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How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

How China is Reshaping

the Global Economy
Development Impacts in Africa
and Latin America
Rhys Jenkins
1
3
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To my grandchildren,
Tom, Mat, and Kit,
who will experience the consequences of China’s
re-emergence as a global economic power.
Preface and Acknowledgements
I first became interested in the impact of China’s economic growth on the

Global South in 2004, when I was commissioned by the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) to prepare a paper for a conference in
Beijing at the launch of the Inter-American Development Bank’s study of
the opportunities and challenges that the emergence of China presented for
Latin America and the Caribbean (Devlin et. al., 2006). This was the first time
that I had visited China, and it began a period when my research was mainly
focussed on questions posed by the rise of China.
Much of my previous work had been about the impact of globalization,
starting with studies of transnational corporations and trade liberalization
in Latin America and then extending to work on the environmental and
socioeconomic implications of globalization in Latin America, South Africa,
Vietnam, and Malaysia.
By the mid-2000s, it was already becoming clear that the dramatic growth of
China and its re-incorporation into the global economy was a key feature of
globalization in the twenty-first century. The accession of China to the World
Trade Organization in 2001 sparked a number of studies looking at the likely
impacts that this would have in both the North and the South.
My own interest developed through further studies for DFID on the impacts
of China on Asia, Africa, and Latin America, carried out with my colleague
Chris Edwards. I was also involved in a network of scholars who studied the
impacts of the Asian Drivers (China and India) on the Global South and
published special issues of the IDS Bulletin and World Development on this
theme (Kaplinsky, ed., 2006: Kaplinsky and Messner, eds., 2008).
Some of my subsequent research on the impact of China on Latin America,
on Brazil, and on South Africa was funded by the UK Economic and Social
Research Council (ESRC),1 and this allowed me to go into greater depth on the
impacts of China on specific countries. I worked with a number of colleagues
on these projects and I am particularly grateful for their contributions. They
include Jonathan Barton, Enrique Dussel-Peters, Andrés Lopez, Alexandre de
1
ESRC grant numbers RES-165-25-005; RES-238-25-0006; and ES/1035125/1.
Preface and Acknowledgements
Freitas Barbosa, and Lawrence Edwards. I was also fortunate to receive a

Leverhulme Research Fellowship that enabled me to start work on this book.
As I delved deeper into the impacts of China on Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), I became aware that I needed
to obtain a better understanding of the drivers of Chinese growth and global
projection. Thus, although the book was originally planned as a study of the
impacts of China on the two regions, I realized that it needed to begin with
developments in China. Although I do not claim to be an expert on Chinese
economic development, I hope that Part I of the book will provide the reader
with sufficient background to make sense of the impacts on LAC and SSA.
I am very conscious that one limitation I faced in writing the book is that
I do not read Chinese. This may have led to the underrepresentation of some
points of view. I have tried wherever possible to refer to official Chinese
documents that are available in English and to the work of Chinese academics
that has been translated into or published in English. However, this probably
does not do full justice to the range of Chinese views on LAC and SSA, and
it may mean that Chinese perspectives that are more critical are not fully
represented. On the other hand, I have drawn on a range of sources from both
LAC and SSA to ensure coverage of views from within both regions.
I would like to thank colleagues who have read and commented on parts of
this book for their invaluable feedback. They include Enrique Dussel-Peters,
Chris Edwards, Raphie Kaplinsky, Bereket Kebede, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea,
and John Thoburn. Michael Abou-Sleiman provided research assistance in
putting together the database and carrying out the econometric analysis that
is reported in the book. Finally, Sally Sutton’s editing work on the manuscript
helped put it into a coherent and presentable form. I acknowledge all their
contributions, while accepting ultimate responsibility for the contents and
any errors that remain.
viii
Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
List of Boxes xv
List of Acronyms xvii
Introduction: China’s Re-emergence as a Global Economic Power 1
Part I. China and the Global Economy

1. The Transformation of the Chinese Economy 13
2. The Workshop of the World 33
3. A Voracious Dragon? China and Global Commodity Markets 52
4. Going Global: Chinese Firms Abroad 72
5. The World’s Wallet? China’s Role in Global Finance 92
Part II. China and Sub-Saharan Africa

6. China’s Economic Expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa 113
7. China’s Economic Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa 149
8. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts

in Sub-Saharan Africa 183
Part III. China and Latin America and the Caribbean

9. China’s Economic Expansion in Latin America and
the Caribbean 223
10. China’s Economic Impacts on Latin America 254
11. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts in Latin America 284

Contents
Part IV. Comparisons and Conclusions

12. A Comparative Perspective on China’s involvement
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean 321
13. Conclusion 337
Statistical Databases 347

References 349
Index 395
x
List of Figures
2.1. China’s Share of World Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and

World Manufactured Exports, 1980–2014 (%) 33
2.2. Share of China’s Manufactured Exports by Technology Level, 1995–2014 45
3.1. Index of commodity prices in constant 2010 US$ (2010=100) 57
4.1. Chinese stock and annual flow of outward FDI and turnover of
contracted projects fulfilled, 1982–2014 (US$ billion) 74
4.2. Geographical distribution of value of completed projects, 1998–2000
and 2013–15 77
5.1. China’s foreign assets, 2004–15 (US$ billion) 95
6.1. China’s trade with SSA, 1995–2015 (US$ billion) 115
6.2. Shares of different products in imports from SSA, 2013–15 116
6.3. Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) stocks and flows
in SSA, 2003–15 (US$ million) 118
6.4. Chinese contracts in SSA, 2003–15 (US$ million) 120
6.5. Sectoral distribution of the value of Chinese project contracts in SSA,
2005–16 121
6.6. Chinese Official Financial Flows to SSA, 2000–14 (US$ million) 123
7.1. Share of Chinese imports in apparent consumption of manufactured
goods in selected countries, 2000–10 161
9.1. China’s trade with Latin America, 1995–2015 (US$ billion) 225
9.2. Shares of different products in imports from Latin America, 2013–15 226
9.3. Chinese OFDI in Latin America, 2003–15 (US$ million) 228
9.4. Sectoral distribution of the value of Chinese project contracts in LAC,
2005–16 231
9.5. Chinese loans and projects in Latin America, 2005–15 (US$ million) 231
10.1. China’s share in apparent consumption of manufactures in selected
Latin American countries, 2000–13 262
11.1. Coincidence of voting between Latin America, China,
and the US, 2000–15 299
List of Tables
0.1. Examples of possible impacts of China on developing countries 6

3.1. China’s significance in commodity markets, 2000, 2015 (%) 55
6.1. Determinants of Sino-SSA economic relations 143
A6.1. Significance of economic relations with China by country in SSA 148
8.1. Percentage of exports of wood products at high risk of illegality,
by destination, 2013 211
A8.1. Effects of voice and accountability on Sino-SSA economic relations 217
A8.2. Effects of control of corruption on Sino-SSA economic relations 217
A8.3. Effect of political stability on Sino-SSA economic relations 218
A8.4. Impact of economic relations with China on governance 219
9.1. Key actors in Sino-LAC economic relations 234
9.2. Determinants of Sino-LAC economic relations, 2002–15 248
A9.1. Significance of economic relations with China by country in LAC 253
10.1. Industries with the highest level of Chinese import penetration 263
11.1. Estimated impact of trade with China on manufacturing
employment in Latin America, 1995–2011 286
11.2. Shares of Latin American trade with China and the US, 2015 (%) 298
A11.1. Determinants of voting coincidence with China 318
12.1. Summary of China’s major impacts on SSA and LAC 331
List of Boxes
4.1. Problems in measuring China’s OFDI 73

6.1. The Angolan model 124
6.2. The Sicomines agreement in DRC 125
7.1. China’s impact on SSA exports of textiles and garments 162
8.1. Debate on labour conditions in Chinese copper mining in Zambia 190
9.1. Argentina and China: the soybean connection 240
List of Acronyms
ABC Agricultural Bank of China

ADB Agricultural Development Bank (China)
AGOA African Growth Opportunities Act
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ATC Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
BOC Bank of China
CADF China-Africa Development Fund
CARI China Africa Research Initiative
CBRC Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission
CCB China Construction Bank
CCICED China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and
Development
CDB China Development Bank
CGGC China Gezhouba Group Company
CIC China Investment Corporation
CNMC China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC China National Petroleum Company
COFCO China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation
CREC China Railway Engineering Corporation
CSR Corporate social responsibility
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DFA Department of Foreign Assistance
DPP Democratic Progressive Party
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EITI Extractive industries Transparency Initiative
EIZ Eastern Industrial Zone
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETDZ Economic Trade and Development Zone
List of Acronyms
Exim Bank Export-Import Bank of China

FDI Foreign direct investment
FOCAC Forum for China Africa Cooperation
FSC Forest Stewardship Council
FTA Free trade agreement
GDP Gross domestic product
GHG Greenhouse gas
GM Genetically modified
GMO Genetically modified organism
GPN Global production network
GVC Global value chain
HRW Human Rights Watch
IADB Inter American Development Bank
ICBC Industrial & Commercial Bank of China
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Import substituting industrialization
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification
JSCB Joint-stock commercial bank
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
M&A Mergers and acquisitions
MEP Ministry of Environmental Protection
MFA Multi Fibre Arrangement
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFCOM Ministry of Foreign Commerce
NDB New Development Bank
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic
of China
NGO Non-governmental organization
NSSF National Social Security Fund
OBOR One Belt, One Road
ODA Official development assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFDI Outward direct foreign investment
xviii
List of Acronyms
OOF Other Official Finance

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRC People’s Republic of China
R&D Research and development
REER Real effective exchange rate
RMB RENMINBI
RTRS Round Table on Responsible Soy
SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange
SASAC State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration
SEZs Special Economic Zones
SIC SAFE Investment Company
SINOSURE China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation
SOE State-owned enterprises
SPR Strategic Petroleum Reserve
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SSI Sinope Sonangol International
SWF Sovereign wealth fund
TNC Transnational corporation
TVE Township and village enterprise
UN United Nations
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VAT Value added tax
WGI World Governance indicator
WTO World Trade Organization
xix
Introduction
China’s Re-emergence as a Global
Economic Power
The re-emergence of China as a major economic power has been a central

feature of globalization over the past four decades. It constitutes a significant
shift in the world economy’s centre of gravity to East Asia. In terms of gross
domestic product, China is now the world’s second-largest economy after the
US, which it is predicted to overtake by 2026 (EIU, 2015, p.3). It is the world’s
leading exporter, and a significant destination for, and increasingly a source
of, foreign direct investment (FDI). It has become a major centre of global
industrial accumulation, accounting for almost a quarter of worldwide manu-
facturing output. It is the most important consumer of many minerals and
industrial raw materials, and is an increasingly significant user of energy and
contributor to carbon emissions. It has the world’s largest foreign exchange
reserves and plays a growing role in international financial markets. All this
has profound effects on countries around the world.
The economic rise of China can be looked at through two lenses. The first,
looking from the outside in, emphasizes changes in the global capitalist econ-
omy that have led to the geographical reconfiguration of the world economy.
The second approach, looking from the inside out, emphasizes the internal
changes in China which have led to its economic transformation since the
introduction of economic reforms at the end of the 1970s (Hung, 2008).
The ‘outside-in’ approach sees China’s economic growth as primarily exter-
nally driven, reflecting a new phase of globalization. In this view, capitalist
accumulation faced increasing barriers in the developed world in the 1970s as
a result of falling profitability, rising wages, and an increasingly mobilized
working class (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 2007; Harvey, 2005). This led to
the abandonment of the Keynesian policies of the post-war consensus and
the adoption of neo-liberalism, particularly under Reagan in the US and
Thatcher in the UK. One of the strategies used by capital to restore profitabil-
ity was to move labour-intensive production offshore in order to reduce
production costs. This had started to happen in the 1960s, but it accelerated
in the 1980s.
In East Asia the ‘flying geese’ pattern in which certain Japanese industries
relocated to the newly industrializing countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore, had, by the 1980s, developed to a point where those
industries were now looking to relocate once more in the face of rising wages.
China’s economic reforms came at an opportune moment, and companies
relocated initially to the special economic zones that were created after 1978,
and then to other parts of the country.
In contrast, the ‘inside-out’ approach takes as its starting point the changes
that occurred in China after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The reforms
to economic policy started by Deng Xiaoping in 1978/9 unleashed a
dynamic process of growth and increased competiveness in China as it
moved from a centrally planned to a market economy (see Chapter 1).
High levels of investment and a rapid increase in exports led to China’s
rising share of world output and trade. Rapid growth in China made it an
attractive destination for foreign investors. Its eventual accession to the
World Trade Organization in 2001 gave a further boost to export growth,
which contributed to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. As
Chinese firms accumulated technological capabilities, they began to invest
and carry out construction projects abroad. China also became a more
important player in global financial markets as a result of lending by Chinese
banks, particularly the policy banks, and investment by its sovereign
wealth funds.
Both of these lenses provide important insights into the growing global
significance of China. The post-1980 phase of globalization set the context
within which the Chinese economy was able to grow so rapidly. A focus on
shifts in global patterns of accumulation and the organization of global pro-
duction networks is a reminder that the Chinese economy is part of a larger
whole. This underlines the fact that China’s economic growth involves a
range of Chinese and international actors, and has depended crucially on
access to foreign markets and foreign inputs, capital, and technology.
Without radical changes within China, however, it is unlikely that these
changes in the global economy would have been accompanied by such spec-
tacular economic growth. Internal changes also determine the characteristics
of China’s ‘socialist market economy’, which have implications both domes-
tically and internationally. Globalization set the context within which China
was able to grow, but the drivers of economic growth were internal to China.
It is, therefore, imperative to analyze at some length the key changes and
stages of economic reform and development (see Chapter 1).
2
Introduction
0.1 China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America

