997.
Chapter 9, “Dong-A and Shinjin Jeep Beget Ssangyong Motor: Begin-
nings to 1996,” outlines the history of Ssangyong Motor and its prede-
cessor automakers. It begins with sections chronicling the rise of the
Ssangyong chaebol (1939–1983), the slow emergence of HDH Motors
(1954–1983), and the short-lived run of Shinjin Jeep’s collaboration
with American Motors (1969–1983). These discussions are followed

by a brief review of the Ssangyong chaebol’s takeover of Dong-A,
which targeted its most important asset, the Korando SUV line of the
former Geohwa/Shinjin Jeep (1984–1992). The chapter then closes with
a section that examines Ssangyong Motor’s Young-sam Kim Regime-
inspired boom-and-bust period (1993–1996), followed by a conclusion
assessing its prospects for the future at the start of 1997.
Chapter 10, “The Origins of Samsung Motors: Beginnings to 1996,”
chronicles the trials and tribulations of Samsung Motors, beginning with
a brief review of the rise to the top of the Samsung chaebol under
its founder Byung-chull Lee (1936–1980). This is followed by sections
discussing Samsung’s first attempt to enter the auto industry through
an alliance with Chrysler Motors (1981–1988), and reviewing Samsung
Heavy Industries’ (SHI) authorization as a commercial vehicle maker
through an alliance with Nissan Diesel. During this period, the Samsung
conglomerate also attempted to enter the car production business by
taking control of Kia Motors (1988–1993). Thereafter, Samsung’s give
and take with the Young-sam Kim Government is described, a compro-
mise that would see Samsung relinquish its hold on Kia, win permission to
enter the car business in December 1994, and culminate in the establish-
ment of an independent car manufacturer, Samsung Motors, on March
28, 1995 (1993–1996). The chapter then concludes with a review of
Samsung Motors’ ambitious plans at the onset of 1997, an agenda intro-
duced without any inkling of the impending financial crisis that would
wreak havoc on Asia.
Part III consists of Chapter 11, “The Korean Auto Industry, 1962–
1996: Summary, Conclusion, and Prelude to Volume 2,” which closes the
book by providing a summary of the key trends regarding the Korean auto
industry through 1996. It then presents more enhanced future outlooks
for all five of the nation’s automakers at the dawn of 1997. As in the other
case-study chapters, these assessments are written as a snapshot in time,
as if the researcher and reader have no knowledge that the impending
Asian Crisis is just on the horizon. The chapter concludes with a section
that serves to prepare the reader for the author’s second volume on the
Korean auto industry by offering a preview of some of the changes to the
nation’s automakers brought upon by the crisis.
In regard to the last subject matter, it became fairly evident early
in the writing process that one volume was not enough to do justice
to the Korean auto industry. As a result, with the consent of Palgrave
16 A. J. JACOBS
Macmillan, the manuscript was split into two volumes, beginnings to

1996 and post-Asian Crisis to 2020. Nonetheless, it is hoped that the
writing style, historical approach, and material covered within this first
volume stands on its own, and therefore, proves useful to both academic
and non-academic audiences.
Some Notes on the Research Process

The origins of this project date back to 1995, when the author
conducted the rudimentary research required for an unpublished paper
that compared Korea’s development trajectory at the time to Japan. After
a long period of dormancy, the second phase in the process occurred
between 2009 and 2012, when the author completed research for two
academic articles and two book chapters. Whereas the first set examined
the factors driving the rapid growth of Hyundai’s hometown, Ulsan, the
second pair chronicled the collaborative regional strategies that led to
the construction in America of the Hyundai Montgomery and Kia West
Point vehicle plants. In the latter papers, the author dubbed the 110-plus
mile, 10-county bi-state, assembly and transplant supplier corridor around
Interstates 65 and 85 in Alabama and Georgia, the “Hyundai-Kia Auto
Valley.”24
The author’s knowledge of Korean automakers in North America was
expanded further during the research for his book: The New Domestic
Automakers in the United States and Canada: History, Impacts, and
Prospects. This 500-page monograph published in 2016 included two
original chapters chronicling Hyundai, Kia, and Daewoo’s activities in
the U.S. and Canada. These essays first reviewed the factors fostering the
rapid growth of Hyundai and Kia car imports in the U.S. and Canada
during the 1980s and the construction of the failed Hyundai Bromont
Plant in Quebec. They then examined how a second advance of imports
and more trade friction during the 2000s provoked the building of
Hyundai Montgomery and Kia West Point. The second chapter also spec-
ulated on the future North American prospects for Hyundai, Kia, and
Korea’s other automakers, Ssangyong, Renault Samsung, and GM Korea.
24 Jacobs (1995, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

The latter included a brief review of Daewoo’s entrance into the U.S.
market in the 1990s, followed by its takeover by GM in 2002.25
The auto FDI book on North America was followed by research for
the author’s Automotive FDI in Emerging Europe: Shifting Locales in
the Motor Vehicle Industry. Published in 2017, this 350-page manuscript
examined foreign transplants in emerging Central-Eastern Europe and
contained two original chapters on the Czech and Slovak auto indus-
tries. These essays included commentary on the Hyundai Nosovice Plant
in Czechia and Kia Zilina in Slovakia that was gleaned from the author’s
field work in the two nations and documents detailing the histories of
both factories.26
Finally, just prior to attending a conference in Ulsan in 2019,
the author completed an invited presentation at Gyeongsang National
University in Jinju, South Korea, entitled “A Short History of Korean
Carmakers, at Home and in North America.” One of the many high-
lights of this trip was a factory tour of Hyundai Motor’s massive, 1.5
million-capacity Ulsan complex. This was to lead to a second presenta-
tion in Jinju in 2020, “A Brief History of Korea’s Other Automakers:
Ssangyong Motor and Renault Samsung,” which was postponed due to
COVID-19. The historical data analysis and field work data completed
for the 2019 and postponed 2020 papers ultimately set the outline for
this book and the second volume to come in 2022.27
Notes About Names

Koryo, Paekche, and Shilla were the transliterations of the three pre-
unified kingdoms of Korea under the old McCune–Reichauser system
of Romanization. Their revised Romanizations (since 2000) are Goryeo,
Baekje, and Silla. Similarly, the unified country, which has been referred
to as Choson, Chosun, or Chosen, is now Romanized as Joseon. Chosun
is used in Chapter 2. To distinguish between Korea as one country and
the post-Korean War two-nation period, the McCune–Reichauser system
is used for all place names prior to 1945. Thereafter, the contemporary
25 Jacobs (2016).
26 Jacobs (2017).
27 Jacobs (2019, 2020).
18 A. J. JACOBS
revised system is used. For example, Inchon or In’chon is now transcribed

as Incheon.
Next, so not to confuse the English-language reader, and for consis-
tency among East Asian and American names, Korean persons are
denoted in the text using the Western style of given name first and family
name second. For example, Hyundai’s Chung Ju-yung is written in the
Western style as Ju-yung Chung.
In addition, historically prominent family names, such as Kim, Lee,
Park, Choi, Koo, and Moon, those of famous people, and company
names are transcribed following the most frequent usage in the scholarly
literature and English-language press. For example, the Yi Dynasty and
President Syngman Rhee are used, rather than referring to both as the
direct transliteration from hanja and hangul which would be Ri. In reality,
the surnames Yi, Ri, Rhee, and Lee were actually derived from the same
Chinese hanja, with Lee used under McCune–Reichauser in South Korea
and Ri or Rhee used in North Korea. In today’s hangul (or hangeul),
these names could be written as Ri or Ii.
Related to this, as a result of their common use in past works, the well-
known South Korean president, Park Chung-hee, is written as Chung-hee
Park rather than as the modernized Jung-hui Bak. Similarly, the family
name of Hyundai’s founder is listed as Chung, rather than the modern-
ized Jeong, Daewoo’s founder is depicted as Woo-choong rather than
as U-jung Gim, and so on. For the same reason, chaebol is used for
Korean conglomerates, rather than the contemporary jaebeol, and the
trademarked names of Hyundai, Kia, and Samsung are utilized as opposed
to their modern direct transcriptions of Hyeondae, Gia, and Samseong.
Finally, the author names for articles, books, and chapters cited in the
reference sections of each chapter match the names listed in the cited
work.
Notes About Exchange Rates

