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Discourse
Markers
An Enunciative Approach
GRAHAM RANGER
Discourse Markers
“This book is an extremely valuable contribution to the study of discourse mark-

ers from an enunciative perspective. It begins at the beginning, with a thorough,
yet accessible, introduction to the Theory of Enunciative and Predicative
Operations. It then proceeds through a comprehensive review of previous works
to a corpus-based study of discourse markers in English. I highly recommend
this book for any student or advanced researcher looking for a solid, consistent
theoretical model to capture the inherent variability of discourse markers.”
—Guillaume Desagulier, Université Paris Nanterre, France
“This book will most certainly create a greater awareness and appreciation of
Culioli’s Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations as a framework for
modeling natural language activity. The advantages of the method are illustrated
by the insightful analysis of the discourse markers ‘anyway’, ‘in fact’ and ‘indeed’
and ‘I think’.”
—Karin Aijmer, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Graham Ranger
Discourse Markers
An Enunciative Approach
Graham Ranger
Département des études du monde anglophone, UFR-ALL
Université d’Avignon et des Pays de Vaucluse
Avignon, France
ISBN 978-3-319-70904-8 ISBN 978-3-319-70905-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70905-5
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Preface
This book is intended for researchers and graduate students in linguistics

but also for anyone interested in linguistic theorisation and / or the for-
mal modelisation of the discursive phenomena of natural language.
Chapter 2 focusses on theorisation. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 provide an
application of the theory to a number of discourse markers. While Chaps.
3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 frequently cite concepts and issues evoked in Chap. 2,
each chapter can stand alone and be read independently, for those whose
interest points them towards one particular question.
The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations is a well known
and widely respected theory, practised in France and other countries. It
provides a rigorous, comprehensive framework for modelling the dynam-
ics of natural language activity. Many aspects of it can be related to other
major theories of language, including Transformational Grammar,
Generative Semantics, Functional Systemic Linguistics, Cognitive
Grammar or Construction Grammar, among others. Despite these fea-
tures, the theory remains little known in English-speaking linguistic
circles.
With this book I hope to contribute to a greater awareness within
anglophone linguistics of this fascinating approach, with a sustained
application of the theory to the problematics of discourse marking in
general and to a number of discourse markers in particular. One very
v
vi Preface
important difference between the theory and many other approaches is

the idea that pragmatic potentials are in a large measure built into the
semantics of linguistic items – provided one recognises that fully-fledged
meaning emerges only at the end of a complex process of configuration
relative to context and situation.
The presentation of the Theory of Enunciative and Predicative
Operations in the following pages draws heavily upon the writings of
Antoine Culioli and his close collaborators. The presentation of the the-
ory and its application of the theory to specific discourse-marking issues
nonetheless represents a personal reading and interpretation of these texts
and is not intended to provide in any sense a definitive account. Not all
enunciative linguists would necessarily choose to give priority to the same
aspects of the theory as me, nor indeed would all enunciative linguists
agree with my analyses.
If this book encourages the reader to explore the theory further, to
return to the foundational texts and to forge his or her own opinions on
these questions, then it will have fulfilled much of its intended
purpose.
The material for this book has developed over some twenty-five years
of teaching and research. I would like to thank my students at the
Université d’Avignon et des Pays de Vaucluse, who have, often unwit-
tingly, contributed to the emergence of new problem areas and with these
the development of new ideas. I thank also those colleagues with whom I
have, directly or indirectly, been able to discuss its contents, or who have
contributed by their research to my own reflexion. These include – non-
exhaustively – Jean Albrespit, Agnès Celle, Hélène Chuquet, Jean
Chuquet, Gilles Col, Lionel Dufaye, Claude Delmas, Guillaume
Desagulier, Catherine Filippi-Deswelle, Yann Fuchs, Lucie Gournay,
Jean-Rémi Lapaire, Jean-Marie Merle, Renaud Méry, Aliyah Morgenstern,
Denis Paillard, Catherine Paulin, Blandine Pennec, Wilfrid Rotgé,
Martine Sekali, Shirley Thomas and Anne Trévise. Thanks also to the
anonymous reviewers of the first drafts of this book, as well as to the
reviewers of the articles which have served over the years as a testing
ground for many of the ideas it contains.
Preface
vii
Lastly my thanks go to Professor Antoine Culioli, for the inspiration

and enthusiasm of his work, and to his students, whose patience and
enthusiasm have contributed to the propagation of the ideas of this semi-
nal thinker.
Avignon, France Graham Ranger

Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Term discourse marker 2
1.3 The Multiplicity of Theoretical Approaches 3
1.4 The Multicategorial Nature of Discourse Markers 4
1.5 The Multifunctional Nature of Discourse Markers 6
1.6 Summary and Outline of the Book 9
Bibliography 12
2 The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations 17

2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations 19
2.3 Aims of Linguistic Enquiry 19
2.4 Methods of Linguistic Enquiry 24
2.5 Discourse Markers Within the TEPO 37
2.6 Multicategoriality Revisited 38
2.7 Multifunctionality Revisited 42
2.8 The Schematic Form 57
2.9 Towards an Enunciative Definition of the Discourse
Marker Category 64
ix
x Contents
2.10 Chapter Summary 77

Bibliography 86
3 Anyway: Configuration by Target Domain 93

3.1 Introduction 93
3.2 Previous Studies 96
3.3 A Schematic Form for anyway102
3.4 Regulation of Interpropositional Relations 105
3.5 Corrective Values: Regulation of Operations
of Representation109
3.6 Regulation of Intratextual and Intersubjective Relations 114
3.7 Summary and Discussion 129
Bibliography 133
4 Indeed and in fact: The Role of Subjective Positioning 135

4.1 Introduction 135
4.3 Accounting for Variation in indeed / in fact143
4.4 Corpus Findings 154
4.5 Further Cases 162
4.6 Concluding Discussion 171
Bibliography 176
5 Yet and still: A Transcategorial Approach to Discourse

Phenomena 179
5.3 Schematic Forms for yet and still186
5.4 Aspectuo-Modal Values 187
5.5 Quantifying Values 198
5.6 Argumentative Values 203
5.7 Summary 221
Bibliography 223
Contents
xi
6 Discourse Marker Uses of like: From the Occurrence

to the Type 227
6.2 The Preposition like: Schematic Form and Variations 230
6.3 The Discourse Marker like240
6.4 Quotative be like253
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 264
Bibliography 272
7 I think: Further Variations in Subjective Endorsement 275

7.2 Previous Research 276
7.3 Schematic Form and Parameters for Configuration 281
7.4 Case Studies of Contextually Situated Values 286
7.5 Concluding Discussion 298
Bibliography 302
8 General Conclusion 305
Index 311
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 The notional domain 31

Fig. 2.2 The branching path model 33
Fig. 3.1 Sequential relationship leading from p to q103
Fig. 3.2 Relationship marked by anyway104
Fig. 3.3 Concessive anyway106
Fig. 3.4 Additive anyway107
Fig. 3.5 Corrective anyway111
Fig. 3.6 Resumptive anyway118
Fig. 3.7 Resumptive anyway in chronological projection 119
Fig. 4.1 Evolution of indeed in the COCA 1990–2012 144
Fig. 4.2 Schematic form for indeed146
Fig. 4.3 Parametered schema of indeed for values of reinforcement 147
Fig. 4.4 Parametered schema of indeed: alignment with an
absent speaker 148
Fig. 4.5 Parametered schema of indeed: alignment with the
cospeaker148
Fig. 4.6 Schematic form for in fact149
Fig. 4.7 Parametered schema of in fact: self-correction 150
Fig. 4.8 Parametered schema of in fact: opposition with an absent
speaker151
Fig. 4.9 Parametered schema of in fact: opposition with the
cospeaker151
xiii
xiv List of Figures
Fig. 5.1 Representation of perfective aspect 188

Fig. 5.2 Prospective validation, threshold, effective validation 189
Fig. 5.3 The branching path model and aspectual determination 189
Fig. 5.4 The branching path model and the notional domain 189
Fig. 5.5 Points tm and tn within a larger set on the ordered class
of instants 190
Fig. 5.6 Representation of yet another success200
Fig. 5.7 Preconstructed situation: frozen yoghurt is good for you202
Fig. 5.8 Constructed situation: frozen yoghurt is not good for you202
Fig. 5.9 Abstract representation of concessive still209
Fig. 5.10 Instantiated representation of concessive still209
Fig. 5.11 Abstract representation of concessive yet210
Fig. 5.12 Instantiated representation of concessive yet210
Fig. 5.13 Abstract representation of conclusive values for initial still219
Fig. 6.1 A representation of predicative like (similarity) 233
Fig. 6.2 A representation of non-predicative like (exemplarity) 236
Fig. 6.3 A representation of the schematic form for like239
Fig. 6.4 A representation of discourse marking like248
Fig. 6.5 A representation of quotative be like259
Fig. 6.6 A representation of the schematic form for like indicating
enunciative responsibilities 266
Fig. 7.1 A representation of initial I think in evaluative context 287
Fig. 7.2 A representation of initial I think in assertive context 290
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Diversity of source categories for discourse markers 5

Table 2.1 Three levels of representation 20
Table 4.1 “The lexical field of actuality” 141
Table 4.2 Cross-corpus frequencies of indeed and in fact145
Table 4.3 Constructional frames for indeed and in fact155
Table 4.4 Frequencies of initial and medial indeed in the spoken BNC 157
Table 4.5 Conjunction collocates of indeed in a 1-L window sorted
by relevance (M.I.) 159
Table 4.6 Conjunction collocates of in fact in a 1-L window sorted
by relevance (M.I.) 159
Table 4.7 Conjunction collocates of medial indeed in a 1-L window
sorted by relevance (M.I.) 160
Table 4.8 Conjunction collocates of medial in fact in a 1-L window
sorted by relevance (M.I.) 160
Table 5.1 Modal collocates of yet in a 1-L window sorted by
Log-likelihood196
Table 5.2 3-L 3-R adverbial collocates of sentence initial yet by
M.I. score 213
Table 5.3 1-L conjunction collocates of yet and still sorted by
Log-likelihood213
Table 7.1 Occurrences of I think by position in a random sample
from the spoken BNC 286
xv
1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In this book I will be pursuing two main objectives. The first is to provide
an introduction to the Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations
(TEPO), developed over the last forty years or so by Antoine Culioli and
associated researchers.1 The second is to use the tools of the theory to
describe a selection of present day English discourse markers, including
anyway, in fact and indeed, yet and still, like and I think. The way the
theory moves from close observation of situated language use to the pos-
sibility of cross-linguistic generalization, from Saussurean parole to langue,
and back again, has led to the development of a number of concepts
which are particularly well suited to the description of discourse phe-
nomena, in their sometimes baffling complexity. Before I present the
theory, however, let me begin by considering some of the difficulties the
study of discourse markers holds for the linguist.
© The Author(s) 2018 1

G. Ranger, Discourse Markers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70905-5_1
2 G. Ranger
1.2 The Term discourse marker

