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Women and the
Lebanese Civil War
Female Fighters in Lebanese
and Palestinian Militias
Jennifer Philippa Eggert

Women and the Lebanese Civil War
Women
and the Lebanese Civil
War
Female Fighters in Lebanese and Palestinian Militias
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry, Warwickshire, UK
ISBN 978-3-030-83787-7 ISBN 978-3-030-83788-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83788-4
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Foreword
When “Fighters for Peace”, a Lebanese NGO working on conflict trans-

formation and dealing with the past, held a workshop with female ex-
combatants from the Lebanese civil war about women’s roles in war
in Lebanon in 2017, the trainer asked the participating women about
typical female characteristics. “Women are beautiful”, said one participant.
“Gentle, soft and kind”, added another. “Women are mothers, they give
life”, voiced yet another. When the trainer asked them more specifically
about women’s roles in war, the participants said that the women were
mostly victims of violence, or civilians who protected their families and
took care of them in hard times. They recalled how women got food and
water, even in the most difficult circumstances, and how they brought the
children to shelters and ensured their safety. They also said that women
were better peace makers than men.
These gender stereotypes are not surprising and are echoed in all facets
of society. Even at the UN level, when listening to debates about gender-
based violence, the narrative is the same. Women are treated as victims
of violence and are seen as peace builders because of their non-violent
“nature” by virtue of their gender.
It was surprising, however, that the participating women in the work-
shop reproduced these gender stereotypes, as almost all of them had been
former combatants in militias during the Lebanese civil war. When formu-
lating these stereotypical gender norms, it was almost as if the women
were in denial of their own personal past. After all, when they were active
v
vi FOREWORD
members of militias in the Lebanese civil war, they all played impor-
tant roles as secret messengers and trainers of women’s units—with many
receiving military training and even engaging in combat.
When the trainer confronted them with the question of whether they
had never gotten dirty during military training, wearing military outfits
and heavy boots, carrying guns or smuggling bombs, there was a short
silence in the room. It could be literally felt that these words and images
triggered memories that had been locked away for many years, perhaps
even decades.
“Yes, it is true”, one former combatant began to recollect. She
continued to say that they used to be strong, courageous and equal to
men at that time. Following her statement, the other participants were
encouraged to speak out about their wartime memories from when they
participated in the Lebanese war as female fighters. The memories were
expanded on in the biography work sessions that followed the workshop,
which sought to connect the women’s life lines of the past with those of
the present.
The anecdote of this workshop is symptomatic of the post-war amnesia
in Lebanon. After the official end of the war in 1990, most Lebanese
citizens felt the need to turn the page and forget about the war. Moreover,
the political elite, of whom many were former warlords, did not have the
slightest interest in bringing up the past. Until today, dealing with the
past of the Lebanese civil war is a task almost exclusively undertaken by a
few civil society organisations. To this day, the recent history of Lebanon is
not taught in public schools, and most Lebanese youth do not know much
about the civil war. To this day, on a national level, a true reconciliation
process has not taken place. Lebanese society remains as divided today
as it was during the civil war and a situation of negative peace persists.
And to this day, it is seen as a taboo to publicly declare having been part
of the civil war as a combatant. For women, this is even more so the
case than for men, because of the predominating gender stereotypes that
women are supposed to be kind, soft and caretakers of the family, instead
of being public figures, political activists or even combatants.
Given the backdrop of this socio-political situation, studies like the one
presented here by Dr. Jennifer Philippa Eggert are very much needed. She
approached “Fighters for Peace” (a Lebanese non-governmental organi-
sation that consists of former combatants of many different parties and
FOREWORD vii
former militias) in 2015/16, asking for help to contact former combat-

ants of the Lebanese civil war from different political groups. We were
more than happy to help with facilitating contacts.
Dr. Eggert was able to quickly gain the trust of former combatants—
both male and female—from a wide range of political and religious back-
grounds and obtained valuable information regarding the motivations of
former combatants to join militia groups, how they were organised, and
the extent to which the groups allowed women to become a part of their
organisation and actions. Dr. Eggert analysed why non-state armed organ-
isations would find it useful (or not) to include female fighters into their
ranks. Individual motivations, organisational characteristics, the overall
security context (which changed over the 15 years of war) as well as soci-
etal factors were Dr. Eggert’s main pillars of exploration. Such thorough
research is very important, because it challenges the common narrative
that the Lebanese civil war was exclusively driven by men—aside from two
female fighter icons maybe—Jocelyne Khoueiry from the Lebanese Forces
and Soha Bechara from the Lebanese Communist Party. It is much less
common knowledge that women were messengers of secret information,
weapons smugglers and avid supporters of armed groups. It is not widely
known that women received military training, that they trained women’s
units and that they even participated in combat and individual attacks.
Women wanted to play an active part in the war and have their say in
many of the armed groups involved in the civil war. Therefore, to have
an analysis of women’s multi-faceted roles in the Lebanese civil war is of
paramount importance.
Wars—especially civil wars—are often more complex than the usual
mainstream narratives imply. The study conducted by Dr. Eggert explores
women’s roles in armed groups—an angle that has not received much
attention so far—and thus sheds light on one of these complexities.
In 2017, when “Fighters for Peace” was designing a project targeting
female combatants, the organisation was again in contact with Dr. Eggert.
The new project, which was funded by the Canadian Embassy in Beirut‚
was implemented in 2017/18. In general, the work with female combat-
ants proved to be more difficult than with their male counterparts. More
distrust and sectarian preconceptions existed amongst the targeted women
than amongst the men. Moreover, the women found it hard to actively
revisit their war memories, and after the first encounter, some women
dropped out because they did not want to deal with the ghosts of the past.
viii FOREWORD
However, “Fighters for Peace” was persistent and those women eventu-
ally returned and participated in the project activities. “Fighters for Peace”
have since established a section of former female combatants within the
organisation.
Dr. Eggert found that during the war years, women from most polit-
ical groups—but mainly the political left and Christian militias—were able
to outdo conservative societal norms and take on more public, “male”
roles within their organisations. Thus, the war braved the societal conser-
vatism and provided them with a window of opportunity to take on more
advanced roles. However, Dr. Eggert also noted that after the war was
over, many women fell back into more traditional roles. This falling back
into more conservative female roles (and the fact that women’s roles as
combatants are not part of the predominant narratives on the war) might
be one of the reasons why in the women’s project of the “Fighters for
Peace”, the female participants initially found it hard to acknowledge their
active roles in the militias involved in the war.
Interestingly enough, similar patterns can be observed in many post-
war contexts worldwide. For example, in Germany during World War II,
when almost all men were in combat, women took on traditionally male
roles and became breadwinners, caretakers and decision-makers. In Berlin,
the “Trümmerfrauen” rebuilt large parts of Berlin and other major cities
after the end of the war in 1945, because many of the men were either
dead, injured or prisoners of war. In the 1950s though, when men had
returned from war and imprisonment, the latter re-established their roles
as breadwinners and decision-makers and pushed women back into their
traditional roles as mothers and housewives. It was not until the student
revolution in 1968 and the hippie movement that women would rebel
and question conventional gender roles.
A critical reflection of the past, with a healthy connection to the present
and a peaceful vision for the future, is what the “Fighters for Peace” strives
for. “Fighters for Peace” is aware of the fact that former combatants—
both male and female—suffer from ruptures in their life lines, because
they often do not make the connection that the life they led during the
war actually has a lot to do with the life they have been leading in the
post-war period. Studies like the one presented here by Dr. Eggert can
contribute to a better understanding of the past and possibly also weaken
the taboos surrounding ex-combatants, especially female ones.
By using methods of biography work, Fighters for Peace supports
former combatants in connecting the past with the present—which is part
FOREWORD ix
of the process of inner healing. The inner healing of the individual is a

prerequisite for a more collective, societal healing process, where wrong-
doings are acknowledged and a transitional justice process can begin. This
would be fundamental for a reconciliation process in Lebanon—some-
thing that has still not taken place 28 years after the war has come to an
end. This, paired with a vision for a peaceful future, and active roles of
former fighters in post-war society, is what Fighters for Peace wants to
achieve, because sustainable peace cannot be reached without the active
involvement of former combatants in peace processes. By playing an active
role in these peace-building processes, former fighters build new strands
of identity and become meaningful role models—both women and men.
Beirut, Lebanon Christina Foerch Saab

May 2018 International Relations Officer, “Fighters
for Peace”
Acknowledgements
Finishing this book would not have been possible without the many
people who have provided their support in the last five years. They say
it takes a village to raise a child—I now know that the same is true for
writing a book!
Thank you ever so much to…
…all of my interviewees, friends, colleagues, housemates and hosts in
Lebanon, and everyone else who helped before and during my research
trips to Lebanon.
…my supervisors, mentors, the administrative staff, my friends and
colleagues at the University of Warwick—in the Department of Politics
and International Studies, the ESRC Doctoral Training Centre, and at
the Institute of Advanced Study.
…my hosts, friends, colleagues and the administrative staff at Princeton
University—in the Department of Politics, at the Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs, the Empirical Studies on Conflict
Project and the Mamdouha S. Bobst Center for Peace and Justice.
…the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the ESRC
Doctoral Training Centre and the Department of Politics and Interna-
tional Studies at the University of Warwick, and the Council for British
Research in the Levant (CBRL), who so generously funded my research
at Warwick, in Princeton and Lebanon.
…the Institute of Advanced Study at the University of Warwick, who
provided me with the funding to write up this book.
xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
…my editors at Palgrave Macmillan, the reviewers who took the time
to comment on the book proposal and my journal articles, the colleagues
and friends who commented on my research at conferences in Europe,
the US and the Middle East or at other occasions.
…every single babysitter who looked after my daughter in the last
years, so that I could conduct my research, write my book and attend
conferences, research workshops and trainings in the UK and abroad.
…my family and friends.
Alhamdulillah.

