Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Financial Times Guide To Investment Trusts The Unlocking The Citys Best Kept Secret 2Nd Edition John C Baron Full Chapter
Financial Times Guide To Investment Trusts The Unlocking The Citys Best Kept Secret 2Nd Edition John C Baron Full Chapter
Financial Times Guide To Investment Trusts The Unlocking The Citys Best Kept Secret 2Nd Edition John C Baron Full Chapter
That’s why we’re working with leading authors to bring you the latest thinking and
best practices, so you can get better at the things that are important to you. You can
learn on the page or on the move, and with content that’s always crafted to help you
understand quickly and apply what you’ve learned.
If you want to upgrade your personal skills or accelerate your career, become a
more effective leader or more powerful communicator, discover new opportunities
or simply find more inspiration, we can help you make progress in your work and
life.
Every day our work helps learning flourish, and wherever learning flourishes, so do
people.
John Baron
PEARSON EDUCATION LIMITED
KAO Two
KAO Park
Harlow CM17 9SR
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)1279 623623
Web: www.pearson.com/uk
The right of John Baron to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by
him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All trademarks used herein are the property of their respective owners. The use of
any trademark in this text does not vest in the author or publisher any trademark
ownership rights in such trademarks, nor does the use of such trademarks imply
any affiliation with or endorsement of this book by such owners.
Pearson Education is not responsible for the content of third-party internet sites.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
24 23 22 21 20
Print edition typeset in Stone Serif ITC Pro 9.5/14 by SPi Global
Printed by Ashford Colour Press Ltd, Gosport
NOTE THAT ANY PAGE CROSS REFERENCES REFER TO THE PRINT EDITION
To Thalia, Poppy and Leone,
with my love
2 Better performance
The evidence
Undertaking research
Performance nuances
Maintaining perspective
Beware unit trust tables . . .
. . . and ‘sister’ funds
3 Competitive fees
Time and numbers
International comparisons
Other factors encouraging competition
Ongoing Charges calculation
Lower investment trust costs
Performance fees
4 Structural advantages
Merits of a closed-ended structure
Poor selling decisions
Yield and diversification
Liquidity and volatility
Less mainstream assets
5 Geared tailwinds
Mathematical logic
The logic in practice
The issue of sentiment
Understanding ‘splits’
6 Discount opportunities
Factors influencing discount levels
Profiting from discount movements
Discount control measures
Z-statistics
7 Dividend heroes
The mechanics
Revenue reserve
Dividend heroes
Capital changes
Dividend terminology
Dividend metrics
Tighter discounts
8 Independent board
An evolving role
The AIC Code
Greater professionalism
Common interests
Monitoring holdings
Social accountability
9 Good communication
Report and accounts
Regular communications
Marketing and distribution
Investment roadshows and seminars
The AIC
15 Accessing markets
Retail Distribution Review (RDR)
Platform providers
Robo-advisers and exchange-traded funds
Wealth managers
Do-it-yourself
16 First principles
First steps
Time in the market
Reinvest the dividends
Diversify to reduce portfolio risk
Rebalancing
Reaching investment goals
17 More considerations
Be prepared to be a contrarian
Keep it simple (and cheap)
Be sceptical of ‘expert’ forecasts
Embrace Einstein’s eighth wonder
18 Further considerations
Active versus passive
Portfolio turnover and conviction
Different investment styles
Marketability
An inconvenient truth
20 Recent commentaries
Where are our pioneering giants?
Do not sell in May
Retaining faith in technology
Patience is usually a virtue
Keep calm and carry on
Index
About the author
John Baron is best known to readers of the FT’s Investors Chronicle
magazine for having successfully managed and reported on two real
investment trust portfolios since 2009 – as measured by their appropriate
MSCI PIMFA Growth and Income benchmarks. His popular monthly column
is closely followed and helps investors – private and professional – with
their investments.
John has used investment trusts in both a private and professional capacity
for over 35 years. After university and the Army, in a career spanning 14
years, he ran a broad range of charity and private client portfolios as a
director of both Henderson Private Clients and then Rothschild Asset
Management (RAM). Whilst at RAM, he was also responsible for the core
UK equity portfolio.
Since leaving the City, John has helped charities monitor their fund managers,
contributes to other publications including The Investment Trusts Handbook
2020, and regularly speaks at investment seminars. He remains a member of
the Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment.
He has also founded Equi Ltd which manages the website
www.johnbaronportfolios.co.uk. The website reports in real time to
members on the progress of nine real investment trust portfolios as they
achieve a range of risk-adjusted strategies and income levels. The website’s
Performance page testifies to their success relative to benchmarks.
His central message is that investment trusts are the best form of funds for
most long-term investors if properly harnessed, and that investment is best
kept simple to succeed – complexity adds cost, risks confusion and usually
hinders performance. This philosophy runs through this revealing book about
the City’s best-kept secret.
Author’s acknowledgements
The writing of any book is a real team effort. This book draws on the
expertise and talents of many people. My thanks go to all who have made
valuable suggestions, contributed to its compilation and helped with its
production.
