Disinformation and Fake News Shashi Jayakumar Full Chapter

Disinformation and Fake News Shashi
Jayakumar
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/disinformation-and-fake-news-shashi-jayakumar/
Disinformation and
Fake News
Edited by
Shashi Jayakumar
Benjamin Ang
Nur Diyanah Anwar
Disinformation and Fake News
“Disinformation and Fake News is a book full of insights from top-notch special-
ists on information operations. Over last several years, various regions of the
world have seen a spike in the use of information operations for geopolitical or
commercial reasons. It is critical to gather and compare existing knowledge across
regions and sectors in one place. Everybody interested in this fast-developing field
should read this volume.”
—Jakub Janda, Executive Director, European Values Center for Security Policy,
Czech Republic
“As ‘disinformation’ has become a common keyword widely used in politics, jour-
nalism and civil society, this volume invites readers to step back and consider it
as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon. By bringing together studies made
by specialists from all over the world and from various disciplines, this volume
makes a useful contribution to the academic debate on the issue, grappling too
with the conceptual questions surrounding disinformation as a political, cultural
and technical issue. Decision makers and citizens seeking an up-to-date assess-
ment of what disinformation means for our societies and how we should (or
should not) counter it will also find within some very thought-provoking ideas
on how to deal with hybrid threats.”
—Kevin Limonier, Associate Professor in Slavic Studies & Geography at the
French Institute of Geopolitics (University of Paris 8), and Vice Director of
Geopolitics of the Datasphere (GEODE)
“Tackling a topic on the radar of every world leader, this book provides the
richness of global perspectives that understanding disinformation requires. For a
greater understanding of disinformation and how it operates, take a read.”
—Fergus Hanson, Director of the International Cyber Policy Centre, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute
Shashi Jayakumar · Benjamin Ang ·
Nur Diyanah Anwar
Editors
Disinformation
and Fake News
Editors
Shashi Jayakumar Benjamin Ang
S. Rajaratnam School of International S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies Studies
Nanyang Technological University Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore Singapore, Singapore
Nur Diyanah Anwar

S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore, Singapore
ISBN 978-981-15-5875-7 ISBN 978-981-15-5876-4 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Contents
Introduction
Disinformation & Fake News: Meanings, Present, Future 3

Benjamin Ang, Nur Diyanah Anwar, and Shashi Jayakumar
Overview of Disinformation
Disinformation as a Threat to National Security 23

Janis Sarts
Tools of Disinformation: How Fake News Gets to Deceive 35

Edson C. Tandoc Jr.
How News Audiences Think About Misinformation Across

the World 47
Richard Fletcher
v
vi CONTENTS
Disinformation in Context
Building Digital Resilience Ahead of Elections and Beyond 61

Donara Barojan
Fighting Information Manipulation: The French

Experience 75
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer
Disinformation and Cultural Practice in Southeast Asia 91

Ross Tapsell
Hate Speech in Myanmar: The Perfect Storm 103

Alan Davis
Countering Disinformation
NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare Threats: Effective Strategic

Communications as a Tool Against Disinformation
and Propaganda 117
Barbora Maronkova
Elves vs Trolls 131

Giedrius Sakalauskas
Fake News and Disinformation: Singapore Perspectives 137

Shashi Jayakumar, Benjamin Ang, and Nur Diyanah Anwar
Notes on Contributors
Benjamin Ang is a Senior Fellow with CENS. He leads the Cyber and
Homeland Defence Programme, which explores policy issues around
the cyber domain, international cyber norms, cyber threats and conflict,
strategic communications and disinformation, law enforcement tech-
nology and cybercrime, smart city cyber issues, and national security issues
in disruptive technology.
Nur Diyanah Anwar is pursuing her Ph.D. at the National Institute of
Education (NIE), NTU. Previously, she was a Senior Analyst with CENS.
Her research interests revolve around identity issues, multiculturalism,
education, social policies, inequality, and the relations between state and
society.
Donara Barojan is a strategic communication and information warfare
expert. She currently works at a London-based strategic communica-
tions company Zinc Network, where she leads an independent media
support project in the Baltic states. Prior to joining Zinc Network,
she worked for the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excel-
lence and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, where
she served as an Assistant Director for Research and Development. Ms.
Barojan’s commentary and research were featured by numerous media
outlets, including the New York Times, BBC, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera,
Reuters, The Economist, and others. Donara frequently runs training
workshops on identifying, analysing, and countering disinformation and
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
extremist narratives. To date, she has trained nearly 1000 researchers,

journalists, and strategic communication experts.
Alan Davis is Asia & Eurasia Director at the Institute for War &
Peace Reporting and also currently works as the Chief of Party on two
Global Engagement Center-funded projects focusing on disinformation.
He has designed and led media, confidence-building, civil society and
strategic communications’-based programs in more than 40 countries—
from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe: Iran to North Korea: He has a partic-
ular interest in combating corruption through multi-sectoral public fiscal
literacy-building projects and working with and inside closed states: For
four years he worked as a media advisor to DFID focusing on Russia
and the Former Soviet Union and was recently made an Associate Fellow
and the King’s College-based International Center for the Study of Radi-
calism in London. Since 1989 when he first visited Cambodia to report
on the Vietnamese troop withdrawal for the UK media, his primary area
of interest has been South East and East Asia.
Richard Fletcher is a Senior Research Fellow and research team leader
at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of
Oxford.
Shashi Jayakumar is Head, Centre of Excellence of National Secu-
rity (CENS) and Executive Coordinator, Future Issues and Technology,
at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer is the Director of the Institute for
Strategic Research (IRSEM, French Ministry of Defense) and a non-
resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC. He
served previously as a Policy officer on “Security and Global Affairs” at the
Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
a Banting postdoctoral fellow at McGill University’s Faculty of Law, and
a Lecturer in international relations at the Department of War Studies
of King’s College London. Holding degrees in philosophy (B.A., M.A.,
Ph.D.), law (LLB, LLM), and political science (Ph.D.), he is the author of
some one hundred articles, twenty books, and two reports on disinforma-
tion: Information Manipulation (CAPS/IRSEM, 2018) and The Macron
Leaks Operation: A Post-mortem (IRSEM/Atlantic Council, 2019).
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
Barbora Maronkova joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), Public Diplomacy Division in Brussels, Belgium in 2006 as
program coordinator where she designed, planned, and implemented
public diplomacy campaigns in a number of NATO member states. As of
September 2010, she advised several candidate countries on their national
public awareness campaigns on NATO membership. From January to
December 2016, she worked for the office of NATO’s Spokesperson.
As of 1st March 2017, she holds the position of Director of NATO
Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv, Ukraine. In 2003, she
established and headed a Slovak based NGO Centre for European and
North Atlantic Affairs to contribute to public and academic debate on
Slovakia’s membership to the EU and NATO. Her work included public
relations and media appearances, public speaking, donors and stakeholders
relations as well as the management of the NGO.
A graduate of the University of Economics of Bratislava, Slovak
Republic, Barbora also holds a Public Affairs diploma from the Chartered
Institute for Public Relations in the UK. She served as a non-resident
Research Fellow with the Centre on Public Diplomacy, University of
Southern California. Barbora is a frequent contributor and speaker on
topics of strategic and government communications and public diplomacy.
Giedrius Sakalauskas is the Director of Res Publica. He graduated from
University of Vilnius/Institute of International Relations and Diplo-
macy in 1995. He has worked in various industries including adver-
tising, entertainment, e-commerce. Since 2014, he has been a civic activist
coordinating cyber-resistance movements countering Kremlin trolls, in
confronting and debunking hostile propaganda to develop the resilience
of society.
Janis Sarts is a Director of the NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence (Riga),—a multinational, cross—sector organisation
providing comprehensive analysis, advice and practical support in strategic
communications to the Alliance and the allied nations. Prior to that, he
has been the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Latvia for seven
years,—leading defence sector reforms during an economic crisis period,
developing a new state defence concept, and encouraging regional defence
cooperation within NATO and the EU. He has also led the Latvian
Government’s efforts to increase its security and defence in cyberspace.
As Chair of the National Cyber Security Board, he was responsible for
formulating and overseeing the implementation of Latvia’s cyber security
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
policy, as well as for overseeing the work of the National Information

Technology Security Incident Response Institution—CERT.LV.
Jānis Sārts holds a degree in History from the University of Latvia,
has graduated from the NATO Defence College and has interned at
the Swedish Defense Research Agency. He has received numerous state
awards for his contribution to defence reforms, fostering Latvia’s member-
ship to NATO and hosting the NATO Summit in Riga.
Edson C. Tandoc Jr. (Ph.D., University of Missouri) is an Associate
Professor at the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Infor-
mation at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research
focuses on the sociology of message construction in the context of digital
journalism. He has conducted studies on the construction of news and
social media messages. His studies about influences on journalists have
focused on the impact of journalistic roles, new technologies, and audi-
ence feedback on the various stages of the news gatekeeping process. This
stream of research has led him to study journalism from the perspective of
news consumers as well, investigating how readers make sense of critical
incidents in journalism and take part in reconsidering journalistic norms;
and how changing news consumption patterns facilitate the spread of fake
news.
Ross Tapsell is a Senior Lecturer at the Australian National University’s
College of Asia and the Pacific. He is author of Media Power in Indonesia:
Oligarch, Citizens and the Digital Revolution and coeditor of the book
Digital Indonesia: Connectivity and Divergence.
List of Figures
How News Audiences Think About Misinformation Across

the World
Fig. 1 Proportion in each country that trust most news most of the
time (Source Newman et al. [2018: 17]) 50
Fig. 2 Proportion that say they are “very” or “extremely”
concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet
when it comes to news (Source Newman et al. [2018: 19]) 51
Fig. 3 Proportion who say they are very or extremely concerned
about each, and proportion who say they encountered each
in the last week (Source Newman et al. [2018: 20]) 53
Fig. 4 Proportion that think that each should do more to separate
what is real and what is fake on the internet (Source Author’s
own, based on data from Newman et al. [2018]) 56
Building Digital Resilience Ahead of Elections and

Beyond
Fig. 1 Venn diagram showing the overlapping vulnerabilities
that contribute to the creation of a toxic information
environment, where disinformation spreads unimpeded 63
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare Threats: Effective Strategic

Communications as a Tool Against Disinformation and
Propaganda
Fig. 1 Model of a counter-hybrid threats strategy (Source
Maronkova 2018b, NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare—Case
Study of Effective Strategic Communications. Presentation
at the workshop Disinformation, Online Falsehoods and Fake
News, Singapore) 120
Fig. 2 Map of Russian Federation and its borders (Source
NATO Website. NATO Setting the Record Straight,
www.nato.int/cps/ra/natohq/115204.htm. Accessed on 5
October 2018) 123
Fig. 3 Overview of most frequent Russian narratives about
NATO’s deployment in the Baltics (Source Nimmo,
Ben. 2017. Russian Narratives on NATO’s Deployment.
www.stopfake.org/en/russian-narratives-on-nato-s-deployment/.
Accessed on 14 October 2018) 126
Introduction
Disinformation & Fake News: Meanings,
Present, Future
Benjamin Ang, Nur Diyanah Anwar, and Shashi Jayakumar
Abstract Besides introducing the various chapters, Ang, Anwar and

Jayakumar provide historical precedents, which form important under-
pinnings through which “fake news” and “disinformation” should be
understood. As the authors go on to observe, terminology matters and
a lack of clear grounding in meaning has lead terms such as “disinfor-
mation‚” “misinformation” and “fake news” to be conflated, hindering
attempts to understand these issues. A strength of the volume lies in the
bringing together of diverse perspectives across east and west. Contrib-
utors have worked on various aspects of the disinformation/fake news
nexus. Some are experts on social media; others have had long experience
in countermeasures and shoring up social resilience. It is only through a
B. Ang (B) · N. D. Anwar · S. Jayakumar

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: isbang@ntu.edu.sg
N. D. Anwar
e-mail: NIE19.NDA@e.ntu.edu.sg
S. Jayakumar
e-mail: isshashi@ntu.edu.sg
© The Author(s) 2021 3

S. Jayakumar et al. (eds.), Disinformation and Fake News,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_1
4 B. ANG ET AL.
pooling of these collective experiences and strengths that holistic under-

standings can be formed about the problem at hand; it is this cooperation
too that will also lend itself to effective real-world solutions.
Keywords Online falsehoods · Disinformation · Resilience · Social

Media
In 1274 BC, the pharaoh Ramesses II of Egypt led his army to a crushing
victory over the Hittites at Kadesh—a “victory” recorded on papyri and
also in glorious stone monuments. The official Egyptian version of the
triumph might well have become orthodoxy in modern historiography if
not for discoveries of texts, including private letters between Ramesses and
the Hittite king Hattusili III, which show the latter asking why Ramesses
was treating the battle fought at Kadesh as a victory even though the
Hittites had “defeated the King of Egypt”. Also extant is the treaty
between the two sides agreed on fifteen years after the battle, which shows
that the Hittites gave as good as they got in the battle (and also shows
both states acknowledging each other as equals).1
State warfare, diplomacy, civil wars, feuds and vendettas—all of them
through time have been marked by degrees of deception, propaganda,
pamphleteering and completely fictitious invention.2 The falsity or slant
serves to cast a certain complexion on what might be regarded as “truth,”
or may even in some cases serve to take its place. This obscurity deepens
with the passage of time, but when done skillfully enough, may have
sowed confusion, influenced minds or changed opinions of contem-
porary audiences too. As one modern commentator observes, in the
internecine conflict between Mark Anthony and Octavian that followed
the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44BC,
1 Alex Loktionov, ‘Ramesses II, Victor of Kadesh: A Kindred Spirit of Trump?’ The
Guardian, 5 Dec 16. https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2016/dec/05/ram
esses-ii-victor-of-kadesh-a-kindred-spirit-of-trump (accessed 20 Jan 2020).
2 For some examples, see Julie Posetti and Alice Matthews, ‘A Short Guide to the
History of “Fake News” and Disinformation’, International Center for Journalists, 23 Jul
18. https://www.icfj.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/A%20Short%20Guide%20to%20H
istory%20of%20Fake%20News%20and%20Disinformation_ICFJ%20Final.pdf.
DISINFORMATION & FAKE NEWS: MEANINGS, PRESENT, FUTURE 5
[What followed] was an unprecedented disinformation war in which the

