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Religious Parties and the Politics
of Civil Liberties
Religious Parties
and the Politics
of Civil Liberties
V I N E E TA YA DAV
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Yadav, Vineeta, author.
Title: Religious parties and the politics of civil liberties / by Vineeta Yadav.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020039396 (print) | LCCN 2020039397 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197545362 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197545386 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Political parties—Islamic countries. |
Religious institutions—Islamic countries. | Islam and politics—
Islamic countries. | Civil rights—Islamic countries. |
Islamic countries—Politics and government.
Classification: LCC JQ1852.A979 Y33 2021 (print) |
LCC JQ1852.A979 (ebook) | DDC 324.2/184091767—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020039396
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020039397
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197545362.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Dedicated in thanks to the peaceful warriors, both religious and secular,
who fight for the dignity and rights of everyone, every day
Contents
List of Illustrations  ix
Acknowledgments  xiii
1. Introduction  1
2. Religious Parties and Religious Organizations: The Fruits of
Partnership  30
3. Religious Parties, Religious Organizations, and the Decline
of Civil Liberties  67
4. The Institutionalization of Religious Organizations in
Muslim-Majority Countries: Statistical Evidence  97
5. Civil Liberties in Muslim-Majority Countries: Statistical Evidence  141
6. The Fall of an Icon: Institutionalization of Religious
Organizations in Turkey  173
7. Resilience and Decline: Religious Parties, Religious
Organizations, and Institutionalization in Pakistan  206
8. The Fall of an Icon: The Decline in Civil Liberties in Turkey  244
9. Resilience and Decline: Civil Liberties in Pakistan  273
10. Conclusion: Summary and Implications for Future Research  302
Appendix  321
References  325
Index  365
Illustrations
Tables
4.1. Muslim-Majority Countries in the Sample 133

4.2. SEI: Main Results for RO Institutionalization 134
4.3. SEI: Robustness Checks 136
4.4. SEI: First-Stage Probit Selection Equation Results 138
4.5. SEI: Second-Stage Probit Selection Equation Results 139
5.1. Civil Liberties: Main Results from OP Model 166
5.2. Civil Liberties: Robustness Test Results 168
5.3. Civil Liberties: First-Stage Probit Selection Equation Results 170
5.4. Civil Liberties: Second-Stage Probit Selection Equation Results 172
8.1. Results for Civil Liberty-Related Policies in Turkey 271
9.1. Results for Civil Liberty-Related Policies in Pakistan 299
A.4. Definition and Data Sources for Control Variables in Tables for
Chapters 4 and 5 321
Figures
1.1. Muslim-majority countries in the sample 2

1.2. Global share of Muslim-majority countries with religious parties 2
1.3. Illustration of the theoretical argument 25
4.1. Moving average of RO institutionalization in the full sample 106
4.2. Distribution of RO institutionalization 107
4.3. Distribution of seat concentration 109
4.4. Seat concentration, inflation crisis, and RO institutionalization 115
4.5. Marginal effect of seat concentration on RO institutionalization in the
absence of inflation crisis 118
x Illustrations
4.6. Marginal effect of seat concentration on RO institutionalization when

inflation crisis occurs 119
5.1. Distribution of civil liberties and civil rights 144
5.2. Moving average of civil liberties and civil rights 144
5.3. RO institutionalization, religious partner, and civil liberties 151
5.4. RO institutionalization, religious partner, and civil rights 152
5.5. High levels of RO institutionalization and civil liberties when religious partner
is equal to 1 155
5.6. Low levels of RO institutionalization and civil liberties when religious partner
is equal to 1 155
5.7. Effect of religious partner on civil liberties when RO institutionalization
is low 156
5.8. Effect of religious partner on civil liberties when RO institutionalization
is high 156
5.9. Low levels of RO institutionalization and civil liberties when
religious partner is equal to 0 157
5.10. High levels of RO institutionalization and civil liberties when
religious partner is equal to 0 157
6.1. Turkey: Distribution of elite support for universal human rights versus
religiously defined rights 185
6.2. Turkey: Distribution of elite support for freedom of expression 187
6.3. Turkey: Distribution of elite preferences on policies affecting civil liberties 188
6.4. Seat concentration and seat index for Turkey, 1970–2016 190
6.5. Annual inflation rates in Turkey, 1956–2016 191
7.1. Pakistan: Distribution of elite support for universal human rights versus
religiously defined rights 220
7.2. Pakistan: Distribution of elite support for freedom of speech 222
7.3. Pakistan: Distribution of elite support for civil liberties 223
7.4. Annual inflation rates in Pakistan, 1960–2016 226
8.1. Turkey: Marginal effects of religious party membership on support for
universal versus religious human rights, by RO influence 247
media censorship, by RO influence 248
mandatory religious education and support for criminalization of adultery,
by RO influence 249
Illustrations xi
8.4. Moving average of civil rights in Turkey, 1985–2010 268

9.1. Pakistan: Marginal effects of religious party membership on support for
universal vs. religious human rights, by RO influence 276
media censorship, by RO influence 278
mandatory religious education and, support for criminalization of adultery,
by RO influence 279
9.4. Moving average of civil rights in Pakistan, 1988–2016 297
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at Penn

State University for providing an intellectually stimulating, cheerful, and sup-
portive environment. Conducting surveys, particularly of elites, is an expensive
and time-consuming business! It would not have been possible without the in-
stitutional support of sponsors such as the National Science Foundation. I grate-
fully acknowledge support from the NSF to conduct three rounds of surveys and
additional field research in Turkey. Round 1 in May 2015 was funded through
NSF Grant #1545180. Rounds 2 and 3 were funded through Grant #1602190. The
survey in Pakistan was funded by Penn State University. I am especially grateful
to the scholars, supervisors, and staff at the two institutes in Turkey and Pakistan
who actually fielded the surveys for me—Frekans in Istanbul and the Pakistan
Institute of Peace Studies in Islamabad. Their advice, support, and in-country
expertise were invaluable in successfully pulling these surveys off, and their ex-
citement was infectious! I am also grateful to Omer Yalcin and Caner Simsek for
their outstanding research assistance for this project and Rebekah Zwanzig for
the Arabic transliteration. Finally, I very much appreciate the willingness of the
survey respondents and interviewees in both Turkey and Pakistan to share their
time, expertise, and experiences. One of the greatest joys of this project for me
was to see the generosity, thoughtfulness, and kindness of the many Pakistanis
who chose to share their time and knowledge with me irrespective of the politics
between our countries. Thank you—you give me for great hope for our future.
At Oxford University Press, I would like to thank my editor, David McBride,
for his encouragement, immense patience, and helpful advice. They were es-
pecially invaluable in this project. I am also indebted to Holly Mitchell, who
guided the manuscript through the production process at Oxford University
Press. Finally, I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their insightful
comments, encouragement, and advice. This book has improved substantially as
a result of their encouragement and constructive criticisms. The final errors are
of course all mine.
As always, my family and friends have been patient, supportive, encouraging,
and (convincingly) enthusiastic through the long life of this project. My parents
Ramesh and Shashi Yadav and many, many other family members sat through
rants, panic attacks, highs, and happy jigs on the long, challenging journey to
complete this project. My friends Ravi, Katie, Alexandra, Ritu, Subbu, Vidhi,
Alison, and Sonali have always been there for me. I cannot tell you how lucky
xiv Acknowledgments
I feel that you count me among your friends. Finally, to the people who bore the
brunt of the good and bad associated with this project, my husband Bumba and
my son Reyhan, go the biggest thanks! This was a marathon that I could not have
completed without both of you. Hopefully, the COVID crisis ends soon so we
can take that well-earned, fabulous vacation (hopefully not to Disney World)!
Vineeta Yadav
July 30, 2020
1
Introduction
Religious parties are increasingly common and increasingly active in politics in

countries across the world.1 Their political energy on issues directly related to
basic civil liberties has been particularly striking. For example, the Jathika Hela
Urumayo, a political party led by Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka, has repeatedly
proposed bills to criminalize conversions out of Buddhism, most recently in
2011 (USCIRF 2018: 5). In Poland, under the Christian Democratic Law and
Justice Party liberal women’s groups advocating for gender equality and LGBTQ
rights have suffered police raids and cuts in state funding and access aimed at
discouraging their participation in public rallies and forcing their closure
(HRW 2019). The religious Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party in Malaysia, a country
with a 62% Muslim population, introduced bills in 2016 and 2017 to adopt the
Islamic penal code (hudūd), which would criminalize apostasy, slander, adultery,
and alcohol consumption for all citizens (USCIRF 2017: 16), while in Kuwait,
parliamentarians affiliated with religious parties passed laws requiring the segre-
gation of men and women in public (in 1996) and private (in 2000) universities
(Gulf News, June 3, 2013). These examples, illustrating how religious parties have
challenged liberal freedoms of religion, association and assembly, expression
and movement across religious traditions have raised fears of an inevitable de-
cline in civil liberties when religious parties succeed in politics.
This fear has perhaps been most prominent in Muslim-majority countries
(MMCs) where religious parties have demonstrated a meteoric rise in political
prominence over the last five decades. Figure 1.1 illustrates all the MMCs in the
world in 2016 and figure 1.2 shows the number of religious parties over time in
these countries. As figure 1.2 shows, in 1970 only 6% of MMCs had a religious
political party, and none had multiple religious parties. By 1995, the share of
MMCs with at least one religious party had increased almost sixfold, to 34%.
By 2016, almost half (49%) of MMCs had religious parties, and 55% of these
countries had multiple religious parties. Impressively, between 1970 and 2016,
religious parties formed part of the ruling coalition in 34% of all country-years
in democratic and autocratic MMCs. This is also a trend that has strengthened
over time. While 23% of ruling coalitions in MMCs between 1985 and 2000
1 See, for example, Madeley 2011; Kurzman and Naqvi 2015; Kuperus 2013; van der Vyver and
Green 2008; Ward 2013; Mantilla 2018; Mkentane 2019.
Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties. Vineeta Yadav, Oxford University Press (2021).
© Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197545362.003.0001
2 Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties
Figure 1.1 Muslim-majority countries in the sample

Dark-shaded colors indicates Muslim-majority countries in which more than 50% of domestic
citizens are Muslims. Data to illustrate this map is drawn from the United Nation’s Statistics Division
Demographic database.
60
50
40
Percentage
30
20
10
0
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
% Countries w/Islamist Parties % Countries w/Multiple Islamist Parties
Figure 1.2 Global share of Muslim-majority countries with religious parties
included religious parties, this share rose to 35% between 2000 and 2016. What
these numbers unequivocally show is that religious parties have become an in-
creasingly popular mode of mobilization among religious elites and voters in
MMCs. Does this rise suggest that MMCs with religious parties are inevitably
headed into a future of illiberal rights and liberties? This is the question that
this book seeks to address.
Skeptics point to examples such as those cited above to answer yes to this ques-
tion (Pipes Dec. 11, 2012; Ali Feb. 28, 2011; Tibi 2008). Optimists argue that par-
ticipation in electoral politics teaches and incentivizes religious political parties
to moderate their orthodox positions regarding the role of religion in society and
state, including their opposition to liberal civil liberties and their advocacy of
Introduction 3
religiously defined civil liberties.2 They point to examples such as the Ennahda
Party’s support for a 2017 bill recognizing marriage between non-Muslim men
and Muslim women in Tunisia (BBC, Sep. 15, 2017), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-
Fazlur’s support for a bill protecting the rights of women working outside the
home in mixed-gender settings in 2010 in Pakistan (Weiss 2014), and the will-
ingness of Algeria’s religious Movement for National Reform (MRN) party to
place women at the top of its electoral lists during elections (Driessen 2014: 182)
as illustrating such moderation. A study examining how support for legal
equality for religious minorities and women evolved in the party manifestos of
83 religious parties in MMCs over time found that these parties did not follow a
single trajectory of increased or decreased support for equality (Kurzman and
Naqvi 2015: 104–106). Instead, confounding both pessimists and predictions of
moderation, parties adopted very different strategies across countries and across
time within the same country in liberal and illiberal directions.
Despite the heated academic and policy debates about the impact of religious
parties on civil liberties, religious parties are surprisingly absent in studies exam-
ining civil liberties in the civil liberties literature. These studies instead have tried
to explain changes in civil liberties in MMCs by analyzing their political and ec-
onomic structures and the nature of their international ties.3 Thus, the question
of how religious parties affect de facto civil liberties in MMCs remains an open
one. In this book, I address this puzzle by building on insights from research on
special interest group politics to examine the relationship between religious in-
terest groups and religious parties, the conditions that strengthen and weaken
their relationships, and the impact of this relationship on the policies and actions
religious parties adopt regarding civil liberties in MMCs.
Religious organizations in MMCs have been the subject of numerous in-
sightful and valuable studies.4 These studies have largely analyzed religious or-
ganizations (hereafter ROs) in the theoretical context of their role as members
of larger Islamic social movements. This theoretical lens has been useful for
understanding outcomes affected by the actions taken by the movement as a
whole, particularly in opposition to government policies. However, while dif-
ferent religious parties and ROs may be allies in pushing for a state and society
based on religious beliefs and preferences, they are often rivals when it comes to
attracting voters, followers, donors, and state patronage (Brown and Hamzawy
2010; Hefner 2011; Werenfels 2014; Pew 2016). In addition to these institutional
2 See Schwedler 2011, 2013; Mecham and Hwang 2014; and Brocker and Künkler 2013 for recent
reviews of this extensive literature.

3 See Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Esposito and Voll 2001; Khan 2006; Turam 2007; Davenport
2007; Fish 2011; Conrad 2011; Dabashi 2012; Bradley 2012; Kubicek 2014; Møller and Skaaning
2014; Miller 2015.
4 This is an extensive and rich literature. For some recent examples see Cesari 2018; Hamid 2014;
Hashmi 2009; Bayat 2007b.

interests, ROs often have competing policy visions, including on the correct
conceptualization of religiously defined civil liberties and the acceptability of
compromising them to accommodate more liberal civil liberties (Brown and
Hamzaway 2010; Hefner 2011; An-Na’im 2011; Werenfels 2014; Hamid 2014;
Dunn 2015). As scholars note, the social movement perspective provides less
theoretical leverage in understanding how competition and alliances between
members of the same social movement can affect their tactics and the policy
outcomes they are mobilizing for (Diani 1992; Della Porta and Diani 2006;
McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Mair 2013; Hunter, Kriesi, and Lorenzini 2018). This
is particularly true when the movement includes entities who are in government
as well as in opposition (McAdam and Tarrow 2013; Mair 2013; Hunter, Kriesi,
and Lorenzini 2018). Fortunately, this is precisely what theories of special in-
terest groups focus on.
A rich literature on special interest groups tells us that organized interests
deploy their organizational resources using inside and outside lobbying tactics
to seek out and influence political actors capable of influencing state patronage
and policies in their favor.5 Analyzing religious interest groups in particular,
scholars find that lobbying by churches in Western, Eastern, and Central Europe
(Grzymala-Busse 2015; Braun-Poppelaars and Hanegraff 2011; Warner 2000),
Africa (Kuperus 2013; van der Vyver and Green 2008; Ward 2013), and Latin
America (Htun 2009; Hagopian 2009) and by professional religious lobbies in the
United States (Adkins et al. 2013; Herzke 2010; Heaney 2010; Yamane 2005) is
common and can influence government policies significantly. Given the promi-
nence of implementing religiously defined civil liberties in the beliefs and policy
agendas of ROs in MMCs, we would expect that the capacity of organized reli-
gious interest groups to influence religious parties and the susceptibility of reli-
gious parties to such lobbying could potentially influence the policy positions that
religious parties adopt on policies important to religious groups. This book builds
on insights from the special interest lobbying literature to systematically analyze
(a) how particular political and economic conditions influence the strength of the
relationship between religious political parties and religious interest groups in a
country and (b) the conditions under which interactions between these two sets
of religious actors lead to declines in the civil liberties of its citizens. By doing so, it
contributes directly to research on political parties, special interest lobbying, civil
liberties, and the moderation of religious parties.
I first argue that nongovernmental da ‘wa organizations and Sufi orders with
a country-wide presence led by nationally prominent leaders are the religious
interest groups of analytical interest in MMCs. To address the first question,
5 For recent overviews of the lobbying literature see Herzke 2010; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Lowery
2013; and de Figueiredo and Richter 2014.