In no particular order, I would particularly like to thank:
The team at the Association of Investment Companies (AIC): David Michael
(my first point of contact) and Sophie Driscoll for their expertise and
guidance, Annabel Brodie-Smith for her valued input, and Ian Sayers for his
contribution and wise oversight of such a great team;
The book’s contributors in Chapters 11, 12 and 13 for their perspective and
sage advice: Nick Train, Neil Hermon, Charles Jillings, Annabel Brodie-
Smith, Jonathan Davis, Alan Brierley, Lord John Lee of Trafford DL FCA
and John Hughman;
The editorial team at Pearson Education for their patience and
professionalism: Dr. Priyadharshini Dhanagopal in India, Eloise Cook,
Melanie Carter and Felicity Baines in Harlow, and Suzanne Pattinson in
Cambridge;
And last but certainly not least, the team at home: My wife Thalia and
daughters Poppy and Leone for their inspiration and help with technology!
The book is in memory of my parents.
Publisher’s acknowledgements
xxiv Association of Investment Companies: AIC welcomes FCA’s Retail
Distribution Review call for input. (2019, May 1). AIC. Used with
permission from AIC; 2 Association of Investment Companies: What are
investment companies? AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 3 Association
of Investment Companies: How investment companies work. AIC. Used
with permission from AIC; 6 Association of Investment Companies:
Discounts and premiums. AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 10-13
Association of Investment Companies: AIC sector review. (2019, May 8).
AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 17 Association of Investment
Companies: Association of Investment Companies (AIC). Used with
permission from AIC; 19 Association of Investment Companies:
Henderson Smaller Companies. AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 24
The Financial Times: From Walters, L. (2011), ‘Fund performance tables
hide bad records’, Investors Chronicle, 19–25 August © The Financial Times
Ltd. 2019, All rights reserved. Used with permission from The Financial
Times Ltd; 27 Association of Investment Companies: Association of
Investment Companies (AIC) /Morningstar. Used with permission from AIC;
30 Thalia Baron: Cartoon by Thalia Baron. Used with permission from
Thalia Baron; 33 Association of Investment Companies: Association of
Investment Companies (AIC) /Morningstar Weighted averages. AIC. Used
with permission from AIC; 35-36 Association of Investment Companies:
AIC Ongoing Charges Calculation. AIC; 39 Association of Investment
Companies: Investment company H1 review: secondary fundraising hits
record. (2019, July 9). Used with permission from AIC; 42-43 Association
of Investment Companies: Association of Investment Companies (AIC)
/Morningstar (as at 14/08/19). Used with permission from AIC; 46
Association of Investment Companies: Investment company 2018 review.
(2018, December 18). Used with permission from AIC; 51-52 Investors
Chronicle magazine: From Investors Chronicle magazine, page 32, 17 May
2019; 57 Association of Investment Companies: Volatility. AIC. Used with
permission from AIC; 64 Association of Investment Companies: Risk
versus reward. AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 74 Association of
Investment Companies: Association of Investment Companies (AIC)
/Morningstar Date as at 14/08/2019. Used with permission from AIC; 77
Association of Investment Companies: Investment trust discounts since
May 2008. AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 80 Association of
Investment Companies: Discounts and premiums. AIC. Used with
permission from AIC; 89 Association of Investment Companies: Selection
of investment trusts and their discount control policies. AIC. Used with
permission from AIC; 91-92 Investec: Closed – end funds daily – Investec.
(2019, Jun 13). Used with permission from Investec; 94 Finsbury Growth &
Income Trust PLC: “Dividends.” Finsbury Growth & Income Trust PLC; 96
Association of Investment Companies: AIC Dividend hero. (2019, Jul 19).
AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 99 Aberdeen Japan Investment
Trust PLC: Aberdeen Japan Investment Trust PLC, Annual Report, 31
March 2019; 100 Finsbury Growth & Income Trust PLC: Finsbury
Growth & Income Trust plc dividend payments: FGT dividends; 107-109
Association of Investment Companies: The AIC Code of Corporate
Governance. (2019, Feb). Used with permission from AIC; 112 Baillie
Gifford & Co Limited: Schroder UK Growth Fund plc Annual Report and
Accounts; 124 Allianz Technology Trust PLC: Allianz Technology Trust
PLC, Factsheet 31 October 2019; 126 Investors Chronicle magazine: From
Investors Chronicle magazine, 26 July 2019; 129-132 Association of
Investment Companies: Winners of the AIC Shareholder Communication
Awards 2019. (2019, June 7). AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 139-145
Association of Investment Companies: Half of investment companies
managed by the same fund manager for more than 10 years. (2019, July 8).
AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 153 Nick Train, Finsbury Growth &
Income Trust: Nick train. Finsbury Growth & Income Trust (FGT). Used
with permission from FGT; 154 Janus Henderson Group plc: Neil Hermon
– Janus Henderson Investors. Used with permission from Janus Henderson
Group plc; 158 ICM Investment Management Limited: Charles Jillings.
