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NAVAL
MODERNISATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Problems and
Prospects for Small
and Medium Navies
Geoffrey Till
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia
Geoffrey Till · Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
Editors
Naval Modernisation
in Southeast Asia
Problems and Prospects for Small
and Medium Navies
Editors
Geoffrey Till Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
Defence Studies Department Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
King’s College London Australian National University
Swindon, UK Canberra, ACT, Australia
ISBN 978-3-319-58405-8 ISBN 978-3-319-58406-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58406-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943482
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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Contents
1 Growing a Navy: Problems and Prospects. An

Introduction 1
Geoffrey Till
2 Naval Modernisation Versus Naval Development:

Implications for Strategic Stability in Southeast Asia 15
Bernard Fook Weng Loo
3 A Common Setting for Naval Planning in Southeast Asia?

Two Case Studies in Divergence 33
YingHui Lee and Collin Koh Swee Lean
4 Naval Development in Singapore 47

Collin Koh Swee Lean
5 Naval Development in Indonesia 61

Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
6 Naval Development in Malaysia 77

Geoffrey Till and Henrick Z. Tsjeng
v
vi Contents
7 Naval Development in Vietnam 93

Truong-Minh Vu and Nguyen The Phuong
8 Conclusions 107
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto and Geoffrey Till
Index 121
About the Editors
Geoffrey Till is Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies at King’s

College London and Chairman of the Corbett Centre for Maritime
Policy Studies. Since 2009, he has also been a Visiting Professor and
Senior Research Fellow at the Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Singapore. His Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from
Trafalgar to the Falklands was published by ABC Clio in 2014 and he
is currently working on a fourth edition of his Seapower: A Guide for the
21st Century.
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is an Indonesian Presidential Ph.D.
Scholar with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian
National University. He is also a former associate research fellow with
the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
vii
Abbreviations
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AIP Air Independent Propulsion (of submarines)
ASEAN Association of South-East Asia Nations
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BAKAMLA Indonesia’s Maritime Safety Agency
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance
COC Code of Conduct for the South China Sea
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
CTF Combined Task Force
DIB Defence-Industrial Base
DOC Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ESSZONE Malaysia’s Eastern Sabah Security Zone
EU European Union
FAC Fast Attack Craft
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IMSS Integrated Maritime Surveillance System
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
ISIS Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
IUU Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (fishing)
JDA Joint Development Area
JMMS Joint Multi-Mission Ship
ix
x Abbreviations
KEMHAN Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence

LMU Littoral Mission Ship
LPD Landing Platform, Dock
LST Landing Ship Tank
MBT Main Battle Tank
MEF Indonesia’s ‘Minimum Essential Force’
MEMA Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
MIMA Maritime Institute of Malaya
MPRA Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
MSP Malacca Strait Patrol
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NSC National Security Council
NTS Non Traditional Security
PA Philippine Armed Forces
PAP People’s Action Party (of Singapore)
PMD Poros Maritim Dunia—Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Axis’
PN Philippine Navy
RIMPAC (US Hosted) Rim of the Pacific Naval Exercise
RMN Royal Malaysian Navy
RSN Republic of Singapore Navy
RTN Royal Thai Navy
SAF Singapore Armed Forces
SCS South China Sea
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLOCS Sea Lines of Communication
SOMS Straits of Malacca and Singapore
SPKB Russian Northern Project Design Bureau
SSV Strategic Sealift Vessel
TNI Indonesia’s National Defence Force
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
List of Figures
Fig. 5.1 The concept of Poros Maritim Dunia 63

Fig. 5.2 Southeast Asia’s defence expenditures in real terms 68
Fig. 5.3 Southeast Asia’s defence expenditures in GDP terms 69
xi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Defence Expenditure in Southeast Asia 18

Table 2.2 Elements of Southeast Asian Navies 20
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Growing a Navy: Problems and Prospects.

An Introduction
Geoffrey Till
Abstract In this chapter the main editor for the two volumes will iden-
tify the general problems and challenges faced by the small and medium
nations of Southeast Asia in growing their navies. The chapter will estab-
lish a general model of naval development.
Keywords Naval modernisation · Southeast Asia · Problems

Strategic consequences · South China Sea
There can be little doubt that a substantial process of naval modernisa-

tion is taking place throughout the Asia-Pacific Region in general and in
Southeast Asia in particular. Most analysis of this phenomenon, though,
concentrates on its extent and nature and especially on its likely conse-
quences for peace and stability in the area. There is, in particular, a focus on
whether we are seeing the beginnings of a potentially de-stabilising naval
arms race in the region. This is perfectly valid and indeed an important line
of enquiry and will be discussed in the next and also subsequent chapters.
G. Till (*)
Defence Studies Department, King’s College London,
Swindon, Wiltshire, UK
e-mail: geofftill45@gmail.com
© The Author(s) 2018 1

G. Till (ed.), Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58406-5_1
2 G. TILL
The focus of this chapter, though, is rather different. Instead it will

look at the processes of naval modernisation—how, in effect, countries
‘grow,’ or maybe maintain a navy and the special problems and chal-
lenges that they often face in doing so.
Looking at the problem theoretically the task of becoming ‘a maritime
power’ and growing a navy would appear to be fairly straight forwards—
in principle at least. It would seem to be largely a matter of reconciling
ends, ways and means at a series of cascading decision-making levels that
range from the grand strategic policy-making at the top of the govern-
mental hierarchy to the tactical details of implementation at the bottom.
The devil, though, is in the practical details. It is these that make the task
so difficult. For each country, the practical details are different, in conse-
quence of their geography, political and strategic culture, economic state
and general circumstances.
While their experience may therefore seem very different, there do,
however, appear to be a number of common factors that determine the
relative coherence, success or failure of a country’s naval development.
Particular cases are useful in illustrating general points. To a degree, this
chapter takes the process of modernisation in India as a point of refer-
ence, not because it is better or worse than anywhere else but simply
because as a regional power India has been ‘growing its navy’ for several
decades and its experience provides pointers to the challenges that other
countries in the Indo-Pacific region will face as they follow suit, if they
do. Perhaps, also, that experience will tell us something about the extent
to which we should worry about the consequences of naval modernisa-
tion for the region’s stability.
In responding to the challenges of naval modernisation, four broad
tiers of decision-making seem particularly important, namely the levels of
• Policy-making at the level of Grand Strategy

