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Narcissus and Pygmalion Illusion and Spectacle in Ovids Metamorphoses Rosati Full Chapter
Narcissus and Pygmalion Illusion and Spectacle in Ovids Metamorphoses Rosati Full Chapter
GIANPIERO ROSATI
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Contents
Introduction 1
1. Narcissus or Literary Illusion 19
1. The myth: origins and developments 19
2. Echo and Narcissus: the deception of the reflection 38
3. Literary fiction and poetic narcissism 56
2. Pygmalion or the Poetics of Fiction 64
1. The outline of the myth 64
2. Pygmalion and Narcissus 71
3. A poetics of literariness 79
3. The Spectacle of Appearances 102
1. The trap of illusions 102
2. The spectacle of metamorphosis 133
3. The spectacle of the word 156
4. Conclusions 170
Bibliography 175
Index Locorum 185
General Index 194
Introduction
This book is the English version of a work first published in Italian in 1983
and reprinted in 2016. It originated from my tesi di laurea in Latin literature
completed a few years earlier at the University of Florence under the
supervision of Antonio La Penna, and followed the tenets of that disciplin-
ary sphere, as was customary in Italian academia at the time: it focused on
the philological dimension of Ovid’s text, the framing of the individual
episode within the structure of the immediate context and the poem as a
whole, and analysis of language and style. The main aim of the work was to
interpret the two important episodes of Narcissus and Pygmalion—i.e.
Ovid’s rewriting of the respective myths—and to highlight the author’s
poetics, in response to the considerable interest that had grown in the latter
decades of the twentieth century (documented, and greatly bolstered, by
G.B. Conte’s influential 1974 essay Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario,
which activated critical categories like poetic memory, allusion, and inter-
textuality).¹ The theme of illusion, central to both episodes, was thus chosen
as the key to penetrating the text and mechanisms of the poem; and to this
the third and longest chapter of the book was dedicated.² Additionally, the
aestheticization of the female or ephebic body and its representation as a work
of art—an obviously central aspect in Pygmalion, but also highly relevant in
Narcissus—served to shed light on a crucial feature of Ovid’s writing: its
congenitally ecphrastic nature, which the book pondered (especially with
regard to episodes like those of Perseus and Medusa), and which reveals a
cultural and psychological attitude that says much about Ovid’s readers. The
intense visuality of the poem—the pleasure of the spectaculum—was the
premise for an analysis of the spectacularity of Ovid’s language and style,
Narcissus and Pygmalion: Illusion and Spectacle in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Gianpiero Rosati,
Oxford University Press. © Gianpiero Rosati 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852438.003.0001
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largely built on the split between reality and illusion, the plurality of surfaces
or levels, and various effects of visual and linguistic ‘reflection’ and ambiguity,
such as the gap between literal meaning and figurative meaning.
It is evident that the general approach of the book, and especially its entire
apparatus of notes and bibliography, seem quite dated today, particularly
after the prodigious development of studies in this second aetas Ovidiana of
the past few decades, and also due to the increased importance of critical
categories linked to the names of Narcissus and Pygmalion, not only in
classical studies, but in various fields, from literature to art history to
psychology. In light of these developments in the critical discourse on
Ovid, the book would have required a radical revision or rather rewriting.
Not being able to write a different book, I just add these few introductory
pages which are intended to take stock of the enduring usefulness of the
theses discussed in Narciso e Pigmalione (henceforward N&P), and to shed
some light on the developments of these past decades with regard to the
main themes the book touches on, as well as possible stimuli for the further
growth of Ovidian studies.³
A first point that now seems worthy of more in-depth reconsideration,
particularly in light of lines of research that have come to the fore in recent
decades, is the legitimacy, or the convenience, of reading the two myths, and
the two Ovidian texts, in association with one another. The idea is obviously
not a new one: the juxtaposition and contrasting of the two myths dates back
to at least the thirteenth century, with the ‘Roman de la Rose’. The author of
the first part of that poem, Guillaume de Lorris, narrates Ovid’s story of
Narcissus very early on in his text, while Jean de Meun, who wrote the much
longer second part about forty years later, counters with the story of
Pygmalion towards the end. The shared Ovidian origin of the tales is in fact
the explicit motivation for the contraposition of the two myths, intended to
emphasize the different degrees of futility of the respective love objects
(Pygmalion himself, in his monologue, asserts that Narcissus’ is a greater
and more destructive folly than his own).⁴ The association, by analogy or by
contrast, between the two mythical figures and their respective psychological
states has been repeatedly brought into play by authors (for example, in
³ In addition to works I will discuss further below, among the most important contributions
have been Bettini 1999 and Bettini-Pellizer 2003 (the latter, after Vinge’s more strictly literary
1967 point of view, reviews the many versions and reprises of the myth in western culture).
⁴ The intentional and calculated nature of the symmetrical arrangement of the two episodes
in the ‘Roman’ is not questioned (cf. e.g. Agamben 1977, p. 78 n. 2).
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J. Starobinsky’s essay ‘The Living Eye’, cf. below p. 77) even in recent years,
and here I will try to discuss the most interesting of them.
The scholarly trend on visuality that saw vigorous development beginning
in the last decades of the twentieth century, particularly in the sphere of art
history, gave a fresh boost to an in-depth analysis of the Narcissus myth
(beyond that of Pygmalion). Jaś Elsner, one of the protagonists of this
research line,⁵ made the two myths—albeit independently from one
another—central to his reflection on Roman art, precisely due to their
visuality which exemplifies the importance of the gaze in Roman culture
(a ‘highly ocular culture’), and on how the gaze functions in the construction
of subjectivity. Although N&P also focused on the importance of visuality in
Ovid’s poem, it does not expound on the matter beyond the too-generic idea
of ‘spectacle’, or at most of the gaze conditioned by artistic models (the
aspect that fuelled the hunt for lost or presumed-lost works in the past), or
real objects seen or conceived as ‘artistic’, through what I called Ovid’s
‘ecphrastic eye’.⁶ The theme of visuality as a cultural construct was certainly
insufficiently dealt with in N&P, and from this point of view there is still a
great deal of work to do, in terms of both text analysis and comparison of the
two episodes, and as a theme of central relevance to the entire poem (as
noted here below). An aspect that should certainly be studied in greater
depth is the relationship between the act of gazing and the psychological and
intersubjective dynamics activated by the interplay of gazes, in the two
episodes most extensively dealt with here.