Utilico Emerging Markets Trust plc. Used with permission from ICM
Limited; 163 Association of Investment Companies: Annabel Brodie-
Smith, Communications Director of the AIC. Used with permission from AIC;
166 The Financial Times: Kay, J. (2018, January 19). Risk, the retail
investor and disastrous new rules. © The Financial Times Ltd. 2019, All
rights reserved; 169 Jonathan Davis: Jonathan Davis, board director.
Investment-reader; 173 Alan Brierley: Alan Brierley, Investec Securities
Research; 178 John Lee: Lord John Lee, Trafford DL FCA; 180 The
Financial Times: John Hughman, Editor of Investors Chronicle. © The
Financial Times Ltd. 2019, All rights reserved. Used with permission from
The Financial Times Ltd; 181 BMO Global Asset Management: Stated
objective of the Foreign & Colonial Government Trust, 1868; 181
Association of Investment Companies: Newlands, J. (1997). Put not your
trust in money. London: Association of Investment Companies; 181 Will
Durant: From “The Map of Human Character” by Will Durant (November
18, 1945); 187 Association of Investment Companies: Just 26% of students
and 13% of graduates expect to pay back their student loan. (2019, July 22).
AIC; 196 Personal Investment Management and Financial Advice
Association: Current Asset Allocation – PIMFA – Building Personal
Financial Futures; 200 Association of Investment Companies: AIC
welcomes FCA’s Retail Distribution Review call for input. (2019, May 1).
Used with permission from AIC; 201 Association of Investment
Companies: AIC welcomes FCA platform report which should benefit
consumers. (2019, March 14). Used with permission from AIC; 203
Association of Investment Companies: 100% investment in investment
companies (%). AIC. Used with permission from AIC; 218 John Baron:
John Baron Portfolios – Diversification,
http://www.johnbaronportfolios.co.uk/site/Diversification.php; 227 Mark
Dampier: Mark Dampier, Research Director, Hargreaves Lansdown; 230
International Monetary Fund: The Arcane Art of Predicting Recessions –
By Prakash Loungani, Assistant to the Director, External Relations
Department, IMF. (2000, December 18); 231 The Economist Newspaper
Limited: A mean feat. (2016, January 9). The Economist Newspaper
Limited; 236 CFA Institute: Cremers, K. J. M., Fulkerson, J. A., & Riley, T.
B. (2018). Challenging the Conventional Wisdom on Active Management: A
Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively Managed
Mutual Funds. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3247356; 252
Bridgewater Associates, LP: Saphier, M., Karniol-Tambour, K., &
Margolis, P. (2019, Feb). Geographic Diversification Has Big Upside For
Investors. Bridgewater Associates, LP; 256 BlackRock, Inc: Blackrock
presentation on thematic investing in February 2019, Alistair Bishop. Used
with permission from BlackRock, Inc; 257 BlackRock, Inc: Alistair Bishop
at Blackrock. Used with permission from BlackRock, Inc; 266 John Baron:
Baron, J. (2019, February 7). Where are our pioneering giants? Used with
permission from John Baron; 269 John Baron: Baron, J. (2019, May 9). Do
not sell in May. Used with permission from John Baron; 272 John Baron:
Baron, J. (2019, August 8). Retaining faith in technology. Used with
permission from John Baron; 275 John Baron: Baron, J. (2019, October 10).
Patience is usually a virtue. Used with permission from John Baron.
Foreword
In many respects, investment trusts remain the City’s best-kept secret.
Despite evidence confirming they perform better and are cheaper than the
unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEICs) which dominate
the nation’s investment and savings market, too many investors continue to be
unaware of them or think them too complex.
This is slowly changing. The introduction of the Retail Distribution Review
(RDR) in 2013 and other changes to financial regulation are proving to be
catalysts. Others include a far greater awareness of the many advantages of
investment trusts courtesy of the financial media and professional
organisations, including the Association of Investment Companies (AIC).
Investment trusts are emerging from the shadows although there is still some
way to go before they enter the investment ‘mainstream’.
At a time when there is sadly a growing financial ‘advice gap’ and the cost of
advice is rising, investors would benefit from better harnessing their
potential. This further edition of The Financial Times Guide to Investment
Trusts will help investors better understand investment trusts and how they
can be best harnessed to achieve financial objectives. Characteristics such as
their structure, gearing and discounts are explained, as are their more
nuanced characteristics which all help to determine how trusts perform and
are perceived.
The book also highlights the stepping stones to successful investing, the
principles of sound portfolio management, and how to construct and monitor
a trust portfolio. We at Equi believe such knowledge is not only important but
necessary. For the evidence suggests better investing can help to reduce
inequalities within society. Why else do the rich keep getting richer? We are
on a mission to both inform and help investors achieve better returns.
The final section of this guide will feature how we put theory into practice,
for actions speak louder than words. By way of illustration, the thinking and
strategy behind one of the nine real investment trust portfolios being managed
in real time on my company’s website will be explained in some detail,
together with the various factors we consider when selecting holdings.