• Implementing and Resourcing Grand Strategy
• Military Policy and Strategy-Making
• Naval Policy and Strategy-Making
Of course the distinctions between these four tiers of decision are fuzzy,
but their hierarchy represents a process of identifying national objectives
at the top and implementing the naval means of helping secure them at
the bottom. At every stage, though, the relevant decision-makers have
to reconcile ends (objectives), ways (methods) and means (tools and
1 GROWING A NAVY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS. AN INTRODUCTION 3
procedures). Major problems at any level can cascade down causing fur-
ther difficulties lower in the hierarchy—inevitably, a feedback system can
work its way up the hierarchy too. After all, it’s a poor strategist who
does not take at least some account of his likely means when deciding his
operational objectives and course of action.
We must also be wary the danger of building apparently ‘western’
assumptions about both process and product into the analysis. 1 All the
same, the following hierarchy of decision in the acquisition of defence
capability is considered universal, even unavoidable, though the manner
in which, and the instruments by which, it is conducted may vary widely
from country to country.
Tier 1: Deciding Grand Strategy or National

Security Policy
At this rarified level at the very top of the decision-making hierarchy, the
task is to identify national objectives and to decide their relative impor-
tance and priority. This is a matter of policy, not strategy-making. This
has to be done before those lower in the hierarchy can address the strate-
gic issues of deciding how those objectives should be met.
One particularly important set of considerations at this level are related
to what the Germans call Aussenpolitik, namely the view that the coun-
try’s top decision-makers take of the international context in which their
country operates and what they deduce they should do about it. The
international context, in short does much to shape the way in which a
country’s policy-makers conceive their maritime vulnerabilities and needs.
Inevitably such perceptions and their policy consequences will in turn
shape the perceptions and policy responses of others—hence the narrative
of action–reaction cycles and, potentially, destabilising arms races.
Even here, though, perceptions of the outer world are likely to
be influenced if not shaped by factors internal to the state—which the
Germans call by contrast Innenpolitik. In any case, the manner in which
a country grows a navy, the process rather than the product will reflect
its domestic circumstances as well as its international context. This may
extend to a near independence of that context—a process of growing a
navy that, to twist an analogy ‘marches to the sound of its own drum,’
that is supported by perceptions of the outside world rather than driven
by them. In essence, naval policy is driven more by internal than exter-
nal dynamics. Accordingly many of the incentives for naval development
4 G. TILL
may have little to do with what is happening abroad, and logically, little
impact on it.
Both the external and the internal challenges facing decision-makers
are clearly comprehensive in that they include all aspects of a country’s
activity and interests—the political, social, economic, legal and mili-
tary. For this reason, decision-making in national security policy likewise
requires a comprehensive approach in which all aspects of a country’s
interests are represented and effectively integrated. One increasingly
common way of doing this is the formation of some sort of National
Security Council system which represents all stakeholders at this level. A
sense of urgency can also be developed by the periodic issue of formal
and public statements of National Security Policy which are intended to
inform the public and to guide policy-makers lower down in the system.
Two problems that affect prospects for maritime development often
characterise this level of policy decision-making. The first is the problem
of sea-blindness as it is often called. Sea-blindness is a condition which
leads sufferers either vastly to underrate the relative importance of the
maritime domain or which leads them to acknowledge this in theory
but to delay or postpone measures to protect their maritime interests to
some later and sometimes unspecified date after more apparently urgent
national requirements are met. For this reason, such ‘maritime interests’
are not handed down for further urgent consideration lower in the pol-
icy and strategy-making hierarchy. India has certainly suffered from this
because of its focus on territorial disputes with its neighbours and on its
internal security.
One way of seeking to correct sea-blindness has been recently exem-
plified by the recent policy statements of China’s President Xi Jinping
and Indonesia’s President Jokowi, both of whom seek to elevate the
development of their country’s maritime attributes to a very high
national priority. Whether this delivers what they seek or not, will of
course depend on consequential decisions about implementation to be
made lower down the system and for that they, and we, will have to wait.
The Indian equivalent of this would seem to be its ‘Maritime Agenda,
2010–2020’ which aims, particularly in creating the kind of maritime
infrastructure (in shipping, ports and related industrial capacity) that his-
torically has been associated with naval growth.2
Another common problem in designing a national policy for the sea is
that of having to ‘see through a glass darkly.’ It is uniformly and intrinsi-
cally difficult for foreign ministries or treasuries to predict the future or
to gauge its requirements. Wide consultation with non-military sources

of expertise may help articulate policy alternatives here but for that to
happen there needs to be an informed ‘commentariat’ (derived essen-
tially from the university sector and national think-tanks) and a willing-
ness for policy-makers to engage with them openly. Perhaps because of a
tendency to overclassify potentially sensitive issues in India there is argu-
ably a lack of informed debate and ‘the security discourse is dominated
by former military officers or bureaucrats who…base their arguments on
opinions and claimed experience’.3
Another way forwards is for the military and other policy stakeholders
to base their own recommendations on rigorous and objective internal
studies. The failure of the Indian military to conduct such a reappraisal
of the operational lessons of the 1999 Kargil campaign has raised doubts
about the extent to which this kind of analysis is regularly done or has
much effect even if it is done.4
Without such internal and external debate, policy statements will
tend to be bland enough to cope with the variety of consequences of
their being unable to predict what is likely to happen when and what
their country will need to do about it in defence of national interests.
Options are maintained rather than prioritised. There is talk of balanced
approaches towards the future, which in practical terms offer very little
real guidance to decision-makers lower down in the system. This being
the case, they also either follow the same line and preserve options rather
than decide priorities, or, more insidiously, they decide their own way
forward in the light of decisions which they think the policy-makers
should have made, but did not. Amongst the consequences of this are
political, economic or military decisions made largely for narrow sec-
tional reasons. Russian experience shows that a likely result of this is a
sequence of unplanned shifts over time that makes it hard for a navy
to chart a consistent course.5 Paradoxically, smaller navies with fewer
options, may be better placed in this regard.
India, like most countries, suffers from all of this to some extent. In
the military dimension of its maritime aspirations it also has a residual
problem in less than perfect Civil-Military Co-operation since critics
allege that the Indian Administrative Service is generalist rather than
specialist and to some extent sees its purpose to be more a question of
controlling the military, rather than helping it take its proper position
in national defence policy decision-making. While it is surely possible to
argue that so firmly entrenched is India’s democracy after nearly 70 years
6 G. TILL
that the relative importance of this implicit task has much declined,
doubts remain.
Finally, in countries like India, deficiencies in the national maritime
defence industrial base (DIB) limit the country’s economic development,
restrict governmental revenue and act on a brake on its naval aspirations.
Despite India’s high levels of reliance on sea-borne trade, only 11% of
the total is carried in Indian ships, there is a lack of adequate port han-
dling capacity and its commercial ship building industry if anything is
declining, now producing barely 1% of total world ship building.6 This
limits what can be produced for the Navy and helps explains why India
has become the world’s largest arms importer despite its emphasis on
self-reliance.
There are questions about the relative priority of investing in the
maritime DIB when compared to other sectors of the economy, and to
the balance to be struck between the interests of the DIB and the navy,
where these diverge. The government’s particular aspirations are crucial
here. It may seek to produce a DIB that will allow the country to act as
an independent national player on the global stage. Alternately its aspira-
tions may be more modest—to support a national DIB that can act as a
global value-added supplier of niche capabilities, working in conjunction
with its equivalents in other countries. From this derive some obvious
questions, such as: What are the key industrial capabilities the govern-
ment wishes to foster? How successful will the maritime programme be?
More specifically, to what extent will maritime development focus on and
benefit the navy and the coastguard, as opposed to the civilian/commer-
cial sectors? As we shall see, this is a question of particular relevance for
Indonesia’s President Jokowi.
Tier 2: Implementing and Resourcing Grand Strategy