and the Caribbean
Both Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
have seen the influence of China increase significantly since the turn of the
century. China is now SSA’s most important trading partner, accounting for
more than a fifth of the region’s total trade. Chinese construction companies
are building roads, railways, dams, and stadiums, and other public buildings
across the region. China has also become an increasingly important source of
FDI, loans, and official development assistance (ODA) to SSA. The Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, at which major announcements are made concern-
ing China’s plans for increased trade with and finance to Africa, meets every
three years.
China is LAC’s second-largest trading partner after the US, and in several
countries, including Brazil, Chile, and Peru, it has overtaken the US. China has
lent more than $100 billion to countries in the region since 2007 and has
made significant investments in oil and mining. It is also involved in major
infrastructure projects in the region, most notably the planned canal in
Nicaragua linking the Caribbean and the Pacific. In 2015 it formalized its
relations with the region with the establishment of the Forum of China and
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.
China’s growing involvement in SSA has been a source of intense debate
(Mhandara et al., 2013). Critics of China’s relations with the region have
portrayed it as a new colonial power extracting natural resources with little
regard for the local population or the environment while supporting authori-
tarian regimes and intensifying corruption. As Lamido Sanusi (2013), former
governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, wrote in the Financial Times:
China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the
essence of colonialism. The British went to Africa and India to secure raw materials
and markets. Africa is now willingly opening itself up to a new form of imperialism.
These critics have been accused by their opponents of ‘China-bashing’ and of

following a Western agenda which sees China as a threat to its interests in
Africa (Hirono and Suzuki, 2014). They argue that on the contrary, the Sino-
SSA relationship is quite different from the colonial and neo-colonial relations
that existed with the West. China is seen as providing SSA with capital and
technology, as well as with a booming market for its exports, leading to the
revival of economic growth in the region in the twenty-first century. Zambian
economist Dambisa Moyo (2012a) writes:
China’s rush for resources has spawned much-needed trade and investment and
created a large market for African exports—a huge benefit for a continent seeking
rapid economic growth.
3
China’s commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other

countries and its provision of aid without any strings attached, in contrast
to the use of economic and political conditionality by Western donors and the
international financial institutions, is also emphasized (Wang and Ozanne,
2010).
In the case of LAC, while the debate has been less heated it is, nevertheless,
possible to discern significantly divergent views ( Jenkins, 2010a). A common
criticism is that China’s economic involvement has led to the recommodi-
fication of the region’s exports and deindustrialization, thus reproducing
the centre-periphery relations that historically characterized trade with
North America and Europe (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Rosales and
Kuwayama, 2012, Ch. II). There are also concerns, particularly on the political
right in the US, that China’s growing presence is threatening US influence and
encouraging left-wing governments in the region (Grudgings and Gardner,
2011). As in SSA, critics of China’s involvement have been accused of
Sinophobia and of propagating myths about Sino-LAC relations (Harris and
Arias, 2016).
The alternative view of Sino-LAC relations emphasizes South-South cooper-
ation, economic complementarity, and mutual benefits. This characterizes
official pronouncements. such as the Chinese government’s policy papers on
the region (PRC, 2008; 2016). Harris (2015) describes China in its relations with
LAC countries as ‘a peaceful panda bear’, which he contrasts with the critics’
view of ‘a roaring dragon’. More specifically, China is seen as having made an
important contribution to the region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global
financial crisis by coming to the rescue of LAC exports (ECLAC, 2010, p.10).
In practice much of the academic literature on the impacts of China on SSA
and LAC recognizes that the reality is more complex and varied than either of
these extremes. There are both positive and negative impacts of the growing
Chinese involvement in the two regions. In Latin America, particularly, some
countries are identified as ‘winners’, and others as ‘losers’, as a result of China’s
growth (Funakushi and Loser, 2005; Gonzalez, 2008). In SSA, too, there has been
some recognition that different countries have been affected differently
(Sindzingre, 2011; Zafar, 2007). However, much of the literature shares certain
basic assumptions characteristic of both the critics and the defenders of
China’s role.
Although this debate is highly polarized, both sides are state centric in their
focus on the actions of the Chinese state.1 They see China as a monolithic
1
As Alison Ayers (2013) notes in her analysis of the ‘new scramble for Africa’, ‘[t]he privileging
of nation-states as the fundamental units of analysis is characteristic not only of realist and liberal
perspectives in IR/IPE [international relations/international political economy] but also various
critical perspectives that have sought to understand the rise of the BRICs [Brazil, Russia, India,
China and South Africa], especially China’ (p.236).
4
Introduction
actor which pursues its interests globally. These interests are seen as either
benign, as portrayed in Chinese discourse on ‘peaceful development’ and the
‘harmonious world’, or as a challenge to the existing world order and an effort
to expand China’s global power, as seen by those who emphasize the ‘China
Threat’. Both sides also focus on the direct bilateral relations between China
and SSA or LAC countries, neglecting the indirect impacts of China’s increased
significance in the global economy. There is also a tendency in much of the
debate on China’s impact to focus exclusively on Chinese interests and
actions, and to see SSA and LAC as simply the beneficiaries or victims of
China’s international expansion, ignoring the role of local actors within the
two regions.
Inevitably, given the politicized nature of the media coverage of China’s
impacts on SSA and LAC, there is a tendency to present things in polarized
terms, emphasizing either the negative side or win-win scenarios. There is also
often a tendency on both sides of the debate to exaggerate the extent of
China’s influence in the two regions. The challenge in analysing China’s
growing significance for SSA and LAC is to provide an accurate picture of the
extent of its influence and to develop a critical account of its impact while
avoiding the ‘China-bashing’ that often characterizes media reports.
This book tries to achieve this by avoiding a state-centric approach to
China’s relations with SSA and LAC. It rejects the monolithic view of China
as a unitary actor pursuing a clearly defined coherent strategy in its approach
to the two regions. Although the Chinese government has issued two policy
papers on its relations with each region these are very broad statements
rather than coherent plans which the state implements (PRC, 2006, 2008,
2015, 2016). Chinese involvement is driven by the interests of a number of
actors including different ministries, provincial and municipal governments,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy and commercial banks, and private
companies.
In analyzing the significance of China for SSA and LAC, this study recog-
nizes that China’s growth has both direct impacts as a result of the countries’
bilateral relations, and indirect ones arising from China’s effects on global
markets and prices. This implies that even those countries whose bilateral
relations with China are limited can, nevertheless, be affected either positively
or negatively by the global economic impacts of China.2 While detailing the
bilateral economic relations between China and SSA and China and LAC, this
2
A similar point could be made in relation to China’s environmental impact on other countries,
which can arise both directly from, for example, the polluting activities of Chinese firms in a host
country, but also indirectly as a result of the contribution of Chinese greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions to global warming.
5
study goes further to consider not only the direct impacts of China but also its
indirect impacts on both regions.
There is, perhaps inevitably, a tendency to focus more on Chinese actors
and interests in a book which looks at the impact of China. However, it is
important to recognize the role played by SSA and LAC actors in terms of both
explaining the increased Chinese presence in the region and the impact of
this.3 While it is true that states in SSA and LAC have been largely reactive in
response to China’s growing involvement, it is also the case that the outcomes
for host countries and different groups within them depend on the responses
of local state and non-state actors.
Table 0.1. Examples of Possible Impacts of China on Developing Countries
Direct Effects Indirect Effects
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Trade Growth of exports Displacement of Increased world Competition from

to China local commodity prices Chinese goods in
producers by third markets
imports from
China
FDI & Inflows of Chinese Displacement of Integration into global Diversion of OECD
projects FDI & local firms by production networks FDI from
technology Chinese with Chinese firms developing
competitors countries to
China
Finance Additional Unsustainable New modes of Global effects of
resources for increases in international finance Chinese financial
investment indebtedness instability
in infrastructure
Social Employment Displacement of Increased government Downward
creation by communities revenues for social pressure on
Chinese firms by Chinese expenditure international
mines & labour standards
dams
Political Increased policy Support for Chinese support for Less international
space for SSA & authoritarian developing protection of
LAC states regimes countries’ positions human rights
in international
organizations
Environment Transfer of Chinese firms Reduced cost of Chinese
technologies for operating in technologies for greenhouse gas
renewables ecologically renewable energy emissions
fragile areas contributing to
global warming
Source: Own elaboration based on Kaplinsky and Messner (2008, Fig. 6)
3
On the importance of recognizing the agency of local actors, see Mohan and Lampert (2013)
and Corkin, 2013, Ch. 2) on SSA, and Levy (2015) on Latin America.
6
Introduction
Finally, this book emphasizes the heterogeneous impacts of China’s growth

on the two regions. Some of the policy-oriented literature discusses these
impacts in terms of ‘threats/challenges and opportunities’4 or ‘competitive
and complementary effects’ (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). This approach
opens up the possibility of a more differentiated perspective on China’s
impact which recognizes that it creates winners and losers both between and
within countries. The framework used in this book recognizes both positive
and negative impacts of China on SSA and LAC, and includes both direct and
indirect impacts.
Table 0.1 illustrates some of the potential impacts. The first three rows cover
those related to the economic impacts of China’s growing involvement in
trade, FDI, construction and engineering projects, and finance. The last three
rows include possible social, political, and environmental impacts. The first
two columns include the effects associated with China’s bilateral relations
with SSA and LAC, while the last two columns describe indirect impacts
arising from China’s effect on the global economy, governance, and environ-
ment. These are all discussed in detail in Parts II and III of the book.
0.2 Outline of the Book
This book sets out to answer a number of questions regarding the growing
involvement of China in SSA and LAC. First, is the hype regarding China’s role
really justified? How much impact has China’s re-emergence as a global
economic power had on the two regions? Next, what are the main channels
through which China is affecting SSA and LAC? What is the relative signifi-
cance of trade, FDI, engineering and construction projects, loans, and ODA
within the relationships? Then, what are the key drivers behind China’s
growing economic relations with SSA and LAC? Are the growing relations a
result of the strategic diplomatic or strategic economic interests of the Chinese
state or of the commercial motives of Chinese companies, and how are these
linked? Finally, the book considers the economic, social, political, and envir-
onmental implications for SSA and LAC of China’s growing significance. It
discusses how these impacts vary both between countries and between differ-
ent groups within countries.
The next chapter sets the scene by examining the transformation of the
Chinese economy since the start of the reforms in the late 1970s that led to
China’s integration into the global economy. It is not a comprehensive
account of China’s economic development, but rather it concentrates on
4
See Devlin et al. (2006) and Lederman et al. (2009) on Latin America, and Ajakaiye (2006) and
Knorringa (2009) on SSA.
7
those features that are essential to understanding the impacts that are
discussed later in the book. These include the growth of trade and FDI,
the development of the financial system, the changing nature of SOEs and
the growth of the private sector, the increases in productivity and wages,
and the effects of growth on natural resources and the environment.
The remainder of Part I consists of four chapters which discuss the most
important characteristics of China’s global economic integration. China is
best known as a manufacturing powerhouse, and Chapter 2 analyzes the
way in which it became a global centre for industrial production, paying
particular attention to the factors that underlie its global competitiveness. It
describes some of the key characteristics of its manufacturing sector, including
its integration into regional and global production networks, the role played
by inward investment, and the increasing technological sophistication of its
production.
The growth of industrial production and rising incomes in China led to a
rapid increase in demand for natural resources and industrial raw materials,
which was increasingly supplied by imports. China went from a marginal
player in global commodity markets to a key consumer with a significant
impact on their prices and organization. Chapter 3 documents its role in
different markets and its contribution to the commodity boom from 2002. It
discusses the strategies used to ensure a secure supply of key commodities, and
the specific characteristics of the Chinese market that make it different from
the developed-country markets to which SSA and LAC have traditionally
exported.
Not only is China a significant destination for FDI, but it has also emerged as
a source of outward FDI, and of non-equity forms of international expansion,
such as engineering and construction contracts. Chapter 4 documents this
growth and analyzes state and firm actors’ motives for investing abroad. A key
debate, the extent to which the internationalization of Chinese firms is
primarily state or market driven, is discussed.
The last chapter of Part I considers China’s growing role in international
finance. There is some confusion in the literature on China over the distinc-
tion between Chinese ‘aid’ and other forms of official finances provided by
Chinese banks. This has led to exaggerated accounts of the significance of
China’s financial contribution to the Global South. The chapter clarifies some
of these issues.
Part II of the book analyses China’s impact on SSA. Chapter 6 sets the
scene, documenting the growth of bilateral relations between China and the
region, focussing on trade, FDI, Chinese construction and engineering pro-
jects, and financial flows, and it identifies the main actors involved in these
relationships. The chapter discusses the role of China’s strategic diplomatic,
strategic economic, and commercial interests in its growing involvement
8
Introduction
in SSA, as well as African interests, before presenting an econometric analysis

