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The Medicalized Body and Anesthetic Culture 1St Ed Edition Brent Dean Robbins Full Chapter
The Medicalized Body and Anesthetic Culture 1St Ed Edition Brent Dean Robbins Full Chapter
The Medicalized Body and Anesthetic Culture 1St Ed Edition Brent Dean Robbins Full Chapter
The Medicalized
Body and Anesthetic
Culture
The Cadaver, the Memorial Body, and the Recovery
of Lived Experience
Brent Dean Robbins
Department of Psychology
Point Park University
Pittsburgh, PA, USA
This book has been a long journey of over two decades of scholarship,
completed over a career as a graduate student in clinical psychology at
Duquesne University, and two tenure-track professorships at Daemen
College and Point Park University.
I am grateful to my mentors, Michael Sipiora and Eva-Maria Simms,
who introduced me to metabletic phenomenology through the work of
Robert Romanyshyn and J. H. van den Berg. At Daemen College, my
research on medical students would not have been possible without the
help of Ashley Tomaka, Gary Styn, Joel Patterson, and Cara Innus. At
Point Park University, my scholarship has been deeply enriched through
hours of conversation with my friend and colleague, Robert McInerney.
Seminal scholarship by others has been formative for my investiga-
tions, including Carolyn Merchant’s work on Enlightenment views of
women and nature, Martha Nussbaum’s taxonomy of forms of objec-
tification, Michael Allen Gillespie’s examination of the impact of nomi-
nalism on modern and postmodern thought, Nick Haslam’s theoretical
model of dehumanization, Katherine Park’s historical scholarship on the
history of cadaver dissection, Mary Watkins and Helene Shulman’s schol-
arship on liberation psychology, Ernest Becker’s existential theory,
and the many psychologists who have contributed to the empirical
investigation of terror management theory, including among them Jeff
Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, Tom Pyszczynski, Jamie Goldenberg, and
my former student from Allegheny College, Matt Motyl. Continental
philosophers have also been deeply formative for my thinking,
vii
viii Acknowledgements
warm my heart always. Thanks to Kelli (and many family members) for
taking good care of him (and me) in the twilight of his days.
Above all, I thank God, who like a patient father, puts up with my
protests in the face of human suffering and mortality, and gives me the
courage and faith, in the midst of it all, to hope and to love.
Contents
xi
xii Contents
Index 321
List of Figures
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Pixar has long been known for their state-of-the-art animated films, from
Toy Story to Finding Nemo. More recently, a beautiful, heart-warming
film, Coco, has introduced an international audience to an annual
Mexican ritual to honor the dead, Dias de Muertos, or the Day of the
Dead. In the movie, a prepubescent boy, named Miguel Rivera, discov-
ers his great-great grandfather played a guitar that resembled that of
the famous pop singer, Ernesto de la Cruz. In his quest to discover the
man’s true identity, he is thrust into the netherworld of the dead, where
he undergoes a great adventure to retrieve his long-lost and forgotten
ancestor.
The fictional narrative of the film introduces the audience to the
practices and rituals that are familiar to the Mexican people. Altars to
deceased relatives honor the dead with photographs, decorations that
include Mexican marigolds, intimate possessions and ofrendas, offer-
ings of favorite food and beverages of the deceased (Brandes, 2009).
The Mexican people celebrate the holiday between October 31 and
November 2, the period of time established by the Roman Catholic tra-
dition for the celebration of All Hallows’ Eve, or Halloween, All Saints’
Day, and All Souls’ Day, designated for remembrance of saints and loved
ones who have passed away.
