Chapter 1: Introduction

1. BLAS F. OPLE, Petitioner, v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,

CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA,
TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.

Facts:
Administrative Order No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos entitled "ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308.

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all encompassing in
scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their
right to privacy.

Issue:
Whether A.O No. 308 is constitutional.

Ruling:
No, it is unconstitutional.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. [22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order.
An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation
in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."[2

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the
law and carrying out the legislative policy.

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order
redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that
it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely
implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to
determine the metes and bounds of the ID System. Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a
reasonable expectation of privacy
II. Separation of Powers

2.1 SAMUEL C. OCCENA, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, Respondents

Facts:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. They asserted that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. Petitioners challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the
validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions[1] proposing constitutional amendments.

Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they
go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of the Interim
National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and not to amend.

Issue:
Whether the Interim Batasang Pambansa as successor of Interim National Assembly has the power to propose
constitutional amendments.

Ruling:
Yes.
The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the
same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications
as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof ." [14] One of such
powers is precisely that of proposing amendments.

The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments.[15] When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of
the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body, it acted by virtue of such
competence. Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed.

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be on indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could
be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments.
Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three-fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority
was obtained.

As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision."[21] The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981.
2.2 G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013
Belgica, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr., et al., respondents.
FACTS
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica et. al., filed an urgent Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and seeking that the annual “Pork
Barrel System,” presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executive’s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners further alleges that congress violeted the separation of powers provided by the constitution as they
participate implementation and enforcement of budget, which power is solely lodge in the executive
department.

ISSUE
Whether or not, congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional as it violated the principle of separation of
powers.

RULING
Yes, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another.
The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion
that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.
In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another department’s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function
both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. The phase of
budget execution “covers the various operational aspects of budgeting” and accordingly includes “the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,” the “regulation and release of funds” as well as
all “other related activities” that comprise the budget execution cycle.
Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles
and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as
any other appropriation law.
Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and
from there the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional
boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional
basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of postenactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

Wherefore the petition is partly granted.

II. Creation, Reorganization and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

a. Sources
3.1 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION,
AND REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, Petitioners, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 15TH DIVISION,
THE HONORABLE CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, BRANCH 26, MANILA, JORGE C. VICTORINO AND
JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS RTC DEPUTY SHERIFFS OF MANILA, ROGER Z.
REYES, ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR., AND EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, Respondents
Facts:
 The case involves a petition seeking the review of the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing a petition
for certiorari filed by the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) and the Republic Planters Bank (RPB).
 The complaint was filed by RPB and other sugar producers against the Philippine Sugar Commission
(PHILSUCOM) and the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA) for the delivery of personal
property and payment of attorney's fees.
 A compromise agreement was later submitted and approved by the court.
 Disputes arose regarding the execution of the judgment and the payment of attorney's fees.
 The SRA and RPB filed a petition for certiorari to nullify the orders of the trial court.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, stating that the SRA does not have the authority to
represent the Republic and that the petition should have been filed through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
Issue:
Whether the SRA has the authority to bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

Ruling:
No.
Executive Order No. 18, enacted on 28 May 1986 abolished the Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) and
created the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) which shall be under the Office of the President.
Section 3 of said Executive Order enumerates the powers and functions of the SRA; but it does not specifically
include the power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in suits filed by or against it. The power to
represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit filed by or against it having been withheld from SRA, it
follows that the latter cannot institute the instant petition and the petition on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
The SRA, no doubt, is an administrative agency or body. An administrative agency is defined as "[a] government
body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers’
compensation commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any department, independent
establishment, commission, administration, authority, board or bureau x x x.”[21]
The power to represent the Republic of the Philippines in any suit filed by or against it having been withheld
from SRA, it follows that the latter cannot institute the instant petition and the petition in C.A.-G.R. No. 17188
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
This conclusion does not, however, mean that the SRA cannot sue and be sued. This power can be implied from
its powers to enter, make and execute routinary contracts as may be necessary for or incidental to the
attainment of its purposes between any persons, firms, public or private, and the Government of the Philippines
and to do all such other things, transact such other businesses and perform such other functions directly or
indirectly incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purposes of the SRA.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

3.2. AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. &
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive
Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15,
1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
On 1 October 1993 the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the Career
Executive Service Board. Such resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil
Service Officer, Rank IV. Petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of CSC Resolution which abolished the Career Executive Service Board is a violation of the
constitution.
Ruling:
Yes.
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.
This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the
contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section
16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to
offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an
autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous
character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB
was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and
program coordination."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is
hereby annulled and set aside.