combatants deployed poetry and rhetoric to assert the righteousness of
the respective campaigns. From the outset, Octavian proved the shrewder
propagandist, using short, sharp slogans written upon coins in the style
of archaic tweets. His theme was that Antony was a Roman soldier gone
awry: a philanderer, a womaniser and a drunk not fit to lead, let alone hold
office.3
Not all false stories had a political kernel to them. Some went even deeper,
into the heart of age-old animosities against peoples, ethnicities and reli-
gions. Demagogues used charisma and mass persuasion impel people to
violence, taking revenge for imaginary offences.4
What is common to all of these is that the lie, whether big or small,
necessarily travelled at the speed that contemporary communications or
technology would allow it to; its dissemination would likewise be circum-
scribed by these same realities. As the technology developed, so did the
speed and reach of falsehoods. The various markers in the technolog-
ical revolution are known to all of us: the invention of the Gutenberg
printing press, the telegraph, radio, telephone, television, the internet.
All these developments have accelerated virality. As the journalist Natalie
Nougayrède observes, “The use of propaganda is ancient, but never
before has there been the technology to so effectively disseminate it”.5
Conceptual Underpinnings
Disinformation & Fake News is a collection of essays dealing with the
impact that modern disinformation and fake news has had in both online
and social sphere. Written accessibly and aimed at the interested lay
reader, practitioners and policymakers in the field, this volume offers a
panoramic view of how fake news sprouts and spreads, how organized
(dis)information campaigns are conducted, who they target, and what has
3 Izabella Kaminska, ‘A Lesson in Fake News from the Info-Wars of Ancient Rome’,
Financial Times, 17 Jan 17.
4 For examples, see Jacob Soll, ‘The Long and Brutal History of Fake News’, Politico,
8 Dec 16. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/fake-news-history-long-
violent-214535 (accessed 22 Jan 2020).
5 Natalie Nougayrède, ‘In This Age of Propaganda, We Must Defend Ourselves. Here’s
How’, The Guardian, 31 Jan 18. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/
jan/31/propaganda-defend-russia-technology.
6 B. ANG ET AL.
been attempted by way of countermeasures—both in the digital and social

spheres.
Some explanation is needed as to why the burgeoning literature on
these issues requires an addition. Although there are many books dealing
with the topic of fake news and/or disinformation, the majority are
focused on one country (such as the United States or Russia) or one
specific issue. Examining a range of countries and contexts across East
and West (and in addition, by bringing together research on specific coun-
tries and international data mined from questionnaires and online studies)
Disinformation & Fake News goes part way towards remedying what is
arguably a U.S., or certainly western at least, centric nature of research on
this topic. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, the foremost expert on disinformation in
France and who authored the well-known report on the “Macron Leaks”
has a contribution,6 but developments in Asia and specifically South-
east Asia are covered too (see contributions by Ross Tapsell and Alan
Davis). The contribution by the editors within the volume is also the first
holistic treatment of Singapore’s approach to fake news and disinforma-
tion (which includes the unique Protection from Online Falsehoods and
Manipulation Act [POFMA] which was passed in Parliament on 8 May
2019), and we might hazard the most comprehensive to date.
The contributions come from diverse fields: security studies, media
and communications, area studies, international studies and journalism
studies. These multi-disciplinary perspectives build on previous concep-
tual and empirical work in a predecessor volume—DRUMS: Distortions,
Rumours, Untruths, Misinformation and Smears (2019).7 The latter
volume had contributions from various experts who had been present
at presented at a workshop organized by the Centre of Excellence for
National Security in July 2017. The present volume contains contribu-
tions from practitioners and experts who were present at the subsequent
edition of the workshop, held in July 2018. The contributions have been
6 J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, and J. Herrera, Information Manip-

ulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS)
of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research
(IRSEM) of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018. https://www.dip
lomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf (accessed 3 Jan
2020).
7 Norman Vasu, Benjamin Ang, and Shashi Jayakumar (eds.), DRUMS: Distortions,
Rumours, Untruths, Misinformation and Smears (Singapore: World Scientific, 2019).
substantially reworked, in some cases with considerable amplification,

from the remarks delivered then.
There have been several attempts to “unpack” what exactly fake news
and disinformation mean.8 Misinformation can—according to one set
of influential definitions—be “information that is false, but not created
with the intention of causing harm”. This in turn can have overlap-
ping meanings with disinformation, which is “information that is false
and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or
country”.9
For the purposes of providing a conceptual underpinning for this
volume and introduction, the editors propose to rely on the above defini-
tions, expanding and refining them while keeping foundational precepts
in mind. Disinformation can be (a) falsehoods and rumours knowingly
distributed, which can be:
(i) Propagated as part of a political agenda by a domestic

group/relativization/differing interpretation of facts based on
ideological bias—some of this can achieve viral status whether or
not there is malicious intent;
(ii) Part of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, and which can
undermine national security and resilience.
At the same time, there exists (b) a huge class of falsehoods and rumours
propagated without a broad political aim (these go by various terms
including “fake news” and “misinformation”, as opposed to “disinforma-
tion”, which has acquired the flavour of something more subversive and
coordinated). This former group—fake news and misinformation—can
achieve viral status and even if not the product of a malice or a coor-
dinated campaign, can harm individuals, or society at large. Finally, and
oftentimes overlapping, there are (c) falsehoods distributed for financial
gain. Some of these can have as a direct consequence (or sometimes, as
8 See Norman Vasu, Benjamin Ang, and Shashi Jayakumar, ‘Introduction: The Seemingly
Unrelenting Beat of DRUMS’, vii–xxii.
9 See Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, Information Disorder: Towards an Inter-
disciplinary Framework for Research and Policymaking. Council of Europe, 27 Sep
17, p. 20. https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framew
ork-for-researc/168076277c (accessed 12 Nov 19).
8 B. ANG ET AL.
a purely unintended by-effect) and effect on national resilience, security,

the body politic or all three.10
Past work concerning categorizations can be useful, but we accept
there are many other possible ways to slice these issues; indeed, several of
the contributors in this volume observe that there are varied ways in which
“disinformation” can be conceptualized. Jean-Baptiste Vilmer argues for
distinguishing the nuances present in “disinformation” and “fake news,”
while Edson Tandoc writes how disinformation can span a spectrum of
modes including political satires, news parodies, state propaganda and
misleading advertising. Despite this, other contributors have posited that
a broader use of these terms—including terms such as “(hostile) propa-
ganda”—should be maintained. This allows easier comprehension for the
wider audience, and access to the discussions present on disinformation
and fake news. What all concerned can accept, surely, is that disinforma-
tion, rumours and false reporting has always been present in society. What
then has changed?
Certainly, the manner in which digital information is being shared has
meant a profound shift in terms of how peoples and societies as a whole
consume information. The sheer volume and velocity of data has made the
current environment more conducive for facilitating the spread of inaccu-
rate or false information. Facebook alone has shut down 5.4 billion fake
accounts in 2019, but millions—perhaps hundreds of millions more—
likely remain.11 Not all are directly linked to disinformation, hate speech
or fake news, but this still gives some indication as to the size of what
tech platforms are grappling with. This is an indication too‚ of as to the
receptiveness of the attack surface when it comes to enabling disinforma-
tion campaigns or other forms of coordinated inauthentic behaviour. As
one researcher and early thinker on this topic, Tim Hwang, observes,
Modern information warfare is characterized by a cartographic shift: social

behaviour is now directly observable at many different scales at remarkably
10 What has been presented by way of categorization represents a refinement to previous

suggestions by researchers from the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS).
See Norman Vasu, Benjamin Ang, Terri-Anne-Teo, Shashi Jayakumar, Muhammad Faizal,
and Juhi Ahuja, Fake News, Influence Operations and National Security in the Post-Truth
Era, RSIS Policy Report, January 2018. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/
2018/01/PR180313_Fake-News_WEB.pdf.
11 Brian Fung and Ahiza Garcia, ‘Facebook Has Shut Down 5.4 Billion Fake Accounts
This Year’, CNN , 13 Nov 19.
low cost. One can observe social reactions to a stimulus as it occurs and
compare these reactions across both time and space. These developments
and the concentration of this data in a small set of platforms change the
nature of information flow and open new possibilities for the strategic
development of information warfare.12
Scale, size and speed are core elements of the problem. To this should
be added a fourth precept—what could be referred to as the cogni-
tive aspect. Target audiences may be completely oblivious to information
campaigns which embed narratives into their cognitive landscape—under-
mining trust and divisions within society (refer to contribution by Janis
Sarts in this volume). Some studies—and they are still emerging—suggest
that false political news has the quality of travelling more deeply, and more
virally, than any other type of false information. The truth, however, takes
considerably longer to reach people and diffuse itself in the same depth
that falsehood has (in fact, in some studies it never manages to diffuse
itself in the same depth).13 All these put together give some indication
as to why an actor with the resources and the motive might want to try
subversion at scale in a target, with the best example being the strategies
employed by Russia in its attempts to influence the outcome of the 2016
U.S. Presidential election.14
As the chapters in this volume will show, disinformation and/or fake
news can have political and social effects on society and state. Whether
they may be hostile information campaigns or hate speech (see Alan Davis’
contribution in this volume), the virality and velocity at which the false
information spreads is the key issue‚ as it may have negative implications
on the levels of trust, societal cohesion and resilience. Cultural contexts
and the political environments present in various milieus can influence the
kind of information spread, and have a bearing on how and why they gain
quick traction.
12 Tim Hwang, Maneuver and Manipulation: On the Military Strategy of Online Infor-
mation Warfare, United States Army War College Press, Advancing Strategic Thought
Series, May 2019.
13 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, ‘The Spread of True and False News
Online’, Science, Vol. 359, Issue 6380, 9 Mar 2018, pp. 1146–1151.
14 Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019).
10 B. ANG ET AL.
Chapters
The volume is divided into three parts. “Overview of Disinformation”
seeks to provide an outline from the temporal, communications and inter-
national angles. “Disinformation in Context” provides perspectives and
experiences from a wide range of states. There is some focus on South-
east Asia and associated developments surrounding disinformation, due to
the rapid growth of social media use in the region. The final part, “Coun-
tering Disinformation” offers insights on countermeasures (such as those
by NATO, as well as civil society).
Janis Sarts explores how the contemporary information environment
has created a favourable space for the spread of hostile disinformation
campaigns. He offers readers a detailed analysis of “state actors that
use disinformation as a part of influence campaigns, to affect targeted
society,” explaining how these actors exploit social weaknesses to disrupt
a country’s social cohesion. Sarts highlights how state actors use military
and diplomatic means “in conjunction with information space activities
to achieve desired effects”. Although many of the tools used in hostile
campaigns were developed during the height of the Cold War, there is
newer emphasis on exploiting opportunities created by the digital envi-
ronment, such as organized trolling (hostile social media campaigns).
Sarts concludes by highlighting four “layers of responsibility” in combat-
ting hostile campaigns, adding that in order to protect societal processes
like elections, “we need to discover ways of how the same technolo-
gies can be used in countering hostile influence and disinformation
campaigns”.
Edson Tandoc assesses why people believe in and propagate false
information found online. He identifies four components of communi-
cation—namely Sender, Message, Channel and Receiver—and examines
the different factors which affect each one. Tandoc’s research reveals that
an increasing number of people get their news from social media instead
of local news websites, which leads to various consequences on all four
components of communication. He explains that individuals judge a news
story’s credibility not only on who shared it on social media, but also on
the number of likes, comments and shares. Fake news producers there-
fore often “produce clickbait content to get more people to like, share,
or comment on their fake stories, often playing into readers’ biases or

interests”. Tandoc proposes that although the majority of disinforma-
tion research has focused on Facebook and Twitter, “fake news now
increasingly moves through closed social media applications, such as the
messaging app WhatsApp”. He also delineates how fake news and disin-
formation thrive in times of uncertainty and in situations of information
overload—combatting this issue will require a “multi-pronged approach
involving technological, economic, legal, and social interventions”.
Richard Fletcher examines some of the key findings from the 2018
Reuters Institute Digital News Report. This report analysed online data
dealing with news consumption from approximately 74,000 respondents
internationally, with particular focus on their “level of concern over and
exposure to specific types of misinformation and disinformation associ-
ated with the news”. One of its main findings was that just over half
of the respondents were either “very” or “extremely” concerned about
bias, poor journalism and completely made-up news. However, Fletcher
explains that the level and areas of concern vary from country to country.
For example, in Eastern Europe, the questionnaire showed that “mis-
leading advertising was more of a concern than in many other parts of
the world”. Fletcher analyses each key finding of the report, including
the public perception of “fake news” as a term, and who news audiences
think should do more to fix problems associated with misinformation. He
concludes by emphasising the importance of monitoring public concern
over misinformation, in order to properly address the problems it poses.
Disinformation in Context
Donara Barojan explores the impact of disinformation and digital manip-
ulation on election vulnerability. She argues that researchers, policymakers
and journalists reporting on elections tend to focus solely on techno-
logical vulnerabilities, while overlooking individuals’ cognitive shortcom-
ings and societal vulnerabilities. Barojan examines these vulnerabilities
by describing the “toxic information environment” created when they
interact, which in turn facilitates the spread of disinformation and fake
news. This mirrors Sarts’ chapter, where he describes how the milieu can
perpetuate and accelerate the spread of hostile disinformation campaigns.
Case studies from elections in Moldova, Malaysia, Mexico and the United
States illustrate the use of doctored videos, commercial and political bots
(automated social media) and sock puppet (inauthentic social media)
12 B. ANG ET AL.
accounts. Barojan then lists a number of approaches to counter online

hostile actors, which include participating in open source and forensic
training events, following the research published by the DFR Lab to
“inform the public of the challenge of disinformation,” maintaining trans-
parent communication with the public and harnessing the “power of
technology” to track disinformation campaigns and digital manipulation
in multiple languages.
Jean-Baptiste Vilmer analyses the impact of the massive data breach
that was used in a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting
Emmanuel Macron and his campaign team, in the run up to the 2017
French presidential elections. Despite the large data leak, the campaign
was deemed a failure, as it did not succeed in significantly influencing
French voters. Vilmer explores why this was the case by highlighting a
number of mistakes made by the hackers, as well as the appropriate and
effective strategies by various agencies involved in playing defence. These
include strategies in public signalling, and raising the level of awareness
around campaign staff, media and the public. Vilmer cautions that the
threat of further leaks persists, and highlights a number of steps needed
to tackle the threat of disinformation head on.
Ross Tapsell evaluates the “cultural practice of disinformation” in
Southeast Asia, arguing that in order to combat this issue, academics
must take into consideration “what kinds of disinformation spread widely,
and why?” This question is addressed in three parts: how Southeast
Asians access the internet, the cultural background in which digitaliza-
tion has entered the public sphere, and the political context in which
disinformation spreads. Tapsell suggests that academics tend to focus on
studying Twitter as data is easier to obtain from the platform. However,
this fails to take into consideration that “millions of Southeast Asians”
are using the internet for Facebook and WhatsApp instead of Twitter.
A significant number of Southeast Asians are obtaining their news from
social media and are not fact-checking the news that they are consuming.
Tapsell also emphasizes that many Southeast Asian citizens distrust offi-
cial news sources due to their experiences of political manipulation and
press corruption, and instead seek alternative sources of information from
what they consider more “trustworthy” sources on social media. Tapsell
concludes by encouraging academics to engage in “big data” scholarship
on disinformation to analyse how digital information is changing South-
east Asian societies and come up with solutions to the complex problems
disinformation poses.
Looking deeper into Myanmar, Alan Davis evaluates key factors