If ever there was any doubt, knowledge continues to be the bedrock of
successful investing. This book aims to explain the potential of investment
trusts in a clear, concise and jargon-free manner. It shows their apparent
complexity is a myth – a myth which has tended to obscure the many merits of
investment trusts for too long. It is hoped readers will benefit from a better
understanding of the wonderful opportunities on offer.
Introduction: The evolving
landscape of investment (trusts)
The investment (trust) landscape has continued to evolve at a clip since this
book was first published in 2013. Some aspects have changed for the better,
some not, and some are progressing albeit perhaps a little too gradually. As
with most things in the financial world, it’s a curate’s egg. The challenge is to
focus on those parts where improvements can be best made for the benefit of
investors.
What is undeniable is that those investors looking at investment trusts to help
them achieve financial goals are today fortunate in that the sector is now at
one of its pinnacles when viewed against its proud 150-year history.
Investment trusts are better poised than ever to play an even greater role in
helping informed investors achieve their financial goals.
The good
However, it remains a truism that too little is generally known about
investment trusts – they have yet to enter the investment ‘mainstream’. Why is
this the case? After all, they have been around for a very long time. Many can
trace their ancestry back to the nineteenth century. And over this period, they
have proved themselves not only to be perhaps the greatest innovation for
long-term investors, but also the most rewarding.
Some of them are very large with market capitalisations exceeding £8,000
million, whilst assets under management within the sector total around £200
billion. These are significant numbers. The largest, Scottish Mortgage Trust
(SMT), is now a constituent of the FTSE 100 index. Sections of the financial
press often talk about the merits of investment trusts, including their better
performance and cheaper fees when compared with the unit trusts that
dominate the retail market.
And yet, the typical investor is unaware or cautious of them. It is one reason
why, with the open-ended market valued recently by the Investment
Association (IA) at around £1.24 trillion, the investment trust sector is one-
sixth the size of open-ended funds (typically unit trusts and open-ended
investment companies), despite their longer history and superior
performance. So why is it so few investors outside the wealth managers in
the City and Edinburgh benefit from them? The answers are various.
Fewer hurdles
A common thread linking them has been a competitive landscape which was
tilted against investment trusts. This is now slowly changing. The key catalyst
has been new regulations introduced in 2013. Hitherto, many investors had
used an independent financial adviser (IFA) to help them run their portfolios.
Most of these professionals earned their money not by charging the client a
fee, but rather by receiving commission payments from the managers of the
products they sold to the client.
Investment trusts do not pay commission to IFAs. Open-ended funds such as
unit trusts did. As a result, there has been an in-built bias in favour of the
latter. Some clients may have thought they were getting ‘free’ advice as they
did not directly pay the fee. Most clients would have been aware of the
arrangement but perhaps hazy about the scale of commission paid to their
IFAs.
Much of this changed in January 2013 when new rules were introduced as a
result of the Retail Distribution Review (RDR). These rules banned
commissions. Instead, IFAs are expected to earn their fees by charging the
client directly themselves and up front. The fee may be an hourly charge
depending on the time spent or a fixed fee depending on the type of advice.
Whichever, the effect will be the same – fees will be paid directly by the
client.
One objective of the RDR is to make charges much more transparent. Another
is to eliminate potential conflict of interest claims against IFAs regardless of
how well they have served their clients. The jury is still out. But whether a
success or not, investment trusts will benefit. These trusts are now competing
with their open-ended cousins on a more level playing field. And, although it
is early days, there are encouraging indications that investors are benefitting
as a result.
Better awareness
However, this is only part of the story. Investment trusts have not always
been good at setting out their stall. They are a slightly more complex
instrument when compared with open-ended funds. And sometimes this
complexity has been exaggerated. Yet historically there have been few
marketing campaigns to put this right. Compare this to the massive marketing
by the unit trust industry, especially when the new ISA season approaches.
This failure to reach out to investors has not been helped by the odd bit of
bad publicity. Some investors will remember the split capital investment
trust scandal. During the late 1990s, these trusts were marketed as low-risk
investments, particularly for those seeking income. But high gearing and
intricate cross-holdings made for a volatile mix. The detail is unimportant,
but a number of investors lost out after the market crashed in 2001–2.
Though severe for those involved, the bad publicity was out of all proportion
to the scale of the affair. Only a few fund managers were felled by the
scandal, but it threw a dark shadow over most of the investment trust
industry. The episode seemed to confirm to many that investment trusts were
a ‘dark art’ best avoided. It certainly did not help the industry’s profile or
appeal to investors.
This environment is now slowly changing for the better. Investors are coming
to realise the many advantages of investment trusts. Progress is slow but it is
inexorable. There has been more coverage in the financial press highlighting
the better performance of investment trusts compared to their open-ended
cousins, and often by some margin. The press has also highlighted that
investment trusts are a cheaper way of gaining exposure to markets – an issue
of increasing importance. These two facts are not unrelated.