3.3 AQUILINO T. LARIN, Petitioner, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COMMITTEE CREATED TO
INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN, COMPOSED OF
FRUMENCIO A. LAGUSTAN, JOSE B. ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M. MAZA, respondents.
Facts:
Larin was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the NIR Code. The president issued a memorandum
to investigate the administrative charge against Larin upon knowing of such fact. Meanwhile, the President
issued the challenged EO 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the BIR. Under said order, some positions
and functions are reorganized, while other offices are also created. The department of which petitioner was the
Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said EO.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Larin pursuant to the reorganization valid.
Ruling:
No.
E.O. No. 292 evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the
creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
While the President's power to reorganize cannot be denied, this does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.
Here, some of the provisions of E.O. No. 132 clearly leads to an inescapable conclusion that there are
circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith in the reorganization of the BIR such as that an office is
abolished and another one performing substantially the same function is created and creation of services and
divisions in the BIR resulting to a significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the non-reappointment of the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner violates
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said provision, officers holding permanent appointments are given preference
for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position or in
case there are not enough comparable positions to positions next lower in rank. It is undeniable that petitioner
is a career executive officer who is holding a permanent position. Hence, he should have given preference for
appointment in the position of Assistant Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted.

3.4. G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
FACTS
Pusuant to the General Appropriations Act of 1998, which provided for Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The CHR promulgated Resolutions adopting an upgrading
and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission with corresponding increase of
salaries. The CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said
staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a
request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the same.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected.
Meanwhile, petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR requested
the CSC Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in
saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve
matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity
of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within
the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE
Whether or not, the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation,
and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management.

RULING
No, In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals, this court held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to
administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government. Thus, the
imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII.
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Palpably, the Court of Appeals’ Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species
of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with
the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the
class of Constitutional Commissions. All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is,
nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we are of the same mind with the DBM on its
standpoint, thus — Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify; upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

3.5. LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO, et.al, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
Facts:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,”
it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect
and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it
has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
These consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 for being violation of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether the President acted within its power in creating the Philippines Truth Commission.
Ruling:
Yes.
Although creation of the PTC does not fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section
31 of the Revised Administrative Code because Section 31 contemplates “reorganization These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
“the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President.
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control . Clearly, the power
of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive,
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws — in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency — is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above,
the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed.
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President
has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO
298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

b. Types of Administrative Agencies

1. MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF
PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE, CITY
ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, AND CITY TREASURER OF PARAÑAQUE, RESPONDENTS
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International Airport located at
Paranaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila
International Airport Authority.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the
NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,[3] including the
runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of Air Transportation.[4] The
MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale
or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
The Officers of Paranaque City sent notices to MIAA due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some
of the amount. When MIAA failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Paranaque city threatened to levy
and subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a Temporary
Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the Supreme Court a day before the public auction, MIAA was
granted with the TRO but unfortunately the TRO was received by the Paranaque City officers 3 hours after the
public auction.

MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are with MIAA still the
 ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends that it is an instrumentality of the
government and as such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public
dominion therefore cannot be subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Paranaque
City claim that MIAA is a government owned and controlled corporation therefore not exempted to real estate
tax.
Issue:
Whether or not MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and controlled
corporation and as such exempted from tax.
Ruling:
Yes, MIAA is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation.
There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate tax.
However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or controlled corporation.
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be "organized as a stock or nonstock corporation." MIAA
is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital
stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation
because it has no members
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers. Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines a
government "instrumentality" as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. - x x x x
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains
a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA
exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,[12] police authority[13] and the levying of fees and
charges.[14] At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order."[15]
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality
remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a "separate and autonomous body"[16] will
make its operation more "financially viable."

2. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. CITY TREASURER AND CITY ASSESSOR OF
THE CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner GSIS owns or used to own two (2) parcels of land, one located at Katigbak 25th St., Bonifacio Drive,
Manila (Katigbak property), and the other, at Concepcion cor. Arroceros Sts., also in Manila (Concepcion-
Arroceros property). Title to the Concepcion-Arroceros property was transferred to this Court in 2005 pursuant
to Proclamation No. 835[3] dated April 27, 2005. Both the GSIS and the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila occupy the Concepcion-Arroceros property, while the Katigbak property was under lease.
The controversy started when the City Treasurer of Manila addressed a letter to GSIS informing him of the
unpaid real property taxes due on the aforementioned properties for years 1992 to 2002. GSIS , through its
legal counsel, wrote back emphasizing the GSIS' exemption from all kinds of taxes, including realty taxes, under
Republic Act No. 8291.
Issue:
Whether GSIS is a government instrumentality exempt from real property taxation.

Ruling:
YES.
Pursuant to Sec. 33 of PD 1146, GSIS enjoyed tax exemption from real estate taxes, among other tax burdens,
until January 1, 1992 when the LGC took effect and withdrew exemptions from payment of real estate taxes
privileges granted under PD 1146; RA 8291 restored in 1997 the tax exempt status of GSIS by reenacting under
its Sec. 39 what was once Sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 including a provision that “real property taxes assessed and due
from GSIS considered paid”.
GSIS an instrumentality of the National Government
Applying the case of MIAA vs. CA which is squarely applicable to GSIS, both MIAA and GSIS being similarly
situated.
First, while created under CA 186 as a non-stock corporation, a status that has remained unchanged even when
it operated under PD 1146 and RA 8291, GSIS is not, in the context of the afore quoted Sec. 193 of the LGC, a
GOCC following the teaching of Manila International Airport Authority, for, like MIAA, GSIS' capital is not
divided into unit shares. Also, GSIS has no members to speak of and by members, the reference is to those who,
under Sec. 87 of the Corporation Code, make up the non-stock corporation, and not to the compulsory members
of the system who are government employees. Its management is entrusted to a Board of Trustees whose
members are appointed by the President.
Second, the subject properties under GSIS's name are likewise owned by the Republic. The GSIS is but a mere
trustee of the subject properties which have either been ceded to it by the Government or acquired for the
enhancement of the system. This particular property arrangement is clearly shown by the fact that the disposal
or conveyance of said subject properties are either done by or through the authority of the President of the
Philippines.
Third, GSIS manages the funds for the life insurance, retirement, survivorship, and disability benefits of all
government employees and their beneficiaries. This undertaking, to be sure, constitutes an essential and vital
function which the government, through one of its agencies or instrumentalities, ought to perform if social
security services to civil service employees are to be delivered with reasonable dispatch.

c. Control over Administrative Agencies

1. CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND THE NATIONAL TREASURER,
RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
was passed pursuant to Article XVI, Section 6 which mandates the statutory creation of a national police
commission that will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder. This law
moved the Philippine police force from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the DILG.
Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, questioned the constitutionality of
the law. He averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president because it diminishes the
president’s commander-in-chief power (war powers).
Carpio also advanced the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by
limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NAPOLCOM and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives
choose local police heads also undermine the power of the president.

Issue:
Whether or not the president abdicated its commander-in-chief power over the PNP and NAPOLCOM by virtue
of RA 6975.

Ruling:
No. the PNP and the NAPOLCOM are not under the Commander-in-Chief Power of the President. They are under
the President’s control power and power of supervision. So there is no abdication to speak of.
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national police force
shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in
question adequately provides for administration and control at the commission level,
The local chief executives choosing local police chiefs is also constitutional. Under the law, the local chief
executives in choosing local police chiefs are acting so as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM is
under the Office of the President. Hence, in no way does the law undermine the President’s power if the local
chief executives choose local police chiefs.
It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to and enforces
the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the
President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject
to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.

2.BLAQUERA, et.al V. ALCALA, et.al

Facts:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
January 19, 1993 – then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 directing all departments,
offices and agencies (DENR, DSWD) which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in
excess of the amount authorized (P1,000) to immediately cause the return/refund of the excess within a period
of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of such Order.
In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, caused the
deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

In the other case, the petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(ADEPT), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) who were granted
productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6971 (Productivity Incentives
Act of 1990).

Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was prohibited under
Administrative Order No. 29. The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal to the
Commission an Audit (COA) which denied the appeal.