of the key determinants of the different types of Chinese involvement in
the region.
Chapter 7 focuses on the key economic impacts of the growth of China,
considering both direct and indirect impacts on SSA. Particular attention is
paid to China’s direct and indirect impact on commodity exports, the
direct involvement of Chinese firms in infrastructure, and the direct and
indirect impacts on the manufacturing sector. These overviews are followed
by case studies of China’s economic impacts on Angola, Ethiopia, and
South Africa.
Part II concludes with a chapter discussing China’s social, political, and
environmental effects on SSA. These effects have been a particular target for
critics of China’s increasing influence in the region. On the social side, it has
been claimed that Chinese firms have preferred to employ Chinese rather
than African workers, and that wages and working conditions are poor and
labour rights frequently violated. China is also often criticized for its involve-
ment with undemocratic and corrupt regimes in SSA. Finally, China’s demand
for resources and the operations of Chinese firms in the region are criticized
for causing environmental degradation. The chapter considers these claims
and shows that the impacts are not universally negative, as some critics
suggest, and that local agency and context have an important effect on the
outcomes in different countries.
Part III is structured along the same lines as Part II to analyze Sino-LAC
relations. Chapter 9 provides background information on China’s economic
involvement in the region, the main actors involved, and the drivers of the
relationship. Chapter 10 considers the economic impacts of these relations,
with particular attention to the impact on commodity exports and prices and
the effects on the manufacturing sector. It concludes with case studies of
Brazil, Mexico, and Chile. Chapter 11 provides an analysis of the social,
political, and environmental impacts. In terms of social impacts, particular
attention is paid to that on local communities, while the section on China’s
political influence includes case studies of Brazil and Venezuela. Latin
America’s booming soybean industry is used to illustrate some of the envir-
onmental problems created by China’s growing demand.
Part IV contains two chapters by way of conclusion. Chapter 12 provides an
explicit discussion of the similarities and differences between China’s rela-
tions with and impacts on SSA and LAC, drawing on the two preceding parts.
It reinforces the conclusion that these impacts are heterogeneous, and that
specific local situations play an important part in determining the costs and
benefits. The final chapter looks at recent developments in China which are
likely to affect its relations with SSA and LAC in the future, paying particular
attention to the change to a slower rate of growth and greater emphasis on
9
household consumption and the quality of growth. It also considers the likely
effects of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy which has been closely associated
with President Xi Jinping. Finally, it considers the prospects for resolving
some of the problems which have characterized China’s relations with SSA
and LAC in recent years.
Several previous monographs and edited collections on China’s impact on
SSA and on LAC have addressed some or all of these questions. Although there
are many parallels between the two regions, no previous study has brought the
two cases together in a systematic way, as here. By highlighting both the
similarities and the differences between the two regions, this book brings
out the importance of specific local contexts and agency in explaining the
ways in which changing global patterns play out.
10
Part I
China and the Global Economy
The Transformation of the Chinese Economy
The growth of the Chinese economy since the late 1970s has been spectacular.
Gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an average of over 10 per cent per
annum until 2011, when the growth rate began to slow down, although still
achieving significant increases. At market exchange rates, China’s total GDP
overtook that of Germany, in 2007, and of Japan, in 2009, and it is now the
second-largest economy in the world. The Economist Intelligence Unit pre-
dicts that it will overtake the US in terms of total GDP by 2026 (EIU, 2015,
p.3). In purchasing power parity terms, the Chinese economy is already larger
than that of the US.1
Gross national income per capita in China increased more than twentyfold
between 1979 and 2012, taking it from a low- to an upper-middle-income
country in terms of the World Bank’s classification. This has led to a massive
reduction in poverty. The proportion of the population living below the
international poverty line fell from 88 per cent in 1981 to 6.5 per cent in
2012, reflecting an absolute reduction of over 500 million in the number of
people living in poverty, according to the World Bank.2
Economic growth has been driven by high levels of investment and rapid
export growth, which have led to significant structural change and product-
ivity increases. Investment levels were high and increasing over the period,
reaching over 40 per cent of GDP in the mid-2000s (Naughton, 2007, p.144).
Exports grew at almost 17 per cent per annum between 1980 and 2010
(UNCTADStat). The share of industry in total output increased, particularly
after 1990, to around 45 per cent of GDP (Naughton, 2007, Fig. 6.4). Estimates
put total factor productivity growth in China in the period at around 3 per
cent a year (Liu et al., 2014, pp.231–3).3
1
Purchasing power parity takes into account differences in countries’ price levels in order to
compare GDP.
2
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#3 (Accessed 26 Aug. 2016).
3
‘Total factor productivity growth’ refers to that part of the increase in output that is not
explained by increases in inputs such as capital and labour.
The remarkable performance of the Chinese economy over that period

followed major changes in economic policy after the death of Mao in 1976.
The period since then can be divided into four main phases. The first phase
from the late 1970s initiated the transition from a centrally planned to a
market economy, creating a ‘dual-track system’ Naughton, 2007. Table 4.1)
describes this as a period of ‘reform without losers’. The second phase began in
1992 with the Communist Party declaring its support for a ‘socialist market
economy’ and endorsing the extension of the market to all the major eco-
nomic sectors. In contrast to the earlier phase, this created losers, particularly
among state-owned enterprise (SOE) workers, as well as winners (ibid,
pp.106–7). In 2001 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) mark-
ing the start of a third phase characterized by further integration with the
global economy. Finally, since 2012, China has entered a new phase referred
to as the ‘New Normal’, which is characterized by slower growth and greater
emphasis on the quality of growth.
The initial reforms introduced under Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1978
focussed on agriculture and created what became known as the ‘household
responsibility system’. There was also an expansion of township and village
enterprises (TVEs) that played an important role in the Chinese economy in
the 1980s. These were not included within the plan, but they contributed
significantly to rural industrialization by producing inputs for agriculture and
basic consumer goods. Rural incomes increased rapidly, and the reforms
proved popular with the majority of the population in rural areas.
The success of reform in the rural areas encouraged Chinese policymakers to
extend the process. SOEs were also allowed to sell production in excess of that
required by the plan through the market, and to transact and cooperate with
non-state enterprises, giving them greater flexibility. This model of reform in
China in the 1980s has been described as a ‘dual-track system’ (Naughton,
2007, pp.91–2). It preserved the traditional system of central planning, which
guaranteed stability, and allowed the government to achieve key targets, while
at the same time allowing a market to develop for the allocation of particular
goods. This led to a two-tier pricing system, with many goods having a low
state-set planned price and a higher market price.4 The creation of Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979 was a further example of the dual-track
approach, which allowed foreign firms to enter China without affecting the
industrial activities of SOEs.
Several factors including rising inflation, anger at corruption, and growing
expectations of political reform led to increasing urban discontent during
1988–9 that culminated in government repression at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
4
The pricing system created incentives for rent seeking and corruption, with SOEs sometimes
able to buy inputs cheaply via the plan and then sell them at higher market prices.
14
In the aftermath, conservatives attempted to reverse the reforms but were

unsuccessful. In 1992 Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour launched a new phase
of reform. In October 1992 the Communist Party supported a ‘socialist
market economy’, endorsing the extension of the market to all the major
economic sectors. The growing significance of market relations in the 1980s
had rendered the system of central planning obsolete, and by the end of
1993, material balance planning had been abolished altogether, and the
dual system disappeared with a reunification of prices.
The second phase of reform saw China extending market relations domes-
tically and negotiating to join the WTO internationally. The process of
reforming state enterprises began with a new Company Law passed at the
end of 1993. The state sector was also downsized to focus on strategic indus-
tries and large firms with the policy of ‘grasping the big and letting go the
small’. Privatization, often through management buyouts, became common
from the mid-1990s, and the significance of the private sector in the economy
increased. The 1990s also saw significant changes in the banking and financial
system with the creation of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in
1992. There were also major reforms related to the external sector as China
prepared the way to join the WTO. In 1993 the foreign exchange regime was
unified, and current account convertibility was established. Trade was further
liberalized with significant tariff cuts and a reduction in the proportion of
imports subject to quotas.
A third phase of reform and development began in 2001 after China became
a member of the WTO. The rate of economic growth accelerated, as did the
growth of exports, until the global financial crisis in 2008. The boom in
exports, coupled with continuing inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI),
generated large balance of payments surpluses so that China accumulated
foreign exchange reserves and the government began to relax some of the
constraints on capital flows. Domestically, the period saw further growth in
the private sector and changes in the way that SOEs were managed to increase
their focus on profit and productivity. The position of SOEs in industries,
which the government considered strategic, was consolidated, and a group
of firms were identified as ‘national champions’. During this period, the
government also began to encourage Chinese firms to ‘go global’ through
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI).
The global financial crisis of 2008 interrupted the spectacular growth of the
Chinese economy, and exports fell in 2009. Growth resumed with a major
stimulus package introduced by the government in 2008, and since this was
targeted particularly at investment in infrastructure, it gave a boost to SOEs.
With the growth of world trade slowing down, the Chinese government
started to give greater emphasis to the expansion of the domestic market and
consumption rather than investment and exports. This led to new phase of
15
development referred to as the ‘New Normal’, with growth since 2012 of

around 6 or 7 per cent a year as opposed to 10 per cent, and a rebalancing of
the economy in favour of domestic consumption. There is more emphasis
given to the quality of economic growth, particularly in terms of its environ-
mental impacts, which had been largely ignored in previous periods. In 2013
President Xi Jinping gave further impetus to the international expansion of
Chinese firms with the launch of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, a major
infrastructure plan, that became a centrepiece of Chinese foreign policy.
This chapter does not attempt a comprehensive review of Chinese eco-
nomic development and economic policy. The focus is on those aspects
which are particularly relevant to understanding China’s impact on the global
economy. As such it begins with reforms that have affected trade and FDI,
before discussing the changes in the financial sector, enterprise reform, and
developments in the Chinese labour market. The final section considers the
impact of rapid growth on the environment and the demand for resources
in China.
1.1 Growing Integration with the Global Economy
One of the most striking features of China’s economic transformation has