The first difficulty is terminology, as the term discourse marker is not uncon-
troversial in itself: many authors use alternative designations, and, even
when the term of discourse marker is used, its extension is variable. Brinton
(1996, p. 29) and Fraser (2009, p. 2) together list nearly thirty terms cover-
ing coextensive or overlapping domains, including comment clause, connec-
tive, continuer, cue phrases, discourse connective, discourse-deictic item,
discourse operator, discourse particle, discourse-shift marker, discourse-signal-
ling device, discourse word, filler, fumble, gambit, hedge, indicating devices,
initiator, interjection, marker, marker of pragmatic structure, parenthetic
phrase, phatic connectives, (void) pragmatic connective, pragmatic expression,
pragmatic particle, reaction signal and semantic conjuncts. Both authors,
incidentally, opt to use pragmatic marker as the most general term.
While some of the above items, such as hedge, initiator or parenthetic
phrase designate fairly clearly delimited subcategories (albeit on the het-
erogeneous criteria of semantics, interaction or syntax, respectively),
other items mean different things for different researchers. For some, par-
ticle is a syntactic term used only for invariable one word items (certain
adverbs, prepositions, etc.), for others, particle is seen more inclusively
and used indifferently for all sorts of related items.2 Fraser, in common
with many, prefers marker but uses the term discourse marker only as a
subcategory of pragmatic marker for those items which “signal a relation
between the discourse segment which hosts them, and the prior discourse
segment” (Fraser 2009, p. 296). Despite the terminological diversity,
however, discourse marker seems to be the most frequent label. As
Schourup notes, “The term D[iscourse] M[arker] […] is […] the most
popular of a host of competing items used with partially overlapping
reference” (Schourup 1999, p. 228).
In the scope of the present study, I will initially be using discourse
marker pretheoretically, as the most general term available to refer to a set
of markers which cannot be described satisfactorily without reference to
discursive phenomena. I shall however be returning more precisely to the
term in Chap. 2, in a critical discussion of how “discourse” and “marker”
are each to be understood within the Theory of Enunciative and
Predicative Operations.
Introduction 3
1.3 he Multiplicity of Theoretical

T
Approaches
This terminological confusion surrounding the set of discourse markers
derives, on the one hand, from the fact that this is a relatively recent
domain of linguistic enquiry and, on the other, from the variety of theo-
retical approaches adopted, each with its own research programme and its
own set of (often unvoiced) assumptions about what aspects of language
it is interested in researching.3
The study of discourse markers as such would undoubtedly have been
difficult within the mainstream linguistic movements of the 1950s and
1960s.4 The pressure of the written norm sidelined spoken items like
Well, Oh or Ah, as well as purportedly non-standard uses of markers such
as anyway, like or whatever.5 At the same time, the Saussurean focus on
langue pushed discourse markers into the realm of parole, while Generative
Grammar was theoretically unprepared either to look closely into ques-
tions of performance or to consider the transsentential and intersubjective
features of language which the study of discourse markers cannot ignore.6
Since the 1970s and the 1980s, interest in discourse markers has
increased exponentially, however, from a whole range of theoretical per-
spectives. In conversation analysis or ethnomethodological approaches,
discourse markers are studied in so far as they reveal the structures of
conventionalized rituals of conversational interaction.7 Neo-Gricean and
more generally pragmatic approaches focus on the way discourse markers
orient interpretative possibilities, providing procedural indications that
contribute to constraining available interpretations, in accordance with
the Gricean cooperative principle. Such approaches have been developed
more particularly, in the framework of Relevance Theory, in respect of
Grice’s maxim of Relation: Be relevant.8 Anscombre and Ducrot consider
discourse markers as evidence of the way in which argumentative possi-
bilities are not the result of mere pragmatic enrichment but are inscribed
in the semantics of linguistic items themselves,9 while Grize, Sanders or
Mann and Thompson, for example, from very different methodological
perspectives, look at how discourse markers participate in marking recur-
ring “argumentative schemata” or “coherence relations” in natural
4 G. Ranger
l anguage.10 Discourse markers in English often concurrently have hom-

onymous, non-discursive uses from which they are diachronically derived.
This feature has inspired studies in phenomena of grammaticalization –
or pragmaticalization – which posit pragmatic principles at work behind
regular patterns of language change.11
Other perspectives could be mentioned, but whatever approach is
adopted will have an inevitable influence both on the terminological
options and on the extension of the area of enquiry. Terms such as “ini-
tiator”, “continuer” or “reaction signal”, for example, imply a conversa-
tion analysis approach, while “pragmatic connective” suggests a
pragmatic approach to intertextual relations. Correlatively, conversation
analysts and ethnomethodologists will probably have more to say about
“Oh”, “Ah”, “Mmm” etc. (interjections or backchannels) than those
who study argumentation in language, who are more likely to focus
their attention on “However”, “Nevertheless” or “So”, for example. The
object of study “discourse marker” (in the broadest sense), therefore,
will not include the same linguistic items, depending upon the angle of
approach.
The diversity of theoretical perspectives on discourse markers often
makes inter-theoretical comparison and dialogue difficult, not to say
impossible. The articles anthologised in Fischer (2006), although
intended to “present such a path through the jungle of different
approaches” (Fischer 2006, p. 1), unfortunately do little to alleviate the
impression of confusion in the domain.12 The different conclusions as to
what discourse markers are, and what they do, seem to be dictated by
preexisting and often incommensurable differences in theoretical
standpoint.
1.4 he Multicategorial Nature of Discourse

T
Markers
A further hurdle in the study of discourse markers is their multicategorial
nature. A large number of discourse marker forms derive transparently
from other linguistic categories. The table below gives an indication of
the diversity of source categories for discourse markers (Table 1.1):
Introduction 5
Table 1.1 Diversity of source categories for discourse markers

Categories Markers
Subordinating conjunctions because, since, though …
Coordinating conjunctions for, so, and, or, but …
Independent clauses I mean, you see, you know …
Imperatives say, let’s say, look, listen …
Subordinate clauses as it were, so to speak, what’s more
…
Manner adverbs consequently, surely, frankly …
Other adverbs nevertheless, anyway …
Prepositions like
Prepositional phrases on the contrary, after all, in particular
…
Interjections Oh, Ah, Gosh …
Interrogatives Why, What …
Various unclassifiable fixed expressions Proof that, The fact is that …
In this respect Fraser notes that discourse markers “do not constitute a
separate syntactic category” , going on to add, “There are three sources of
D[iscourse] M[arker] – conjunction, adverb, and prepositional phrases –
as well as a few idioms like still and all and all things considered” (Fraser
1999, p. 943). Fraser’s “discourse markers”, of course, constitute only a
subcategory of the larger extension we accord to the same term here.
The only really consensual syntactic property of discourse markers in
the broadest sense is their syntactic and prosodic detachability, and their
overall preference for clause-initial position.13
Given the lack of arguments for a syntactic category of discourse mark-
ers, research more usually focusses on functional properties, as Schourup
puts it:
D[iscourse] M[arker]s are most often said to constitute a functional cate-

gory that is heterogeneous with respect to syntactic class. On this view DM
status is independent of syntactic categorization: an item retains its
non-DM syntactic categorization but does ‘extra duty’ as a non-truth-
conditional connective loosely associated with clause structure. (Schourup
1999, p. 234)
It is accordingly to the function(s) of discourse markers that we now

turn.
6 G. Ranger
1.5 he Multifunctional Nature of Discourse

T
Markers
The functions of discourse markers can be evoked with at least two goals
in mind. The aim can be to describe general properties with a view to
delimiting a class of discourse markers relative to other categories, or to
use specific properties with the aim of distinguishing different types of
discourse markers within the overall discourse marker category. Let us
look at each of these approaches in turn.
Most definitions agree to consider that discourse markers are non
truth-conditional, that is, that they contribute nothing to the truth-
conditional, propositional content of their host utterance. Definitions in
terms of positive properties are less consensual, however.
For Schiffrin, discourse markers are “sequentially dependent elements
which bracket units of talk” (Schiffrin 1987, p. 31). This is a working
definition which is refined in the course of the discussion in her Discourse
Markers. In the final chapter, she writes: “markers provide contextual coor-
dinates for utterances: they index an utterance to the local contexts in
which utterances are produced and in which they are to be interpreted”
(Schiffrin 1987, p. 326 original emphasis). The “local contexts” Schiffrin
is speaking of include both participants and text.
For Fraser, discourse markers – Fraser’s “pragmatic markers” – are non-
propositional contributions to sentence meaning which are “[…] linguis-
tically encoded clues which signal the speaker’s potential communicative
intentions” (Fraser 1996, p. 68).
A difficulty with this type of functional definition, however, is that it
does not delimit a finite class, since, as Fischer notes, the general functions
proposed by Fraser or Schiffrin might just as well be carried out by other
linguistic expressions:
For instance, conversational management functions are also fulfilled by

speech formulas and nonlexicalized metalinguistic devices, such as au ris-
que de me répéter [at the risk of repeating myself]. Stance can be expressed by,
among others, modal verbs, adverbs, parenthetic clauses, or tag questions.
And linking functions can also be fulfilled by conjunctions and speech
formulas. (Fischer 2006, p. 5)
Introduction 7
Correspondingly, definitions of the discourse marker category are

often an ad hoc mixture of non truth-conditionality, functional features –
such as Schiffrin’s or Fraser’s – and formal features (short words or fixed
phrases, adverbs, etc.) – which aim to exclude from the category of dis-
course markers the nonlexicalised metalinguistic devices, speech formu-
las, et cetera, mentioned by Fischer.
Not all approaches to discourse markers consider them as non truth-
conditional. Argumentation Theory (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983, etc.)
or Relevance Theory as presented in Blakemore (2004) prefer to consider
truth-conditionality irrelevant to the representation of linguistically con-
structed meaning. In the next chapter I shall propose a definition of the
properties of discourse markers within the Theory of Enunciative and
Predicative Operations which also rejects the truth-conditional paradigm.
Let us move on now to see how a functional approach might help
determine classes within the set of discourse markers. There are numerous
attempts to define specific properties of discourse markers or families of
discourse markers within an overarching category.
Fraser’s 1996 contribution draws the conclusions from his broad func-
tional definition of “pragmatic markers” to distinguish four subcategories:
basic markers (markers of “illocutionary force”, essentially, including mood),
commentary markers (Fraser gives the examples of sentence-initial stupidly,
frankly etc.), parallel markers (vocatives, certain interjections), discourse
markers (relating text to foregoing discourse) (Fraser 1996, pp. 168–169).
These categories form the object of further subcategorisation.
Schiffrin (1987) distinguishes five different “planes of talk” on which dis-
course markers operate: “exchange structures, action structures, idea struc-
tures, participation frameworks, and information states”, a list which is
reduced by Redecker to three “components of coherence […] ideational struc-
ture, rhetorical structure, and sequential structure” (Redecker 1991, p. 1167).
Brinton (1996) lists no fewer than nine functions of discourse markers
ranging from the clearly argumentative function of marking “sequential
dependence” (pace Levinson 1983) to the interactional functions of indi-
cating “cooperation, sharing, intimacy” (1996, p. 36). These are however
synthesized, in Brinton as in Fernandez-Vest (1994, p. 31) and elsewhere,
to a more fundamental opposition between the textual (consequently,
however, etc.) and the interpersonal (frankly, you see, etc.).14
8 G. Ranger
It would be possible to quote further attempts at subcategorisation

within the broad class of discourse markers (particles, etc.). The point
however is clear: the lack of any clear consensus as regards the functions
of discourse markers is a predictable consequence of three factors: the
diversity of theoretical approaches to the question, the members included
in the discourse marker category and the heterogeneous nature of dis-
course markers themselves.
We have seen that discourse markers derive from a range of grammati-
cal categories and often continue to function standardly within their
source categories. Adverbs such as hopefully, or frankly, for example,
might function either as discourse markers, expressing speaker comment
or stance relative to the host clause, or as manner adverbs. In addition to
this, many discourse markers can also often function on more than one
discourse level. Take the marker anyway, in examples (1)–(4):
(1) Maybe he would feel better if he had something. He put a forkful in his
mouth. It was cold. He ate it anyway. HJC 141215
(2) “I think a course of electroconvulsive therapy is what young Byrne
needs.” “The mental hospital?” Sister Cooney looked concerned. “Yes, but
don’t tell him that – not for the moment, anyway.” A7J 559
(3) Why not resign? Even contemplating walking out over such a small
matter may seem ridiculous, but within the context of that small world, the
dispute was a major one. Also, and I don’t want to go on about this, I was
a lonely person in those days and I had very little else to think about.
Anyway, on with my story, for soon other pressures were to be brought to
bear. A0F 130
(4) Inside, the elderly English upper-class proprietor told me that true
Communism only survives in Albania. Who wants true Communism any-
way? Not the Albanians, I’m sure. ADM 2146
In each of these examples anyway functions as a discourse marker, but