This decision-making tier is largely a matter of identifying the ways and
means by which policy objectives are to be achieved and of providing
the resources needed for their accomplishment. Here, general policy
directions get translated into practical action across the whole front
of government activity. In this, the maritime dimension takes its place
alongside all the others (education, health, social care and so forth) in
the consequent jostling for resources and budgetary priority. Here again
the requirement is to identify the extent to which the various levers of
national power can most effectively contribute to the general policy

objectives identified earlier and to ensure that each ‘lever’ is provided
with the resources necessary for the task, whether that be to build the
infrastructure, support the development or survival of a DIB or develop
a navy and/or coastguard.
Since government resources anywhere are never the equal of possible
commitments this is likely to be an essentially competitive process and the
political standing of the advocates of each dimension of national policy
is likely to be critical to their success. The maritime interest’s capacity to
‘get its case heard’ depends on the attitudes of the political class. In India
there is something of a problem in this regard, when it comes to naval
development. For a variety of reasons, not least residual concerns about
the politicians ‘meddling’ in operational matters widely held to have con-
tributed, for example, to the deficiencies of the 1962 campaign against
China, the political class have tended to steer clear of involvement in the
major defence issues confronting India, being content, it would seem, to
leave that to the professional judgement of the individual services. The
result is something of a lack of political ‘ownership’ of defence and insuf-
ficient dialogue between the political class and the military.
Tier 3: Military Policy and Strategy-Making

at the Ministry of Defence Level
At this third, (‘Ministry’) level, the broader decisions taken higher up

have to be implemented, within the constraints of the resources allo-
cated. Each section of the maritime community, the industrial, the navy
and the coastguard, have to identify their policy ‘ends’ or objectives,
deduce their strategy and decide their ‘ways’ and allocate their ‘means.’
For the Navy and the Coastguard, there will undoubtedly be issues
about the extent to which the administrative procedures and institu-
tions within their respective ministries actually work in translating gen-
eral ideas and aspirations into concrete and practical programmes. The
Indian navy suffers here from the less than perfect relationship between
the service headquarters and the Ministry of Defence and the defec-
tive division of labour that results from this. This state of affairs pro-
duces long bureaucratic delays and over the years has resulted in the
Navy being unable actually to spend the budget it has been allocated.
The problem is aggravated by the quality and attitudinal problems of the
8 G. TILL
Indian Administrative Service already referred to and, additionally by a

relatively low level of interservice cooperation, which results in both seri-
ous capability gaps and wasteful duplication. None of these problems are,
of course, unique to India.
Tier 4: Naval Policy and Strategy-Making
The ways, ends and means approach applies just as much at the fourth
level, the Navy department (and its industrial and coastguard equiva-
lents) where the maritime capabilities required to sustain the naval con-
tribution towards the conduct of actual or potential military operations
in support of national policy are developed. This task requires the iden-
tification and prioritisation of naval roles and the development of the
capabilities to perform them to the required degree. All of the poten-
tial constraints noted above will apply at this level of decision as well,
but there are some additional complications that especially apply to naval
development.
First, the maritime scene incorporates and represents industrial, ship-
ping and fishing interests as well as the navy and the coastguard. It will
require the navy to work alongside the coast guard and other agencies of
safety and law enforcement at sea. In all probability this will require close
cooperation with other like-minded navies as well. The Indian Navy, for
example participates in a large number of such multinational exercise and
togetherness programmes such as IONS, Milan, RIMPAC and so forth.
Accordingly, this will require the navy to develop a nexus of connections
and procedures to enable multinational maritime cooperation across the
whole security spectrum in addition to, but largely separate from, its
connections with the other two Indian military services. There may well
be tensions between these two demands.
Second, to the extent that the procurement and acquisition of mate-
riel is handled at the navy department level, then a series of non-military
industrial considerations are likely to come into play. The acquisition of
naval materiel is intrinsically difficult since both the lead times normally
required to produce sophisticated naval weapons, sensors and platforms
and their probable service life are likely to be very long. As one expert
group have recently concluded, ‘it is a truth universally acknowledged’
that ‘defence equipment acquisition is one of the most challenging of
human activities. …a uniquely demanding bureaucratic morass littered
with military, technological, economic and political pitfalls.’7 The very
long lead times normally required to produce sophisticated naval weap-