contributing to the inter-ethnic conflict in the Rakhine State. He
argues that during the country’s transition from a totalitarian state to a
more open society, the international community sought out easy indi-
cators in order to “declare success quickly and then move on”. The
dramatic increase in the number of media outlets in Myanmar was
recognized as proof of increased levels of freedom of expression in the
country. However, Davis states that with the rise of social media—mainly
Facebook—traditional media is becoming less relevant. This builds on
Tapsell’s study showing how there is a lack of trust in official news
sources, and people are turning to alternative media outlets or platforms
for information—whether they may be authentic or false. Davis high-
lights the increase in hate speech against Muslims in general and the
Rohingya in particular (this is important too in balancing this volume,
as we should be concerned with material that can be both incendiary
and viral, but which is not necessarily the result of action by a state
adversary). He argues that the international community should have also
been more aware of the “confluence of factors, crowned by Facebook”
in Myanmar, contributing to the risk of inter-communal violence and the
ethnic cleansing of Rohingya Muslims.
Countering Disinformation
Barbora Maronkova looks at strategies present at the state and interna-
tional level, by evaluating NATO’s strategy and implementation plans
for countering hybrid warfare. This strategy comprises four main pillars:
defence and deterrence with high readiness forces in place, cyber defence,
enhancing resilience through national civil preparedness and the protec-
tion of critical infrastructure, as well as strategic communications to fight
disinformation and propaganda. Maronkova underlines the importance of
proactive communication between NATO members in order to counter
the “systemic use of disinformation, propaganda and fake news”. This is
particularly with regard to Russia, which has deployed a number of propa-
ganda attacks targeting its immediate neighbours and NATO. Maronkova
explains how these attacks have led NATO to develop new initiatives to
counter Russian disinformation, including countering propaganda with
facts and information to debunk recurrent falsehoods. She concludes by
emphasizing the importance of proactive and transparent communication
14 B. ANG ET AL.
between NATO members in order to deter and defend against any threat
which may arise.
Giedrius Sakalauskas describes his experience participating in a group
of Lithuanian activists who refer to themselves as “elves”, in the fight
against various falsehoods spread by Russian internet trolls (hostile social
media accounts) on social media. Sakalauskas details the four different
types of elves which emerged to counter these online attacks, and each
of their roles in finding hostile propaganda and spreading positive news
about Lithuania, the European Union and NATO. He explains the key
principle in the elves’ fight against Russian trolls using examples from
various campaigns, which is to never counter lies with more lies, but to
instead expose and debunk the lies through civic duty and action.
The editors’ contribution concerns Singapore’s multipronged
responses to the perceived threats of disinformation and fake news.
The authorities have watched information manipulation in the West with
some sense of looking over their own shoulders, given past instances
of communal and ethno-religious violence (too far in the past to be
remembered by most Singaporeans, but keenly felt by policymakers
nonetheless). Official thinking and inquiry have extended, unusually, to
a full Parliamentary Select Committee looking into these issues in 2018.
The ensuing recommendations concerning building trust, cohesion and
digital literacy are perhaps not entirely eyebrow-raising, but what has
attracted considerable attention—as well as detractors and supporters in
equal measure—is legislation.
The Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act
(POFMA)‚ passed in 2019, is unique in that it gives the Minister the
power to direct (via a Correction Direction) either the maker of the state-
ment, or the platform upon which it is posted, to publish a correction next
to the original statement, while the original statement remains online.
The Correction Direction is therefore analogous to a legally enforceable
right to reply, which ensures that members of the public can read both
the original statement and the official reply, and make their own judge-
ment. Further study will be needed over time to evaluate the effectiveness
of POFMA in dealing with online falsehoods and manipulation—for
example, in which types of cases the public is more convinced by the
official government correction; what types of corrections, fact-checks or
debunking statements are most effective and even an analysis of whether
POFMA directions give more visibility to the original statements. It is also
at present too early to say if this approach will be used by other states;
but it is fair to say that the Singapore experiment is being watched closely
by others grappling with these same issues.
Notes Towards a Future Body of Work
Nuclear war and climate change threaten the physical infrastructure that
provides the food, energy, and other necessities required for human life.
But to thrive, prosper, and advance, people also need reliable information
about their world – factual information, in abundance.
—Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (the creators of the Doomsday
Clock), January 2019.15
We began with the issue of conceptual underpinnings. There are from

time to time calls for researchers to go beyond concepts and to arrive at an
all-encompassing analytical framework capturing all aspects of fake news
and disinformation. We are unlikely to get one because, as the contribu-
tions have shown, there is an immense canvas forming the backdrop for
the issues at hand. The issues span—besides fake news—hostile informa-
tion campaigns, countermeasures (both legal and non-legal), cognitive
aspects (such as critical thinking and digital media literacy), particular
pressure points, such as elections (and securing election integrity) and
the issue of foreign interference. As the contributions show, these have
implications on society at large, and can influence levels of trust and
resilience even as the state and other actors grapple with the intricacies
of countering disinformation and fake news. Any attempt at developing
an all-encompassing framework would have to take into account of a wide
range of tactics, including the use of biased interpretations and innuendo
(not strictly disinformation), co-opting or manipulation of politicians,
business leaders and influential people (more influence than information),
or even censorship and suppression of news.
The multiplicity of overlapping issues means that a whole slew of obser-
vations and suggestions for further work can be made. We select a few
below.
15 “‘A new abnormal: It is still 2 minutes to midnight’. 2019 Doomsday Clock State-
ment, Science and Security Board, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 2019, p. 5.
https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/2019-doomsday-clockstatement/#”.
16 B. ANG ET AL.
The tech platforms attempting to up their game when it comes

to interdicting hostile information campaigns, troll farms and account
swarms that act in a coordinated, inauthentic manner.16 Governments
are also stepping up in terms of finding ways to inform and educate their
citizenry.17 There are now, for example, initiatives which see law enforce-
ment, security agencies and others communicate directly to the people to
give them tools and resources, to understand how adversaries might try
to influence political processes.18
Partnerships are important. Some of these activities above have been
unmasked, thanks only to collaboration between the platforms such as
Facebook and researchers.19 Other forms of collaboration also take place
outside the orbit of the platforms, with investigative websites or bodies
devoted to fact-checking working either independently or synergistically
to call out inauthentic behaviour.20 “Ordinary people” also have a role,
particularly where a concerned citizenry takes up the fight against fake
news and inauthentic narratives—the Baltic Elves being a case in point.
Various studies have suggested that while fact-checking or debunking
can in certain circumstances be useful, effectiveness is limited when these
efforts come up against deep-seated beliefs or ideology. If the aim is to
16 Lily Hay Newman, ‘Facebook Removes a Fresh Batch of Innovative, Iran-Linked

Fake Accounts’, WIRED, 28 May 19. https://www.wired.com/story/iran-linked-fake-
accounts-facebook-twitter/.
17 See for example Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, and
CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, 5 Nov 19. https://www.dhs.gov/news/
2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020-ele
ctions, and ‘Overview of the Process for the U.S. Government to Notify the Public and
Others Regarding Foreign Interference in U.S. Elections’, https://s.wsj.net/public/res
ources/documents/Overview%20of%20the%20Process%20for%20the%20U.S.%20Governm
ent%20to%20Notify%20the%20Public%20and%20Others%20Regarding%20Foreign%20Inte
rference%20in%20U.S.%20Elections%20(1).pdf?mod=article_inline.
18 See for example Protected Voices. https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintellig
ence/foreign-influence/protected-voices.
19 See for example Operation Secondary Infektion, Atlantic Council/DFRLab (various
authors), 22 Jun 19. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/rep
ort/operation-secondary-infektion/; also see Issie Lapowsky, ‘Inside the Research Lab
Teaching Facebook About Its Trolls’, WIRED, 15 Aug 18. (On the critical work done
by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Research [DFRLab] Lab in collaboration with
Facebook).
20 Eliot Higgins, ‘New Generation of Digital Detectives Fight to Keep Russia Honest’,
Stopfake.org, 15 Jul 16. https://www.stopfake.org/en/new-generation-of-digital-detect
ives-fight-to-keep-russia-honest/.
change the minds of those with certain beliefs or who have been suscep-
tible to information campaigns, governmental rebuttal if not done well
may simply come to be seen as part of the conspiracy itself, and may
simply push the recipient further into his or her echo chamber. This is the
“self sealing” quality of fake news and conspiracy theories—the type that
is resistant to contrary evidence and especially resistant to government
rebuttal—as highlighted by some observers.21
Fresh thinking is needed in terms of how to communicate in a way
that works—not simply rebuttal or exposure of inauthentic behaviour, but
adaptive counter messaging, and more compelling narratives. Investments
are also needed in upstream interventions: a thread running through
several of the contributions is the importance of investing in the resilience
of society against disinformation such as media literacy campaigns. In
particular, as key experts in the field are starting to point out, more work
should be done on cultivating “emotional scepticism” at an individual
or societal level rather than unthinkingly believing or sharing sensational
news.22 The need for this type of upstream intervention is a critical one,
given the refinements in activity on the part of the malicious actor. Enti-
ties such as the Internet Research Agency (IRA) have upped operational
security and made fake accounts and activity harder to detect.23 The lies
are themselves becoming harder to detect.24
A particular pressure point, as some contributors (such as Donara
Barojan and Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer) have noted, will be the
democratic process and elections specifically. Here, a great deal will clearly
rest on the efforts of platforms. Useful starts have been made. Twitter
21 Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, ‘Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures’, The
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 202–227.
22 Nicole Brown, ‘“Emotional Skepticism” Needed to Stop Spread of Deepfakes on
Social Media, Expert Says’, CBS News, 12 Nov 19. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dee
pfakes-on-social-media-users-have-responsibility-not-to-spread-fake-content-expert-says/.
23 As the tech platforms themselves have observed in the course of their own takedowns,
malicious actors are making progress in efforts to mask identities online. ‘Removing Bad
Actors in Facebook’, 31 Jul 18. https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/07/removing-
bad-actors-on-facebook/.
24 As one contributor to this volume (Donara Barojan), has elsewhere remarked, “Dis-
information Is Moving from Outright Falsehoods to Highly Divisive/Extreme Authentic
Content That Is Inauthentically Amplified” (Donara Barojan, remarks at the NATO
StratCom Centre of Excellence DigiCom19 Seminar, Riga, 30 Oct 19. The editors thank
Barojan for a personal communication).
18 B. ANG ET AL.
for example has banned political advertising.25 Separately, pledging to

keep the 2019 UK general election “healthy and safe,” it has unveiled
various measures, including tools introduced to make it easier to report
misleading content about voting processes.26 But even as takedowns of
bot armies and fake accounts designed to interfere in elections gather
pace, the malicious actors have evolved and adapted.27 One study by
an NGO working on protecting democracies‚ published in November
2019, suggests that in the first ten months of the year‚ “politically rele-
vant disinformation was found to have reached over million estimated
views‚ enough to reach every reported registered voter in the US at least
once”. Viral stories that had already been looked into a debunked by
reputable fact-checking organizations were still at the time of the study
drawing in vast amounts of readers.28 The latest Kremlin/IRA efforts
targeting the United States have seen fake accounts posing as individ-
uals with interests in almost all conceivable parts of the U.S. political
spectrum, with assets that could divide and polarize American society in
25 Tony Romm and Isaac Stanley-Becker, ‘Twitter to Ban All Political Ads Amid 2020
Election Uproar’, The Washington Post, 30 Oct 19. Facebook’s stance at the time of
writing (November 2019) is markedly different: the platform has rescinded an earlier ban
on false claims in political advertising, with many classes of political advertising now also
exempt from third party fact checking. Alex Hern, ‘Facebook Exempts Political Ads from
Ban on Making False Claims’, The Guardian, 4 Oct 19. https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/oct/04/facebook-exempts-political-ads-ban-making-false-claims.
26 Katy Minshall, ‘Serving the Public Conversation for #GE2019’, 11 Nov
19. https://blog.twitter.com/en_gb/topics/events/2019/serving-the-public-conversat
ion-for-ge2019.html.
27 Amongst the many other refinements in technique, one which bears watching is “nar-
rative laundering”, which has a long history but has been updated for the information age.
Certain state narratives can be diffused from official organs or state propaganda to achieve
wider currency, and believability, through “useful idiots”, other publications, social media,
and other assets. These might include think tanks, and media outlets seen to be rela-
tively unbiased, and of course fake online identities. ‘New White Paper on GRU Online
Operations Puts Spotlight on Pseudo-Think Tanks and Personas’, Stanford Internet Obser-
vatory, 12 Nov 19. https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/potemkin-pages-personas-
blog; for a full exposition, see Renée DiResta and Shelby Grossman, Potemkin Pages
& Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014–2019, Stanford Internet Observatory
Cyber Policy Center, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/potemkin-
pages-personas-sio-wp.pdf (pp. 5–8, 13 on narrative laundering).
28 US 2020: Another Facebook Disinformation Election? Avaaz, 5 Nov 19. https://ava
azimages.avaaz.org/US_2020_report_1105_v04.pdf.
the leadup to the 2020 elections.29 Inauthentic accounts on social media

platforms have also attacked specific Democratic candidates for the presi-
dency, with the apparent aim of undermining the candidates, and sowing
discord and dividing the Democrats.30 Platforms involved included Face-
book, Twitter and Instagram, but the activity has extended to Medium
and online forums.
Astute observers of the disinformation scene have observed that the
“ecosystem of influence”—using elements of open societies such as poli-
tics and cyberspace—is evolving, and only a matter of time before the
ecosystem is used for illicit purposes in a more “sustained and strategic
way”.31 Studying how technologies may be harnessed to perpetuate—
and even innovate—future campaigns will be crucial. States may take
advantage of the potential implications from artificial intelligence (AI),
Deepfakes and audio or video manipulation to interfere or spread disin-
formation. It is not easy at the current stage to fully comprehend (or even
predict) the tools or strategies underlying such manipulation.
The current focus by researchers on state-on-state hostile information
campaigns is understandable—but arguably unsustainable. Beyond this,
there is a need for better understandings of nuances of state activity,
including attacks on organizations, individuals or movements through‚
for example‚ smearing reputations or the muddying of facts. The smears
against the White Helmets (and in particular its late co-founder, James
Le Mesurier)—alleged to have been linked to the Kremlin—are a case
29 For an in-depth examination see Camille François, Ben Nimmo, and C. Shawn Eib,
The IRACopyPasta Campaign, Graphika, Oct 19. https://graphika.com/uploads/Gra
phika%20Report%20-%20CopyPasta.pdf. Many sleeper accounts gain trust by first posting
innocuous news, only later switching to polarising messaging close to pressure point such
as an election. ‘The St. Petersburg Troll Factory Targets Elections from Germany to the
United States’, EUvsDisinfo, 2 Apr 19. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-st-petersburg-troll-fac
tory-targets-elections-from-germany-to-the-united-states/.
30 Natasha Korecki, ‘“Sustained and Ongoing” Disinformation Assault Targets Dem
Presidential Candidates’, Politico, 20 Feb 19. https://www.politico.com/story/2019/
02/20/2020-candidates-social-media-attack-1176018.
31 Alina Polyakova, ‘#DisinfoWeek Brussels 2019 Storyteller: Unpacking the Toolkit of
Influence’, 7 Mar 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhQY45aUkXI&feature=
youtu.be (see 12.55–13.18; accessed 3 Jan 2020).
20 B. ANG ET AL.
in point, as are online attacks against the pro-democracy Hong Kong

protestors.32
Finally, given the constantly evolving nature of the threats, are we then
in for an endless arms race where the defence side is doomed to playing
catch up against shapeshifting aggressors? What implications would this
have on the overall societal resilience—should this in fact be considered
a public health issue? These, the cognitive aspects, and overall deleterious
effects of “fake news” on societies touched on in this volume, are those
which especially demand further attention. Already, informed observers
are beginning to remark on an apathy and “general exhaustion with news
itself”; this at a time when authentic and good quality information is
needed most.33
This volume has attempted to make a contribution to these conversa-
tions—the conversations are themselves part of a field that is extremely
old, but in some ways just beginning too.
32 See Kim Sengupta, ‘James Le Mesurier death: Co-founder of White Helmets Besieged
by Funding Worries and Russian Propaganda Campaign Against Him’, The Independent,
15 Nov 19, and Shelly Banjo and Alyza Sebenius, ‘Trolls Renew Social Media Attacks on
Hong Kong’s Protesters’, Bloomberg, 4 Nov 19 (accessed 11 Nov 19).
33 Sabrina Tavernese and Aiden Gardiner, ‘“No One Believes Anything”: Voters Worn
Out by a Fog of Political News’, The New York Times, 18 Nov 19 (accessed 27 Nov 19).
Disinformation as a Threat
to National Security
Janis Sarts
Abstract Janis Sarts explores how the contemporary information envi-

ronment has created a favourable space for the spread of hostile disin-
formation campaigns. He offers readers a detailed analysis of ‘state actors
that use disinformation as a part of influence campaigns, to affect targeted
society’, explaining how these actors exploit social weaknesses to disrupt
a country’s social cohesion. Sarts highlights how state actors use military
and diplomatic means ‘in conjunction with information space activities
to achieve desired effects’. Although many of the tools used in hostile
campaigns were developed during the height of the Cold War, there is
newer emphasis on exploiting opportunities created by the digital envi-
ronment, such as organised trolling (hostile social media campaigns). Sarts
concludes by highlighting four ‘layers of responsibility’ in combatting
hostile campaigns, adding that in order to protect societal processes like
elections, ‘we need to discover ways of how the same technologies can be
used in countering hostile influence and disinformation campaigns’.
The views expressed here are solely those of the author.
J. Sarts (B)
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Riga, Latvia
e-mail: Evita.Luste@stratcomcoe.org