in different ways, as we can show by the reformulations available for each
example. In (1), the function of anyway is equivalent to even though: He
ate it even though it was cold. In (2) anyway might be reformulated as in
any case, or at least but not with even though. In (3) sentence-initial any-
way provides a way of returning to a topic after a previous digression (cf.
on with my story) and might be replaced in this role by So or Well. In (4)
Introduction 9
anyway, in association with an interrogative, adds a conflictual note to

the question Who wants true Communism? which might alternatively be
rendered by an intensive such as Who ever / on earth …? et cetera. In
terms of functions, it might be possible to speak, within the discourse
marker paradigm, of an intertextual, concessive function (1), an interper-
sonal, self-corrective function (2), a topic-management function (3) or
an interpersonal, intensive function (4). However, it appears problem-
atic, if not undesirable, to limit each use in context to one function: in
(4), for instance, anyway certainly contributes to making the question
sound more polemical than it would do otherwise, and hence could be
qualified as having an interpersonal function, but it also relates the inter-
rogative back to some foregoing text, and in this respect carries out a
textual, linking function. Similarly, in (3) the sentence-initial use of any-
way serves a recentring function, resuming a previous topic, but also par-
ticipates in an informal style which in turn carries implications for the
relation between speaker and co-speaker et cetera.16
In short, not only are discourse markers multifunctional, in that the
category as a whole covers a range of different types of functions, but in
addition, many individual markers are liable to be used in different, often
overlapping ways. This leads to a further problem in describing the mean-
ing of discourse markers: if one linguistic form is associated with more
than one meaning in context, should we see this as homonymy, poly-
semy, or should we aim for a monosemous account of meaning, from
which the various situated meanings might be derived?17 Of course this
question is not specific to discourse markers, but in view of the properties
of this linguistic category, it is particularly germane to their study and we
shall correspondingly return to it at length, in the framework of the
TEPO, in the next chapter.
1.6 Summary and Outline of the Book

The preceding pages have dealt with some of the issues raised by the study
of discourse markers. I began by showing that the term discourse marker
itself is not universally accepted and that, when it is used, depending
upon the author, it does not necessarily include the same phenomena.
10 G. Ranger
Indeed there is no consensus as to the list of members of the class of dis-

course markers, even when the term is taken in its broadest acceptation.
It is difficult to establish common ground for dialogue between often
divergent theoretical positions, each with its own approach, questions
and assumptions as to the object of research. Part of this theoretical diver-
gence can be attributed to the relative novelty of discourse markers as a
research field. Part of it, however, is due to the nature of discourse mark-
ers themselves, which derive from numerous source categories – where
they may continue to function as before – and which, even when they do
recognizably function as discourse markers, often carry out more than
one function simultaneously. Consequently, the study of discourse mark-
ers raises, more acutely perhaps than elsewhere, the familiar question of
how to account for asymmetric form-meaning mappings.
The TEPO developed as a formal linguistics that eschews the traditional
modular separation of domains between syntax, semantics and pragmat-
ics. This property makes it particularly sensitive to the formalization of
discourse phenomena. Culioli has devoted a number of papers to certain
discourse markers in French, including donc, bien or mais, while, more
recently, Paillard has developed a specifically enunciative approach to the
study of the category of discourse markers in French with a series of foun-
dational articles and his Inventaire raisonné des marqueurs discursifs du fran-
çais.18 Work on English discourse markers within the TEPO has tended to
focus on specific markers or configurations. In the following chapter, I will
present the TEPO and reformulate some of the issues raised above, within
this framework, before going on to illustrate the methods of the theory in
the study of the English discourse marker anyway (Chap. 3). The subse-
quent chapters will look in turn at the discourse markers in fact and indeed
(Chap. 4), yet and still (Chap. 5), like (Chap. 6) and I think (Chap. 7).
Notes
1. In French the theory is known as the Théorie des Opérations Prédicatives
et Énonciatives, commonly abbreviated to TOPE.
2. See for example Östman’s use of the term particle for the comment clause
you know (Östman 1981). Fried and Östman (2005, p. 1757) justify the
Introduction 11
use of pragmatic particle as a catch-all term. Lenk (1998) chooses to con-

sider discourse marker as a subcategory of particle. Schourup (1999,
pp. 229–231) or Fischer (2006, p. 4) contain useful presentations of the
terminological difficulties, commenting upon the particle / marker dis-
tinction in some detail. The term particle would appear to be more wide-
spread among researchers working on Germanic languages (except
English) where the category of modal particles is long established, as noted
by Wierzbicka (1986, p. 520). Fernandez-Vest defends the use of the term
particule in French (Fernandez-Vest 1994), while Dostie discusses the
opposing positions of Fernandez-Vest and Fraser (Dostie 2004, pp. 41 sq).
3. Schourup concludes along similar lines: “Such variation is to be expected
in an area that has only recently become a focus of intensive study and
which bears on many different areas of discourse research, cognitive,
social, textual, and linguistic” (Schourup 1999, p. 242).
4. Which is not to say that discourse markers had not fallen under scrutiny
previously. Finell (1986) discusses Jespersen’s and Sweet’s early contribu-
tions to the field.
5. See Östman (1995, p. 95) for support but also for a brief presentation of
work on pragmatic particles in languages other than English before the
1970s.
6. One exception to this would be J. R. Firth and in particular the neo-
Firthian approach in Halliday and Hasan’s pioneering study of Cohesion
in English (2013).
7. See for example Schegloff and Sacks (1973) or Schiffrin’s justly influen-
tial Discourse Markers (1987).
8. As in Relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and, more specifically on
discourse markers, Blakemore (1989a, 1989b) and Blakemore (2004).
In a non-Relevance Theoretical approach, successive studies by Fraser
(1988, 1990, 1999, 2006a, 2006b, 2009 or 2013) give a progressively
finer-grained taxonomy of discourse markers (which for Fraser are a sub-
set of pragmatic markers).
9. See in particular L’argumentation dans la langue (Anscombre and Ducrot
1983).
10. Useful references here are Grize (1990, 1996), Knott and Sanders (1998),
Sanders et al. (1992) or Mann and Thompson (1983).
11. Key texts here are From Etymology to Pragmatics (Sweetser 1990),
Grammaticalization (Hopper and Closs Traugott 2003), or, for more
punctual studies of specific markers, Closs Traugott (1995, 1999 or
2005).
12 G. Ranger
12. Paillard (2009, p. 118) or Paillard and Vũ (2012, p. 10) arrive at a simi-
lar conclusion.
13. Even so, there are discourse markers which only accept clause-final posi-
tion, such as adverbial though and many the meaning of which changes
significantly according to position, such as after all, or anyway.
14. Halliday and Hasan (1976, p. 26) also make this distinction, again pres-
ent in the opposition between stance adverbials and linking adverbials in
Biber et al. (1999, pp. 853–892), or indeed disjuncts and conjuncts in
Quirk et al. (1985, pp. 612–647). Pennec’s recent enunciative study
makes distinctions of a similar nature, too (Pennec 2016, pp. 78–81).
15. Examples here and elsewhere, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from
the British National Corpus, accessed essentially via the BNCweb online
platform. The alphanumerical references given after each example iden-
tify texts and line numbers respectively (Hoffmann et al. 2008).
16. These remarks should be understood as pretheoretical. We return to any-
way in more detail in Chap. 3.
17. The contributions in Fischer (2006) are in fact organized according to
the criterion of whether they adopt a polysemous or a monosemous per-
spective on discourse markers.
18. See, for example, Culioli (1990, pp. 115–126, pp. 135–176), Paillard
(1998, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2011, 2015) or Paillard and Vũ (2012).
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Philosophie et Langage. Bruxelles: P. Mardaga.
Biber, D., Johansson, S., Leech, G., Conrad, S., & Finegan, E. (1999). Longman
Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Harlow: Longman.
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BF00627397.
Blakemore, D. (2004). Relevance and Linguistic Meaning: The Semantics and
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Introduction 13
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931–952. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-2166(98)00101-5.
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18773109-13050209.
14 G. Ranger
Fried, M., & Östman, J.-O. (2005). Construction Grammar and Spoken
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1752–1778. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2005.03.013.
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Introduction 15
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discursifs.
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2
The Theory of Enunciative
and Predicative Operations
2.1 Introduction
The term “discourse marker” is, as seen above, undoubtedly the most
widely used among the many terms competing to designate sets of similar
linguistic items. The use of the term is rarely accompanied with a reflex-
ion as to what it implies, however. How should we understand the “dis-
course” that a “discourse marker” marks, and what do we mean by
“marking”? The answers to both questions are in fact central to the per-
spective we take on discourse markers.
“Discourse”, to begin with, is frequently used in at least two different
ways. Firstly, it can be used to refer to language “above the sentence or
above the clause”.1 Linguists who understand – explicitly or implicitly –
discourse in this way will tend to consider that discourse markers relate
to transsentential questions of textual cohesion, working as textual
linking devices.2 Secondly, discourse can mean “language in use”,3 i.e.
what Brown and Yule refer to as the “interactional” function of language
“involved in expressing social relations and personal attitudes” (Brown
and Yule 1983, p. 1). Linguists working on discourse markers in this
© The Author(s) 2018 17

G. Ranger, Discourse Markers,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70905-5_2
18 G. Ranger
perspective, will be primarily interested in describing interpersonal or

social functions.4,5
The second question, “what does a marker mark?”, is posed even less
often, even though the term is widely accepted.6 Should we understand a
“marker” in a quasi-medical sense, as “the symptom of ” something else,
in which case, a “discourse marker” is just something that appears symp-
tomatically wherever there is discourse? In this case, “discourse” is
accorded autonomous status, that is, independently of whether or not it
evinces “markers”. Here, one is not far from the concept of a mere place
marker, a “gap filler” approach. Or, alternatively, should we understand a
“marker” as creating and contributing to the surrounding discourse,
informing options for interpretation of linguistic forms?
This chapter will deal with these issues from the point of view of the
Théorie des Opérations Prédicative et Énonciatives, in English the Theory of
Enunciative and Predicative Operations (henceforth TEPO) (Sect. 2.2).
The question of which perspective to adopt regarding the term “dis-
course” raises the crucial epistemological question of the object of study
and the aims which linguistic enquiry sets for itself (Sect. 2.3). The
approach to the term “marker” leads us to consider the methods of the
linguist and hence of the metalanguage employed (Sect. 2.4).7 This brief
presentation of the epistemology and methodology of the TEPO will
enable us to focus on discourse markers more precisely (Sect. 2.5). We
will consider in greater detail some of the recurrent issues evoked in the
previous chapter, including multicategoriality (Sect. 2.6), multifunctional-
ity and polysemy (Sect. 2.7), proposing a critical reassessment of each,
within an enunciative framework.8 These last points will lead to a presen-
tation of the concept of the schematic form, the blueprint for dynamic
(re-)construction of meaning in the TEPO (Sect. 2.8). Once this ground-
work is established, I will delineate a specifically enunciative approach to
discourse markers both from without, in terms of the discourse marker
category compared to other categories, and from within, in terms of the
variations observable for markers and operations inside the category
(Sect. 2.9).
The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations 19
2.2 he Theory of Enunciative

T
and Predicative Operations
The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations has developed
essentially within France, where it is often seen as a formal continuation
of the programme envisaged by Benveniste in, for example, “L’appareil
formel de l’énonciation”.9 There are relatively few presentations of the
theory in English, exceptions being Liddle’s annotated translation of sig-
nificant extracts from Culioli’s 1983–1984 postgraduate seminar (Culioli
1995; Bouscaren and Chuquet 1992; Groussier 2000).10 Culioli has pub-
lished in English, and the following presentation draws largely on two
key articles, first published in 1976 and 1989 and anthologized in the
1990 collection Pour une linguistique de l’énonciation (Culioli 1990,
pp. 67–82 and pp. 177–214).11
2.3 Aims of Linguistic Enquiry