Praise for Women and the Lebanese
Civil War
“Eggert has written an excellent book on female participation in militia

groups in Lebanon during the Civil War. Relying on extensive qualita-
tive work, interviews and in-depth fieldwork, Eggert examines the ways
in which gender and organizational barriers structured female participa-
tion. The book is an authoritative account on the ways in which gender
dynamics shaped the motivations of women in these groups.”
—Prof. Amaney A. Jamal, Director: Bobst Center for Peace and Justice
and Workshop on Arab Political Development_PIIRS, Princeton
University, New Jersy, USA
“Female Fighters in Lebanese Civil War is the first comprehensive, book-

size publication that takes all key actors in the war into account, particu-
larly women who were not just victims of the war or “peacemakers” but
also perpetrators and supporters of violence. This narrative contradicts
widespread assumptions about women being more peaceful than men. It
also challenges the widespread depiction of women in non-state armed
groups as being devoid of agency, naive, delusional and manipulated.
Female Fighters fills a major gap in the field.”
—Prof. Fawaz A. Gerges, Professor of International Relations at the
London School of Economics, is author of Making the Arab World: Nasser,
Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East
xiii
xiv PRAISE FOR WOMEN AND THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR
“At long last, a book-size thorough research dedicated to one of the most
occulted aspects, and yet one of the most interesting, of Lebanon’s long
war, especially its initial years. Beyond this crucial contribution, this book
sheds an important new light on the study of female fighters’ involvement
in non-state conflicts in general. It is on both scores a remarkable achieve-
ment that any discussion of these issues will need to take into account
hereafter.”
—Prof. Gilbert Achcar, Professor at SOAS, University of London, London,
UK
“Jennifer Eggert has produced pioneering research on female fighters,

countering the dominant narrative of women-as-victims and filling a crit-
ical research void in our understanding of female perpetrators of political
violence. She claims this space because of a notable absence in existing
literature: the roles and experiences of women in accounts of war and
conflict have been silenced. The Lebanese civil war is no exception. Eggert
gives voice to Lebanese women’s experiences, as told by the women
themselves.
Women in Lebanon are silenced in so many aspects of their lives – but
nowhere more so than in academic literature on female fighters in the
Lebanese Civil War, even though it has been almost 30 years after the
end of the war. In this book, we come to understand how women defied
socio-cultural restrictions with their insistence to be included, overcoming
gendered barriers to achieving equality in war. Despite assumptions,
coercion did not in fact play a role in women’s motivations.
Contrary to our imagined narrative, Lebanese women were driven by
choice, and compelled by agency. This book is a must-read—not only to
understand Lebanon’s history but also present insights to gender roles,
undoing predominant gender-blindness across all aspects of public life in
Lebanon.
In this book, Eggert makes a significant intellectual contribution with
great practical implications. She explains that there is “hardly any litera-
ture on women (even less so on female combatants) during the Lebanese
civil war”, and yet women were involved in variety of roles in nearly all
political parties and militias during the war. Eggert’s courageous research,
extensive fieldwork in Lebanon, and deep contextual knowledge is a gift
to Lebanese hers tory. In this work, she brings Lebanese women back into
the Lebanese story.
PRAISE FOR WOMEN AND THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR xv
Eggert’s work will be the first monograph on the roles female fighters
played in the Lebanon conflict. The main contribution of this study is
an in-depth examination of the decision-making of organizational forces
regarding the inclusion of female fighters. Rather than present us with a
theory of female political violence in general, Eggert uses her contextual
understanding and deep knowledge of Lebanon to tell a specific story.
Lebanon’s diversity and specificities are understood and explored in this
work.
While the extent to which findings of this study can be used to under-
stand the motivations of non-state armed groups vis-à-vis female fighters
remains to be seen, there are still lessons that can be gleaned and applied
to other conflict contexts. As Eggert herself explains, this study provides
empirical support for claims in current literature—critical in a field of
study that is often characterized by its lack of empirical studies.
Additionally, this book is written in a manner that makes it accessible
to readers who might not be experts or academics, but rather for any
reader with interest in the role of women in the Lebanese war. As such,
findings of this study are particularly relevant to practitioners working on
violence prevention, conflict transformation, post-war recovery—recog-
nizing women’s pivotal role in all of these. As an academic, as an activist,
as a former humanitarian aid worker, and as the current Director of the
Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World, I strongly endorse this
important work. Jennifer Eggert is a long-time friend of the Institute—
and of Lebanon - and her work is a much-needed contribution to this
field.”
—Dr. Lina Abirafeh, Executive Director, Arab Institute for Women
(AiW), Lebanese American University
“This important new book is the first systematic study of the participa-
tion of female fighters in the Lebanese civil war, in addition to presenting
valuable new perspectives on the recruitment of women in non-state
armed groups more generally. It will undoubtedly stimulate discussion
and debate.”
—Dr. Nicola Pratt, Reader in International Relations the Middle East,
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
“Jennifer Eggert’s book Women and the Lebanese Civil War: Female
Fighters in Lebanese and Palestinian Militias makes an important contri-
bution to our understanding of how and why women are involved (or not)
xvi PRAISE FOR WOMEN AND THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR
in armed insurgent and terrorist organizations and how society, need and
ideology interact to impact if they do participate and how they participate
in such organizations. Focusing on female fighters in armed groups in
Lebanon she examines a population of people that is often overlooked in
the study of violent nonstate actors. Eggert makes an important contri-
bution to this field both in the specific historical context of the seven
cases of violent organizations in Lebanon she is examining as well as the
larger theoretical questions she is raising. Lebanon is a particularly inter-
esting country to serve as a case study given the prevalent gender norms
that pushed back strongly against women’s involvement in conflict. Using
qualitative research based on field research involving extensive interviews
with former fighters of both genders and party members and others,
Eggert teases out the causes of different levels and types of participation
in different organizations over time. One of Eggert’s most interesting
findings is that often the key factor driving women’s involvement was the
insistence by women themselves to be involved and their push against
societal and organizational norms that often tried to block them. Eggert
also finds strong support for the impact of organizational ideology on
women’s involvement and the roles they were given, as well as the impor-
tant impact of external threat directed at organizations driving them to
include women. Overall, this is a fascinating and well written book that is
shining an important theoretical and empirical light on our understanding
of when and how women join violent nonstate organizations and when
they pick up guns to fight and to kill.”
—Prof. Victor Asal, Professor of Political Science, Rockefeller College of
Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York at Albany, New
York, USA
Contents
1 Women, War and Political Violence 1

1.1 Existing Research on Female Fighters 3
1.2 Research Question and Aims 6
1.3 Methodological Approach 7
1.4 Findings 8
1.4.1 Numbers, Percentages and Roles of Women
in the Militias 8
1.4.2 Individual Motivations: Women’s Insistence
to be Included 9
1.4.3 Organisational Characteristics 10
1.4.4 The Security Context 11
1.4.5 Societal Factors 12
1.5 Civil War(s) in Lebanon 12
1.5.1 Causes of the War 12
1.5.2 Key Non-State Armed Political Actors 16
1.5.3 Phases of the War 16
1.6 Structure of the Book 20
Bibliography 21
2 Researching Non-state Political Violence 29
2.1 Understanding Involvement in Political Violence 30
2.1.1 Structure or Agency 30
2.1.2 Psychological Approaches and Rational
Perspectives 31
xvii
xviii CONTENTS
2.1.3 Greed or Grievances? 33

2.1.4 Context-Based Theories and Process-Focused
Explanations 34
2.1.5 Summary 35
2.2 Explaining Organisational Decision-Making 35
2.2.1 Applying Organisational Theory to the Study
of Non-State Armed Actors 36
2.2.2 Studying Non-State Armed Groups as Rational
Actors 38
2.2.3 Organisations Matter 39
2.2.4 A Multi-Level Approach to the Study
of Organisational Decision-Making 40
2.2.5 Summary 41
2.3 Conducting Field Research on Non-State Political
Violence 42
2.3.1 A Case for Qualitative Research on Non-State
Political Violence 42
2.3.2 Research Context 43
2.3.3 Research Methods 44
2.3.4 Sampling and Access Issues 46
2.3.5 Research Ethics 48
2.3.6 Researcher Reflexivity 49
2.4 Conclusion 51
Bibliography 51
3 Individual Motivations 57
3.1 Choice or Coercion? 58
3.2 Individual Backgrounds 60
3.3 Gender-Specific Motivations? 65
3.4 The Influence of the Security Context and Perceived
Injustice on Individual Motivations 69
3.5 The Influence of Organisational Characteristics
on Individual Motivations 72
3.6 The Influence of Societal Aspects on Individual
Motivations 74
3.7 Conclusion 77
Bibliography 78
4 Organisational Characteristics 83
4.1 Ideology 84
CONTENTS xix
4.2 Internal Structure and Processes 89

4.3 External Influence 94
4.4 Age and Size 97
4.5 Aims 100
4.6 Conclusion 104
Bibliography 105
5 Security Context 109
5.1 Threat Perception 111
5.2 Seeking Attention 117
5.3 Asserting a Position 122
5.4 Avoiding Detection 124
5.5 Conclusion 129
Bibliography 131
6 Societal Factors 133
6.1 Facilitating Factors 135
6.1.1 Societal Approval 135
6.1.2 Societal Changes 137
6.1.3 Female Participation in Political Parties 138
6.1.4 Loosening of Gender Norms Amplified by War 140
6.2 Inhibiting Factors 141
6.2.1 Conservative Gender Norms and Expectations 142
6.2.2 Women’s Non-Violent Roles in the Militias
and Political Parties 143
6.2.3 Fear of Sexual Violence 144
6.3 Inter-Community and Intra-Community Variation 146
6.3.1 Local Differences 146
6.3.2 Religious Differences 148
6.3.3 The Role of Class and Education 150
6.4 Managing Societal Expectations 152
6.4.1 Risk-Awareness 152
6.4.2 Practical Steps 153
6.4.3 Narrative Approaches 155
6.4.4 Role-Models 157
6.5 Conclusion 157
Bibliography 158
7 Conclusion: Female Fighters in the Lebanese Civil War
and Beyond 161
xx CONTENTS
7.1 Summary of Findings 162

7.1.1 Individual Motivations: Women’s Insistence
to be Included 162
7.1.2 Organisational Characteristics 163
7.1.3 The Security Context 165
7.1.4 Societal Factors 166
7.2 Discussion of Findings and Contribution to Existing
Literature 167
7.2.1 Women and the War in Lebanon 167
7.2.2 Understanding Political Violence 168
7.2.3 Understanding Individual Motivations 169
7.2.4 Understanding Organisational Characteristics 171
7.2.5 Understanding the Security Context 172
7.2.6 Understanding Societal Factors 173
7.3 Limitations of This Study 174
7.4 Implications for Practice and Policy 176
7.5 Epilogue: Post-War Perspectives 180
Bibliography 183
Appendix 189
Index 201
Abbreviations
Amal Amal Movement