There has also been the sterling work of the Association of Investment
Companies (AIC), the industry’s well-respected trade body, which has done
much in recent years to inform and educate. A visit to its website is well
worthwhile. For example, the animated video entitled ‘Your investment
journey’, launched in October 2018, explains why and how to go about
investing and where investment trusts can fit in.
An evolving industry
The industry itself has continued to evolve. It has emerged from the split
capital crash with an endeavour wholly conducive to investors. Part of this
has been driven by necessity. The rise of passive low-cost instruments (such
as exchange-traded funds and index funds), together with activist investors
looking to crystallise undervalued situations, has spawned self-help and
innovation.
In responding to investors’ recent search for yield, a host of ‘alternative’
assets, including renewable energy and infrastructure, have been
encompassed by investment trusts as evidenced by the extent of fundraising.
Whilst such assets are now well-established, other examples including trusts
which aim to capitalise on recorded music rights and to provide capital to
biotech companies prove innovation is alive and kicking. Once again, such
examples are proving helpful to those investors seeking income and
diversification.
Following the crash, regulatory and governance changes have also assisted
the sector by helping to improve the way trusts are managed and by making it
easier for trust boards to market their company, issue new shares and pay
higher dividends out of capital, all of which benefit shareholders to varying
degrees.
In doing so, more investors are coming to appreciate trusts’ other helpful
features. These include the ability to ‘store’ dividends and so produce a
growing stream of income even when markets are rocky – helpful for long-
term planning. An increasing awareness that their structure is better suited to
certain illiquid asset classes, such as private equity and commercial
property, has helped – and funds have been raised accordingly from investors
from both established and new investment trusts.
The rise of more conventional equity IPOs (initial public offerings) has also
been a welcome feature in recent years. An IPO is the very first sale of stock
issued by a company to the public. Examples in 2018 saw Mobius Investment
Trust (MMIT), AVI Japan Opportunity Trust (AJOT), Baillie Gifford US
Growth Trust (USA) and Smithson Investment Trust (SSON) all be created
courtesy of fundraising, the latter raising a record £822 million.
Meanwhile, many well-respected investment trusts are raising their assets
under management and continuing to grow by initiating regular secondary
share issues courtesy of their share prices standing at premiums to their Net
Asset Value (NAV) because of investor demand. Perhaps the best example is
Scottish Mortgage Trust (SMT), which has raised over £600 million in
recent years. Other examples include Finsbury Growth & Income Trust
(FGT) and CC Japan Income & Growth (CCJI).
Although helped by favourable markets, little wonder total assets have now
doubled from the £100 billion under management since this book’s first
edition in 2013. Investment trusts are now being rewarded for their
endeavours, and this is beginning to combat the lack of knowledge that has
characterised attitudes. The momentum continues to move in their direction.
These are positive developments which are slowly benefitting investors.
However, the journey is ongoing – for not everything is as it should be.
The bad
Improvements apart, investment trusts still face headwinds. The Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA), the industry’s regulator, sometimes creates the
impression that trusts are of little interest to them – and, as such, may be
inadvertently allowing nuanced biases within the system to favour the open-
ended behemoths that are unit trusts.
This is not withstanding the fact that the FCA ushered in the RDR reforms
which aimed to remove the commission bias in favour of open-ended funds.
This was welcomed by investment trust supporters including myself. Yet their
focus on passive investment, while logical in one respect given the growth in
that business, is illogical in another in that it tends to marginalise the role of
trusts despite their superior track record.
Anomalies are therefore allowed to exist. For example, it appears the ability
to apportion any part of a defined-contribution (DC) pension plan to
investment trusts remains difficult. This is important given the forecast
growth in DC schemes to around £1 trillion by 2029. On balance, if
reasonable assets have already been accumulated, those investors wishing to
meaningfully embrace investment trusts would still be better to start or
transfer into a self-invested pension plan (SIPP). There is no logical reason
why this should be the case.
Similarly, research from the AIC last year found that, despite seven years
having passed since the introduction of the RDR rules, around just 5% of the
money invested on advisor platforms was accounted for by investment trusts.
Again, something is wrong when the best form of funds is being seconded by
inferior instruments. Despite the best of intentions, there remain biases
against trusts within the system.
It is therefore welcome news that the FCA launched in May 2019 its
‘Evaluation of the Retail Distribution Review and the Financial Advice
Market Review’ which seeks feedback to assess how effective RDR has
been in improving the distribution of financial services products to retail
investors and establish a more effective retail investment market.
Ian Sayers, Chief Executive of the Association of Investment Companies
(AIC) has said:
We welcome the FCA’s call for input in evaluating RDR. The changes RDR put in
place were a significant step in the right direction to improve financial advice to
retail investors. Purchases of investment companies by advisers and wealth
managers on adviser platforms have increased five-fold since RDR, from £219m in
2012 to nearly a billion in 2018.
However, there’s still more work to be done. The majority of advisors are not
recommending investment companies to their clients despite investment companies’
many benefits. We look forward to continuing to work with the FCA and
contributing to the call for input.