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_2
24 J. SARTS
Keywords Campaign · Digital environment · Social weakness ·

Information space · Trolling
From ancient times people have sought to exert influence on each other.
It has been a continuous element of internal group interaction, interaction
between societies and ultimately between nations. The goal in conflict
between states has always been about changing the behaviour of one party
to the benefit of the other. It can be about conceding territory, surren-
dering to the rule of the other or giving up beliefs. Throughout history,
this has been accomplished by force, but even early military theoreticians
like Sun Tzu recognised the importance of influencing behaviour through
non-military means.1
Increasingly in the modern world, outright military conflict is both
politically and economically expensive, making influence operations
beneath the threshold of classic war ever more appealing. One of the
central elements of these influence operations is changing the perceptions
of the other state’s target audiences through manipulative disinformation
campaigns aimed at changing the behaviours of these groups by delib-
erate strategy.2 These behaviours can seek to bring out anger, distrust in
central authorities, alter value systems and install a sense of weakness.
The New Information Environment

These strategies are not new, but the contemporary information envi-
ronment presents a much more favourable space for these strategies
than the one we had just a decade ago. This new digital information
flow is profoundly shifting societal information consumption habits. It
is characterised by the constant consumption of information enabled
by smartphones resulting in a continuous individual news cycle, the
democratisation of information providers and the algorithm-driven emer-
gence of informational echo chambers. This high tempo of information
flow also pushes consumers to decrease the amount of time they spend
1 Tzu, Sun. 2008. The Art of War. London: Arcturus Publishing Ltd.
2 Nissen, Thomas. 2016. Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare. Riga: NATO
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
DISINFORMATION AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY 25
on any particular news to just a few seconds.3 People are increasingly

consuming just the headline of an article and the visual, if attached to
it, not paying attention to the source of the story, not to mention actu-
ally reading the full text of the news. Emotional processing of news items
thus increases significantly, which in turn inflates the number of ‘highly
emotional’ stories.
This new information environment plays on elements like cognitive
bias not only exposing those, but also rewarding stories that exploit these
notions. As a result, fact-based, balanced and accurate news stories have
less reach and impact. An MIT study published in 2018 concluded that
on the social media platform Twitter, false stories get consistently much
bigger reach than factually correct news.4 This then has an impact on
social discourse and the ability to conduct a comprehensive dialogue in
society, and enables an environment where conspiracy theories and ideas
unsupported by facts continuously get more exposure than expert views
and factually based ideas. This being a predominantly social media grown
phenomenon, it is increasingly crossing in the traditional media field. As
their traditional business models are under pressure or being disrupted,
many are seeking solutions by mimicking social media approaches and
opting for sensationalist and emotional content at the expense of factual
and balanced content.
This information environment is fertile ground for conducting hostile
disinformation campaigns. Here it would be pertinent to make a distinc-
tion between misinformation and disinformation. While misinformation
is creating false or misleading information that is a single—typically
not malicious—act created by identifiable person, disinformation, on
the contrary, is the deliberate, consistent and coordinated use of false,
deceptive or distorted information across various information channels to
achieve a desired effect on a specific audience. Most successful influence
campaigns go unnoticed by society and many actors employ this tactic.
The first group use it for financial gain, where disinformation campaigns
are designed to get a reaction from an audience and clicks which can
be converted into financial gain using a variety of methods. The second
group seek to achieve political advantage and are ready to step into the
3 Attention Spans. Consumer Insights. 2015. Microsoft Canada.

4 Soroush, Vosoughi, Deb, Roy, Sinan, Aral. 2018. The Spread of True and False News
Online. Science Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1146–1151.
26 J. SARTS
grey zone of disinformation to advance their idea, attack political oppo-

nents or promote a specific cause. The third group are state actors that use
disinformation as part of influence campaigns, to affect targeted society,
typically through consistent, coordinated disinformation campaigns. In
some of the cases, one can observe an interplay between these groups
which is driven by mutual interests.5
State Actor Influence Campaigns

The most dangerous and resourceful is this third group, as it can bring
to bear all instruments of national power and communicate across that
spectrum. Some parameters are typical of state actors influence campaigns.
Establishing preconditions for the success of the influence campaign.

Every society has specific patterns of information consumption, networks
through which information flows both in traditional as well as digital
media landscape. To conduct an influence campaign, a hostile actor has
to establish itself as an integral part of that landscape. Once it is gener-
ally considered as part of ‘normality’ it helps to conceal these campaigns
and achieve one of the critical parameters: be unnoticed. A good example
here is the Crimean occupation by Russia. The most important element
of success has been the long-standing domination of the Kremlin’s media
channels in this part of Ukraine, which helped shape the perceptions of
the Crimean audience over a long period, developing a habit of viewing
Russia’s channels as the primary source of information. Eventually, in
2014, it was used as the primary vector to manage the perceptions and
behaviour of the local population during the process of occupation.6
Similar tactics are used by Russia in the Baltic states and number of other
countries.7
Exploitation of vulnerabilities. Case studies of influence campaigns by

hostile state actors indicate consistent exploitation of societal weaknesses
5 Internet Research Agency Indictment—Department of Justice, https://www.justice.

gov/file/1035477/download, last accessed 3 October 2018.
6 Vladimir, Sazonov, Kristina,Muur, Holger, Molder (eds.). 2016. Russian Informa-
tion Campaign Against Ukrainian State and Defence Forces. Riga: NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence.
7 Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2018. Russia’s Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic
Information Environment. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
as a venue for the disruption of social cohesion of a country. Deepening

the rifts within a country is seen as an effective way of weakening an
opponent, weakening political leadership of the country and its ability to
act. This is an area where a state actor might seek out relationships with
local players that might benefit from such discourse. This is an effective
method because it is difficult, while confronting it, delineate where it is
legitimate local groups reaction to the issue and where it is hostile powers
attempt to exploit a vulnerability to weaken society. Issues can range from
religious, inter-ethnic, social inequality, migration, etc.
The comprehensive approach. This is one of the key indicators for the
hostile state activity. As the previous actor groups are limited both in
resources and scope, a state actor functions across all elements of power to
achieve desired effects. In the information space, it ranges from traditional
media pursuing consistently specific narratives, to exploiting the social
media environment through trolls, robotic networks, impersonations and
leaks of hacked documents. It also involves ‘agents of influence’ to field
particular narratives, through traditional and social media. This has the
ultimate aim of developing a consistent, multifaceted story, creating the
illusion of many voices actively engaged in discussing and promoting it.
State actors, however, are not limited to the information space. They can
use military and diplomatic means, or their security services in conjunc-
tion with information space activities to achieve desired effects. A good
illustration is the Eston Kohver case in Estonia,8 when in September
2014, just two days after US President Barack Obama made a speech
in Tallinn addressing US commitment to Baltic states’ security in the
face of a growing Russian threat, an Estonian security police (KAPO)
officer was abducted by Russian security services (FSB) on the Estonian
side of the Estonia–Russia border. The other example is Russia’s military
activity in the Baltic sea.9 During Russian military exercises, a large part
of Western Latvia experienced a disruption of mobile networks services,
directly affecting a significant proportion of the population and inflating
the fear of the Russian military. A similar case was reported by Finnish
8 Roonemaa, Holger. 2017. How Smuggler Helped Russia to Catch Esto-

nian Officer. Re:Baltica. https://en.rebaltica.lv/2017/09/how-smuggler-helped-russia-to-
catch-estonian-officer/, last accessed 4 October 2018.
9 Mehta, Aaron. 22 November 2017. Lessons from Zapad—Jamming, NATO and the
Future of Belarus, DefenseNews.
28 J. SARTS
and Norwegian authorities in 2018, attributing the loss of GPS signal in

the northern parts of these countries to Russian military activity.
Tools and Techniques

When we look at the toolbox of such disinformation campaigns, it is
varied and diverse. Many of the tools are based on techniques devel-
oped during the height of the Cold War when two different worldviews
were competing across the globe. These include more traditional media
instruments like TV, newspapers and radio which are used to dissemi-
nate a particular worldview and are aiming to get audiences accustomed
to and sharing specific narratives, and consequently, world views. But in
moments of crisis, it can turn to more sinister methods, such as using
false, emotional stories, or distorted interpretations of events to affect the
behaviours of targeted audiences.10
The other well-known instruments is the use of networks of influence
agents. They are used to affect public discourse on specific subjects that
are important to a given hostile state actor, ranging from topics such as
business, politics, international relations to subtle areas like culture and
history.11
Although these old tools are very much in use in the contemporary
environment, new emphasis is put on exploiting opportunities provided
by the digital environment. Organised trolling12 is a very well-known
instrument that creates the illusion that significant parts of society share
a specific point of view and actively exploits human popularity bias, by
making people believe something is true because many other people
think it is true. Trolling can also be used to mute opinion leader voices
during crises by swarming trolls on the social media accounts of these
people. Trolls can also be used to aggressively attack specific opinions,
thus discouraging people from sharing these views.
10 Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2017. Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia’s

Manipulative Techniques. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
11 Lutsevych, Orysia. 2016. Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the Contested
Neighborhood. London: Chatham House.
12 Aro, Jessikka. 2016. The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare Tools.
European View Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 121–132.
A recent sub-tool for traditional trolling is the so-called ‘Robotrolling’

or the use of social automated or semi-automated account networks. The
most common use of this tool is to amplify specific stories. It leads to a
number of effects: first, it serves the same human popularity bias. Second,
it helps distort public sentiments, sensitivities and interests if automated
social media measurement tools are used, leading to false results and thus
wrong conclusions. Finally, it is an effective way of manipulating social
media algorithms, tricking them to promote particular stories. It is linked
to a set of methodologies that are designed to upgrade specific stories in
the search engines like Google and YouTube in particular.13
Big data based on the microtargeting of citizens, especially during
politically sensitive moments like elections, is another new tool available
for hostile state actors to pursue their malign interests. Increasingly data
crumbs that are left by people while online can be collected and used to
create profiles that can include information on psychology, income, family
status, beliefs and political inclinations. This information is typically used
to target people with specified marketing campaigns for consumer prod-
ucts, but gradually it is being used to affect political behaviours. This tool
makes it much easier to find particular groups in the society that are disil-
lusioned or have adversarial perspectives or specific beliefs and target them
with itemised messages for predesigned outcomes. This was demonstrated
by Russia during the 2016 US presidential election campaign.14
A key objective when using these tools is to deploy specific narra-
tives and embed them in the cognitive landscape of an audience. This
is then exploited to create divisions in society, or widen existing fractures.
One of the vectors of such activity is aimed at undermining the trust
between different elements of society. Typically, these target trust in the
central government, in the military and security systems of the country,
in opinion leaders and ultimately in the very construct of the country.15
13 James, David. 2016. How to Successfully Rank a Video on YouTube