CAO Communist Action Organisation
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Fatah Palestinian National Liberation Movement
Kataeb Lebanese Kataeb Party
LCP Lebanese Communist Party
LF Lebanese Forces
LFr Lebanese Front
LNM Lebanese National Movement
MDSO (design) Most Different Cases, Similar Outcome (Design)
MSDO (design) Most Similar Cases, Different Outcome (Design)
NLP National Liberal Party
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PSP Progressive Socialist Party
SSNP Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
xxi
CHAPTER 1
Women, War and Political Violence
Female participation in political violence1 is generally considered a

deviance of the norm (Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). This is the case in
most societies worldwide and applies to women’s participation in state
militaries as well as their involvement in non-state armed groups2 (Gentry
and Sjoberg 2015; Kennedy-Pipe 2000). Women’s participation in non-
state armed organisations is often particularly contested. Nevertheless,
women have been involved as militants in the majority of non-state armed
organisations worldwide, including as fighters3 (Henshaw 2016). Why
do women become involved in non-state political violence? What are
the reasons for non-state armed political groups to decide to involve
1 I use the terms ‘political violence’ and ‘violent conflict’ interchangeably, while
acknowledging that there is a difference between ‘political violence’ and ‘conflict’ (Kalyvas
2006).
2 When I speak of ‘non-state armed groups’ or ‘non-state armed organisations’, I mean
non-state armed groups with a political agenda. This is to distinguish between non-state
armed political groups and other non-state violent actors such as gangs or other criminal
organisations which do not have any political aims. In the Lebanese context, non-state
armed political groups involved in the Lebanese civil war are usually referred to as militias.
3 I use the terms ‘fighter’ and ‘combatant’ interchangeably to describe individuals
directly participating in combat. For individuals involved in supportive roles, I use the
terms ‘militant’ or ‘militia member’. There is often a grey area concerning fighters and
civilians. For the purpose of this study, I do not consider individuals who are involved in
one-off violent acts to be fighters.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
J. P. Eggert, Women and the Lebanese Civil War,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83788-4_1
2 J. P. EGGERT
women in combat roles? And what role do societal attitudes on female

participation play?
In analyses of women’s roles and experiences during war and violent
conflict, it is often assumed that women are primarily victims of political
violence (Cunningham 2003; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). At times, their
roles as potential actors for positive change, peacebuilding and conflict
transformation are also stressed. These ascribed roles as either “the
victim” or “the peacemaker” to women in relation to political violence
are linked to deeply entrenched notions of women being essentially peace-
loving and innocent (Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). It is true that in large
parts of the world, women are amongst the most vulnerable members of
society and that they are often perceived to be disproportionally affected
by violent conflict and war.4 However, women are also often actively
involved in inciting, enabling and perpetrating violence during times of
conflict and war. In fact, women’s numbers in non-state armed organi-
sations with a political agenda have increased across much of the world
(Henshaw 2016). This is true for groups across the ideological spectrum.
Far right, left-wing, animal liberation, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Islamist
and secular groups have all included female fighters (Cunningham 2003;
Eager 2008; Henshaw 2016). Female political violence is indeed a global
phenomenon. Women have taken on combat roles in groups operating
in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East (Alison 2009;
Bloom 2011; Cunningham 2003; Eager 2008; Henshaw 2016). Within
non-state armed political groups, women’s roles cover a wide range of
different activities, including, in some cases, leadership roles.
Women’s long-standing and increasing involvement in political
violence—not just as supporters but also as agents of violence—stands
in stark contrast to the lack of attention the topic receives in main-
stream academic literature on political violence (Henshaw 2016). Most
publications on political violence overlook the roles and experiences of
women during war and violent conflict (Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). As
outlined above, if women’s roles are taken into account at all, they are
often presented as being only victims or peacemakers (Gentry and Sjoberg
2015). A notorious example is Sageman’s theory of terrorist cells, which
he dubbed “bunches of guys” (2008)—as though women did not play
4 This narrative has been challenged by some scholars, such as Adam Jones (2004),
who point to the fact that most fighters at times of violent conflict are men and argues
that men are, in fact, more affected by violent conflict than women.
1 WOMEN, WAR AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 3
a role in many such groups. Similar lacuna can be found in much of

the mainstream conflict studies literature, which focuses on civil wars
and rebel groups (Arjona et al. 2015; Gurr 1971, 2012; Kalyvas 2006;
Staniland 2014; Weinstein 2006). An illustrious example from within the
conflict studies literature is the title of Ted Gurr’s book: “Why Men
Rebel” (1971, 2012)—which implies that rebel groups (and other armed
political organisations) consist only of men. Gaps of this kind can be
found in much of the academic literature on political violence. This
remains the case despite a small but emerging trend in studies on political
violence to increasingly take women and gender during violent conflict
and war into account (Welland 2016).
These gaps in the literature should be of concern. Firstly, intellectu-
ally, it is not possible to fully understand a social phenomenon without
taking the role of all of the actors involved into account. We cannot
understand political violence without making room in our analyses for the
women who contribute to it. Secondly, from a practical point of view, this
academic unawareness of female violence is mirrored in a lack of gender-
sensitive conflict transformation, counter-extremism, counter-terrorism,
peacebuilding and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
programmes (Eggert 2018). Non-state armed political actors worldwide
are increasingly relying on female fighters—and yet, the states and civil
societies affected by their violence do not seem to have adapted to this
change (Cunningham 2007; Satterthwaite and Huckerby 2012). In order
to contribute to putting an end to violent conflict and to help former
fighters reintegrate into their societies (allowing them to contribute
to rebuilding healthy, peaceful and striving communities), we need to
understand what made them resort to specific forms of violence in the
first place. By asking why non-state armed organisations employ female
fighters, this study hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the
strategies adopted by non-state armed actors.
1.1 Existing Research on Female Fighters

The tendency to overlook the role of female perpetrators of violence at
times of violent conflict and war in the general literature on political
violence is mirrored in the literature on the Lebanese civil war. Over forty-
five years after the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 and
more than thirty years after its end in 1990, a substantial body of literature
on the war, its causes, development and actors, has developed. Both local
4 J. P. EGGERT
and international scholars have published extensively on the war (see, for
example, El-Solh 2004; Fisk 2001; Hanf 2014; Hirst 2011; Mackey 2006;
Salibi 1976, 1988; Traboulsi 2012). However, the question of women is
rarely examined, and there is hardly any literature on women (even less
so on female combatants) during the Lebanese civil war. Indeed, some
suggest that women did not play any role in the outbreak and sustainment
of the war, and that it was only men who were to blame for the violence
inflicted on the country and its inhabitants (Karamé 1995; Shehadeh
1999). Only a handful of publications (many of them of article-length
only) examine the roles women played in the militias as supporters or
perpetrators of violence (André-Dessornes 2013; Karamé 1995; Parkinson
2013; Peteet 1991; Sayigh 1993; Shehadeh 1999). However, the ques-
tion of why some of the militias decided to employ women in military
roles whilst others continued to allocate non-military roles only to them
remains largely unanswered. Moreover, none of the existing publications
focus on all of the major non-state players during the war, but highlight
the roles of women in some of the groups only.5
Although Lebanon-specific publications on the topic are rare, in recent
years a sound body of relevant literature on other conflict contexts has
developed. This literature can help shed light on the question of women’s
roles in the militias during the Lebanese civil war. In this study, I use
conflict, civil war, rebel and terrorism studies literature (as well as publica-
tions on female fighters informed by other disciplinary backgrounds, such
as history, sociology, anthropology, media, communication, gender and
area studies)—not because I believe the organisations described in this
book were (or were not) terrorist actors, but because I believe the divide
between terrorism studies and other approaches to the study of non-state
political violence is largely an artificial one (Khalidi 2010; Moghadam
et al. 2014; Ness 2005, p. 357).
5 The main militias during the Lebanese civil war included Lebanese leftist, Palestinian,
Christian and Shia groups. Karamé (1995) focuses on the role of women in the Christian
militias, whereas Shehadeh (1999) compares the contribution of women in the biggest
Christian militia, the Lebanese Kataeb Party (or Kataeb for short) with women’s roles in
the Shia groups Amal Movement (also known by its abbreviation Amal) and Hezbollah.
Both completely omit the roles of women in the leftist and Palestinian militias. Peteet
(1991), Parkinson (2013) and Sayigh (1993) focus on female members of Palestinian
organisations only. André-Dessornes (2013) examines female suicide attackers, which were
mostly deployed by the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).
The theories underlying this study focus on the causes and mecha-
nisms of why people get involved in violent conflict (such as Horgan
2005, 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Taylor and Horgan 2006;
Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006) and how non-state armed groups
make decisions (Lichbach 1998; McCormick 2003; Shapiro 2013). Whilst
this body of literature does not usually take the role of women and gender
into account, it still provides us with a framework for studying how and
why non-state armed groups include female combatants. Further under-
standing of how female involvement occurs is provided by the strand of
literature focusing on female fighters in other conflict contexts. A substan-
tial number of studies of female non-state political violence have been
published in the last few decades, including from a terrorism studies
perspective (Berko and Erez 2007a, 2007b; Bloom 2011; Cunningham
2003, 2007, 2008, 2010; Dalton and Asal 2011; Davis 2013, 2017;
Dearing 2010; Eggert 2015; Gonzalez-Perez 2008; Jacques and Taylor
2008, 2009; Speckhard 2008; Speckhard and Akhmedova 2008; Victor
2003; Von Knop 2007)—as well as by scholars working within conflict,
war or rebel studies or other disciplinary frameworks (Alison 2003,
2009; Bernal 2000, 2006; Burgess 1989; Cohen 2013; Coulter 2008;
Eager 2008; Gayer 2009; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015; Hamilton 2007;
Henshaw 2016; Katto 2014; Magadla 2015; McKay 2007; Ortega 2012;
Parashar 2009, 2014; Parvati 2005; Reif 1986; Roy 2012; Sajjad 2004;
Shayne 1999; Shekhawat 2012; Shikola 1998; Van Hauwermeiren 2012;
Vázquez 1997; Veneracion-Rallonza 2015; Viterna 2006; West 2000).
Much of this literature focuses on individual cases rather than indi-
vidual, group and societal motivations. Nevertheless, together these
studies can help us understand why female fighters are included in non-
state armed groups. Analysing existing publications, three explanations of
why women join non-state violent political groups can be found, namely:
(1) individual motivations, (2) organisational characteristics and contex-
tual pressures—which for the sake of clarity, I divide into (3) the security
context and (4) societal aspects.
6 J. P. EGGERT
1.2 Research Question and Aims

Women were involved in a variety of roles in nearly all of the polit-
ical parties and militias6 during the Lebanese civil war. They assumed
a number of supportive roles such as logistics, first aid, cooking and
washing for male fighters, telecommunications, intelligence gathering,
recruitment, PR and communications—and almost all militias employed
female fighters (interviewees 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14, 16–18, 20–25, 27–41, 44–
60, 62–66). Some had separate female units (such as the LF), whereas in
others, men and women fought in mixed units (Duplan and Raulin 2015,
p. 9; Shehadeh 1999, p. 156). The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) did
not include any official female fighters at all. The Amal Movement (or
Amal for short) did not include any female combatants before 1978,
and even then, involved women in combat against Israel only. How can
this variation be explained? Why did some non-state armed organisations
operating during the Lebanese civil war include women in combat activ-
ities whilst others did not? Why was the percentage of female fighters
higher in some militias than in others? And how can we explain variation
over time and in different locations? In order to shed light on this ques-
tion, the four existing explanations which can be found in the literature
on female political violence will be examined in regard to Lebanon. For all
involved groups, I will demonstrate (in a dedicated chapter of this book)
how individual motivations, organisational characteristics, the security
context and societal aspects played a role in the group’s decision-making
on the involvement of women in combat activities.
The research objective of this study was threefold. Firstly, I intended
to contribute to debates on the roles of women during the Lebanese civil
war, by adding to the scarce literature on female militia members in the
war. Secondly, whilst the focus of this study is on militias operating during
the Lebanese civil war, I hope that its findings will help advance the
study of female political violence more generally. In a field of study where
many publications tend to focus on the same group of over-researched
cases (Dolnik 2013, p. 4; Ranstorp 2013, p. 51), adding a new group of
6 Most political parties in Lebanon either had a separate militia at the beginning of
the war or they formed one after the war broke out. In some cases, the lines between
the party and the militia became blurred after the outbreak of the war, which led some
interviewees to speak of “politico-military organisations” (interviewee 18). For the sake
of clarity, I only use the names of the parties in this thesis and specify whether I speak
about the party or the militia, when necessary.
cases and new data has the potential to stimulate existing discussion and
prompt new debates. Finally, I hope that not only researchers but also
practitioners working in conflict prevention, conflict transformation and
post-war recovery will benefit from this research. After all, it is impossible
to effectively counter political violence and limit its destructive effects
without fully understanding all of the actors involved.
1.3 Methodological Approach