ons, sensors and platforms and their lengthy probable service life makes
them peculiarly susceptible to developmental risk because conditions
change.
The US Navy’s Rear Admiral Thomas Rowden dramatically illus-
trated the point recently by pointing out that most ships of the US Fleet
of 2034 are either already at sea or in advanced design stages.8 Building
modern ships of submarines is especially complicated and expensive, with
defence inflation in steel, equipment and sensors running at 6% per year,
a rate that exceeds the inflation escalators that most countries build into
their budgets. This will bear down on platform numbers and increase
incentives for levels of individual platform versatility that are in any case
justified by the unpredictability of the future operating environment.
Canada’s Halifax replacement programme, for example is expected to
deliver a ship capable of operating on the open ocean and in the littorals,
at home and abroad, independently, in a national task force or as part of
an international coalition force. It will need to cope with great distances,
and be Arctic capable. Not surprisingly, the currently planned programme
of 15 ships will come in two variants, a general-purpose type and a more
specialist Area Air Defence and Command and Control version.9
Such future-oriented procurement strategies tend to suffer quite badly
from the unpredictability of the future economic, budgetary and strate-
gic environment. All too frequently, this produces cycles of boom-and-
bust which make sustained planning over, say, a 30-year period, almost
impossible for manufacturers. Typically, this will result in constant delays,
cost increases and iterative tinkering with the original specification; and
eventually in the failure or chronic delay of the programme in ways
which means that the navy tends to acquire new materiel in an piece-
meal, opportunistic way rather than as part of an overall strategic plan
and in a manner which may undermine its capacity to perform its present
roles, let alone its future ones. No navy has shown itself immune to such
pressures and constraints.
The Indian Navy—and the whole Indian defence effort—has been
a victim of such unavoidable problems in the acquisition of platforms,
weapons and sensors. Over the past 7 years, $9 billion worth of tenders
have been cancelled halfway through procurement, half a dozen foreign
companies have been black-listed on charges of alleged corruption, and
more than 50 complaints against various defence deals have been sent to
the country’s anti-fraud agency.10
10 G. TILL
Nor can the problem of corruption, in which procurement deci-

sions are made for entirely the wrong kind of reasons, be safely ignored.
Countries vary in their vulnerability to this problem and it is one of the
clearest ways in which a navy can reflect the nature of the state it seeks
to protect. Corruption can not only result in naval acquisition that does
not properly match a country’s naval needs but can also breed amongst
the wider population considerable scepticism about the validity of those
needs in the first place. It can be a truly corrosive problem, both malign,
in its effects and difficult to eradicate.
Additionally, there could well be problems in the industrial capacity of
the country to produce the equipment the navy needs in terms of time,
number and quality. Here there might well also be a conflict of interest
between the navy in getting what it needs when it needs it, and indus-
try in developing the research, development and production sustainabil-
ity that is so much easier to provide if demand is predictable and so can
be planned for in advance. Finally if government policy is to develop a
defence industrial sector not just for strategic reasons, but to help encour-
age the kind of industrial and technological skills needed for a modern
developed economy or in response to its wider economic interests (such
as employment opportunities, balance of trade or regional development
policies11) then there might well be conflict between government policies
and the immediate needs of the navy. Recent Australian investigation sug-
gests that for all these reasons the cost of naval technology may be 20%
higher than buying the same technology off the shelf from a foreign sup-
plier—at least when narrowly measured in the short term.12
Coping with all these defence management problems while deliver-
ing the kind of equipment needed requires personnel in sufficient num-
ber that have the experience, skill sets and authority necessary to ensure
that naval defence acquisition system is ‘smart.’ For this to happen they
need to be familiar with industrial processes, able to articulate a convinc-
ing case, to defend it where necessary (for this is inevitably a competitive
process too) and to follow a project through to completion of the par-
ticular stages for which they are responsible. Producing the kind of peo-
ple in the numbers required to make a material contribution to the naval
policy and decision-making system and indeed very likely to help shape
policy at the Ministry level as well demands heavy investment in profes-
sional military education and training.
Bearing in mind the many challenges the Indian navy faces, it is pos-
sible to argue that it has been remarkably successful. In accordance with
the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, 2012–2017, the fleet will

steadily expand in size and capability through the period, and its share
of the defence budget rise from 18% at the moment to 30% in a dec-
ade’s time. The extent to which this happens is however, because of the
general and the specifically naval decision- and policymaking apparatus
remains an open question, however.
All this may be particularly difficult for smaller navies which cannot
generate the economies of scale in either platforms or personnel that
make such problems more manageable. In that at least the Indian navy is
better off than most of its smaller equivalents.
Conclusions
When analysts look at the naval modernisation process, especially when it
takes on the characteristics of an actual or potential naval arms race, they
often make one set of assumptions about motivation which depend on
a second set of assumptions about whether the process itself is a careful
one or not. Is the naval force that drops out of the bottom of a coun-
try’s decision-making process the result of a considered and deliber-
ate policy at the grand strategic level together with a coherent overall
plan of implementation? Or, on the other hand, is it the near accidental
product of a whole variety of conflicting interests and perspectives that
neither tells us very much about the overall intent of the programme,
nor provides other countries with much guidance as to how they should
rationally react. Most navies exhibit the symptoms of a mix of both these
approaches!
In trying to understand the various ways in which the countries of
Southeast Asia are growing their navies, some obvious questions seem
naturally to emerge, and which may serve as topics for analysis in the
chapters that follow. Does the country in question have a grand strate-
gic vision of its overall security objectives, a clear sense of its maritime
interests and the role that it navy (or coastguard) can play in securing
them? Does it even have the apparatus for grand strategic thinking? Are
its security policy objectives identified with sufficient clarity to guide oth-
ers lower down the hierarchy, and is the maritime case given due weight
in this process? Does the machinery of government effectively turn such
objectives into a coherent strategy through the provision of priority and
resources? Is the Ministry of Defence fit for purpose in driving guid-
ing naval development within a joint service perspective? And finally, to
12 G. TILL
what extent are the Navy’s troubles (assuming it has some!) due to its
own institutional deficiencies rather than to malign circumstances? Is its
success the consequence of institutionalised ‘muddling through’ or the
result of a coherent policy and strategy-making process?
Implicit in this is the complex issue of the source of the conceptions
which drive policy and strategy-making. Do they derive in the main from
the nature of the state or from an objective appraisal of the challenges
posed by the international context. In this regard how the naval mod-
ernisation processes of other countries are seen and interpreted may well
be crucial in framing a particular country’s perception of strategic need.
Inevitably tackling this issue slides us back into an investigation into the
consequences of naval modernisation rather than into its processes. But
this is clearly a determinant in naval policy-making, even if indirectly, and
so this book will move on to a review of the overall possible results of
naval modernisation in Southeast Asia, before returning in subsequent
chapters to the narrower issue of the manner in which naval modernisa-
tion is being pursued in the region.
Notes
1. Bettina Renz, ‘Russian Military Capabilities after 20 years of Reform,’
Survival 56, No 3—June—July 2014, 61–84.
2. Shyam Saran, ‘Enhancing India’s Maritime Security,’ The Tribune,
(Chandigarth), 25 Feb 2014.
3. Anit Mukherjee, ‘Tell it like it is,’ Times of India, 9 June 2010.
4. Anit, Mukherjee, ‘Facing Future Challenges: A transformational roadmap
for India’s Military Strategy,’ IDSA Paper no p 3, also ‘Facing Future
Challenges: Defence Reform in India,’ RUSI Journal October/Nov
2011.
5. Nicholas Papstratigakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military
Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (London: I.B.
Taurus, 2011).
6. Shyam Saran, op cit.
7. Ken Hambleton, Ian holder and David Kirpatrick ‘Ten chronic challenges
in UK defence acquisition,’ Defence studies, 2013, Vol 13, No 3, 361–371.
8. RAdm Thomas Rowden, ‘Building the Surface Fleet of Tomorrow,’
USNIP, Jan 2014.
9. Ian Wood (ed.) National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy: Charting the
Course (Halifax: Dalhousie University, June 2014), pp 38, 48.
10. Vivek Raghuvaneshi, ‘Procurement problems Await Next Indian Gov’t,’