For example, the relationship between Echo and Narcissus needs to
be read in a less schematic way, abandoning Fränkel’s formula in which
Echo is ‘pure difference’ and Narcissus ‘pure identity’.⁷ Echo in fact does
not have a purely passive function; her behaviour determines Narcissus’
reaction and also influences his self-perception, almost offering him an
external eye through which to see himself. There is, for example, the striking
metaphor of ‘heating up,’ used to describe the effect the sight of Narcissus
has on the nymph (3.371–2 vidit et incaluit . . . flamma propiore calescit
[when she saw . . . Echo’s heart was fired . . . the nearer flamed her love]): an
eminently Pygmalionic metaphor (10.281 visa tepere est [she seemed warm])
that makes her in some way an ‘active’ woman capable of acting on her own
erotic initiative, but one who is frustrated, condemned to pure ‘reaction,’ to
⁵ Cf. Elsner 2007 (but the chapter ‘Intimations of Narcissus’, 132–76 is in large part from
1996).
⁶ Cf. especially Rosati 2017. ⁷ Fränkel 1945, 84.
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the point that she ends up turning into cold stone (the inverse fate of
Pygmalion’s statue, which turns from stone/ivory into flesh) and serves
solely as an echo, a mirroring response to Narcissus’ gestures.
We should also lend greater importance to the active function of reflec-
tion: the reciprocity of the actions of Narcissus and his reflected image,
insistently replicated in linguistic and stylistic terms (415, 417, 421, 424–30,
436–7, 441–2, 446, 450–2, 457–62, 504), confirms the idea of the reciprocity
of functions between the two figures—who swap roles and become inter-
changeable, in a sort of closed circle (Caravaggio’s Narcissus naturally comes
to mind)—and the need for an outside gaze, an active and passive role, or
rather a doubly active role. And the lexicon of specularity, so typical of
Narcissus, has its own analogy in Pygmalion’s language of reciprocity
(10.291–4 oraque tandem/ore suo non falsa premit, dataque oscula virgo/
sensit et erubuit timidumque ad lumina lumen/attollens pariter cum caelo
vidit amantem [at last his lips pressed real lips, and she, his girl, felt every
kiss, and blushed, and shyly raised her eyes to his and saw the world
and him]), a reciprocity that is not illusory but real, in which the senses of
sight and touch (282–9 temptat temptatum mollescit . . . positoque rigore
subsidit digitis ceditque . . . remollescit tractataque . . . flectitur . . . retractat . . .
saliunt temptatae [caressed . . . beneath his touch . . . grew soft . . . hardness
vanishing . . . yielded . . . softens and is shaped . . . the pulse beat]) play an
essential role as instruments for perceiving one another. Today, this leads
us to (among other things) a ‘parallel’ reading of the two myths, rather than
one in which they are exclusively contrasted.
The fruitfulness of an approach attentive to the active role of the ‘mirror’
is demonstrated, for example, in Victoria Rimell’s work Ovid’s Lovers,⁸
which brings an important contribution to the discussion. Taking a different
tack from established, more traditional readings that see in Narcissus a poet-
Narcissus, pleased with his own technical virtuosity (as proposed in N&P),
or (from a feminist standpoint) that see in both Narcissus and in Pygmalion
‘the male viewer who spurns woman and/or (re)creates her as artwork and
fetish’ (1), Rimell views the dialogue between Echo and Narcissus as an
example of the interaction of desire and seduction between two different
subjectivities. Rimell is interested in observing how a monologue can
become dialogue, how female subjectivity resists and disengages from the
masculine ‘monological’ pretension to claim its own voice and autonomy,
⁸ Cf. Rimell 2006, ‘Introduction (Narcissus and Medusa: Desiring subjects and the dialectics
of Ovidian erotics)’, 1–40.
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but also how real and imaginary worlds interweave, and how simulacra attain
concreteness and enter into actual reality, populating it and influencing its
developments. ‘Even in relationships which appear to be self-contained,
Ovidian sex depends on multiplications, triangulations, substitutions, go-
betweens, which inevitably render mirroring interactions much more com-
plex than the Narcissus–Echo, subject–object (male–female) prototype would
suggest’ (5).
A theme that has now become unavoidable is Ovid’s attentiveness to the
woman’s construction of her own image; he does not confine her to
the purely passive role she is often assigned. This is clearly demonstrated
by the importance lent to the mirror as an instrument of self-knowledge, a
means of looking at oneself ‘from the outside’ and acquiring self-awareness
(Ars 3.135–6). Today, the discourse on Narcissus and Pygmalion, as on
other important episodes of the poem that revolve around female/male
conflicts, must interlink with analysis of these themes in the rest of Ovid’s
work, particularly his early elegies. In this sense, Ovid’s Lovers opened an
important line of research that could shed light on little-explored territories
and offer a global view of Ovid’s erotica.
The same year as Rimell’s volume appeared saw the publication of
another, more properly philosophical, work that put Narcissus at the centre
of a reflection on the gaze: The Mirror of the Self by Shadi Bartsch.⁹ Taking
the story as the realization of Tiresias’ initial prophecy (Ov. met. 3.346–8),
Bartsch reads the Ovidian myth of Narcissus within a perspective that
combines vision, ethics, and sexuality, against a background of Plato’s
Phaedrus and its reflection on mirrors, eros, and self-knowledge, as well as
the Lucretian theory of simulacra.¹⁰ Narcissus is the victim of his own
illusion, and his gaze and self-enamourment have a certain philosophical
value: Narcissus hews to the Lucretian model rather than that of the Platonic
Phaedrus, and instead of achieving greater insight through beauty, falls
victim to the deceptions that Lucretius had shown to be the source of
perpetual suffering and frustration for lovers. Because, as Bartsch observes,
Narcissus is simultaneously on both ‘sides’ of the ancient mirror: one side is
a noble philosophical instrument of self-knowledge, but at the same time,
and most importantly, the other side is a feminine tool of deception, illusion,
vanity. And the risks linked to an inopportune use of the mirror are
confirmed, according to Bartsch, in the story of Hostius Quadra related by
that explains the frustration of that desire in Echo and Narcissus.¹² Reacting
to Lucretius, ‘Ovid creates a mythological drama out of a psychological
account of the delusions of the senses of sound and sight’ (156), and the
comedy of misunderstandings that characterizes the stories of the two
frustrated lovers illustrates the deceptive mechanisms hidden in sensorial
perception of reality, as well as in the lovers’ illusory fantasies.