Introduction 5
I consider when and how religious parties that see these ROs as valuable po-
tential political allies are able to strengthen these organizations. I argue that
when (i) religious parties are present in the legislature as a highly concentrated
religious-party bloc and (ii) an inflationary crisis creates a serious political threat
for non-religious parties, religious parties are able to effectively champion ROs as
agents who can mitigate the political impact of this economic crisis and convince
other parties to adopt policies that strengthen ROs. These policies allow ROs to
increase their material assets and social reach by strengthening their presence
in the education and welfare sectors and expanding it into the commercial and
media sectors, a process I label the socioeconomic institutionalization (SEI) of
ROs. Absent one or both of these conditions, non-religious parties prevent poli-
cies favorable to ROs from being passed, thus preventing ROs from gaining such
organizational reach and strength.
High SEI transforms these ROs into formidable political players with valu-
able political resources, but, I argue, this can prove a mixed blessing for religious
parties. While religious parties benefit from the resources and support of highly
institutionalized ROs during elections, they also face the threat of the consid-
erable political damage highly institutionalized ROs can inflict on them should
they choose to deviate from the shared religiously inspired policy agenda that
motivated ROs to support them in the first place. For this reason, I argue, when
religious parties do well in elections and join the government, their ability to
moderate their policy positions on civil liberties in order to broaden their pop-
ular appeal, to legislate, and to govern with non-religious allies will depend
on whether or not they face highly institutionalized ROs. If they do, they will
choose not to moderate and de facto civil liberties will decline. Conversely, if
they don’t face highly institutionalized ROs, religious parties will prefer to mod-
erate, and civil liberties will not decline due to their ascent to office. Thus, only
when religious parties win office and are operating in the political context of
highly institutionalized ROs should we expect to see a decline in de facto civil
liberties.
I test these arguments by combining “large-N” time-series cross section
(TSCS) statistical analyses of all 49 MMCs from 1970 to 2016 with an in-depth
comparative case study of two carefully selected countries—Turkey and Pakistan.
For the large-N empirical analysis, I construct and analyze a novel data set that
builds on primary and secondary sources to code new data on religious parties
in government, the legislative concentration of these parties and an original
measure of the SEI of nongovernmental, national-level ROs for this entire set of
countries. For the case study chapters, I use open-ended interviews with political
party leaders and ROs, among others, along with original within-country surveys
of politicians from religious and non-religious parties in Turkey and Pakistan
to analyze politicians’ preferences on civil liberties and their responsiveness to
religious interest groups on these issues. This analysis is supplemented by quan-

titative and qualitative evidence from secondary sources to test the causal logic
of these theoretical claims. Collectively, this approach allows me to test the gen-
eralizability of the theoretical framework and to assess the causal mechanisms
leading to the main theoretical predictions.
The findings in this book suggest that instead of viewing the political rise and
success of religious parties with undiluted skepticism or with enthusiastic op-
timism, analysts must first identify and understand the various political and
economic conditions that shape and limit the strategic options and indepen-
dence of religious parties. One such important condition is the strength of or-
ganized social and economic actors with different agendas in these societies, and
the nature and extent of their relationships with all political parties, including
religious parties. Another condition relates to understanding the effects of ec-
onomic conditions on the relationship between various interest groups and reli-
gious political actors. The insights on the dynamic relationship between religious
lobbies and religious parties presented in this book promise theoretical leverage
over many open questions in comparative politics and comparative political
economy. For example, understanding how the lobbying strategies of various
kinds of special groups, including religious, business, labor, and environmental
groups, affect the political calculations of religious and non-religious parties in
MMCs may help us better understand phenomena such as the independence
of the judiciary, the regulation of banking and financial markets, the nature of
welfare programs, the conduct of foreign policy, and democratic consolidation
in these countries. Finally, while this book focuses on MMCs, the arguments
underlining the evolution of RO-religious party relationships and the ability of
ROs to constrain the political choices of religious parties do not rely on specific
details of MMCs or Islam. This opens up many new and intriguing avenues of
research for researchers and policymakers examining how well these arguments
are able to explain the evolution of the RO-religious party relationships and their
consequences in other developing countries.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by defining two key terms
used in this book—civil liberties and religious parties in MMCs. I then discuss
why religious parties face a dilemma in choosing to support or oppose liberal civil
liberties by contrasting them with civil liberties as articulated by orthodox reli-
gious positions in Islam. I then highlight the surprisingly limited attention both
the literatures on the moderation of religious parties and on civil liberties have
paid to the role and influence of organized religious interest groups in shaping
the incentives of political actors on this issue, and the reasons why this omission
is important. The rest of this chapter then previews the theoretical argument and
research design and describes the organization of the rest of the book.
Introduction 7
Definition: Civil Liberties
Civil liberties are part of a broad spectrum of rights and liberties that are consid-
ered to comprise the human rights of individuals in a liberal democratic regime.
The 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has
become the global reference point for defining the liberal standard for human
rights and has influenced the formulation of these civil liberties in sovereign
constitutions and regional charters on human rights in countries across the
world.6 For these reasons scholars and advocacy groups have used UDHR prin-
ciples as a yardstick for measuring how liberal the de jure and de facto civil liber-
ties provision is in any country.7 In this book, I follow their lead in defining and
focusing on the following liberal civil liberties in accordance with the articles
of UDHR:
Freedom of Movement—Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within
the borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Freedom of Religion—Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice worship and observance.
Freedom of Expression—Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, re-
ceive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers.
Freedom of Assembly and Association—Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
6 For example, even the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, issued by the
London-based Islamic Council; the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam issued by the
Organization of Islamic States; and the 2004 Arab Charter of Human Rights all directly reference
UDHR 1948 and use its language to frame their principles, even as they depart from many of its key
principles (Dunn 2015; An-Na’im 2011).
7 See, for example, Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Møller and Skaaning 2014; Grote and Rödder
2015; Witte and Green 2011; and Chase and Hamzawy 2006 among academics, and Freedom House,
Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch among human rights advocacy groups.
These definitions allow us to identify the types of laws, decrees, policies,

behaviors, and actions that strengthen and undermine civil liberties. While the
passage of legislation and issuance of executive decrees are the most visible and
verifiable ways to observe whether civil liberties are being strengthened or weak-
ened by governments, informal norms, practices, and institutions can also do
considerable harm to the state of civil liberties in a country (Mahmoudi 2016;
Witte and Green 2011). For example, while laws mandating the censorship of art
shows violate the freedom of speech, using excessive force only against liberal
women’s groups or targeting only their organizations for tax audits violates their
freedom to assemble and associate.
Following other scholars,8 I focus on these civil liberties as a collective out-
come rather than focusing on them individually.9 This choice is influenced by
the interdependent nature of civil liberties and, as discussed later, by the nature
of sharia-based principles regarding civil liberties. The full exercise of one civil
liberty frequently requires the ability to exercise others freely as well (Mahmoudi
2016; Witte and Green 2011; An-Na’im 2011; Mayer 2007; Mernissi 1992; Milani
2011). For example, to exercise their freedom of religion, citizens need to be able
to establish religious foundations that allow them to manage their religious af-
fairs, to meet collectively in public places to observe communal rituals together,
and to freely discuss and share their beliefs about their faith. The first requires
freedom of association, the second freedom of assembly, and the last freedom of
expression.
Furthermore, as I discuss later in more detail, orthodox interpretations of
sharia impose values and rules of behavior that simultaneously affect multiple
civil liberties as articulated by UDHR. This makes their consequences for civil
liberties inseparable and, as scholars note, makes it logical to study their impact
as a collective (Dunn 2015; Gerges 2013; An-Na’im 2011; Chase and Hamzawy
2006). For example, if as champions of orthodoxy argue, women must ask the
permission of their male head of household to venture outside of their home,
they are denied not only their freedom of movement but also their freedom to
join voluntary associations of their choice or participate in public gatherings of
their choice. Similarly, if religious minorities are denied the freedom to prose-
lytize, they are denied their freedom of religion and their freedom of speech. For
these reasons I believe that to understand how the political success of religious
parties affects civil liberties, we must study their impact on all of these liberal
civil liberties collectively.
8 See Burgat 1997; Nasr 2001; Esposito and Voll 2001; Khan 2005; Peters 2005; Bayat 2007b; Turam
2007; An-Na’im 2011; Mayer 2007; Liouw 2009; Bradley 2012; Dabashi 2012; Møller and Skaaning
2014; Dunn 2015.
9 These are substantial literatures. For example, see Evans 2009, 2011; Hare and Weinstein 2009;
Cross 2015; Fox 2015; and Perry 2011.

Introduction 9
As political parties, religious parties have extensive policy agendas covering a

wide range of social, economic, institutional, security, and foreign policy issues.
The specific focus on civil liberties in this book is motivated by many substan-
tive concerns. First, the provision of basic civil liberties—the freedoms of expres-
sion, religion, movement, association, and assembly—is considered essential for
allowing individuals to live lives of dignity safe from persecution by the govern-
ment and the majority (UDHR 1948).10 These civil liberties are also considered
essential for allowing the procedural components of democracy, such as elections
and lawmaking, to function democratically and for providing responsiveness and
accountability, which are vital for building high-quality democracies (Linz and
Stepan 1996; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Haggard and Kaufmann 2016). Third,
the state of civil liberties in a country also influences its business environment,
potentially affecting domestic and foreign investment, productivity, innovation,
and the development of important components of economic growth, such as fi-
nancial markets (Younis and Younis 2011; Woodberry 2012; Lawrence, Morton,
and Khan 2013; Grim, Clark, and Snyder 2014; Binmahfouz 2017). Finally, since
imposing religiously defined constraints on civil liberties has featured promi-
nently in the founding platforms of religious parties, understanding when and
why parties maintain this policy commitment and when they moderate or sacri-
fice it is important for understanding the evolution of civil liberties as well as the
evolution of religious parties as political parties.
Liberal civil liberties pose unique challenges for religious parties in MMCs
for several reasons. As political actors, religious parties benefit directly from
the ability to exercise these freedoms themselves. In countries where religious
groups and parties have faced suppression from their governments, this lesson
can be particularly potent among these politicians, giving them strong strategic
incentives to support these liberties. Yet politicians in MMCs often face citizen
majorities who favor democracy, as exemplified by direct, multiparty elections
for office, but not liberal civil liberties.11 This puts politicians in the politically
delicate position of favoring for strategic reasons positions that voters do not
necessarily support. Finally, while sharia does not specify specific institutional
arrangements as religiously appropriate, it does specify what kind of civil liber-
ties Muslims are religiously entitled to and the limits to those claims (An-Na’im
2011; El Fadl 2016; Mahmoudi 2016). This makes it easier for politicians to frame
their preferred institutional choices as religiously condoned but poses a problem
for justifying liberal civil liberties on religious grounds. Politicians therefore face
10 For example, see Berlin 2002; Ishay 2004; Keith 2002; and Hathaway 2002.
11 Most recently see polls by Gallup (35 countries, 2001–2007), Tessler, Jamal and Robinson 2012
and Pew (39 countries, 2008–2012).
a thornier problem in supporting liberal civil liberties compared to supporting

liberal democratic institutions.
Definition: Religious Parties in MMCs
In MMCs, religious parties inspired by Islam are referred to by scholars as Islamist

parties. In this book, I use common scholarly definitions of Islamist parties as
represented here by Schwedler (2011) and Mecham and Hwang (2014) to iden-
tify religious parties inspired by Islam in MMCs. Schwedler’s (2011: 349) defini-
tion of Islamists is that they are “highly diverse political actors who, in varying
ways, find the blueprint for social, moral, political, and economic reform in the
teachings of the Islamic faith.” Her definition includes both individual politicians
and political parties. Mecham and Hwang (2014: 3) elaborate on her definition in
the case of parties to define religious parties in MMCs as
political parties that seek to win votes in the electoral arena, and that articu-
late a political agenda derived in large part from an Islamic worldview. They
are political parties that use Islamic religious narratives to make political
claims on the state, which may include concerns for Islamic social and cultural
norms, Islamic models of governance, or resource allocation toward religious
institutions. Often, but not universally, Islamist parties articulate some degree
of support for the application of Islamic law in their societies.
Some scholars only consider parties whose platforms explicitly include a com-
mitment to create an Islamic legal and political structure as Islamist parties
(Cammett and Luong 2014; Yavuz 2009; Bayat 2007b). However, in the first
large-scale analysis of the electoral platforms of 83 religious political parties in
MMCs, Kurzman and Naqvi (2015: 104–105) show that this is neither an in-
trinsic nor a constant feature of such parties as a category or, importantly, even
of individual parties over time. They find that, while all religious parties are
founded on platforms derived directly from orthodox interpretations of sharia,
many, but not all, parties adjust their stated positions on sharia and the role they
propose it play in society with some regularity. For these reasons, most scholars
continue to define parties in MMCs as religious based not on their demand for
an Islamic state but rather on their extensive reliance on Islam as the source for
ideological and policy inspiration.12 This is the definition I use to identify reli-
gious parties in MMCs, also referred to as Islamist parties, in this book. Finally,
12 See, for example, Yavuz 2012; Schwedler 2016; Brown and Hamzawy 2010; Yadav 2010;
Nasr 2005.
Introduction 11
once a religious organization declares itself to be a political party and starts par-
ticipating in elections, it is no longer considered to be a civil society organization
but is considered to be a political party.
Why Would Religious Parties Protect or Oppose Liberal