Defense News, 14 April 2014.
11. Hambleton et al., op cit, p. 369.
12. Julian Kerr, ‘Report on Australian ship-building finds 30–40% cost pre-
mium,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 April 2015.
Author Biography
Geoffrey Till is Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies at King’s College
London and Chairman of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. Since
2009, he has also been a Visiting Professor and Senior Research Fellow at the
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. His Understanding
Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the Falklands was published by ABC
Clio in 2014 and he is currently working on a fourth edition of his Seapower: A
Guide for the 21st Century.
CHAPTER 2
Naval Modernisation Versus Naval

Development: Implications for Strategic
Stability in Southeast Asia
Bernard Fook Weng Loo
Abstract The chapter reviews naval development in Southeast Asia as a

whole and finds that it is less than a naval arms race but more than a pro-
cess of normal naval modernisation. It then identifies some of the possi-
ble consequences for international stability in Southeast Asia.
Keywords Naval modernisation · Southeast Asia · Problems · Strategic

consequences · South China Sea
Since the 1980s, navies in Southeast Asia have been experiencing a sig-
nificant increase in the allocation of resources. This study focuses on
six countries who have significant maritime—Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. According to data
derived from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, total
spending on naval platforms by the countries in this study increased by
approximately $US one billion each decade between 1970 and 1999
(see “Appendix”). This increase in spending has resulted in a significant
B.F.W. Loo (*)

Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: ISAFWLoo@ntu.edu.sg

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58406-5_2
16 B.F.W. LOO
increase in naval platforms, allowing these navies to move from primar-

ily brown water-capable platforms to green water-capable platforms, and
most recently, platforms capable of performing limited blue water mis-
sions. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, most of these
countries have either espoused interest in, or have acquired, sub-surface
warfighting capabilities as well. Clearly, the trend of dedicating resources
to growing naval capabilities has not shown any signs of abating.
How should this increase in naval platforms and capabilities be under-
stood? Is it a case of obsolete capabilities simply being replaced—in other
words a straightforward modernisation programme? Or is it a rather
more complicated phenomenon? Are these recent acquisitions changing
the balance between offensive and defensive capabilities? Are they chang-
ing the regional balance of naval power? Stemming from this last ques-
tion, are these acquisitions suggestive at the very least of a potential naval
arms race? If so, what are the follow-on consequences for strategic stabil-
ity in Southeast Asia, and indeed the larger Indo–Pacific region?
This study rejects two arguments that have attempted to explain these
processes: one argument suggests that these processes represent a naval
arms race in Southeast Asia1; another argument suggests that these pro-
cesses represent a modernisation programme, anchoring in what Buzan
and Herring refer to as maintaining the status quo.2 Instead, this study
argues that recent developments in naval acquisitions in Southeast Asia
ought to be understood differently, that these represent a slow-motion
development of fully fledged navies, at least in terms of how each state in
the region understands a fully fledged navy that corresponds to how each
state perceives its respective strategic environment and the security mis-
sions that accrue thereafter.
Deconstructing the Naval Arms Race Argument

Depicting arms acquisition processes in Southeast Asia as potentially
destabilising at the very least, if not as an arms race in the offing, has
been something of a cottage industry since the 1990s, when military
spending in the region began to garner international attention. The idea
that arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia had potentially destabilising con-
sequences is strengthened when comments by particular political leaders
painted these processes in a negative light.3
Admittedly, there are elements of arms acquisitions by Southeast Asian
countries that at least partially fulfill the arms race argument. Outside
2 NAVAL MODERNISATION VERSUS NAVAL DEVELOPMENT … 17
the domain of naval acquisitions, for instance, Malaysia’s acquisition of