According to Hardie, this ‘poetics of illusion’ inspires not only the
Metamorphoses, but can be found in all of Ovid’s work, underlying his desire
to create the illusion of a presence, or an ‘absent presence’ in the Lacanian
sense of a perpetually fleeting presence of an object of desire; an illusory
presence generated largely through words and images. If we consider that
Ovid cogently theorizes the mechanism of desire (Quod licet, ingratum est;
quod non licet, acrius urit [what one may do freely has no charm; what one
may not do pricks more keenly on], am. 2.19.3), and if we accept the premise
that desire is ‘the master-term for an understanding of Ovid’s poetics of
illusion’ (11), then we can understand why Hardie recognizes the myth
of Narcissus as so central to a reading of the poem—and, as we shall see,
that of Pygmalion as well. In Narcissus (chpt. 5 ‘Narcissus. The mirror of the
text’, 143–72) Hardie sees the ‘paradigm for the beholder of a work of art, for
there is a narcissistic quality in the ancient rhetorical formulation of
response to realist works of art’ (147), deriving from the confusion between
the reader/viewer’s fantasies of a work of art and his desire to believe in the
reality of the text or the image reproduced. The ephemeral nature of the
image corresponds to the unrealizability of desire, and the surface of water is
the Lacanian mirror that separates the Self from the Other. The impossible
dialogue between Echo and Narcissus is thus the emblem of the Lucretian
‘comedy of the senses’ we mentioned above, that is, of the deceptive nature
of the reflection of an image or a sound that feeds the idea of imaginary
presences and ends up engendering the agonizing frustration of desire.
Hardie’s Lucretian key to the Narcissus narrative astutely grasped the
centrality of the simulacrum in Ovid, and opened the path to a reading of the
episode built on the idea of absent presence (Derrida) and on the import-
ance of the gaze in defining the structure of desire. Making use of this theme
of the gaze as expression and exercise of power, an implicit comparison
between the myths of Narcissus and Pygmalion is constructed by the
¹² In Lucretius’ parallel treatises on two phenomena of reflection, the optical imago and the
acoustic one, Hardie sees confirmation of the hypothesis that Ovid was the first to combine the
stories of Echo and Narcissus (Hardie 2002, 152–4).
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classical art historian Jaś Elsner, the author of one of the most in-depth
discussions on the theme of seeing and the inter-subjective relations of
which it is the expression. For him, Ovid’s Pygmalion myth is an allegory
of the act of reading (chpt. 5 ‘Viewing and Creativity. Ovid’s Pygmalion as
viewer’, 113–31): while he, like others, sees Pygmalion/sculptor as a symbol
of the artist/writer (and of the tensions intrinsic to his work, which explores
problems of naturalism in art), he views the observer/lover who eventually
sees his dream come true as a symbol of the reader, of the reactions he might
have when faced with the impression of reality produced by a work of art, of
his own avid or minimal involvement in the act of fantasy and desire that
reading entails.
Elsner goes on to dedicate a particularly exhaustive analysis to the myth of
Narcissus (chpt. 3 ‘Viewer as Image. Intimations of Narcissus’, 132–76),
which he sees as ‘a fundamental paradigm for the inseparability of self from
representation, and for the inextricability of desire from either’ (132).¹³ In
the many variants of the myth, the central theme remains ‘the question of
self and its objectification’ (133): what is the degree of autonomy between
the observer’s eye and the object he sees? Narcissus believes his reflected
image is a real person (this is the desire of naturalism, the same desire
Pygmalion has), and falls in love with it; according to Elsner, this explains
Greco-Roman art theoreticians’ interest in the myth of Narcissus and its
dynamics, ‘which reflect with such acuteness on the desires of naturalism’
(137). Narcissus is in fact ‘naturalism’s limit-case: the viewer whose success
in believing that the imitation is real (that a reflection is its prototype) is
tragically engulfed by his failure to see that the prototype he loved was not
an other but himself ’ (142). Roman culture’s fascination with the figure of
Narcissus, evidenced by the myth’s widespread diffusion during the Imperial
era in painting and various forms of private material culture, focuses on the
theme of seeing and the dynamic of gazes revolving around him, the object
of desire. A Narcissus at the centre of a painting and of the world, intro-
verted and indifferent to any form of social interaction, any voyeuristic gazes
and attention aimed at him, trapped as he is in the web of his own image
and disinclined to look at anyone but himself. This intense orchestration of
the view staged around him, a procedure whose full self-awareness is
indicated by the choice of Narcissus as subject, thus translates—in Elsner’s
reading of the myth—the dynamics of intersubjective relations, of which
¹³ Although he states that he is not focusing specifically on Ovid’s text (Elsner 2007, 137 n. 12),
but on antique figurative texts and ecphrastic illustrations.
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the Roman house was a sort of theatre, and the power relations between
inhabitants and visitors.
Seeing and being seen is in fact a crucial element in defining the social
identity of the first-century Roman citizen, who controls the world around
him and is at the same time subject to its gaze, who sees and is seen. Social
visibility, with the complex network of power relations it signals and affirms,
is a requisite and a condition of primary importance for the Roman élite,
and the widespread presence of the myth of Narcissus in domestic and
private spaces is one of many clues to the widespread sensitivity to this
experience.
Attention to the theme of seeing, of the gaze as instrument and exercise of
power, proves to be an important key to understanding the construction of
Ovid’s poem as well. In the Metamorphoses, not only is the act of looking
particularly frequent (and this would merit a study of its own), but it is an
instrument through which the reader monitors the dynamics of the relations
between characters as an outside observer, and is also involved in them, even
to the point of having his own superiority and emotional stability called into
question. In short, looking confers power, but can also be a source of anxiety.