In order to answer the research question, I carried out a small-n
comparative study focusing on seven non-state armed groups in a single
country case study. These included the Lebanese Communist Party
(LCP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian
National Liberation Movement (Fatah), Progressive Socialist Party (PSP),
Lebanese Kataeb Party (Kataeb), the Lebanese Forces (LF) and the Amal
Movement (Amal).7 The cases examined in this study were selected with
the aim to include the widest spectrum of militias involved in the civil
war in terms of ideology, aims, size and age. LCP, PFLP, Fatah and
PSP, along with several other leftist groups, were members of the leftist
Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was opposed by the Chris-
tian Lebanese Front (LFr) at the beginning of the war. Kataeb and later
the LF, as well as several smaller Christian militias, were members of the
LFr. LNM and LFr were the two main—adversarial—alliances in the early
years of the war. Amal was close to the LNM in the first year of the
war, but later opposed them fiercely (Norton 1987). I also interviewed
members of the LNM-affiliated Communist Action Organisation (CAO)
and Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party as well as the Christian Tanzim and
the National Liberal Party (NLP). Due to the low number of interviews
in the case of these four groups, the main analysis does not focus on
them. Nevertheless, all major non-state armed organisations involved in
the war—except for Hezbollah and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party
(SSNP)—are included in this study. Despite several attempts to contact
Hezbollah, it was not possible to interview any former fighters or party
members. However, I include Amal which, to a certain extent, shares
some similarities and a common past with Hezbollah and has the added
advantage of having been in existence since the pre-war period—unlike
7 An overview of the different militias is included in the appendix.

8 J. P. EGGERT
Hezbollah, which was only founded in the mid-/early 1980s, ten years
into the Lebanese civil war (Norton 1987, 2014). Gaining access to
former SSNP members also proved to be very challenging. In both cases,
one of the main reasons for the difficulty in accessing these two groups
was their continued military involvement in the war in Syria.
The findings presented in this study are based on fieldwork in Lebanon
undertaken during four research trips (1.5 months in July/August 2015,
1 month in December 2015/January 2016, 1.5 months in July/August
2016 and 1 week in October 2016). Overall, I conducted 64 interviews
with 69 (male and female) former fighters, party members, researchers,
journalists and civil society representatives, with expertise on the civil
war, on the involved parties and militias or on the role of women before
and during the war.8 Moreover, I analysed the (auto)biographies of
four former female fighters with the LCP, Kataeb/LF, the (Christian)
Guardians of the Cedar and the LF (Bechara 2003; Duplan and Raulin
2015; El Murr 2014; Sneifer 2006).
1.4 Findings
The research undertaken as part of this study has shown that the main
reason for female participation as fighters in the Lebanese civil war
(1975–1990) was the women’s insistence to be included in combat roles.
Organisational barriers to female participation as fighters in militias that
were not entirely in favour of female participation were overcome in
most militias when faced with extreme external security pressures. Overall,
societal opposition to female participation remained high, which is why—
when compared with other conflict contexts—the overall number of
female fighters remained relatively low. By tackling these questions, this
book addresses a gap in the literature on the Lebanese civil war and
contributes to existing debates on non-state political violence and female
perpetrators more generally.
1.4.1 Numbers, Percentages and Roles of Women in the Militias

Women participated in all of the militias involved in the Lebanese civil
war. They were included as nurses, cooks, cleaners, laundry women,
8 An overview of all interviewees can be found in the appendix.

smugglers, administrators, political organisers, spies, fighters, comman-

ders, recruiters, liaison contacts, as well as in telecommunications and
PR (interviewees 1, 2, 4, 6–12, 14, 16–18, 20–25, 27–41, 44–60, 62–
66). Moreover, they were employed as suicide attackers against the Israeli
occupying forces, mostly in the SSNP (André-Dessornes 2013). Iden-
tifying exact numbers and percentages is difficult, if not impossible, as
several interviewees stressed (interviewees 2, 7, 8, 44). This is due to
the secretive (and often unorganised) nature of many non-state armed
groups, and the fact that many militias either did not keep any archives—
or archival holdings were destroyed during the war or post-war period
(interviewees 2, 7, 8, 44). Any figures, on both the overall numbers
of fighters and the percentage of female militia members, are there-
fore only estimates. Based on triangulation of interview data with the
limited information available from secondary literature, I estimate that—
at the beginning of the war—the overall number of fighters in the LCP
was between 3000 and 6000 (interviewees 1, 2, 7; Badran 2008), the
percentage of female militants between 20 and 60% (interviewees 1, 22,
23, 27–29, 32, 54) and the percentage of female fighters up to 15% (inter-
viewees 1, 22, 23, 27, 31, 32, 54). The PFLP was a small militia, with
only a few hundred fighters at the beginning of the war (interviewees
67–69). The percentage of female fighters is likely to have been slightly
lower than in the LCP (interviewees 61; Badran 2008). The percentage of
female fighters in Fatah was considerably lower than in the PFLP (inter-
viewees 1, 14, 18, 52 61, 67–69). At the beginning of the war, Kataeb
had between 4000 and 6000 fighters (interviewees 1, 7, 55, 57; Badran
2008). Of these, an estimated 2–7.5% were female fighters, with the exact
figure probably being more in the lower end of the scale (interviewees 2,
16, 41, 44, 55, 57). In the case of Amal, numbers were probably very
low as well.
1.4.2 Individual Motivations: Women’s Insistence to be Included

Contrary to the findings of some scholars working on female participation
in other contexts, coercion did not play a role during the civil war in
Lebanon. The women who participated in the war did so out of their own
choice. Faced with the extreme security context and perceived injustice at
the outbreak of the war, women were highly motivated and insisted to
be included in combat. This was the most important factor in bringing
about female participation in the militias. It is unlikely that women had
10 J. P. EGGERT
participated as fighters, if it had not been for the women’s insistence to

be included. The women involved in the militias largely shared the same
motivations as men. A minority of interviewees mentioned gender-specific
motivations, such as the fight for women’s liberation and gender equality.
There were no major differences between the backgrounds of the men
and the women who joined the militias involved in the war. They were
often young and many had personal links to the militias—either through
friends or family members. For many, non-violent activism was a pathway
into violent roles. The fact that women’s rights and gender equality were
de facto not a priority for many militias did not stop women from joining.
1.4.3 Organisational Characteristics

After women’s insistence to be involved, the second most important
factors were organisational characteristics. When the women insisted on
being included as fighters, they were included in those militias that (at
least officially) believed in women’s rights and gender equality. This
explains the high percentages of female involvement in the LCP, PFLP
and the CAO—a small LNM-affiliated, communist militia. Those militias
with a more ambiguous position on women’s roles (such as Kataeb, Fatah
and Amal), saw a lower level of female involvement. In the same vein, the
main reason why women were not included as fighters in the militias of
the PSP was the party’s de facto gender ideology. The case of the PSP
stresses the importance of looking beyond official labels when assessing
an organisation’s gender ideology and instead taking de facto practices
into account. Similarly, the reason Amal did not allow women to join
as fighters until 1978 was the group’s gender ideology. Amal’s gender
ideology allowed female participation in combat only under very specific
conditions. It prescribed that female involvement in combat was only
permitted in a situation of defence against an external invader—resistance
against whom was perceived as legitimate in religious terms. This was
the case in 1978, when Israel invaded large parts of the Shia-dominated
south of the country. Internal structure and dynamics also played a role in
facilitating female involvement in the militias. The militias of the far left
(including the LCP, CAO and PFLP), whose leadership was in favour of
female participation, included women from the outset. In those organ-
isations whose leadership was undivided in their opposition to female
deployment, women did not participate in combat (namely in the PSP and
in Amal before 1978). In the militias in which the leadership was divided
(such as in Kataeb and Fatah), a window of opportunity for women’s

involvement was opened, which made their participation possible—at least
temporarily. Lastly, nearly all organisations which deployed female fighters
had had a long tradition of engaging women in separate non-violent
political women’s units. Several interviewees saw this factor as crucial in
the later participation of female militia members in general, and female
combatants in particular, as it provided women with a space to gain polit-
ical experience and confidence before the war started and highlighted that
there was a place for women in the struggle. Moreover, the Lebanese left
was clearly inspired by the role of the women in the Palestinian revolution.
Female members of the Christian militias did not have similar role models
for female involvement, which is likely to be another factor contributing
to the relatively low numbers of female fighters in the Christian militias.
Lastly, organisational aims, age and size did not play any significant role,
as both organisations with domestic aims as well as those with an inter-
national agenda included female fighters, but there is some evidence that
the specific project for the nation-state the various militias were fighting
for played a role in the inclusion of female fighters.
1.4.4 The Security Context

In those militias with organisational characteristics that were not
conducive to the inclusion of female combatants (including organisational
gender ideology and the leadership’s position on female employment
in combat), female participation was nevertheless rendered possible due
to external security pressures. Ideological considerations were overcome
when the militias were confronted with increasing security pressures. The
same security pressures and perceived injustice that had led individuals to
join the militias at the beginning of the war facilitated female involvement
on the organisational level. The evolving levels of female involvement
throughout the war illustrate this clearly. How the security context was
interpreted differed from militia to militia: the militias of the far left
considered the war to be “the Revolution” they had been preparing
for, whilst the Christian militias perceived their involvement in the war
as a fight for survival. Amal saw its fight against Israel as a war against
an external invader who represented the “absolute Evil”. Each of these
interpretations facilitated the inclusion of female fighters in their own way.
12 J. P. EGGERT
1.4.5 Societal Factors

The main reason why female participation in combat remained relatively
low, especially when compared with other conflict contexts, was society’s
opposition to women’s involvement in the war. Lebanon had started to
undergo a process of development towards a more gender-progressive
society in the 1960s and 1970s. This trend was amplified by the war;
however, overall Lebanon remained a comparatively gender-conservative
society, with relatively high levels of opposition to female involvement
in combat. Whilst there was considerable intra- and inter-community
variation, overall, most Lebanese did not see a role for women on the
frontlines. Those militias that defied communal gender norms and expec-
tations by involving women in combat roles navigated their relations
with the communities with a number of tactical steps, on both a prac-
tical and a narrative level, in order to prevent negative reactions from the
communities.
1.5 Civil War(s) in Lebanon

The decision-making of the militias analysed in this book took place in
a specific context. This is not the place to undertake a comprehensive
analysis of the war—others have done that in much more detail (see,
for example, Norton 1987; Fisk 2001; Hirst 2011; Traboulsi 2012).
However, in order to appreciate the context in which the decision-making
of the militias and their members took place, it is necessary to provide a
brief discussion of the different phases of the Lebanese civil war, its main
actors and the debate about its causes.
1.5.1 Causes of the War