But perhaps the strongest evidence of any indifference shown towards
investment trusts from both sides of the Channel relates to the introduction of
the KID (Key Investor Document), which every trust has needed to produce
in addition to its own literature. KIDs have been the product of EU regulation
which attempts to help investors better understand what they are buying. This
heavy-handed regulation is well-intentioned but misleading to the point of
being dangerous.
It is misleading in assessing risk when comparing with unit trusts. The EU
regulations use different methodologies when measuring risk to the point that
investors could be led into believing investment trusts are less risky than unit
trusts. It is generally accepted that, because of their particular characteristics,
trusts are more volatile and therefore riskier in the short term but long-term
investors are prepared to accept this because of better returns.
The KID is also misleading in relation to the projection of future returns,
which are based simply on extrapolating recent returns. In a bull market, this
will suggest higher returns – and vice versa. A recent AIC report suggested
42 KIDs were forecasting 20%+ annual returns in the ‘moderate’
performance category. Such returns require accepting a decent level of risk.
If not stopped, it will encourage investors to ‘Buy high, sell low’, the exact
opposite of what they should be doing.
One could go on. Other misleading comparisons include comparing trusts to
similarly mandated ‘sister’ funds run by the same manager within the unit
trust sector. No wonder the major trade organisations have expressed
concern that these documents could cost investors dear. The AIC’s advice
regarding KIDs is to ‘burn before reading’. The FCA initially seemed
unwilling to intervene but relented by instigating a consultation (Call for
input) in 2018.
It was therefore welcome that, in announcing its findings in March 2019, the
FCA agreed that the summary risk indicators and performance scenarios in
KIDs can indeed be misleading, and that the regulation could cause consumer
harm. Its intention is to press the EU to think again. This is welcome but it
will take time. The FCA needs to act promptly if investors are not to be
misled into making ill-informed decisions.
Last year I met with Andrew Bailey, the then Chief Executive of the FCA,
who readily agreed the KIDs regulations could then be misleading and
detrimental to investors. However, its problem was that its hands are bound
by EU regulations whilst the UK remains a member of the EU. The FCA fully
understands that it has a duty to protect investors, given that it knows the
regulation is flawed due to its own findings regarding consumer harm and the
conclusion of others including the AIC.
The FCA has consulted its lawyers on the issue but promised to see what
more it could do. The general consensus was that the EU had not been
receptive to concerns expressed in various representations by the UK. The
FCA would continue to lobby the EU to address these problems – investment
trusts not being well understood or used on the continent.
The FCA also understands the need to be ready to replace or improve these
regulations, and amend the guidance regarding the KIDs, once they become
the responsibility of the UK upon our exit. The FCA acknowledged this point.
It was emphasised that time was of the essence. The FCA promised to work
closely with the AIC and other bodies to explore options. Regulations set
elsewhere are rarely an easy task.
I have also raised these issues with ministers (including the very capable
John Glen MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury) both in Parliamentary
committees and in private. The Government correctly says this is a role for
the FCA to oversee. Yet Government also has a responsibility. If it wants
people to take on greater responsibility for their financial futures, then they
must be able to rely on the relevant information when making decisions. This
information is ultimately its responsibility.
Time will tell whether these and other industry representations have the
desired effect. Meanwhile, after a tsunami of complaints, the FCA has
allowed trust boards to provide additional information if they believe their
KID is misleading. This may just be an acceptable sticking plaster so long as
a more fundamental reassessment of the necessity of KIDs is quickly
undertaken. But this remains regulation born out of ignorance.
Costs
The financial industry is attempting to respond with various (usually
technology-led) initiatives but then the serious issue of cost comes into view.
Some reports have recently suggested that the variation in possible fees
charged is enormous. One recent report asked over a hundred advisers what
their charges were for a variety of scenarios. The quotes for advising
someone about drawing an income ranged from £500 to £5,000. Advice for a
young parent looking to save for their child’s university education varied
from £300 to £2,500.
Trying to compare advisers is notoriously difficult. Personal circumstances
are a factor: how much money is being invested, what percentage of one’s
wealth the invested sum represents, and what detail by way of advice is
required. Is such advice ‘restricted’? Is the adviser only able to recommend
specific products courtesy of their employer? And is an IFA authorised and
regulated by the FCA? (It’s always worth checking on its register.)
If IFAs are not the answer, then what is? There are various alternatives, some
website-based and the more traditional avenues including the City’s wealth
managers (more on this later in the book) for investors willing to hand over a
sum of money. The reason for mentioning it here is the cost in relation to the
growing advice gap.
The different avenues to market for an average investor vary from around 1%
to 1.5% for standardised portfolios, offered by the website-based solutions,
to between 2% and 2.5% (higher in the first year because of set-up costs) for
the more traditional wealth management service (including tax advice)
provided the portfolio is of a certain size. Such percentages could easily
represent around half of an investor’s portfolio yield.