Civil Liberties?
Almost all religious parties in MMCs start their political lives with manifestos
and platforms that are either based directly on or draw substantial inspiration
from orthodox interpretations of sharia for their policy proposals, procedures,
and institutions (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010, 2015; Rumi 2014; Gerges 2013;
Hefner 2011; Brown and Hamzaway 2010).13 Policies supporting religiously de-
fined civil liberties based on orthodox interpretations of sharia occupy a very
prominent place in the platforms of religious parties in MMCs (Kurzman and
Naqvi 2015; Gerges 2013; Hefner 2011; Brown and Hamzawy 2010). As I discuss
later, these religiously defined civil liberties are in striking contrast to liberal civil
liberties as defined by the UN charter. Changing positions from religiously de-
fined to liberal civil liberties would therefore indicate a very substantial shift in
the ideological and policy platforms of Islamist parties. In order to understand
(i) why pursuing a religiously defined set of civil liberties would weaken civil lib-
erties protections for citizens in MMCs, (ii) why shifting support to uphold lib-
eral civil liberties would involve significant ideological and policy compromises,
and (iii) when and why religious parties are willing to make such compromises,
it is important to first understand how civil liberties articulated on liberal prin-
ciples differ from those articulated based on orthodox interpretations of the
Quran and the Sunna.
Orthodox Religious Views of Civil Liberties
Proponents of orthodox positions on civil liberties believe that all human lib-
erties are enshrined in sharia and may only be elaborated in the spirit of sharia
13 Sharia is commonly defined as “the totality of the normative system of Islam, ranging in
subject-matter from doctrine of belief and ritual worship practices, to ethical principles and social
institutions” (An-Na’im 2007: 1). Both the strictly legal and normative aspects of sharia draw upon
two sources—the Quran and the Sunna. The Sunna is defined as “the canonical words and deeds of
the Prophet (known collectively as the Sunna [traditions] of the Prophet) as recorded in the authen-
ticated accounts knows as the hadith” (Hefner 2011: 8). Importantly, there are many rich traditions
of interpretation of both the Quran and the Sunna and thus, many traditions of interpreting sharia
(see An-Na’im 2007, 2011; Hefner 2011; El Fadl 2007, 2015; Ramadan 2009; and Vikor 2005 for
discussions of these various traditions).
(An-Na’im 2011; El Fadl 2016; Dunn 2015).14 For example, Abou El Fadl
(2003: 122) notes that the champions of this orthodox view believe that “what-
ever rights human beings are entitled to enjoy, they are entirely within the pur-
view of Shari‘ah law,” and Mayer (2007: 60) notes that “the authors of the Islamic
human rights schemes . . . cling to the ideas and attitudes of traditional ortho-
doxy.” The second important aspect of this conceptualization of civil liberties
among orthodox Islamists, as scholars note, is that they believe that religiously
condoned civil liberties in Islam are in direct opposition to liberal civil liberties
as articulated by the UN human rights charter. El Fadl (2003: 126), for example,
notes that orthodox Islamists have a “defiant stance toward contemporary inter-
national human rights claims,” and An-Na’im (2011: 63) emphasizes that they
“reject openly the idea of universal human rights as an imperial Western impo-
sition.” These definitions and differences are expounded and emphasized widely
in the writing of influential religious scholars and intellectuals representing this
orthodox position on civil liberties.
The orthodox position on the freedom of expression is represented by Maulana
Maududi, one of the most influential figures in the Islamist movement globally,
as follows: “Islam gives the right of freedom of thought and expression to all
citizens of the Islamic State on the condition that it should be used for the prop-
agation of virtue and truth and not for spreading evil and wickedness. . . . Under
no circumstances would Islam allow evil and wicked-ness to be propagated”
(Maududi 1978: 28). In this conceptualization of freedom of expression what is
evil and wicked is largely subjective and most authoritatively identified as such
by pious leaders with the appropriate moral and religious authority (An-Na’im
2011; Kramer 2015; Mahmoudi 2016). Such leaders may use their authority to
recognize specific speech, literature, or art as blasphemy, heresy, or apostasy
and invoke a variety of penalties for any transgressions ranging from exclu-
sion from the community of Muslims (takfīr) to the death penalty (An-Na’im
2011; Kramer 2015; Mahmoudi 2016). Importantly, this religiously constrained
freedom of expression directly limits the ability of individuals to criticize any
religious beliefs, practices, and institutions and potentially religious leaders to
demand rights not condoned by orthodoxy, to speak out against religiously con-
doned practices that violate their civil liberties, or to use speech to mobilize
14 Scholars broadly define an orthodox view of these rights as driven by the belief that sharia as
revelation provides a complete guide to all rights and situations at all times and a reformist view as
one that believes that sharia needs to be reinterpreted by humans in order to speak to the contempo-
rary issues of different eras. Orthodox and reformist scholars draw on different sets of verses to justify
their interpretations, and they often differ on how literally individual verses are to be interpreted.
Finally, among orthodox followers, all legitimate reinterpretations of the Quran and the Hadith
ended in the eighth century and the interpretations after this date are unacceptable. Reformists have
contested this claim (An-Na’im 2011). For further discussion of different reformist trends within
Islam see Dunn 2015; An-Na’im 2011; Rumi 2014; and Bayat 2007b, 2013.
Introduction 13
others in the cause of such rights (An-Na’im 2011; Hefner 2011; Dunn 2015;
Mahmoudi 2016).
Orthodox interpretations of sharia also forbid people from assembling
for causes deemed un-Islamic and from creating entities that promote such
causes (An-Na’im 2011; Hefner 2011; Dunn 2015; Mahmoudi 2016). Again,
the standard of what can be considered un-Islamic is to be determined only
by pious leaders with the appropriate moral and religious authority (An-Na’im
2011; Kramer 2015; Mahmoudi 2016). Orthodox interpretations of sharia
also endorse the enforcement of various injunctions regarding the religious
practices of religious minorities that directly limit the freedoms of religion, as-
sociation, and assembly. Forsaking Islam for another religion or for secularism
is considered apostasy (ridda), is explicitly forbidden, and is punishable under
the mandatory hudūd provisions of sharia in an orthodox framework (Kramer
2015: 181; An-Na’im 2011: 64). To ensure that Muslims are not lured into
joining another religion, champions of orthodoxy argue for limiting the rights
of religious minorities “to assemble for religious purposes, to establish chari-
table institutions, to write and circulate religious publications, to celebrate reli-
gious holidays, and to participate in similar activities” (Mahmoudi 2016: 541).
Recognized religious minorities may be allowed to practice their faith in a pious
Muslim society as long as they recognize the superiority of Islam, but they
should be barred from holding any office that requires the application of sharia
law and principles (Mahmoudi 2016; Lerner 2011; Kramer 2015; An-Na’im
2011; Mayer 2007).15 Since Islam is believed to offer a complete way of life, this
principle can potentially be applied to bar religious minorities from holding
any office at any level, including the judiciary, the military, high administrative
offices, and high political offices (Mahmoudi 2016; Lerner 2015; Kramer 2015;
An-Na’im 2011). Thus, even this limited religious freedom would come at the
cost of social, political, economic, and legal discrimination, and the freedoms of
expression, movement, association, and assembly of religious minorities would
be seriously limited.
Finally, orthodox interpretations of religious injunctions regarding the rights
and status of women and their role in their households and in society place
severe limits on the ability of this half of the population to engage in free ex-
pression, to move freely, or to exercise their freedom to assemble, associate, or
choose a religion (Mernissi 1992; Ahmed 1992; Hajjar 2004; Mayer 2007; Milani
2011; Mir Husseini 2019; Chaudhry 2015). Chaudhry (2015: 264) observes that
15 Traditionalists distinguish between religious minorities who are considered people of the book
(Christians and Jews, termed dhimmis) and other religious minorities (for example Hindus, Sikhs,
and the Baha’i). While dhimmis are accorded some protections, non-dhimmi minorities are not rec-
ognized under sharia and are afforded no explicit protections regarding their ability to practice their
faith or enjoy equal civic and legal rights at all (Kramer 2015; An-Na’im 2011).
orthodox scholars use “verses on marital discord (Q.4:34), polygamy (Q.4:3), the
higher rank of men over women (Q.2:228) and women’s testimony (Q.2:282) to
establish an asymmetrical relationship between men and women in both private
and public spheres . . . to limit women’s participation in the public sphere and
the political process.” Similarly, Milani (2011: 2) notes that the Quranic injunc-
tion to practice modesty is used by supporters of orthodox views to justify “the
exclusion of women from public debate and the public sphere.” Supporters of
orthodoxy advocate placing limits on the movement of women in order to avoid
mixed-gender settings and requiring them to obtain the permission of their male
guardians for all major life decisions and for decisions to step out of the home
(Milani 2011; Mernissi 1992; Mir Husseini 2019; Hajjar 2004; Ahmed 1992).
Thus, women would require the permission of the male head of the household
in order to access education, take up a job, perform in public, travel to any event,
or join any organization. Such restrictions would therefore effectively prevent
women from exercising their freedom to join associations of their choice; partic-
ipate in public rallies, demonstrations, or other public events; choose their reli-
gious affiliation or exercise free speech (Mayer 2007; Milani 2011; Mernissi 1992;
Mir Husseini 2019; Hajjar 2004; Ahmed 1992).
Finally, the orthodox view of the relationship between citizens and the state has
important implications for civil liberties as well. In this view, the state is the pro-
tector of the moral soul of society and the manifestation of a pious community’s
will to police its morality (Maududi 1978; Bayat 2007b; An-Na’-im 2011; Dunn
2015; El Fadl 2016). Individuals who criticize or challenge societal norms, rules, or
an Islamic state are therefore seen to pose a threat to this moral society (Maududi
1978; An-Na’im 2011; Dunn 2015; El Fadl 2015). Since the state is considered
responsible for ensuring that its citizens live according to the true principles of
sharia, the state must protect society from such individuals (Dunn 2015; An-Na’-
im 2011; Yavuz 2011; Maududi 1978). This view, which seeks to protect society
from the individual, is fundamentally different from that of liberal democracy,
in which civil liberties protect citizens from repression by the state and society
(Mayer 2007; An-Na’-im 2011; Dunn 2015). As this brief overview highlights, or-
thodox views on the rights that citizens in MMCs can enjoy are in stark contrast to
the liberal civil liberties embodied by the UN human rights declaration discussed
earlier.
Importantly, the orthodox interpretation is not the only interpretation of
sharia. Rather, there is a rich and passionate debate on how to interpret sharia
for modern societies using the principle of human reasoning (ijtihād) to support
liberal democracy and civil liberties.16 Participants in this debate include not just
16 See, for example, the work of Ahmed 1992; An-Na’im 2008, 2011; Soroush 1994, 1998; Abou el-
Fadl 2005; Mir Husseini 2011; and Dunn 2011, among many others.
Introduction 15
orthodox Islamists, who are against the principles of reinterpretation, but also
“modernists,” who argue in favor of reinterpreting classical sources for contem-
porary times in the context of an Islamic society, and “Muslim secularists,” who
argue for a separation between the state and religious authorities, with religion
as a private activity (Hefner 2011: 6–10; An-Na’im 2011; El Fadl 2016; Dunn
2015).17 The range of this debate suggests that politicians and parties looking for
religious justifications to support liberal civil liberties can potentially find them
in more liberal interpretations of sharia (Mayer 2007; An-Na’im 2011; El Fadl
2016; Dunn 2015).
Furthermore, the long and rich history of Muslim emperors and kings
demonstrates that there was no single set of authoritative homogenous practices
with regard to governance and law in Islamic societies and neither policies
nor law in practice took the strict scripturalist approaches that contemporary
traditionalists promote.18 Instead, rulers adopted flexible and tolerant inter-
pretations of sharia and deviated from it in order to accommodate the interests
and rights of their diverse populations.19 Such deviations from the strict letter of
sharia were never formally written down but were “accepted adaptation of the
Sharia” (Vikor 2005: 16). Thus, as Hefner (2011: 20) observes, “One irony of re-
cent efforts to restore the Sharia, then is that the legal imaginary to which its less
scholarly proponents rally shows the imprint, not of a thousand years of Islamic
legal practice, but of Western positive law and its partner in governance, the high
modernist state.”
This diversity of perspectives regarding sharia among religious scholars
and intellectuals and the rich history of flexible, tolerant, and diverse practices
of implementing sharia in societies ruled by Muslim rulers provides religious
parties with many potential religiously grounded arguments and historical
precedents to support a liberal interpretation of civil liberties that is rooted in
Islamic, not Western, tradition. This suggests that religious parties who want to
support liberal civil liberties can find religiously acceptable frames to do so. The
intriguing question therefore is when religious parties are motivated to do so.
Next, I draw on a rich literature analyzing the conditions under which religious
parties choose to moderate their ideology, their policies, and their behaviors for
insights that can help us answer this question.
17 Abduh Rahman and Madjid are examples of modernists, while Soroush, An-Na’im, and El Fadl
are considered Muslim secularists (Hefner 2011: 6–10; An-Na’im 2011; El Fadl 2015; Dunn 2015).
18 Hefner 2011: 19; Ramadan 2009; Kamali 2008; Vikor 2005; Berkey 2003; Lapidus 2003; Zubaida
2003; Bulliet 1994.

19 Hefner 2011; Ramadan 2009; Kamali 2008; Vikor 2005; Berkey 2003; Lapidus 2003; Bulliet 1994.
When Do Religious Parties Moderate?
As political parties, religious parties must choose their ideological platforms,

their positions on various policies, and their tactics to attract voters, donors,
and supporters and make tactical decisions about whether to ally with other
parties. Building on earlier work studying the moderation of leftist parties in
Europe and Latin America20 (e.g., Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Huntington
1993; Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Sokhey 2007) and Christian Democratic
parties in Europe (e.g., Kalyvas 1996, 2000; Warner 2000), scholars argue
that when religious parties in MMCs choose to participate in elections, their
decisions on policies and tactics become increasingly influenced by the many
strategic compulsions of electoral politics, and these in turn lead religious parties
to moderate their positions on policies.21 The most important such incentives
highlighted in extant research are the need to expand a religious party’s voter
base beyond its loyal religious partisan base and the temptation to form
coalitions with other parties to increase its chances of winning seats and forming
governments (Langohr 2001; Schwedler 2006; Yadav 2010; Wickham 2013;
Mecham and Hwang 2014). These scholars argue that to accomplish these goals,
religious parties must change their traditional positions on policies dear to less
religious or secular voters and parties to positions that they will find acceptable.
Consequently, religious parties change their positions on many policies from the
orthodox doctrinal position they adopted in their founding documents to more
moderate positions. This new position may be a genuinely liberal position or the
position that is more “normal” (be it liberal or illiberal) in that country’s general
party landscape, and parties may adopt moderate positions only for the period of
time they find politically expedient (Mecham and Hwang 2014). Other scholars,
however, argue that electoral participation can lead to permanent changes in
policy positions among religious parties if the new and diverse perspectives they
are exposed to through their interactions with diverse voters and parties induce
genuine cognitive changes in leaders and members of religious parties (Kurzman
and Naqvi 2010; Yadav 2010; Tezcur 2010; Wickham 2013).
These arguments therefore suggest that religious parties in MMCs should start
modifying their stands on civil liberties to more moderate and less orthodox
positions when they enter electoral politics. Research on political parties suggests
that this move should become more common as religious parties become bigger
in size; become more mainstream; face more competitive elections, particularly
20 For the moderation of socialist and Christian Democratic parties in various contexts see,
for example, Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Huntington 1993; Kalyvas 1996, 2000; Warner 2000;
Mainwaring and Scully 2003; Sokhey 2007; Grzymala-Busse 2015; and Driessen 2013.
21 See Schwedler 2016, 2011; Somer 2011; Mecham and Hwang 2014; and Brocker and Künkler
2013 for recent reviews of this extensive literature.