(Case Study). https://medium.com/@BGD_Marketing/how-to-successfully-rank-a-video-
on-youtube-case-study-19a1f298052, last accessed 4 October 2018.
14 Internet Research Agency Indictment—Department of Justice, https://www.justice.
gov/file/1035477/download, last accessed 3 October 2018.
15 Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2017. Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia’s
Manipulative Techniques. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
30 J. SARTS
Response
We face a difficult situation that is becoming more complex every day. We
are facing not only the old techniques of influence but also fast evolving
new ones based on digital technologies, getting more refined, sophisti-
cated and effective every day. We see a plethora of actors with hostile
intentions operating in the information environment. We see the disso-
lution of country boundaries in the information space making physical
distances irrelevant and seemingly organic infiltration of audiences easy.
What are the steps governments should take to confront such hostile
influence and stay on top of the problem?
As in every crisis or battle, the first essential prerequisite is to know
what exactly is happening. In the modern and complex information
environment, it is vital to have a clear and accurate picture of the infor-
mation space. States have to invest in creating effective awareness tools
and processes. Such tools should give an understanding of the audience
landscape and how society is networked information wise. What kind of
echo chambers exist? Are there are any non-organic influences in these
chambers? What organised troll networks are operating in a country’s
information space? What kind of robotic networks are running in the
social media environment, and who is the most likely owner of these
networks? Are microtargeting campaigns occurring that are unrelated
to the selling of goods or services? These are just some of the critical
questions that need to be answered to understand the information envi-
ronment and be able to respond effectively to these challenges, especially
during crises.
As argued above, influence operations typically exploit vulnerabilities
in society. Coordinated attacks can occur across the spectrum of govern-
ment, including cybersecurity, media oversight, health care systems, social
security systems and public transportation systems. Coordination of
government institutions to confront such attacks that exploit such cross-
sectoral issues is paramount. This requires cross-government coordinating
systems, risk assessment processes to analyse influence operation related
vulnerabilities and the introduction of these scenarios in government exer-
cises. This brings us to the issue of capability development. It is essential
to have experts that are capable of understanding, responding and have
the technical means to operate in confronting influence in the information
space, not only in a few departments of government but in almost every
sector. A comprehensive and coordinated response to disinformation-

centric attacks has proven to be one of the most effective antidotes to
the problem.
The third layer of responsibility lies in society and its resilience.
Evidence has shown that societal resilience to influence operations
increases once it is exposed to the public, as was demonstrated by the ‘Lisa
case’ in Germany.16 There has to be public discussion of the risks of disin-
formation and how they can be used by hostile actors against the interests
of society. Steps to increase media literacy of citizens should be intro-
duced and the educational system should step up the training of critical
thinking, especially in the context of the digital information environment.
To balance government efforts, the NGO sector—such as think tanks
and investigative media—should be encouraged to develop programmes
that track organised disinformation campaigns and share them publicly.
In crises, NGOs can serve as a counterbalance to attacks on govern-
ment credibility. An increase of public and government services personnel
digital hygiene, especially related to data, should be a particular area of
effort.
The fourth layer of activity is cooperation with digital media plat-
forms—social media in particular. It is increasingly hard to counter digital
influence campaigns without collaboration with digital platforms. They
hold the key data and understand the processes on their platform. It
is of paramount importance—especially in the early stages of a crisis—
that there is cooperation and platforms can understand the situation and
can take necessary steps to limit the spread of organised disinforma-
tion campaigns that fuel crises. Regulatory frameworks should also be
considered. Clear rules that do not limit individual freedoms but restrict
non-organic, organised disinformation would strengthen crises response
measures both on a state level as well as would provide better guidance
for digital information platforms.
Conclusion
Using disinformation campaigns to undermine countries is an increas-
ingly effective instrument that is used by hostile state actors. Changes in
the information environment brought about by technology have created
16 Meister, Stefan. 2016. The “Lisa Case”: Germany as a Target of Russian Disin-
formation. NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/lisa-
case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm, last accessed 4 October 2018.
32 J. SARTS
numerous new challenges. Beyond our current experience, new develop-

ments like deep fakes, better use of neuroscience discoveries coupled with
better big data analyses and developments in deep machine learning will
enable even more powerful influence tools upon society. But we must
note, technology itself has neither good nor bad qualities. It is up to the
people how we decide to use these new technological possibilities. To
protect the future cohesion of our societies and social processes, like elec-
tions, we need to discover ways of how the same technologies can be used
in countering hostile influence and disinformation campaigns. Govern-
ments have to focus on the challenges of tomorrow that will shape the
information environment and information warfare to remain capable of
confronting increasingly diverse and dangerous threats of the near future.
References
Aro, Jessikka. 2016. The Cyberspace War: Propaganda and Trolling as Warfare
Tools. European View Vol. 15, Issue 1, pp. 121–132.
Attention Spans. Consumer Insights. 2015. Microsoft Canada.
Internet Research Agency Indictment—Department of Justice. https://www.jus
tice.gov/file/1035477/download, last accessed 3 October 2018.
James, David. 2016. How to Successfully Rank a Video on YouTube (Case
Study). https://medium.com/@BGD_Marketing/how-to-successfully-rank-a-
video-on-youtube-case-study-19a1f298052, last accessed 4 October 2018.
Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2017. Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values:
Russia’s Manipulative Techniques. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications
Centre of Excellence.
Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2018. Russia’s Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic
Information Environment. Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of
Excellence.
Lutsevych, Orysia. 2016. Agents of the Russian World Proxy Groups in the
Contested Neighborhood. London: Chatham House.
Meister, Stefan. 2016. The “Lisa Case”: Germany as a Target of Russian Disin-
formation. NATO Review. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-
in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm, last
accessed 4 October 2018.
Nissen, Thomas. 2016. Social Media as a Tool of Hybrid Warfare. Riga: NATO
Roonemaa, Holger. 2017. How Smuggler Helped Russia to Catch Estonian
Officer. Re:Baltica. https://en.rebaltica.lv/2017/09/how-smuggler-helped-
russia-to-catch-estonian-officer/, last accessed 4 October 2018.
Soroush, Vosoughi, Deb, Roy, Sinan, Aral. 2018. The Spread of True and False
News Online. Science Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1146–1151.
Tzu, Sun. 2008. The Art of War. London: Arcturus Publishing Ltd.
Vladimir, Sazonov, Kristina, Muur, Holger, Molder (eds.). 2016. Russian Infor-
mation Campaign Against Ukrainian State and Defence Forces. Riga: NATO
Tools of Disinformation: How Fake
News Gets to Deceive
Edson C. Tandoc Jr.
Abstract In this chapter, Edson C. Tandoc Jr. assesses why people believe
in and propagate false information found online. He does so through
four components of communication—namely Sender, Message, Channel
and Receiver—and examines the different factors that affect each one.
Tandoc’s research reveals that an increasing number of people get their
news from social media instead of local news websites, which leads to
various consequences on all four components of communication. He
explains that individuals judge a news story’s credibility not only on who
shared it on social media, but also on the number of likes, comments, and
shares. Fake news producers therefore often “produce clickbait content
to get more people to like, share, or comment on their fake stories, often
playing into readers’ biases or interests”. Tandoc proposes that although
the majority of disinformation research has focused on Facebook and
Twitter, “fake news now increasingly moves through closed social media
applications, such as the messaging app WhatsApp”. He also delineates
how fake news and disinformation thrives in times of uncertainty and
in situations of information overload—combatting this issue will require
E. C. Tandoc Jr. (B)

Wee Kim Wee School of Communication
and Information, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: edson@ntu.edu.sg

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_3
36 E. C. TANDOC JR.
a “multi-pronged approach involving technological, economic, legal, and