been the increased integration with the global economy and its emergence as
the world’s largest exporter, a major destination for inward FDI and a growing
source of OFDI.
During the Maoist period, China emphasized self-reliance, particularly after
the break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s,
China was one of the most closed economies in the world, with total trade
(exports plus imports) never exceeding 10 per cent of GDP (Naughton, 2007,
p.377). The system of state control of foreign trade meant that the State
Planning Commission’s import plan covered over 90 per cent of all imports,
and that exports were also comprehensively planned (Branstetter and Lardy,
2008, p.634). Both inward and outward FDI were virtually non-existent during
the Maoist period. In 1978 twelve state trading companies controlled by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade were the only firms allowed to engage in inter-
national trade or invest outside China (ibid, Table 16.1). There were also severe
restrictions on FDI in China during the 1970s.
This started to change during the first phase of economic reform with a push
to expand exports and attract foreign investment. One of the first steps taken
was the creation of four SEZs in Shenzhen (next to Hong Kong), Zhubai (next
to Macao), Shantou (on the coast facing Taiwan), and Xiamen (across the
Taiwan straits from Taiwan). These zones were open to foreign investors
who wanted to establish plants in order to export goods from China without
16
being subjected to the restrictions on FDI and the bureaucracy and taxes that
applied to investments elsewhere in the country. These experiments were
extended from the mid-1980s with a second wave of liberalization which
declared fourteen new Open Port Cities, all of which set up Economic Trade
and Development Zones (ETDZs) that offered the same kind of incentives as
the SEZs (Naughton, 2007, pp.406–10). In 1986 significant liberalization of
FDI regulation was applied throughout China. These ‘22 Regulations’ reduced
corporate tax rates for foreign firms and lifted restrictions on profit remit-
tances. Export-oriented projects and those using advanced technology were
eligible for further benefits.
The result was a dual system, with a distinction drawn between ‘processing
trade’ and ‘ordinary trade’. The latter applied to products for sale on the
Chinese market or used as inputs for production for the domestic market
which, after the removal of the state monopoly of foreign trade, were subject
to a complex system of tariffs, quotas, and import licences which remained
quite restrictive during the 1980s (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008, pp.634–5).
‘Processing trade’ which applied to exporters was largely free of restrictions on
imports.
Despite these measures, FDI inflows remained modest during the 1980s.
Most FDI was in joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned firms were only
allowed in the SEZs. During the first phase of the reforms, FDI was largely
confined to export manufacturing, and foreign firms had little access to the
domestic market. Inflows were largely dominated by Hong Kong and Taiwan-
ese firms relocating labour-intensive activities to the SEZs and to the southern
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, which received a number of concessions
from the central government in the early 1980s to pursue their own, more
market-oriented, policies (Thoburn et al., 1991).
During the second phase of reform in the 1990s, steps were taken to open up
the economy further in preparation for membership of the WTO. This
involved significant reductions in the protection given to production for the
domestic market. Average tariffs fell from 43 to 15 per cent, and the propor-
tion of imports covered by quotas and licences from nearly half to less than
10 per cent between the late 1980s and 2001 (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008,
p.635).
The government also began to selectively open the domestic market to
foreign investors in this period. Urban real estate was opened up to foreign
investment. There was also a third wave of new ETDZs, with eighteen
approved in 1992–3 (Naughton, 2007, p.409). In 1995, the dualistic system,
which encouraged FDI in some sectors while protecting Chinese firms in
others, was formalized with the publication of The Catalogue Guiding Foreign
Investment in Industry, which listed those sectors where foreign investment
was encouraged, restricted, or prohibited (Breslin, 2009, p.87). This led to a
17
surge in inward investment in the 1990s with US, Japanese, and European
firms now beginning to invest in China on a significant scale. Total inflows of
FDI increased more than tenfold in current dollars, from $4.4 billion in 1991
to $44.9 billion a decade later, although a substantial part of this FDI consisted
of ‘round-tripping’, which involved Chinese firms taking money out of the
country to Hong Kong, Macao, and offshore financial centres, and bringing it
back as FDI.5
China became a member of the WTO in 2001, and committed itself to
further tariff reductions in subsequent years. Further liberalization of the
Chinese FDI regime was also required in order to meet WTO membership
requirements. Before joining the WTO, China had required foreign investors
to meet certain local content requirement or balance their trade by offsetting
their imports with exports. Approval of FDI projects was also often contingent
on conditions regarding technology transfer or the establishment of a research
centre in China. The WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement
outlawed many of these practices, and China agreed to abide by these rules
when it became a WTO member (Branstetter and Lardy, 2008, pp.651–2).
Despite this, China’s FDI policy remained restrictive compared to that of
other countries.6
The decade that followed China’s accession to the WTO saw a substantial
increase in its integration with the global economy. Exports grew rapidly
because Chinese exporters could now access foreign markets under the same
conditions as other WTO members. The average growth of exports doubled
from less than 15 per cent per annum in the 1980s and 1990s to over 30 per
cent in the mid-2000s (UNCTADStat). Although imports also grew rapidly,
reflecting the growing demand for raw materials and the significant imported
content of many of the manufactured goods that China exported, imports
lagged behind exports and China’s trade surplus grew from around $30 billion
a year in 2002–4 to $300 billion by 2008 prior to the global financial crisis.
Despite the comparatively restrictive FDI regime, the size and growth of the
Chinese economy has made it an attractive destination for foreign invest-
ment. Since joining the WTO, the stock of inward FDI in China has increased
more than sixfold in current dollars, from $203 billion in 2001 to $1,221
billion in 2015. In 2014 China was the largest recipient of FDI in the world,
ahead of the US, although the latter regained the top position in 2015
(UNCTAD, 2016, Fig. 1.4).
5
Estimates of the scale of round-tripping vary from around a quarter to more than a half of total
FDI flows to China in the 1990s and early 2000s (Xiao, 2004).
6
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) FDI
Restrictiveness Index, which covers a number of OECD and non-OECD countries, despite a
substantial reduction in the index for China since 1997, it remained the second most restrictive
country after the Philippines in 2015 (OECDStat).
18
Although China continues to be a major destination for FDI, the relative

significance of foreign firms in the Chinese economy has declined. The stock
of FDI as a share of GDP, and the share of foreign firms in industrial output,
peaked in 2003 (Huang, 2014, Fig. 14.4; Davies, 2013, Fig. 4). This does not
indicate a decline in foreign investors’ interest in China but rather the
increased competitiveness and growth of Chinese firms.
As a result of persistent trade surpluses and inflows of capital, China’s
foreign exchange reserves grew more than tenfold in less than a decade
(World Bank, World Development Indicators, n.d.). The bulk of the reserves
were held in US Treasury bills, but with low interest rates, this was not a
productive use of reserves, and the Chinese authorities have tried to diversify
their holdings and find alternative ways of utilizing these surpluses (see
Section 1.2).
One of these ways was through encouraging OFDI. During the first period of
economic reform, foreign exchange shortages and the priority given to
domestic accumulation meant that OFDI policy was highly restrictive. In the
1990s the approval procedures were gradually eased, and it became easier for
firms to obtain foreign exchange. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, regulation was tightened once more, and it became more
difficult to obtain foreign exchange for overseas investment.
The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001–5) and the adoption of a series of decrees
between 2000 and 2002 to regulate and promote OFDI (Shambaugh, 2013,
pp.174–6) marked the start of the ‘Go Out’ or ‘Go Global’ policy of encour-
aging Chinese firms to expand abroad. Over the past decade, government
policy towards OFDI has evolved in a number of ways (Rosen and
Hanemann, 2009, pp.11–12; Sauvant and Chen, 2014). The state, although
it can and still does intervene in high-profile investments, plays less of a
directive role and acts more as a regulator, allowing firms to make decisions
on commercial grounds. The approval procedures have been gradually eased,
and some of the decision-making decentralized to local agencies. Access
to foreign exchange for firms wanting to invest abroad has been eased by
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
The government has also increased incentives and support to firms expand-
ing abroad, including finance from the China Development Bank (CDB) and
the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank); subsidies through a fund
managed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Commerce;
tax deductions and exemptions; investment insurance from the China
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE); and the provision of
information on investment opportunities to Chinese companies. The Chinese
government has also been extremely active in signing bilateral investment
treaties, and in June 2013, it had agreements with 125 countries, second only
to Germany (Sauvant and Chen, 2014, pp.153–4).
19
These changes, together with the growing capabilities of Chinese compan-

ies, led to the rapid growth of OFDI since the early 2000s. This has consider-
ably narrowed the gap between inward and outward FDI in China. Despite the
relaxation of some of the approval procedures for OFDI, the state continues to
have a considerable influence on the scale and type of investment carried out
by Chinese firms. The incentives and other state support also provide an
important means of influencing outward investment.
1.2 The Financial Sector
During the pre-reform era, the People’s Bank of China was the only bank in
the country, referred to as the ‘monobank’. The first phase of reform saw the
break-up of the monobank in the early 1980s, to create four state-owned
commercial banks: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which
was responsible for lending and deposit taking in urban areas; the Agricultural
Bank of China, which did the same in rural areas; the China Construction
Bank, focussing on project finance; and the Bank of China, which dealt with
foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions. The People’s Bank of China,
which had previously been both a central bank and a commercial bank under
the MOF, became a separate entity, transferring its commercial banking oper-
ations to the ‘Big Four’ (Allen et al., 2008; Naughton, 2007, pp.454–6).
The second phase of reform in the 1990s saw a new round of banking
reforms beginning in 1994, to allow the commercial banks more independ-
ence from the government so that they could operate on a more commercial
basis. At the same time, three ‘policy banks’, the CDB, the Exim Bank, and the
Agricultural Development Bank, were created to carry out lending that was
specifically related to government policy objectives and which would not
necessarily generate a commercial rate of return. The CDB and the Exim
Bank later expanded their international operations becoming the major chan-
nels for Chinese loans to Africa and Latin America.
A number of new joint-stock commercial banks ( JSCBs) were also created in
the late 1980s and 1990s, many linked to local rather than central government
and with the participation of both SOEs and non-SOEs. Eleven JSCBs were
created between 1986 and 2001, which increased competition in the banking
system (Naughton, 2007, p.456). In 1998 the PBC was also restructured, and
shortly afterwards, steps were taken to deal with problems arising from the
weakness of financial supervision and build-up of non-performing loans in
the state banking system (Naughton, 2007, pp.103–4).
Further reforms to the domestic financial system took place after China
joined the WTO. In 2003 the regulatory functions of the PBC were transferred
to a newly created China Bank Regulatory Commission. As a result of its
20
accession to the WTO, China agreed to allow foreign banks to operate in