For annual profit and losses of automakers, Korean Won (KRW) to
U.S Dollar ($) exchange rates on December 31 of a given year were
utilized. For most factory and investment costs, average annual rates were
used until 1981, when daily figures became more readily available. In
cases where dollar figures were quoted directly in press reports, these
figures were checked against daily respective exchange rates and some-
times revised slightly to maintain consistency throughout the manuscript.
The sources for exchange rates are cited in the footnotes and references
of each chapter.
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Watanabe, M. (1993). Korea—Protection and regulation in the automotive
industry. In R. Inoue, H. Kohama, & S. Urata (Eds.), Industrial policy in
East Asia (pp. 229–246). JETRO.
Woo, J. (1991). Race to the swift: State and finance in Korean industrialization.
Columbia University Press.
World Bank. (1993). The East Asian miracle: Economic growth and public policy.
Oxford University Press.
World Bank. (2021). Population, total, by Nation, 1960–2019. https://data.wor
ldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL, downloaded 12 February 2021.
Woronoff, J. (1992). Asia’s ‘miracle’ economies (2nd ed.). M.E. Sharpe.
CHAPTER 2
The State and Development in South Korea:

From Yi to Early Park
Introduction
Situated on a peninsula between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan
(East Sea), the Republic of Korea, or South Korea, was established on
August 15, 1948. Exactly three years prior, the peninsula had been liber-
ated after four decades years of Japanese occupation and split in two at the
38th parallel. The Allied forces then initially governed the south and the
Soviets the area that would become known as the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea or North Korea. It was within such a precarious geo-
political context—bordered on the north by an ideological adversary, on
three sides by the sea but just 120 miles West of Japan, and in the
crosshairs of multiple rival superpowers—that South Korea created its
so-called Economic “Miracle of the Han.”
This chapter offers a cursory historical outline of South Korea’s context
for development through 1972. It begins with a brief summary of the
peninsula’s Koryo (936–1392) and Yi Dynasty/Chosun (1392–1910)
periods. It then introduces some of the links between the Japanese colo-
nization period (1910–1945) and South Korea’s post-WW-II economic
growth. This is followed by sections that highlight some of the pivotal
political-economic events occurring during the Rhee (1945–1960) and
early Park (1961–1972) Regimes. The chapter concludes with addi-
tional commentary regarding the rapid transformation of the Korean
economy during early Park. This then sets the stage for Chapters 3 and 4,
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 25

Switzerland AG 2022
A. J. Jacobs, The Korean Automotive Industry, Volume 1,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86347-0_2
26 A. J. JACOBS
which chronicle the State’s creation of a domestic auto industry (1962–

1979) and its emergence internationally leading up to the Asian Crisis
(1980–1996).
Beginnings: A Brief Summary of Korea Until 1910

The name Korea derives from Koryo or Koryeo, the medieval fiefdom that
unified the three kingdoms of Koguryo, Paekche and Silla in 936.1 Based
in Kaeseong, in present-day North Korea’s North Hwanghae Province,
the Koryeo ruled today’s Korean Peninsula, plus parts of Manchuria
and Inner Mongolia, until July 12, 1392. They were then ousted in
a bloodless coup by the forces of Seong-gye Yi. By 1394, General Yi
had moved his Chosun Kingdom to Silla’s capital/Koryeo’s southern
capital, Hanyang (today’s Seoul). He then renamed the city, Hansong
or “Castle on the Han River.” Yi’s descendants would thwart chal-
lenges from Japanese and Mongol invaders and rule the area for another
500 years.2
To some degree, the Yi Dynasty could be summed up by the Korean
Government’s relationships with its two nearest neighbors: great rever-
ence for China and friendship with Japan. Since China still claimed
control over the territory of Chosun, after his takeover of the area,
General Yi sought approval from the Ming Court to fully legitimize his
reign. In exchange for Ming’s blessing, he pledged his loyalty to China
based upon the principle of sadae or “serving the great power.” This led
to a Sinification of the peninsula in which political and social life came to
be governed by Confucian precepts (ex. benevolent monarch, supported
by a wise and virtuous bureaucracy; harmony and unity among men and
between man and spirit). Nevertheless, Yi society remained highly strati-
fied, with land primarily in the hands of the yanban class (civil and military
1 Sunoo (1970), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), and Cumings (2005). For more on
the McCune-Reichauser and contemporary Korean transliterationsfor Korean place and
prominent family names, see Chapter 1.
2 Sunoo (1970), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), and Cumings (2005). It was not until
1945 that the area became known as Seoul. It was then officially chartered as a home-rule
city on August 15, 1946, before being re-classified as the Seoul Metropolitan Government
on August 15, 1949, see Seoul (2021).
2 THE STATE AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA … 27
aristocrats or nobility) who oversaw the military, economy, and culture of

Chosun.3
For many, the highlight of the Yi Dynasty was the reign of King Sejong.
In power from 1418 to 1450, the progressive Sejong encouraged his
subjects to become interested in science and technology, and appointed
officials whom he felt were the best qualified for a given position,
regardless of class. He also was credited with creating hangul in 1443,
a simplified new alphabet that made reading and writing accessible to
the masses. Despite Sejong’s introduction of Korean’s modern syllabary,
however, Chosun’s pledged reverence to China would prevent hangul
from dislodging Chinese as the script utilized in Korean government
documents and scholarly writings for another 451 years.4
Meanwhile, Chosun’s peaceful tributary relationship with China was
juxtaposed by its open, but unequal association with Japan. Known as
the “land bridge between China and Japan,” Korea’s contributions to
Japanese society date at least as far back as the third century. During
the third through sixth centuries, envoys from Paekche brought Confu-
cianism and Buddhism to Japan and taught their advanced administrative
practices and weaving techniques to its people. These activities spawned
Japan’s first literary movement and resulted, for a time, in Korean
high officials holding important positions in the Japanese Government.
This tutelary relationship continued until around 1404, when China
recognized Japan’s military ruler as equal to the Yi of Chosun.5
Chosun and Japan’s friendship was dramatically altered during the
1590s, however, when the forces of Hideyoshi Toyotomi twice invaded
the peninsula. With the help of the Chinese, the Yi were able to push
back the forces of Hideyoshi. Following these failed conquests, Japan was
thrust into a civil war of its own, with the country unified and stabilized
under the Tokugawa Shogunate. In contrast, seven years of war with its
former ally had left Chosun in ruins and suffering from widespread famine
and shortages. Moreover, before retreating, Japanese soldiers kidnapped
some of Chosun’s finest ceramists and pilfered numerous cultural trea-
sures and the country’s more advanced printing-press equipment (metal
3 Sunoo (1970), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), Eckert et al. (1990), Eckert (1991), and
Cumings (2005).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
28 A. J. JACOBS
movable type). The devastation was most pronounced in the south,