social interventions”.
Keywords Social media · Disinformation · Components of

communication · Fake news · Viral
Introduction
The worsening problem with disinformation, aggravated by the influx of
fake news online, has prompted institutions around the world to take
action. Governments have initiated legislation. News organisations have
come together to fight fake news. Other organisations have launched
and funded fact-checking initiatives. Technology companies, blamed for
the rise of fake news, have also taken action by removing accounts that
spread fake news, among other initiatives. Yet, the ultimate question to
the problem is: What makes people believe in fake news?
The answer, unfortunately, is not simple. The production and prolifera-
tion of fake news is motivated by financial and ideological gains. Initiatives
to combat fake news are also not likely to stop actors with vested interests
from finding new ways to spread fake news and other forms of disinfor-
mation. This is why research has tended to focus on understanding the
factors that make individuals prone to being misled by fake news, for these
factors are often exploited by those behind the production and prolif-
eration of fake news. Studies have argued that the reach of fake news,
at least during the US presidential elections in 2016, was limited—with
only a fraction of the population exposed to fake news posts (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017; Nelson & Taneja, 2018).
However, for those who have been fooled by fake news, the effects
are real. For example, a man opened fire at a pizzeria in Washington
DC on 4 December 2016 after reading a viral and false conspiracy
story that identified the pizzeria as the site of an underground child
sex ring ran by then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and her
former campaign manager, John Podesta (Lopez, 2016). In India, fake
news posts spreading on the messaging application WhatsApp have been
blamed for numerous lynching and murders of people misidentified as
kidnappers (Frayer, 2018; Safi, 2018). In a small town in Mexico, a 43-
year-old man and his 21-year-old nephew were burned to death by a mob
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
monde et les hommes! Certes, je me suis vingt fois trouvé ridicule
d’aimer quelques aunes de blondes, du velours, de fines batistes,
les tours de force d’un coiffeur, des bougies, un carrosse, un titre,
d’héraldiques couronnes peintes par des vitriers ou fabriquées par
un orfèvre, enfin tout ce qu’il y a de factice et de moins femme dans
la femme; je me suis moqué de moi, je me suis raisonné, tout a été
vain. Une femme aristocratique et son sourire fin, la distinction de
ses manières et son respect d’elle-même m’enchantent; quand elle
met une barrière entre elle et le monde, elle flatte en moi toutes les
vanités, qui sont la moitié de l’amour. Enviée par tous, ma félicité me
paraît avoir plus de saveur. En ne faisant rien de ce que font les
autres femmes, en ne marchant pas, ne vivant pas comme elles, en
s’enveloppant dans un manteau qu’elles ne peuvent avoir, en
respirant des parfums à elle, ma maîtresse me semble être bien
mieux à moi: plus elle s’éloigne de la terre, même dans ce que
l’amour a de terrestre, plus elle s’embellit à mes yeux. En France,
heureusement pour moi, nous sommes depuis vingt ans sans reine:
j’eusse aimé la reine. Pour avoir les façons d’une princesse, une
femme doit être riche. En présence de mes romanesques fantaisies,
qu’était Pauline? Pouvait-elle me vendre des nuits qui coûtent la vie,
un amour qui tue et met en jeu toutes les facultés humaines? Nous
ne mourons guère pour de pauvres filles qui se donnent! Je n’ai
jamais pu détruire ces sentiments ni ces rêveries de poète. J’étais
né pour l’amour impossible, et le hasard a voulu que je fusse servi
par delà mes souhaits. Combien de fois n’ai-je pas vêtu de satin les
pieds mignons de Pauline, emprisonné sa taille svelte comme un
jeune peuplier dans une robe de gaze, jeté sur son sein une légère
écharpe en lui faisant fouler les tapis de son hôtel et la conduisant à
une voiture élégante. Je l’eusse adorée ainsi. Je lui donnais une
fierté qu’elle n’avait pas, je la dépouillais de toutes ses vertus, de
ses grâces naïves, de son délicieux naturel, de son sourire ingénu,
pour la plonger dans le Styx de nos vices et lui rendre le cœur
invulnérable, pour la farder de nos crimes, pour en faire la poupée
fantasque de nos salons, une femme fluette qui se couche au matin
pour renaître le soir, à l’aurore des bougies. Elle était tout sentiment,
tout fraîcheur, je la voulais sèche et froide. Dans les derniers jours
de ma folie, le souvenir m’a montré Pauline, comme il nous peint les
scènes de notre enfance. Plus d’une fois, je suis resté attendri,
songeant à de délicieux moments: soit que je la revisse assise près
de ma table, occupée à coudre, paisible, silencieuse, recueillie et
faiblement éclairée par le jour qui, descendant de ma lucarne,
dessinait de légers reflets argentés sur sa belle chevelure noire; soit
que j’entendisse son rire jeune, ou sa voix au timbre riche chanter
les gracieuses cantilènes qu’elle composait sans efforts. Souvent
elle s’exaltait en faisant de la musique: sa figure ressemblait alors
d’une manière frappante à la noble tête par laquelle Carlo Dolci a
voulu représenter l’Italie. Ma cruelle mémoire me jetait cette jeune
fille à travers les excès de mon existence comme un remords,
comme une image de la vertu! Mais laissons la pauvre enfant à sa
destinée! Quelque malheureuse qu’elle puisse être, au moins l’aurai-
je mise à l’abri d’un effroyable orage, en évitant de la traîner dans
mon enfer.
Jusqu’à l’hiver dernier, ma vie fut la vie tranquille et studieuse
dont j’ai tâché de te donner une faible image. Dans les premiers
jours du mois de décembre 1829, je rencontrai Rastignac, qui,
malgré le misérable état de mes vêtements, me donna le bras et
s’enquit de ma fortune avec un intérêt vraiment fraternel. Pris à la
glu de ses manières, je lui racontai brièvement et ma vie et mes
espérances. Il se mit à rire, me traita tout à la fois d’homme de génie
et de sot. Sa voix gasconne, son expérience du monde, l’opulence
qu’il devait à son savoir-faire, agirent sur moi d’une manière
irrésistible. Il me fit mourir à l’hôpital, méconnu comme un niais,
conduisit mon propre convoi, me jeta dans le trou des pauvres. Il me
parla de charlatanisme. Avec cette verve aimable qui le rend si
séduisant, il me montra tous les hommes de génie comme des
charlatans. Il me déclara que j’avais un sens de moins, une cause
de mort, si je restais seul, rue des Cordiers. Selon lui, je devais aller
dans le monde, égoïser adroitement, habituer les gens à prononcer
mon nom et me dépouiller moi-même de l’humble monsieur qui
messeyait à un grand homme de son vivant.—Les imbéciles, s’écria-
t-il, nomment ce métier-là intriguer, les gens à morale le proscrivent
sous le mot de vie dissipée; ne nous arrêtons pas aux hommes,
interrogeons les résultats. Toi, tu travailles: eh! bien, tu ne feras
jamais rien. Moi, je suis propre à tout et bon à rien, paresseux
comme un homard: eh! bien, j’arriverai à tout. Je me répands, je me
pousse, l’on me fait place: je me vante, l’on me croit. La dissipation,
mon cher, est un système politique. La vie d’un homme occupé à
manger sa fortune devient souvent une spéculation; il place ses
capitaux en amis, en plaisirs, en protecteurs, en connaissances. Un
négociant risquerait-il un million? pendant vingt ans il ne dort, ni ne
boit, ni ne s’amuse; il couve son million, il le fait trotter par toute
l’Europe; il s’ennuie, se donne à tous les démons que l’homme a
inventés; puis une liquidation le laisse souvent sans un sou, sans un
nom, sans un ami. Le dissipateur, lui, s’amuse à vivre, à faire courir
ses chevaux. Si par hasard il perd ses capitaux, il a la chance d’être
nommé receveur-général, de se bien marier, d’être attaché à un
ministre, à un ambassadeur. Il a encore des amis, une réputation et
toujours de l’argent. Connaissant les ressorts du monde, il les
manœuvre à son profit. Ce système est-il logique, ou ne suis-je
qu’un fou! N’est-ce pas là la moralité de la comédie qui se joue tous
les jours dans le monde? Ton ouvrage est achevé, reprit-il après une
pause, tu as un talent immense! Eh! bien, tu arrives au point de
départ. Il faut maintenant faire ton succès toi-même, c’est plus sûr.
Tu iras conclure des alliances avec les coteries, conquérir des
prôneurs. Moi, je veux me mettre de moitié dans ta gloire: je serai le
bijoutier qui aura monté les diamants de ta couronne. Pour
commencer, dit-il, sois ici demain soir. Je te présenterai dans une
maison où va tout Paris, notre Paris à nous, celui des beaux, des
gens à millions, des célébrités, enfin des hommes qui parlent d’or
comme Chrysostome. Quand ils ont adopté un livre, le livre devient à
la mode; s’il est réellement bon, ils ont donné quelque brevet de
génie sans le savoir. Si tu as de l’esprit, mon cher enfant, tu feras
toi-même la fortune de ta théorie en comprenant mieux la théorie de
la fortune. Demain soir tu verras la belle comtesse Fœdora, la
femme à la mode.—Je n’en ai jamais entendu parler.—Tu es un
Cafre, dit Rastignac en riant. Ne pas connaître Fœdora! Une femme
à marier qui possède près de quatre-vingt mille livres de rentes, qui
ne veut de personne ou dont personne ne veut! Espèce de problème
féminin, une Parisienne à moitié Russe, une Russe à moitié
Parisienne! Une femme chez laquelle s’éditent toutes les
productions romantiques qui ne paraissent pas, la plus belle femme
de Paris, la plus gracieuse! Tu n’es même pas un Cafre, tu es la
bête intermédiaire qui joint le Cafre à l’animal. Adieu, à demain. Il fit
une pirouette et disparut sans attendre ma réponse, n’admettant pas
qu’un homme raisonnable pût refuser d’être présenté à Fœdora.
Comment expliquer la fascination d’un nom? Fœdora me poursuivit
comme une mauvaise pensée avec laquelle on cherche à transiger.
Une voix me disait: Tu iras chez Fœdora. J’avais beau me débattre
avec cette voix et lui crier qu’elle mentait, elle écrasait tous mes
raisonnements avec ce nom: Fœdora. Mais ce nom, cette femme,
n’étaient-ils pas le symbole de tous mes désirs et le thème de ma
vie? Le nom réveillait les poésies artificielles du monde, faisait briller
les fêtes du haut Paris et les clinquants de la vanité; la femme
m’apparaissait avec tous les problèmes de passion dont je m’étais
affolé. Ce n’était peut-être ni la femme ni le nom, mais tous mes
vices qui se dressaient debout dans mon âme pour me tenter de
nouveau. La comtesse Fœdora, riche et sans amant, résistant à des
séductions parisiennes, n’était-ce pas l’incarnation de mes
espérances, de mes visions? Je me créai une femme, je la dessinai
dans ma pensée, je la rêvai. Pendant la nuit je ne dormis pas, je
devins son amant, je fis tenir en peu d’heures une vie entière, une
vie d’amour; j’en savourai les fécondes, les brûlantes délices. Le
lendemain, incapable de soutenir le supplice d’attendre longuement
la soirée, j’allai louer un roman, et passai la journée à le lire, me
mettant ainsi dans l’impossibilité de penser ni de mesurer le temps.
Pendant ma lecture le nom de Fœdora retentissait en moi comme un
son que l’on entend dans le lointain, qui ne vous trouble pas, mais
qui se fait écouter. Je possédais heureusement encore un habit noir
et un gilet blanc assez honorables; puis de toute ma fortune il me
restait environ trente francs, que j’avais semés dans mes hardes,
dans mes tiroirs, afin de mettre entre une pièce de cent sous et mes
fantaisies la barrière épineuse d’une recherche et les hasards d’une
circumnavigation dans ma chambre. Au moment de m’habiller, je
poursuis mon trésor à travers un océan de papier. La rareté du
numéraire peut te faire concevoir ce que mes gants et mon fiacre
emportèrent de richesses: ils mangèrent le pain de tout un mois.
Hélas! nous ne manquons jamais d’argent pour nos caprices, nous
ne discutons que le prix des choses utiles ou nécessaires. Nous
jetons l’or avec insouciance à des danseuses, et nous marchandons
un ouvrier dont la famille affamée attend le payement d’un mémoire.
Combien de gens ont un habit de cent francs, un diamant à la
pomme de leur canne, et dînent à vingt-cinq sous! Il semble que
nous n’achetions jamais assez chèrement les plaisirs de la vanité.
Rastignac, fidèle au rendez-vous, sourit de ma métamorphose et
m’en plaisanta; mais, tout en allant chez la comtesse, il me donna de
charitables conseils sur la manière de me conduire avec elle. Il me la
peignit avare, vaine et défiante; mais avare avec faste, vaine avec
simplicité, défiante avec bonhomie.—Tu connais mes engagements,
me dit-il, et tu sais combien je perdrais à changer d’amour. En
observant Fœdora j’étais désintéressé, de sang-froid, mes
remarques doivent être justes. En pensant à te présenter chez elle,
je songeais à la fortune; ainsi prends garde à tout ce que tu lui diras:
elle a une mémoire cruelle, elle est d’une adresse à désespérer un
diplomate, elle saurait deviner le moment où il dit vrai; entre nous, je
crois que son mariage n’est pas reconnu par l’empereur, car
l’ambassadeur de Russie s’est mis à rire quand je lui ai parlé d’elle.
Il ne la reçoit pas, et la salue fort légèrement quand il la rencontre au
bois. Néanmoins elle est de la société de madame de Sérisy, va
chez mesdames de Nucingen et de Restaud. En France sa
réputation est intacte; la duchesse de Carigliano, la maréchale la
plus collet-monté de toute la coterie bonapartiste, va souvent passer
avec elle la belle saison à sa terre. Beaucoup de jeunes fats, le fils
d’un pair de France, lui ont offert un nom en échange de sa fortune;
elle les a tous poliment éconduits. Peut-être sa sensibilité ne
commence-t-elle qu’au titre de comte! N’es-tu pas marquis? marche
en avant si elle te plaît! Voilà ce que j’appelle donner des
instructions. Cette plaisanterie me fit croire que Rastignac voulait rire
et piquer ma curiosité, en sorte que ma passion improvisée était
arrivée à son paroxysme quand nous nous arrêtâmes devant un
péristyle orné de fleurs. En montant un vaste escalier tapissé, où je
remarquai toutes les recherches du comfort anglais, le cœur me
battit; j’en rougissais: je démentais mon origine, mes sentiments, ma
fierté, j’étais sottement bourgeois. Hélas! je sortais d’une mansarde,
après trois années de pauvreté, sans savoir encore mettre au-
dessus des bagatelles de la vie ces trésors acquis, ces immenses
capitaux intellectuels qui vous enrichissent en un moment quand le
pouvoir tombe entre vos mains sans vous écraser, parce que l’étude
vous a formé d’avance aux luttes politiques. J’aperçus une femme
d’environ vingt-deux ans, de moyenne taille, vêtue de blanc,
entourée d’un cercle d’hommes, mollement couchée sur une
ottomane, et tenant à la main un écran de plumes. En voyant entrer
Rastignac, elle se leva, vint à nous, sourit avec grâce, me fit d’une
voix mélodieuse un compliment sans doute apprêté. Notre ami
m’avait annoncé comme un homme de talent, et son adresse, son
emphase gasconne me procurèrent un accueil flatteur. Je fus l’objet
d’une attention particulière qui me rendit confus; mais Rastignac
avait heureusement parlé de ma modestie. Je rencontrai là des
savants, des gens de lettres, d’anciens ministres, des pairs de
France. La conversation reprit son cours quelque temps après mon
arrivée, et, sentant que j’avais une réputation à soutenir, je me
rassurai; puis, sans abuser de la parole quand elle m’était accordée,
je tâchai de résumer les discussions par des mots plus ou moins
incisifs, profonds ou spirituels. Je produisis quelque sensation: pour
la millième fois de sa vie Rastignac fut prophète. Quand il y eut
assez de monde pour que chacun retrouvât sa liberté, mon
introducteur me donna le bras, et nous nous promenâmes dans les
appartements.—N’aie pas l’air d’être trop émerveillé de la princesse,
me dit-il, elle devinerait le motif de ta visite. Les salons étaient
meublés avec un goût exquis. J’y vis des tableaux de choix. Chaque
pièce avait comme chez les Anglais les plus opulents, son caractère
particulier: la tenture de soie, les agréments, la forme des meubles,
le moindre décor, s’harmoniaient avec une pensée première. Dans
un boudoir gothique dont les portes étaient cachées par des rideaux
en tapisserie, les encadrements de l’étoffe, la pendule, les dessins
du tapis, étaient gothiques: le plafond, formé de solives brunes
sculptées, présentait à l’œil des caissons pleins de grâce et
d’originalité; les boiseries étaient artistement travaillées; rien ne
détruisait l’ensemble de cette jolie décoration, pas même les
croisées, dont les vitraux étaient coloriés et précieux. Je fus surpris à
l’aspect d’un petit salon moderne, où je ne sais quel artiste avait
épuisé la science de notre décor, si léger, si frais, si suave, sans
éclat, sobre de dorures. C’était amoureux et vague comme une
ballade allemande, un vrai réduit taillé pour une passion de 1827,
embaumé par des jardinières pleines de fleurs rares. Après ce salon,
j’aperçus en enfilade une pièce dorée où revivait le goût du siècle de
Louis XIV, qui opposé à nos peintures actuelles, produisait un
bizarre mais agréable contraste.—Tu seras assez bien logé, me dit
Rastignac avec un sourire où perçait une légère ironie. N’est-ce pas
séduisant? ajouta-t-il en s’asseyant. Tout à coup il se leva, me prit
par la main, me conduisit à la chambre à coucher, et me montra
sous un dais de mousseline et de moire blanches un lit voluptueux
doucement éclairé, le vrai lit d’une jeune fée fiancée à un génie.—
N’y a-t-il pas, s’écria-t-il à voix basse, de l’impudeur, de l’insolence et
de la coquetterie outre mesure, à nous laisser contempler ce trône
de l’amour? Ne se donner à personne, et permettre à tout le monde
de mettre là sa carte! Si j’étais libre, je voudrais voir cette femme
soumise et pleurant à ma porte.—Es-tu donc si certain de sa vertu?
—Les plus audacieux de nos maîtres, et même les plus habiles,
avouent avoir échoué près d’elle, l’aiment encore et sont ses amis
dévoués. Cette femme n’est-elle pas une énigme? Ces paroles
excitèrent en moi une sorte d’ivresse, ma jalousie craignait déjà le
passé. Tressaillant d’aise, je revins précipitamment dans le salon où
j’avais laissé la comtesse, que je rencontrai dans le boudoir
gothique. Elle m’arrêta par un sourire, me fit asseoir près d’elle, me
questionna sur mes travaux, et sembla s’y intéresser vivement,
surtout quand je lui traduisis mon système en plaisanteries au lieu
de prendre le langage d’un professeur pour le lui développer
doctoralement. Elle parut s’amuser beaucoup en apprenant que la
volonté humaine était une force matérielle semblable à la vapeur;
que, dans le monde moral, rien ne résistait à cette puissance quand
un homme s’habituait à la concentrer, à en manier la somme, à
diriger constamment sur les âmes la projection de cette masse
fluide; que cet homme pouvait à son gré tout modifier relativement à
l’humanité, même les lois les plus absolues de la nature. Ses
objections me révélèrent en elle une certaine finesse d’esprit. Je me
complus à lui donner raison pendant quelques moments pour la
flatter, et je détruisis ses raisonnements de femme par un mot, en
attirant son attention sur un fait journalier dans la vie, le sommeil, fait
vulgaire en apparence, mais au fond plein de problèmes insolubles
pour le savant. Je piquai sa curiosité. Elle resta même un instant
silencieuse quand je lui dis que nos idées étaient des êtres
organisés, complets, qui vivaient dans un monde invisible, et
influaient sur nos destinées, en lui citant pour preuves les pensées
de Descartes, de Diderot, de Napoléon, qui avaient conduit, qui
conduisaient encore tout un siècle. J’eus l’honneur de l’amuser. Elle
me quitta en m’invitant à la venir voir; en style de cour, elle me
donna les grandes entrées. Soit que je prisse, selon ma louable
habitude, les formules polies pour des paroles de cœur, soit qu’elle
vît en moi quelque célébrité prochaine, et voulût augmenter sa
ménagerie de savants, je crus lui plaire. J’évoquai toutes mes
connaissances physiologiques et mes études antérieures sur la
femme pour examiner minutieusement pendant cette soirée sa
personne et ses manières. Caché dans l’embrasure d’une fenêtre,
j’espionnai ses pensées en les cherchant dans son maintien, en
étudiant ce manége d’une maîtresse de maison qui va et vient,
s’assied et cause, appelle un homme, l’interroge, et s’appuie pour
l’écouter sur un chambranle de porte. Je remarquai dans sa
démarche un mouvement brisé si doux, une ondulation de robe si
gracieuse, elle excitait si puissamment le désir, que je devins alors
très-incrédule sur sa vertu. Si Fœdora méconnaissait aujourd’hui
l’amour, elle avait dû jadis être fort passionnée. Une volupté savante
se peignait jusque dans la manière dont elle se posait devant son
interlocuteur: elle se soutenait sur la boiserie avec coquetterie,
comme une femme près de tomber, mais aussi près de s’enfuir si
quelque regard trop vif l’intimide. Les bras mollement croisés,
paraissant respirer les paroles, les écoutant même du regard et avec
bienveillance, elle exhalait le sentiment. Ses lèvres fraîches et
rouges tranchaient sur un teint d’un vive blancheur; ses cheveux
bruns faisaient assez bien valoir la couleur orangée de ses yeux
mêlés de veines comme une pierre de Florence, et dont l’expression
semblait ajouter de la finesse à ses paroles; son corsage était paré
des grâces les plus attrayantes. Une rivale aurait peut-être accusé
de dureté ses épais sourcils qui paraissaient se rejoindre, et blâmé
l’imperceptible duvet qui ornait les contours de son visage. Je trouvai
la passion empreinte en tout. L’amour était écrit sur ses paupières
italiennes, sur ses belles épaules dignes de la Vénus de Milo, dans
ses traits, sur sa lèvre inférieure un peu forte et légèrement
ombragée. Cette femme était un roman: ces richesses féminines,
l’ensemble harmonieux des lignes, les promesses que cette riche
structure faisait à la passion, étaient tempérés par une réserve
constante, par une modestie extraordinaire, qui contrastaient avec
l’expression de toute la personne. Il fallait une observation aussi
sagace que la mienne pour découvrir dans cette nature les signes
d’une destinée de volupté. Pour expliquer plus clairement ma
pensée, il y avait en elle deux femmes séparées par le buste peut-
être: l’une était froide, la tête seule semblait être amoureuse. Avant
d’arrêter ses yeux sur un homme, elle préparait son regard, comme
s’il se passait je ne sais quoi de mystérieux en elle-même: vous
eussiez dit une convulsion dans ses yeux si brillants. Enfin, ou ma
science était imparfaite, et j’avais encore bien des secrets à
découvrir dans le monde moral, ou la comtesse possédait une belle
âme dont les sentiments et les émanations communiquaient à sa
physionomie ce charme qui nous subjugue et nous fascine,
ascendant tout moral et d’autant plus puissant qu’il s’accorde avec
les sympathies du désir. Je sortis ravi, séduit par cette femme,
enivré par son luxe, chatouillé dans tout ce que mon cœur avait de
noble, de vicieux, de bon, de mauvais. En me sentant si ému, si
vivant, si exalté, je crus comprendre l’attrait qui amenait là ces
artistes, ces diplomates, ces hommes du pouvoir, ces agioteurs
doublés de tôle comme leurs caisses. Sans doute ils venaient
chercher près d’elle l’émotion délirante qui faisait vibrer en moi
toutes les forces de mon être, fouettait mon sang dans la moindre
veine, agaçait le plus petit nerf et tressaillait dans mon cerveau! Elle
ne s’était donnée à aucun pour les garder tous. Une femme est
coquette tant qu’elle n’aime pas.—Puis, dis-je à Rastignac, elle a
peut-être été mariée ou vendue à quelque vieillard, et le souvenir de
ses premières noces lui donne de l’horreur pour l’amour. Je revins à
pied du faubourg Saint-Honoré, où Fœdora demeure. Entre son
hôtel et la rue des Cordiers il y a presque tout Paris; le chemin me
parut court, et cependant il faisait froid. Entreprendre la conquête de
Fœdora dans l’hiver, un rude hiver, quand je n’avais pas trente
francs en ma possession, quand la distance qui nous séparait était si
grande! Un jeune homme pauvre peut seul savoir ce qu’une passion
coûte en voitures, en gants, en habits, linge, etc. Si l’amour reste un
peu trop de temps platonique, il devient ruineux. Vraiment, il y a des
Lauzun de l’École de droit auxquels il est impossible d’approcher
d’une passion logée à un premier étage. Et comment pouvais-je
lutter, moi, faible, grêle, mis simplement, pâle et hâve comme un
artiste en convalescence d’un ouvrage, avec des jeunes gens bien
frisés, jolis, pimpants, cravatés à désespérer toute la Croatie, riches,
armés de tilburys et vêtus d’impertinence?—Bah! Fœdora ou la