Introduction 17
in their ideological niche; and if they develop poor valence reputations (Adams
2014; Chadi and Orlowski 2012; Somer-Topcu 2009, 2015). The design of elec-
toral and executive institutions may also strengthen or weaken these incentives
as they affect the share of votes parties need to win seats and form governments
(Masoud 2014a).
However, even when religious parties do decide to moderate their policy
positions, they may have strong “red lines” in terms of policies on which they
are not willing to compromise their positions (Schwedler 2006; Yadav 2010).
After all, too much compromise on policies held dear by a party’s core voters and
workers could alienate them from the party (Aldrich 2011; Adams et al. 2014).
Importantly, from the perspective of the question this book wishes to address,
scholars find that many of these red lines are on policies regarding the freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, and the status of religious minorities and women—
issues that directly impact civil liberties.22 These red lines therefore pose the
following important question: what determines where these red lines are for reli-
gious parties and when they shift?
Extant research argues that factors that can influence which policies parties
decide will fall inside or outside these red lines are the presence of charismatic
party leaders who can persuade rank-and-file members of the legitimacy and
political viability of new policy positions (Yadav 2010), the organizational will-
ingness of religious parties to hold open internal debates to determine their
platforms (Yadav 2010; Schwedler 2006; Wickham 2004), and clientelistic rather
than ideological foundations of voter attachment to religious parties (Lust 2009;
Blaydes 2010; Gerges 2013; Corstange 2012; Wegner2017). These analyses are
consistent with findings from a larger literature on political parties that argues
that the level of internal party democracy and public opinion are highly influen-
tial in shaping the policy platforms of political parties.23 However, surprisingly, a
set of actors that the larger literature argues is central to policymaking and party
politics in most regimes—special interest groups—has received less attention in
the analyses of religious parties.
Like all other political parties, religious political parties need money, mana-
gerial and policy expertise, volunteers, and permanent staff to run their organi-
zations, organize competitive campaigns, turn out voters, draft policy positions
and bills, and challenge the policies of others. Non-religious parties obtain these
vital resources from a wide variety of interest groups, including business asso-
ciations and chambers, labor unions, women’s groups, environmental groups,
professional associations, and so on. To build and maintain their relationship
22 See Mahmoudi 2016; Masoud 2013; Brown and Hamzawy 2010; Ottoway and Hamzawy 2010;
Yadav 2010; Schwedler 2006, 2011.

23 See, for example, Dalton 2014; Ceron 2016; Hellwig 2012; Heaney 2010; Scarrow 2004; Adams
et al. 2004.
with parties, these interest groups use tactics from a repertoire that includes
inside lobbying tactics (donating money, sharing technical policy information
and political intelligence) and outside lobbying tactics (sponsoring media ads
and campaigns and holding public rallies and demonstrations by members and
supporters).24 Parties that receive these valuable political assets from interest
groups and win elected office can reciprocate in a variety of ways. They can
provide allied interest groups with preferential access to the policymaking and
policy implementation processes, appoint personnel favored by interest group
allies to influential positions in government, and sponsor laws and policies that
favor these groups.25 The more dependent parties are on specific interest groups,
the more likely these groups are to gain influence over the policies and tactics
parties adopt and over internal party decisions, such as the choice of the party’s
election candidates, organizational leaders, and even party leaders (Kolodny
and Dwyer 2017; Desmarais et al. 2014; Bawn et al. 2012; Warner 2000). This
research finds that powerful interest groups could influence whether parties
hold an internal debate on certain policies, whether internal elections are held
fairly or held at all, and who holds influential positions in the party leadership.
Recall that these are the factors that existing research on moderation of reli-
gious parties suggests influences which policy issues are considered red lines by
such parties.
There is no a priori reason to believe that religious parties would be in less
need of politically valuable assets than other parties if they want to be com-
petitive in their country’s politics. If so, their policy positions could also be
influenced by the policy agenda of the interest groups that choose to offer them
resources such as funds, volunteers, staff, expertise, and media exposure or to
pressure them using outside lobbying tactics such as protests and media attacks
(Kalyvas 1996; Warner 2000; Htun 2009; Hagopan 2009; Braun-Poppelaars and
Hanegraff 2011; Gryzmala-Busse 2015, 2016). This extensive body of research on
the relationships between parties and special interest groups therefore suggests
that if we want to understand when and why religious parties change their policy
positions to become more supportive of liberal civil liberties or why they choose
not to change their positions, we need to ask a new set of questions: what kind
of interest groups do religious parties typically receive these political resources
from? What are the policy agendas of these special interest groups? When are
parties able to resist the policy demands of these groups, and when are they un-
able to do so?
24 See de Figuerido and Richter 2014; Lowery 2013; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Yadav 2011; Baumgartner
et al. 2009; Duvanova 2007; and Frye 2000 for extensive discussions of these tactics and the conditions
under which they are used and are more effective.
25 This is an extensive literature; see de Figuerido and Richter 2014; Lowery 2013; Hojnacki et al.
2012; Yadav 2011; and Baumgartner et al. 2009 for more recent discussions.
Introduction 19
Extant literatures in political science, sociology, and anthropology have exam-

ined the beliefs and practices of various types of ROs in MMCs, such as Sufi
orders; da ‘wa organizations; Islamic student, professional, labor, and women’s
associations; and charitable foundations.26 How these different organizations
engage with their political systems to lobby for the institutional and policy goals
they seek, including regarding civil liberties, has received less attention.
As I discuss extensively in c hapter 2, using the theoretical lens of special in-
terest group lobbying to understand the politics of civil liberties offers us several
advantages. First, social movements theories that have informed the majority of
studies on Islamic ROs and special interest group theories have different theoret-
ical strengths. Social movements are “networks of informal interactions between
a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations” forged “on the basis of a
shared collective identity” (Diani 1992: 3), but the individual participants in a
social movement are autonomous entities with their own organization-specific
institutional interests and policy interests (Della Porta and Diani 2006; McAdam
and Tarrow 2013; Mair 2013; Hunter, Kriesi, and Lorenzini 2018). While dif-
ferent interest organizations may come together as part of a social movement to
advocate for shared policy interests, their institutional interests do not overlap
and, in fact, are often directly opposed to each other.
For example, consider the political Islam movement in Egypt and Pakistan.
Broadly speaking, the Muslim Brotherhood, various Salafi da ‘wa organizations,
individual Salafi preachers such as Muhammed Maqsoud and Safwat Hegazy, al-
most 80 Sufi orders, TV preachers such as al-Qaradawi and Mohammed Hassan,
institutions such as Al-Azhar, and a plethora of religious parties are all consid-
ered part of the Egyptian movement to revive Islam and to realize a genuine
sharia-based state and society (Cesari 2018; Hamid 2014; Hashemi 2009; Bayat
2007b). Despite these shared policy goals, organizations such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, various Salafi organizations such as Salafi Dawa, and many Sufi
orders have a long history of being direct rivals for followers, donors, and state
patronage (Hamid 2014; Hoffman 2014; Brown and Hamzawy 2009). Similarly,
in Pakistan various Sufi orders, Sufi organizations such as the Minhaj-ul-Quran
and Dawat-e-Islami, Deobandi organizations such as the Tablighi Jamaat, and
Salafi organizations such as Ahle Hadith and Markaz Da ‘Wa Wal Irshad, along
with prominent TV preachers such as Aamir Liaqat Hussein, Junaid Jamshed,
and Farhat Hashmi and more than 25 religious political parties form the larger
Islamic movement (Rana 2011; Khan 2011; Philippon 2014a). Again, while
Pakistani ROs share a common goal of realizing an orthodox sharia-based state,
26 See, for example, Gilsenen 1967; Trimingham 1976; Hoffman 1995, 2013; Westerlund and
Svanberg 1999; Vikor 2000; Schulze 2000; Hedin et al. 2004; Kramer 2003; Bayat 2007b, 2013; Howell
2012; Howell and van Bruinessen 2007.
they have long been bitter rivals for followers, public status, resources, and state
patronage (Rana 2011; Khan 2011; Jalal 2017).
Importantly, such rivalries between ROs are common across MMCs and form
an intrinsic feature of the strategic environment that ROs operate in in these
countries.27 Protecting and pursuing their own institutional interests in these
competitive environments is vital for the survival of ROs and for strengthening
their resource base and public reach (Gill 1998; Warner 2000; Hojnacki et al.
2012; Lowery 2013; Gryzmala-Busse 2015). In turn, ROs’ institutional strength
directly affects their capacity to realize their own organization’s policy goals.
The more competition there is between ROs in a country, the more important
securing institutional interests will be to a group’s survival and policy success.
ROs must also compete against other interest groups, such as business associ-
ations, labor unions, and women’s groups, among others, to secure the attention
and loyalty of followers and influence policy. Furthermore, most governments,
including those in MMCs, regulate ROs extensively and selectively allocate
valuable public resources and policy access to preferred groups (Pew 2016:
68–72).28 For all of these reasons, we should expect that ROs should actively
lobby governments and elected officials not just to influence policy, but also to
secure their institutional interests. Importantly, they should do so as individual
organizations, not as a larger social movement, since another organization’s gain
in funding or patronage could come at their expense. Since the institutional ca-
pacity of ROs determines the political resources and benefits they can offer to
political parties, understanding the determinants of ROs’ institutional capacity
should in turn help us understand the willingness and ability of religious parties
to accommodate the policy interests of ROs.
This suggests that the relationship between religious parties and ROs should
be shaped significantly by the nature and magnitude of ROs’ institutional
interests and the capacity of political parties to meet ROs’ institutional needs.
Interest group theories offer a rich body of research to understand precisely
this dynamic. For this reason, insights from the lobbying literature have been
fruitfully applied to the study of ROs, including to churches by Gryzmala-Busse
(2015), Braun-Poppelaars and Hanegraff (2011), Warner (2000), and Kalyvas
(1996) in Europe; Elgar (2014), Htun (2003, 2009), and Hagopian (2009) in
Latin America; Dowd (2015) and Kuperus (1999) in Africa; and in American
politics (e.g., Adkins, Layman, and Campbell 2013; Herzke 1988, 2010; Yamane
27 See Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Vikor 2000; Voll 2007; Villalon 2010; Driessen 2012; Howell
2012; Werenfels 2014; Hamid 2014, 2018; Cesari 2018.

28 This study of 198 countries found that 89% had mandatory registration for ROs, and in 54%
such procedures affected organizations adversely; in 96% of countries ROs received government
favors, but in 74%, government favors only went to select organizations (Pew 2016: 68) and in 88%
governments provided funds to ROs, but in 67% governments displayed favoritism in allocating
funds (Pew 2016: 69). See also Finke 2013.
Introduction 21
2006). While research on Islamic movements has offered rich insights into the
interactions between movements and governments in pursuit of collective move-
ment goals, interest groups theories seem more suited for understanding how
the individual ROs that participate in Islamic social movements pursue their
own specific institutional interests.
The second advantage of using this approach is that it helps us to understand
the political preferences and tactics not just of ROs that form their own parties,
but importantly of the vast majority of ROs that do not from their own parties
but are actively involved in politics and policy advocacy and in securing their
institutional interests. It is vital to remember that even though most scholarly
attention has understandably focused on the largest ROs, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia, which have their
own political parties, the vast majority of ROs in any country do not have their
own party. This means that most ROs choose which party to lobby and build
relationships with. For example, in Egypt by the 2011 elections, the majority
of ROs did not create their own political parties (Ottoway 2011; Brown 2012).
The range of religious parties they could choose from included multiple Salafi
parties, such as al-Nour, al-Asala, and al-Fadila; two prominent Sufi parties, the
Sawt al-Hurriya and Tahrir al-Misri; and even multiple parties associated with
the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, including the Freedom and Justice Party, al-
Wasat, al-Tayyar al-Masry, and al-Reyada (Ottoway 2011).
Since these ROs can command funds, media assets, and followers that could
translate into votes and volunteers, their ability to choose which party benefits
from these resources gives them significant bargaining power with religious
and non-religious parties. Even political parties with close ties to established
ROs, such as the Freedom and Justice Party and the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt and the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Nahdlatul Ulama in
Indonesia, have found that the resource wealth of their sister organizations is
dwarfed by the sheer amount of resources needed to compete in elections and
in politics (Masoud 2014b; Hamid 2014: 175; Barton 2011; Tanuwidjaja 2010).
Consequently, they have reached out aggressively to other ROs, including ide-
ological rivals, to secure more of these valuable political assets (Masoud 2014a;
Hamid 2014: 175; Barton 2011; Tanuwidjaja 2010). While we can expect that re-
ligious parties founded by ROs will actively champion their ROs’ institutional
and policy interests, the leverage of the book’s theory comes from exploiting an
interest group approach to explain when and why even parties with loose formal
ties or no organizational ties to ROs will nevertheless find it in their interest to
champion ROs’ interests and may be effectively constrained by the ROs’ policy
agendas, and when ROs may not find religious parties useful for their purposes.
For the reasons discussed here, I believe that to explain the policy
choices and behaviors of religious parties, we must take into account their
interactions with ROs regarding policy and institutional interests of ROs and
that the literature on special interest group politics offers valuable theoretical
leverage in analyzing these choices when it comes to civil liberties. A handful
of studies have examined the relationships between specific ROs and specific
religious parties, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Dawa in
Egypt, and the parties they founded and the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan and
the party it founded.29 However, to the best of my knowledge, a systematic
examination of the lobbying behavior of organized religious groups and their
impact on policies for the comprehensive set of all MMCs has not yet been
undertaken.
A key reason for this, perhaps, has been the challenge of identifying who the
relevant organized religious actors in MMCs are. Islam does not have the equiv-
alent of a supranational authority such as the Vatican or a clear hierarchy at the
domestic level such as a national church (Bayat 2007b; Hefner 2011; An-Na’im
2011). Thus, there is no self-evident institutional actor such as the church whose
actions scholars can focus on in MMCs. Furthermore, none of the MMCs legally
regulate lobbyists or lobbying practices (OECD 2013). Thus, there is no available
database that can be used to identify the religious groups that are active in these
countries, as scholars have done to study religious advocacy in the United States.
Therefore, in order to address questions about ROs’ institutional capacity and
their influence over civil liberties, one must first identify the relevant organized
religious actors in these countries.
This book takes one step in this vast agenda by identifying these religious
actors and then analyzing the factors that shape their institutional capacity to
exert influence over religious parties. This in turn, allows us to examine the im-
pact their relationships with religious parties have on de facto civil liberties in
MMCs. Next, I provide a brief summary of the arguments explaining who the
appropriate religious actors to focus on in MMCs are and present the theoretical
arguments articulating their effects on civil liberties.
Brief Summary of the Theoretical Framework
In order to address the question posed in this book—whether the success of re-
ligious parties leads to a decline in civil liberties in MMCs—I pose and answer
three questions: who are the relevant religious interest groups in MMCs and what
are their policy and institutional interests? What shapes the strength of the rela-
tionship between these religious interest groups and religious parties in MMCs?
29 For example, see Wickham 2004, 2013; Schwedler 2006; Nasr 1996, 2005; Grare 2001;
Yadav 2010.
Introduction 23
What are the consequences of this relationship for the ability of religious parties
to moderate or not when it comes to policies and tactics, including civil liberties?
In this book, I argue that those da ‘wa organizations and Sufi orders that are
nongovernmental, private ROs, have a national presence, and are led by individ-
uals who are nationally prominent civic figures in their countries are the relevant
religious interest groups in MMCs.30 These ROs satisfy the definition of formal
special interest groups, as they comprise individuals with shared interests, have
formal rules of membership and operations, and work to advance the interests
of their members.31 These ROs have clear ideological doctrines that favor more
orthodox interpretations of sharia, and their beliefs have in turn translated into
concrete policy positions on the role of government, the legal system, and a
range of social and economic policies, including civil liberties.32 Importantly, as
chapter 2 discusses in detail, considerable evidence shows that these ROs actively
seek out and lobby political actors, including political parties, using inside and
outside lobbying tactics to protect their institutional and policy interests.33
Religious Party-RO Alliances and the Socioeconomic

Institutionalization of ROs
ROs’ success in gaining favorable outcomes will depend crucially on (i) finding
political allies who are ideologically and strategically inclined to support their
goals and (ii) possessing politically valuable assets that can be used to persuade
potential political allies to champion ROs’ interests. Shared ideology provides
a common and strong foundation for interest groups and parties to build
relationships on (Grossman and Helpman 2000; Herzke 2010). Given their re-
ligious platform, religious parties are the most natural ideological allies for ROs
(Grzymala-Busse 2015; Hagopian 2009; Htun 2009; Warner 2000; Kalyvas 1996;
Baumgartner et al. 2009). Like all political parties, religious parties need vital
political resources such as funds, professional staff, volunteer, media exposure,
political intelligence, policy expertise, and so on. However, non-religious civil
30 Da ‘wa organizations are missionary organizations founded to revive Islamic beliefs among
Muslims and propagate them among non-Muslims (Bayat 2000). Sufi orders are religious orders built
around a founding figure, a religious teacher, who provides guidance and inspiration for followers
(Vikor 2000).
31 See Becker 1983; Grossman and Helpman 2000; Nownes 2006; Herzke 2010; Grzymala-Busse
2015; Braun-Poppelaars and Hanegraff 2011; Hagopian 2009; Warner 2000.