In watching the film, I was reminded of similar rituals the world over,
most commonly found in indigenous cultures, and especially common in
South America, which honor the dead in a variety of ritual celebrations
similar to the Mexican tradition. For example, I recalled the Haitian
A Theological Context
Ernest Becker’s existential theory posits that an ideal society will provide
for its members an adequate symbolic action system to propel a cultural
hero-project. In his assessment, modern society’s crisis of meaning leaves
us vulnerable to death anxiety and neurosis. Consistent with Becker’s
evaluation of modern society’s shortcomings, Chapter 11 provides
an assessment of how modern culture in the West erupts from out of
a religious crisis. This crisis provided the background against which the
mechanistic and objectifying view of the body and nature appear as dom-
inant themes. In the Middle Ages, Trinitarian theology and Christology
informed a relational conception of the cosmos, in which the body was
experienced as sacred, infused with supernatural grace through the incar-
nation, and intrinsically harmonious with nature. The nominalist revolt
14 B. D. Robbins
Anesthetic Culture
By use of the historical phenomenological method of metabletics,
Chapter 13 traces the cultural habit of anesthetic consciousness to the
attitude of detached concern instituted through subculture of modern
1 THE MEDICALIZED BODY AND ANESTHETIC CULTURE 15
anatomical medicine and medical practice. This cultural habit and its ten-
dencies toward mechanistic objectification nature, the body, and others
are seen through as a template for the objectivist metaphysics and episte-
mology of detached objectivity. This detached objectivity, in turn, forms
the basis of mastery through prediction and control in modern culture.
The metabletic analysis highlights two periods of history that illustrate
how a confluence of influences in medicine, art, theology, and the new
science gave birth to a cultural habit of anesthetic consciousness. An
examination of the figure of Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli reveals his cen-
tral role as a cultural agent, whose influence contributed to the nomi-
nalist revolution, the revival of Neoplatonism in the Renaissance, the
development of linear perspective technique in art, the new anatomy of
Vesalius, the new physics of Galileo, and the launch of colonialism at the
Council of Florence, which contributed to Christopher Columbus’ dis-
covery of the New World. A focus on America in the 1830s reveals how
the anesthetic culture of the Enlightenment casted a shadow that cul-
minated in the invention of medical anesthesia, the genocide of Native
Americans, the emergence of the Temperance Movement, and the birth
of consumerism beginning with the first department story, A. J. Stewart
and Company. These historical developments are analyzed to reveal their
implicit connection as expressions of a new Gnosticism which functions
anesthetically to escape experience through psychic numbing.
References
Arguinzoni, O. (2016). Bolivia’s Fiesta de la Ñatitas. Americas Quarterly, 19(4), 8.
Aries, P. (1975). Western attitudes toward death: From the Middle Ages to the pres-
ent (6th ed.). Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Brandes, S. (2009). Skulls to the living, bread to the dead: The Day of the Dead in
Mexico and beyond. Malder, MA: Blackwell.
Brooks, J. (2017). Why are there so many dead people in Colma? And so
few in San Francisco. KQED News. Online: https://ww2.kqed.org/
news/2017/10/26/why-are-so-many-dead-people-in-colma-and-so-few-in-
san-francisco/.
Brown-Rice, K. (2013). Examining the theory of historical trauma among Native
Americans. The Professional Counselor, 3(3), 117–130.
DeSpelder, L. A., & Strickland, A. L. (1992). The last dance: Encountering death
and dying (3rd ed.). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishers Inc.
1 THE MEDICALIZED BODY AND ANESTHETIC CULTURE 17
that this denial of the lived body serves as a form of death denial by
concealing what is, in fact, existentially lost with death: the self as lived
body nested in relationships within the living world. While it will take
several chapters to fully “flesh out” this claim, this chapter will focus on
exposing how what appears to be a sober and rational view of death as
a mechanical malfunction of the body, when viewed existentially, can
be understood, rather, as a highly advanced and typically unacknowl-
edged defense mechanism against death as an existential possibility for
ourselves.
When we look at religious worldviews that have become more mar-
ginalized in our culture, and which have been exposed to radical cri-
tiques by the likes of Nietzsche, Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud, we have
become accustomed to judging supernatural belief in the afterlife as
quaint and naïve delusions by which people protect themselves against
death anxiety and other sources of human anxiety and misery, such as
injustice or servitude. But a particularly medical version of denying death
has been too close to us—too ingrained in modern, Western conceptions
of reality—for it to be easily exposed as a similar form of death denial.