China from 2006. However, other restrictions have meant that the share of
total banking assets controlled by foreign banks in China has remained
minimal.
The Chinese government attempted to insulate the domestic financial
market from international capital markets, maintaining tight capital controls
during the early years of economic reform up until the mid-1990s. There was a
dual exchange rate with a high official rate and a much lower market-oriented
rate that was available only to licensed foreign trade organizations. In 1994
these two rates were unified, and two years later, the government liberalized
the current account, signing up to Article VIII of the International Monetary
Fund and announcing its intention to fully liberalize the capital account by
2000.7 However, the East Asian Financial Crisis which broke out in 1997 led to
a renewed strengthening of capital controls to clamp down on capital flight.
A new round of liberalization of capital flows began late in 2002, following
China’s entry into the WTO. China’s Balance of Payments current and finan-
cial account surpluses surged as both exports and inward FDI grew rapidly. As
a result China accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves which came to
US$3.9 trillion by 2014, the largest total of any country (World Bank, World
Development Indicators, n.d.). Initially much of this was held in US Treasury
securities, of which China has been the largest holder in recent years. How-
ever, the return on these was very low, and the depreciation of the dollar
meant that the government was effectively suffering a loss through holding
them.8 In recent years, therefore, it has sought to diversify its overseas hold-
ings and encourage investment in assets which can generate higher returns.
This partly explains the liberalization of outward investment discussed in the
previous section, but it has also involved the relaxation of controls on other
forms of capital outflows. Two sovereign wealth funds, the China Investment
Corporation and the SAFE Investment Company, were set up to invest a
portion of the country’s reserves. China’s policy banks and commercial
banks also became increasingly involved in lending abroad through medium-
and long-term loans and export credits.
Despite the steps taken to liberalize foreign transactions, capital controls
remain pervasive in comparison with other emerging markets, and most types
of capital outflows either require approval or are subject to quota restrictions
(Bayoumi and Ohnsorge, 2013, p.4). According to various indicators of
7
Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund requires currency convertibility for current
account transactions, i.e. primarily those involving transactions in goods and services.
8
Hanemann and Rosen (2013), Figure 8, shows that the implied return on Chinese foreign
assets in the late 1990s and early 2000s was only around 2 per cent. Santiso, ed. (2013) estimates
that in real terms, China was incurring large losses on its foreign exchange reserves, which came to
$125 billion in 2009 as a result of the depreciation of the dollar against the RMB.
21
financial openness, China still has the least open financial sector of any major
economy (Kroeber, 2016, p.148).
1.3 SOEs and Enterprise Reform
Prior to the start of the reforms, virtually all industrial production in China
was in the hands of the state, either through SOEs directly controlled by the
relevant government ministry or in ‘collective enterprises’ nominally owned
by the employees but in practice controlled by local government or other state
organizations. A key feature of the transformation of the Chinese economy
has been the change in the role played by SOEs and privately owned firms. It is
clear that the private sector has become a much more significant economic
actor since 1978 (Lardy, 2014).
However, it is difficult to analyze this simply in terms of changes in the
shares of SOEs and private firms in output, employment or assets since the
boundary between them is blurred (Milhaupt and Zheng, 2015). First, Chinese
statistics are often contradictory, and the distinctions between different forms
of ownership are not always clear, with definitions changing over time.9
Second, changes in governance and managerial incentives may be as or even
more important as changes in formal ownership in understanding the roles
played by state and private firms, so that focussing merely on the shares of
different types of firms may at best only give a partial picture. Third, firms
which are formally privately owned may be highly dependent on their links
with the state: ‘private but not independent’ (Breslin, 2010, pp.23–5). Fourth,
state-owned firms may vary considerably in terms of the degree to which they
are effectively controlled by the state.
In contrast to the ‘Big Bang’ approach used in the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe to transfer SOEs to the private sector, the Chinese government
adopted a gradualist approach, concentrating initially on changing the way in
which SOEs were managed and allowing alternative forms of ownership to
grow up alongside them. In the 1980s state control was decentralized to the
provincial, municipal, and township levels, which increased competition
between different areas to attract resources (Guthrie et al., 2015, p.77). The
government also reformed the incentive system, so that managers would
become more concerned with increasing the efficiency and productivity of
their firms. This gave rise to a more market-oriented approach in which
managers had increased power to make key economic decisions (Naughton,
2007. pp.310–13).
9
See Lardy (2014, Ch.3) for a detailed account of the problems of estimating the share of
Chinese production according to type of ownership.
22
The adoption of a ‘socialist market economy’ in 1992 marked the start of a

decade of radical change during which the state sector was subject to a wave of
market-oriented reforms and SOEs were forced to adapt to market competi-
tion, shut down or move out of the state sector. The process of the corporat-
ization of SOEs began in 1993, with the setting out of a blueprint for adopting
what was termed a ‘modern enterprise system’. In 1994 a Company Law
was passed, which provided a clearer separation between ownership and
management in SOEs and made it possible to create better incentive systems
for managers. In 1995 the Central Committee of the Communist Party
announced the ‘grasping the large, letting go the small’ policy (Breslin,
2010, p.8). This maintained central government control of the ‘commanding
heights’ of the economy while allowing competitive sectors that were of no
strategic significance to be opened up to the private sector. Many locally
owned SOEs and collective enterprises were privatized through employee
buyouts.10 Tens of thousands of ‘zombie’ SOEs that had been kept in produc-
tion by government loans and subsidies were closed down, and millions of
SOE employees laid off. The number of SOEs fell from more than 100,000 in
1993 to less than 30,000 in 2002 (Song, 2014, p.189).
By the early 2000s, the process of replacing a planned economy with a
‘socialist market economy’ was largely complete, and most prices were deter-
mined by market forces. This was followed by a period of consolidation. In
2003 the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) was created to hold the assets of central SOEs, and in 2004, local
SASACs were set up at provincial level to own local-level SOEs. SASAC oper-
ated as a holding company, and this tended to increase the SOEs’ emphasis on
profitability and shareholder value. SOEs were encouraged to merge and
consolidate into large groups. By 2010 the number of core companies owned
by SASAC had been reduced to 121, but the total number of companies under
SASAC control came to 23,738, an average of almost 200 subsidiaries per core
company (Naughton, 2015, p.53). In 2001 a target of creating between thirty
and fifty national champions by 2010 was set (Pearson, 2015, p.33). Not all
national champions were state owned: some, such as the Shanghai Automo-
tive Industry Corporation, were owned by local authorities, and others, such
as Huawei, were privately owned.
10
Although initially these involved worker buyouts, they were soon eclipsed by ‘elite’ forms of
ownership transfers to managers and relatives of government officials (Breslin, 2010, p.9). Some
nominally collective firms were in any case in fact privately run firms registered as collectives to
take advantage of the benefits that this status brought. In 1998 the government issued a policy to
encourage such firms to ‘take off the red hat’, leading to a significant reduction in the reported
share of industrial production accounted for by collective enterprises in subsequent years (Song,
2014, p.189).
23
The period saw further rapid growth of the domestic private sector, which
increased its share of industrial output from less than 10 per cent in 2001 to
almost 30 per cent in 2008.11 Foreign firms also continue to play a significant
role in China, and despite the decline in their share in recent years, they
account for 30 per cent of industrial output and almost half of Chinese
exports. Over the same period, the share of SOEs in industrial output fell
from 45 per cent in 2001 to less than 30 per cent in 2008 (Song, 2014,
Fig. 12.5). Although there has been talk of ‘the state advancing and the private
sector retreating’ in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, what in fact
appears to have happened is that the pace at which the share of the private
sector is increasing has slowed down (Kroeber, 2016, pp.106–7). The economic
stimulus created by the government to deal with the effects of the financial
crisis has been largely implemented through SOEs, giving them a boost
(Fan and Hope, 2013, p.4).
Pearson (2015) identifies three tiers of business in China. The top tier is
made up of central SOEs in strategic industries such as defence, finance, oil
and gas, petrochemicals, electricity, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation,
and shipping. These industries are considered strategic in terms of national
security. Indeed Chinese political leaders have increasingly used both trad-
itional national defence and ‘economic security’ to justify public ownership in
these sectors (Tsai and Naughton, 2015, p.9). These companies control the
‘commanding heights’ of the Chinese economy and are very large. In 2014,
fifty-nine centrally owned Chinese SOEs were listed in Fortune’s Global 500
list of the largest firms in the world in terms of revenue (Kroeber, 2016, p.100).
A middle tier is made up of firms in sectors which have been classified as
‘pillar industries’. These include heavy industrial machinery, automobiles,
information technology, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, steel, and base
metals. In this tier there is a mix of ownership, including some centrally
owned SOEs, large provincial or municipally owned SOEs, and large privately
owned firms (Pearson, 2015, p.34). Although on average, local SOEs are much
smaller than those under central control, some, such as Shanghai Automotive
Industry Corporation and Hebei Group, China’s largest steel producer, are
very large companies. Twenty-three local SOEs are included in the Fortune
Global 500 list. There are also a number of large privately owned companies
such as Huawei and ZTE,12 and ten of these made it on to the Fortune list
(Kroeber, 2016, p.100).
The bottom tier comprises the vast majority of firms in China and is made
up of largely competitive industries where barriers to entry are low. This tier is
11
These figures refer to firms with annual sales of more than RMB 5 million.
12
ZTE is sometimes regarded as an SOE and sometimes as a private company (Milhaupt and
Zheng, 2015, pp.674–6).
24
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
scarlatto in viso e risposi che no — Egli è (aggiunse Lisia) il figlio del
Conte signore del nostro paese, al quale ognuno presta omaggio ed
obbedienza; è ricchissimo e potente ed il più bello e valoroso giovine
di tutte le terre del Lago. Ei vi conosce e so di lui tal cosa che vi
farebbe andare orgogliosa fra le fanciulle d’Arona e fors’anco della
stessa Milano — E che sai tu? — non potei astenermi dal
domandarle — So ch’egli è preso per voi da ardentissimo amore. —
«Ah Lisia! Lisia! — esclamò Agnese dimenando il capo.
«D’onde apprendesti una tal cosa? (soggiunsi io) e chi ti fa ardita a
tenermi somiglianti ragionamenti? — Non v’avrei mossa parola
(rispose Lisia), se non fossi ben certa che l’amor suo è onesto e
sincero. Che tale ei sia ve ne faccia prova la protesta uscita dalle
sue labbra che se voi lo amate d’eguale amore, egli vi si vuole
dichiarare fidanzato e non dubita d’ottenervi da suo padre in donna,
poichè è istruito che il vostro sangue non è volgare ed avete
facoltosi parenti. Qual consolazione, qual trasporto recassero in me
questi detti non è possibile descriverlo; il pensiero di diventare la
sposa di lui che colla sola lontana presenza formava tutte le mie
delizie, superava ogni piu ardita speranza.
«E tutto ciò (profferì Agnese con voce cupa) non era forse che un
empio inganno?
«Che dite mai? era la pura inalterata verità. Egli aveva realmente
manifestati i sentimenti suoi; sì mi amava più di se stesso, lo ripetè
mille volte alla mia presenza, nè quel cuore sapeva mentire. Oh con
quanto ardore ci giurammo poscia fedeltà eterna avanti la
sacrosanta Immagine della Vergine!
«Dunque poteste avere prestamente colloquio seco lui. Come mai
ciò avvenne senza che mio padre penetrasse l’arcano?
«Un ombroso sentiero guida con breve cammino dalle mura d’Arona
ai margini della Vevra. Là dove le limpide acque di quel torrente
abbandonati i balzi della rupe s’internano fra i recessi di un’amena
selva, sorge una cappelletta, rifugio de’ pastori nelle procelle, ivi un
giorno fui scontrata da lui, e divenne quindi il luogo de’ nostri
convegni. Io mi recai colà accompagnata dalla Lisia nell’ora che
precede il declinare del giorno e vedeva discendere il mio Guido
dall’alto del colle d’onde aveva attesa e spiata la mia venuta.
Ragionamenti i più soavi, leali e tenere espressioni, parole
incantevoli rendevano ognora troppo fuggitivi quegli istanti; era in
esso poi un rispetto, una devozione sì gentile e completa che in me
duplicava la gara d’amore. Ah! Agnese, vicina a lui sembravami che
una luce più splendida e pura investisse gli oggetti: ogni cosa mi
pareva beata come l’anima mia!...
Dipingevasi sul volto con ammirabile sorriso l’intimo inesplicabile
diletto che dal rammentare que’ felici momenti scaturiva in cuore ad
Ingelinda, in cui la perduta virtù visiva rendeva più fervido e sensibile
l’interno immaginare. Ma come raggio in tempesta fu rapida quella
gioja, e più dolorosa tornò la mestizia a diffondersi sulla pallida
faccia.
«Da tanta contentezza a tanti affanni! — Pronunciò fra se stessa
Agnese rimirando que’ lineamenti, e rivolta alla Suora, temperando
affabilmente la voce proseguì. «Partita voi da Arona, il Cavaliere, se
ben compresi, continuò venirvi a rivedere nella terra di Lesa: vostra
madre avrà dovuto allora esserne resa consapevole?
«Quando, trascorsi più di sei mesi, feci ritorno a casa, trovai mia
madre estenuata, languente. Nel lungo amplesso con cui m’accolse
inondandomi di lagrime, mi rimproverava la prolungata assenza. Le
sue parole erano spine al mio cuore; appena rimanemmo sole, mi
gettai di nuovo nelle sue braccia e tutto le feci aperto il secreto amor
mio. Ella m’ascoltò intenerita, poscia mi domandò ripetutamente s’io
non temeva che si celasse sotto le dolci parole menzogna o
tradimento — Madre le dissi, se approvate il nostro amore verrà egli
stesso a ripetere i suoi giuri innanzi a voi. — Ebbene (rispose dessa)
s’egli è uomo secondo il tuo cuore il cielo adempia le vostre
promesse. — Venne; mia madre lo vide, l’ascoltò, e ben presto l’amò
qual figlio; e di chi quell’angelo non s’avrebbe guadagnato l’affetto?
Fu allora stabilito ch’entro un anno sarei divenuta sua sposa.
«Se vostra madre assentiva perchè frapporre tanto indugio alle
nozze?
«Ohimè! Quello spazio di tempo fu giudicato indispensabile. A capo
ad un anno il mio Guido diveniva per età signore di sè stesso, per
ciò potendo farmi sua liberamente, non temeva, s’anco si
dimostrasse sottomesso al genitore, che questi fosse per rigettare la
sua inchiesta e rifiutare di ricevermi per nuora. Nè m’era grave
l’attendere: egli presso che ogni giorno approdava veleggiando a
Lesa o vi veniva sul suo corsiero. Io gli usciva incontro e alla sua
vista il mio cuore tremava e addoppiava i palpiti con tanta veemenza
che pareva volesse uscirmi dal petto; giunto a me vicino
riconducevami lungo il lido a casa, rimanendo quivi con noi sino
all’imbrunire. I suoi accenti affettuosi e fervidi erano per me un
balsamo soave, e valevano a temperare la pena che mi stava in
petto per lo stato infelice della mia povera madre.
«La sua salute continuava dunque ad essere mal ferma? Dopo il
vostro ritorno era a sperarsi che le di lei infermità si dissipassero.
«Al contrario, i di lei patimenti ogni dì aumentavano, e la vedeva
deperire ad onta delle mie più assidue cure. Mai però un lamento
uscì dalla sua bocca; e quand’io accorgendomi ch’ella pur tanto
soffriva, prorompendo in pianto dirotto nascondeva la mia faccia tra
le sue coltri. — Non t’addolorare Ingelinda (mi diceva
accarezzandomi), i miei mali saranno di breve durata, e s’ho a
morire muoio contenta giacchè ti lascio affidata al più virtuoso
giovine, al più leale dei cavalieri, il quale formerà la consolazione di
tutti i tuoi giorni, ciò che fu sempre l’unica meta de’ miei desiderj. —
Ah madre adorabile se sapeste che il cielo ben lungi dal verificare le
vostre parole mi rese la più afflitta di tutte le creature! che per la
vostra Ingelinda non corsero più che giorni d’amarezza e di pianto!
«Sventurata fanciulla!... Ma ancora non intendo...
«Udite. Ruppe in quel tempo la guerra tra gli Svizzeri collegati con
quei di Francia e il Duca. Una grossa banda nemica sbucando dalle
montagne improvvisamente invase i confini dell’Ossola. Tosto tutto il
paese fu in armi: il mio Guido, pel primo chiamato dal padre a
capitanare la schiera, lasciare mi dovette e partire. Io non vi potrei
dipingere il mio stato: peggiorava gravemente mia madre; dalle
novelle che provenivano dall’alta valle sapevasi che le zuffe
s’avvicendavano sanguinosissime. Ad ogni tratto soldati mutilati o
feriti passavano a drappelli da Lesa: io faceva porgere loro tutti quei
soccorsi che meglio poteva, e ansiosa chiedeva ad essi dell’amor
mio — Egli è la prima spada del campo (rispondevanmi) combatte
da valoroso e cerca d’opporre un argine possente al soverchiare de’
nemici. — Oh cielo qual cuore era il mio! mai s’asciugavano ne’ miei
occhi le lagrime. Finalmente un giorno... agghiaccio tutta nei dirlo!...
venne l’orrendo annunzio che Guido era stato veduto cadere
pugnando dall’erta d’una rupe, ove s’avventò troppo arditamente, e
che precipitato dalla balza nei profondi burroni la salma di lui giaceva
insepolta insieme a quelle di tanti altri guerrieri... A tal disastro
l’animo non resse: caddi svenuta a piè del letto di mia madre
agonizzante... e quando rinvenni in me stessa, sommo Iddio! ella era
morta.
«Oh tremendo caso!... Il conte Guido però diceste che non era
perito?
«No: ma in me fu irreparabile il colpo. I nodi che mi univano
all’esistenza s’erano come troncati per istantanea forza; lo strazio
estremo cagionò una lenta febbre che logorando consumava le
potenze della mia vita. Il pianto s’inaridì; le mie pupille esauste,
cocenti più non sostennero la luce, e a poco a poco, per eccesso di
desolazione, un nero insollevabil velo le ricoprì in eterno.
«Mi si spezza il cuore!... (esclamò Agnese con voce di pianto).
«Quando fui ridotta in sì orribile stato, e condannata solitaria a
divorare entro me medesima l’acerbissima mia pena, allora seppi
che Guido viveva ancora, poichè il capo di quella banda nemica
contro cui erasi slanciato riconosciutolo all’atto della mischia, quando
lo vide dal numero de’ suoi atterrato e ferito, lo fece trasportare giù
del monte. Avviatolo poi secretamente nell’interno paese, sperando
più grossa somma pel di lui riscatto lo tenne rinchiuso prigioniero in
un inaccessibile castello, d’onde fermata che fu dopo due mesi la
tregua, spedì un messo al Conte in Arona per trattare della
liberazione del figlio.
«Qual gioja a tale notizia per la famiglia di lui, che sino a quel tempo
sarà pure stata avvolta nel fatale vostro errore?
«Oh sì in essa quanto insperata tanto piu grande e intera fu la
consolazione.
«E in voi?
«In me... oh Dio!... in me, non lo chiedete. Sentii più gravemente il
peso de’ miei mali. Forse se l’avessi invocato quel generoso cuore
non avrebbe abbandonata e respinta un’infelice, priva per cagion
sua del più prezioso de’ sensi. Ma nol volli: una cieca non era più
degna di lui, nè io doveva colla mia presenza rattristare tutti i suoi
giorni. Unica a confortarmi sorse in me la speranza ch’ei mi terrebbe
ognora impressa in seno, e che all’annunzio della cruda sventura
della sua Ingelinda avrebbe versato lagrime sincere. Ciò tolse in
parte l’asprezza de’ miei affanni; si riaprì la vena del pianto, la mente
sollevata potè effondersi in fervidissima preghiera, onde mi sottoposi
più umiliata ai divini decreti, ed aspirai ad una pace che m’era da
prima inconcepibile. Feci riferire allo Zio la mia volontà di essere
rinchiusa in questo Monastero, al quale faceva dono de’ miei beni ed
ove sarei stata ricevuta, sendovi parente la Badessa, e Voi già suora
da più anni, Voi di cui mi risovvenni con tanto affetto.
«Oh amata cugina! — disse Agnese con tal dolcezza che
contraccambiava la manifestazione di quella riconoscente
rimembranza. E aggiunse: «Aveva il conte Guido già fatto ritorno dal
paese nemico, quando voi qui venendo abbandonaste la casa
paterna?
«Egli era atteso di que’ giorni ed io volli evitare la tremenda prova di
saperlo vicino. Mi feci condurre al letto ove morì mia madre, lo baciai
e bagnai di lagrime, indi, dato a tutti un ultimo addio, fra il loro
compianto me ne partii. Il mio sagrificio fu immenso è vero; ma
sapete voi comprendere sorella, l’angoscia del sentirsi d’appresso
un essere che si adora e non potere squarciare le tenebre d’una
perpetua notte per contemplare almeno un istante sul suo viso
l’espressione dell’amore?
Tacque Agnese dal dolore impedita, poi frenando a stento i
singhiozzi rispose «Ah sì m’immagino quanto grave e crudele deve
essere il mancare dell’uso delle pupille tanto necessarie ad ogni atto
della vita, e per cui si scoprono ed ammirano le meraviglie operate
dalla mano del Creatore.
«Talvolta (profferì Ingelinda) mi si affaccia con terrore il pensiero che
dalla oscurità in cui giaccio vivente, abbia a passare a quella della
morte e rimanervi eternamente sepolta.
«Non lo temere, o sconsolata! (rispose l’altra con pietoso
entusiasmo) Verrà il dì, ne son certa, che in premio di tanto soffrire
godrà la vostr’anima dello splendore de’ cieli, e di tutte le sue
beatitudini.
«Oh vorrei solo che mi fosse dato rivedere il caro lume del giorno, e
il sole diffuso raggiante indorare le mie rive ed i monti, vorrei
ricongiungermi a mia madre, e... per colmo di contentezza... ohimè
che dissi?... l’ho perduto per sempre.
Uno scoppio amarissimo di pianto le concesse appena di profferire
quest’ultime parole.
L’estremo raggio del crepuscolo penetrando fra i rami, mesceva al
pallore del volto di lei un’incerta moribonda luce, che le faceva
prendere aspetto d’una larva addolorata, apparsa a gemere in que’
silenzii le colpe del cuore. Agnese asciugandosi tacitamente le
lagrime le offrì il braccio, e dolcemente sollevandola si rinviarono
insieme alle loro romite cellette.
FINE DELL’INGELINDA.
IL BRAVO E LA DAMA
SCENA STORICA
Era suonata l’Avemaria. Milo il biondo, Bravo del Conte P..... se ne