More than thirty years after the end of the Lebanese civil war, there is no
single narrative of what caused the war. The most commonly cited causes
of the war include sectarian, political, economic and external factors. Most
academic authors highlight the multitude of reasons that led to war in
Lebanon and maintain that singling out one reason would be an over-
simplification (Abul-Husn 1998; Fisk 2001; Hirst 2011; Mackey 2006;
Traboulsi 2012; Winslow 1996). Some also stress that whilst several main
themes might have been at stake, different antagonisms played a role at
the various stages of the conflict, depending on the “ebb and flow of the
issue in dispute” (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 2–3).
The Lebanese civil war has often been described as religious in nature,
with authors presenting it as “just another round of conflict in a sectarian
system” (Johnson 2001, p. 21–23). Indeed, “[i]ntercommunal tension
has been a feature of the modern state of Lebanon since its creation” in
1920 (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 2–3), and the Lebanese civil war did have a
sectarian dimension. However, most analysts now agree that the war was
not fundamentally a religious conflict (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 2–3; see also
Bechara 2003, p. 32; Mackey 2006, pp. 93–94). The fact that, especially
in the West, it was assumed early on that the civil war was fought about
religious questions (Johnson 2001, pp. 21–23; Mackey 2006, p. 91) is
likely to be a reflection of widespread assumptions about Lebanon and the
Middle East rather than the actual nature of the conflict. Indeed, many
Western interpretations of conflict in the Middle East continue to be read
through a neo-colonial lens, essentialising and othering the region and its
peoples as violent, uncivilised and primordial (Khalidi 2010; Little 2008;
Said 1979; Zelizer et al. 2002).
Rather than religion, political factors are highlighted in other publica-
tions on the causes of the war in Lebanon. They stress that Lebanon’s
political leaders had developed a very specific political power-sharing
agreement and conflict regulation mechanism which “offered each
community an opportunity to contribute to the political process in the
country according to its numerical weight” (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 3–4).
The lack of flexibility of this particular form of political confession-
alism is said to have contributed to the increasing alienation of Lebanese
Arab Nationalists and leftists (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 3–4; El-Solh 2004,
p. 334). According to this approach of explaining the war, hostilities
broke out over divergent interests in changing the power-sharing formula
in place (Abul-Husn 1998, p. 3). Leftists in Lebanon had been calling
with increasing vehemence for a new political and economic order and for
reforms since the early 1970s (El-Solh 2004, p. 331; see also Traboulsi
2012). The polarisation of the Lebanese political landscape along a left–
right dichotomy, and between those who called for a “secular state with
social, economic and political reforms and those who support[ed] ‘tradi-
tional chieftains, urban notables, business tycoons’ who run the system”
had become increasingly pronounced (Mackey 2006, p. 161; see also El-
Solh 2004, p. 331; Hirst 2011, p. 89). Another salient political issue
was the problem of competing Lebanese nationalisms and the question
14 J. P. EGGERT
of whether Lebanon was (to be) closer to the Arab or Western world
(El-Solh 2004, pp. ix, 2–9; Johnson 2001, p. 24; Mackey 2006, p. 158).
Some analysts also focus on economic reasons for the war. Traboulsi,
who analyses the war from a political economy perspective, is one of these
(2012). He deplores that “[w]ritings on Lebanon … have often sacrificed
economic and social history in favour of an exclusively political perspec-
tive” (Traboulsi 2012, p. viii). Those focusing on economic and social
causes of the Lebanese civil war point out that one of the triggering
events of the war was the killing of the politician and activist Marouf
Saad, who was killed at a demonstration of fishermen over economic
grievances in Saida in early 1975 (Mackey 2006, p. 156). They also high-
light that the call of the LNM and its allies for a new political order
included demands for economic reforms (Mackey 2006, p. 161), and
that one of the reasons especially Palestinians, Shia Muslims and other
marginalised groups engaged in the war (especially during the its first
phase) was to challenge the traditional clientelist system that preserved
economic interests of two dominating societal groups—the Maronites,
and, to a lesser degree, Sunni Muslims (Johnson 2001, pp. 5–7; see also
Mackey 2006, pp. 95–103). Others believe that the country’s economic
marginality made it more prone to conflict (Winslow 1996, p. 3) or point
to the role economic factors played in fuelling the war once it had started
(Johnson 2001, p. 226).
Lastly, another frequently quoted cause for the war is external factors.
Analysts invoking external factors usually point to the activities of Pales-
tinian organisations and the role of a number of Middle Eastern and
Western states that intervened in the war at one point. Main external
actors included Syria, Palestinians and Israel (Abul-Husn 1998, p. 4), even
though one could argue that the Palestinians were only semi-external,
considering that large parts of the community had been refugees in the
country since the Arab–Israeli war of 1948/1949. Since the expulsion
from their homeland in 1948, Palestinian militants had used Lebanon as
a base in their fight against Israel, and Israel often targeted Lebanon in
preventive, pre-emptive and retaliatory operations (Hirst 2011, pp. 92,
95; Mackey 2006, pp. 142, 150). In 1969, decades of oppression of
Palestinians in Lebanon led to the intifada of the camps (Hirst 2011,
pp. 76–78), during which Palestinians and leftist Lebanese (who had
been radicalised by the 1967 Israeli-Arab war and inner-Lebanese discord)
confronted the Lebanese army (Hirst 2011, pp. 90, 96–97; Mackey
2006, pp. 144–145). The Lebanese government tried to fight off the
Palestinian organisations to no avail, and so in autumn 1969, Beirut
formally agreed to Palestinian militias operating from Lebanese soil, in the
Egyptian-brokered Cairo Agreement (Hirst 2011, p. 94). This was seen as

threat to national interests by large parts of the Maronite elite, especially
since many of the Palestinians were Sunni Muslims and were therefore
seen to have the potential to imbalance the traditional sectarian makeup
of the Lebanese society and state (Traboulsi 2012). And indeed, many
Lebanese, who “shared the revolutionary aspirations of the Palestinian
movement”, sympathised with the Palestinians and their cause (Mackey
2006, p. 143). The Christian Kataeb party started to strengthen their
already existing militia, with others joining in (Hirst 2011, p. 98; Mackey
2006, pp. 145–146). The situation intensified even more when the PLO
was expelled from Jordan in September 1970 and made Lebanon their
new political base (Mackey 2006, p. 147). In 1975, one of the two trig-
gering events of the war (the other being the killing of Marouf Saad in
Saida) involved Palestinian fighters, in the massacre of Ain Al-Rummaneh
(Traboulsi 2012). However, the degree to which the Palestinian presence
in Lebanon contributed to the outbreak of the war is contested. On the
one hand, some have suggested that external factors “exacerbated but did
not cause the conflict” (Abul-Husn 1998, p. 131). On the other hand,
it has been claimed that “had it not been for the PLO’s militarization
of Lebanese politics (and the responsive militarization of the Maronites),
all the socioeconomic and confessional tensions in Lebanon could have
been contained by the Lebanese state” (Johnson 2001, p. 24). In any
case, the Lebanese civil war had a distinct regional dimension—and not
just because of the involvement of the Palestinian militias (Hirst 2011,
pp. 102–103). In addition to Syria and Israel, the states of Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Libya (and later Iran) were directly or indirectly involved (El-Solh
2004, pp. 300–301; Hirst 2011, p. 108). Other key international players
included notably France, the US and the UN (Traboulsi 2012). This
outside support (which all militias involved in the conflict benefitted from
in one way or another) intensified and prolonged the conflict, especially
since the supporting states were often entangled in discord and rivalries
amongst themselves (Abul-Husn 1998, p. 4; Mackey 2006, p. 247). As
Johnson rightly put it, “[i]t would be naïve to think that the Lebanese
fighters were innocents manipulated by outside forces”, but it is unlikely
that they could have fought as long and as fiercely without the support
of regional states (Johnson 2001, pp. 225–226).
16 J. P. EGGERT
1.5.2 Key Non-State Armed Political Actors

At the beginning of the war, two main camps were opposing each other.
Key non-state armed actors included the members of the LNM—which
comprised of Lebanese and Palestinian socialist, communist and Arab
Nationalist organisations, and the LFr—which brought together Christian
parties and militias (Abul-Husn 1998, pp. 3–5; El-Solh 2004, p. 324).
Moreover, some organisations were not formally part of the LNM but
politically close to it, at least for part of the war. This includes the Amal
Movement—which, despite not formally being a member, coordinated its
activities with the LNM in the beginning of the war (Abul-Husn 1998,
p. 4; Norton 1987, p. 48). In short, the LNM fought for a new socio-
economic and political order, for an end of Maronite domination of the
political system, and for Palestinian rights and their armed presence in
Lebanon (Traboulsi 2012). The LFr, on the other hand, fought for the
preservation of the status quo in the country and against the presence
of armed Palestinian groups in Lebanon (Traboulsi 2012). Whilst these
were the alliances at the beginning of the war, in the later stages, many
former allies started turning against each other, which resulted in bloody
intra-alliance and even intra-group fighting. In the 1980s, another group
of non-state actors gained prominence—parties with a distinctive Islamist
agenda, such as Hezbollah (Norton 2014).
1.5.3 Phases of the War

The Lebanese civil war lasted for almost sixteen years, from 1975 to
1990. It can be divided into four stages,9 even though regional differ-
ences meant that different parts of the country were subjected to fighting
and occupation at different times and to various degrees.
1.5.3.1 Phase 1: Spring 1975 to Summer/Autumn 1976

It is generally assumed that war in Lebanon was ignited by two inci-
dents—the shooting of protesting fishermen in Saida in February 1975
and armed clashes (between members of the Christian militias on the
one side and Palestinian militants on the other) in Ain al-Rummaneh in
East Beirut in April of that year (Abul-Husn 1998, p. 2; Traboulsi 2012,
9 For an alternative analysis of the different stages of the war, see Hirst (2011, pp. 102–
103).
pp. 188–189). It has been stressed, however, that these were the last two
of a series of violent incidents, which eventually lead to the outbreak of
war (Hirst 2011, pp. 99–102). This first stage of the war was largely
dominated by fighting between (Palestinian and Lebanese) leftist militia
members in one camp and Christian militia members in the other camp
(Hirst 2011, pp. 109–110; Mackey 2006, p. 157). As Hirst argued, “in
the initial phase, 1975–6, it was the civil war that predominated”, with
Lebanese actors leading the way (Hirst 2011, pp. 108–109). Regional
politics did not play a major role yet (Hirst 2011, pp. 108–109). The
first phase was also marked by a number of massacres—mostly in Beirut,
such as the Black Saturday massacres in December 1975 and mass killings
in Karantina, Maslakh, Damour and Tel el-Zaatar in the year after (Hirst
2011, p. 114; Mackey 2006, p. 164). Another key characteristic of this
part of the war was heavy inner-city fighting, such as during the Battle of
the Hotels in Beirut in late 1975 and early 1976 (Hirst, 2011, p. 111).
Beirut was quickly divided along the so-called Green Line—a demarcation
line dividing the city into a LNM-dominated, majority Muslim part in the
West and a LFr-controlled, majority Christian part in the East (Mackey
2006, p. 165). Towards the end of this first stage of the war, the fighting
largely turned from battles over ideology to fighting over petty interests
(Mackey 2006, pp. 162–163). This phase ended with an invasion by the
Syrian army, which took place over three stages from April to October
1976 (Hirst 2011, p. 114). Finally, a diplomatic intervention of the Arab
world resulted in a ceasefire (Hirst 2011, pp. 114–115).
1.5.3.2 Phase 2: Early 1977 to Summer 1982