For example, the recurrent process in the poem in which the reader is
invited to ‘look at someone who is looking’—a process that aligns the
reader’s gaze with that of a character staring at the object of his or her desire
(usually a mortal woman, a nymph, or a boy), establishing a sort of com-
plicity with the character—corresponds to the mechanism of ‘mimetic
desire’ explicated by Réné Girard.¹⁴ The most famous mythological episodes
of divine love—one of the most frequent and typical literary subjects of the
Metamorphoses, and also divulged in a vast array of expressions of visual
culture—are the perfect representation of the mediated nature of desire,
which finds both ethical legitimization and aesthetic ennoblement of reality
in lofty models produced by art and literature. The ‘loves of the gods’ are
thus models of mediation of desire through the gaze, projections of fantasy
elaborated thanks to literature and its iconographic expressions, of which
visual perception (internal and external to the text) becomes the instrument.
Looking at a painting, or a fresco in a domestic setting, that reproduces the
loves of Jove or other male deities or great figures of myth means arousing
the imagination of the observer (or the reader) and intensifying his emo-
tional experience. If it is true that ‘all desire is a desire for being’, a
¹⁵ For an overall view and an historical reconstruction of the growth of interest in studies on
this aspect of Ovid’s poetry, cf. Casali 2009.
¹⁶ Rimell 2006, 2: ‘His (i.e. Narcissus’) myth offers a neat allegory for the move from naïvety
to knowingness, nature to art celebrated by postmodernism, a field of thinking owed much of
the credit for Ovid’s flight to stardom at the end of the second millennium’.
¹⁷ In particular John Hollander’s well-known, important essay on Renaissance poetry: cf.
Hollander 1981. Another notable contribution to the study of repetition in Latin poetry is Wills
1996.
¹⁸ Cf. Barchiesi 1995 (then in Barchiesi 2001), with previous bibliography.
¹⁹ Cf. Bonanno 1990, 196, and Bonadeo 2003, 70. If such were the case, the Echo episode
inserted into the myth of Narcissus would be Ovid’s rewriting of the aition of the echo, which is
rendered more fitting to its nature as imago vocis, a reflection of sound, opportunely set in the
mountains (instead of by or in a fountain), and structurally ‘mirroring’ the episode of Narcissus’
self-enamourment.
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Stephen Hinds, for his part, showed that Ovid did not forgo the opportunity
to exploit the words of Echo herself (in met. 3.501), making them echo a
verse from Virgil’s Eclogues (3.79), so that Virgil himself becomes a further
intertextual echo.²⁰ Following Barchiesi and Hinds, Mark Heerink’s work on
the topos of the echo of Hylas’ name in Hellenistic and Roman poetry
confirmed this ‘natural’ tendency of the echo to serve as a figure of inter-
textuality, or of the relationship between a word (especially when it is
artistically formulated) and its repetition—a relationship of love/admiration,
the same sentiment that dominates in Echo’s voice until the end, i.e. until
Narcissus’ death, and even beyond: Ov. met. 3.501, 508. But all late-antique
echoic poetry (like the Pentadius verses we will discuss below), built around
the technique of echolalia, or ‘echoed word’, is not only a sophisticated
intertextual product, but an act of expressly declared admiration and long-
ing for the great models of the past.
So it is hardly surprising that Narcissus, the archetypal symbol of love for
a reflection, is also viewed as a figure of intertextuality, of attraction to a text
one admires and identifies with, from which one cannot or does not want to
disengage. An exemplary case of this attitude seems to me Statius’ silva 2.3,
the Flavian poet’s birthday homage (genethliakon) to his friend and patron
Atedius Melior, which recounts the origin of the strange shape of a plane
tree on the bank of a pond in his garden. It is the mythical tale, built on a
typically Ovidian schema, of Pan’s pursuit of the nymph Pholoe, who, to
escape the erotic assault, plunges into the pond and melds with its water; the
frustrated god can do nothing but leave a sign of his presence in that spot,
protecting his beloved nymph beneath the fronds of a tree he plants there as
a symbol of his eternal love. The plane tree’s branches stretch out over the
water and then curve skywards from the middle of the pond:
The image of the tree, a metonym of Pan, bending lovingly over the pond
towards the unreachable object of its desire—a water that ‘averts’ contact—
evokes, or I might say mirrors, that of Ovid’s Narcissus bending to admire
his own tantalizing yet literally untouchable beauty (met. 3.427–9, 475–9,
etc.). As Françoise Morzadec rightly observes, ‘Statius makes the techniques
of reflections and mirrors the sign of his poetics; in the reflection he signals
the source of his inspiration’,²¹ and after having clearly alluded to the
Ovidian model of the episode (2.3.24–6, a reference to the numerous stories
of rape in the Metamorphoses) in the image of the tree bending in vain over
the water towards its unattainable love object, Statius evokes the gesture
typical of Narcissus, the symbol of the Ovidian model-text, but also of the
narcissistic poetics Statius himself shares. ‘A reflexive figure, Narcissus is a
mise en abîme of the self-conscious poet in his poem’:²² a poet who mirrors²³
his model, the much-loved and admired Ovidian text.