ritornava passo passo per una delle strade più solitarie di Milano, giù
dal ponte di Porta Romana. Aveva accompagnato il padrone nella
solita casa, ove recavasi alla serale adunanza.
Non era stato d’uopo per rischiarare la via di accendere l’occhio di
bue (lucernetta d’ottone e cristallo), giacchè splendeva la più bella
luna, che mai si potesse dire. Egli veniva lentamente or cantando
ora zufolando alla distesa: teneva la destra mano appoggiata alla
cintura dello spadone, e colla sinistra faceva varii moti, onde far
brillare al raggio della luna una falsa gemma che portava in dito,
legata in largo anello d’argento. La strada era per metà rischiarata
dalla luna, e sull’altra metà batteva l’ombra d’un lungo muro di
giardino, sul quale sopravanzavano gruppi di piante ed alberi isolati,
che accrescevano in varia foggia la linea oscura, interrotta in certo
punto da uno spazio, in cui non riflettevansi sul terreno che le aste
del cancello, il quale serviva di porta.
Milo cantava; il suo spirito era sereno al pari del cielo, che gli stava
di sopra ed a cui alzava di tratto in tratto gli occhi, siccome ad un
vasto padiglione turchino trapunto di stelle, senza pur sognare nè la
pluralità dei mondi, nè l’infinità dello spazio. Aveva un cappelletto
acuminato, da cui pendevano varie fettucce di velluto: e lo portava
obbliquo sulla rete, che gl’involgeva la capigliatura folta e bionda, dal
colore della quale aveva ricevuto il soprannome: da ciascuna delle
tempia gli ricadevano due ciocche attortigliate a modo di treccia
riunite da picciol nastro all’estremità. Non aveva affatto nè
mustacchi, nè barba: il suo collo era nudo e slanciato; portava un
farsetto bruno, ingombro sul davanti di catenelle e gale, tra cui
usciva luccicante l’impugnatura d’acciajo d’un coltello stilato.
Zufolando le note allegre e acute della pavaniglia, sentì da un albero
un usignuolo gorgheggiare più vivacemente dopo il ritornello: egli
s’arrestò un momento ad ascoltarlo; poi ricalcando la via, prese a
cantare la canzone a serenata, che fra il popolo era allora di moda; e
cominciò con voce spiegata ed alta:
«Mi vo’ trasformar grillo per cantare,

«Mi voglio per dolcezza far sentire
«La notte quando tu stai a dormire».
«La notte quando tu stai a dormire».
«Oh bella, che c’è? — (esclamò, porgendo l’orecchio e fermandosi

sui due piedi, colpito dal suono di due bellissime voci femminili, che
avevano in armonia e con più lenta cadenza ripetuto l’ultimo suo
verso). — Sono lì dentro il muro del giardino: ragazze allegre: mi
berteggiano; lasciamole fare:
«Tu sei un fior di giglio un fior di pepe:

«Io giro intorno a te, come fa l’ape,
«Che gira intorno al fiore della siepe».
«Che gira intorno al fiore della siepe».
Così le voci risposero, come prima, da dentro il muro; ma erano

venute avanzandosi e corrispondevano al punto della strada, ove
trovavasi Milo. Questi proseguì in tuono più lieto:
«Mira che bel seren, che belle stelle;

«Questa è la notte da invitar zitelle
«A passeggiar nei campi al chiar di luna».
«A passeggiar nei campi....