particularly in Kyongsang Province, where the ports of Pusan Yompo,
and others destroyed; both would eventually recover in the post-WW II
period, with Busan eventually becoming South Korea’s second largest city
and the Yeompo area becoming host to the world’s largest automobile
factory, Hyundai Motor Ulsan.6
Although the spoils of war would greatly benefit Japanese society, and
the Tokugawa would reinitiate trade with Chosun in 1609, the attack
by Toyotomi would severely fracture relations between the two countries
for many years to come. With both nations turning completely insular,
this smoldering hostility would remain latent for 250 years, with the two
nations experiencing a relatively peaceful coexistence until 1860s. The
situation would change dramatically in the late nineteenth century, when
Japan and Russia would battle with China, and against one another, for
control of the Korean Peninsula.7
A pivotal turn in this drama occurred on February 27, 1876, when
on Kangwha Island, Chosun signed the Treaty of Friendship with the
restored Imperial Government of Japan. The Kangwha Accord and
ensuing agreements forced Chosun to open three of its ports to Japanese
trade: Pusan in 1876; Wonsan in 1880; and Chemulpo (Inch’on) in 1883.
It also formalized an unequal relationship between the two countries,
favoring Japan, that would simultaneously promote major politico-social
reforms and civil instability within Chosun.8
By the latter year, severe drought, civil unrest, and pressure from
America and Europe had forced the nation to open up to the West.
The treaty with America proved beneficial, as among other things, it
enabled envoys from Chosun to consult with the U.S. on matters related
to public schools, customs, postal services, and diplomacy. On the other
hand, after many years of being a “Hermit Nation,” the Yi Government
6 Sunoo (1970), Morishima (1982), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), and Bridges (1993),
the area’s represent today’s Gyeongsang-do, Busan, and Yeompo.
7 Sunoo (1970), Suh (1978), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), Eckert et al. (1990), and
Cumings (2005).
8 Noble (1929), Sunoo (1970), Suh (1978), Kim and Roemer (1981), Lee (1984),
Nahm (1988), Eckert et al. (1990), Cumings (2005), and Meyer (2009), Kangwha is
written as Ganghwa and Inch’on as Incheon under contemporary Korean Romanization.
Pusan was known as Fuzan, Wonsan as Genzan, Chemulpo as Saimoppo, and Inch’on as
Jinsen under Japanese colonial rule. Wonsan is in today’s Kangwon Province of North
Korean. The Port of Chemulpo or Jemulpo is now known as the Port of Incheon.
was now badly exposed to Russian military forces encroaching from the
north, Japanese troops infringing on the south, and Chinese diplomats
and merchants reasserting themselves in the center.9
By July 1894, China and Japan had responded to peasant uprisings in
Chosun by going to war with each other over the peninsula. The more
technologically equipped Japanese would prevail, and thereby, flip the
balance of power in East Asia on its head. This shift was formalized on
April 17, 1895, when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, ending the
First Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s victory released Chosun from its tribu-
tary relationship with China (the armistice also ceded Taiwan to Japan).
This was made official on October 13, 1897, when the sovereign nation
of Daehan Jeguk (the Great Korean Empire) was constituted.10
Independence lasted only eight years, however, as by then Japan also
had beaten back Russia. Japan’s triumph in the Russo-Japanese War was
formalized in the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905, which
among other things, led to Korea becoming a protectorate on November
17, 1905. Twenty months later, on July 24, 1907, the Japanese Resident-
General was effectively made ruler of Korea, and Japanese nationals were
appointed as the heads of all of Korea’s central ministries and provincial
and city administrations. The final step in the fait accompli culminated
on August 29, 1910, when Korea’s Emperor was forced to yield his
throne and his country to Japan. To add insult to injury, the capital
city of Hansong (today’s Seoul) was renamed Keijo by the Japanese or
Kyongsong in Korean.11
The Japanese Colonial Origins

of Korean Industrialization, 1910–1945
During Korea’s transition from protectorate to colony, Japanese offi-
cials began creating a politico-legal framework that would further their
nation’s expansionist aspirations in Asia. Their economic development
policy agenda in Korea, before and during the occupation, was simi-
larly purposeful. Its objective was to aid in solving three issues plaguing
9 Rhee (1922), Sunoo (1970), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), Eckert et al. (1990), Chung
(2006), and Meyer (2009).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.; in modern Romanization, Kyongsong is written as Gyeongseong (i.e., Seoul).
30 A. J. JACOBS
the Japanese homeland, namely: a scarcity of natural resources; a related

growing shortage of food; and a need to expand the markets for its
industrial goods. The colonial government in Keijo then took complete
control of Korea’s natural resources and its economy, and directed firms,
both public and private, to tailor their activities to help achieve these
interconnected objectives.12
As part of its efforts, the colonial government also implemented poli-
cies that heavily favored Japanese industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu) over
native firms. As a result, by 1910, Japanese business already commanded
the lion’s share of the peninsula’s economic assets. In addition, the
colonial authorities had appropriated 20% of Korea’s arable land. The
main enabler of these activities was Japan’s Daiichi Kokuritsu Bank (or
First National Bank), aided by its spinoffs, the Oriental Development
Company, the Bank of Chosun, and the Chosun Industrial Bank.13
Established in Japan in 1873, Daiichi Bank opened its first branch in
Chosun in 1878. By 1905, it was so involved in the Korean economy
that it was effectively serving as the country’s central bank. Alarmed by
Daiichi’s power, the newly appointed Japanese Resident-General decided
to gradually reassign some of its functions to newly created institutions.
The most formidable of these was the Oriental Development Company
(ODC), which was established in 1908 and charged with the purchasing
and managing of agricultural land. This made it a primary facilitator of
Japanese emigration to Korea. However, over time, the ODC’s authority
was greatly broadened, entitling it to finance any activities that would
expand exports of foodstuffs to Japan, or further other nationalistic
purposes.14
The Bank of Chosun was created in 1909 and delegated Daiichi’s
central bank functions. This initially involved governance over Korea’s
12 Sunoo (1970, 1994), Suh (1978), Kim and Roemer (1981), Cumings (1984),
Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), Amsden (1989), Steinberg (1989), Eckert et al. (1990),
McNamara (1990), Eckert (1991), Kohli (1994, 2004), and Chung (2006).
13 Koh (1970), Suh (1978), Kim and Roemer (1981), Lee (1984), McNamara (1990),
Woo (1991), Kohli (1994), Cumings (2005), and Chung (2006). These companies were
known in Japanese, respectively, as: Toyo Takushoku Kabusha Kaisha, or literally, the
Oriental Colonialization Development Joint-Stock Company; Chosen Ginko; and Chosen
Shokusan Ginko. The Bank of Chosun was originally known as the Bank of Korea, with
its name changed after Japan’s annexation of the country in 1910, see Koh (1970), Lee
(1984), and McNamara (1990).
14 Ibid.
monetary policy, but later expanded to include providing development

assistance and oversight over monetary and fiscal policy in Japan’s other
colonies.15 The Chosun Industrial Bank was created in 1918 through
the merger of six regional agricultural banks. Its capital and debt ceilings
then were substantially raised to better enable it to provide medium and
long-term loans to investors involved in development projects.16
During the early colonial period, the authorities also replicated some
of the reforms implemented during Japan’s own late nineteenth century
modernization. This included, among others, abolishing slavery, insti-
tuting land and educational reforms, and accelerating its pre-1910
upgrading of Korea’s economic and physical infrastructure. As part of
this, the three Daiichi offshoots, in concert with commercial banks and
local financial cooperatives, became involved in not only subsidizing
private enterprises, but also in ensuring corporate compliance to Japan’s
national objectives. These activities were complemented immensely by the
zaibatsu, which launched new operations in Korea staffed by executives,
managers, and technicians transferred from Japan.17
These enhancements, combined with the knowhow and technology of
the Japanese transplants, allowed for a dramatic quickening in the pace
of the Korea’s industrialization and urbanization.18 In contrast, although
the modernization process had its benefits, the concurrent political and
economic repression inflicted on the indigenous population also served
to fan the flames of civil unrest. The discord came to a head on March 1,
1919, when the colonial government brutally responded to independence
movement demonstrators, killing 1200, wounding 16,000, and arresting
nearly 20,000 Koreans.19
To calm the situation, the colonial government sought to pacify local
elites by cultivating a small Korean merchant class. A number of these
indigenous capitalists, or their descendants educated during the occupa-
tion, would become major political-economic actors in postwar South
15 Koh (1970), and Woo (1991).