32 Chapter 2 will discuss these details and variations among these groups in more detail. See Vikor
2000; Nasr 2001; Lapidus 2003; Kramer 2003; Westerlund and Svanbarg 2004; Hedin et al. 2004; Voll
and Esposito 1996; Hefner 2011; Howell 2012; Hicks 2013; Rubin 2014; Schulze 2014.
33 See Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Vikor 2000; Nasr 2001; Lapidus 2003; Kramer 2003;
Westerlund and Svanbarg 2004; Hedin et al. 2004; Voll and Esposito 1996; Hefner 2011; Howell 2012;
Hicks 2013; Rubin 2014; Schulze 2014; Werenfels 2014.
society organizations typically have either hostile or ambiguous attitudes toward

religious parties and non-religious parties exhibit the same attitudes toward
ROs, making potential allies scarce for both religious parties and ROs (Beinin
and Vairel 2013; Hamzawy and Brown 2010; Ottoway and Hamzawy 2010;
Abdelrahman 2007). These practical strategic realities reinforce the ideological
bond between religious parties and ROs. ROs are therefore highly motivated to
provide these valuable resources to religious parties if they have them. For these
reasons, I argue that religious parties will find it in their own strategic interest to
invest in ROs’ institutional growth when they can.
In chapter 3, I argue that religious parties find such an opportunity when
(i) the country is hit by an inflation crisis and (ii) they form a concentrated leg-
islative bloc in parliament.34 Unlike a recession or an exchange rate crisis, an
inflation crisis affects citizens across class, ethnic, religious, and regional lines
(Fischer 1993; Barro 1995; Easterly and Fisher 2001; Gupta and Uwilingiye
2008), creating a serious political threat for ruling parties in democracies and
autocracies, particularly from religious parties (Grewal et al. 2019; de la O and
Rodden 2008). Ruling coalitions therefore look for immediate and effective
ways to meet citizen needs in order to protect their own political base and re-
duce political support for competitors. When religious parties form a concen-
trated legislative bloc, they pose a more serious political threat to the incumbent
and are able to exert more legislative influence. In the context of an inflationary
crisis, this concentrated religious bloc champions ROs as an effective tool the
ruling coalition can use to address inflation-related political concerns. This is
a persuasive argument because ROs are typically active in meeting educational
and welfare needs in society on some scale at all times and already possess or-
ganizational capacity and expertise in these areas. In the context of the potential
political threat posed by an inflationary crisis and a concentrated legislative re-
ligious parties bloc, non-religious ruling parties support laws and policies that
allow ROs to expand the scale and sectoral scope of their organizational activ-
ities in order to meet these threats. As a result, Hypothesis 1 postulates, ROs
are able to increase their organizational penetration into society by increasing
the scale of their existing educational and welfare operations and by entering
and expanding their presence in nontraditional activities, including the private
business and media sectors. I refer to this expansion by ROs as the socioeco-
nomic institutionalization (SEI) of ROs.
In the absence of an inflation crisis, non-religious governments and parties
do not face a serious political threat that needs to be addressed by supporting
34 An inflation crisis is commonly defined in the macroeconomic literature as an inflation rate that
is higher than two-standard deviations from that country’s long-term mean (Easterly and Fischer
2001; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
Introduction 25
High Legislative Seat Low Legislative Seat

Concentration Concentration
HIGH Inflation LOW HIGH Inflation LOW

(Inflation Crisis) Inflation (Inflation crisis) Inflation
HIGH RO
LOW RO Socioeconomic
Socioeconomic
Institutionalization Institutionalization
Rel. Parties in Non-Rel. Parties Rel. Parties in Non-Rel. Parties

Government in Government Government in Government
Civil Liberties No Effect on Civil Liberties

Decline
Figure 1.3 Illustration of the theoretical argument
ROs’ expansion (Corollary 1). If the legislature lacks a concentrated religious-

party bloc during an inflationary crisis, non-religious incumbents will not per-
ceive religious parties as a viable threat and will not court ROs to neutralize them
(Corollary 2). When both conditions are absent, religious parties have no ca-
pacity to push for policies favorable to ROs, and non-religious parties have no
reasons to enact such policies either. Hence, the SEI of ROs will stay low under
these three conditions. The top half of figure 1.3 summarizes these arguments
and the outcomes these different conditions result in.
The Decline of Civil Liberties
When religious parties participate in government, either as part of a coalition

or as a single party, they are in a position to use their legislative influence to pass
bills that enact policies and institutional changes consistent with their religious
agenda, to use their appointment powers to stack government agencies with
religiously committed appointees, and to use their budgetary powers to favor

public agencies, private actors, and civil society groups that share their agenda.
However, as moderation theory suggests, religious parties in office become more
willing to accept a status quo which includes the free exercise of basic civil lib-
erties and more willing to create and support a legal and political system which
protects these rights for both tactical and ideological reasons (Schwedler 2006,
2011; Somer 2011; Wickham 2013; Tezcur 2010; Wegner and Pellicor 2009;
Langohr 2001; Mecham and Hwang 2014). However, ROs whose agenda remains
unchanged, now have high expectations that their religious policy agenda will
be finally implemented by the religious parties they have previously supported.
Moderation by religious parties that results in the lack of progress on a shared
religiously inspired policy agenda is not a desirable or acceptable outcome from
the point of ROs. I argue that ROs will therefore act aggressively to counter the
incentives parties face to moderate, but their ability to do so successfully will de-
pend strongly on the political value of their assets.
When ROs are highly socioeconomically institutionalized, in addition to
moral legitimacy they control a powerful portfolio of assets that can be used
to support or undermine political actors. More extensive education and wel-
fare networks expand the number of beneficiaries and followers who can be
mobilized and influenced by RO leaders to support or oppose religious parties.
Owning businesses gives ROs the capacity to fund election campaigns and party
organizations, generate economic outcomes that make the government’s eco-
nomic performance look good or bad, and provide patronage for party workers.
Media assets, particularly television channels and radio stations, allow ROs to
offer parties a friendly public platform that can be used to reach a national au-
dience and to frame the actions and policies of parties in ways that benefit them
politically. Since all these assets can be offered to rival parties instead, the oppor-
tunity cost of alienating ROs can be very high for religious parties. As a result,
in countries where ROs are highly socioeconomically institutionalized, religious
parties in the government will face a set of organized lobbies willing and able to
wield a powerful set of carrots and sticks to ensure that religious parties stick to
their shared agenda of curbing liberal civil liberties in line with religious beliefs.
This will compel religious parties to reduce civil liberties through change in de
jure laws and in de facto practices. Consequently, I hypothesize, in c hapter 3, that
when religious parties are in government and ROs are highly socioeconomically in-
stitutionalized, the level of civil liberties enjoyed by citizens in that country will
decline.
In contrast, in countries where ROs are weakly institutionalized socioec-
onomically, they will lack the assets necessary to successfully pressure reli-
gious parties, and, consequently, religious parties will find it more beneficial to
moderate their positions on civil liberties (Corollary 1). When ROs are highly
Introduction 27
institutionalized but there are no religious parties in office, ROs will lack a polit-
ical partner willing to legislate and reliably implement a policy agenda of curbing
civil liberties for religious reasons (Corollary 2). When both conditions are ab-
sent, both religious parties and ROs lack the ability to implement their civil lib-
erties agenda. Importantly, as this argument highlights, the mere ascent to power
by religious parties will not necessarily lead to a decline in the civil liberties that
citizens enjoy in a country. Rather, as the bottom half of figure 1.3 illustrates,
ceteris paribus, it is only when religious parties are in government and ROs are
highly socioeconomically institutionalized that civil liberties will decline.
Empirical Research Design
I adopt a multi-methodological approach to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the corol-

laries associated with each of these two hypotheses, and the causal arguments
I have presented. To test the generalizability of both hypotheses, I use a new
time-series cross section dataset of all 49 MMCs from 1970 to 2016. In this data
set, I develop and present an original ordinal measure of ROs’ SEI that meas-
ures the extent of their participation in the education, welfare, business, and
media sectors; expand substantially on Kurzman and Naqvi’s 2015 data set on
the electoral participation of religious parties in MMCs; and provide new data
that records the participation of religious parties in government in these coun-
tries.35 I also use multiple measures of civil liberties, the key dependent variable
in the analysis. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 and their corollaries, I estimate a va-
riety of ordered probit models that account for temporal dynamics, serial corre-
lation, and country-specific heterogeneity in the Muslim-majority country-year
sample. I explicitly control for alternative explanations and employ different esti-
mation techniques that address potential econometric issues such as endogeneity
of political liberalization in autocracies to inflationary crisis and potential bias
due to selection of countries into being more inclusive of religious parties and
supporting liberal civil liberties. The statistical results are robust and strongly
support the predictions in Hypotheses 1 and 2 and their corollaries.
The theoretical arguments presented in this book focus on elite behavior,
that is, the effects of ROs on politicians and parties. However, data to test these
mechanisms at this appropriate level are simply not available for any country.
In the absence of such data at a cross-country level, I adopt a comparative case
study of two carefully selected cases—Turkey and Pakistan—and use a “within-
subjects” design to test the validity of the causal mechanisms articulated in both
35 As described in c
hapter 4, the temporal and cross-sectional range of my sample of MMCs is de-
termined by the availability of data for the dependent and independent variables.
hypotheses in this book. Turkey and Pakistan offer many advantages as cases. As
discussed in detail in the research design section in c hapter 4, these two coun-
tries share many features that existing theories argue influence civil liberties.
Importantly, both countries exhibit considerable variation over time in the key
independent variables in my theory—inflation rates, the legislative concentra-
tion of religious parties, SEI, and the presence of religious parties in government.
Furthermore, both countries have gone through periods of democracy and au-
tocracy. This is a characteristic that is shared by many MMCs. These features—
within-case variation in the theoretically relevant parameters and variation in
regime—therefore allow us to evaluate the validity of the causal mechanisms in
both democratic and autocratic contexts while minimizing variation in unob-
servable country-level factors.36 I use open-ended interviews with party leaders,
RO leaders, bar associations, journalists, and human rights groups, among
others; elite-level data from original surveys of political elites conducted in 2017
and 2018; as well as qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources
to evaluate the theoretical mechanisms. These cases collectively provide strong
support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and all their corollaries.
Book Outline
Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to developing the book’s central theoretical frame-
work. In chapter 2, I discuss the strategic challenges that religious parties face in
order to survive and succeed politically in MMCs. The rest of the chapter then
discusses the characteristics, theoretical distinctiveness, as well as the institu-
tional and policy preferences of national private ROs in MMCs. It introduces
the concept of socioeconomic institutionalization, discusses why ROs desire to
increase it, and how increased SEI translates into increased capacity and effec-
tiveness in lobbying for ROs.
Chapter 3 then presents the main theoretical arguments of this book. I first
develop my theoretical argument explaining why ROs experience an increase in
their institutionalization when a country is experiencing an inflationary crisis
and there is a concentrated bloc of religious parties in parliament and why the ab-
sence of even one of these conditions undermines the chances for their increased
institutionalization. This argument leads to the prediction in Hypothesis 1 and its
two corollaries. Next, I analyze why religious parties are compelled or not to curb
liberal civil liberties when they are in government. Hypothesis 2 predicts that
this happens only when religious parties are operating in the political context
36 Also referred to as a “within-subjects” design. See Gerring 2005, 2007; McDermott 2002; and
Kinder and Palfrey 1993 for further discussions of this technique.

Introduction 29
of highly socioeconomically institutionalized ROs. In the absence of institu-

tionalized ROs, religious parties find it politically expedient to moderate their
positions on civil liberties, with the result that their presence in government does
not lead to a significant religiously-motivated decline in civil liberties.
Chapter 4 begins the empirical analysis in this book by presenting the details of
the research design adopted to test the two hypotheses and their associated cor-
ollaries and evaluate the validity of the causal arguments presented in c hapters 2
and 3. The rest of the chapter introduces the new measure of RO institutional-
ization and the sample and presents results from the large-N statistical tests to
evaluate Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries. Chapter 5 presents the statistical results
from models testing support for Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries. Chapters 6
through 10 then provide in-depth analysis of the cases of Turkey and Pakistan.
Chapters 6 and 7 evaluate the support for Hypothesis 1 and its corollaries for
Turkey and Pakistan, respectively. Chapters 8 and 9 then evaluate the support for
Hypothesis 2 and its corollaries for Turkey and Pakistan, respectively.
In the concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings presented in this
book and discuss their theoretical and empirical contributions to research on
the politics of religious parties, religious interest groups, and civil liberties in
MMCs. I present some evidence that suggests that the insights from this book
can travel to countries other than MMCs. Finally, I discuss how understanding
the dynamics of religious interest group lobbying may help us better understand
policy choices and outcomes in diverse areas, such as democratic backsliding,
judicial independence, and environmental policies. The appendix presents de-
tailed descriptions of the data sources used for this project and the sample and
methodology used for the elite surveys, provides the full survey questions used
in the case studies, and reports some key characteristics of the sample of political
parties surveyed.
2
Religious Parties and
Religious Organizations
The Fruits of Partnership
When citizens, scholars, and policymakers discuss the impact of religious parties
on democracy, it is often their impact on nonprocedural aspects of democracy,
particularly civil rights, that cause the most debate. Yet, as discussed in the in-
troduction, scholarly research has yet to focus on the actors that policymakers
and activists argue play a considerable role in shaping the civil liberties prac-
ticed in societies—civil society interest groups. Civil society in MMCs, however,
is dominated by religious organizations whose work is either tied directly to the
propagation and revival of Islam or inspired by religious principles.1 The liberal
civil society groups that policymakers and scholars have credited with bringing
about democratic change and consolidation of democratic values and behaviors
in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America are weak, alienated, and un-
popular organizations in MMCs, and their democratic potential in MMCs has
been questioned as well (Jamal 2007).2 Conversely, religious civil society groups
are genuinely embedded in these societies and are highly respected by most
citizens. Research on special interest groups suggests that these groups should
be actively pursuing their institutional and policy goals by lobbying political
parties, including religious parties. In this chapter, I focus on the nature of the
interactions between religious political parties and religious groups, the special
interest groups that I argue are most relevant for understanding the nature and
extent of lobbying pressures religious parties face with respect to civil liberties
in MMCs.
I begin by discussing the severity of the challenge that religious political
parties face in mobilizing resources and support for their parties and the range
of options they have for meeting these resource challenges. The next section then
identifies and discusses religious organizations as the key set of interest groups in
1 Mecham 2017; Cammett and Luong 2014; Beinin and Vairel 2013; Brown 2012; Abdelrahman
2007; Piro 2001.