The PTA is a GOCC created in pursuance of a policy of the State. Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 189 states
that "To implement the policies and program of the Department (Dept. of Tourism), there is hereby created a
Philippine Tourism Authority, xxx." Likewise, Section 21 of the same decree provides that "All officials and
employees of the Authority, xxx, shall be subject to Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and the coverage of
the Wage and Position Classification Office."
Furthermore, although Supplemental Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. #6971 was issued only on
December 27, 1991, the law itself is clear that it pertains to private business enterprises whose employees are
covered by the Labor Code of the Philippines,

Issue:
Whether AO 29 or RA 6971 is applicable to PTA, being a GOCC undertaking governmental functions.

Ruling:

It is AO 29 that is applicable.

Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both,
depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate
benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the
advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the public in general, the function is governmental.[9]
Powers classified as "proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit.

The PTA was established by Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 564 ("PD
564"). The powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared towards the
 development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is irrefutable that PTA also
performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its charter.
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled corporations performing proprietary
functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is gleanable from the other provisions of the law.
To repeat, employees of government corporations created by special charters have neither the right to strike
nor the right to bargain collectively, as defined in the Labor Code.
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter subject
to Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations,[25] is already within the scope of an incentives award system under
Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission
("Commission"). Since government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters do have an
incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that would address the same concern of officials and
employees of governmentowned and controlled corporations incorporated under the general corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no reversible error in the finding by
respondent Commission that PTA is not within the purview of RA 6971. As regards the promulgation of
implementing rules and regulations, it bears stressing that the "power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules in the implementation of the statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment."[26] In the case under scrutiny, the Supplementary Rules Implementing RA 6971 issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment and the Secretary of Finance accord with the intendment and provisions of
RA 6971. Consequently, not being covered by RA 6971, AO 29 applies to the petitioner.

3. EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR., (Deceased), substituted by his widow, CONCORDIA V. MORAN, petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA and PGA CARS, INC., respondents.

Facts:

On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a
verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisions of Republic Act
No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. The complaint alleged that the
private respondent should be held liable for the product imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to
complainant.

On September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a Decision in favor of complainant and ordered the private
respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment of costs of litigation and
administrative fines.

On October 19, 2005, the private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision but the CAO denied the
motion in an Order dated January 19, 2006. Thus, the private respondent appealed to the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the quasi-judicial agency designated by Article 165[8] of RA 7394 to
entertain appeals from the adverse decisions and orders of the CAO. However, in a Resolution dated April 28,
2006, the DTI Secretary dismissed the appeal of the private respondent who then filed an appeal with the
herein public respondent OP.

On April 3, 2007, the OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary's Resolution, and dismissed the
complaint. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP, but the OP denied said motion in an
Order dated October 22, 2008.

On January 23, 2009, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394. On March 13, 2009, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of appeal and for the failure of the petitioner to
state material dates. On June 25, 2010, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Since, Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. passed away on May 17, 2010, his widow, Concordia V. Moran filed the present
petition for review on certiorari on August 9, 2010. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in denying the petition
for certiorari which alleged error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP. She contends that in cases alleging error
of jurisdiction on the part of the OP, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because
appeal is not available to correct lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, even though appeal is available, it is not
considered as the plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.

Respondent argues that the CA was correct in denying the petition for certiorari since this was an improper
remedy in view of the availability of an appeal from the OP. Furthermore, the private respondent confirms the
appellate jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI based on the constitutional power of control of the OP over
Executive Departments and the well-entrenched doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that petitioner resorted
to a wrong mode of appeal.

Ruling:

NO.
Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and the mandate to act upon complaints filed by
consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting the consumer against deceptive, unfair and
unconscionable sales, acts or practices.[12] Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer
complaints are heard and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions are appealable to the
DTI Secretary. Article 166 thereof provides:

ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.
The decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with
the proper court.

The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987. Section 1
thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken
within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or
appealed from…

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,[15] we interpreted the above
provision and declared that "a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the
Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal."

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."

Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government,
and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the
executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the
matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally
subject to this Court's rule-making power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section
5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning the procedure in all courts.

Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to
the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a
decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when
there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of
respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI
involving petitioner's application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O.
No. 18.

In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of
the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent should
have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.

In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OP's lack of jurisdiction, complainant
Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground of being an improper remedy.

Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary had become FINAL and
EXECUTORY with private respondent's failure to appeal the same within the 15-day reglementary period.