Little wonder more and more people are now contemplating ‘DIY investing’
– whether through circumstance or choice. There appears to be a growing
tendency by investors to apportion tasks and fees accordingly. Good tax
advice and lunches are usually worth paying for, but why allow such services
to disproportionately add to the cost of the most important component of
wealth management – that of securing handsome returns over time from
portfolio investment?
For example, our website-based service reports to members on the progress
of our nine real investment trust portfolios, including a five portfolio risk-
adjusted journey which caters for those first starting to invest to those in
retirement wishing to draw a healthy income whilst preserving capital. The
total cost for annual membership is £192 (including VAT). This then allows
scope for members to purchase specialist add-on services (tax advice, for
example) from elsewhere as circumstances require.
Addressing inequality
Meanwhile, on a different yet related note, interesting research in 2017 has
confirmed what we knew instinctively, but had yet to see the substantive
evidence – that better investing can help to solve inequality. The Stockholm
School of Economics measured the performance of different income groups
over time. These wealth surveys are some of the most reliable in the world
because Swedish households have to report their total wealth.
The report found that the top 5 to 10% of households earned 2.7% a year
more than the median household. The top 0.1% did best of all by
outperforming the median household by 6.1% a year. Given the reliability of
the data and there being no reason to suggest the findings would be any
different elsewhere, it confirms that the rich indeed do better than the average
and that the richer they are the better they do.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that the rich are better investors in the
sense of having better investment strategies and stock picking skills, or
timing the market. What the report did find is that the rich are more prepared
to take on risk in the form of financial investments per se, notably equities
and private investments. The median household had most of its wealth
wrapped up in its property, with only 21% of its net worth invested in ‘risky’
assets. By contrast, that figure rose to 62% for the top 5 to 10% of
households and 95% for the top 0.1%.
This explains why the rich get richer. Over time, a properly managed
portfolio of different assets, including equities and those less correlated for
reasons of diversification, will in most cases do better than average house
prices. And the more risk that is taken, the higher those returns should be,
provided a long-term view is taken and volatility is accepted. Such a journey
is seldom smooth.
But how best to achieve this worthy goal of encouraging the average
household to take on more risk at a time when the ‘advice gap’ seems to be
getting bigger. On one side of the equation, in addition to the policies
mentioned earlier, governments should do more via tax breaks to encourage
investment via pensions and ISAs. In part, the flow has been somewhat the
other way of late. Radical options like no longer exempting main homes from
CGT could further level the playing field between different types of
investment.
Whatever the policies, this fast-evolving investment landscape will require
better investing by those who are less wealthy. This is crucial to reducing the
equalities in our society. And in the search for more cost-effective and better
returns, investment trusts are well-placed. For too long investment trusts
have largely remained the City’s best-kept secret. This is now changing. The
challenge is to explain clearly how they work and how they can best serve
investors.
This book
It is hoped that The Financial Times Guide to Investment Trusts will play a
small part in achieving this goal. The first section of the book (Chapters 1 to
9) explains what trusts are, their pros and cons (including performance, fees,
discounts, ability to borrow and structure), and how they differ from unit
trusts and OEICs. It will also examine some of the more nuanced
characteristics and factors influencing investment trust selection, in order to
help investors make informed investment decisions and better monitor their
own fund manager.
Having examined investment trusts in isolation, the second section (Chapters
10 to 14) attempts to set a broader narrative. How should investors discern
between them? What makes the case for one trust over another? What are the
sector’s current trends and topical issues? How have respected experts best
approached their role and where do they see the sector in five to ten years?
And what advice do they have for investors?
Chapter 10 considers the various factors which are useful when comparing
and selecting investment trusts. Chapters 11 to 13 then feature perspectives
from a broad range of experts – all respected professionals in their particular
fields. Their insights reflect the depth of experience and diversity of the
positions held. Such issues are important in themselves. But they are doubly
so when constructing a portfolio, given there are always competing factors
and trusts to consider.
The third section (Chapters 14 to 20) addresses the starting blocks when
commencing an investment journey, the importance of mapping out financial
objectives, the principles of successful investing and the nuances of portfolio
construction. Finally, as a way of illustrating the key themes of the book, it
talks through the thinking and strategy behind one of the nine real investment
trust portfolios run in real time on our company’s website. There is no better
way of sharing how best to put theory into practice.
Readers should be aware that, when referring to individual investment trusts,
the book will detail the stock market code in brackets immediately following
the name for easy reference when seeking the trust on an investment platform.
For example, Finsbury Growth & Income Trust (FGT). It will also at times
refer to investment trusts as simply ‘companies’ or ‘investment companies’.
It is hoped this book achieves its objective of helping readers to better
understand the wonderful opportunities which investment trusts can offer
long-term investors. Trusts are now better placed than they have been for a
long time to help investors achieve their financial goals, standing as they do
at a zenith despite their proud history. All it requires is a little patience to
better understand them, and then patience when investing to best reap their
rewards. I wish you well with your investments.
1
What are investment trusts?