2 Mecham 2017; Cammett and Luong 2014; Beinin and Vairel 2013; Brown 2012;
Abdelrahman 2007.
Religious Parties and the Politics of Civil Liberties. Vineeta Yadav, Oxford University Press (2021).
© Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197545362.003.0002
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ihrer Vermählung abkürzte, um so häufiger und ängstlicher forschte
sie nach ihm, um so häufiger sprach sie die Besorgniß aus, er
könnte wol gar durch seine Geschäfte so lange in Anspruch
genommen werden, daß ein Wiedersehen in der Heimath unmöglich
würde.
Aurelie erschöpfte die Kräfte ihres mitfühlenden Herzens, um
Sidonie zu beruhigen und in der bezweckten Täuschung zu erhalten;
trotzdem litt die Prinzessin unter dem sich immer mehr und mehr in
ihr geltend machenden Gedanken, den Grafen nicht mehr zu sehen,
so sehr, daß Aurelie es für besser erachtete, ihr nichts mehr zu
verhehlen und zugleich das Portrait einzuhändigen.
Mit großer Vorsicht bereitete sie die Prinzessin darauf vor, indem
sie mit ihr gemeinschaftlich erwog, ob dem Fernhalten des Grafen
nicht vielleicht ein bestimmter Zweck zu Grunde liegen und dieser
Zweck die wohlgemeinte Absicht in sich schließen könnte, sowol
Sidonien als dem Grafen selbst den Schmerz der Entsagung zu
verringern.
Sie erinnerte die Freundin zugleich, daß eine solche Absicht
gewiß eben so edel als durch die Umstände geboten sei, und bat
sie, der Rücksichten zu gedenken, die sie dem Grafen zu schenken
verpflichtet sei. Sie erinnerte sie alsdann, daß der Letztere nicht
minder als sie selbst unter den unheilvollen Verhältnissen leiden
müßte, und es daher vielleicht im Interesse Sidoniens und seiner
eigenen Ruhe für besser erachtete, ein Wiedersehen vorläufig zu
vermeiden.
Aurelie kannte der Freundin Herz zu wohl, um nicht von der guten
Wirkung ihrer Vorstellungen überzeugt zu sein, und täuschte sich in
dieser Beziehung auch nicht. Sidonie gab trotz ihres Verlangens und
Schmerzes die Richtigkeit und Zweckmäßigkeit zu, welche des
Grafen Fernhalten in sich schloß, und die Erinnerung an des
Geliebten Leid genügte schon, ihm zu Liebe das Verlangen nach
seinem Besuch zu beschwichtigen.
In dem Gedanken seines Kummers vergaß sie fast ihr eigenes
Weh und wünschte sogar, er möchte nicht kommen, um sein Leid
nicht zu vermehren.
Als Aurelie die guten Wirkungen ihrer Worte auf Sidonie bemerkte,
glaubte sie den Zeitpunkt gekommen, ihr des Grafen Portrait
einzuhändigen; denn jetzt meinte sie nicht nur keine üble, sondern
vielmehr eine wohlthätige Wirkung davon auf die Prinzessin
erwarten zu dürfen. Sie täuschte sich auch in dieser Beziehung
nicht; es war in der That so.
Sidonie hatte sich in Folge aller der bezeichneten Erwägungen
bald mit dem Gedanken vertraut gemacht, den Grafen vor ihrer
Vermählung nicht mehr zu sehen, und es fiel ihr dies um so weniger
schwer, da sie einen solchen Verzicht im Interesse des Geliebten für
nothwendig erachtete. Der Besitz seines Portraits, statt ihre
Sehnsucht nach seinem Wiedersehen zu erhöhen, erfüllte sie
vielmehr mit einer süßen Ruhe und kräftigte ihre Seele.
O, mit welchem glücklichen Blick begrüßte sie dasselbe, mit
welcher Innigkeit heftete er sich an die geliebten Züge! Mit ihrer
Freundin vereint betrachtete sie die letzteren und forschte, in wie
weit es dem Künstler gelungen war, die Natur wieder zu geben. Sie
fand sich freilich nicht ganz befriedigt, denn sie betrachtete das Bild
mit den Augen der Liebe, während der Künstler es doch nur als
solcher zu gestalten befähigt war. Aber was dieser nicht hineingelegt
hatte, verbesserte ihre Erinnerung, und so fühlte sie sich durch
seinen Besitz ganz beglückt.
Bald waren auch die letzten Tage, die sie in der Heimath verleben
durfte, verflossen, und sie sagte derselben ein schmerzliches
Lebewohl, um in Begleitung ihrer Eltern und ihres Bruders sich auf
den Weg nach dem fürstlichen Hofe zu begeben, woselbst die
Vermählung gefeiert werden sollte. Beim Beschreiten der Grenze
des Fürsten wurde sie von dem Prinzen mit einem glänzenden
Hofstaat empfangen und nach der Residenz und dem Schloß
geleitet, woselbst sie die zu ihrer und der Ihrigen Aufnahme
prachtvoll ausgestatteten Gemächer bezog.
Am folgenden Tage fand die Vermählung in der fürstlichen
Schloßkapelle statt, der sich eine Menge Festlichkeiten, theils in
dem Schloß, theils an anderen Orten anreihten und mit Opern und
Ballets abwechselten. Nachdem dieselben ihr Ende erreicht hatten,
vertauschten die Neuvermählten das Residenzschloß mit einem
Palais in einer, wenige Meilen von der Residenz entfernten, kleinen
Stadt, woselbst der Fürst schon seit vielen Jahren lebte. Der
Letztere hatte derselben wegen ihrer Naturschönheiten vor der
geräuschvollen Residenz den Vorzug gegeben und sie im Lauf der
Zeit mit Schlössern und vielen anderen Prachtbauten, Parkanlagen
und Wasserkünsten geziert, und lebte hier in einem Kreise
geistreicher Männer den Wissenschaften und in einer beschaulichen
Ruhe, nach welcher sich gewöhnlich das Alter mit seinen
körperlichen Beschwerden zu sehnen pflegt.
Da die Verwandten des fürstlichen Hauses und der Adel theils in
der Residenz, theils in der Nähe derselben wohnten, und sich nur
die von dem Fürsten bevorzugten Personen sowie einige der
Cabinetsbeamten hier dauernd aufhielten, um in jeder Stunde sich
ihm zu Diensten stellen zu können, so herrschte sowol an des
Fürsten Hof, wie in der Stadt selbst, stets eine an Einförmigkeit
grenzende Ruhe, die selten durch ein Hoffest unterbrochen wurde.
Der Fürst, über die erfolgte Vermählung seines Neffen sehr erfreut,
wünschte dessen Nähe und hatte ihm darum ein prachtvoll
ausgestattetes Palais daselbst angewiesen.
Es geschah dies zugleich in der Absicht, den Prinzen von seinen
lockeren Freunden zu entfernen und für eine ernste Beschäftigung
zu gewinnen. Die wichtigsten Staatsgeschäfte wurden gewöhnlich
an dem Wohnsitz des Fürsten erledigt, und so war die dauernde
Anwesenheit des Prinzen daselbst um so mehr erforderlich, sollte er
in die ersteren eingeweiht werden. Dieser schien sich in die
Bestimmungen seines Oheims gern zu fügen, ja es schien sogar, als
ob er in dem Besitz seiner Gemahlin weniger Werth auf die so lange
mit Leidenschaft aufgesuchten Genüsse legte.
Dies war in der That jedoch nur für kurze Zeit der Fall und währte
nur so lange, als der Reiz der Neuheit seine Wirkung auf ihn
ausübte; sobald dieser jedoch aufhörte, fühlte der an stete
Zerstreuungen gewöhnte Prinz eine peinigende Langweile. Das
einförmige Leben wurde ihm unerträglich, wozu sich noch der
unangenehme Zwang gesellte, den ihm sein eheliches Verhältniß
auferlegte.
An Verlockungen von seinen alten Freunden fehlte es natürlich
nicht, und so geschah es, daß er sehr bald und häufig wieder in der
Residenz gesehen wurde. Die Höflinge bereiteten zu Ehren seiner
Rückkehr ein wahres Freudenfest, das, eben so reich als wohl
überdacht, nur zu sehr geeignet war, den Prinzen mit neuen Fesseln
an sie zu ketten.
Gewohnheit, mehr noch die angeborene Neigung thaten das
Uebrige, und wenige Monate nach seiner Vermählung hatte sich der
Prinz seinem ehemaligen ausschweifenden Leben wieder mit ganzer
Leidenschaft ergeben.
Aus diesen Umständen ist leicht ersichtlich, wie geringen Einfluß
Sidonie trotz ihrer Schönheit und Liebenswürdigkeit auf ihren
Gemahl ausübte. Vielleicht würde dies mehr der Fall gewesen sein,
hätte sich des Prinzen Charakter zur Entfaltung ihrer sittlichen
Vorzüge geeignet und wäre durch die Uebereinstimmung ihrer
Naturen jenes Vertrauen in ihr erwacht, das ihre Schüchternheit und
Abgeschlossenheit besiegt hätte.
Wir kennen Sidoniens Abneigung gegen den Prinzen, die um so
weniger schwinden konnte, da der nähere Umgang mit ihm durchaus
nicht geeignet war, dieselbe wenigstens in ein achtungsvolles Gefühl
umzuwandeln.
Ihre Schüchternheit und Duldsamkeit verleitete ihn, ihr gleich
einem Kinde zu begegnen und nur die nothwendigste
Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken, da sie ja überdies von ihm nichts
mehr zu beanspruchen schien und sich in einem zurückgezogenen
Leben gefiel. Niemals äußerte sie einen Wunsch, niemals erhob sie
irgend einen Anspruch auf etwas, obgleich sie ihre Stellung dazu
berechtigte. Ebenso schien ihr des Prinzen Fernhalten eher
erwünscht, als ungebilligt zu sein, wie das ihre Umgebung zu
bemerken glaubte und was ihre schweigende Duldung obenein noch
bestätigte. Wir wissen, daß dies in der That der Fall war, wenngleich
Niemand die eigentlichen Gründe ihres Benehmens ahnte und dies
ihrem einfachen, anspruchslosen Charakter zuschrieb. Wie natürlich,
daß der Prinz, von gleicher Täuschung befangen, seinen Neigungen
allmälig mehr und mehr die Zügel schießen ließ.
Sidonie ahnte ihres Gemahls Treiben nicht, denn ein Jeder hütete
sich, ihr dasselbe zu verrathen, und sie selbst war weit entfernt,
nach demselben zu forschen, obgleich ihr des Prinzen Wesen und
Benehmen und seine häufigen und längeren Besuche in der
Residenz mit der Zeit immer mehr Veranlassung dazu boten.
In dem vertraulichen Umgange mit ihrer treuen Freundin Aurelie
und in einem gewählten Genuß der ihr gebotenen Zerstreuungen,
sowie in den eifrigen Bemühungen nach geistiger Ausbildung und
ihres musikalischen Talents, fühlte sie sich, so weit dies eben sein
konnte, befriedigt, und je weniger sie durch das Hofleben in dieser
Abgezogenheit gestört wurde, um so angenehmer war es ihr.
Da des Fürsten Gemahlin, von diesem getrennt, ein stilles,
zurückgezogenes Leben und er selbst ein ähnliches führte, so
konnte es nicht ausbleiben, daß Sidoniens Wünsche ziemlich
befriedigt wurden, und dies um so mehr, da der Prinz selbst keine
Veranlassung fühlte, seine schüchterne Gemahlin durch
geräuschvolle Feste zu zerstreuen, oder sie für sich zu
beanspruchen.
Wie manche Stunde saßen die beiden Freundinnen in
vertraulichem Gespräch bei einander, sich der Vergangenheit und
des gemeinschaftlichen fernen Freundes erinnernd, der, wie sie
wußten, die Alpen durchzogen und jetzt in dem sonnigen Italien
lebte, wo er Geist und Seele an den Reizen der Natur und reichen
Kunstschätzen labte, um sein Leid zu mildern und die zur Thätigkeit
nothwendige Ruhe zu finden. Denn der Graf war, seinem
Vornehmen getreu, beim Nahen des Herbstes von Paris nach der
Schweiz gereist und ging von hier nach Italien, woselbst er sich
längere Zeit aufzuhalten gedachte.
Sidonie war durch Aurelie mit alledem bekannt gemacht worden
und billigte, wenn auch seufzend, sein Fernhalten, und es beruhigte
sie der Gedanke, den Geliebten in Orten zu wissen, die so wohl
geeignet sind, der leidenden Seele angenehme Eindrücke zu
gewähren. Hatte sie doch früher selbst das Verlangen gehegt, jene
Länder zu sehen, und es sich so überaus reizend gedacht, an des
Gatten Seite einst dort leben zu können.
Alle die schönen Träume, wie waren sie zerronnen, zerstoben vor
einer kalten, lieblosen Wirklichkeit! —
Der Graf hatte nach dem ersten Briefe nur noch zweimal an
Aurelie geschrieben und sich von ihr über Sidonie Mittheilungen
erbeten, nach deren erfolgter Vermählung er es für besser erachtete,
den Briefwechsel vorläufig zu unterbrechen. Bei seiner Ankunft in
Rom hatte er zum letzten Mal geschrieben und seitdem nicht wieder.
Etwa fünf Monate waren seit Sidoniens Vermählung dahin
gegangen, als neue Interessen ihre Seele erfüllten, Interessen, die
jedes weibliche Herz mit ganz besonderen Empfindungen zu erfüllen
pflegen. Es war die Hoffnung, Mutter zu werden und dadurch den so
heiß gehegten Wunsch des Fürsten zu erfüllen. Diese Hoffnung übte
einen tiefen Einfluß auf das stille Leid ihrer Seele aus, indem sie
dasselbe durch ihre Bedeutsamkeit verklärte.
Der Fürst empfing die so erfreuliche Nachricht durch den Prinzen,
und seine Theilnahme daran war größer als diejenige des Letzteren,
dem die Geburt eines Kindes, namentlich wenn es kein Thronerbe
war, von keiner Bedeutung erschien. Ihm waren die Gefühle, welche
die Hoffnung auf den Besitz eines lieblichen Kindes einzuflößen
pflegt, durchaus fremd und wurden auch durch die Aussicht der
baldigen Vaterschaft nicht geweckt.
Hatte sein bisheriges Benehmen ihn schon nicht für Sidonie
gewinnen können, so war die kaum bemäntelte Gleichgiltigkeit, mit
welcher er ihre Mittheilung aufnahm, um so weniger dazu geeignet.
Von der Ueberzeugung erfüllt, daß die letzteren ihn mit der höchsten
Freude erfüllen würde, sah sie sich in der empfindlichsten Weise
getäuscht und erkannte mit Schrecken, daß des Prinzen Gemüthsart
noch übler sei, als sie es bisher geglaubt.
Seit diesem Augenblick trennte sich ihre Seele noch mehr von
ihm, und es trat eine Kälte zwischen ihnen ein, zu deren Beseitigung
der Prinz nichts weniger als bemüht war, indem er, ohne die unter
den besonderen Umständen Sidonien schuldende Rücksicht zu
beobachten, seinen Neigungen unbeschränkt nachging.
Sidonie, dadurch tief verletzt, forschte zum ersten Mal nach den
Ursachen einer solchen Lieblosigkeit und seiner so häufigen und oft
Tage währenden Besuche der Residenz, und erfuhr sehr bald, in
welchen Genüssen der Prinz Befriedigung fand. Es konnte in Folge
dessen nicht ausbleiben, daß sie sich immer mehr von ihm
zurückzog und ihr eheliches Leben kaum noch ein solches genannt
werden durfte. Sie sah den Prinzen höchstens einmal in der Woche
und auch dann nur flüchtig, da er sich selten lange bei ihr aufhielt. In
solcher übeln Weise war die Zeit dahin gegangen und Sidoniens
Entbindung genaht. Die Prinzessin knüpfte daran so mannichfache
Wünsche und Hoffnungen.
Liebte sie auch den Prinzen nicht, so war es ihr doch als seine
Gemahlin nicht gleichgiltig, was man über denselben und mit Recht
sprach und wie man über ihr eheliches Verhältniß urtheilte. Des
Prinzen Ausschweifungen mußten sie verletzen, indem sie dadurch
in der Achtung ihrer Umgebung und der Welt herab gesetzt wurde.
Sie hatte davon schon mancherlei Beweise erhalten und wünschte
daher so viel Einfluß auf den Prinzen zu gewinnen, um dergleichen
übeln Erfahrungen für die Folge vorzubeugen.
Was war natürlicher als die Voraussetzung, dies durch die Geburt
eines Kindes zu erreichen, und die Hoffnung, daß das Interesse für
dieses den Prinzen zum Aufgeben seines wüsten Lebens
veranlassen und zu einer achtungsvolleren Annäherung an sie
führen würde. Sie sollte sich jedoch in diesen Erwartungen bitter
getäuscht sehen.
Denn als sie glücklich eines Mädchens genas, zeigte sich der
Prinz um so weniger geneigt, ihre Freude darüber zu theilen, da
seine Wünsche hinsichts eines Thronerben sich nicht erfüllt hatten.
Sidonie war untröstlich darüber, und ihr Schmerz steigerte sich, da
sie erkennen mußte, daß auch selbst die natürlichsten Gefühle dem
Prinzen mangelten, jene Gefühle, die so sehr geeignet sind, die
Herzen aneinander zu ketten.
Vielmehr schien ihm Sidonie seitdem nur noch gleichgiltiger
geworden zu sein, was auch in der That der Fall war, da er, von den
Reizen buhlerischer Frauen umstrickt, sich diesen mit der Zeit ganz
hingegeben hatte und in dem Wechsel des Genusses allein
Befriedigung fand.
Gewährte Sidonien auch ihr Mutterglück einen ganz neuen,
köstlichen Trost in ihrem Kummer, so überwand sie dennoch die
erfahrene Ehrverletzung von Seiten des Prinzen nicht. Gern
verzichtete sie auf seine Liebe, doch nicht auf die ihr schuldige
Achtung, und erkannte das für eine Pflicht gegen sich selbst, sollte
sie nicht endlich nur zu einer bemitleideten und belächelten Person
herabsinken, der man nach dem Vorbilde des Prinzen immer
weniger Achtung zu bezeigen sich erdreistete. Nach den bereits
gemachten Erfahrungen drohte ihr diese Gefahr mit aller
Bestimmtheit, und dieser Umstand forderte ihr ganzes, verletztes
Selbstgefühl heraus.
Sie hatte Aurelien schon oft ihren Kummer darüber vertraut und
mit ihr berathen, was sie noch thun könnte, da die bereits näher
bezeichneten Umstände nicht den geringsten Einfluß auf den
Prinzen ausgeübt hatten. Sie erachtete es für das Zweckmäßigste,
dem Prinzen selbst Vorstellungen zu machen und sich dadurch den
gewünschten Erfolg zu sichern. Sie glaubte diese Rücksicht
beobachten zu müssen, um ihn durch Vermittlung Anderer, etwa des
Fürsten, nicht zu verletzen.
Daß sich Sidonie dazu nur sehr schwer zu entschließen
vermochte, werden wir im Hinblick auf ihren besondern Charakter
erklärlich finden; wir würden uns jedoch in der Annahme täuschen,
ihr hätte der erforderliche Muth dazu gefehlt.
Bekanntlich sind die Verhältnisse, in welchen wir leben, zur
Entwicklung unseres Wesens von der höchsten Wichtigkeit, und je
bedeutsamer dieselben sind, je mehr sie uns herausfordern, um uns
ihren Einflüssen gegenüber zu behaupten, um so rascher entfalten
sich unsere Seelen- und Geistesanlagen, und der angeborene
Charakter des Menschen tritt schärfer und bestimmter hervor. Und
so geschieht es, daß uns bekannte Personen nach längerem
Wiedersehen oft sehr verändert erscheinen und ihr Wesen uns ganz
neue Seiten zeigt, von denen wir früher nicht die mindeste Ahnung
gewonnen. Je nach der Besonderheit der Einflüsse und der
Naturanlage werden diese Veränderungen verschieden und eben so
übel als angenehm sein.
Diese Erscheinungen treten ganz besonders bei dem weiblichen
Geschlecht und unter den bei Sidonien angegebenen Umständen
hervor, wozu wir noch das jugendliche Alter zählen müssen, in
welchem neben der körperlichen auch die sittliche Entwickelung
gewöhnlich stattzufinden pflegt.
Dergleichen Veränderungen waren auch mit der Prinzessin
vorgegangen, ohne daß dieselben von dem Prinzen beachtet
wurden. Ihr Charakter war durch die herausfordernden Verhältnisse
rasch gereift, und ihr tief verletztes Ehrgefühl erfüllte sie mit Muth,
sich dem Prinzen gegenüber zu behaupten und, was man ihr nicht
freiwillig brachte, sich in ihrem guten Recht zu fordern.
Wir haben früher erfahren, welchen nachtheiligen Einfluß des
Prinzen Verhalten gegen Sidonie ausübte, indem dasselbe die
Umgebung der Letzteren und selbst den Hof verleitete, ihr mit
Geringschätzung zu begegnen. Diese Wirkung wurde noch
bedeutend dadurch erhöht, als die Prinzessin, von ihrer
feinfühlenden Natur bestimmt, es wagte, sich mißbilligend über das
sittenlose Treiben auszusprechen, und diejenigen Personen von
ihrer Nähe fern hielt, welche sich keines besonders guten Rufs
erfreuten. Das wurde ihr in hohem Grade verdacht, denn sie
verletzte dadurch die Eitelkeit, und diese ist bekanntlich
unversöhnlich.
Sie gab aber auch ihren Widerwillen gegen die unzüchtigen und
karikirten Trachten der Frauen zu erkennen, indem sie sich sittsam
und stets einfach kleidete und die Benutzung der damals beliebten
tausendfachen Toilettenmittel verschmähte, wodurch sich die Damen
und auch die Herren zu verschönen bedacht waren.
Damit verstieß sie noch mehr gegen die herrschende Sitte, die
sich in der Frivolität wohl fühlte und darum an Züchtigkeit und
Sittlichkeit nicht erinnert sein wollte.
Es konnte daher nicht ausbleiben, daß die Prinzessin sehr bald
ziemlich allein dastand und nur wenig Nachahmung fand, sich
jedoch auch eben so wenig Freunde erwarb.
Sie ließ sich dadurch jedoch nicht zum Aufgeben ihres Verhaltens
bestimmen, und that dies um so weniger, da sie ihre sittliche Natur
dazu nöthigte.
Ueberdies hatte sie längst erkannt, daß man an einem Hof nicht
auf wahre Freundschaft hoffen durfte, und fühlte sich im Besitz ihrer
Freundin Aurelie befriedigt. Huldigungen der Welt waren ihr
durchaus bedeutungslos, auch war sie nicht eitel genug, darnach zu
streben, und bedauerte daher in der ihr gezeigten Abneigung keinen
Verlust.
Ihr Verhalten entsprang jedoch nicht etwa aus der bestimmten
Absicht, auf ihre Umgebung in solcher Art eine Wirkung auszuüben,
sondern lediglich aus den angeborenen Trieben. Doch würde es sie
sehr beglückt haben, hätte man sie verstanden und das Bessere
anerkannt.
Wir sehen, daß sie sich dadurch in einen Widerspruch mit der sie
umgebenden Welt gesetzt hatte, und werden erfahren, in welcher
Weise sich derselbe lösen sollte.
Einige Wochen waren dahin gegangen, ohne daß sie den für
nothwendig erkannten Schritt zu thun vermochte, bis endlich der
Zufall sie darin unterstützte.
Bei einem Hoffest hatte sich die Oberhofmeisterin der Prinzessin
gegenüber eine verletzende Freiheit erlaubt, indem sie ihre
Mißbilligung über deren Verhalten in wenig passenden Worten
gegen diese aussprach.
Hatte sie sich bereits früher öfter in dieser Beziehung gehen
lassen, durch Sidoniens ruhiges Hinnehmen der Belehrung verleitet,
so überschritt ihr Benehmen in dem angegebenen Fall die zu
beobachtenden Rücksichten in vermehrtem Grade.
Welche Ueberraschung malte sich jedoch in ihrem und dem Antlitz
der in der Nähe befindlichen Hofdamen, als Sidonie, statt wie
gewöhnlich die Belehrung ruhig hinzunehmen, sich stolz aufrichtete
und der Oberhofmeisterin mit festen und ruhigen Worten bedeutete,
sich künftighin in den ihr vorgeschriebenen Grenzen der Etikette zu
halten, um nicht durch ihr Benehmen dem Hofe ein übles Beispiel zu
geben.
Die stolze Dame, in solcher Weise und so durchaus ungeahnt von
der schüchternen Prinzessin zurecht gewiesen, blieb starr und
bestürzt vor dieser stehen, ohne ein Wort der Entschuldigung zu
finden, ja sie vergaß sogar die übliche Verneigung, als sich die
Prinzessin nach jenen Worten mit den Hofdamen rasch entfernte
und sie einsam zurückließ.
Sie würde den Vorfall für eine Vision gehalten haben, hätte sie
sich nicht ganz allein in dem Saal gesehen und hätten die
zurechtweisenden Worte der Prinzessin nicht in der mißtönendsten
Weise noch immer ihre Ohren durchklungen. Die sich über das
Erfahrene in ihr erhebende Entrüstung erweckte sie aus der
Bestürzung, und kaum wieder so weit gesammelt, um den
unerhörten Fall genügend zu erwägen, war sie auch sofort
entschlossen, sich bei dem Prinzen darüber zu beklagen und ihn zu
bestimmen, der Prinzessin das Ungehörige ihres Benehmens gegen
sie vorzustellen und diese zugleich zu einer ihr zu gebenden
Genugthuung zu veranlassen. Sie kannte ihren Einfluß auf den
Prinzen und die geringe Achtung, die dieser seiner Gemahlin
schenkte, nur zu wohl, um des Erfolgs nicht gewiß zu sein. Sie hatte
die Prinzessin niemals leiden mögen, und diese Abneigung theilte
sie mit einer nicht eben geringen Anzahl Gleichgesinnter. Der Grund
dazu lag darin, daß Sidonie durchaus ihren eigenen Willen haben
wollte und ihre klugen Worte stets unberücksichtigt ließ. Ueberdies
verschmähte sie auch die gebräuchlichen Mittel, die Toilette zu
verschönen. Denn sie bediente sich weder der falschen Haare, noch
des Puders, färbte eben so wenig die Augenbrauen, noch
verschönte sie ihren Teint durch Schminke und Schönpflästerchen.
Sie verachtete alle diese Dinge, obgleich der herrschenden Mode
gemäß sich die Damen des Hofes und der Aristokratie in solcher
Weise zu verschönen für eine Anstandspflicht erachteten. Dieser
Umstand diente ihr und ihren Gesinnungsgenossen für einen
Beweis, daß sich die Prinzessin klüger als sie Alle dünkte, den guten
Ton vom Hofe zu verbannen bedacht wäre und obenein die Absicht
hegte, daselbst ein prüdes, moralisches Leben einzuführen, wozu
sie wie ihre Freunde nicht die geringste Lust verspürten. Gründe
genug in Verbindung mit dem soeben Erfahrenen, die Prinzessin
recht von Herzen zu hassen.
Um so mehr war sie daher bedacht, sich Genugthuung zu
verschaffen.
Sie sah sich in ihren Erwartungen auch wirklich nicht getäuscht;
denn nachdem sie dem Prinzen die Angelegenheit in ihrem Sinne
vorgetragen und dabei der ihr obliegenden Pflichten als
Oberhofmeisterin der unerfahrenen, einem kleinen herzoglichen
Hofe entsprossenen Prinzessin gegenüber gedacht und somit ihr
Verhalten gegen diese als durchaus berechtigt bezeichnet hatte, gab
ihr der Prinz nicht nur seine Zustimmung zu ihrer Klage zu erkennen,
sondern auch das Versprechen, die Prinzessin zu der gewünschten
Abbitte zu veranlassen. Er sprach überdies seine Ueberraschung
über das Verhalten seiner Gemahlin aus, das er durchaus nicht
erwartet, überhaupt nicht vermuthet hatte.
Sehr befriedigt schied die Oberhofmeisterin, ihres Sieges gewiß.
Sidonie glaubte den Prinzen mit dieser Angelegenheit nicht
behelligen zu müssen und schwieg darum, ohne den Schritt der
Oberhofmeisterin zu ahnen; sie war daher nicht wenig überrascht,
als der Prinz sie aufsuchte und ihr in ziemlich verletzender Weise
Vorstellungen über ihr Verhalten gegen die Erstere machte und es
zugleich als eine Nothwendigkeit bezeichnete, derselben einige
entschuldigende Worte zu sagen.
Sidonie hatte ihn, wenngleich mit gesteigerter Ueberraschung, so
doch ruhig angehört; als er schwieg und ihre Zustimmung erwartete,
blickte sie ihn fest an und entgegnete eben so fest, daß sie weit
entfernt sei, sein Verlangen zu erfüllen, und sich dazu durchaus
berechtigt glaube. Zugleich setzte sie ihm den Vorfall genau
auseinander.
Der Prinz schaute sie mit Ueberraschung an; in solcher Weise
hatte die Prinzessin noch nie zu ihm zu sprechen gewagt und
ebenso wenig ein so bestimmtes, festes Wesen gezeigt. War dies
auch zurückhaltend und ruhig, so verrieth es dennoch nichts von der
früheren Schüchternheit und Befangenheit. Was jedoch den Prinzen
für seine Gemahlin hätte gewinnen sollen, reizte vielmehr seine
Empfindlichkeit, und so geschah es, daß er, statt ihr Recht
anzuerkennen, auf seinem Verlangen beharrte.
Jetzt schien Sidonien der rechte Augenblick gekommen, dem
Prinzen alle jene Momente zu bezeichnen, durch welche das
ungeziemende Verhalten der Oberhofmeisterin hervorgerufen
worden war, und ihr volles, tief verletztes Herz zögerte damit nicht.
Ihre Worte waren bestimmt, sie bezeichneten nur die nicht
abzuläugnenden Thatsachen und deren unausbleibliche Folgen, und
drückten endlich das bestimmte Verlangen aus, der Rücksichten
eingedenk zu sein, die der Prinz ihr als seiner Gemahlin schulde.
In großer Erregung und sprachlos vor Erstaunen starrte sie der
Prinz an. Ihre Vorstellungen erschienen ihm als Vorwürfe, die sie ihm
zu machen wagte, indem sie sich erkühnte, ihre Mißbilligung über
sein Treiben und Verhalten gegen ihn auszusprechen und von ihm
eine Rückkehr zu einem bessern, sittlichen Leben, sowie eine
achtungsvollere Begegnung von seiner Seite verlangte. Fest, stolz
und nichts weniger als schüchtern stand sie vor ihm da, blickte ihn
eben so fest an, und ihre ganze Haltung zeigte, daß sie es sehr
ernst damit meinte.
Die Wirkung der letzteren auf den Prinzen war eine um so tiefere,
da sie ihn so durchaus ungeahnt überraschte und zugleich erkennen
ließ, wie sehr er sich hinsichts Sidoniens Charakter getäuscht hatte.
Dieser Umstand diente jedoch leider nur dazu, seinen ganzen, ihm
beiwohnenden Jähzorn zu erregen und der Prinzessin in der
verletzendsten Weise zu entgegnen, daß ihre Vorwürfe eine
Anmaßung wären, die er ein- für allemal zurückweise, worauf er sie
in großer Erregung verließ.
Durch diesen so unglücklichen Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen tief
gebeugt, durch des Prinzen Jähzorn und heftige Worte beleidigt,
fühlte Sidonie die ganze Bedeutungslosigkeit ihrer Stellung, war aber
auch zugleich überzeugt, daß damit alle näheren Beziehungen zu
dem Prinzen ihr Ende erreicht hätten. Sie befestigte sich um so mehr
in dieser Ueberzeugung, da der Prinz seit dieser Unterredung nicht
nur nicht an ein Aufgeben seines wüsten Lebens zu denken schien,
sondern dieses vielmehr in noch erhöhterem Grade fortsetzte,
gleichsam um ihr den Beweis der geringen für sie gehegten Achtung
zu liefern.
Sidonie nahm das ruhig und geduldig hin; sie hatte die Pflicht
gegen sich und den Prinzen erfüllt; mehr zu thun vermochte sie
nicht. Wie groß ihr Schmerz darüber war, darf kaum bemerkt
werden.
In der Liebe und der Pflege ihres Kindes und in dem vertraulichen
Umgang mit Aurelien fand sie den so nothwendigen Trost,
wenngleich sie erkannte, daß mit jener Begegnung des Prinzen der
erste Schritt zu einem dauernden Kampfe mit demselben gethan
war, wollte sie sich dem ihr gewissen Schicksal nicht für die
Folgezeit unterwerfen. Daß sie das nicht durfte und auch ihrem
Charakter nach nicht vermochte, stand in ihr fest; in welcher Weise
sich jedoch ihre Lage entscheiden würde, war eine in der Gegenwart
schwer zu beantwortende Frage.
Zwar hatte der Fürst, dem das eheliche Zerwürfniß nicht
unbekannt geblieben war, sowol dem Prinzen als auch Sidonien
Vorstellungen darüber gemacht und sich bemüht, eine Aussöhnung
zwischen ihnen herbeizuführen; jedoch ohne jeden Erfolg.
Der Prinz zeigte keine Neigung, auf Sidoniens, wie er es nannte,
überspannte und ungehörige Forderungen einzugehen, und sie
vermochte ihren Widerwillen gegen ihn nicht zu bezwingen, und so
blieb Alles beim Alten.
In trüber Einsamkeit gingen Sidonien seitdem die Tage hin,
zehnfach kummervoller im Hinblick auf ihr verlorenes Liebesglück
und in dem Gefühl der Machtlosigkeit, ihrem Leiden ein Ende zu
machen. Wie oft ruhte in jener Zeit ihr von Thränen gefeuchtetes
Auge auf den Zügen des fernen, so edlen Geliebten! Welch einen
Gegensatz bot dieser zu dem Gemahl! — In dieser Zeit ihrer Leiden
sollte sie noch ein neuer tiefer Schmerz treffen und ihre Seelenkraft
herausfordern: ihr Vater erkrankte bedenklich.
Sie eilte an sein Lager, jedoch nur, um ihn bald zur Gruft zu
begleiten.
Zwei Monate darauf starb auch ihre Mutter.
Wir übergehen den schmerzvollen Kummer, den dieser so rasch
auf einander folgende doppelte Verlust in ihrer Seele hervorrief;
derselbe beugte sie in dem Gefühl, in ihrem Leiden nun auch noch
des elterlichen Beistandes beraubt und der Willkür ihres Gemahls
anheim gegeben zu sein, unendlich tief und raubte ihr allen
Lebensmuth.
Diese sie betreffenden Ereignisse waren zugleich die Ursache,
daß sie des Prinzen zügellosem Leben keine Aufmerksamkeit
schenkte und froh war, wenn sie nicht durch irgend welche
Umstände daran erinnert wurde.
Obgleich der Prinz mit ihr dasselbe Palais bewohnte, lebte er
dennoch von ihr getrennt in dem einen Flügel des Schlosses,
während sie den andern Theil benutzte. Es fanden daher
persönliche Berührungen um so seltener statt, da der Prinz, wie
schon bemerkt, sich überdies häufig in der Residenz oder an
anderen Orten aufhielt und bei seiner Rückkehr vorzugsweise im
Kreise seiner näheren Freunde befand und Gemahlin und Tochter
unbeachtet ließ. In solcher Weise waren die Jahre bis zu dem
Zeitpunkt dahin gegangen, mit welchem unsere Erzählung beginnt.
Sidonie war, nachdem sie sich von den sie betroffenen
Schicksalsschlägen wieder erholt hatte, bemüht, ihr Leben nach
ihren Neigungen zu gestalten, das, an und für sich ziemlich einfach,
doch nicht ganz der angenehmen Zerstreuung entbehrte.
Außer den Besuchen ihres Bruders, der an des Fürsten Hof eine
militärische Stellung bekleidete, empfing sie einmal in der Woche ein
paar Herren und Damen, deren sittliche und geistige Vorzüge ihren
Wünschen entsprachen.
Musikalische und Theater-Aufführungen gehörten sodann zu den
von ihr beliebten Genüssen, denen sie ein gewisses Interesse
schenkte.
Ohne jede Rücksicht auf ihren Gemahl gestaltete sie so ihr Leben
durchaus selbstständig und wurde darin durch die frühere
Oberhofmeisterin nicht mehr gestört, da ihre Vorstellungen bei dem
Fürsten die Entfernung derselben trotz dem Prinzen erzielt hatten.
Freilich war sie durch den Ersatz derselben auch nicht besonders
erfreut worden, da die neue Dienerin allerdings feinere Manieren und
ein achtungsvolleres Verhalten beobachtete, übrigens jedoch nichts
mehr war, als was in jener sittenverderbten Zeit eine Dame in ihrer
Stellung zu sein pflegte. Steife Formen, ein hohles Herz und ein
nicht minder hohler Geist, gemischt mit der Vorliebe für Intriguen und
dem Verlangen, sich überall Einfluß, namentlich auf die Prinzessin,
zu verschaffen.
Trotz alledem war es Sidonie durch ihr sicheres Benehmen
gelungen, sich in ihrer Umgebung Ehrerbietung und Achtung zu
verschaffen, die sich bei einzelnen Personen sogar bis zu wirklichem
Mitgefühl mit ihrem traurigen Geschick steigerte.
Die Welt nannte sie nun nicht mehr die s c h ü c h t e r n e, sondern
die u n g l ü c k l i c h e Prinzessin; denn es konnte nicht fehlen, daß
das Gerücht von dem ehelichen Zerwürfniß schon lange über die
Hofkreise hinaus gedrungen war.
Mit der aufrichtigsten Theilnahme hing manches Auge an dem
bleichen, traurigen Antlitz der Prinzessin, wenn sie sich öffentlich
zeigte, und mancher Wunsch zu ihrem Glück und einer
befriedigenden Aenderung ihrer Lebensverhältnisse wurde
ausgesprochen.
Um wie viel größer würde diese Theilnahme gewesen sein, hätte
man eine Ahnung von dem Schmerz gehabt, den Sidonie überdies
im Herzen trug.
Doch davon wußte die Welt nichts; denn Sidoniens Liebe war
Jedermann unbekannt geblieben, Dank des so vorsichtigen und
richtigen Verhaltens des edelsinnigen Grafen. Wie sehr dieser
bedacht war, dies Geheimniß zu bewahren, können wir aus der
Vorsicht entnehmen, welche er bei dem Wiedersehen der Prinzessin
beobachtete.
Sehen wir nun, in wie weit es Aurelien gelang, ihre so
wohlgemeinte Absicht auszuführen.
Viertes Kapitel.
Die zu des Grafen Besuch bezeichnete Stunde nahte und Aurelie