But alongside this ‘direct’ and immediate form (a text mirroring another
text that is its declared or evident model), there are various other and more
complex modes of narcissism. For example, the ‘cultural narcissism’ Jaś
Elsner²⁴ individuates as typical of the late-antique Virgilian cento (fifth–
sixth century) entitled Narcissus, transmitted by the same codex Salmasianus
that also contains Pentadius’ echoic verses (fourth century?), as if the
narration of the myth of Narcissus were delegated to the ‘voice of Echo’
(265 Riese): two texts that share the principle of repetition—albeit achieved
using different techniques—and the same intent found in Ovid’s Narcissus
to reflect the content of the tale in its form. The cento is presented as a
rewriting of the Ovidian story of Narcissus’ self-love condensed into sixteen
hexameters, but reconstructed through a clever reutilization of segments of
Virgilian text: Elsner reads it as an exercise in cultural ‘narcissism’ (p. 177),
‘an interrogation of feelings of identification and highly valued emotional
experience in a moment when the once vibrant presence of the ancient past
was receding into the distance of a series of figures reflected in the pool’
(p. 176). The figure of Narcissus acts as the symbol of a world in which the
between nature and art), and with its focus on the act of gazing and the
illusion of truth that the image transmits, it has always stimulated interpret-
ations oriented within that perspective. In the De pictura, Leon Battista
Alberti (1435) saw in Narcissus the inventor of painting, but long before
Alberti, two Greek writers of the Second Sophistic (second–fourth century),
Philostratus and Callistratus, used this myth, reproduced as artwork in the
ecphrases they described, to discuss naturalism—the difference between
the real person and his image—as well as eroticism, the amorous attraction
the image arouses in its observer.²⁷
The association between a work of art (in the form of an extraordinarily
attractive body) and enamourment, which is present in the myth of
Narcissus, is obviously central to the myth of Pygmalion, especially the
Ovidian version, which replaces the conventional story of agalmatophilia
(the perverse ‘love for a statue’ attested by other classical authors) with that
of the artist’s enamourment with his own work. Ovid’s Pygmalion does not
love an already-existing statue, but a statue he himself is sculpting out of
ivory (10.248 sculpsit ebur), the material used for the prosthesis that restores
Pelops’ mutilated body (6.405),²⁸ and one that is often a source of illusion (as
in the famous ivory gates that appear in Homer, Od. 19.564–7 and later in
Virgil, Aen. 6.893–8). This of course (just as the myth of Narcissus func-
tioned as the foundational myth of painting with its evanescent, incorporeal,
superficial image, so does that of Pygmalion for sculpture, image as body in
all its plasticity) demonstrates that images created by man are devices of his
desire, and also shows the intrinsically narcissistic nature implicit in the
myth of Pygmalion, in which the artist falls in love with a work that is a
projection of himself, created in his image.
Shifting the focus from both the widespread idea of Pygmalion as cham-
pion of illusionistic art and the conception that dominated studies of the
myth several decades ago of Pygmalion as an emblem of male desire’s
appropriation of the feminine, i.e. the woman constructed as the mirror
image of male desire (‘womanufacture’²⁹), Victor Stoichita, in a key work on
the myth of Pygmalion in the history of European culture (The Pygmalion
Effect, 2008), proposes a decidedly innovative reading. His interpretation
³⁰ The subtitle of the French edition (Genève 2008) reads Pour une anthropologie historique
des simulacres.
³¹ Cf. N&P pp. 68–9.
³² On the importance and originality of this conception, see not only the second chapter of
N&P (‘A poetics of literariness’), but especially Rosati 1979.
17
³³ Hinds 2002 analyses the tradition, extremely widespread in European culture, of garden-
ing and landscape architecture as a privileged form of application of the Ovidian principle of
natura aemula artis. He demonstrates how the aestheticization, and especially the mythologiza-
tion of the landscape interacts with coeval visual arts, and the degree to which such practices are
indebted to the Metamorphoses, which had an early influence on a wide range of expressions of
European visual culture. Cf. also Rosati 2014 and 2017.
18
analogies between them and between the themes they implicate. For us,
living in an era in which the digital revolution is redefining our relation-
ships with the Self and the world, our complex visual perception of reality
and the central function of simulacra in that perception, the myths of
Narcissus and Pygmalion can once again constitute a useful lens through
which to examine modes, effects, and consequences of our visual and
intellectual experience.
1
Narcissus or Literary Illusion
The myth of Narcissus is universally known. The story of the boy who bends
rapt over the mirror of a pool of water in vain admiration of his own beauty
has proven vastly popular in western art and culture.¹
The origin of the myth is unknown: in all probability, it dates back to
Hellenistic literature, but references to it in art and literature have been
found no earlier than the end of the first century . Ovid, in the third book
of the Metamorphoses, offers us the most important version from a literary
point of view, as well as the most complex, and this version was thus
destined to transmit to European culture the captivating tale of the illusion
‘ch’accese amor tra l’omo e ’l fonte’ [that kindled love between the man and
the fountain] (Dante).
¹ On the myth of Narcissus and its reception we have a truly excellent study: L. V, The
Narcissus Theme in Western European Literature up to the Early 19th Century, Lund 1967,
exemplary in terms of completeness, depth, and clarity of analysis. Vinge analyses all of the re-
workings of the myth up to the romantic era with a balance and methodological thoroughness
that is particularly notable in a field—Stoffgeschichte, or thematology, the study of recurrences of
a given theme in various types of literature and in different eras—often viewed with diffidence
due precisely to the risks of artificiality and distortion to which it can be subject. Also on the
reception and popularity of the myth in various applied arts, but simply a list, H. H,
Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie mit Hinweisen auf das Fortwirken antiker
Stoffe und Motive in der bildenden Kunst, Literatur und Musik . . . , Wien 1959, pp. 265 f. On the
figurative arts, see especially G. H, Zauber des Spiegels. Geschichte und Bedeutung des
Spiegels in der Kunst, München 1951, pp. 69 ff. On the history of the myth in classical antiquity,
F. W, Narkissos. Eine kunstmythologische Abhandlung nebst einem Anhang über die
Narcissen und ihre Beziehung im Leben, Mythos und Cultus der Griechen, Göttingen 1856 is as
ever very useful, particularly for the wealth of material gathered. Good summaries in entries by
S. E in RE, XVI 2 (1935), 1721–33 and by W. G in the Lexicon by W.H. Roscher, III 1
(1897–1902), 10–21.
Narcissus and Pygmalion: Illusion and Spectacle in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Gianpiero Rosati,
Oxford University Press. © Gianpiero Rosati 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852438.003.0002
20
Spem sine corpore amat, corpus putat esse, quod unda² est.
Adstupet ipse sibi vultuque inmotus eodem
Haeret ut e Pario formatum marmore signum;
420 Spectat humi positus geminum, sua lumina, sidus
Et dignos Baccho, dignos et Apolline crines
Inpubesque genas et eburnea colla decusque
Oris et in niveo mixtum candore ruborem,
Cunctaque miratur, quibus est mirabilis ipse:
425 Se cupit inprudens et, qui probat, ipse probatur,
Dumque petit, petitur pariterque accendit et ardet.
Inrita fallaci quotiens dedit oscula fonti!
In mediis quotiens visum captantia collum
Bracchia mersit aquis nec se deprendit in illis!