— Ah!... Ah!... — udì Milo, che giunto al cancello del giardino vi si
affacciò per guardar dentro; e vide due giovani donne fuggire rapide
fra mezzo ai cespugli ed alle piante e sparire nell’ombra fitta
dell’ampio palazzo, che vedevasi sorgere in fondo al viale di
prospetto al cancello, e dalla cui nera fronte alcune finestre
lasciavano trasparire bagliore di lumi.
Milo dopo qualche istante se ne partì di là meno gajo di quello che vi
fosse venuto; poiche nella sua mente pullularono cento vaghi e
straordinarii pensieri.
Non eravi, per far contenta certa specie di uomini, miglior mestiero di
quello di Bravo, quando il servigio fosse in città presso una famiglia
ricca, potente e poco facinorosa, qual era appunto quella, ove
trovavasi Milo. I bravi, o buli, in tal condizione, pretendevano differire
grandemente da quelli della classe più infima e scellerata, che
appellavansi mazzadori (vedi qual nome!), ed erano sicarii
unicamente prezzolati per la commissione dei delitti; volevano
essere invece una specie di Guardia del corpo; nè alcuno ignora la
vita lieta che conduceva in quei tempi una tale milizia.
Con grosso salario, ottimo pasto, senza tema nè di sbirraglia nè di
giustizia, protetto dal nome e dal lustro della casa, che lo pagava, e
che esso alla sua volta proteggeva colla propria forza, distinto dal
rimanente della servitù, nè obbligato ad alcun basso e laborioso
ufficio, un Bravo, se non aveva a seguire il padrone in viaggio, alla
caccia, in qualche spedizione amorosa o nelle passeggiate notturne,
a null’altro ordinariamente pensava, che a perfezionarsi nel
maneggio delle armi proditorie e ad abbandonarsi coi compagni al
giuoco, all’intemperanza e ad ogni sorta d’obbrobrioso solazzo, chè
per tale audace e fiera genìa nulla v’era di vietato e d’illecito.
Milo era figlio del torno, come soleva dire il volgo agli esposti. Tolto
infante a quell’ospizio da un vecchio servo senza prole, crescendo
esso bello e vigoroso e appalesando armigere inclinazioni, venne dal
suo adottante collocato in qualità di Bravo nella casa dei Conti P.....,
una delle più cospicue di Milano. Benchè fossero già alcuni anni che
quivi esercitasse tale professione e avesse avuto modo di riceverne
tutta la ferrea tempra, pure per vero dire conservava nei tratti e nel
carattere un non so che d’affabile, s’aveva un brio ed una giocondità
civile e mansueta, ch’erano qualità rarissime fra individui del suo
stato. L’affabilità e la dolcezza sua non lo rendevano però meno
proclive al risentimento, meno insofferente d’ogni contraddizione e
d’ogni contrasto, meno feroce nell’ira e implacabile nella vendetta;
giacchè questi sendo difetti precipui e universali del secolo,
divenivano natura e doveri per i suoi pari.
Quella sera Milo evitare voleva di recarsi alla taverna dell’Olmo,
consueto loro luogo di convegno; ma scontrato dagli amici fu quasi a
forza colà condotto; ed ivi fra le tazze, le carte e i dadi gli gridarono:
— Prendi la mandola e canta, Biondo, canta. Egli per tal’arte aveva il
vanto su tutti e soleva intrattenere e rallegrare la brigata
s’accompagnando con un mandolone, ch’era del taverniere, e stava
appeso alle pareti presso la di lui cappa.
Milo rispose: «Non ne ho voglia, non posso: ho già cantato
abbastanza questa sera in Porta Romana».
«Eh! a chi cantasti? (disse l’uno) forse alla Leonora, la fiorentina che
vende le polveri e l’acqua nanfa alla crocetta di San Calimero?».
«Corpo d’un sagro! (esclamò un altro, stringendo le carte in pugno e
percotendo con una forte palmata il tavolo) alla Fiorentina ci parlo
io.... Vorrei sapere chi ci pretende! Vedete quest’orletto cremisi del
giustacuore? me lo ha fatto lei; lei con quelle sue manine benedette,
che spargono profumi... e se qualcuno ci volesse bazzicare, sangue
di...».
«Che bestemmi tu? (gridò un terzo). Tienti pure la tua profumata
Fiorentina; chè mi saprai dire che capo è, quando conterai le
berlinghe. Sì, eh, non mi ricordo io quand’ella abitava dietro le
carceri della torretta colla Lena e colla Stella losca, e s’avevano
corteggio di tre moschettieri spagnuoli? Fu uno di quegli ammazza-
pidocchi, che spendendole dietro l’ultimo suo quartillo la mise in
voga. Milo non è ragazzo da perdersi in quella fogna: dimmi, Biondo,
non è la verità? scommetterei, che tu cantasti piuttosto la Luna
piena; oppur Diana in camiciuola bianca».
«Sì, in fede mia: hai colpito giusto. Ho cantato alla luna; e, vedi
stravaganza! mi pareva che la luna cantasse a me».
«Ho capito; sei brillo, sei brillo. È il bicchierino che ti dà il padrone a
merenda. Anche il vino, sai tu, canta, ride e parla».
«Eppure più ci penso, più son persuaso che cantò la luna». Così
Milo soggiunse sorridendo in aria misteriosa; e lasciò che gli altri lo
mettessero in burla, credendolo cotto: ma non palesò punto
l’avventura.
E tre e sei e dieci volte le due cantatrici avevano fatto eco dal
giardino a Milo, che ogni sera alzava il canto al cominciare di quella
via; ma quand’egli giungeva al cancello per riguardarle, sempre
sparivano fuggendo. «Che storia è questa? io non so intenderla
(diceva Milo tra sè lungo la strada, crollando indispettito la testa e
tenendo giunta al rovescio una mano coll’altra). Sono esse figlie del
giardiniere?... del cantiniere?... dello scalco? sono cameriere di
casa?... perche mai rispondono alla canzone sembrando chiamarmi,
e poi, quando comparisco, scappano, come se vedessero il
folletto?... Che avessero paura di me, per causa del mio mestiere?...
Corbellerie! Una donna non ha mai paura d’un bravo; d’un bravo,
s’intende, sul fiore dell’età, che non abbia barba da caprone ed occhi
da indemoniato. A credere quello che dicono gli altri, i bravi sono
anzi i prediletti. Oh le novelle che narrano!... nel palazzo, nel
castello, nella villa, questo è stato, quello è entrato, quell’altro ha
avuto... A me veramente nulla ancora è toccato, ma però lo credo;
perche la sorella del padrone, Donna Isotta, quando in campagna
passeggia pel bosco, ove vuole ch’io la seguiti colla cagnuolina,
appena è fuori di veduta della casa, chiude il libro e mi dice: — Leva
da terra la mia Sibillina, povera bestiuola! e fatti pure d’appresso, o
Biondo, ch’io di te non ho schifo: gli altri servi non li posso
sopportare; ma pei bravi sono diversa. I lacchè mandano un tanfo di
sudore insopportabile; i carrozzieri puzzano di fimo cavallino; i
cucinieri sono macchiati d’untume: tutti hanno qualche cosa, che mi
nausea: voi altri soli siete sempre puliti, netti, ben pettinati, e vi
mettete per gli abiti certi odoretti aggradevoli, solleticanti... tu
specialmente... birboncello, birboncello... — E mi batte col ventaglio
la spalla, facendo certi occhietti, che vent’anni sono avranno
cagionate pazzie. Se è così, perche queste invece mi attirano, e poi
se ne vanno senza lasciarsi mai vedere, nè parlare?... io intisichisco,
se mi tengono ancora sulla corda in tal modo. Voglio mirarle
davvicino; voglio che mi parlino; e insisterò tanto e tanto, che alfine
la spunterò».
E fu così. Tre giorni dopo, al chiarore delle stelle, Milo bisbigliava
leggiadre parolette estratte da tutta la sua rettorica, la quale, avuto
riguardo al suo grado sociale, sarà stata non poca, poichè la
galanteria de’ concetti era pure una delle più formidabili manìe del
secolo. Le due ninfe del giardino stavano a breve distanza dal
cancello, ed alle inzuccherate frasi di Milo nulla rispondevano, se
non che di tratto in tratto mandavano leggieri e soffocati scoppii di
riso; ed egli continuava studiandosi di più in più di riuscire
persuasivo, quando al rumore, che si udì dell’aprirsi d’una porta nel
palazzo, entrambe scomparvero e sol’una rivolgendosi un istante,
disse a mezza voce: A rivederci domani a sera.
Milo giojoso e beato della conquista che teneva in pugno, s’avviò
alla taverna dell’Olmo; giacchè, sebbene tacesse ogni cosa
rigorosamente ai compagni, aveva piacere di lasciar loro intravedere
alcun che sulla propria fisonomia, che indicasse il possesso d’un
secreto, il quale altamente lo interessava.
Era piena quel giorno la città di un’avventura, accaduta nella notte
ad insigne personaggio spagnuolo, che copriva la prima carica di
Milano, il quale per fare, non si sa, se grata od ingrata sorpresa ad
una bella dama, aveva voluto entrarle in casa mascherato, e gli era
stata appoggiata una bastonatura delle più solenni, ad onta del
ducato, del marchesato, del don e degli y, che fregiavano il suo
nome. I Bravi dell’Olmo non parlavano essi pure che di tal fatto. Dai
comenti, che sopra gli faceva ciascuno a proprio capriccio, volse
agevolmente il discorso ad altri simiglianti eventi; ed uscì fuori una
serie di storielle e d’aneddoti relativi ad amorose imprese andate alla
peggio per gli eroi protagonisti. Siccome poi nel racconto principale
entrava un travestimento, si venne anche a dire di quei casi, in cui
sotto una bella larva nascondendosi un visaccio spaventevole, gli
ingordi spasimanti, che si credevano all’apice della ruota di lubrica
fortuna, non avevano riportato che scorno e beffe.
Queste ultime narrazioni andarono poco a sangue al nostro Milo,
che annuvolatosi pensò: «Per una bella donna non curerei un jota nè
stocchi, nè durlindane, nè stanghe; chè chi volesse mettere le mani
addosso al Biondo, per dianabacco! ci dovrebbe riflettere due volte.
Ma se le mie sirene fossero due spauracchi, che l’una, per esempio,
tenesse aperta una finestra sola e l’altra avesse le guancie o il naso
a bitorzoli e per civettare con esse mi capitasse un’archibugiata nelle
reni?... che bella fine sarebbe la mia!... quand’un bravo è sballato, è
sempre peggio per lui; e tutti riderebbero a sapere, che mi son fatto
accoppare per due streghe, due teschii da morto. Ma no... sono
pazzo... non è possibile; quelle voci angeliche non puonno uscire
dalla gola di due deformi creature; e poi questa sera, ancorchè fosse
oscuro, la loro corporatura l’ho distinta abbastanza, e mi parvero
fatte a pennello. L’una è poco più grande dell’altra; ma entrambe
sono snelle, di forme ben rilevate, strette alla cintura ed agili come
daini. Quella che mi disse: a rivederci, deve avere un bocchino di
rosa: che grazietta! che armonìa! la sua voce sembrava il suono
cristallino del salterio sfiorato dal vento; mi pare già di preferirla
all’altra. Che cosa non darei per poterla vedere?».
La sera del dì appresso cominciò a legarsi colloquio tra Milo e le sue
ignote sirene. Non erano che generalità e parole tronche, scucite,
che sembravano slanciate all’avventura; ma facevano l’uffizio di que’
razzi, che da un esercito si fanno volare per riconoscere le posizioni
dell’inimico, innanzi d’ingaggiare formale battaglia. Ne’ giorni
successivi i ragionamenti si fecero più seguenti e concatenati. Quella
che Milo aveva dichiarato di preferire, senza pure saperla
discernere, era animatissima nelle parole, viva ed energica nelle
espressioni: l’altra mostravasi gaja e scherzosa; ma era allo stesso
tempo fredda e sottomessa. Milo fu interamente per la prima.
Varie giojose serate si succedettero in tal maniera, e sempre più
calorosi divennero i dialoghi che passavano attraverso i ferri di quel
cancello del giardino. Finalmente il cancello stesso, stato sì propizio
ai notturni incontri, divenne odioso, insoffribile, e (chi ’l direbbe?) non
fu il Biondo il primo ad annunziarlo.
Una notte buja e ventosa pioveva a rovescio. Allo scoccare dell’ora
prefissa, Milo slancia la sua scala di corda; è in piedi sul muro,
discende pei travicelli della spalliera di carpini, calca il terreno. Il suo
cuore tremava e tremava, il suo sangue pareva avere sospeso il
proprio corso, ma non era paura;... quando una mano femminile
prese la sua, un sudore gelato lo coprì tutto; eppure non era paura.
Pensava, che tra brevi istanti poteva forse dissiparsi un’illusione,
ch’egli avrebbe voluto prolungare a costo d’ogni tormento,
un’illusione di paradiso... Cammina a passi sospesi; attraversa colla
guidatrice un boschetto; s’accosta ad una porticella; questa s’apre;
passa a tentoni un andito; sale una scaletta a chiocciola; tocca un
uscio, eccolo sulla soglia d’un magnifico gabinetto.
La di lui mente ne’ più aurei sogni non aveva prestata sì magica
bellezza alla sua incognita amante. Il volto era neve e rosa, finissime
lucenti le chiome; gli occhi pieni di tenerezza e languore: stava
avvolta in un mantelletto di serico drappo, che non lasciava scorgere
della persona altro che una porzione del piccolo piede entro pianella
di velluto azzurro. Gli arredi erano preziosi, ricco il tappeto, e
argentea la lampada, che ardea da un canto, mitigata nel chiarore
dall’alabastro. Milo rimase attonito e confuso, non sapeva credere a
sè stesso, nè ardiva innoltrarsi; l’ancella lo trasse avanti; ed egli
quasi involontariamente cadde ai piedi della bella Dama, che con un
sorriso giojoso ed espressivo premurosa lo rialzò, asciugandogli
colle proprie mani i biondi capegli e facendogli deporre le armi.
Scorsero più mesi. Una mattina allo spuntar dell’alba esce un laico
dal convento di San...., colla sportella per le provvigioni:
mormorando i salmi, imbocca quella strada e tosto gli viene allo
sguardo uu oggetto oscuro, disteso in terra in mezzo alla via:
s’avvicina, è un uomo — Oh san Francesco, che disgrazia! — È un
morto... È il povero Milo freddo, stecchito.
Grida, chiama: accorrono le persone. Che fu?... chi è?... ma
come?... ma quando?... nessuno sa dirlo. Si scopre alfine che è un
bravo del conte P... — Sarà stata una rissa (dice il mondo), una
provocazione, una sfida: è un bravo e tanto basta. — La casa lo fa
seppellire, gli fa celebrare due messe in suffragio, nè più alcuno ne
parla.
Il beccamorti però, che levata la camicia al cadavere gli aveva
trovato sul braccio sinistro un nastro verde con alcune cifre ricamate
in oro, chiuso con fermaglio a modo di smaniglio, e vendutolo ad un
ebreo ne aveva buscato quattro filippi, si ricordò del Biondo per una
settimana intera. Allorchè poi, trenta o quarant’anni dopo, corse per
Milano la voce, che una vecchia cameriera aveva confessato di
essere stata complice nel delitto di certa Dama, già defunta, la quale
aveva fatto ammazzare un tale con cui amoreggiava e narravasi,
che di questa confessione fu causa la vista d’un braccialetto, il
beccamorti rammemorò in confuso l’evento; ma non poteva mai
risovvenirsene i nomi. Onde pur volendo raccapezzarne i fili, quel
decrepito curioso andava sulle fosse interrogando del fatto i
compagni seppellitori; nè potè sapere altro mai, se non che l’ucciso
era unico figlio, ignorandolo, di un ricco signore zio di quella Dama
stessa. In qual modo poi ella venisse in chiaro di ciò, se quindi la
tema d’essere palesata, l’avidità, o la sazietà la conducessero a
tanto eccesso, rimasero sempre un profondo mistero.
La memoria di tal fatto, commista a quella di tanti altri non meno
empii ed atroci, arrivò da quel secolo sino a noi sbiadita bensì e
confusa, ma tetra come il rumore dell’eco, che nel cuor della notte
desta da lungi un disperato lamento. — Ora però t’allegra, o
leggitrice vezzosa, per bella sorte Italia piu non dà alla cronaca sì
sanguinosi racconti: l’ottime leggi, i buoni governi e veggenti hanno
fatto dolce il costume, soavi e regolati gli affetti, sacri i diritti
d’umanità, di natura.
FINE DEL BRAVO E LA DAMA.
ADELBERTA BONIPRANDI
EPISODIO DELLA STORIA NOVARESE
Fra i monti che gli Insubri hanno alle spalle