16 McNamara (1990).
17 Suh (1978), Lee (1984), Amsden (1989), McNamara (1990), Eckert (1991), Kohli
(1994), and Chung (2006).
18 Ibid.
19 Sunoo (1970, 1994), Lee (1984), Nahm (1988), Steinberg (1989), Eckert et al.
(1990), Kirk (1994), and Cumings (2005).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
LA MER
LA MINE
Du berthon, l’un des canots légers que possédait le chalutier, le

petit midship, seul, monta sur le pont, presque d’un saut, par
l’échelle de tribord. Et il laissa l’embarcation à la mer, avec deux
matelots, au lieu de la faire hisser sur le pont : il pensait bien qu’il
aurait à s’en servir encore, dans les cinq minutes.
— Quelque chose dans le filet, sur bâbord, nord-ouest, après la
troisième bouée, dit-il. La quatrième a foncé. Ça tire dessus.
Le petit midship n’avait pas encore un poil de barbe, et sa figure,
si pleine et si lisse qu’on eût dit d’une grosse fille campagnarde,
n’était plus qu’un coup de soleil. Elle avait l’éclat de la tomate sur les
joues, de la viande crue sur la nuque. Quand il parlait, il bafouillait
effroyablement à cause de son horrible timidité, avec un accent
méridional qui sonnait comme un timbre de cuivre, et ça le rendait
presque incompréhensible. Il fallait avoir l’habitude. Mais le
commandant avait eu tout le temps pour la prendre, depuis vingt-
deux mois qu’ils bourlinguaient ensemble dans la Méditerranée,
toujours entre les mêmes îles et les mêmes golfes de la côte
grecque !
Le petit midship était un Français, né à Barcelone. C’est
quelquefois une bonne chose, pour les enfants, d’avoir vécu à
l’étranger ; ça les trempe, ça les rend surtout volontaires. Ce gamin
avait déjà passé les examens du long cours, puis s’était inscrit pour
ceux de l’École navale. Et comme la guerre avait éclaté, une
décision du ministère de la marine avait fait de lui un aspirant, ou un
« midship », comme on dit plus généralement, même dans la marine
française. Quant à son chef, c’était un ancien premier maître, versé
dans la réserve. On lui avait donné le commandement de ce
chalutier.
Dans le lointain, la noble masse de l’Acrocorinthe apparaissait
toute en rose et en velours chocolat. Il était quatre heures du matin.
Les sèches montagnes du Péloponèse se transfiguraient,
somptueuses comme un tapis de Turquie. Mais les deux hommes
n’avaient aucun regard pour ces choses. Depuis vingt-deux mois ils
ne voyaient que la mer. Leur équipage aussi. Depuis vingt-deux
mois ils n’avaient pas dormi une moyenne de quatre heures par nuit.
Ils n’étaient jamais revenus en France, et ne descendaient que bien
rarement à terre. Ils escortaient les navires de commerce avec leur
chalutier à vapeur. Ils posaient des ceintures de filets autour des
ports, des golfes et des détroits, pour fermer la route aux sous-
marins, et peut-être les prendre. Ils traînaient des dragues, armées
de puissants sécateurs, pour faire remonter les mines à la surface et
les détruire. Le petit midship était bien plus souvent dans le berthon
ou à cheval sur une des bouées, soulevant les filets, de l’eau jusqu’à
mi-corps, que dans le chalutier. Il ne rouspétait jamais. Son rêve
seulement était d’être inscrit au tableau des enseignes. Il se voyait
enseigne comme d’autres rêvent de passer président de la
République.
L’ancien premier maître était beau comme un chevalier des
anciens jours. Ses yeux s’étaient enfoncés sous l’arc resté très pur
de ses cils, à force de regarder la mer ; et il ne parlait jamais que
d’une voix très douce ; un gentilhomme, qui s’appelait Bonnard, tout
uniment. La France en fait beaucoup comme ça. Il demanda :
— Quelque chose dans le filet ? Quoi ?
— Ça ne doit pas être un sous-marin, répondit l’enfant avec
regret. Mais je crois que c’est une mine. A trois mètres sous l’eau.
— En dérive, alors, dit le commandant, Ça se peut. Je vais aller
voir avec vous.
Il fit armer le deuxième berthon.
La mer était très calme. Elle gonflait seulement le dos, par
places, sans raisons appréciables, comme fait l’eau qui commence à
bouillir, dans une marmite. Un grand goëland, qui picorait on ne
savait quoi sur l’arête du filet, s’envola paresseusement.
— C’est là ! dit le midship. Par trois mètres. Voyez-vous ?
L’œil du commandant plongea.
La chose était là, en effet. Elle avait bien un mètre de diamètre,
et semblait monter et descendre imperceptiblement avec l’enflure du
flot.
— Oui, dit le commandant du chalutier. C’est rond, et ça a la taille
d’une mine. Une mine qui aurait chassé sous le courant, en
entraînant son contre-poids. Si elle avait lâché son crapaud, elle
serait venue en surface. Et c’est bien la profondeur où ils les
immergent… Rentrons. Je mangerais bien quelque chose. Et puis
on avisera.
A bord du chalutier, ils n’avaient que des conserves, bien
entendu. Mais le cuisinier avait fait la cuisine.
— C’est bon, le singe accommodé, quand il est chaud ! observa
l’enfant, béatement.
Ce n’est pas tous les jours fête. En hiver, le gros temps est
presque la règle. Les vagues balaient de bout en bout ces petits
bâtiments, éteignant le feu du cuisinier. Durant des mois, souvent il
faut manger les conserves « nature », et froides.
— Si c’est une mine, dit l’enfant, ça me fait un point pour passer
enseigne. Au moins !…
Il s’absorba dans son rêve. Mais il reprit bientôt :
— Comment va-t-on faire pour l’avoir ? Nous n’avons plus de
drague.
— Tirer dessus avec notre 75, dit le commandant. Je sais bien
que c’est chanceux, elle est immergée par trois mètres ; enfin, on
tiendra compte de la réfraction et de la résistance de l’eau… Mais il
faudra commencer par haler le filet à distance, sans ça l’obus
abîmerait les maillons.
Et, quand ils eurent pris le café — car on pouvait aussi faire le
café ce jour-là, jour de noce — ils redescendirent dans les berthons,
frappèrent un câble entre le filet et le chalutier, qui s’éloigna ensuite
bien doucement, machine cent tours à la minute. Le filet suivit
l’impulsion et se déplaça.
— … Elle remonte ! La mine remonte ! cria le midship, enchanté.
Juste au moment où la chose effleura l’eau ; un des matelots de
nage qui avait emporté sa carabine par ordre — on ne sait jamais —
tira…
— Quoi ! fit le midship, stupéfait.
— Cette mine-là n’aurait jamais fait beaucoup de mal au monde,
dit le matelot, qui rigolait en dedans.
La « mine » flottait, en vraie dérive, cette fois. On y distinguait des
appendices singuliers, des pattes courtes, terminées en nageoires
griffues, une tête semblable à celle d’un serpent, une queue…
— Une tortue ! gémit l’enfant désolé. Ce n’était qu’une tortue !
La bête marine s’était arrêtée contre le filet, tout bonnement, pour
dormir dans un courant d’eau chaude en se calant contre les
maillons. Le filet se déplaçant, elle avait remonté, et se préparait
sans doute à replonger quand le matelot l’avait tuée.
— Ça vaut mieux qu’une mine, déclara le matelot, d’une voix
consolante. Ça nous fera de la viande fraîche : depuis le temps !
Le midship ne répondit rien. Pour des raisons personnelles, il eût
préféré une mine, une vraie mine, à des tonnes de viande fraîche.
Quand il eut regagné le chalutier, le commandant, arrivé le
premier, lui montra un petit papier, la traduction du « morse »
parvenu en leur absence à leur poste de T. S. F. : « Placer un filet en
travers de la baie d’Astra Spitia. Commencer sans tarder. »
— Nom de Dieu ! jura l’enfant ; quarante-huit heures de turbin,
sans se coucher. Chien de métier !
C’était la première fois qu’il renâclait devant l’ouvrage. A cause