The Syrian intervention and following ceasefire ended the war, but not
the crisis. The grievances which had led to the outbreak of the war in
Spring 1975 were not addressed (Hirst 2011, p. 115; Mackey 2006,
pp. 166–167), and the Syrians were “unwilling and unable to suppress
the various militias” (Johnson 2001, p. 224). In fact, in some parts of
the country, namely the South, the fighting actually intensified (inter-
viewee 1). Bomb explosions and assassinations took place in other parts
of the country too. Winslow argued that what had changed was the aim
of militias leaders and politicians:
[A]fter 1976, Lebanese were not pitted against other Lebanese to win
control over the whole Republic. Instead they fought to carve out a
18 J. P. EGGERT
piece of the country either for themselves or as proxies in the regional

competition for strategic control. (Winslow 1996, p. 212)
Overall, the phase from 1977 to 1982 was a “sullen three-way stalemate”
between Christian militias, Lebanese and Palestinian leftists, and the
Syrians (Mackey 2006, p. 173). Militias of the different camps started to
turn against each other, as seen for example, in the intra-Christian fighting
that resulted in the massacres of Ehden in the Summer of 1978 and Safra
in the Summer of 1980. Musa Sadr, the leader of Amal, disappeared on
a visit to Libya in August 1978 (Mackey 2006, p. 201). He has been
celebrated as a martyr by parts of the Lebanese Shia community since
and continues to inspire contemporary Shia Lebanese politics (Norton
1987, 2014). In March 1978, earlier advances of the Israeli army esca-
lated with a new bigger-than-before invasion, named Operation Litani,
into the South of Lebanon (Traboulsi 2012, p. 212). After the Israeli
withdrawal, the UN sent UNIFIL troops to patrol the border (Mackey
2006, p. 173). However, the conflict in the South was not resolved—and
skirmishes (between the Lebanese army, pro-Israeli Christian militias such
as Saad Haddad’s South Lebanon Army (SLA), the Israeli army, Pales-
tinian militants and Lebanese leftists) continued (Norton 1987; Traboulsi
2012).
1.5.3.3 Phase 3: Summer 1982 to Spring 1985

In June 1982, after years of low-scale conflict along the Lebanese-Israeli
border between the Israeli army, their Lebanese allies and Lebanese and
Palestinian opponents, the second major Israeli invasion of Lebanon took
place (Mackey 2006, pp. 175–176). The invasion had three main aims:
(1) to destroy the infrastructure of the PLO, (2) to establish a new polit-
ical order in Lebanon under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel—one of
the senior members and leaders of Kataeb and the LF—in order to (3)
reach an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty and drive the Syrian army out of
Lebanon (El-Solh 2004, pp. 339–340). The invasion was based on an
agreement between Bashir Gemayel and his supporters and the Israeli
regime. However, asked by the Israelis to storm West Beirut which was
held by Lebanese and Palestinian leftist militias, Bashir Gemayel’s LF
refused (Hirst 2011, pp. 149–150; Traboulsi 2012). In the following
weeks, the Israeli army besieged and shelled West Beirut, until the Pales-
tinian political leadership agreed to leave the country in August, facilitated
by the American government (Mackey 2006, pp. 178–181; Winslow
1996, pp. 233–234). As planned, Bashir Gemayel was elected President

in September. However, he was assassinated shortly afterwards (Mackey
2006, pp. 181–182). In response to the killing, Christian Lebanese mili-
tias supported by the Israeli army committed the massacres of the Sabra
and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut (Hirst 2011, pp. 154–
160; Mackey 2006, pp. 183–184). These developments led the French,
Italian and US American troops, who had been on the ground to monitor
the evacuation of the PLO, to re-enter Beirut (Traboulsi 2012; Winslow
1996, p. 235). This Multinational Force remained in the country until
a major attack by Hezbollah killed over 300 French and US Amer-
ican soldiers in October 1983 (Hirst 2011, pp. 194–196). Israel then
pulled out of most of Lebanon at the end of 1982 (Mackey 2006,
p. 244). However, amongst other strategic areas, it continued to occupy
an extended “security zone” in the South, which included Saida—one
of Lebanon’s three major cities, until June 1985. In 1985, after a
brutal occupation that lasted for three years, the Israelis left the South
of Lebanon—except for a smaller buffer zone near the border (Hirst
2011, pp. 196–204). It was during this time that Hezbollah, a new Shia
Islamist party, was formally founded by former members of Amal and
other Shia groups—even though the group’s origin as a loosely organ-
ised militia dates back to the early 1980s (Hirst 2011, p. 187; Mackey
2006, pp. 206–207; Traboulsi 2012, p. 229; Norton 2014, p. 23). Mean-
while, in the aftermath of the Israeli withdrawal from their positions in
the Shouf Mountains in late 1983, fighting broke out between the PSP
and the LF (and their allies), which resulted in large-scale massacres and
expulsion of Christians from the Shouf (Traboulsi 2012, pp. 230–231),
with French and American forces intervening in support of the Christian
militias (Mackey 2006, pp. 189–190).
1.5.3.4 Phase 4: June 1985 to Autumn 1990

During the last five years of the war, Lebanon went through a particularly
destructive phase of fighting. Former allies increasingly turned against
each other, and intra-sectarian battles resulted in some of the bloodiest
parts of the war (Hirst 2011, p. 208). Whilst kidnappings of Lebanese
had been a frequent occurrence since the beginning of the war, now
abductions of foreigners also increased considerably (Hirst 2011, p. 225;
Mackey 2006, pp. 213–221).
20 J. P. EGGERT
The fighting went on and on. But less and less, now, did it serve any
discernible military or strategic purpose; it was more and more the insti-
tutional, the pathological, activity of a self-perpetuating warrior caste
divorced from the society, and its conflicting causes, which had spawned
it. (Hirst 2011, p. 207)
Such fighting between former allies (and even members of the same
militia) took place between two fractions of the LF, following the failed
Tripartite Accord at the end of 1985—a Syrian-brokered attempt at
ending the war and ensuring Syrian hegemony by bringing together
leaders of the LF, Amal and the PSP (Winslow 1996, pp. 251, 254–
256). Other examples of fighting between previous allies include notably
the War of the Camps (between Amal and the Palestinian organisations),
and prolonged, bloody confrontations between Amal and Hezbollah in
Beirut, the Bekaa and the South (Traboulsi 2012, p. 240). In 1988,
the term of Amin Gemayel (who had been elected after the assassina-
tion in 1982 of his brother Bashir), as President of the Republic, ended
(Traboulsi 2012, p. 246). The parliament, as well as “the outside powers
which traditionally influenced its choice”, could not agree on a new
president and so for a brief period of time, the country had two rival
governments (Hirst 2011, p. 209). In October 1989, in the resort of
Taif in Saudi Arabia, peace negotiations finally came to a conclusion
(Abul-Husn 1998, p. 5). Lebanese deputies approved a Charter of Recon-
ciliation and elected a new president (Winslow 1996, p. 274). However,
the fighting continued, until President Hrawi called for support from the
Syrian army (Winslow 1996, pp. 276–279), which invaded the country
and stopped the fighting in October 1990 (Hirst 2011, pp. 213–214). In
the following months, “[w]ith the help, and sometimes under the control,
of the Syrian army”, the new regime disarmed and dissolved all militias,
except for Hezbollah (Hirst 2011, pp. 215–216). The Lebanese civil war,
which had lasted for over 15 years, had officially ended.
1.6 Structure of the Book

This book consists of seven chapters. After Chapter 1 (this introduction),
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical perspectives underlying this study and
discusses the practicalities of conducting research on the Lebanese civil
war. In Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, I examine the individual, organisational,
security-related and societal factors that impacted the inclusion of female
fighters during the Lebanese civil war. Each of these chapters discusses the
findings of my research in Lebanon, comparing and contrasting findings
of my research with claims in the existing literature on female fighters and
non-state armed groups. Chapter 3 is dedicated to individual motivations
and the reasons why women decided to join the militias and insist on their
inclusion as fighters. I examine the extent to which coercion played a role
in the recruitment of female fighters, look at the women’s backgrounds
and examine if there were any differences between men’s and women’s
backgrounds and motivations. Chapter 4 looks at organisational charac-
teristics and the extent to which ideology, aims, age, size and internal
dynamics affected the organisations’ decision-making on the inclusion of
female fighters. Chapter 5 analyses the role of the security context in
which the militias operated. I discuss to what extent claims in the existing
literature (that non-state armed organisations employ women to avoid
detection, seek attention or assert a position) hold true in the case of
the militias involved in the civil war in Lebanon. Chapter 6 is dedicated
to the importance of societal and communal norms and expectations.
I highlight which factors facilitated women’s participation in the mili-
tias, which factors inhibited it, and how the militias managed communal
gender expectations that conflicted with their organisational strategies.
Chapter 7 is the conclusion, in which I summarise the findings of my
research, describe limitations of the study, make recommendations for
policy and practice and briefly discuss militants’ experiences in post-war
Lebanon.
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MODUS VIVENDI, Alaskan Boundary.
See (in this volume)

ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION.
MODUS VIVENDI, The Newfoundland.

NEWFOUNDLAND: A. D. 1899-1901.
MOMBASA-VICTORIA RAILWAY, The.

UGANDA RAILWAY.
----------MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: Start--------
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1895.

The situation of the Treasury of the United States.
Contract for replenishing its gold reserve.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (JANUARY-
FEBRUARY).
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1895-1896.

The gold reserve in the U. S. Treasury again imperilled.
Refusal of relief by the Senate.

MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A. D. 1895-1896 (DECEMBER-FEBRUARY).
The Silver Question in the United States
Presidential elections.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER);
and
1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).

Movements for monetary reforms in the United States.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1898.

Renewal of the privileges of the Bank of France.
The privileges of the Bank of France, as the fiscal agent of

the French Government, expired with the close of the year
1897, and renewal of them was opposed by the Radicals and
Socialists, who demanded the creation of a State Bank. The
government succeeded, however (June, 1897), in carrying the
measure necessary for continuing the existing system, on terms
somewhat more favorable to the state than before.
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1897 (March).