mort! criai-je au détour d’un pont. Fœdora, c’est la fortune! Le beau
boudoir gothique et le salon à la Louis XIV passèrent devant mes
yeux, je revis la comtesse avec sa robe blanche, ses grandes
manches gracieuses, et sa séduisante démarche, et son corsage
tentateur. Quand j’arrivai dans ma mansarde nue, froide, aussi mal
peignée que le sont les perruques d’un naturaliste, j’étais encore
environné par les images du luxe de Fœdora. Ce contraste était un
mauvais conseiller, les crimes doivent naître ainsi. Je maudis alors,
en frissonnant de rage, ma décente et honnête misère, ma
mansarde féconde où tant de pensées avaient surgi. Je demandai
compte à Dieu, au diable, à l’état social, à mon père, à l’univers
entier, de ma destinée, de mon malheur; je me couchai tout affamé,
grommelant de risibles imprécations, mais bien résolu de séduire
Fœdora. Ce cœur de femme était un dernier billet de loterie chargé
de ma fortune. Je te ferai grâce de mes premières visites chez
Fœdora, pour arriver promptement au drame. Tout en tâchant de
m’adresser à son âme, j’essayai de gagner son esprit, d’avoir sa
vanité pour moi. Afin d’être sûrement aimé, je lui donnai mille raisons
de mieux s’aimer elle-même. Jamais je ne la laissai dans un état
d’indifférence; les femmes veulent des émotions à tout prix, je les lui
prodiguai; je l’eusse mise en colère plutôt que de la voir insouciante
avec moi. Si d’abord, animé d’une volonté ferme et du désir de me
faire aimer, je pris un peu d’ascendant sur elle, bientôt ma passion
grandit, je ne fus plus maître de moi, je tombai dans le vrai, je me
perdis et devins éperdument amoureux. Je ne sais pas bien ce que
nous appelons, en poésie ou dans la conversation, amour; mais le
sentiment qui se développa tout à coup dans ma double nature, je
ne l’ai trouvé peint nulle part: ni dans les phrases rhétoriques et
apprêtées de J.-J. Rousseau, de qui j’occupais peut-être le logis, ni
dans les froides conceptions de nos deux siècles littéraires, ni dans
les tableaux de l’Italie. La vue du lac de Brienne, quelques motifs de
Rossini, la Madone de Murillo, que possède le maréchal Soult, les
lettres de la Lescombat, certains mots épars dans les recueils
d’anecdotes, mais surtout les prières des extatiques et quelques
passages de nos fabliaux, ont pu seuls me transporter dans les
divines régions de mon premier amour. Rien dans les langages
humains, aucune traduction de la pensée faite à l’aide des couleurs,
des marbres, des mots ou des sons, ne saurait rendre le nerf, la
vérité, le fini, la soudaineté du sentiment dans l’âme! Oui! qui dit art,
dit mensonge. L’amour passe par des transformations infinies avant
de se mêler pour toujours à notre vie et de la teindre à jamais de sa
couleur de flamme. Le secret de cette infusion imperceptible
échappe à l’analyse de l’artiste. La vraie passion s’exprime par des
cris, par des soupirs ennuyeux pour un homme froid. Il faut aimer
sincèrement pour être de moitié dans les rugissements de Lovelace,
en lisant Clarisse Harlowe. L’amour est une source naïve, partie de
son lit de cresson, de fleurs, de gravier, qui rivière, qui fleuve,
change de nature et d’aspect à chaque flot, et se jette dans un
incommensurable océan où les esprits incomplets voient la
monotonie, où les grandes âmes s’abîment en de perpétuelles
contemplations. Comment oser décrire ces teintes transitoires du
sentiment, ces riens qui ont tant de prix, ces mots dont l’accent
épuise les trésors du langage, ces regards plus féconds que les plus
riches poèmes? Dans chacune des scènes mystiques par lesquelles
nous nous éprenons insensiblement d’une femme, s’ouvre un abîme
à engloutir toutes les poésies humaines. Eh! comment pourrions-
nous reproduire par des gloses les vives et mystérieuses agitations
de l’âme, quand les paroles nous manquent pour peindre les
mystères visibles de la beauté? Quelles fascinations! Combien
d’heures ne suis-je pas resté plongé dans une extase ineffable
occupé à la voir! Heureux, de quoi? je ne sais. Dans ces moments,
si son visage était inondé de lumière, il s’y opérait je ne sais quel
phénomène qui le faisait resplendir; l’imperceptible duvet qui dore sa
peau délicate et fine en dessinait mollement les contours avec la
grâce que nous admirons dans les lignes lointaines de l’horizon
quand elles se perdent dans le soleil. Il semblait que le jour la
caressât en s’unissant à elle, ou qu’il s’échappât de sa rayonnante
figure une lumière plus vive que la lumière même; puis une ombre
passant sur cette douce figure y produisait une sorte de couleur qui
en variait les expressions en en changeant les teintes. Souvent une
pensée semblait se peindre sur son front de marbre; son œil
paraissait rougir, sa paupière vacillait, ses traits ondulaient, agités
par un sourire; le corail intelligent de ses lèvres s’animait, se dépliait,
se repliait; je ne sais quel reflet de ses cheveux jetait des tons bruns
sur ses tempes fraîches; à chaque accident, elle avait parlé. Chaque
nuance de beauté donnait des fêtes nouvelles à mes yeux, révélait
des grâces inconnues à mon cœur. Je voulais lire un sentiment, un
espoir, dans toutes ces phases du visage. Ces discours muets
pénétraient d’âme à âme comme un son dans l’écho, et me
prodiguaient des joies passagères qui me laissaient des impressions
profondes. Sa voix me causait un délire que j’avais peine à
comprimer. Imitant je ne sais quel prince de Lorraine, j’aurais pu ne
pas sentir un charbon ardent au creux de ma main pendant qu’elle
aurait passé dans ma chevelure ses doigts chatouilleux. Ce n’était
plus une admiration, un désir, mais un charme, une fatalité. Souvent,
rentré dans mon toit, je voyais indistinctement Fœdora chez elle, et
participais vaguement à sa vie. Si elle souffrait, je souffrais, et je lui
disais le lendemain:—Vous avez souffert. Combien de fois n’est-elle
pas venue au milieu des silences de la nuit, évoquée par la
puissance de mon extase! Tantôt, soudaine comme une lumière qui
jaillit, elle abattait ma plume, elle effarouchait la Science et l’Étude,
qui s’enfuyaient désolées; elle me forçait à l’admirer en reprenant la
pose attrayante où je l’avais vue naguère. Tantôt j’allais moi-même
au-devant d’elle dans le monde des apparitions, et la saluais comme
une espérance en lui demandant de me faire entendre sa voix
argentine; puis je me réveillais en pleurant. Un jour, après m’avoir
promis de venir au spectacle avec moi, tout à coup elle refusa
capricieusement de sortir, et me pria de la laisser seule. Désespéré
d’une contradiction qui me coûtait une journée de travail, et, le dirai-
je? mon dernier écu, je me rendis là où elle aurait dû être, voulant
voir la pièce qu’elle avait désiré voir. A peine placé, je reçus un coup
électrique dans le cœur. Une voix me dit:—Elle est là! Je me
retourne, j’aperçois la comtesse au fond de sa loge, cachée dans
l’ombre, au rez-de-chaussée. Mon regard n’hésita pas, mes yeux la
trouvèrent tout d’abord avec une lucidité fabuleuse, mon âme avait
volé vers sa vie comme un insecte vole à sa fleur. Par quoi mes
sens avaient-ils été avertis? Il est de ces tressaillements intimes qui
peuvent surprendre les gens superficiels, mais ces effets de notre
nature intérieure sont aussi simples que les phénomènes habituels
de notre vision extérieure: aussi ne fus-je pas étonné, mais fâché.
Mes études sur notre puissance morale, si peu connue, servaient au
moins à me faire rencontrer dans ma passion quelques preuves
vivantes de mon système. Cette alliance du savant et de l’amoureux,
d’une cordiale idolâtrie et d’un amour scientifique, avait je ne sais
quoi de bizarre. La science était souvent contente de ce qui
désespérait l’amant, et, quand il croyait triompher, l’amant chassait
loin de lui la science avec bonheur. Fœdora me vit et devint
sérieuse: je la gênais. Au premier entr’acte, j’allai lui faire une visite.
Elle était seule, je restai. Quoique nous n’eussions jamais parlé
d’amour, je pressentis une explication. Je ne lui avais point encore
dit mon secret, et cependant il existait entre nous une sorte
d’attente: elle me confiait ses projets d’amusement, et me demandait
la veille avec une sorte d’inquiétude amicale si je viendrais le
lendemain; elle me consultait par un regard quand elle disait un mot
spirituel, comme si elle eut voulu me plaire exclusivement; si je
boudais, elle devenait caressante; si elle faisait la fâchée, j’avais en
quelque sorte le droit de l’interroger; si je me rendais coupable d’une
faute, elle se laissait long-temps supplier avant de me pardonner.
Ces querelles auxquelles nous avions pris goût, étaient pleines
d’amour. Elle y déployait tant de grâce et de coquetterie, et moi j’y
trouvais tant de bonheur! En ce moment notre intimité fut tout à fait
suspendue, et nous restâmes l’un devant l’autre comme deux
étrangers. La comtesse était glaciale; moi, j’appréhendais un
malheur.—Vous allez m’accompagner, me dit-elle quand la pièce fut
finie. Le temps avait changé subitement. Lorsque nous sortîmes il
tombait une neige mêlée de pluie. La voiture de Fœdora ne put
arriver jusqu’à la porte du théâtre. En voyant une femme bien mise
obligée de traverser le boulevard, un commissionnaire étendit son
parapluie au-dessus de nos têtes, et réclama le prix de son service
quand nous fûmes montés. Je n’avais rien; j’eusse alors vendu dix
ans de ma vie pour avoir deux sous. Tout ce qui fait l’homme et ses
mille vanités furent écrasés en moi par une douleur infernale. Ces
mots:—Je n’ai pas de monnaie, mon cher! furent dits d’un ton dur
qui parut venir de ma passion contrariée, dits par moi, frère de cet
homme, moi qui connaissais si bien le malheur! moi qui jadis avais
donné sept cent mille francs avec tant de facilité! Le valet repoussa
le commissionnaire, et les chevaux fendirent l’air. En revenant à son
hôtel, Fœdora, distraite, ou affectant d’être préoccupée, répondit par
de dédaigneux monosyllabes à mes questions. Je gardai le silence.
Ce fut un horrible moment. Arrivés chez elle, nous nous assîmes
devant la cheminée. Quand le valet de chambre se fut retiré après
avoir attisé le feu, la comtesse se tourna vers moi d’un air
indéfinissable et me dit avec une sorte de solennité:—Depuis mon
retour en France, ma fortune a tenté quelques jeunes gens: j’ai reçu
des déclarations d’amour qui auraient pu satisfaire mon orgueil, j’ai
rencontré des hommes dont l’attachement était si sincère et si
profond qu’ils m’eussent encore épousée, même quand ils n’auraient
trouvé en moi qu’une fille pauvre comme je l’étais jadis. Enfin
sachez, monsieur de Valentin, que de nouvelles richesses et des
titres nouveaux m’ont été offerts; mais apprenez aussi que je n’ai
jamais revu les personnes assez mal inspirées pour m’avoir parlé
d’amour. Si mon affection pour vous était légère, je ne vous
donnerais pas un avertissement dans lequel il entre plus d’amitié
que d’orgueil. Une femme s’expose à recevoir une sorte d’affront
lorsque, en se supposant aimée, elle se refuse par avance à un
sentiment toujours flatteur. Je connais les scènes d’Arsinoé,
d’Araminte, ainsi je me suis familiarisée avec les réponses que je
puis entendre en pareille circonstance; mais j’espère aujourd’hui ne
pas être mal jugée par un homme supérieur pour lui avoir montré
franchement mon âme. Elle s’exprimait avec le sang-froid d’un
avoué, d’un notaire, expliquant à leurs clients les moyens d’un
procès ou les articles d’un contrat. Le timbre clair et séducteur de sa
voix n’accusait pas la moindre émotion; seulement sa figure et son
maintien, toujours nobles et décents, me semblèrent avoir une
froideur, une sécheresse diplomatiques. Elle avait sans doute médité
ses paroles et fait le programme de cette scène. Oh! mon cher ami,
quand certaines femmes trouvent du plaisir à nous déchirer le cœur,
quand elles se sont promis d’y enfoncer un poignard et de le
retourner dans la plaie, ces femmes-là sont adorables, elles aiment
ou veulent être aimées! Un jour elles nous récompenseront de nos
douleurs, comme Dieu doit, dit-on, rémunérer nos bonnes œuvres;
elles nous rendront en plaisirs le centuple du mal dont elles ont dû
apprécier la violence: leur méchanceté n’est-elle pas pleine de
passion? Mais être torturé par une femme qui nous tue avec
indifférence, n’est-ce pas un atroce supplice? En ce moment
Fœdora marchait, sans le savoir, sur toutes mes espérances, brisait
ma vie et détruisait mon avenir avec la froide insouciance et
l’innocente cruauté d’un enfant qui, par curiosité, déchire les ailes
d’un papillon.—Plus tard, ajouta Fœdora, vous reconnaîtrez, je
l’espère, la solidité de l’affection que j’offre à mes amis. Pour eux,
vous me trouverez toujours bonne et dévouée. Je saurais leur
donner ma vie, mais vous me mépriseriez si je subissais leur amour
sans le partager. Je m’arrête. Vous êtes le seul homme auquel j’aie
encore dit ces derniers mots. D’abord les paroles me manquèrent, et
j’eus peine à maîtriser l’ouragan qui s’élevait en moi; mais bientôt je
refoulai mes sensations au fond de mon âme, et me mis à sourire:—
Si je vous dis que je vous aime, répondis-je, vous me bannirez; si je
m’accuse d’indifférence, vous m’en punirez: les prêtres, les
magistrats et les femmes ne dépouillent jamais leur robe
entièrement. Le silence ne préjuge rien: trouvez bon, madame, que
je me taise. Pour m’avoir adressé de si fraternels avertissements, il
faut que vous ayez craint de me perdre, et cette pensée pourrait
satisfaire mon orgueil. Mais laissons la personnalité loin de nous.
Vous êtes peut-être la seule femme avec laquelle je puisse discuter
en philosophe une résolution si contraire aux lois de la nature.
Relativement aux autres sujets de votre espèce, vous êtes un
phénomène. Eh! bien, cherchons ensemble, de bonne foi, la cause
de cette anomalie psychologique. Existe-t-il en vous, comme chez
beaucoup de femmes fières d’elles-mêmes, amoureuses de leurs
perfections, un sentiment d’égoïsme raffiné qui vous fasse prendre
en horreur l’idée d’appartenir à un homme, d’abdiquer votre vouloir
et d’être soumise à une supériorité de convention qui vous offense?
vous me sembleriez mille fois plus belle. Auriez-vous été maltraitée
une première fois par l’amour? Peut-être le prix que vous devez
attacher à l’élégance de votre taille, à votre délicieux corsage, vous
fait-il craindre les dégâts de la maternité: ne serait-ce pas une de
vos meilleures raisons secrètes pour vous refuser à être trop bien
aimée? Avez-vous des imperfections qui vous rendent vertueuse
malgré vous? Ne vous fâchez pas, je discute, j’étudie, je suis à mille
lieues de la passion. La nature, qui fait des aveugles de naissance,
peut bien créer des femmes sourdes, muettes et aveugles en amour.
Vraiment vous êtes un sujet précieux pour l’observation médicale!
Vous ne savez pas tout ce que vous valez. Vous pouvez avoir un
dégoût fort légitime pour les hommes: je vous approuve, ils me
paraissent tous laids et odieux. Mais vous avez raison, ajoutai-je en
sentant mon cœur se gonfler, vous devez nous mépriser: il n’existe
pas d’homme qui soit digne de vous.
Je ne te dirai pas tous les sarcasmes que je lui débitai en riant.
Eh! bien, la parole la plus acérée, l’ironie la plus aiguë, ne lui
arrachèrent ni un mouvement ni un geste de dépit. Elle m’écoutait en
gardant sur ses lèvres, dans ses yeux, son sourire d’habitude, ce
sourire qu’elle prenait comme un vêtement, et toujours le même pour
ses amis, pour ses simples connaissances, pour les étrangers.—Ne
suis-je pas bien bonne de me laisser mettre ainsi sur un
amphithéâtre? dit-elle en saisissant un moment pendant lequel je la
regardais en silence. Vous le voyez, continua-t-elle en riant, je n’ai
pas de sottes susceptibilités en amitié! Beaucoup de femmes
puniraient votre impertinence en vous faisant fermer leur porte.—
Vous pouvez me bannir de chez vous sans être tenue de donner la
raison de vos sévérités. En disant cela, je me sentais prêt à la tuer si
elle m’avait congédié.—Vous êtes fou, s’écria-t-elle en souriant.—
Avez-vous jamais songé, repris-je, aux effets d’un violent amour? Un
homme au désespoir a souvent assassiné sa maîtresse.—Il vaut
mieux être morte que malheureuse, répondit-elle froidement. Un
homme aussi passionné doit un jour abandonner sa femme et la
laisser sur la paille après lui avoir mangé sa fortune. Cette
arithmétique m’abasourdit. Je vis clairement un abîme entre cette
femme et moi. Nous ne pouvions jamais nous comprendre.—Adieu,
lui dis-je froidement.—Adieu, répondit-elle en inclinant la tête d’un air
amical. A demain. Je la regardai pendant un moment en lui dardant
tout l’amour auquel je renonçais. Elle était debout, et me jetait son
sourire banal, le détestable sourire d’une statue de marbre, sec et
poli, paraissant exprimer l’amour, mais froid. Concevras-tu bien, mon
cher, toutes les douleurs qui m’assaillirent en revenant chez moi par
la pluie et la neige, en marchant sur le verglas des quais pendant
une lieue, ayant tout perdu? Oh! savoir qu’elle ne pensait seulement
pas à ma misère et me croyait, comme elle, riche et doucement
voituré! Combien de ruines et de déceptions! Il ne s’agissait plus
d’argent, mais de toutes les fortunes de mon âme. J’allais au hasard,
en discutant avec moi-même les mots de cette étrange conversation,
je m’égarais si bien dans mes commentaires que je finissais par
douter de la valeur nominale des paroles et des idées! Et j’aimais
toujours, j’aimais cette femme froide dont le cœur voulait être
conquis à tout moment, et qui, en effaçant toujours les promesses
de la veille, se produisait le lendemain comme une maîtresse
nouvelle. En tournant sous les guichets de l’Institut, un mouvement
fiévreux me saisit. Je me souvins alors que j’étais à jeun. Je ne
possédais pas un denier. Pour comble de malheur, la pluie déformait
mon chapeau. Comment pouvoir aborder désormais une femme
élégante et me présenter dans un salon sans un chapeau mettable!
Grâce à des soins extrêmes, et tout en maudissant la mode niaise et
sotte qui nous condamne à exhiber la coiffe de nos chapeaux en les
gardant constamment à la main, j’avais maintenu le mien jusque-là
dans un état douteux. Sans être curieusement neuf ou sèchement
vieux, dénué de barbe ou très-soyeux, il pouvait passer pour le
chapeau problématique d’un homme soigneux; mais son existence
artificielle arrivait à son dernier période: il était blessé, déjeté, fini,
véritable haillon, digne représentant de son maître. Faute de trente
sous, je perdais mon industrieuse élégance. Ah! combien de
sacrifices ignorés n’avais-je pas faits à Fœdora depuis trois mois!
Souvent je consacrais l’argent nécessaire au pain d’une semaine
pour aller la voir un moment. Quitter mes travaux et jeûner, ce n’était
rien! Mais traverser les rues de Paris sans se laisser éclabousser,
courir pour éviter la pluie, arriver chez elle aussi bien mis que les
fats qui l’entouraient, ah! pour un poète amoureux et distrait, cette
tâche avait d’innombrables difficultés. Mon bonheur, mon amour,
dépendait d’une moucheture de fange sur mon seul gilet blanc!
Renoncer à la voir si je me crottais, si je me mouillais! Ne pas
posséder cinq sous pour faire effacer par un décrotteur la plus
légère tache de boue sur ma botte! Ma passion s’était augmentée de
tous ces petits supplices inconnus, immenses chez un homme
irritable. Les malheureux ont des dévouements dont il ne leur est
point permis de parler aux femmes qui vivent dans une sphère de
luxe et d’élégance; elles voient le monde à travers un prisme qui
teint en or les hommes et les choses. Optimistes par égoïsme,
cruelles par bon ton, ces femmes s’exemptent de réfléchir au nom
de leurs jouissances, et s’absolvent de leur indifférence au malheur
par l’entraînement du plaisir. Pour elles un denier n’est jamais un
million, c’est le million qui leur semble être un denier. Si l’amour doit
plaider sa cause par de grands sacrifices, il doit aussi les couvrir
délicatement d’un voile, les ensevelir dans le silence; mais, en
prodiguant leur fortune et leur vie, en se dévouant, les hommes
riches profitent des préjugés mondains qui donnent toujours un
certain éclat à leurs amoureuses folies. Pour eux le silence parle et
le voile est une grâce, tandis que mon affreuse détresse me
condamnait à d’épouvantables souffrances sans qu’il me fût permis
de dire: J’aime! ou: Je meurs! Était-ce du dévouement après tout?
N’étais-je pas richement récompensé par le plaisir que j’éprouvais à
tout immoler pour elle? La comtesse avait donné d’extrêmes valeurs,
attaché d’excessives jouissances aux accidents les plus vulgaires de
ma vie. Naguère insouciant en fait de toilette, je respectais
maintenant mon habit comme un autre moi-même. Entre une
blessure à recevoir et la déchirure de mon frac, je n’aurais pas
hésité! Tu dois alors épouser ma situation et comprendre les rages
de pensées, la frénésie croissante qui m’agitaient en marchant, et
que peut-être la marche animait encore! J’éprouvais je ne sais quelle
joie infernale à me trouver au faîte du malheur. Je voulais voir un
présage de fortune dans cette dernière crise; mais le mal a des
trésors sans fond. La porte de mon hôtel était entr’ouverte. A travers
les découpures en forme de cœur pratiquées dans le volet, j’aperçus
une lumière projetée dans la rue. Pauline et sa mère causaient en
m’attendant. J’entendis prononcer mon nom, j’écoutai.—Raphaël,
disait Pauline, est bien mieux que l’étudiant du numéro sept! Ses
cheveux blonds sont d’une si jolie couleur! Ne trouves-tu pas
quelque chose dans sa voix, je ne sais, mais quelque chose qui
vous remue le cœur? Et puis, quoiqu’il ait un peu l’air fier, il est si
bon, il a des manières si distinguées! Oh! il est vraiment très-bien! Je
suis sûre que toutes les femmes doivent être folles de lui.—Tu en
parles comme si tu l’aimais, reprit madame Gaudin.—Oh! je l’aime
comme un frère, répondit-elle en riant. Je serais joliment ingrate si je
n’avais pas de l’amitié pour lui! Ne m’a-t-il pas appris la musique, le
dessin, la grammaire, enfin tout ce que je sais? Tu ne fais pas
grande attention à mes progrès, ma bonne mère; mais je deviens si
instruite que dans quelque temps je serai assez forte pour donner
des leçons, et alors nous pourrons avoir une domestique. Je me
retirai doucement; et, après avoir fait quelque bruit, j’entrai dans la
salle pour y prendre ma lampe, que Pauline voulut allumer. La
pauvre enfant venait de jeter un baume délicieux sur mes plaies. Ce
naïf éloge de ma personne me rendit un peu de courage. J’avais
besoin de croire en moi-même et de recueillir un jugement impartial
sur la véritable valeur de mes avantages. Mes espérances, ainsi
ranimées, se reflétèrent peut-être sur les choses que je voyais. Peut-
être aussi n’avais-je point encore bien sérieusement examiné la
scène assez souvent offerte à mes regards par ces deux femmes au
milieu de cette salle; mais alors j’admirai dans sa réalité le plus
délicieux tableau de cette nature modeste si naïvement reproduite
par les peintres flamands. La mère, assise au coin d’un foyer à demi
éteint, tricotait des bas, et laissait errer sur ses lèvres un bon sourire.
Pauline colorait des écrans: ses couleurs, ses pinceaux, étalés sur
une petite table, parlaient aux yeux par de piquants effets; mais,
ayant quitté sa place et se tenant debout pour allumer ma lampe, sa
blanche figure en recevait toute la lumière. Il fallait être subjugué par
une bien terrible passion pour ne pas admirer ses mains
transparentes et roses, l’idéal de sa tête et sa virginale attitude! La
nuit et le silence prêtaient leur charme à cette laborieuse veillée, à
ce paisible intérieur. Ces travaux continus et gaiement supportés
attestaient une résignation religieuse pleine de sentiments élevés.
Une indéfinissable harmonie existait là entre les choses et les
personnes. Chez Fœdora le luxe était sec, il réveillait en moi de
mauvaises pensées; tandis que cette humble misère et ce bon
naturel me rafraîchissaient l’âme. Peut-être étais-je humilié en
présence du luxe; près de ces deux femmes, au milieu de cette salle
brune où la vie simplifiée semblait se réfugier dans les émotions du
cœur, peut-être me réconciliai-je avec moi-même en trouvant à
exercer la protection que l’homme est si jaloux de faire sentir. Quand
je fus près de Pauline, elle me jeta un regard presque maternel, et
s’écria, les mains tremblantes, en posant vivement la lampe:—Dieu!
comme vous êtes pâle! Ah! il est tout mouillé! Ma mère va vous
essuyer. Monsieur Raphaël, reprit-elle après une légère pause, vous
êtes friand de lait: nous avons eu ce soir de la crème, tenez, voulez-
vous y goûter? Elle sauta comme un petit chat sur un bol de
porcelaine plein de lait, et me le présenta si vivement, me le mit sous
le nez d’une si gentille façon, que j’hésitai.—Vous me refuseriez? dit-
elle d’une voix altérée.