de cette sale tortue. La déception lui alourdissait le cœur. Quand on
désire passer enseigne…
UN GABIER EXCEPTIONNEL
Je n’ai jamais connu, sur mer, un équipage plus gai, plus vaillant,
plus allant, depuis le dernier des novices jusqu’au commandant, qui
disait aux passagères inquiètes : « Mais non, mesdames, ils ne nous
couleront pas ! Nous sommes trop petits !… Quoique ça, ne quittez
pas vos ceintures de sauvetage, et dormez sur le pont ! »
C’était pendant la guerre, en 1917, et ils ont tous été noyés, les
pauvres diables, noyés comme des rats, par un sous-marin
allemand, un mois plus tard, entre Corfou et Brindisi, dans
l’Adriatique. Je n’avais passé que trois jours avec eux, et ça me fait
peine encore, quand j’y pense, une vraie peine, comme si on m’avait
tué de très vieux, de très sûrs amis.
C’était un tout petit vapeur, qui s’appelait l’Édouard-Corbière, du
nom de son ancien propriétaire, père du poète Tristan Corbière. Ce
vieux capitaine au long cours, qui fut corsaire, négrier, journaliste,
romancier et même poète, était un homme d’entreprise : il avait créé,
entre je ne sais plus quel port d’Armorique et l’Angleterre, une petite
ligne de navigation dont le fret le plus habituel se composait de
cochons engraissés en France et destinés à la nourriture des
insulaires de Grande-Bretagne. Les vieux matelots du bord
rappelaient en riant cette époque de paix et de tranquillité. Ces gens
qui chaque jour attendaient la mort — et qui l’ont reçue — étaient
d’une sublime et magnifique insouciance. Chaque jour ils prenaient
leurs repas de l’après-midi en plein air, devant le poste d’équipage,
sur un prélart qui couvrait l’entrée de la cale, tout près du hublot de
ma cabine. Ils ne me voyaient point, ignoraient ma présence et
causaient librement. J’ai entendu là, de leur bouche, sans qu’ils s’en
pussent douter, les plus belles histoires, presque toutes fausses.
Les marins sont comme les enfants : ils ne demandent jamais
« si c’est arrivé » ; ils lisent peu, ou pas du tout ; leur âme ingénue et
malicieuse à la fois a besoin pourtant de romans : ils inventent des
romans parlés. Toutes les races de nos côtes étaient représentées
parmi ces condamnés à mort, et qui le savaient sans doute, si
simplement et joyeusement braves : les mokos de la rive
méditerranéenne, les pêcheurs du golfe de Gascogne, les Bordelais,
les Vendéens, les Bretons, les Normands de Granville et de Saint-
Malo, les gens de Boulogne, de Calais, de Dunkerque. Il y en avait
— c’était le plus grand nombre — qui ne faisaient qu’écouter et rire,
ou s’émouvoir, mais rire le plus souvent. Par réaction contre le
danger, ils semblaient, en effet, préférer le rire aux larmes. Ils
goûtaient mieux, par un sentiment populaire, instinctif, l’aventure qui
finit bien ; ils aimaient aussi celle qui réserve une surprise à la fin, et
déconcerte. A leur manière, ils avaient le goût aiguisé, ils étaient des
amateurs difficiles. Et celui qui contait le mieux ce que nos voisins
d’Angleterre nomment le yarn, ce que nos compatriotes du Midi
appellent la galéjade, n’était point, chose surprenante, de Toulon ou
de Marseille : un Flamand de Bray-Dunes, pêcheur à l’Islande, puis
marin à l’État. Je me souviens de son nom, un nom de mon pays :
Bogaërt. Ça se prononce « Bogart », en faisant sonner le t. Il était
lourd, rond, puissant, musculeux et gras, avec un air d’assurance
pour affirmer les choses les plus invraisemblables ; il filait le conte
comme un curé son prêche, si sérieusement qu’on y était toujours
pris. Voilà une de ses histoires. Je vais m’efforcer de la dire autant
que possible telle que je l’ai entendue :
« Moi, j’ai connu un gabier, un gabier étonnant ! Il n’y en a pas

deux comme ça dans la marine française, ni dans aucune autre
marine du monde. Les Anglais, les Américains, les Boches, ils n’en
ont pas : il pouvait vivre sans respirer !
« — Sans respirer ?
« — Sans respirer l’air. Autre chose, n’importe quoi, ça lui était
égal. Excepté l’eau, naturellement, et le vide. A part ça, tout. On n’en
savait rien, il n’en disait rien, il s’en vantait pas. Quand il y avait de
l’air, il en profitait, comme tout le monde, mais il pouvait s’en passer.
« C’est sur un sous-marin que je l’ai connu. Un des premiers
sous-marins qu’on ait faits, bien avant la guerre. Quelque chose
dans le genre « gymnote », un mauvais gros petit cigare de tôle où
nous n’étions que six hommes, avec un maître d’équipage et un
officier. A cette époque, on se demandait encore si ça pourrait
jamais servir à quelque chose, ces machines-là. Ça n’était pas au
point, on faisait seulement des expériences, quoi, dans la rade de
Brest. Et on n’avait pas encore inventé l’oxylithe, qui absorbe l’acide
carbonique de la respiration. Alors, comme c’était très resserré dans
cette boîte, pour ne pas être empoisonné, il fallait remonter souvent.
On avait bien des obus d’oxygène, mais pas perfectionnés comme
au jour d’aujourd’hui.
« C’est du reste là dedans que j’ai appris que l’air était composé
d’oxygène et d’azote, et aussi d’un troisième gaz, dont j’ai oublié le
nom, et que du reste on ne connaissait pas au moment : avant d’être
sur le sous-marin, je m’en étais toujours f…tu ; l’air, c’est l’air, ça
suffit !
« Le gabier que je parle, il s’appelait Métivet, et il était Parisien :
un type qui s’était engagé à la flotte, comme tous ces idiots des
villes, qui n’ont jamais pêché que le goujon, jamais vu la mer, mais
qui ont lu des boniments dans les journaux illustrés quand ils étaient
petits. Pas mauvais marin, malgré ça, bon mécanicien, serviable et
tout : dégourdi… Bon ! voilà qu’un jour on repart pour ces sacrées
expériences, on remplit d’eau les ballasts, et on va s’asseoir dans la
rade sur un fond de quinze mètres, tout ce que les tôles pouvaient
supporter. Après ça on veut remonter : le premier ballast, celui
d’avant, ça va bien : il se vide comme une baignoire d’amiral. Mais
celui d’arrière… celui d’arrière ne veut rien savoir : Quelque chose
de bloqué dans la mécanique. Quoi ? Si on l’avait su, ça se serait
arrangé, mais on n’a pas su, on n’a jamais su. Les ingénieurs ont dit
plus tard que ça aurait dû marcher. Cochon de gouvernement, qui
invente des outils pareils pour assassiner les matelots. On travaille
deux heures, trois heures, quatre heures : la peau ! Ce qui était
bloqué reste bloqué. Je suppose que ça devait commencer à puer,
dans la boîte, mais on s’en apercevait pas. Seulement on respirait
difficilement. Le commandant, qui était un enseigne, fait ouvrir les
obus d’oxygène, et ça nous soulage, pour un temps. Mais on n’en
avait que pour douze heures, et après ? Le commandant dit pour
nous rassurer : « On sait où nous sommes, à peu près, on viendra
nous chercher. On sondera… Nous ne sommes pas mouillés très
profond, on pourra frapper des grappins, à l’avant et à l’arrière, et au
milieu, et nous relever… » Mais en attendant, nous étions dans une
sale position, l’avant en l’air et le cul sur la roche : impossible de se
tenir debout. Et puis, on a eu envie de dormir tout le temps, avec mal
à la tête, et des vomissements : l’air, n’est-ce pas, l’air qui manquait.
On s’empoisonnait soi-même… Excepté ce Métivet ! C’est là qu’on
s’est aperçu qu’il y avait quelque chose de pas ordinaire avec lui : il
avait presque pas l’air incommodé ; il a dit, d’un air naturel : « Mon
commandant, ils tournent de l’œil, vous tournez de l’œil : y a pas un
médicament ? » Le commandant a répondu : « Y en a pas… du café,
peut-être, pour nous réveiller ! » Alors, Métivet a fait une
gymnastique extraordinaire pour arriver à la cambuse, et il a fait du
café !
« Vingt-deux heures, ça a duré ! Il paraît que nous râlions tous,
nous étions sans connaissance, excepté Métivet. C’est lui qui a
entendu les sondes qui nous cherchaient, c’est lui qui a causé avec
les sauveteurs, en tapant l’alphabet morse sur la tôle. Il donnait des
conseils pour passer des chaînes sous la coque, il essayait de nous
ranimer, en nous entonnant du café, qu’on pouvait plus prendre, et
en disant : « Ça va ! Ça va ! Ils sont là ! Vous laissez pas clamser,
nom de Dieu ! »
« Et à la fin, on a été tiré à la surface, et on a ouvert l’écoutille.
Ah ! Bon Dieu ! la première lampée d’air ! Y a pas de coup de tafia
qui vaille ça. Mais on en a eu tous pour quinze jours d’hôpital,
toujours excepté Métivet.
« Quand j’ai été retapé, je lui ai dit : « Ça te faisait donc rien, à
toi ? Comment qu’tu peux vivre, sans oxygène ? »
« Il m’a répondu : « L’oxygène ? C’est bon pour les c… comme
toi. Moi, mon père était concierge rue Mouffetard. J’ai été élevé dans
sa loge jusqu’à dix-huit ans. Et l’air des loges de concierge, dans les
vieilles maisons de Paris, c’est pas fait avec de l’oxygène : c’est un
mélange de gaz d’éclairage, d’acide carbonique qui vient du
fourneau, et de vapeur de café au lait. Je m’ai habitué !… »
— Tu vas un peu fort, Bogaërt ! dit l’équipage.
Et tous éclatèrent de rire, bonnement. Braves gens !