Adoption of the gold standard in Japan.
By a law of the Japanese Parliament, passed in March, 1897, to

come into force October 1, a gold monetary standard was
adopted, at the ratio of 32½ to 1, the silver dollar to be
legal tender until six months after notice given of its
withdrawal.
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1897 (April-

October).
Negotiation by American Commissioners in Europe for an
international bi-metallic agreement.
In fulfilment of the pledge given by the Republican party, at

its national convention, in 1896, that it would use efforts to
bring about an international agreement for free coinage of
gold and silver at some common ratio, the following Act was
passed by the two Houses of Congress in January and February,
1897: "That whenever after March 4, 1897, the president of the
United States shall determine that the United States should be
represented at any international conference called by the
United States or any other country with a view to securing by
international agreement a fixity of relative value between
gold and silver as money by means of a common ratio between
these metals, with free mintage at such ratio, he is hereby
authorized to appoint five or more commissioners to such
international conference; and for compensation of said
commissioners, and for all reasonable expenses connected
therewith, to be approved by the secretary of state, including
the proportion to be paid by the United States of the joint
expenses of any such conference, the sum of $100,000, or so
much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated. That
the president of the United States is hereby authorized, in
the name of the government of the United States, to call, in
his discretion, such international conference, to assemble at
such point as may be agreed upon. And he is further
authorized, if in his judgment the purpose specified in the
first section hereof can thus be better attained, to appoint
one or more special commissioners or envoys to such of the
nations of Europe as he may designate, to seek by diplomatic
negotiations an international agreement for the purpose
specified in the first section hereof. And in case of such
appointment so much of the appropriation herein made as shall
be necessary shall be available for the proper expenses and
compensation of such commissioners or envoys." Pursuant to
this Act, President McKinley, on the 12th of April, appointed
Senator Edward O. Wolcott; of Colorado, ex-Vice-President
Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, and General Charles J. Paine,
of Massachusetts, to be commissioners for the purpose which
the bill describes. The commissioners first visited Paris, and
there obtained assurances from the French government of
cordial cooperation and support. They then proceeded to
London, for negotiation with the British authorities, on whose
attitude towards the movement for international action in the
matter its success was well known to depend. Some members of
the British government, conspicuously Mr. Balfour, were
outspoken advocates of bi-metallism, and much was hoped from
the discussion to be opened with them. The American
commissioners were cordially received, and they were invited
to a formal meeting, on the 12th of July, with Lord Salisbury,
the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury, Sir
Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord
George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India. The American
Ambassador, Mr. Hay, accompanied them to the conference, which
was held at the Foreign Office. A memorandum of the
conversation at this meeting, and at a second one held on the
15th, together with a correspondence which followed, were
published later in a parliamentary "blue book," from which the
following account is drawn. Mr. Wolcott explained the wish of
the American envoys to obtain the views of several
governments, preliminary to the inviting of an international
bi-metallic conference. He added that they expected to have,
in England, the full cooperation of the Ambassador of the
French Republic, who happened, for the moment, to be absent
from the country, but who had requested them to proceed with
the meeting in his absence. "Mr. Wolcott then presented some
reasons which, in the opinion of the Special Envoys, rendered
it desirable that some international agreement for the
restoration of bimetallism should be reached, and explained
why, in their opinion, the success of this effort depended
upon the attitude which England would take regarding the
question. He then stated that the Special Envoys requested
that England should agree to open English mints as its
contribution to an attempt to restore bimetallism by
international agreement, and dwelt upon the importance of the
fact that France and the United States were together engaged
in an attempt to bring about such an agreement, and were
cooperating together to that end. Lord Salisbury desired to
know if the French Government would co-operate upon the basis
of opening their mints to the free and unlimited coinage of
silver.
{315}
Mr. Wolcott answered in the affirmative. Lord Salisbury then
asked at what ratio, and was informed by Mr. Wolcott that the
French Government preferred the ratio of 15½ to 1, and that
the United States were inclined to yield this point and accept
this as a proper ratio. Considerable discussion on the
question of the ratio and the method by which it should be
settled then took place. … It was then suggested that further
proceedings should be deferred until the French Ambassador
might be also present. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in
further conversation, said that if the suggestion of opening
the English mints was to be made, he thought an answer in the
negative would undoubtedly be given. The First Lord of the
Treasury asked whether, assuming this request for opening
English mints to be refused, it was desired that the subject
be discussed upon the basis of something different and less
than the opening of English mints. Upon a mutual understanding
that in the absence of the French Ambassador, anything said
should be considered as said informally, a discussion then
took place as to the concessions that England might make
towards an international solution of the question, if it
should refuse to open English mints. Mr. Wolcott, for the
Special Envoys, presented the following as a list of
contributions which, among others, England might make towards
bimetallism if an international agreement could be effected:
1. Opening of the Indian mints. Repeal of the order making the

sovereign legal tender in India.
2. Placing one-fifth of the bullion in the Issue Department of
the Bank of England in silver.
3.
(a.) Raising the legal tender limit of silver to, say, £10.
(b.) Issuing the 20s. notes based on silver, which shall be
legal tender.
(c.) Retirement, gradual or otherwise, of the 10s. gold
pieces, and substitution of paper based on silver.
4. Agreement to coin annually £ … of silver [present silver

coinage average for five years about £1,000,000, less annual
withdrawal of worn and defaced coin for recoinage, £350,000].
5. Opening of English mints to coinage of rupees, and for

coinage of British dollar, which shall be full tender in
Straits Settlements and other silver standard Colonies, and
tender in the United Kingdom to the limit of silver legal
tender.
6. Colonial action, and coinage of silver in Egypt.
7. Something having the general scope of the Huskisson plan.
Some general conversation followed in regard to the preceding

suggestions, and the interview terminated, to be resumed on
the 15th July, 1897, when it was understood that the French
Ambassador would also be present."
At the second meeting, July 15, Baron de Courcol, Ambassador

of the French Republic, and M. L. Geoffray, French Minister
Plenipotentiary, were present, and the former spoke at length,
stating the position of the French government on the question
of the free coinage of silver. He said: "'Our population,
notably the agricultural population, finds that it has not at
its disposition sufficient resources in currency, in metallic
money. On the other hand, if the Government in the actual
state of affairs reopens the mints to the free coinage of
silver, we would be flooded by the abundance of this metal
coming from all other countries of the world, and we could not
resist the even greater evil of the inevitable depreciation of
one of our precious metals, that is to say, of the effective
destruction of the legal ratio upon which our monetary system
is based. … In other words, we think that the production of
silver, more active in certain quarters of the globe in the
last quarter of a century, is not of itself considerable
enough to change in an enduring manner the normal ratio
between gold and silver after these two metals will have been
scattered over the entire surface of the world among all
nations who are called upon to absorb them. There is, then, in
our eyes, a need which is perhaps transitory, but which is
actually common to all the commercial nations, of taking
measures adequate for assuring, by a common understanding, the
re-establishment of the normal ratio of 15½ between silver and
gold. If measures of this kind should be adopted by all the
commercial nations, we would be able to reopen our mints to
the free coinage of silver without fear of being submerged by
an excessive influx of this metal. The reopening of the mints
of all the commercial countries to the free coinage of silver
in the ratio of 15½ with gold would be the most natural and
the most efficacious means of arriving at the result sought
for. This is the desideratum which I am instructed to bring
forward here, and which I am particularly to urge upon the
English Government as a primordial condition of the success of
the common understanding. If the Government of the Queen, even
in consenting to reopen the mints in India, should refuse to
adopt the same measure for England, at least would they not be
able to take certain measures which would be, up to a certain
point, equivalent, in order to maintain the full value of
silver, and to prevent India from being the victim of a
depreciation of this metal in consequence of an unlimited
coinage? … By way of suggestion, I would indicate, as one of
the measures which the English Government might usefully
adopt, the annual purchase of a certain quantity of silver
metal, which might afterwards be disposed of as seemed
best-either it might be preserved in ingots, or it might be
used for regular consumption, or it might be sent to India.
This quantity might be fixed approximately, at least, for a
number of years, at a sum of £10,000,000 in nominal value.
This is, perhaps, only a palliative; it is, in any event, only
one of the expedients which would be deemed necessary. But I
am to urge strongly that the English Government determine to
take measures of this kind, or other equivalent measures, if,
as I believe, it recognizes with us the necessity of improving
the monetary situation in a great part of its Empire—I may
say, in a great part of the entire world.' Lord Salisbury then
asked whether the French Government would decline to open its
mints unless England would also open her mints. The French
Ambassador replied that he preferred to discuss the subject
upon the basis that France would go to open mints if England
would consent to open her mints, but that he would not exclude
from his view the question of contributions by England towards
maintaining the value of silver, short of open mints. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in response to this, stated
definitely that the English Government would not agree to open
English mints to the unlimited coinage of silver, and that,
whatever views he and his colleagues might separately hold on
the question of bimetallism, he thought he could say they were
united upon this point. …
{316}
The suggestions made by the Special Envoys at the interview on
the 12th July were again read, and the Special Envoys accepted
also as important and desirable the proposal that the English
Government should purchase annually, say, £10,000,000 of
silver, with proper safeguards and provisions as to the place
and manner of its use. The French Ambassador expressed his
approval generally of the suggestions of the Special Envoys,
as being serviceable in the consideration of the question. It
was then understood that the proposals submitted by the French
Ambassador and by the Special Envoys of the United States
should be considered, and due notice given when a reply could
be made."
The proposal for the reopening of the Indian mints to silver