schaute erwartungsvoll durch das Fenster auf die Straße, auf
welcher sich der Erstere dem Palais nähern mußte.
Wie war ihr treues Herz doch erfüllt mit Besorgniß, Freude und
Kummer, und wie viel hatte sie dem Grafen mitzutheilen, wie viel von
ihm zu erfahren! Fast drei Jahre der Trennung lagen ja zwischen
ihrem letzten Zusammensein und dem heutigen, so ungeahnten
Wiedersehen.
Aurelie hatte die ihr bis zu dem Empfang des Grafen gebliebene
Muße dazu benutzt, sich in der ihr eigenthümlichen verständigen
Weise alles das zurecht zu legen, was sie dem Grafen mittheilen
wollte und wie sie die von ihm jedenfalls zu erwartenden Fragen
über Sidonie zu beantworten hätte, um sein edles Herz nicht zu sehr
zu betrüben. Sie sagte sich allerdings, daß der Graf mit der Freundin
Unglück trotz seiner langen Abwesenheit von der Heimath gewiß
bekannt sein würde, ein Verhehlen oder Beschönigen desselben von
ihrer Seite daher also kaum einige Wirkung auf ihn ausüben würde;
dennoch wollte sie so viel zum Guten beitragen, als in ihren Kräften
stand.
Kaum erkannte sie den Grafen wieder, als ihr ausschauendes
Auge seine Annäherung gewahrte. Zwar schritt er noch wie ehedem
sicher und fest einher; doch zeigte sein durch die südliche Sonne
gebräuntes Antlitz einen viel tieferen Ernst als früher, und sein Auge
blickte, wenn auch frei, so doch fast düster vor sich hin. Ebenso