Culioli has repeated his vision of linguistics in the following terms: “I
shall define linguistics as the science whose goal is to apprehend language
through the diversity of natural languages and registers.” (Culioli 1990,
p. 179, 1995, p. 13, etc.). Note that language is used in two different ways
here, firstly in the singular as the (universal) activity of language (langage,
in French) and secondly in the plural as a culturally-specific manifesta-
tion of this faculty (French langue).
Linguistic forms (words, constructions, prosodic features, etc.) are
seen as traces of underlying cognitive operations.
My contention is that utterances display shapes that derive from complex

forms which the linguist re-constructs through modelling. The goal is to
lay bare the formal workings that underlie the production and the recogni-
tion of interpretable shapes, namely, utterances. We have no access to the
processes that originate the forms on which the shapes are based, but we
have at our disposal the textual traces which point to such processes.
(Culioli 1990, p. 178, original emphasis)
20 G. Ranger
I shall return to the technical opposition between abstract forms and

situated shapes shortly.
A distinction is drawn between three levels of representation: Level 1 is
the level of mental representations (cognitive and affective), a level to
which the linguist has no access (cf. supra). The linguist does have access
to Level 2, the level of linguistic representations, or texts, in the broadest
sense of the term. Texts are considered to be the observable traces of Level
1 operations. Phenomena such as polysemy and ambiguity (one form, sev-
eral underlying representations), synonymy and reformulation (more than
one form for the same underlying representation) or more fundamentally,
the transindividual nature of language, that is, the fact that representa-
tions are transferable, mean that there can be no one-to-one relationship
between Levels 1 and 2, between cognitive and linguistic representations.
The linguist therefore works on Level 3, a level of explicit, metalinguistic
construction.12 Culioli makes the point that the linguist cannot legiti-
mately claim to describe cognitive operations directly. However, if the rela-
tionship between Level 2 observables and a coherent system of Level 3
metalinguistic representation is formulated explicitly, then this might be
hoped to teach us something about the relationship between Level 2
observables and Level 1 mental representations and operations:
Level I will escape us, but it is reasonable to surmise that a successful link
between the Level II traces and the Level III meta-operations may provide
useful clues about the link between Level I processes and Level II markers.
(Culioli 1990, p. 179, original italics)
As Groussier points out (2000, p. 170), this approach means that the
TEPO makes fewer and less ambitious claims than other psychologically
or cognitively oriented schools of linguistics concerning the postulated
relationship between linguistic research and the cognitive processes that
underlie language activity (Table 2.1).13
Table 2.1 Three levels of representation

Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Mental representation Linguistic forms (textual traces) Metalinguistic
representation
It is important to note that the mental representations of Level 1 can

relate not only to some form of reality – including fictions, past reality,
future projections, etc. – but also to the rather particular reality of the
Level 2 representations, in such a way that a speaker can comment reflex-
ively upon the appropriateness (or otherwise) of a word, situate this rela-
tive to foregoing text, to other speakers or points of view et cetera.14
Culioli refers to this type of informal linguistic representation as epilin-
guistic activity.15 This is particularly relevant for the present study since
many discourse markers involve – as we shall show – some form of epi-
linguistic activity.
Similarly, the use of language to construct meaning itself involves a
form of reflexivity as linguistic “[s]ystems of representation make it pos-
sible for a subject to produce meaningful shapes, that are recognized by
another subject as having been produced in order to be recognized as
interpretable” (Culioli 1990, p. 181).16
Meaning itself is not some preconstituted, parametered content, trans-
mitted via utterances but is (re-)constructed – possibly erroneously, this
is the nature of the system – by speakers in a dynamic activity of produc-
tion and recognition of forms. This involves three concomitant and inter-
related processes: representation, reference assignment and regulation:
Language, which is meaningful representation activity, is only accessible

through text sequences, that is, through patterns of markers which are
themselves traces of underlying operations […] A threefold relationship
between mental representation, referential processes and regulation, is a
prerequisite to any symbolic conceptual activity mediated by text (and / or
gesture) sequences that subjects produce and recognize as interpretable
meaningful shapes. (Culioli 1990, p. 179)
Let us look at each of these processes in turn.

The process of mental representation involves matching – and fitting –
individual cognitive representations to transindividual linguistic forms. It
is in this respect a manifestation of the human faculty for categorization.
This means relating phenomenological occurrences to classes as instances
of such and such a category. The occurrences in question might be enti-
ties, events, situations, et cetera. Relations of interpropositional thematic
dependence can also be modelled in this way.17
22 G. Ranger
The process of reference assignment involves hooking up representa-

tions – in many cases propositional content – to the spatio-temporal and
subjective coordinates of the speech situation. “Assignment” in this
respect again is to be understood as a dynamic process, and not as a
simple labelling exercise:
The same is true of referential processes […] the prerequisite to reference

assignment is the construction of a complex intersubjective coordinate sys-
tem, of a referential space, and of localizable linguistic objects (more accu-
rately, locatable with respect to the organizing centre of a notional domain,
as well as relative to the subjective and spatio-temporal parameters of the
referential space). (Culioli 1990, p. 180)
In other words, the referential value of an utterance is constructed rela-

tive to a situation of validation or reference, itself situated relative to the
source situation, i.e. the situation of utterance (cf. Sect. 2.4.3 infra). A state
of affairs might be validated for the speech situation, for some previous
situation, for a hypothetical situation and so on, but in every case the
situation of validation is constructed relative to the set of source coordi-
nates: the space, time and subjective source of utterance.
The choice to speak of referential values rather than reference and of
validation rather than truth is a deliberate one:
There must be no confusion between logico-philosophical problems of ref-

erence (truth values, external reference, ontological status of individuals)
and the (non-symmetrical) construction by the inter-locutors of referential
values to be assigned to utterances through the production and the recog-
nition of forms. (Culioli 1990, p. 73)18
The relationship between linguistic forms – propositional content, in

particular – and the extra-linguistic reality is not that of a simple nomen-
clature; it is in fact unavoidably mediated by the subjectivity of the very
conditions of utterance.
This brings us to the process of regulation. Since there is no one-to-one
relationship between linguistic forms and referential values, the construc-
tion of meaning is not a simple matter of coding and decoding forms.
There is, in particular, no guarantee that the form-value relationship
anticipated in production by a speaker will be symmetrically re-constructed

in recognition by a co-speaker. The system incorporates inbuilt and com-
plex possibilities for regulation:
Regulation plays a central role in language activity: (1) the system is self-
regulated through the subjects’ unconscious (as well as conscious) reflexion
on their own language activity, hence a never-ending transforming and
deforming process; (2) intersubjective regulation consists in adjusting
frames of reference and representations […]; (3) another form of teleon-
omy concerns such internal processes as stabilization, preponderance, equi-
librium and, generally speaking, good form, to use a Gestalt term. (Culioli
1990, p. 181)
This process is absolutely central to the workings of discourse markers,

all of which involve regulation, in a variety of forms. It is because the rela-
tionship between linguistic forms and cognitive representations is plastic,
in its essence deformable, that processes of regulation are necessary, help-
ing to stabilize the inherent open-endedness and ambiguity of the system.
These three processes, mental representation, reference and regulation,
should not be understood as successive stages. It would indeed be possi-
ble to imagine a step-by-step procedure whereby a speaker (1) chooses
lexical items; (2) adds articles, tense and space-time determination; (3)
adds stance adverbials, connectors and other interpretative hints in a
quasi-generative input-output model. However, while such a model
might serve limited purposes in automatic generation of texts, for exam-
ple, it cannot be seen as a faithful reflexion of natural language activity
where all three processes take place concomitantly and in complex
interaction.
The term discourse is rarely employed by Culioli. He explains this
avoidance in Culioli and Normand (2005, pp. 88–89 or p. 139) as moti-
vated essentially by a desire to avoid the potential ambiguities inherent
in its use. The relevant definition is that of language activity, which
includes spoken and written texts, in which meaning is determined by
the surrounding linguistic context as well as by subjective and intersub-
jective configurations. Such an approach includes both the concept of
discourse as “above the sentence or above the clause” and that of discourse
as “language in use”. Either concept, taken individually, would impose
24 G. Ranger
unnecessary and artificial limitations on the object of study. The first

cordons off the linguistics of the sentence from the linguistics of some
higher-order entity. And as for the second, one wonders what language
might do, when it is not “in use”. After all, in the perspective defended
here, language is an activity, not a tool.19
If the object of linguistics is the activity of language (Fr. langage), this
can only be apprehended through texts, the written or spoken product of
the language process. We find the definition of text as product in other
currents of linguistic thought, too. Widdowson, for example, defines “dis-
course” and “text”, contra Fairclough and the school of Critical Discourse
Analysis, in a similar spirit: “Discourse […] is the pragmatic process of
meaning negotiation. Text is its product” (Widdowson 1995, p. 164).20
Let me sum up the ground covered in the above discussion. We have
seen that the use of the qualifier “discourse” in “discourse marker” carries
with it a number of assumptions about what “discourse” is and hence
about the object of this particular type of linguistic enquiry. We pre-
sented the aims of linguistic enquiry within the TEPO, which aims to
model the relationship between Level 2 linguistic forms and Level 1 men-
tal representations, via a Level 3 system of metalinguistic representation.
The construction of meaning through linguistic forms implies concomi-
tant processes of representation, reference assignment and regulation, the
last of which is particular germane to the current investigation. From this
brief presentation of the epistemological stance of the TEPO it is clear
that neither the “above and beyond the clause” perspective on discourse,
nor the “language in use” perspective, is satisfactory since each one
imposes artificial limits on the object of study.
As for the term marker, it carries implications as to the methods of
linguistic enquiry, and it is to these that we now turn our attention.
2.4 Methods of Linguistic Enquiry

2.4.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, the term marker is used pretheoretically in a variety

of ways: as a gap filler or “placemarker”, a semantically empty function
invoked by the discourse context, as an indicator and indeed creator of
discourse or, less ambitiously, as a catch-all term which simply allows one
to refer indifferently to heterogeneous phenomena (particles, preposi-
tional phrases, conjunctions, et cetera).
In the framework of the TEPO “marker” is used theoretically as short-
hand for “marker of an operation”. Let me reproduce an earlier quote
with its consecutive context:
Level I will escape us, but it is reasonable to surmise that a successful link
between the Level II traces and the Level III meta-operations may provide
useful clues about the link between Level I processes and Level II markers.
This is why I insist on using the term markers, because it is short for markers
of operations. (Culioli 1990, p. 179, original emphasis)
The use of marker is hence linked to a certain perspective on language

activity which postulates that observable linguistic forms provide evi-
dence for underlying operations. This raises the question of what might
constitute an operation. Correspondingly the remainder of this section
will present the primitive operations and operands of the TEPO before
showing how these can be developed into complex polyoperations which
may in turn be incorporated into the metalanguage of Level 3.
2.4.2 Operations
An utterance provides us with the trace of operations of determination, not

in the sense of nominal determination, for example, but in an etymological
sense (Lat. terminus: limit), referring to the delimitation and circumscrip-
tion of meaning in a complex process where different entities are situated
both in relation to each other and to the extralinguistic universe. This pro-
cess depends on a fundamental metaoperation: the operation of location.
Representation is a many-levelled complex of n-th order operations, based

on a primitive elementary operation called an operation of location (French,
opération de repérage). The concept of location is linked to the idea of locat-
ing one term relative to another. To say that x is located relative to y means
that x is situated with reference to y […] The basic idea is that an object
only acquires a form and a value by means of a dynamic scheme of loca-
tion. (Culioli 1990, pp. 179–180)21
26 G. Ranger
This fundamental operation of location is conventionally represented