was submitted at once by the home authorities of the India
Office, at London, to the government of India, and the reply
of the latter was not received until the following October.
When the reply came, it extinguished hopes of the arrangement
which the American and French governments desired. In a long
despatch, the Indian government explained with clearness the
monetary situation in that country, and discussed the effect
which a return to the unrestricted mintage of silver would
have upon it, under the circumstances and prospects of the
time. "The currency system of India," said the despatch, "is
in a transition state; the Government of India in 1893 decided
to establish a gold standard, and the first step towards that
object was the closing of the mints to silver by Act VIII of
1893. The silver rupee is still the sole legal tender coin,
though the Government has by Executive orders undertaken to
receive gold and sovereigns under certain restrictions, … the
rate of exchange adopted being 16d. the rupee or 15 rupees=£1.
The measures to be taken when the transition period has passed
have not been laid down, but it is probable that the Indian mints
will be opened to gold, and gold coins will be made legal
tender to an unlimited amount; silver rupees would also
continue to be legal tender to an unlimited amount, and the
ratio between the rupee and the gold coins as legal tender
would at the same time be finally settled. The system towards
which India is moving is thus a gold standard of the same kind
as that which now exists in France and the United States, but
with a different ratio for legal tender; but for the present
the mints are closed both to gold and silver. The transition
period has lasted for more than four years, but there is
ground for hope that it is now drawing to a close. The changes
which are involved in the arrangements proposed to Her
Majesty's Government are the following. France and the United
States are to open their mints to the free coinage of silver,
continuing the free coinage of gold and the unlimited legal
tender of coins of both metals, the ratio remaining unchanged
in France and being altered to the French ratio of 15½ to 1 in
the United States. India is to open her mints to silver, to
keep them closed to gold, and to undertake not to make gold
legal tender. France and the United States would thus be
bimetallic: India would be monometallic (silver); while most
of the other important countries of the world would be
monometallic (gold). The object which the proposers have in
view is the establishment of a stable relation between the
values of gold and of silver. This would include the
establishment of a stable exchange between the rupee and
sterling currency, which was the object of the Government of
India in the proposals made in our financial despatch of the
21st June, 1892, which proposals ultimately resulted in the
adoption, in view to the attainment of that object, of the
policy of a gold standard, and in the closing of the mints to
the free coinage of silver. If, then, it were certain that the
suggested measures would result in the establishment of a
stable ratio, the Government of India might well consider
whether their adoption would not be preferable to the policy
to which they committed themselves in 1893 in the hope of
attaining the same result by isolated action on the part of
India alone. The principal questions therefore for us to
consider are whether the measures are more likely to succeed
than the policy of 1893, and what consequences to India may be
apprehended if the measures should fail of success after being
brought into operation. … The first result of the suggested
measures, if they even temporarily succeed in their object,
would be an intense disturbance of Indian trade and industry
by the sudden rise in the rate of exchange, which, if the
ratio adopted were 15½ to 1, would be a rise from about 16d.
to about 23d. the rupee. Such a rise is enough to kill our
export trade, for the time at least. If the public were not
convinced that the arrangement would have the effect intended,
or believed that it would not be permanent, the paralysis of
trade and industry would be prolonged and accompanied by acute
individual suffering, none of the advantages expected would be
attained, and the country would pass through a critical period
which would retard its progress for years. How long the crisis
would last before normal or stable conditions were restored it
is not possible to conjecture. It would be long even if the
mercantile and banking community saw that silver was being
steadily maintained at the prescribed ratio, while any
indication of unsteadiness would greatly prolong the period by
giving foundation for doubt. If the doubt should happen to be
justified by the results, the position would be disastrous
alike to the State, to individuals, and to trade generally. …
We cannot help seeing that if the policy of 1893 is now
abandoned, and if the triple union now proposed as a
substitute should fail in its operation or should terminate,
and in its failure subject Indian trade to the violent shocks
we have described, the Government of India could not, as a
responsible Government, call upon the commercial public to
face another prolonged period of doubt, suspense, agitation,
and difficulties. For it must be clearly and fully recognized
that if India joins in the proposed measures, we shall be left
dependent, as the sole means of attaining stability in
exchange, on the success of those measures, and that if they
should fail, India must be content to remain permanently under
the silver standard with all its admitted disadvantages. … We
have given very careful consideration to the question whether
France and the United States are likely, with the help of
India, to be able to maintain the relative value of gold and
silver permanently at the ratio they intend to adopt, and have
come to the conclusion that while we admit a possibility of
the arrangements proposed resulting in the permanent
maintenance of the value of gold and silver at the ratio of
15½ to 1, the probability is that they will fail to secure
that result, and that it is quite impossible to hold that
there is anything approaching a practical certainty of their
doing so.
{317}
One reason for this conclusion is, that the arrangement would
rest on too narrow a basis. A union consisting of two
countries, with a third lending assistance, is a very
different thing from the general international union of all or
most of the important countries of the world, which was
advocated by the Government of India in the despatches of
March and June 1892 and of February and September 1886. To
afford a hope that a monetary union will succeed in
establishing stability in the relative value of gold and
silver, it is essential that the nations adhering to it should
be of such number and importance that the metallic currency of
the whole body shall be of sufficient extent to allow of the
exercise of adequate influence on the value of the two metals.
We doubt whether any two, or even three, nations in the world,
unless, indeed, one of them was Great Britain, could comply
with this condition, and we have no hesitation in saying that
France and the United States and India certainly could not. …
We have no hesitation in recommending your Lordship to refuse
to give the undertaking desired by the Governments of France
and the United States. We are quite clearly of opinion that
the interests of India demand that her mints shall not be
opened as part of an arrangement to which two or three
countries only are parties, and which does not include Great
Britain." Immediately on receiving this reply, Lord Salisbury
informed Ambassador Hay that "Her Majesty's Government feel it
their duty to state that the first proposal of the United States
Representatives is one which they are unable to accept," and
expressing a wish to know "how far the views of the American
and French Governments are modified by the decision now
arrived at, and whether they desire to proceed further with
the negotiations at the present moment."
Great Britain, Parliamentary Publications

(Papers by Command: Commercial, Number 8, 1897).
In the view of the American envoys, it seemed useless to

proceed, with no hope of cooperation from Great Britain, and
they returned to America with a discouraging report.
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1897 (December).
Adoption of the gold standard in Russia.
An imperial ukase declared the adoption of the gold standard

in Russia, authorizing the issue of a new five-rouble gold
piece.

Settlement of the monetary system in the United States.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (MARCH-
DECEMBER).
MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1900 (November).

Withdrawal of legal tender silver coins in Germany.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (NOVEMBER).
----------MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: End--------
MONGOLIA.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA.
MONOPOLIES.

TRUSTS: UNITED STATES.
MONROE DOCTRINE, The:

As emphasized in the Treaty of International Arbitration.

PEACE CONFERENCE.
MONROE DOCTRINE, The:
Its discussion as involved in the Venezuela Boundary Question.

VENEZUELA; A. D. 1895 (JULY) and (NOVEMBER).
MONTAUK POINT, Removal of troops from Santiago de Cuba to.

A. D. 1898 (JULY-AUGUST: CUBA).
MONTENEGRO.

BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES.
MOROS, The.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; THE NATIVE INHABITANTS;
and A. D. 1899 (MAY-AuGUST).
MORTMAIN, Proposed restrictions on, in France.

FRANCE: A. D. 1901 (JANUARY).
MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS:

Conflicts in Armenia.

TURKEY: A. D. 1895.
MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS:

Conflicts in Crete.
TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (FEBRUARY-MARCH).
MOSQUITO, The, as a carrier of disease.

SCIENCE, RECENT: MEDICAL, AND SURGICAL.
MUKDEN.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA; also,
RUSSIA IN ASIA: A. D. 1891-1900.
MUNICIPAL EVENTS, Notable.

BOSTON, CHICAGO, NEW YORK, TOLEDO, LONDON.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS:
Institution in Cuba.

CUBA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS:
Institution in the Philippines.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (MARCH).
MUSIC: In the Nineteenth Century.

NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE MUSICAL CENTURY.
N.
NABONIDOS, Discovery of an inscription of.

ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH: BABYLONIA:
DISCOVERY OF AN INSCRIPTION.
NANSEN'S EXPEDITION, Return of.

POLAR EXPLORATION, 1896.
NASHVILLE EXPOSITION.

TENNESSEE: A. D. 1897.
NATAL.

SOUTH AFRICA.
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF 1896.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER.)
NATIONAL PARTY, The.

A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER); and
1900 (MAY-NOVEMBER).
NATIONAL SILVER PARTY.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (JUNE-NOVEMBER).
{318}
NATIONAL STEEL COMPANY, The.

TRUSTS: UNITED STATES.
NATIONALISTS, FRENCH, Revolutionary conspiracy of.

FRANCE: A. D. 1899-1900 (AUGUST-JANUARY).
NAVAL POLICY, German.

GERMANY: A. D. 1900 (FEBRUARY-JUNE).
NAVIES OF THE SEA POWERS: A. D. 1900.
The following tables are compiled from a return issued by the

British Admiralty in the spring of 1900, showing the state of
the fleets of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy,
the United States, and Japan, including vessels then built and
in progress of construction.
Of battle-ships, there were built and building in the several

navies:
Count with a displacement

of
Great Britain. 70 821,605
France. 35 339,599
Russia. 24 262,912
Germany. 25 191,259
Italy. 19 193,001
United States. 16 184,144
Japan. 7 92,420
Of armored and protected cruisers, there were built and

building:

of
France. 60 297,486
Russia. 23 144,673
Germany. 22 107,844
Italy. 25 93,673
Japan. 23 114,479
Of unprotected cruisers, armored coast-defence vessels,

and special vessels there were built and building:

of
France. 29 93,385
Russia. 26 66,886
Germany. 35 59,617
Italy. 3 13,821
Japan. 13 24,065
Of torpedo vessels and torpedo-boat destroyers

the number built and building was:
of
France. 305 34,002
Russia. 233 37,735
Germany. 130 20,094
Italy. 180 24,863
Japan. 71 9,537
A consolidation of the above figures shows a

total of ships in the principal navies as follows:
Great Britain, 486;

France, 429;
Russia, 306;
Germany, 212;
Italy, 227;
United States, 122;
Japan, 114.
A writer in the "Fortnightly Review," discussing the above

returns, points out the imperfectness of the representation
which such gross figures give of the actual naval strength of
the several Powers, and he has undertaken to correct them by a
calculation of what he calls the "fighting weight" of the
ships, based on the age of each and its displacement in tons.
He says: "The scale of depreciation for age that I have used
is as follows: Ships, built and now building, that were
launched, or which will be launched, during 1895-1899 (and
later), are reckoned at their full value of fighting weight;
i. e., at 100 per cent. Ships launched during 1890 1894 are
reckoned as now worth only 80 per cent. of their fighting
weight. The other depreciations being: Ships launched
1885-1889 are valued at 60 per cent. of their nominal fighting

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Women and the Lebanese Civil War :

Female Fighters in Lebanese and

Jennifer Philippa Eggert

ISBN 978-3-030-83787-7 ISBN 978-3-030-83788-4 (eBook)

When “Fighters for Peace”, a Lebanese NGO working on conflict trans-

former militias) in 2015/16, asking for help to contact former combat-

of the process of inner healing. The inner healing of the individual is a

Beirut, Lebanon Christina Foerch Saab

Jennifer Philippa Eggert

“Eggert has written an excellent book on female participation in militia

“Female Fighters in Lebanese Civil War is the first comprehensive, book-

“Jennifer Eggert has produced pioneering research on female fighters,

1 Women, War and Political Violence 1

2.1.3 Greed or Grievances? 33

4.2 Internal Structure and Processes 89

7.1 Summary of Findings 162

Amal Amal Movement

Women, War and Political Violence

Female participation in political violence1 is generally considered a

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

women in combat roles? And what role do societal attitudes on female

a role in many such groups. Similar lacuna can be found in much of

1.1 Existing Research on Female Fighters

1.2 Research Question and Aims

1.3 Methodological Approach

7 An overview of the different militias is included in the appendix.

1.4.1 Numbers, Percentages and Roles of Women in the Militias

8 An overview of all interviewees can be found in the appendix.

smugglers, administrators, political organisers, spies, fighters, comman-

1.4.2 Individual Motivations: Women’s Insistence to be Included

participated as fighters, if it had not been for the women’s insistence to

1.4.3 Organisational Characteristics

(such as in Kataeb and Fatah), a window of opportunity for women’s

1.4.4 The Security Context

1.4.5 Societal Factors

1.5 Civil War(s) in Lebanon

1.5.1 Causes of the War

Egyptian-brokered Cairo Agreement (Hirst 2011, p. 94). This was seen as

1.5.2 Key Non-State Armed Political Actors

1.5.3 Phases of the War

1.5.3.1 Phase 1: Spring 1975 to Summer/Autumn 1976

1.5.3.2 Phase 2: Early 1977 to Summer 1982

piece of the country either for themselves or as proxies in the regional

1.5.3.3 Phase 3: Summer 1982 to Spring 1985

1996, pp. 233–234). As planned, Bashir Gemayel was elected President

1.5.3.4 Phase 4: June 1985 to Autumn 1990

1.6 Structure of the Book

Davis, J. 2017. Women in Modern Terrorism: From Liberation Wars to Global

Horgan, J. 2009. Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from

MODUS VIVENDI, Alaskan Boundary.

See (in this volume)

MODUS VIVENDI, The Newfoundland.

See (in this volume)

MOMBASA-VICTORIA RAILWAY, The.

See (in this volume)

----------MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: Start--------

MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1895.

See (in this volume)

MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1895-1896.

See (in this volume)

See (in this volume)

MONETARY QUESTIONS AND MEASURES: A. D. 1896-1898.

See (in this volume)