F/A-18s and MiG-29s was announced by then-Minister for Defence
Najib Abdul Razak, now Malaysia’s Prime Minister, to state that the
Malaysian air force was back on par with Malaysia’s neighbours.4
Indeed, Malaysia’s reconfiguration of its armed forces from counter-
insurgency doctrines to a conventional warfighting doctrine was almost
certainly driven by the growing conventional warfighting capabilities of
the Singapore armed forces.5 Singapore unveiled its Ah-64D Apache-
Longbows shortly after Malaysia’s Defence Ministry announced the
acquisition of PT-91 main battle tanks. Myanmar’s attempt to develop
a conventional land warfighting capability in the late 1990s was almost
certainly motivated by Thailand’s growing military capabilities.6 At face
value, these patterns at least partially resemble the action–reaction ele-
ment intrinsic to any arms race.
But how accurate are these arguments? As Richard Bitzinger argued
recently, the portrayal of these Southeast Asian acquisitions as an arms
race is problematic.7 To begin with, although political relationships
within Southeast Asia are not entirely positive, the idea of armed conflict
between Southeast Asian states is nevertheless almost certainly almost
unthinkable, at least for the foreseeable future. Certainly, it would be
a mistake to characterise political relationships within Southeast Asia as
openly mutually adversarial and hostile. Second, while there is almost
certainly an element of one-upmanship in how specific weapons capabili-
ties are either acquired or announced, this does not qualify as the action–
reaction acquisition patterns that arms races demand.8 Finally, there
has been no significant increases in defence expenditures in Southeast
Asia throughout and since the 1990s. Indeed, defence expenditures in
Southeast Asia have remained remarkably consistent when seen as a per-
centage of national gross domestic products or national budgets.
It is true that spending on naval platforms experienced a fairly signifi-
cant increase for at least some Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s (see
Table 2.1). Furthermore, individual acquisitions can appear to parallel at
least certain aspects of arms race models. For instance, Singapore ordered
six missile corvettes in 1983. Ostensibly this was to assist the Singapore
Navy in its stated mission of protecting the sea lines of communica-
tion upon which Singapore’s economy was so dependent. At the time,
the strike component of the Singapore Navy comprised smaller brown
water-capable missile gunboats, whereas their immediate neighbours had
larger (and presumably more prestigious) green water-capable vessels.
18 B.F.W. LOO
Table 2.1 Defence Expenditure in Southeast Asia
1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010– Total

1969 1979 1989 1999 2009 2013
Indonesia
Aircraft 1784 485 1178 617 656 921 5641
Armoured 311 48 141 110 31 42 683
vehicles
Artillery 40 10 111 23 24 40 248
Ships 1270 361 1596 1075 1021 110 5433
Malaysia
Aircraft 299 566 485 1369 1117 60 3896
Armoured 12 109 281 28 241 51 722
vehicles
Artillery 2 89 38 8 51 23 211
Ships 261 680 877 720 1218 350 4106
The Philippines
Aircraft 246 558 248 223 100 35 1410
Armoured 11 67 35 43 5 3 164
vehicles
Artillery 8 66 6 78
Ships 109 481 14 156 19 108 887
Singapore
Aircraft 20 887 1348 1720 2288 1562 7822
Armoured 20 308 154 62 126 400 1070
vehicles
Artillery 92 71 17 20 200
Ships 20 377 699 2018 198 3311
Thailand
Aircraft 609 1183 1127 1546 581 468 5514
Armoured 142 63 522 346 26 146 1245
vehicles
Artillery 38 61 200 206 31 41 577
Ships 114 460 554 1781 22 115 3046
Vietnam
Aircraft 1006 2031 2829 606 355 1124 7951
Armoured 239 2178 240 18 2675
vehicles
Artillery 519 396 34 949
Ships 250 280 574 300 314 760 2478
Expenditure on major combat systems, calculated at constant 1990 USD, millions; data accessed from
http://www.sipri.org/databases, accessed 20 November 2014
Granted, the missile corvettes gave Singapore’s navy an anti-submarine

warfare capability, but only Indonesia possessed submarines—and old,
no longer seaworthy vessels at that. Arguably, acquiring a modern mine
counter-measures capability might have been a more pressing require-
ment, given the Singapore Navy’s mission of protecting shipping lanes.
It is possible to conclude that it was the politics of envy that drove this
Singapore decision. More recently, regional navies have been focusing
on acquiring submarines—Singapore first, then Malaysia, Indonesia and
Vietnam, and even Thailand has now espoused interest in acquiring sub-
marines. Robert Kaplan cited this author as describing these submarines
as “bling”.9 In other words, there is the element of these platforms as
flashy and ostentatious statements; but there is potentially also an under-
lying statement of “having made it”, of now being a more rounded naval
force with both surface and sub-surface warfighting capabilities. Intrinsic
to the acquisition of “bling” is therefore an element of “keeping up with
the Joneses”.10
It is possible to argue that “keeping up with the Joneses” implies a
pattern of competitive, if not outright adversarial, relationships between
the states of the region. Southeast Asia is certainly not a security com-
munity; there are some lingering suspicions and points of contention
in specific bilateral relationships.11 Nevertheless, the absence of adver-
sarial relationships and action–reaction acquisition patterns identified
earlier still applies in this case, and consequently undermines—if not
invalidates—the arms race argument. Furthermore, as the subsequent
section will argue, naval spending in the 1990s can be—indeed it ought
to be—understood through a longer term historical lens that will begin
to suggest a non-arms race explanation for this increase in spending on
naval platforms.
Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: A Long-Term

Perspective
To begin with, looking at the patterns of defence expenditure across
the maritime states of Southeast Asia, the general trend is that up till
the 1990s, the respective navies of these states were not receiving very
much in terms of their shares of their respective states’ defence budg-
ets. This trend of relative neglect becomes apparent by examining the
number of principal surface combatants that the respective navies had
(see Table 2.2).12 Singapore’s navy is the starkest manifestation of this
20 B.F.W. LOO
Table 2.2 Elements of Southeast Asian Navies
1969 1979 1989 1999 2009
Indonesia PSCa 21 11 15 33 30
Heavy lift 7 9 15 28 29
Submarines 6 3 2 2 2
Malaysia PSC 2 3 4 10 12
Heavy lift 3 2 3
Submarines 2
The Philippines PSC 18 3 1 1
Heavy lift 6 27 24 9 7
Submarines
Singapore PSC 6 12
Heavy lift 6 5 3 4
Submarines 3 6
Thailand PSC 3 7 7 20 20
Heavy lift 14 5 6 9 6
Submarines
Vietnam PSC 3 7 7 11
Heavy lift 3 7 6 6
Submarines 2 2
aThis refers to principal surface combatants, which in this study includes aircraft carriers, cruisers,
destroyers, frigates and corvettes
pattern of relative neglect, growing significantly in terms of principal sur-

face combatants only since the 1990s. Vietnam’s navy gained a principal
surface combatant fleet only since the late 1970s. Indonesia started out
the 1970s with a large naval force, but the numbers of principal surface
combatants dropped drastically by 1979. This pattern remained con-
stant for two decades before a significant surge in naval platforms in the
late 1990s. The Philippines experienced a significant growth in princi-
pal surface combatants and heavy sealift in the 1970s, but those numbers
dropped significantly after the 1980s.
There are two obvious exceptions. Malaysia’s navy may have been
relatively small in the 1969s, but it has thus far not experienced any sig-
nificant drops in terms of the numbers of principal surface combatants of
naval heavy lift throughout the period under study. This constant empha-
sis on naval platforms is consonant with the strong maritime element in
Malaysia’s strategic calculus of its geostrategic environment.13 Thailand’s
navy similarly started out small, but grew slowly and steadily, and did not
experience any significant drops in numbers of platforms.
This pattern of relative neglect becomes more apparent when jux-