Disinformation and Fake News Shashi Jayakumar Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Disinformation and Fake News Shashi Jayakumar Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Disinformation and Fake News Shashi

Nur Diyanah Anwar

ISBN 978-981-15-5875-7 ISBN 978-981-15-5876-4 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Melisa Hasan

Disinformation & Fake News: Meanings, Present, Future 3

Disinformation as a Threat to National Security 23

Tools of Disinformation: How Fake News Gets to Deceive 35

How News Audiences Think About Misinformation Across

Building Digital Resilience Ahead of Elections and Beyond 61

Fighting Information Manipulation: The French

Disinformation and Cultural Practice in Southeast Asia 91

Hate Speech in Myanmar: The Perfect Storm 103

NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare Threats: Effective Strategic

Elves vs Trolls 131

Fake News and Disinformation: Singapore Perspectives 137

extremist narratives. To date, she has trained nearly 1000 researchers,

Barbora Maronkova joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

policy, as well as for overseeing the work of the National Information

How News Audiences Think About Misinformation Across

Building Digital Resilience Ahead of Elections and

NATO Amidst Hybrid Warfare Threats: Effective Strategic

Benjamin Ang, Nur Diyanah Anwar, and Shashi Jayakumar

Abstract Besides introducing the various chapters, Ang, Anwar and

B. Ang (B) · N. D. Anwar · S. Jayakumar

© The Author(s) 2021 3

pooling of these collective experiences and strengths that holistic under-

Keywords Online falsehoods · Disinformation · Resilience · Social

[What followed] was an unprecedented disinformation war in which the

been attempted by way of countermeasures—both in the digital and social

6 J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, and J. Herrera, Information Manip-

substantially reworked, in some cases with considerable amplification,

(i) Propagated as part of a political agenda by a domestic

a purely unintended by-effect) and effect on national resilience, security,

Modern information warfare is characterized by a cartographic shift: social

10 What has been presented by way of categorization represents a refinement to previous

or comment on their fake stories, often playing into readers’ biases or

accounts. Barojan then lists a number of approaches to counter online

Looking deeper into Myanmar, Alan Davis evaluates key factors

Notes Towards a Future Body of Work

We began with the issue of conceptual underpinnings. There are from

The tech platforms attempting to up their game when it comes

16 Lily Hay Newman, ‘Facebook Removes a Fresh Batch of Innovative, Iran-Linked

for example has banned political advertising.25 Separately, pledging to

the leadup to the 2020 elections.29 Inauthentic accounts on social media

in point, as are online attacks against the pro-democracy Hong Kong

Abstract Janis Sarts explores how the contemporary information envi-

The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

© The Author(s) 2021 23

Keywords Campaign · Digital environment · Social weakness ·

The New Information Environment

on any particular news to just a few seconds.3 People are increasingly

3 Attention Spans. Consumer Insights. 2015. Microsoft Canada.

grey zone of disinformation to advance their idea, attack political oppo-

State Actor Influence Campaigns

Establishing preconditions for the success of the influence campaign.

Exploitation of vulnerabilities. Case studies of influence campaigns by

5 Internet Research Agency Indictment—Department of Justice, https://www.justice.

as a venue for the disruption of social cohesion of a country. Deepening

8 Roonemaa, Holger. 2017. How Smuggler Helped Russia to Catch Esto-

and Norwegian authorities in 2018, attributing the loss of GPS signal in

Tools and Techniques

10 Lange-Ionatamishvili, Elina (ed.). 2017. Redefining Euro-Atlantic Values: Russia’s

A recent sub-tool for traditional trolling is the so-called ‘Robotrolling’