I hope to demonstrate that a “medical model” of death, however, does
serve just such a function and that this seemingly more “rational” form
of death denial is just as prone to compensatory distortions of perception
as the religious beliefs we are quick to scorn. Once we can see through
the delusions of the “medical model” of death, we’ll find ourselves in
a better position to see through other, similar distortions and delusions
of the “medical model” as it becomes applied to psychiatry. To lift the
veil on the “medical model” of death, in turn, exposes a different but
suppressed understanding of the body (and by implication, the mind),
which in turn will demonstrate some fallacies at the roots of the concep-
tual foundations of psychiatry. By exposing these fallacies, we will be bet-
ter prepared to examine a potential alternative approach to working with
people who suffer.
Death Denial
In The Denial of Death, Ernest Becker (1973) postulated that identifi-
cation with human systems of meaning—in essence, culture—serves as a
buffer against death anxiety. As Becker (1973) wrote:
2 CONFRONTING THE CADAVER … 21
The idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing
else; it is a mainspring of human activity—designed largely to avoid the
fatality of death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final
destiny of man. (p. 11)
in one’s self, can have detrimental effects on the health and well-being
of medical professionals, if not managed well (Sorensen & Iedema,
2009). Nurses seem to be particularly vulnerable to defense mechanisms
of depersonalization, detachment, and denial, and doctors are cultured
by the medical establishment into an attitude of “detached concern”
(Leiderman & Grisso, 1985; Lief & Fox, 1963; Sorensen & Iedema,
2009), which may negatively impact a physician’s ability to work through
their own emotional needs or the emotional needs of the patient and
their family (Sorensen & Iedema, 2007, 2009). As I will discuss in more
detail later, the “detached concern,” or dispassionate detachment prev-
alent in medical culture, which is central to medical training, is a likely
cultural antecedent to the Enlightenment-era emphasis upon objectivity,
by which a whole new worldview is born, including modern physics and
innovations in Renaissance art, not to mention modern anatomy.
Moreover, the profession of medicine is likely to have institutionalized
modes of discourse that shape ways of speaking, perceiving, and acting
which help physicians and other medical professionals to maintain com-
posure in the face of persistent mortality salience. Menzies (1960), for
example, observed how the nursing services of a general hospital oper-
ated as a social system to defend against anxiety. Modern medicine’s dis-
course around the cadaver helps to reveal at least some of the ways the
medical profession acts implicitly to deny the existential reality of death
and to manage the “emotional labor” associated with the confrontation
with mortality in daily, professional life.
embodied and present to that which lies before us. To really grasp this
strange insight and to really take it in, we have to imagine that death can
never be an actuality for us. At least, it can never be an actuality for us in
this life with this body as we understand it now. My own death is an expe-
rience I can never really have. To incorporate this experience of death as a
possibility is to acknowledge the nothingness of my death. It is to say, in
effect, “My death can only be experienced as a possibility, because when it
becomes an actuality, I will no longer be there to experience it.”
To take up death as an actuality is to constitute death as a concrete
event, a real possibility that I can have. And in a certain manner of speak-
ing, as Heidegger (1962) teaches us in Being and Time, death, however,
can only ever be experienced as that which I am a being-toward. We are
always on the way to death, but to arrive there is to not be there at all.
“To be” is to be a living bodying forth of existence, and death is the loss
of this “to be.” Human being-in-the-world therefore has its existential
condition of possibility in its possibility for not-being-at-all, a possibility
which cannot be escaped and yet also a possibility that, as such, deter-
mines in an ultimate way the meaning of human being-in-the-world as a
whole. An essential aspect of being human is the existential fact that we
die, and our death reveals something important about us—that, until we
die, we exist, and beyond death, we are faced with a profound mystery.
We face the limits of our existence in death, which in turn delimits our
life as it exists in terms of a range of possibilities available to us. Death
is the point on the horizon of life where possibilities come to an end.
Like a deer erupting onto a dark and deserted wooded road, we never
know when death will lunge toward us over the oncoming horizon and
swallow our possibilities, drinking them down into an abyss of emptiness.
Yet, at the same time, in a certain manner of speaking, our possibilities
depend upon the impossible, that very emptiness, for their significance.
Any given possibility matters and makes a difference—has meaning, in
other words—because it runs the risk of not-being rather than being.
Death is at the very heart of what it means to be human.