by the symbol ∈ which is read “is located relative to”, so that the notation
< x ∈ y > reads “x is located relative to y”.22 The relationship is asymmetri-
cal. The first term (the locatum), gains in determination through its loca-
tion relative to a second term (the locator).23
A second symbol ∋ reads “locates”, and represents cases of location
where the locator is placed first such that < y ∋ x > reads “y locates x” or
“y is the locator for x”.24
The metaoperation of location can assume three basic values: identifi-
cation, differentiation and disconnection.
The first of these, identification, is represented conventionally by an
equals sign “=”. < x = y > reads “x is identified with y”.
The second, differentiation, is represented as “≠”; < x ≠ y > reads “x is
differentiated from y”.
The third, disconnection, is represented with an omega sign “ω” and
translates the concept of disconnection or unrelatedness: < x ω y > “x is
disconnected from / unrelated to y”. Disconnection is used in represent-
ing cases where a term is situated outside a binary opposition, as neither
identified with, nor differentiated from a locating term.
One illustrative application of these three values is the construction of
the category of person. The first person singular subject pronoun can be
represented as marking, among other things, an operation of identifica-
tion between the subject of the utterance, noted S2 and the enunciative
source, noted 0 , i.e. < S2 = 0 >.25 The second person subject pronoun
can be represented as marking an operation of differentiation between
the same operands, viz. < S2 ≠ 0 >. The third person subject pronouns
are by definition absent from the speech situation and can accordingly be
represented as standing outside the I / you opposition. This is represented
as an operation of disconnection, < S2 ω 0 >. This is not the whole pic-
ture. The construction of the category of person may also imply – from
one language to the other – considerations of number, gender, honorific
distinctions et cetera. which will also be constructed via the same basic
set of operations, but operating on different domains, so that the con-
struction of a given person in a given language might simultaneously
involve several types of location.26 The construction of argumental roles
will similarly imply complex operations of interlocation between argu-
ments and predicates.
A fourth operation of indetermination, represented by an asterisk *, is

sometimes cited. This value, also called the hypothetical or fictive value,
provides us with a metalinguistic wildcard. Its fundamental property is its
capacity to be used to represent another operation, or combination of
operations, in cases where the linguistic forms are – as is often the case –
provisionally under-specified. In French the generic personal pronoun on
(cognate with formal English one) provides an example of this value since,
while in itself it specifies no particular person, contextual pressures will
often imply subjective weighting in favour of one or other available val-
ues. The value ultimately obtained is a composite, derived from the dia-
lectic interplay between the initial indetermination and the subsequent
weighting towards a particular type of location.27
In the context of the present study, the three fundamental operations
of identification, differentiation and disconnection will be used in modelling
various possibilities for the subjective positioning of a speaker relative to
the endorsement of a propositional content, in the case of the opposition
between indeed and in fact, for example (cf. Chap. 4).
2.4.3 Operands
The operands which enter into the operations of location are of two fun-
damental types: notions and situations.
Culioli presents the notion as follows:
A notion can be defined as a complex bundle of structured physico-cultural

properties and should not be equated with lexical labels or actual items.
Notions are representations and should be treated as such; they epitomize
properties […] derived from interaction between persons and persons, per-
sons and objects, biological constraints, technical activity, etc. (Culioli
1990, p. 69)28
The concept of the notion evolved originally from a profound dissatis-

faction with compositional lexical semantics. While compositional studies
might be important in technical or classificatory applications, they are not
representative of genuine language activity and in particular they do not
allow for phenomena such as metaphor or, more generally, intersubjective
28 G. Ranger
adjustment. The properties canine, domesticated, adult, male, for example,

might be useful from the point of view of classification, but do not help us
to understand the use in English of dog as a verb, the existence of the
adjective dogged, the adverb doggedly, extensions of meaning in compounds
like dogcheap, dogcollar, dogdays, dog’s dinner, dog-eared, dog’s-tooth or locu-
tions such as go to the dogs. These extensions of meaning result from cul-
ture-specific properties of the notion /dog/, or “dogness”.
The initial elaboration of the concept of the notion as a metalinguistic
representation of lexical meaning has been extended to applications in
which the same conceptual framework is applied to the grammatical
fields of person, number, temporality, aspectuality or modality, for exam-
ple. In more recent work within the TEPO, the distinction between
grammatical and lexical notions is seen more in terms of a distinction of
degree than of type.29
The association of lexical notions by operations of predication leads to
a third type, a complex notion, or predicable content, which corresponds
to what is often referred to as propositional content or lexis.30 The process
can be reiterated, and so, in the study of discourse markers, a (complex)
notion might sometimes correspond to a sentence, a paragraph or a whole
argumentative orientation (as, for example, with the anaphoric function
of after all, at least, etc).
For a given language and linguistic community it is reasonable to con-
sider that lexical and grammatical notions correspond to a relatively con-
sensual, transindividual repertoire. There will of course be all sorts of
significant variation – in register, dialect, sociolect, idiolect et cetera, but
there will be some negotiable basis for linguistic activity. It is possible for
complex notions to be held consensually, but more often than not com-
plex notions (propositions, sets of propositions, argument schemata) are
constructed, negotiated and modified on an ad hoc basis.31 In the case of
both lexical notions and grammatical notions, one can oppose a prelin-
guistic, cognitive representation, conventionally noted  , and its lin-
guistic counterpart, N.
The second type of operand to enter into relations of location is the
situation.
For a propositional content to be able to receive referential values, it
must be located relative to some situation of reference. The situation for
which a given representation is validated – the situation of validation,

conventionally noted Sit2 is ultimately located relative to the situation of
utterance, or speech situation, noted Sit0.
Any utterance therefore implies the presence of an original situation of
utterance including a time and place of utterance (a spatio-temporal
parameter), noted  0 , and an enunciative source which I will refer to for
the sake of convenience as the speaker, noted 0 . Also implied is an act
of utterance, an enunciative event, noted  0 .32
Here is how Culioli describes the relationship between the utterance
and the situation of utterance33:
Any utterance is located relative to a situation of utterance which is defined

relative to an initial enunciative source 0 […] and a time of utterance  0 .
If one symbolizes with cursive capital letters the terms that belong to the
enunciative event and with block capitals the terms that belong to the target
set (the utterance or text), then we can see that any enunciative relationship
corresponds to a set of relationships:
 the event of utterance ⇄ E the resulting utterance or text

 the speaker / enunciative ⇄ S the subject(s) of the utterance
source
 the time of utterance ⇄ T the time of the event to which
the utterance refers
(Culioli 1999b, p. 44, my translation)
Block letters indicate conventionally that the utterance or text, the

subject(s) and the time to which the utterance refers are linguistically con-
structed entities, while cursive letters indicate that the enunciative event,
the enunciative source and the time of utterance belong to an extralin-
guistic reality, re-constructed retroactively on the strength of the textual
evidence. The relationship is bijective (⇄): the enunciative event pro-
duces the utterance, while the utterance provides evidence for the event.
In this way, tense markers, for example, can be seen as the trace of dif-
ferent operations of location between the event time and the utterance
time, personal pronouns as the trace of relationships between the subject(s)
of the utterance and the enunciative source, and so on. The distinction
30 G. Ranger
between the enunciative event and the resulting utterance is central, as we

shall see, to an enunciative definition of the discourse marking category.
To sum up, there are two fundamental types of operands: notions,
which may be subdivided into lexical notions, grammatical notions and
complex notions, and situations.
The notion itself is a potential. It is only ever apprehended through
linguistic occurrences. A predicable lexis (or propositional content) results
from a complex operation in which notions are located relative to each
other. This operation may be iterated recursively, allowing for operations
of location between lexes, et cetera.
The occurrence of a notion results from the location of a notion rela-
tive to a situation of validation. Situations of reference are ultimately
derived, by means of operations of location, from the source situation,
that is, the situation of the utterance-event, reconstructed on the basis of
the textual traces of the utterance-object. The situation comprises a
spatio-temporal parameter, a subjective parameter and an utterance
parameter.
The operations and the operands presented above form the elements
from which the linguist can construct more complex polyoperations –
recurrent conceptual templates which enable us to model language activ-
ity on a cross-linguistic basis. In terms of information technology, we
might see these as subroutines, in that, while it is possible to build them
up piecemeal from the basic operations, the templates are encountered so
frequently that to do so on each occasion would involve pointless
repetition. The next three sections present briefly three such tools: the
notional domain, the branching path model and the distinction between
quantitative and qualitative determination (QNT / QLT).
2.4.4 Polyoperations: The Notional Domain
The construction of a notional domain corresponds to an operation of

categorization (Culioli 1990, p. 67) whereby a subject locates a phenom-
enal occurrence (real or imaginary) relative to an ideal abstract occur-
rence of a notion:
Notions are apprehended and established through occurrences (enunciative

events) which involve: distinguishing phenomenal instances, identifying
properties and assessing their distance from one another, gauging the degree
and the kind of similarity, deciding whether to keep the occurrences quali-
tatively separate or to categorize them as equivalent relative to a type […]
For any two occurrences, we have to choose whether they are indiscern-
ible, ceteris paribus, or roughly equivalent, or totally different, or just
incomparable. We (that is, linguists […]) are thus led to construct a
notional domain which structures the class of occurrences of a given notion
[…] (Culioli 1990, pp. 69–70)
The operations of identification and differentiation allow us to con-

struct the Interior and the Exterior of a notional domain, respectively.
When an occurrence is identified to a prototypical instance of the notion
we say it is situated on the Interior of the notional domain. When it is
differentiated from the notional type, it is on the Exterior. In addition to
this it is sometimes necessary to construct a Boundary area, where occur-
rences are both identifiable to and differentiable from the type. When a
notion is conceptualised in terms of degrees (i.e. involving scalarity), we
may need to construct a gradient leading from minimal identification on
the Boundary to intensive values at the Centre.
This model, which is related to point-set topology, is represented
graphically for a given notion p in Fig. 2.1 (adapted from Culioli 1990,
p. 71):
This representation provides a maximally instantiated abstract schema. In
genuine language use, the notional domain will be constructed in different
ways, depending on contextual pressures. An all-or-nothing classificatory
Fig. 2.1 The notional domain

32 G. Ranger
opposition between, for example, married / single or awake / asleep might

imply a simple binary opposition between the Interior and the Exterior, in
which case the Boundary or Centre positions are irrelevant and hence not
constructed. In other cases, it might, however, be associated with a change
of state, in which case the domain is located relative to the ordered class of
instants, potentially yielding boundary values, just married, still single, et
cetera. Intensive values may also be constructed, as in wide awake or fast
asleep and speakers might also play with the inherent all-or-nothing seman-
tics with very married / single and so on. The Centre of the domain can addi-
tionally be constructed either in terms of (proto-)typicality, or in terms of
intensity or high degree (or arche-typicality). These two modes of regulation
are termed the organizing Centre and the attracting Centre, respectively.34
The model of the notional domain developed in relation to questions
of how subjects engage in operations of lexical categorization in authentic
language use. Its applications have extended to other areas including
aspectual determination (modelling perfective and imperfective aspect,
for example) or subjective endorsement of propositional content (cf.
Chap. 7, for example).
In a very intuitive way, we realize that there can be representations enabling

us to perform trans-categorial operations: not only to construct categories,
but also to bring together lexical and grammatical problems, modal and
aspectual problems, quantification […] (Culioli 1995, p. 68)
We will be returning to such representations in the course of the study.