430 Quid videat, nescit, sed, quod videt, uritur illo,
Atque oculos idem, qui decipit, incitat error.
Credule, quid frustra simulacra fugacia captas?
Quod petis, est nusquam; quod amas, avertere, perdes!
Ista repercussae, quam cernis, imaginis umbra est:
435 Nil habet ista sui: tecum venitque manetque,
Tecum discedet, si tu discedere possis.
Non illum Cereris, non illum cura quietis
Abstrahere inde potest, sed opaca fusus in herba
Spectat inexpleto mendacem lumine formam
440 Perque oculos perit ipse suos paulumque levatus,
Ad circumstantes tendens sua bracchia silvas
‘Etquis, io silvae, crudelius’ inquit ‘amavit?
Scitis enim et multis latebra opportuna fuistis!
Etquem, cum vestrae tot agantur saecula vitae,
² It is not without some hesitation that I opt for the reading unda, much better documented
in the manuscript tradition (and accepted by nearly all modern editors) than the variant umbra.
The meaning is certainly tolerable, but umbra is definitely more efficacious in opposition to
corpus (which, however, in a certain sense also renders it lectio facilior, so the hypothesis of its
possible genesis due to the corruption or erroneous transcription of an original unda seems
more likely than the contrary hypothesis): cf. for ex. 14.358 and 362, where umbra is used in
reference to effigiem nullo cum corpore falsi . . . apri [a fictitious, disembodied image of a wild
boar]; or 3.434, a few verses after our passage; or 11.660 inveniesque tuo pro coniuge coniugis
umbram [and in place of your groom you shall find his shadow]; or 9.460, where umbra is used
in the sense of ‘appearance’ (and cf. also 4.443; other parallel passages with umbra in the sense of
‘reflection’, from later authors, are gathered by D.R. S B in Cl. Quart., n.s., 6,
1956, p. 86, in which, however, the uncertainty of the two Ovidian passages, Her., 14.93 and
Met., 3.417 should be noted). Conversely, the passages customarily mentioned in favour of unda
are not overly probative: in Her., 14.93, Met., 1.640 and 3.200 we always find in unda, i.e. the
reference is always to the reflection ‘in the water’, and not to the reflected image itself.
23
The Ovidian version of the myth of Narcissus is the only one that recounts
(or, we might say, depicts) the decisive moments of the youth’s fate with a
wealth of detail and specifically ‘artistic’ aims. But different versions of the
myth were also known in antiquity, like, for example, the one found in
30
³ Conon frg. 24 in Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, ed. F. Jacoby, Berlin 1923, Bd. 1,
pp. 197 f. A meticulous analysis of the Conon text (also in relation to Ovid) in B. M,
Narcissus bei Konon und Ovid (Zu Ovid, Met. 3, 339–510), Hermes, 103, 1975, pp. 349–72.
⁴ M, art. cit., p. 363. ⁵ Paus. 9.31.7.
31
then, in greater detail, another version, ‘less well known than the first,’ but in
his opinion more plausible. In this latter version, which is clearly a ration-
alized form of the more common one, Narcissus had had a twin sister with
whom he had fallen in love. After her death, he consoles himself in the face
of this irreparable loss by contemplating his own beauty reflected in the
spring, in which he consciously evokes the beauty of his beloved sister. In
keeping with his tenacious rationalism, Pausanias concludes by refuting
another element of the customary version of the myth, the origination of
the narcissus flower from the homonymous youth. The aspect of the com-
mon version that Pausanias cannot accept as believable is Narcissus’ ingenu-
ousness (inconceivable, for Pausanias, in a nearly-adult person), his inability
to recognize himself in the mirror of the pool. Thus he presents a different,
ostensibly more plausible version that eliminates the motif of mistakenness
and rationalizes the theme of reflection: Narcissus admires himself in the
watery mirror because he knows that he is in fact admiring another beauty,
that of the girl he had loved and lost.
It is not easy to establish any dependent relationship among the various
versions of the myth, but based on Pausanias, we can reasonably deduce that
the original version was the one he himself did not ‘understand’, i.e. that in
which Narcissus does not recognize himself in the reflected image, and falls
prey to a fatal deception.⁶ The myth probably had its roots in the province of
magic, perhaps linked to beliefs in the magical powers of reflections in
water,⁷ beliefs that eventually faded, giving rise to various attempts at
rationalization.
Narcissus thus becomes cognizant of his self-love. The first instance of
this attitude is in Ovid, but perhaps Conon’s version (in which it is not clear
whether Narcissus recognizes himself or not) was an earlier attempt to offer
a motive for an incomprehensible occurrence with the introduction of
divine punishment.⁸
Transformation into a flower, as we have seen, is a constant in the most
widely known versions, bringing our myth into the sphere of the numerous
Greek sagas of the metamorphoses of heroes and heroines into plants or
flowers to which they give their names: Adonis, Hyacinth, Crocus, Lotus,
⁶ Cf. M, art. cit., p. 351. Before this, the more specific P. Z, ‘ “Iste ego sum”.
Der naive und der bewusste Narziss’, Bonner Jahrbb., 166, 1966, pp. 152–70, who in addition to
literary sources also analyses the figurative arts and identifies the late-Hellenistic appearance
(Ovid being the first example) of the character’s self-awareness.
⁷ But cf. below, p. 18.
⁸ This is the hypothesis advanced by M, art. cit., pp. 352 f.
32
⁹ Cf. E 1726, 40 ff. Many of these names, like that of Narcissus (cf. ibid. 1721, 43 ff.),
testify to the pre-Greek origin of the relative mythical personages.
¹⁰ A great deal of material in W, Narkissos cit., pp. 81 ff. and 123 ff. Cf. as well
P. H, ‘Le mythe de Narcisse et son interprétation par Plotin’, in Nouv. Rev. de Psychan., 13,
1976, pp. 82 ff., and E 1723. The types of Narcissus to which antique authors generally
allude in reference to our myth are those that botanists call Narcissus poeticus and Narcissus
Tazetta.
¹¹ Like, for ex., Pliny, Nat. Hist., 21.128: a narce narcissum dictum. Other passages in E
1721, 48 ff. There is no unanimity among modern linguists: some accept the etymology
(A. C, Dictionnaire étymologique des noms grecs de plantes, Louvain 1959, p. 185), others
are uncertain (Boisacq, Frisk), and others consider it a typical folk etymology (Hofmann and
especially Chantraine).