Investment trusts (also called ‘investment companies’ or ‘companies’) are
like other public-quoted or listed companies such as Shell or Glaxo, but
instead of managing oil or pharmaceuticals they manage investments on
behalf of their shareholders. These investments can span a broad range of
financial assets, such as equities or bonds, and physical assets such as
property. Whatever the type of investment, the idea is that investors gain
exposure to a balanced portfolio of assets which is professionally run.
This form of ‘collective fund’ has proved a popular way for investors to
invest their savings. Trusts have been around for a long time. The first,
Foreign & Colonial, was established in 1868. Today there are over 400
investment trusts in total managing around £190 billion of assets. The largest,
Scottish Mortgage Trust, is a constituent of the FTSE 100 index and there are
quite a few trusts which manage assets of over £1 billion in size.
Investment trusts possess an excellent performance record relative to both
unit trusts and relevant benchmarks, but they also have a slightly more
complex structure in comparison. This presents an opportunity for those
investors who take the time to understand them. The effort can be very
rewarding.
Most funds are unit trust or OEICs – both being ‘open-ended’. These are so-
called because when any investor buys or sells them, they are directly adding
or subtracting from the pot of money invested in that fund and managed by the
manager. Assets will need to be bought and sold, depending on cash levels.
In doing so, as investors buy and sell, they are creating or cancelling shares
in line with investor demand.
Table 1.1 Open-ended funds
There are also funds called investment trusts. These are listed or public
companies and as such are ‘closed-end’ in that they have a fixed number of
shares: they are ‘closed’ after the initial launch or share issue. Their shares
are listed and traded on the stock exchange like other public companies such
as Shell, M&S and Glaxo.
Figure 1.2 How an investment company works
Source: AIC
If Shell, M&S and Glaxo manage and grow their assets well and profits
increase as a result, all things being equal, this will be reflected in a rising
share price to the benefit of the shareholders who own the shares. Whether
these companies succeed will depend on a number of factors, such as the
economic environment, the business model, their competitiveness and, above
all, the quality of the management team.
Similarly, investment trusts strive to grow the value of their portfolio of
stocks. Success or failure will eventually be reflected in the share price of
the trust – just as it will be with other companies. Factors such as the
economy, the method of research, stock selection and the investment acumen
of the manager will all play their part.
Being closed-end, investment trusts can and do borrow to enhance the returns
achieved on their portfolio of assets. This is called ‘gearing’. Provided the
portfolio rises in value more than the cost of the borrowing, then the gearing
will produce higher returns – and vice versa. Investment trusts are typically
5–15% geared. This has tended to be beneficial given that markets have risen
over time.
Figure 1.3 How closed-end and open-ended funds compare
By way of example, let us assume that today the total value of ABC
investment trust’s portfolio of shares and cash is £100 million – there being
no debt. There are 100 million shares of ABC in issue. The NAV is therefore
£1.00 (£100 million value divided by 100 million shares). If, in future, the
value of the underlying portfolio was to rise to £120 million because the
portfolio had risen, then the NAV would rise to £1.20.
The NAV is a useful way of relating the value of the portfolio to the share
price and is one of the factors closely watched by investors when evaluating
an investment trust. The NAV should be used when comparing performance
within a trust’s peer group and with unit trusts.
As such, the share price can be more or less than the NAV. If it is less, the
trust is said to be trading at a discount (see Table 1.3). Most investment
trusts trade at a discount to NAV. Presently, discounts average between 5–
10%. This effectively means that an investor is buying £1’s worth of assets
for 90–95p.
Source: AIC
This discount reflects the fact that historically institutions have been sellers
and that costs would be incurred if an investment trust was to be wound up. It
may also reflect the fact that investment trust prices can be a little more
volatile than those of open-ended funds. This is because their price is not
only affected by movements in their NAV (like open-ended funds) but also by
movements in the discount (unlike open-ended funds). Investors may
therefore be seeking compensation or a margin of comfort for holding
investment trust shares.
A discount to NAV is not necessarily an opportunity. A large discount may,
for example, also reflect low confidence in the fund manager – perhaps
because of poor performance – or a dislike of the trust’s focus on a particular
region or sector. It can also reflect the fact that the investment trust is not
communicating its investment strategy well to the market. Investors do not
like uncertainty.
If the share price is more than the NAV of the underlying portfolio, then the
trust is said to trade at a premium. There may be a good reason – the fund
manager may be well respected or the underlying focus of the portfolio may
be very much in fashion. But investors should be aware that, as buyers, they
are effectively paying more in order to obtain exposure than investors who
buy at discount.
Figure 1.4 NAV and share price
The fact that share prices trade at discounts or premiums to NAV can present
both opportunities and risks for investors. Such valuations are a key
determinant in deciding whether trusts represent good value at any given
point. This is something covered in later chapters. For the moment it is
important to recognise that the characteristic of discounts and premiums does
not exist with unit trusts and OEICs, and that investment trust shares are
traded by investors so their prices will vary depending on supply and
demand.