Note that the template above is not another theoretical primitive, but is
built up from the primitive operands and operations presented earlier.
2.4.5 Polyoperations: The Branching Path Model
In modelling phenomena of epistemic possibility – or eventuality –,

for example, we are faced with a configuration in which there is a hia-
tus between the situation of utterance and the projected situation of
validation. Let us take a concrete example, for the purposes of the
demonstration:
(1) The rain may reach the area but on the other hand it may not. KRH
2480
In (1) the complex notion corresponding to the predicative relation is

the association of three lexical notions in a primitive relationship < rain
reach area >. Let us call this p. The speaker considers two potential situa-
tions: one in which the predicable content of p is validated, the other in
which it is not. These correspond to two opposing positions on a notional
domain: one on the Interior (p is the case), the other on the Exterior (p is
not the case). Naturally, both p and non-p cannot be the case simultane-
ously for the same speaker, but from the point of view of the enunciative
source, in the situation of utterance it is conceptually possible to enter-
tain the prospective validation of either (p / non-p).35
This is represented conventionally as a bifurcation or branching path
model (the translation is from Groussier 2000, p. 179), where the situa-
tion of utterance and the situation of validation are schematized three-
dimensionally, as disconnected parallel planes. Figure 2.2, adapted from
Groussier (2000, p. 180), illustrates this.36
The relationship between Sit0 and Sit2 is complex. On the one hand,
the situation of validation Sit2 is disconnected from the situation of utter-
ance Sit0: it is a subjectively constructed projection of a hypothetical situ-
ation. On the other hand, Sit2 is in a relation of sequentiality relative to
Sit0, that is, if Sit2 comes about, it will do so after Sit0. The passage from
Sit0 and p / non-p to either p or non-p in (1) is temporally quantifiable.
The relationship between Sit0 and Sit2 can therefore be construed as a
compound operation involving modal disconnection ω and temporal dif-
ferentiation ≠.
Fig. 2.2 The branching path model

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RATTEN, KOGELFLESCHJES EN LADDERS!
Het is voor negenen in den morgen. Een gedeelte van de bende staat voor de
school te knikkeren.
Een schel gefluit kondigt de nabijheid van Ambro aan en deze komt in vollen
draf aangerend, z’n knikkerzak boven z’n hoofd zwaaiend, als een cavalerist,
die op den vijand aanrukt.
Hijgend nadert hij het troepje.
„Potje schoffelen, Ambro,” vraagt Karel, „of pompen?”
Maar Ambro luistert niet naar hem. Hij is vervuld van het groote nieuws, dat
hij ze moet vertellen.
„Jongens, ik heb een brief, van wie denk je?”
„Van Margootje,” veronderstelt Paul.
„Bê-je,” zegt Ambro diep beleedigd.
„Daar zou ik zoo’n drukte van maken? Neen, ’t is geen zij, maar een hij.”
„Ik weet ’t,” roept Piet. „Van Dokter Reens!”
„Wat zou die mij te schrijven hebben!”
De jongens branden van nieuwsgierigheid.
„Nog eenmaal raden,” roept Ambro en hij zet een gewichtig gezicht.
„Nou,” zegt Chris. „Dan is er nog maar een die ’t kan zijn … de directeur van
den Dierentuin.”
„Mis vader! Hij is van Wim Bolk.”
„Wim Bolk!” roepen ze in koor.

„Dat is waar, die leeft ook nog,” zegt Puckie droog. [142]
Wim Bolk was met de noorderzon vertrokken, want z’n vertrek viel juist in de
groote vacantie, toen het meerendeel der jongens uit de stad was.
Zijn vader, ambtenaar der posterijen, was plotseling overgeplaatst naar

Haarlem en na het afscheid op school, vóór de groote vacantie, had geen van
de jongens Wim teruggezien.
Den eersten tijd had hij nog wel met hen gecorrespondeerd, ofschoon die
correspondentie uitsluitend bestond uit een prentkaart, met zijn naam er
onder. Maar vrij spoedig hielden ook deze levensteekenen op en dachten de
jongens niet meer aan elkaar.
„Zeg, jongens, hij komt weer hier wonen,” zei Ambro. „Z’n vader is weer
overgeplaatst.”
„Waar was ie ook weer?”
„In Haarlem. Hij vraagt me of jullie ’t allemaal goed maken en of het Hol van
Kaan nog bestaat. Met September gaat hij naar de H.B.S.”
„We hebben veel keet met hem gehad,” zegt Chris. „’t Was een eerste-klas-
keet-schopper.”
„Zou-die veranderd zijn?”
„An z’n brief zou je ’t niet zeggen,” zegt Ambro die den brief voor den dag
haalt.
De jongens steken de hoofden bijeen en lezen:
Hooggeachte bende van het Hol van Kaan,
Gij zult waarschijnlijk Uw oud mede-lid, die thans de pen heeft opgenomen om zijne
vroegere bondgenooten te verwittigen van zijn … barst!… ik kan er niet uit komen.
[143]
Zeg, kerels, ik kom fijn weer in Rotterdam wonen, en dan zullen we de peentjes
opscheppen.
In Haarlem is ’t niks gedaan, hoor! Een saaie bedoening!

Op school trof ik allemaal brave Hendrikken, die niks durven. En om alleen de beest
uit te hangen … daar had ik geen lol in.
Dan wij, hè! Weet jullie nog, die keet aan de haven, toen Ambro aan de kraan hing.
Toen ik ’t die brave Haarlemmer halletjes vertelde, wilden ze ’t niet eens gelooven.
Een was wel eens in Rotterdam geweest en had, bij z’n terugkeer, z’n voeten
geveegd, vóór hij in Haarlem aankwam.
Nou, ik heb wat vaak naar de Rotterdamsche modder verlangd! Nog twee weekie’s,
dan ben ik er weer!
Leeft Alebes nog? Maken jullie het allemaal goed? En hoe staat ’t met het Hol van
Kaan? Met September ga ik naar de H.B.S. Jullie ook zeker? Ik hoop maar, dat we
allemaal op dezelfde komen. Een reuzen-keet, zeg!
Komen jullie me allemaal van den trein halen, dan schrijf ik nog hoe laat ik kom.
Adi, ik smeer ’m. Tot kijks,
Wim.
„Nee, hoor, hij is nog niks veranderd,” zegt Chris blij.
„Ik had ’m ook geen gezicht meer aangekeken,” zegt Puckie. [144]
Ze vonden het allen eenparig fijn, dat ie terugkwam en Ambro vond, dat zijn
terugkeer feestelijk gevierd moest worden.
Daar ging de schoolbel.
„Fijn, vanmiddag vrij, kunnen we verder vergaderen in het Hol,” zegt Ambro.
In korten tijd ligt het schoolplein, eerst zoo vol lawaai van joelende jongens,
nu stil en verlaten daar en wordt de schooldeur hard en onverbiddelijk achter
ze gesloten.
Ze zijn weer voor drie lange uren opgeborgen, de woelige rakkers.
De elementen waren hen echter dien middag niet gunstig gezind.

Toen de school uitging plasregende het en de jongens, hierop onvoorbereid,
rennen in woeste vaart naar huis.
Op school hebben ze afgesproken samen te komen in het oude apen-

gebouw, dat bij slecht weêr als vergaderzaal dienst deed.
Om één uur zijn ze allen present.
„Wat een snert-weêr,” zegt Ambro.
„Maar, dat is niets, dan maar wat turnen.” En meteen trekt hij zich op aan een
horizontale ijzeren stang en maakt den buik-zwaai.
In minder dan geen tijd bengelen nu alle jongens aan de zijstangen naast de
leege hokken.
Dan komt Chris met een plan voor den dag.
„Jongens, we gaan ratten vangen.” [145]
„En zeker weer d’r uit getrapt worden,” roept Puckie.
„Neen,” zegt Ambro. „In dien kletsregen is ’t niks gedaan, dan zijn ze d’r niet
eens.”
„Wel neen, niet buiten,” schreeuwt Chris terug. „Hier zitten d’r bij de vleet.
Maar we moeten voorzichtig te werk gaan,… ik weet precies door welk gaatje
ze ’m piepen. Daar ginds,” wijst hij. „Tegen ’t schot bij den chimpansee.”
„Hoe wil je ze dan pakken? Zeker met je handen.”
„Dat ’s te gevaarlijk,” zegt Paul. „Een rat in angst vliegt je naar de keel.”
„O, daar heb je juffrouw Piepzak! Hoor je ’t jongens, Paul knijpt ’m alweer,”
plaagt Puckie.
„Neen,” zegt Chris. „Onder de cape krijgen we ze te pakken,” en hij wijst op

het eerste hok van den ingang af.
„Als we ons nou koest houden, komen ze daar maïs vreten, want je begrijpt
wel, dat ze, als we blijven schreeuwen en lawaai schoppen, kalm in hun
holletje blijven.”
„Ik begrijp er niks van,” zegt Ambro. „Wat mot je nou eigenlijk met die cape?”
„Laat me dan ook uitspreken. Achter deze deuren stellen we ons op, dan zal
je zien, dat de ratten spoedig komen, want toen we daarnet binnenkwamen
zag ik ze „weg-peesen”. Dan gaan ze, zòò, langs den heelen muur en aan het
einde moeten ze een gangetje oversteken voor ze bij hun hol zijn. [146]
„Wij loopen met een cape daar ook naar toe, zoo hard we kunnen, hè! dan
gooien we de cape bliksemsnel op een rat en gaan er op dansen. Ben
reuzen-bak, jongens! ik heb ’t al meer gedaan.”
Nu deze ingewikkelde geschiedenis duidelijker vormen voor ze aanneemt,

vinden de jongens het plan kapitaal en ze besluiten dan maar direct te
beginnen.
„Als de oppasser ’t maar niet merkt,” waagt Paul het te zeggen.
„Och, Lutjebroek, als je bang bent, hoepel dan maar op. Trouwens, we doen
er een goed en nuttig werk meê.”
„Ja,” merkt Paul schamper op. „Een maand den tuin uit als je een dooje rat op
het kantoor brengt.”
„Verdelgt de ratten en ge zult spinazie eten,” zegt Ambro zalvend. „Vooruit

knullen, beginnen!”
„Hier moeten we staan,” en Chris neemt het opper-commando op zich.
„En één ding, jongens, kop dicht! Wie kabaal maakt, krijgt een peut in z’n
ribben.”
Onbewegelijk en dood-stil staan ze achter de deuren. Chris houdt een oog in

’t zeil.
„Er kaikt mit één oogie!” imiteert Ambro een clown waarvan hij pas genoten
heeft, als hij Chris zoo naar één punt ziet staren.
Maar vijf stompen doen hem er aan herinneren, dat het wachtwoord „kop
dicht” is.
„Nog één keer,” dreigt veldheer Chris. „En dan smeer je ’m maar, jij bederft
altijd alles met je flauwe kul.” [147]
Wel vijf minuten lang heerscht er de diepste stilte en met wederzijdsche