¹² Clement of Alex., Paed., 2.8.71.3. ¹³ Cf. W, Narkissos cit., pp. 9, 79 ff., 93 f.
¹⁴ Artemidoro, Oneir., 1.77 (transl. D. E. Harris-McCoy).
¹⁵ Plut., Quaest. conv., 3.1.647 B.
33
affording Pluto the opportunity to snatch her and carry her away to Hades.¹⁶
Seduction and death are thus the characteristics associated with the narcis-
sus flower, and are also recurrent motifs in literary elaborations of the myth
(one can certainly understand the fascination it held for symbolist and
decadent poets). In a work by the most important Greek poet of Late
Antiquity, Nonnus of Panopolis, Dionysus uses a daffodil to seduce Aura
with his usual blend of charm and trickery: the flower and the water
alongside which it grows lull his beloved nymph to sleep (in this instance
Narcissus is said to be the son of Endymion, the beautiful youth who lives in
perpetual sleep).¹⁷ The relationship with the sphere of Dionysus here (and
recurring elsewhere as well) is interesting, perhaps suggested by an under-
lying affinity between the narcotic, chthonic nature of the flower and some
of the god’s traits, such as his power to produce enthrallment, hallucin-
ations, and fatal deception¹⁸ (as in the stories of Pentheus and the
Tyrrhenian sailors, for example, from the same third book of Ovid’s
Metamorphoses). Another sphere with which Narcissus is commonly asso-
ciated, but in terms of opposition or antagonism, is that of the god Eros, who
exacts a harsh revenge upon the youth.
Cold as the flower he will beget,¹⁹ proud of his independence and resistant
to love as a form of ‘self-concession’, Narcissus is punished by being made to
fall in love with and ardently yearn for a non-existent ‘other’, an insubstan-
tial shadow. His sad story is in fact used as an exemplary illustration of the
Greek proverb ‘many will hate you if you love yourself ’.²⁰
Punishment carried out by means of reflection in water leads us to
another sphere of beliefs concerning the psycho-physiological effects gener-
ated by the contemplation of reflective surfaces in which we might be
inclined to trace the myth’s roots and meaning.²¹ ‘Behold not yourself in a
¹⁶ Homeric Hymns, To Dem., 5 ff., as well as v. 425; cf. E 1727, 15 ff.
¹⁷ Cf. H, art. cit., pp. 88 ff.
¹⁸ Cf. V, op. cit., p. 31 and H, art. cit., p. 90. Less convincing, in my view, Hadot’s
insistence on the role of Artemis in the Narcissus myth.
¹⁹ Psychrótaton [freezing cold] is the descriptor used in the Geoponica, 11.25 (a work
compiled in Greek in the tenth cent. with writings by Greek and Latin authors on agronomy).
²⁰ Imparted by the lexicon Suda, IV n. 1934.
²¹ Cf. A. D, La catoptromancie grecque et ses dérivés, Liège 1932, p. 152 and E
1728, 18 ff. More recently, there is an insistence on this element as the key to interpreting the
myth in H. C, ‘Spiegel der Erkenntnis (Zu Ovid, Met., III 339–510)’, Der altsprachl.
Unterr., 10, 1, 1967, pp. 42 ff. But we must consider the strong arguments against this
interpretation offered by H, art. cit., pp. 96–8. Ample documentation of these beliefs,
which still thrive for example in Greek folklore, in Delatte and in A. W, ‘Narkissos oder
das Spiegelbild’, Archiv Orientální, 7, 1935, pp. 37–63 and 328–50.
34
mirror by the light of a lamp,’ went one Pythagorean symbol; and another
warned, ‘Gaze not upon your reflection in the water of a river.’ Columella
even tells us of a curious belief: that mares who saw their own reflections in
water would be seized by a vain infatuation and would waste away as a result
of their unquenched desire.²² On the other hand, the oneiromancer
Artemidorus asserted that ‘seeing one’s reflection in water portends the
death of the dreamer himself or of a person near to him’.²³
As we have seen, in Ovid’s version of the myth, the most complete and
detailed rendering we have, there is no specific moralistic intent, nor any
trace of commentary or of an edifying interpretation of the story. But the
most important ancient-world interpretation of the myth, the neo-Platonic
one, moves precisely in that direction, towards an allegorical reading of
Narcissus’ fatal deception. Even before Plotinus, however, there had been a
couple of precedents in that sense: Lucian’s, and a more meaningful one by a
Christian author, Clement of Alexandria. In Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead²⁴
the figure of the youth (along with the equally proverbial ones of Hyacinth,
Nireus, and other heroes) is taken as a symbol of human beauty subordin-
ated to the inexorable law of death: death alone, which sets us all on the same
level, reveals the ephemeral vanity of human things. Clement of Alexandria
is even more explicit;²⁵ he deplores women’s habit of primping and preening
in front of the mirror, and admonishes them to forsake the false flattery of
appearances, recalling the fatal deception of Narcissus. The mythical youth
thus serves as the paradigm of the behaviour of those who allow themselves
to be seduced by exterior beauty, which the author naturally contrasts with
the moral obligation to seek out and revere the only sort of beauty that is not
deceptive and hollow, namely the beauty of the spirit. The core of the myth,
then, lies in the deception that makes illusory appearances seem true, and
the motif of vanitas²⁶ also provides the interpretive key to Plotinus’ reading
of it a few decades later.