taposed with the acquisition of air power assets.14 Between 1989 and
1999: Indonesia’s air force had grown from 70 combat aircraft (A-4F/F,
F-5E/F) to 91 combat aircraft (A-4E, F-16A/B and Bae Hawk);
Malaysia had grown from 58 combat aircraft (A-4, F-5E/F) to 87 com-
bat aircraft (F-5E/F, Bae Hawk, and MiG-29); Singapore had grown
from 151 combat aircraft (A-4SU, F-74 Hunter and F-5E/F) to 174
combat aircraft (A-4SU, F-16A/B/C/D, F-5S); Thailand had grown
from 143 combat aircraft (F-5A/B/E/F, other COIN platforms) to
162 combat aircraft (F-16A/B, F-5E/F); and Vietnam reduced from
250 combat aircraft (Su-20/22, MiG-21) to 189 combat aircraft (Su-22,
Su-27, MiG-21).
What makes this pattern all the more counter-intuitive is the fact that
for these states, the maritime environment has always been a significant
element of their respective national lives. The respective national histori-
cal narratives of these states have always had a strong maritime element,
whether by dint of their archipelagic nature or by the maritime trade that
has characterised the histories of these states, from pre-colonial to cur-
rent times.
From Relative Neglect to Naval

Modernisation: Explaining the Pattern
The challenge is to be able to explain these patterns of relative neglect in
some cases and “feast to famine” patterns in others, moving from relative
neglect that the navies of these states had to endure between the 1960s
and the 1980s on the one hand, to the relative largesse since the 1990s,
where investments in naval platforms across these states have increased
quite significantly.
To be sure, there almost certainly is a strategic-security rationale
for this surge in investments in naval platforms. Maritime security—
security of shipping routes from criminal activities, rival territorial claims,
access to fisheries or energy resources—became an increasingly impor-
tant focal point for these states from the 1990s onwards. Given the
rather antiquated or limited nature of naval systems and capabilities at
that time, it was therefore imperative that these navies be modernised
and expanded in capabilities. Furthermore, as suggested earlier, this phe-
nomenon ought not to be seen as constituting a naval arms race; rather
22 B.F.W. LOO
it constitutes a slow-motion development of more or less full-fledged

navies for these states. There is a simple reason for this: naval platforms—
especially larger naval platforms capable of at least green water, if not
blue water, operations—cost a lot more in absolute terms than combat
aircraft. Affordability therefore becomes a potentially significant consid-
eration when it comes to military modernisation writ large. When seen
in the context of gross domestic product (see “Appendix”), it becomes
clear that it is really in the 1990s that the respective GDPs for these
states begins to grow significantly. There is therefore some correlation
between arms acquisitions and economic affluence.15
At the same time, there are a number of country-specific explana-
tions for this surge in naval capabilities since the 1990s. For Vietnam, the
explanation for the relative neglect of naval investments throughout the
1960s into the 1970s is obvious: the Vietnam War was fought predomi-
nantly, indeed almost exclusively, in the air and land domains. The mari-
time domain was important in terms of the lesser known maritime Ho
Chi Minh Trail, but the operation of this maritime channel of supplies to
Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam required small private craft that
could avoid detection from US naval vessels. For much of the 1980s,
Vietnam was embroiled in the Cambodian conflict—otherwise known
as the Third Indonchina War—which resulted in a significant drain on
its already scarce economic resources, crippled by the years of fighting
against the USA in the Second Indochina War, and the economic embar-
goes placed on it as a result of its invasion of Cambodia on 25 December
1978. It is therefore not surprising that Vietnam’s investments in naval
platforms only began to surge in the 1990s onwards.
Indonesia ended the 1960s with the largest naval force in Southeast
Asia. However, the principal surface combatants that Indonesia’s navy
deployed—a Sverdlovsk-class cruiser, seven Skory-class destroyers and 13
frigates—were acquired from the former Soviet Union, during a period
of Indonesia’s history that saw the Sukarno government tilt towards the
Soviet Union. When Sukarno was subsequently toppled in a military coup,
the relationship with the Soviet Union consequently suffered. In any case,
these Soviet vessels were patently unsuited for tropical conditions—muddy
and high salinity tropical waters resulted in significant erosion for the hulls
of these vessels, and they were subsequently returned to the Soviet Union
or decommissioned. The human rights abuses of the military-led govern-
ment that replaced Sukarno resulted in arms embargos that also affected
the quantity and quality of the Indonesian navy throughout the 1970s and
1980s. The surge in principal surface combatants in the Indonesian navy

in the 1990s can be attributed to the acquisition of former East German
naval vessels by the former President Suharto.16 The decision was driven
principally by the then-Minster for Research and technology B.J. Habibie,
who was leveraging on his close ties with the newly unified Germany
in concluding this acquisition programme. However, the vessels were
acquired at over-inflated prices.17 The possibility that corruption was a key
element in this acquisition cannot be ruled out therefore.
For Singapore, the relative neglect that the Singapore navy had to
endure up to the decade of 2000–2009, in contrast to very significant
investments in air force capabilities, can be attributed to the influence
of the Israeli military advisors who had helped to build the Singapore
Armed Forces.18 These Israeli advisors, having arrived in Singapore in
the aftermath of Israel’s stunning victories in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war,
were convinced about the absolute necessity of ensuring that Singapore,
as a small state surrounded by much larger potential adversaries, had to
maintain a significant advantage in air combat systems over these poten-
tially hostile neighbours. This was in obvious detriment to the develop-
ment of the Singaporean navy. By the 1990s, however, as the Singapore
air force began to mature, this was when defence budgets could begin
to pay more attention to modernising or upgrading naval capabilities.
As the former Singapore Navy Chief Richard Lim noted in his speech
on 5 May 1997 at the Singapore Navy’s 30th anniversary, “We have
now reached adulthood, the product of a generation’s effort … Starting
from a small patrol force we have now a balanced navy with capabili-
ties to operate over, upon and under the sea”.19 Richard Lim noted
how the Singapore Navy had grown from providing “a basic coastal
defence capability” with patrol craft and missile gunboats to “missions
of seaward defence and safeguarding our sea lines of communications”
with maritime patrol aircraft, mine counter-measures vessels, and new
patrol vessels. In the twenty-first century, a submarine capability would
be added to that list of capabilities that such a “balanced” force would
require.
In the case of Thailand, the surge in numbers of principal surface com-
batants in the 1990s can be attributed to the acquisition of a helicopter
carrier from Spain and a number of Chinese Type 053 Jianghu-class frig-
ates in the 1990s by the Chuan Leekpai government. It was reported that
the Thai navy was less than impressed with the quality of the Chinese frig-
ates, which had been sold to Thailand at the so-called friendship prices.
24 B.F.W. LOO
As to why these Chinese frigates were acquired, therefore, explanations