bewondering voor deze algeheele rust, kijken de jongens elkaar in spanning
aan.
Hun geduldig wachten wordt beloond. Een stevige rat schiet met een telkens
afgebroken vaart rrrtsss langs den muur.
Zóó is bij op zijn hoede voor dreigend gevaar, dat hij zich telkens
onbewegelijk houdt, en, geen onraad bespeurend, weer snel vooruit schiet.
De jongens behoeven zich nu geen geweld meer aan te doen om stil te zijn.
Ademloos bespieden ze, met groote tintelende oogen, iedere beweging van
hun prooi.
De rat loopt z’n noodlot tegemoet, hij is den bak met maïs genaderd.
Als een pijl uit den boog, schiet Chris met zijn cape vooruit, de jongens volgen
hem. En de rat vliegt in volle vaart terug langs den muur, maar Chris is hem
vóór, en juist, als het dier het gangetje oversteekt werpt hij handig de cape
over hem heen en begint luid schreeuwend, een woesten oorlogsdans boven
op hem.
De jongens volgen direct zijn voorbeeld en als een troepje Indianen om een
gevangen blanken broeder, zoo voeren ze hun krijgsdans uit.
De rat, die niet weet, hoe hij ’t heeft, wijst door sprongen de plaats aan waar
hij zich onder de cape bevindt en iedere sprong, wordt beantwoord met een
trap naar zijn kant.
„Hou op, jongens, da’s wreed,” roept Paul met [148]ongewone stemverheffing.
„As-t-ie dood moet, best, maar dan ineens.”
Ze zien hem daar ineens, bleek en klein tegen den muur gedrukt staan.
„Bah! hij is bang,” zegt smalend Chris.
„Dat ben ik niet,” zegt Paul heftig.
„Maar ik vind jullie laf. Je hebt ’m nou toch gepakt, laat ’m nou weer los.”
Deze woorden van Paul hebben de jongens toch even tot kalmte gebracht, en
de rat heeft deze tijdelijke rust benut om onder de cape weg te schieten en
vliegensvlug in zijn hol te verdwijnen.
„Hoe was ie?” vraagt Chris zegevierend.
„Nog een keertje,” roept Karel.
„Dàt kê-je denken,” antwoordt Chris. „Nou duurt ’t uren voor-ie weer komt.”
„Paul kijkt er beteuterd van,” zegt Ambro. „Jij [149]moet maar rokken gaan
dragen,” smaalt Piet.
Paul, nu gerustgesteld over het lot van de rat, trekt zich van al die gezegden
bitter weinig aan.
„Zou ’t nog regenen?” vraagt Ambro.
Chris, die inziet, dat er niet veel meer in het oude apenhuis te doen valt, zegt:
„We zullen zien,” en met loopt hij naar den ingang en constateert het heugelijk
feit, dat de zon is doorgebroken.
„Pracht-weêr, jongens! Kom mee, we gaan er uit!”
„Naar ’t Hol,” roept Karel.
„Wel nee! daar is ’t nog kletsnat. Goed om de pip te krijgen.”
„Wat moeten we dan doen?”
Geen van hen weet iets te bedenken en de bende slentert doelloos voort in
de richting van de groote sociëteit.
„Willen we honderd meter hardloopen,” stelt Piet voor.
„Eerst me vriendin bezoeken,” zegt Ambro. „Ik weet geen raad van den dorst.”
De vriendin van Ambro is een oude juffrouw, meer bekend onder den naam
van „het watervrouwtje”. Ze verkoopt glazen water voor 1 cent per stuk en is
tevens opper-„privaat”-meesteres.
Ambro stond bij haar in een goed blaadje, omdat hij dikwijls voor haar op de
torenklok ging kijken hoe laat het was. Als belooning mocht hij dan zooveel
water drinken als hij wilde.
Maar nu, zonder haar opdracht af te wachten, bracht hij haar de tijding, dat
het zeven minuten [150]over drieën was, waarop ze hem vriendelijk bedankte
en vroeg of hij niet wat wilde drinken.
„Zes glazen drink ik vandaag,” was het antwoord van Ambro. „En als ik ze niet
alleen op kan, zullen me vrienden wel helpen.”
En zich tot dezen richtend, riep hij: „Jongens, ik geef een rondje water.”
Zes groote glazen werden naar binnen geklokt. De jongens namen afscheid
van het oudje en vervolgden hun weg.
Toen ze de sociëteit genaderd waren, riep Puckie: „Kijk es, het kelderluik staat
open, laten we stiekum naar binnen kruipen en lol maken.”
Dáár waren ze voor te vinden.
Een ontelbaar aantal stoeltjes stond in lange rijen tegen den achtermuur van
de sociëteit, klaar, om vervoerd te worden naar het groote terrein bij de
muziektent.
„Zou er niemand zijn,” fluistert Ambro en hij luistert aandachtig aan het
kelderluik.
„Ik hoor niks. Nou stil, jongens, ik zal wel voor gaan.” En hij daalt
behoedzaam het trapje af, dat naar den kelder voert. De rest van de bende
volgt. En nu staan ze in den half-duisteren kelder.
„Krimmenikkie, wat is ’t hier donker,” roept Paul.
„En vol ratten,” plaagt Ambro. „Volgen jullie me maar, straks zitten we in stik-
duisteren nacht.”
Blijkbaar is er niemand in den kelder en vol moed trekken ze nu voorwaarts.
De kelder loopt door onder de geheele sociëteit en heeft dus een verbazende
omvang. [151]
De jongens staan nu voor een vierkant gat in den muur, ongeveer een meter
boven den beganen grond.
Het schaarsche licht, dat door een raampje valt, maakt, dat ze nog net
kunnen zien, waar ze zich bevinden.
„Hier moeten we inkruipen,” zegt Ambro. „Maar pas op, dat je je kop niet
stoot, ’t is hier bar laag.”
Achtereenvolgens kruipen ze nu door het gat.
„Een mooie boel hier,” gromt Chris. „Waar kruip ik eigenlijk over heen?
Kolengruis of zand?”
„Dat zal je wel zien als je weer buiten bent,” zegt Ambro en hij waarschuwt
voor een gaspijp, die dwars over hun weg ligt.
„Zoo zullen we er nog een heeleboel tegen komen,” zegt hij.
„Waar ga je eigenlijk naar toe,” roept Karel, die evenmin als Chris erg veel
pleizier schijnt te hebben in dit duistere avontuur.
„Nog veertig meter ongeveer moeten we vooruit kruipen, dan komen we uit de
benauwenis en vinden als belooning voor ons ploeteren een heelen stapel
kogelfleschjes.”
„Hij zeit wat!” roept Chris ongeloovig.
„Op me woord van eer,” zegt Ambro.
Dit „prikkelende” vooruitzicht doet de jongens verder zonder morren hun weg
vervolgen over stof en kolengruis, gaspijpen en glasscherven en dat alles,
kruipend op hun buik in volslagen duisternis.
„We zijn er haast,” zegt Ambro. [152]
„Ik proef ’t al,” roept Puckie.
„Ik zoek frambozen uit,” zegt Piet. „Als je tenminste zien kan wat je te pakken
hebt.”
„Ik gember,” zegt Paul verrukt.
Ze zijn nu in de nabijheid gekomen van het kelderraampje, aan de voorzijde

van de sociëteit en tot aller verademing wijkt de lage zoldering boven hun
hoofden en staan ze wederom in een half-verlichte ruimte.
„Kijk jongens, daar staan ze,” roept Ambro triomfantelijk.
De jongens rennen er op af.
„Ver …, da’s een leege,” bromt Piet.
„Die ik heb ook,” roept Puckie.
„Ze zijn allemaal leeg,” schreeuwt Karel.
En Ambro, die dit reeds lang wist, maar zonder dit aanlokkelijk vooruitzicht
geen kans zag de bende mee te krijgen op dezen luguberen tocht door de
catacomben, zegt met het onnoozelste gezicht van de wereld:
„Heb ik dan gezegd, dat ze vol waren?”
„Flauwe bak,” bromt Piet.
„Hebben we daarvoor zoo gezwoegd? Als je nog eens wat weet,” zegt Chris,
z’n handen van kolengruis reinigend.
„Nou, wees maar koest,” kalmeert Ambro. „Jullie krijgen ieder van mij een
mooi glazen knikkertje,” en meteen ketst hij met kracht een kogelfleschje
tegen den muur.
„Hier heb je er al een,” zegt hij, het glazen kogeltje aan Paul gevend. [153]
„Da’s een idee,” zegt Chris getroost
De jongens, na allen Ambro’s voorbeeld volgend, pakken ieder een projectiel

en de onderaardsche gewelven daveren van uiteenspattende granaten in den
vorm van kogelfleschjes.
In minder dan geen tijd, heeft ieder een stuk of tien fleschjes gebroken en met
rijken buit belaân, wordt langs denzelfden moeilijken weg de terugtocht
aanvaard.
„Ik zal blij zijn als we weer buiten staan. Au!” schreeuwt Puckie, die vergeten
is, dat de zoldering maar een halve meter hoog is.
„Puckie denkt, dat z’n kop een kogelfleschje is,” lacht Ambro.
„Zouden ze niets gehoord hebben,” vraagt Paul bevreesd.
„Vast en zeker,” stelt Ambro hem gerust. „We vinden nu de deur gesloten en
een man tot de tanden toe gewapend er voor. Maar dat is niets, ik weet een
geheimen uitgang.”
Eindelijk zijn ze weer bij het vierkante gat gekomen, waardoor heen ze hun
tocht begonnen zijn.
„Zie je wel,” zegt Ambro verschrikt. „Het kelderluik is dicht! En de geheime

gang is versperd.”
„Wat moeten we nou beginnen?” zegt Paul en ook de andere jongens zien de
toekomst donker in.
In werkelijkheid, wilde Ambro z’n makkers slechts schrik aanjagen, want, het
kelderluik stond nog open en de geheime gang bestond slechts in zijn
verbeelding.
„Hij liegt,” roept Chris, die direct na Ambro [154]het gat bereikte. „We kunnen er
uit, hoor!”
„Hè, gelukkig maar,” zucht Paul opgelucht „Ik was al bang den tuin uitgetrapt
te worden.”
Behouden staat het zestal weer buiten en als ze elkaar bekijken, schateren ze
het uit. Ze zijn veranderd in negers, hun kleeren, bedekt met een dikke laag
stof en spinrag, de gezichten zwart van kolengruis.
„Ja, jullie hebben lol,” zegt Paul beteuterd. „Maar ik heb pas een nieuw pakkie
an, daar zit weer wat op.”
„Kolengruis zit er op,” plaagt Ambro. „En dat zal er wel af gaan ook,” en hij
begint Paul zóó hardhandig af te kloppen, dat deze het uitschreeuwt van pijn.
„Tjonge, jonge, wat stuift het? Weet je wat we doen, jongens? we gaan straks
naar het weiland achter het spoor en brengen onze kleertjes weer netjes in
orde, en …”
„Da’s van later zorg,” valt Piet Ambro in de rede. „Ik zie een hooge ladder
staan.”
„Waar?” vraagt Ambro haastig. En de angst voor hun besmeurde kleêren

vermindert sterk bij het gezicht van dit verleidelijk voorwerp.
„Daar moeten we op,” zegt Ambro, „niks an te doen!”
„Ik heb er voorloopig genoeg van,” zegt Paul knorrig.
„Des te beter, dan ga jij op den uitkijk staan en waarschuwt als er iemand
aankomt,” zegt Piet.
„Hij gaat heelemaal tot het dak, zie je wel. Ik [155]zal wel weer voorgaan.” En
Ambro begint de ladder te beklimmen.
„Goed uitkijken, Paul,” roept hij toen hij midden op de ladder is gekomen.
Piet wil hem onmiddellijk volgen, maar de ladder begint bij deze beweging zoo
onregelmatig te zwiepen, dat Ambro, een beetje benauwd, naar beneden kijkt
en tot Piet schreeuwt:
„Even wachten tot ik boven ben, stommert!”
En Piet houdt zich nu stil en hoeft niet lang te wachten, want Ambro is het
bovenste terras van de sociëteit genaderd.
„Hè, wat een fijn uitzicht!” zegt hij uitblazend. „Piet, nou kan je komme.”
En achtereenvolgens klimt de bende, behalve Paul, naar boven.
„Wat nou?” vraagt Chris. „Daar staan we! Vriezen we dood, dan vriezen we
dood!”
„O, we kunnen nog hooger,” is Ambro’s antwoord. „En dan zullen we wel
verder zien.”
„Jij commandeert ons maar den heelen middag,” zegt Chris. „En wij doen
maar als makke schapen je zin.”
„Stil maar, ik heb alweer een plan. We gaan rangeeren.”