Verso dove il soffiar di Borea scende
Sta il vago piano dell’amena valle
Che Sesia bagna, e da essa il nome prende.
Varallo. Poema antico.
Erano i ricchi e potenti di Novara divisi in due fazioni, i Sanguigni ed i

Rotondi. Capi dei Sanguigni erano i Brusati, capi dei Rotondi i
Tornielli. L’odio che vicendevolmente nutrivano stette alcun tempo
ne’ fieri petti sepolto, ma bastò una scintilla a farlo divampare
inestinguibile. Uno dei Sanguigni da lieve ingiuria avvelenito contro
Giovanni figlio di Ugone Torniello lo assalì con una mano de’ suoi nel
bel mezzo della piazza maggiore e a colpi di pugnale lo stese al
suolo. Al divulgarsi del nefando caso accorsero i Rotondi; si
sguainarono le spade e accanita, micidiale durò la zuffa. Rimasti al
fine i Rotondi vincenti, i Brusati con tutti i loro gir dovettero in bando.
Volgeva l’anno 1257. Rapida come peste la febbre della discordia si
dilatò. Da tutte le terre e le castella sbucarono armati per l’una e per
l’altra delle avverse fazioni parteggiando; onde le offese e le
uccisioni addoppiandosi moltiplicarono l’alimento all’ira ed alle
vendette.
Il tradimento ricondusse i Sanguigni in Novara dalle cui mura
vennero espulsi i Tornielli, non senza che di molto sangue fosse
nuovamente la città macchiata.
Ugone Torniello orbato del figlio, errante dalla patria, per trovare
scampo alla rabbia nemica cercò rifugio in un castello posto tra gli
ultimi scoscesi monti di Val di Sesia. Andava desso strettamente
congiunto al conte Guido Boniprandi, cui era stata madre una
propria sorella. Signore di vasto territorio era il conte Guido poichè
possedeva l’intera borgata di Robiallo nel Varallese colle terre
circonvicine [1], e s’aveva inoltre per feudo il dominio dell’alta
Vallesesia che acquistò menando in moglie la bella e celebrata
Adelberta ultima prole d’Arduino marchese d’Ivrea, quegli che
coronato Re d’Italia subì la sorte dell’audace Berengario.
Conducevano Guido e la sua vaga consorte tranquilla vita e felice,
lungi dall’armi e dall’astio de’ partiti, dimorando tra fedeli vassalli
alpigiani nel castello che alzava le turrite mura all’estremità superiore
della valle, ove ora stanno i pacifici presepi di Lagna, ed ove dalle
nevi eterne e dai ghiacciai del monte Rosa colano perpetui rigagnoli
che danno origine e corso alla Sesia.
L’esule Torniello oppresso dalle ambasce e dall’età, pervenne a
gravissimo stento tra quelle rupi, ed entrato al cospetto del nipote gli
si gettò tra le braccia chiedendogli asilo. Affettuoso il conte Guido
l’accolse; e benchè tosto comprendesse che ricettare lo zio valeva lo
stesso che gettare il guanto alla fazione nemica, pure non seppe da
sè respingere il canuto parente precipitato in miseria.
Nè andò guari che le previsioni del Conte si verificarono. Ai Brusati
si congiunse la possente famiglia dei Cavallazzi in cui vigeva antico
rancore contro i capi nemici. Per tal considerevole aumento di forze
infellonendo i Sanguigni concepirono il pensiero d’interamente
distruggere i Rotondi. Non era rimasto celato che Ugone Torniello
amicamente ricevuto dal Boniprandi viveva seco lui pacifico e sicuro;
tanto bastò perchè il Conte fosse immantinenti considerato nemico e
si statuisse di sterminarlo.
Giù dalle rocche di Fara, di Briona, dalla torre di Grignasco calarono
masnade di battaglieri che congiunte piombarono sulle terre del
Conte a Robiallo. Mettevano a fiamme i casolari, devastavano i colti,
trucidavano gli uomini, se non che a porre riparo a tanta ruina,
s’affrettò colà con sue bande il conte Guido. Replicate feroci pugne
si commisero su quel terreno, in una delle quali Boniprandi trafisse di
propria mano Ardizzo Brusati il più terribile de’ capi Sanguigni. Ma
sopravvenne da Novara con gran numero d’uomini Ubaldo
Cavallazzi, che urtando nelle schiere del Conte le ruppe e tagliò a
pezzi, e il Conte stesso fu visto, trapassato il petto da una freccia,
cadere rovescio nella Sesia e seppellirsi ne’ flutti.
Era la stagione propizia. Imbaldanziti i Sanguigni dalla riportata
vittoria accolsero plaudendo la proposta di Ubaldo di campeggiare in
Val di Sesia al castello dell’estinto Boniprandi per abbattere dalle
fondamenta anche le mura in cui si osò dare stanza all’odiato capo
nemico.
Quella fiera turba d’armati fatta più grossa da nuovi drappelli di
venturieri si mette per la valle: la devastazione segna i suoi passi, nè
trova ostacolo alcuno al progredire poichè tutti gli abitatori fuggono
dinanzi ad essa.
Sostanno i guerrieri al cadere del secondo giorno presso le rupi da
cui sboccando il turgido Sermenza versa le sue acque nei meandri
della Sesia. Placide trascorsero l’ore notturne, ma quando i primi
raggi dell’aurora dorarono le cime dei monti, quale non fu la loro
immensa sorpresa nello scorgere all’opposta sponda tutte le alte
falde gremite di montanari armati di fionde e d’archi? — Ogni masso
sporgente, ogni roccia molti ne sostiene, che in estesa linea disposti
o variamente aggruppati palesano colle ardite attitudini quanto
abbiano l’animo parato a vendicarsi delle sofferte crudeli offese.
Più però che l’apparizione inaspettata di quella agguerrita
moltitudine infonde meraviglia e terrore nella coorte di Ubaldo la
vista e l’aspetto di colui che la guida. Stassi egli ritto sullo scoglio più
erto, avvolto in brune lane monacali, serrate al corpo da rozza
cintura.

How China Is Reshaping The Global Economy Development Impacts in Africa and Latin America 1St Edition Rhys Jenkins Full Chapter

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How China Is Reshaping The Global

Economy: Development Impacts In

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

How China is Reshaping

Preface and Acknowledgements

I ﬁrst became interested in the impact of China’s economic growth on the

Preface and Acknowledgements

Freitas Barbosa, and Lawrence Edwards. I was also fortunate to receive a

Introduction: China’s Re-emergence as a Global Economic Power 1

Part I. China and the Global Economy

2. The Workshop of the World 33

3. A Voracious Dragon? China and Global Commodity Markets 52

4. Going Global: Chinese Firms Abroad 72

5. The World’s Wallet? China’s Role in Global Finance 92

Part II. China and Sub-Saharan Africa

7. China’s Economic Impacts on Sub-Saharan Africa 149

8. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts

Part III. China and Latin America and the Caribbean

10. China’s Economic Impacts on Latin America 254

11. Social, Political, and Environmental Impacts in Latin America 284

Part IV. Comparisons and Conclusions

13. Conclusion 337

Statistical Databases 347

2.1. China’s Share of World Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) and

0.1. Examples of possible impacts of China on developing countries 6

4.1. Problems in measuring China’s OFDI 73

ABC Agricultural Bank of China

Exim Bank Export-Import Bank of China

OOF Other Ofﬁcial Finance

The re-emergence of China as a major economic power has been a central

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

0.1 China, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America

These critics have been accused by their opponents of ‘China-bashing’ and of

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

China’s commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

Table 0.1. Examples of Possible Impacts of China on Developing Countries

Direct Effects Indirect Effects

Positive Negative Positive Negative

Trade Growth of exports Displacement of Increased world Competition from

Source: Own elaboration based on Kaplinsky and Messner (2008, Fig. 6)

Finally, this book emphasizes the heterogeneous impacts of China’s growth

0.2 Outline of the Book

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

in SSA, as well as African interests, before presenting an econometric analysis

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

The remarkable performance of the Chinese economy over that period

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

In the aftermath, conservatives attempted to reverse the reforms but were

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

development referred to as the ‘New Normal’, with growth since 2012 of

1.1 Growing Integration with the Global Economy

One of the most striking features of China’s economic transformation has

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy

Although China continues to be a major destination for FDI, the relative

How China is Reshaping the Global Economy

These changes, together with the growing capabilities of Chinese compan-

1.2 The Financial Sector

The Transformation of the Chinese Economy