Since death, understood ontologically, is a condition of possibility for
human existence, and only ever a possibility, when I make death into an
actuality or reduce it to some concrete, ontic event, this is a very subtle
and inescapable way of concealing death. It is, psychologically speaking,
a denial of death. But it is a form of denial that comes in many forms. In
more primitive forms, as might be witnessed especially among children,
the concretization of death often appears through the personification
26 B. D. Robbins
through genuine acceptance of our ultimate fate. One cannot find one’s
self bereaved before a cadaver; but the memorial body can be mourned.
Think of the dead body at the funeral of a loved one. When my father
died, I remember looking at his corpse in the coffin, and what I saw
there was a figment of the person he had once been. His body served
as a memorial of his past life. Within the context of the funeral parlor,
his body was a memorial body. Now, contrast this image of my father,
or your deceased loved one, with the cadaver in the dissection room of
medical school. Initially, the face of the cadaver is concealed by cloth.
The students come to forget the memorial body of the cadaver lying on
the table. They are asked, in effect, to exchange their experience of the
person’s memorial body with the experience of a cadaver as a fascinating
machine, a tool for learning. Some students find this transition more dif-
ficult than others. It only takes a small reminder—a touch of nail polish,
a tattoo, etc.—to bring the student back to the memorial body of the
cadaver. But medicine has nothing to say about this memorial body.
If we look to the history of cadaver dissection, we find a similar ambi-
guity at play (van den Berg, 1978). For example, we can examine the
fourteenth-century drawing of a dissection by Guy de Parc (see Fig. 2.1).1
It was taken from a text by the physician Vigevano. Here, we can see the
physician making the first incision into the cadaver’s abdomen. And
where does he look? Into the eyes of the cadaver. Does he search for
signs of life? Does he expect a wince of pain as he cuts into the flesh of
the body? We cannot know for certain, but it seems clear that for this
physician, the body retains many of the features of the memorial body.
The cadaver is more than a cadaver; it is also the desiccated shell of a for-
mer soul.
On the other hand, less than a century later, dissection in art reveals
a different physician, represented well by Andrea Vesalius, who is the
grandfather of modern anatomy (see Fig. 2.2).2 In a famous self-portrait
of Vesalius, we can see that he is not looking into the eyes of the corpse;
instead, he gazes at us. He seems to be proudly inviting us in to marvel
at his work—the carved arm from which flesh has been stripped away to
reveal muscle and nerves. But, if we look more carefully, we can notice
something very strange about this body. This is not a memorial body
at all. It appears to be a living person, standing by Vesalius’s side, with
his face concealed. Vesalius is the inventor of modern anatomical dis-
section—dissection which he performed upon dead bodies. But in this
image from 1542, we find next to him not the body of the deceased
30 B. D. Robbins
Fig. 2.1 Plate XXXI from the manuscript of Guy de Vigevano of 1345 at
Chantilly
but the body of the living—the body of the living now transformed and
figured through a different style of vision—a vision which confuses and
conceals the difference between the body of the living and the body of
the dead. Here, Vesalius’s style of vision conceals death and concretizes it
so that he no longer trembles like Guy de Parc before a deceased friend;
instead, the living body has been concretized into the mechanical body
of his anatomical vision, an anatomical vision that has turned away from
the memorial body and, in that motion, has also turned from the imme-
diate perception of death’s possibility. His corpses do not just lie there;
2 CONFRONTING THE CADAVER … 31
Fig. 2.2 Vesalius, page xxi of De human corporis fabrica (1543 edition)
32 B. D. Robbins
Fig. 2.3 Anatomical drawing from page 174 of De human corporis fabrica by
Vesalius
34 B. D. Robbins
me. And, as I heard him say those words, I realized that he was asking
for those students, as they explore the flesh of his body, that they pay
him the respect to see his body not only for the fascinating machine that
it is, and was, but also to preserve his memorial body—to make his body
into a memory of the person he was and to honor the gift of his body to
their education.
What the physician, educator and student forget, the donor reminds
us. The memorial body can be concealed, but he cannot be repressed for
ever. A painted fingernail. A piercing. A tattoo on the back. These things
are reminders of a life past; they signal the re-emergence of that memo-
rial body, calling out to the student: “Do not forget. Where you are, I
once was. Where I am now, you will be.”4
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