UN CIMETIÈRE
… C’est un lieutenant de vaisseau qui a donné sa démission,

comme presque tous les lieutenants de vaisseau, depuis la guerre.
Que voulez-vous ? Il n’y a presque plus de navires, et plus du tout
d’avancement ; il y a aussi le dégoût du métier qu’on leur imposa,
pendant que les autres, les officiers de l’armée de terre, risquaient
leur vie, eux aussi, mais utilement. Il me dit :
— Si j’ai commandé un sous-marin ? Oui. Si j’ai eu ce que vous
appelez des aventures ? Naturellement. Ce n’est pas une navigation
drôle en temps de paix, que la navigation sous-marine. Mais en
temps de guerre ! Tenez il y avait des jours où je plaignais les
Allemands, qui ne connaissaient plus d’autre navigation que celle-là.
« On est comme des poissons volants, avec cette aggravation
qu’on ne peut pas voler. Vous savez, les poissons volants qui
sautent hors de l’eau pour échapper à un ennemi, à un autre
poisson ennemi, et trouvent en l’air une mouette qui leur tombe
dessus ! Pour nous, c’est la même chose. Sous l’eau, il y a les mines
et les filets. En surface, les torpilleurs qui vous cherchent, et, dans le
ciel, les hydravions. Il faut avoir les yeux partout, ou du moins il
faudrait les avoir partout : et c’est impossible. Mais ce n’est pas de
ça que je veux parler aujourd’hui, ni même du « pépin », du gros
pépin qui a précédé l’incident que je veux vous conter, un incident
qui n’a même pas été noté en deux lignes sur le livre de bord : il
n’avait aucune importance au point de vue de la navigation et de la
sécurité du bateau. Et pourtant, c’est le plus atroce et le plus
dramatique de mes souvenirs.
« C’est avant, que la sécurité du bateau avait été compromise.
Nous croisions dans l’Atlantique, à ce moment-là, pas loin du cap
Gibraltar et du cap Spartel. Nous venions de pousser, le long de la
côte, jusqu’aux environs de San-Lucar, au delà de Cadix. Nous
cherchions les sous-marins allemands, et ce fut un torpilleur
allemand qui nous aperçut ; ce sont des choses qui arrivent ! On
s’immergea, un peu vivement, pour ne pas recevoir le premier coup
de canon, et, après, placer sa torpille. Je ne sais comment ça se fit,
mais nous descendîmes, nous descendîmes beaucoup plus profond
que nous n’avions pensé, et vînmes nous asseoir par vingt-cinq
mètres sur je ne sais quoi : on n’y fit guère attention à cet instant.
Une fois là, plus moyen de se remettre en surface ! Je commandai :
« Chassez partout ! » Mais bonsoir : il y avait quelque chose de
détraqué dans un des ballasts. Celui d’avant chassait bien, mais
celui d’arrière ne voulait rien savoir. Ce sont encore des choses qui
arrivent, et l’agrément de ces mécaniques.
« Nous sommes restés six heures comme ça : il y a des
situations plus joyeuses ! Mourir empoisonné de son haleine, au
fond d’un sous-marin : n’importe quel supplice chinois est plus doux !
Pourtant, ce n’est pas encore l’histoire. S’il n’y avait eu que cette
avarie, je ne vous en parlerais même pas : on s’en est tiré, puisque
me voilà… Mais quand je parvins à faire remplir à nouveau,
normalement cette fois, le réservoir d’avant, et que le sous-marin se
remit d’aplomb sur sa quille, nous entendîmes tous un bruit, un
bruit ! oh ! si singulier ! comme si nous écrasions de grosses
broussailles, un bruit de bois cassé. Nous n’étions pas en aéroplane,
pourtant, et nous n’avions pu tomber sur une forêt !
« Ce qu’il y a d’embêtant, dans un sous-marin, une fois les
capots fermés, c’est qu’on ne peut rien voir du dehors, bien entendu,
excepté par le périscope ; et le périscope, au-dessous de la surface,
ça ne vaut pas mieux qu’une paupière fermée. Mais, par chance,
mon sous-marin avait aussi été paré pour être « mouilleur de
mines » ; et, par l’orifice du mouille-mines, ayant revêtu un appareil
de scaphandrier, je pus descendre sur ce que je prenais pour le fond
de mer. Je voulais savoir en quoi consistait l’avarie. Et puis je ne
sais quelle curiosité, j’imagine : je vous avoue que d’avance, sans
savoir pourquoi, je m’attendais à quelque chose. Mais pas à ça !
L’eau était assez claire pour qu’en écarquillant les yeux sous le
casque de cuivre, je pusse distinguer — je distinguai à moitié,
comme on voit sous l’eau… une espèce de rêve, vous comprenez,
un rêve, un cauchemar, dans cette brume sous-marine, — ce que je
vais vous dire :
« Nous étions tombés par le travers d’un vieux, d’un très vieux
navire coulé. Une frégate, je suppose, d’après ses dimensions, qui
étaient si vastes que, malgré tous mes efforts, mon regard ne
pouvait atteindre ni l’avant ni l’arrière. Et ces débris étaient pâles,
tout pâles, blanchâtres dans la demi-nuit glauque de l’eau ; en mer,
au fond de la mer, c’est comme sur terre : la poussière tombe depuis
le commencement du monde ; seulement, cette poussière, c’est une
boue blanche ou rouge, suivant les endroits. Et, sous cette espèce
de linceul, c’était des canons, des fantômes de canons, et des
squelettes, aussi, des fantômes de squelettes. J’ai vécu six heures,
je vous dis, dans ce cimetière abominable, avec l’idée que nous
ferions nous aussi, à notre tour, dans un siècle ou deux, un
épouvantail pour d’autres idiots aussi malchanceux. Mais qu’est-ce
que c’était, qu’est-ce que ce pouvait bien être ? Tout à coup je
pensai aux deux navires de la grande flotte franco-espagnole de
Villeneuve et de Gravina, le Fougueux ou le Monarca, qui avaient
coulé près de San-Lucar, après la bataille de Trafalgar, et qu’on n’a
jamais repêchés. Il y en a tant qu’on ne repêchera jamais !
« Enfin, on en est sorti tout de même. Ah ! la joie de sentir la
coque se redresser, flotter naturellement, sans rester crochée dans
ce vieux cadavre pourri ! Mais voilà que, tout près, il y en avait un
autre. Un autre, plus petit. Plus ancien, plus jeune ? Je ne pourrais
vous le dire : il y a des morts qui n’ont pas d’âge. Un navire de
commerce, peut-être, coulé par les Allemands des temps passés. Il
y a toujours eu des Allemands. A la fin, quand déjà nous flottions en
surface, je croyais voir encore des galères, des trois-mâts, des
bateaux de toutes les formes, de toutes les époques, échoués là, et
qui nous disaient : « Vous y resterez ! »
« Vous concevez ? Près des détroits, c’est là qu’on se bat, c’est
là qu’on s’est toujours battu : pour ouvrir ou forcer à demeurer
fermées les portes de la mer. C’est là qu’il y a le plus de
macchabées de bateaux.
« Quand je me suis trouvé sur l’eau, enfin sur la surface de l’eau,
et non dessous, et qu’on a ouvert le capot, je suis monté comme les
autres, j’ai respiré, et je pensais de toutes mes forces : « Voilà une
éternité que les hommes sont des bêtes féroces, féroces ! Est-ce
que ça ne va pas finir ? Ce n’est pas possible que ça ne finisse pas.
Cette guerre sera la dernière. Il le faut ! »
« Mais il y a trois ans de ça, et maintenant j’en suis moins sûr.
Avec le temps, l’horreur des souvenirs s’affaiblit, et l’on songe aussi
que, puisque les hommes ont toujours été des loups pour les
hommes, pourquoi cela changerait-il jamais ? »
LES CACHALOTS
Le grand vapeur de la compagnie Sud-Atlantique, après avoir