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Religious Parties and the Politics of

Civil Liberties Vineeta Yadav

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

4.1. Muslim-​Majority Countries in the Sample  133

1.1. Muslim-​majority countries in the sample  2

4.6. Marginal effect of seat concentration on RO institutionalization when

8.4. Moving average of civil rights in Turkey, 1985–​2010  268

I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at Penn

Religious parties are increasingly common and increasingly active in politics in

Green 2008; Ward 2013; Mantilla 2018; Mkentane 2019.

Figure 1.1 Muslim-​majority countries in the sample

% Countries w/Islamist Parties % Countries w/Multiple Islamist Parties

Figure 1.2 Global share of Muslim-​majority countries with religious parties

reviews of this extensive literature.

Hashmi 2009; Bayat 2007b.

2013; and de Figueiredo and Richter 2014.

religious interest groups on these issues. This analysis is supplemented by quan-

Definition: Civil Liberties

These definitions allow us to identify the types of laws, decrees, policies,

Cross 2015; Fox 2015; and Perry 2011.

As political parties, religious parties have extensive policy agendas covering a

a thornier problem in supporting liberal civil liberties compared to supporting

Definition: Religious Parties in MMCs

In MMCs, religious parties inspired by Islam are referred to by scholars as Islamist

Why Would Religious Parties Protect or Oppose Liberal

Orthodox Religious Views of Civil Liberties

2003; Bulliet 1994.

When Do Religious Parties Moderate?

As political parties, religious parties must choose their ideological platforms,

2013 for recent reviews of this extensive literature.

Yadav 2010; Schwedler 2006, 2011.

Extant literatures in political science, sociology, and anthropology have exam-

2012; Werenfels 2014; Hamid 2014, 2018; Cesari 2018.

Brief Summary of the Theoretical Framework

Religious Party-​RO Alliances and the Socioeconomic

2015; Braun-​Poppelaars and Hanegraff 2011; Hagopian 2009; Warner 2000.

society organizations typically have either hostile or ambiguous attitudes toward

High Legislative Seat Low Legislative Seat

HIGH Inflation LOW HIGH Inflation LOW

Rel. Parties in Non-Rel. Parties Rel. Parties in Non-Rel. Parties

Civil Liberties No Effect on Civil Liberties

Figure 1.3 Illustration of the theoretical argument

ROs’ expansion (Corollary 1). If the legislature lacks a concentrated religious-​

The Decline of Civil Liberties

When religious parties participate in government, either as part of a coalition

religiously committed appointees, and to use their budgetary powers to favor

Empirical Research Design

I adopt a multi-​methodological approach to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the corol-

Kinder and Palfrey 1993 for further discussions of this technique.

of highly socioeconomically institutionalized ROs. In the absence of institu-

2007; Piro 2001.

Die zu des Grafen Besuch bezeichnete Stunde nahte und Aurelie

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

4.1. Muslim-Majority Countries in the Sample 133

1.1. Muslim-majority countries in the sample 2

8.4. Moving average of civil rights in Turkey, 1985–2010 268

Figure 1.1 Muslim-majority countries in the sample

Figure 1.2 Global share of Muslim-majority countries with religious parties

Religious Party-RO Alliances and the Socioeconomic

2015; Braun-Poppelaars and Hanegraff 2011; Hagopian 2009; Warner 2000.

ROs’ expansion (Corollary 1). If the legislature lacks a concentrated religious-

I adopt a multi-methodological approach to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the corol-