„Rangeeren?” vraagt Puckie, die zich al de gekste sprongen van Ambro
voorstelt, nu ze daar zoo hoog staan.
Ambro heeft nu een tweede ladder ontdekt, veel kleiner dan die ze
beklommen hebben en die naar het dak voert. [156]
Blijkbaar zijn er op het oogenblik geen werklieden aanwezig en gretig maakt

de bende van deze gelegenheid gebruik en als ze eindelijk boven staan, zegt
Ambro tevreden: „Ziezoo, jongens, hooger kunnen we niet, en nou gaat ’t spul
beginnen.”
Hij haalt een groote fluit voor den dag en wijst naar een paar
goederenwagens op het spoorterrein achter den Dierentuin, die gerangeerd
moeten worden.
De fluit van den rangeerder had hem de booze gedachte ingegeven, ook zijn
fluit te gebruiken en daarmee den boel in de war te sturen.
De jongens zitten nu naast elkaar langs de daklijst. Plotseling laat Ambro een
langgerekt gefluit hooren en zóó zuiver was de nabootsing van het rangeer-
signaal, dat de machinist in den waan werd gebracht en de locomotief tot
staan bracht, met het gevolg, dat onmiddellijk een tegen-signaal volgde van
den rangeerder.
En toen Ambro voor de tweede maal deze grap uithaalde, kreeg de man de
bende op het dak in de gaten en begon luid vloekend met zijn vuist te dreigen,
terwijl hij ze den raad gaf gauw met dat spelletje op te houden.
De waarschuwing van den man werd ontvangen met een waar hoongelach
van de brutale bengels, maar plotseling werden ze opgeschrikt door een
alarmkreet van Paul, die hen toeriep dat de werklieden in aantocht waren.
„Hij houdt ons voor ’t lappie,” zegt Ambro. [157]„Hij is natuurlijk bang, dat we
weer den tuin uitgetrapt worden, blijf maar gerust zitten, jongens, en die kerel
aan den overkant kan toch niet bij ons komen, laat die maar vloeken.”
En ook op de tweede waarschuwing van Paul werd geen acht geslagen,

zoodat de werklui, die intusschen vlak bij waren gekomen, de jongens op het
dak ontdekten.
„Kijk daar een stelletje spreeuwen,” lachte een goedmoedige, oude metselaar.
„Ik zal ze daar es effe nemen!”
Paul staat duizend doodsangsten uit, doch durft niets te zeggen.
„Help es, Jan,” zegt de metselaar tot z’n zoon, een stevige, jonge borst. „We
zullen es effe dat laddertje weghalen,” en luid voegde hij er aan toe: „Dan
hebbe de heere daarbofe gratis losjies!”
„Zie je wel,” zegt Chris boven nijdig tot Ambro. „Paul hield ons niet voor de
mal, da’s niks voor hem.”
„Hij heeft weer es wat gedaan,” vult Puckie aan en de heele bende is ineens
tegen Ambro.
„Leggen jullie nou niet an me kop te kletsen,” zegt deze. „Maar laten we liever
een middel bedenken, hoe we zonder die ladder naar beneden kunnen
komen.”
„Dat wordt nek breken,” zegt Karel. „Ik heb geen zin in een doodval.”
„Al gevonden,” juicht Ambro. „Ze zullen een reuzen-strop hebben! Vlug
jongens, volg me!” en hij daalt de kleine ladder af, naar ’t eerste terras.
Ambro’s beslist optreden en z’n résolute manier [158]van spreken heeft de

gewenschte uitwerking op de jongens en ze gehoorzamen hun hoofdman
weer blindelings.
Ze staan nu op het terras, waarop de deuren uitkomen van het Indisch

Museum.
Ambro had reeds ontdekt, dat één ervan open stond en fluisterend tot de
jongens zegt hij: „Dàt deurtje is onze redding, maar we moeten voorzichtig
zijn en goed kijken of die vent van het Museum ons niet in de gaten heeft.”
„Die maft het grootste deel van den dag,” zegt Piet. „Dus we hebben kans.”
De rolgordijnen voor de deuren zijn neergelaten, om de zon buiten te houden,

dus voor ontdekking behoeven de jongens voorloopig niet bang te zijn.
Op handen en voeten sloop Ambro naar de openstaande deur en keek
behoedzaam naar binnen.
„Inderdaad, de mummie maft,” zegt hij blij-verrast. „Nou zachtjes, jongens. Als
we hem eenmaal voorbij zijn, is het zaakie gezond.”
De bewaker van het museum, evenals de edele Alebes, een Oud-Gediende,

sliep als een Turk, hetgeen niet te verwonderen was, want het was een
warme dag en van bezoek was in dezen tijd van het jaar geen sprake.
Geruischloos sluipt nu het vijftal de deur binnen en of ze op vilten toffeltjes

loopen, inplaats van op stevige moddertrappers, zóó zacht passeeren ze den
slapenden waakhond.
Nu is de uitgang van het museum gauw bereikt en als ze eenmaal de trap

genaderd zijn, [159]holt de bende juichend naar beneden, terwijl het laatste
gedeelte afgegleden wordt langs de breede trapleuning.
„Wat een strop,” lacht Ambro. „Dat hadden ze niet gedacht, de kevers! Ik ga
ze vertellen, dat er vijf jongens in nood zitten, want mij hadden ze toch niet in
de gaten.”
„Ja, ja, een reuzen-bak,” roepen de jongens.
En met z’n zoetsappigste snuitje gaat hij naar de werklieden, terwijl de

overige jongens zich verscholen houden.
„Mijnheer,” spreekt hij den ouden metselaar aan. „Aan den anderen kant van
de sociëteit staan vijf jongens te schreeuwen, ze kunnen d’r niet af. Boven op
het dak, mijnheer, heelemaal boven.”
„Ja, ja, ik weet ’t,” zegt de oude man. „Laat ze maar schreeuwen, me hebbe
den tijd. Asse-me naar huis gaan, magge ze d’r af, en dat duurt nog een paar
uurtjes.”
„Hè toe, laat u ze d’r af, ’t huilen staat ze nader dan ’t lachen.”
„Zeur niet, jong, anders kâ-je een pak op je broek krijgen.”

Ambro geeft het op en slentert langzaam weg. En als hij op een behoorlijken
afstand van den metselaar is gekomen, wenkt hij de jongens.
En als ze weer allemaal bij elkaar zijn, maakt hij van z’n hand een toeter en
schreeuwt tot den metselaar:
„Meheer! hier zijn ze al! De spreeuwen kenne vliege, leg ze zout op hun
staart!” [160]
En in woeste vaart rennen ze weg, bang, achtervolgd te worden door de

werklui.
„Naar ’t Hol, naar ’t Hol!” gilt Ambro.
En als ze daar, hijgend en blazend aangekomen zijn, vinden ze Paul, die

rustig zit te lezen en laconiek zegt: „Ik dacht wel dat jullie ontsnappen zouden,
Ambro was er toch bij.”
Dit volkomen vertrouwen streelde den hoofdman niet weinig.

[Inhoud]
AMBRO EN PAUL OP REIS.
De jongens hebben Paasch-vacantie. De meeste van hen zijn uit de stad.
Ambro en Paul zijn de eenigen die in stad bleven en ze hebben zich

voorgenomen veel samen uit te gaan.
Allerlei tochten zijn al op touw gezet om toch zooveel mogelijk te kunnen

genieten van de vacantie.
Op een dezer dagen komt Paul al ’s morgens vroeg naar Ambro toe om hem
te vragen of hij lust heeft hem te vergezellen naar Delft, waar hij een pakje
moet brengen naar zijn grooten broer, die daar in garnizoen ligt.
„’t Is wèl een heel eind, heen en terug,” zegt Ambro, die niet veel voelt voor
zoo’n reuzenloop.
Maar Paul stelt hem spoedig gerust.
„Bê-je mal! niet loopen! we gaan heen en terug met het bootje.”
„’t Zal niet gaan, man, ik heb nog maar twee kwartjes en die ga ik niet in één
dag opmaken.” [161]
„Dat hoeft ook niet; moeder fuift ons. Ik vond ’t saai om alleen te gaan en
vroeg of ik jou mee mocht nemen. Dat vond moeder best en ze gaf me
reisgeld voor ons allebei.”
„Dan is ie fijn en nu ben ik je man,” zei Ambro. „Ik zal ’t even aan moeder gaan
zeggen.”
In een wip is ie terug en zegt: „Wanneer gaan we?”
„Over een uur gaat het bootje.”
„Kom mee, Paul, dan tracteer ik op appelen, dan hebben we wat te bikken
onderweg.”

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Discourse Markers: An Enunciative

Approach 1st Edition Graham Ranger

“This book is an extremely valuable contribution to the study of discourse mark-

ISBN 978-3-319-70904-8 ISBN 978-3-319-70905-5 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018930133

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: © theendup / Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

This book is intended for researchers and graduate students in linguistics

important difference between the theory and many other approaches is

Lastly my thanks go to Professor Antoine Culioli, for the inspiration

Avignon, France Graham Ranger

2 The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations 17

2.10 Chapter Summary 77

3 Anyway: Configuration by Target Domain 93

4 Indeed and in fact: The Role of Subjective Positioning 135

5 Yet and still: A Transcategorial Approach to Discourse

6 Discourse Marker Uses of like: From the Occurrence

7 I think: Further Variations in Subjective Endorsement 275

Fig. 2.1 The notional domain 31

Fig. 5.1 Representation of perfective aspect 188

Table 1.1 Diversity of source categories for discourse markers 5

© The Author(s) 2018 1

1.2 The Term discourse marker

1.3  he Multiplicity of Theoretical

l­ anguage.10 Discourse markers in English often concurrently have hom-

1.4  he Multicategorial Nature of Discourse

Table 1.1 Diversity of source categories for discourse markers

D[iscourse] M[arker]s are most often said to constitute a functional cate-

It is accordingly to the function(s) of discourse markers that we now

1.5  he Multifunctional Nature of Discourse

For instance, conversational management functions are also fulfilled by

Correspondingly, definitions of the discourse marker category are

It would be possible to quote further attempts at subcategorisation

In each of these examples anyway functions as a discourse marker, but

anyway, in association with an interrogative, adds a conflictual note to

1.6 Summary and Outline of the Book

Indeed there is no consensus as to the list of members of the class of dis-

use of pragmatic particle as a catch-all term. Lenk (1998) chooses to con-

Closs Traugott, E. (1995). The Role of the Development of Discourse Markers in a

Paillard, D. (2015). Les locutions en + N dans leurs emplois comme marqueurs

© The Author(s) 2018 17

perspective, will be primarily interested in describing interpersonal or

2.2  he Theory of Enunciative

2.3 Aims of Linguistic Enquiry

My contention is that utterances display shapes that derive from complex

I shall return to the technical opposition between abstract forms and

Table 2.1 Three levels of representation

It is important to note that the mental representations of Level 1 can

Language, which is meaningful representation activity, is only accessible

Let us look at each of these processes in turn.

The process of reference assignment involves hooking up representa-

The same is true of referential processes […] the prerequisite to reference

In other words, the referential value of an utterance is constructed rela-

There must be no confusion between logico-philosophical problems of ref-

The relationship between linguistic forms – propositional content, in

anticipated in production by a speaker will be symmetrically re-­constructed

This process is absolutely central to the workings of discourse markers,

unnecessary and artificial limitations on the object of study. The first

2.4 Methods of Linguistic Enquiry

As mentioned above, the term marker is used pretheoretically in a variety

The use of marker is hence linked to a certain perspective on language

Avignon, France Graham Ranger

2 The Theory of Enunciative and Predicative Operations 17

2.10 Chapter Summary 77

3 Anyway: Configuration by Target Domain 93

4 Indeed and in fact: The Role of Subjective Positioning 135

5 Yet and still: A Transcategorial Approach to Discourse

6 Discourse Marker Uses of like: From the Occurrence

7 I think: Further Variations in Subjective Endorsement 275

Fig. 2.1 The notional domain 31

Fig. 5.1 Representation of perfective aspect 188

Table 1.1 Diversity of source categories for discourse markers 5

1.2 The Term discourse marker

1.3 he Multiplicity of Theoretical

l anguage.10 Discourse markers in English often concurrently have hom-

1.4 he Multicategorial Nature of Discourse

1.5 he Multifunctional Nature of Discourse

1.6 Summary and Outline of the Book

2.2 he Theory of Enunciative

2.3 Aims of Linguistic Enquiry

anticipated in production by a speaker will be symmetrically re-constructed

2.4 Methods of Linguistic Enquiry

2.4.4 Polyoperations: The Notional Domain

2.4.5 Polyoperations: The Branching Path Model