touché Dakar pour faire du charbon et débarquer quelques
fonctionnaires de l’Afrique occidentale française, piquait droit sur
Rio-de-Janeiro. Plusieurs mois s’étaient écoulés depuis la signature
des préliminaires qui avaient terminé la grande guerre ; les Alliés,
pour se couvrir des pertes que leur avait fait subir les sous-marins
allemands, s’étaient fait livrer la presque totalité de la flotte
marchande appartenant à l’adversaire. Ce grand paquebot, jadis,
quand son port d’attache était à Hambourg, s’appelait le Vaterland
ou le Kronprinz, on ne savait plus. A cette heure, il était naturalisé
français, il portait un autre nom inscrit sur son tableau d’arrière et
collationné sur les registres du bureau Veritas. Les passagers
considéraient avec une vanité de victoire les mots germaniques par
lesquels se dénonçaient encore les cabines de bains, la salle à
manger, l’escalier conduisant à la coupée. Ces mots-là, à cette
heure, avaient l’air de prisonniers.
Les visages étaient radieux. On pouvait enfin respirer après ce
grand cataclysme, et l’on respirait dans la gloire et dans l’honneur.
Les Français se disaient qu’ils avaient appris, dans cette guerre, le
devoir de l’activité, et qu’on allait bien le voir, là où ils allaient ! Les
Brésiliens et les Argentins se trouvaient comme anoblis du coup
d’épaule qu’ils avaient donné, en même temps que les États-Unis, à
la bonne cause. Il y avait aussi des Anglais, ingénus, l’air juvénile
jusque dans la maturité, vigoureux. Une sorte d’allégresse
particulière pénétrait ce grand navire, où l’on se sentait entre amis,
entre alliés seulement : il n’y avait pas un Allemand sur ce vaisseau
qui avait été allemand.
La plupart de ces passagers n’en étaient plus, d’ailleurs, à leur
première traversée. Ils se montraient blasés sur les ordinaires
spectacles de la mer : les somptueux couchers de soleil, qui
changent l’infini des flots en un parterre sans bornes de violettes et
de mauves, construisent dans le ciel des continents mouvants et
lumineux ; les bâtiments empanachés de fumée qu’on croise sans
s’arrêter, tandis que quelques jumelles à peine sortent de leur étui
pour tâcher de lire leur nom et leur nationalité ; même les beaux vols
des poissons volants de l’Atlantique, plus grands que ceux de la mer
Rouge, aux écailles diaprées comme celles des maquereaux,
n’excitaient qu’une indolente curiosité.
Cependant, un matin, une petite fille qui regardait les poissons
volants cria tout étonnée :
— Un jet d’eau, là-bas ! Il y a un jet d’eau sur la mer.
Un vieux passager, ayant levé les yeux à son tour, après qu’il se
fut lentement dressé de sa chaise longue, certifia :
— C’est un souffleur !
On vit d’autres de ces jets de vapeur mêlée d’eau : toute une
bande de cachalots, une vingtaine au moins de ces monstres, qui
semblaient se poursuivre et jouer sur la face immense de l’océan.
Sans doute, c’était pour eux la saison des amours, un instinct
puissant triomphait de leur méfiance ; ou bien trois ans de guerre,
trois années pendant lesquelles les pêcheurs les avaient laissés
tranquilles, leur avaient donné à croire qu’il n’y avait plus maintenant
d’ennemis de leur race géante. Parfois, ils avaient l’air de danser :
une femelle plongeait devant un mâle pour le séduire, ou par pure
joie de vivre ; on voyait jaillir de l’onde dix ou quinze mètres de son
corps énorme, noir, tout luisant d’huile : le bruit de sa queue qui
battait l’eau en retombant sonnait à travers l’espace vide.
Le commandant avait pris sa lunette et regardait lui aussi. Il dit à
une passagère distinguée, à laquelle il avait fait les honneurs de sa
passerelle.
— On ne les rencontre, en général, que plus au sud de notre
route, bien plus au sud, entre Sainte-Hélène et l’Ascension. Les
mauvaises mers les auront poussés au nord, sans doute ; ou bien ils
sont devenus plus hardis, depuis qu’on ne les chasse plus.
— Oh ! mon commandant, mon commandant ! supplia la
passagère, allons les voir de plus près ! Ça vaut bien de perdre une
heure…
— Oui ! oui, confirmèrent d’autres spectateurs, groupés sous
l’échelle et qui avaient entendu. Faites route sur eux, mon
commandant !
Le commandant hésita. Résolu déjà à céder, il se penchait vers
le téléphone…
A ce moment même, on entendit une détonation sourde ; un
grand souffle de vent passa sur le navire, un souffle bizarre, qui
courait à l’inverse des vents « commerciaux », de l’alisé ordinaire.
Une vaste gerbe d’écume et de fumée monta vers le ciel comme un
geyser. Les cachalots plongèrent, silencieusement. Mais le matelot
de vigie annonça :
— Il en est resté un ! Débris d’un souffleur par bâbord, 30 degrés
nord-ouest !
Et le commandant déclara :
— Oui, il est en morceaux. La pauvre bête a passé sur une mine
en dérive…
Il ajouta, tout pâle :
— Dix minutes de plus, et si j’avais fait cette route, c’était le
bateau qui cognait dessus !… Combien de temps y en aura-t-il
encore dans l’eau de ces sales trucs ?
… Oui, combien de temps encore, en pleine paix, pour rappeler

aux hommes la folie et la cruauté insensée de la guerre, les mines
en dérive continueraient-elles d’errer partout, au hasard, sur
l’étendue des flots, — leur méchanceté sournoise, inintelligente et
désastreuse flottant sans fin, jusqu’à la seconde farouche qu’elle
rencontrerait l’étrave d’un navire ? Durant des années, en pleine
paix, la mer demeurerait presque aussi dangereuse qu’aux jours de
la grande guerre. Abandonnées par un courant, reprises par un
autre, les mines perfides feraient lentement le tour du globe, puis
recommenceraient. Jusqu’au jour…
… Il se pouvait que celle-là ne fût pas seule, qu’elle fît partie d’un
chapelet. Le grand paquebot ralentit sa marche. Il n’avança plus
qu’avec prudence, comme à tâtons. Les vagues poussèrent à sa
rencontre de larges lambeaux de chair, de l’huile, de la graisse qui
surnageaient.
— Pauvre bête ! dit un passager en frissonnant.
— J’aime mieux que ce soit elle que nous, répondit un autre : elle
nous a rendu un fier service !
A vingt milles de là, les cachalots étaient remontés à la surface.
Une femelle se rapprocha d’un vieux mâle, un pacha fier de son
harem ; sa carapace de lard était toute couturée de cicatrices,
nobles traces des batailles d’amour qu’il avait livrées.
— Qu’est-ce que c’était que ça, dit-elle, Qu’est-ce que ça veut
dire ?…
— Une mine ! grogna le vieux mâle. C’est honteux ! Ça ne nous
regarde pas, ces choses-là, ce n’est pas pour nous !
Une fois encore, dans la création, les hommes et les bêtes