In his treatise On Beauty, the philosopher reprises the famous theory
from Plato’s Symposium on the phases of the ideal path towards Absolute
Beauty.²⁷ The first phase in this process, which must be passed through in
order to attain beauty of the soul and, finally, transcendent beauty, is
constituted by the visible, perceptible beauty of bodies. As an example of
one who is unable to pass through this first phase, which is merely a tenuous,
distant reflection of supreme beauty, he introduces the case of Narcissus, who
succumbs to the deception of appearances: ‘In fact, one who pursues these
shapes in bodily forms, as if touching real things, is like he who sought to
grasp his own beautiful image playing on the water and—this is the meaning
of the story—sank into the depths, and disappeared into nothingness. And so
too, one who is held prisoner by material bodies and cannot break free from
them will plummet, not in body, but in soul, into the depths . . . .’²⁸ Narcissus
does not realize that the beautiful image that seduces him is an insubstantial
reflection, and above all he does not realize its origin; he does not understand
that it comes from him himself.²⁹ So, the soul that behaves like Narcissus,
mired in spiritual confusion, fails to understand that his body is merely a self-
generated reflection (because, according to Plotinus, the perceptible world is
a reflection of the soul in the mirror of matter). If the soul takes an interest in
and yearns for its own reflection, almost as if it were reality, then it distances
itself from its proper aim, from transcendent beauty. Its true path must be
one that leads inward, towards the supremacy of the Intellect, and not
towards exterior forms of the perceptible world.
The neo-Platonic interpretation of the Narcissus myth came up again
centuries later within the sphere of Florentine humanism. In his 1569
Comment on Plato’s Symposium—an important component of his untiring
effort to translate and interpret Platonic and neo-Platonic culture—,
Marsilio Ficino mentions the myth of Narcissus precisely with regard to
the notion that the human soul puts itself at great risk when it allows itself to
be seduced by corporeal beauty. In the Orphic source text he refers to,³⁰
Ficino perceives a specific allegorical intention: Narcissus represents the
misfortune of one who forgets the beauty of the soul and gives in to the
charms of physical beauty, and who is thus attached to the lowest realm, the
merest reflection of supreme beauty.³¹
The last link in this ideal chain of neo-Platonic readings of the myth of
Narcissus is in German romanticism. In his monumental Symbolik und
Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen (4 vols., 1810–12), one
of the emblematic works of that cultural milieu, Georg Friedrich Creuzer,
the ‘romantic among philologists’, proposed to reconstruct a presumed
primitive unity of religions: he believed that ancient myths contained traces
of a primordial symbolic language.³² The myth of Narcissus was, naturally,
no exception to such interpretation. Creuzer suggested it signified the
experience of the soul which, seeking itself in the memory of its original
nature (as part of God), mistakes its own individual existence—the reflection
of its essence—for its actual essence. In this search for the self (philautia),
the soul first dissolves and then is reborn as a flower of mourning, a funerary
blossom.³³
But while the Narcissus narrative has provided fodder for philosophers
and ‘moralizing’ treatises, it has had a truly vast impact in the field of
literature. That impact is, of course, in part attributable to the poet who
authored the Metamorphoses: his influence is immense (second only, and
only slightly, to Virgil’s), and covers an arc of time from the early centuries
of the last millennium (known as the aetas Ovidiana) to the romantics.
From troubadour poetry to the Roman de la Rose to Marino and beyond, the
myth of Narcissus pervades European literature, and even though Ovid’s
popularity declined markedly in the nineteenth century, the myth continues
to have a life of its own, becoming charged with new meanings. The history
of its reception in European tradition in fact constitutes a fascinating chapter
of cultural history, already richly described in Louise Vinge’s excellent book,
repeatedly cited here. In the history of the myth’s popularity, the dominant
motif, much more so than self-love, has been that of error, illusion, and
confusion between appearance and reality. Only in the eighteenth century
did this meaning come to be supplemented and later replaced by that of
man’s relationship with the Self, and in particular that of the artist with his
³¹ A detailed analysis of the text Ficino cites is in V, op. cit., pp. 123–7.
³² On Creuzer’s life and work see O. D in the Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bd. 3 (Berlin
1957), pp. 414 f., and M.M. M̈, La ‘Symbolique’ de Friedrich Creuzer, Paris 1976. V,
op. cit., pp. 315 ff. offers thoughtful consideration regarding an analysis of the method.
³³ In reality, this is just one—apparently the definitive one—of the interpretations proposed
by Creuzer (in the second ed. of the Symbolik). Partially different from that in the first ed. and
the one espoused in the introduction to Plotinus’ treatise On Beauty, published autonomously in
1814. On this matter cf. once again V, op. cit., pp. 317–22.
37
As we have said, the Narcissus story is narrated in the third book of the
Metamorphoses. After an account of the world’s origination from primordial
chaos and the phases of the Urzeit comes the long section on the mythical
era (from 1.452 to 11.493, after which the author moves on to historical
events, from the Trojan War to the days of Augustus).³⁹ Here, in a succes-
sion organized in very loose chronological order and in fact determined by
thematic associations, Ovid narrates various and sundry tales of the gods
and heroes of myth. At the beginning of the third book we are in Boeotia,
where the young prince Cadmus—who will later found Thebes there—
arrives in search of his sister Europa, who has been seduced and abducted
by Jove. Thus begins the cycle of the Theban sagas. At a certain point we are
introduced to Tiresias who, asked to resolve a teasing and rather risqué
dispute between Jove and Juno, gives a response that displeases the latter,
who punishes him by striking him blind. Jove partially recompenses this
harsh punishment by granting the unfortunate fellow the gift of prophecy; as
the first test of his infallibility as a seer, the story of Narcissus is introduced.
Upon its conclusion, Ovid uses the figure of Tiresias to segue into the tale of
Pentheus, who will pay dearly for disregarding and mocking the seer’s
Author: B. M. Croker
Language: English
IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II.
London
CHATTO & WINDUS, PICCADILLY
1894
“Lord of himself, though not of lands;
And having nothing, yet hath all.”
Sir H. Wotton.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
CHAPTER PAGE
XVII. “Take a Friend’s Advice” 1
XVIII. The Table of Precedence 23
XIX. Let us tell the Truth 44
XX. Miss Paske defies her Aunt 55
XXI. The Great Starvation Picnic 68
XXII. Toby Joy’s Short Cut 94
XXIII. Captain Waring’s Alternative 111
XXIV. “Sweet Primrose is coming!” 132
XXV. Sweet Primrose justifies her Reputation 150
XXVI. The Result of playing “Home, Sweet 176
Home”
XXVII. Mrs. Langrishe puts herself out to take 202
Somebody in
XXVIII. The Club is Decorated 216
XXIX. Mark Jervis is Unmasked 237
MR. JERVIS.
CHAPTER XVII.
“TAKE A FRIEND’S ADVICE.”