n’étaient pas du même avis.
CEUX D’EN FACE
ANNA MAC FERGUS, ÉCOSSAISE
Il n’y a jamais rien eu dans ma vie de plus frais, de plus ingénu,

de plus voluptueux aussi, de plus près d’Ève, la première des
femmes, quand nous essayons de l’imaginer, si nous sommes
poètes, si nous aimons à imaginer qu’il y eut une première des
femmes, qui ne savait rien et qui savait tout — il n’y a jamais rien eu
dans ma vie de plus frais, de plus voluptueux qu’Anna Mac Fergus.
Je le sais, maintenant, parce que j’ai vieilli : quand on est jeune,
on jouit des femmes, on ne les connaît pas, on ne les goûte pas
dans toute leur saveur, dans ce que chacune a en elle qui
n’appartient, n’appartiendra jamais à aucune autre. Je le sais si
particulièrement, presque douloureusement, parce que cette nuit où
j’écris est la nuit du premier croissant de la nouvelle lune.
Dans le ciel, dans le ciel d’un noir épais, profond, moelleux
comme un tapis il est là, le premier croissant ; pas plus large qu’un
coup d’ongle qui viendrait de rayer ce velours de soie, et qui serait
lumineux, si doucement ! d’une lumière extraordinairement pâle qui
semble dire : « Tais-toi !… Si tu parles, si le moindre bruit me trouble,
dans cette splendide et sombre obscurité sans bruit où je règne, je
vais m’évanouir. » … dans le ciel cette lumière descend sur le sable
de l’allée, qu’elle fait blanc comme une neige un peu bleue, sur
l’herbe d’une pelouse qu’elle rend tout à fait bleue, sur un bosquet
de bambous, devant moi ; et quand le vent rebrousse une feuille de
ces bambous, cette feuille, un instant presque insaisissable aux
sens, jette un éclair léger, comme les poissons qui virent tout à coup
dans un torrent, et, dont, une seconde insaisissable, on aperçoit le
ventre d’argent, au lieu du dos obscur…
… Mais je ne saurais point tout cela, je ne le saurais point
comme on le doit savoir, avec ma sensibilité, non plus ma sèche et
froide raison, avec toute mon enfance enfin revenue par miracle, si
je n’avais connu la sensibilité fervente, l’éternelle enfance d’Anna
Mac Fergus. Elle avait plus de trente ans quand elle m’aima, elle
n’en était pas à son premier amour, mais plus qu’à nulle femme son
dernier amour était toujours le premier. Voilà pourquoi je ne fus
jamais jaloux de ceux qui existèrent pour elle avant moi, pourquoi je
suis jaloux, amèrement, de ceux qui vinrent ensuite, et que
j’ignorerai toujours ! C’est elle qui m’a fait comprendre la beauté
miraculeuse, inégalable, de ce pâle croissant que mes yeux
contemplent cette nuit : mes yeux, la seule chose, avec mon cœur et
mes sens, qui soit restée ce qu’elle était dans ce temps-là. Anna me
disait :
— Vois comme il est jeune ! Tous les mois, la lune est vierge !
Tous les mois elle est comme le premier jour qu’elle a brillé sur la
terre, il y a des milliers et des milliers d’années ! Ah ! comme elle est
heureuse ! Elle est bénie : c’est un miracle réservé pour elle !
Alors je songeais que la nature avait fait ce même miracle pour
Anna Mac Fergus ; mais je ne le lui disais pas : ce sont
communément les plus beaux et les plus fiers éloges qu’on ne
saurait adresser à ceux qui les méritent, surtout aux femmes ; ils
paraissent une amère critique, même la plus sombre insulte ; et
pourtant je la désirais davantage, songeant qu’elle était aussi vierge
que l’astre ressuscité. Mais, un de ces soirs immaculés que je la
voulus saisir, elle répondit :
— Non !… Elle nous a vus : cela nous porterait malheur !

The Korean Automotive Industry Volume 1 Beginnings To 1996 A J Jacobs Full Chapter

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The Korean Automotive Industry Volume 1 Beginnings To 1996 A J Jacobs Full Chapter

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The Korean Automotive Industry,

Volume 1: Beginnings to 1996 A. J.

ISBN 978-3-030-86346-3 ISBN 978-3-030-86347-0 (eBook)

Part I The Rise of South Korea’s Auto Industry:

Part II Korean Carmaker Stories, 1962–1996

9 Dong-A and Shinjin Jeep Beget Ssangyong Motor:

Part III Volume 1—Conclusion and Summary

A. J. Jacobs is a Professor of Sociology at East Carolina University. His

4WD/4x4 Four-wheel drive vehicle

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

KCIA Korean Central Intelligence Agency

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation

pushed Japanese automakers to accept

Administrative Divisions of South Korea

Fig. 3.1 Finished vehicles assembled in South Korea, 1962–1979 70

Table 3.1 Progression of Korea’s vehicle plants, 1955–1979 62

Table 10.1 Samsung Group existing and planned vehicle plants,

The Rise of South Korea’s Auto Industry:

Introduction and Overview: The Rise

1 Ward’s (1972–2020), KAMA (1990–2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 3

What explains this remarkable growth? The answer is complex, and

industries and to forge more insightful international trade pacts. In

The Four Stages of the Korean

(HCI) drive of the 1970s, it attempted to rationalize its automakers as

Final vehicle assemblies then fell to 123,135 in 1980 and 109,837 in

Vehicle deliveries at home also began to ascend briskly during this

17 Ward’s (1972–2020), and Jacobs (2016).

with local actors, primarily in developing Asia. Hyundai latter committed

its government permit to produce cars (1976–1981). The second half of

with American Motors (1969–1983). These discussions are followed

Macmillan, the manuscript was split into two volumes, beginnings to

Some Notes on the Research Process

24 Jacobs (1995, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

Notes About Names

revised system is used. For example, Inchon or In’chon is now transcribed

Notes About Exchange Rates

Hyun, J. (2003). Korean automotive Foreign Direct Investment in Europe.

OICA. (2021). Annual Vehicle Production by Nation, 1998 to 2019. Paris:

The State and Development in South Korea:

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 25

which chronicle the State’s creation of a domestic auto industry (1962–

Beginnings: A Brief Summary of Korea Until 1910

aristocrats or nobility) who oversaw the military, economy, and culture of

movable type). The devastation was most pronounced in the south,

The Japanese Colonial Origins

the Japanese homeland, namely: a scarcity of natural resources; a related

monetary policy, but later expanded to include providing development

15 Koh (1970), and Woo (1991).

Du berthon, l’un des canots légers que possédait le chalutier, le

C’était la première fois qu’il renâclait devant l’ouvrage. A cause

« Moi, j’ai connu un gabier, un gabier étonnant ! Il n’y en a pas

Et tous éclatèrent de rire, bonnement. Braves gens !

… C’est un lieutenant de vaisseau qui a donné sa démission,

Le grand vapeur de la compagnie Sud-Atlantique, après avoir

… Oui, combien de temps encore, en pleine paix, pour rappeler

Une fois encore, dans la création, les hommes et les bêtes

ANNA MAC FERGUS, ÉCOSSAISE

Il n’y a jamais rien eu dans ma vie de plus frais, de plus ingénu,

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