have been few and far between. Ostensibly, the Thai navy had been wor-
ried about the insufficient numbers of such vessels.20 The acquisition of
the frigates also took place against a backdrop of warm Sino-Thai rela-
tions, although at the military to military level, relations have stalled
because of the Thai navy’s desire to acquire better quality platforms and
equipment.21 It is therefore possible to speculate that the frigates were
acquired from China despite the Thai navy’s objections and that these
acquisitions were part of a larger Sino-Thai political relationship.
Implications for Strategic Stability in Southeast Asia

This strategic rationale does not itself constitute a sufficient basis for a
naval arms race. For an arms race to exist, there must be, as Colin Gray
has argued, an existing mutually acknowledged antagonistic relationship
between the relevant strategic actors.22 Even if national interests in fish-
eries and energy resources collide with the rival territorial claims, these
do not suffice to constitute mutually acknowledged antagonism.
That is not to say that there are no concerns for strategic stability in
Southeast Asia today. To begin with, this study takes strategic stability
to refer to a situation where the likelihood of miscalculations resulting in
armed conflicts that policymakers neither anticipated nor wanted.23 The
worst-case scenario is one where two countries regard each other as likely
adversaries in a potential future war, and they are locked in a conflict-
ing geopolitical conflict over either territory or resources. At least one
side perceives its geostrategic conditions to be fundamentally unfavour-
able, thus increasing the attractiveness of preemptive military operations.
Finally, both countries possess the military capacities to project power
against each other; in other words, both countries possess the military
capacity to threaten the interests, possibly even the existence, of the state.
When strategic stability is understood in this light, it becomes clear
that this condition does not apply in the case of Southeast Asia. As stated
earlier, there are no overtly antagonistic relationships within Southeast
Asia; admittedly, there are issues of contention between specific states,
but these do not amount to overtly hostile relationships.
That being said, the potential for misunderstandings spiralling out of
control into armed conflicts cannot be ruled out entirely. The naval plat-
forms recently acquired or in ongoing acquisition programmes do con-
stitute a potential—but very limited—power projection and war-fighting
capability. To a certain extent, this introduction of power projection

capabilities in the naval domain can transform the strategic landscape
of Southeast Asia; nevertheless, as an earlier study suggested, this trans-
formation of the strategic landscape of their region has yet to happen.24
While regional navies are beginning to acquire power projection capa-
bilities, the numbers being acquired can only provide very limited power
projection, and this power cannot be projected in any sustained manner.
The positive tone thus far needs to be tempered, however. There is
one geopolitical issue that may, if not managed well, spiral out of control
into armed conflict, namely the territorial disputes in the South China
Sea. Robert Kaplan describes the South China Sea as Asia’s Cauldron,
the “throat of the Western Pacific and Indian oceans”.25 The recent
development of particular note in China’s construction of an airfield and
land reclamation activities in some of the other atolls and islets. While
it is tempting to see these activities as evidence of China attempting to
create a permanent manned military presence in the South China Sea,
it is also possible to argue that these activities are evidence of more than
purely military considerations.26 It is very likely that Vietnam’s recent
acquisitions of six Kilo-class submarines and four Gepard-class frigates
from Russia are meant to strengthen its naval capacity to at least interfere
with Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea. Malaysia’s acquisi-
tion of two Scorpene submarines and the Philippines’ espoused interest
in acquiring submarines are almost surely connected with these coun-
tries’ respective interests in the South China Sea disputes as well.
Further, given the absence of adequate incidents-at-sea and other cri-
sis management regimes beyond the scope of this study, the increasingly
crowded nature of the South China Sea may eventually create crises that,
if not managed properly, can spiral out of control into limited armed con-
flicts.27 As it stands, as Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan have noted, “The coun-
tries of South-east Asia have their own agendas and their own attitudes and
problems and these are reflected in their quite distinctive naval policies”.28
That being said, it is worth noting that the South China Sea has
become a potential flashpoint commanding international attention
principally because of China’s involvement. It is true that a number of
Southeast Asian states are rival claimants to the South China Sea islets
and rocky atolls. Given that these Southeast Asian countries possess only
rudimentary capacities to project naval power into the South China
Sea—but not the capacity to sustain this naval presence for a long time—
it is reasonable to argue that the respective interests in submarines and
26 B.F.W. LOO
principal surface combatants are driven more by China’s involvement

than targeted against other Southeast Asian claimants. This means that
the observations made earlier in this study about the absence of intense
rivalry between the Southeast Asian countries therefore remains valid.
Conclusions
Seen from this long-term perspective, this study concludes that naval
acquisitions by these countries since the 1990s ought not to be regarded
as evidence of anything even approximating an arms race in the naval
domain. Rather, the dominant pattern ought to be regarded as a
slow-motion development of more fully rounded naval forces. The
explanations for the respective national acquisition patterns range from
economic affordability as a result of economic growth, political develop-
ments peculiar to individual countries, to the delayed recognition of the
increasing importance of the maritime domain for the respective coun-
tries national security and economic outlooks. There is no naval arms
race in Southeast Asia, simply put.
That is not to say that the increasing numbers of green water-capable
naval forces in terms of both principal surface combatants and subma-
rines is a phenomenon that does not warrant some concern. As sug-
gested earlier, this proliferation of relatively advanced and capable
naval vessels is occurring in a maritime domain that is not only replete
with geopolitical tensions and potential flashpoints, it is also a domain
that lacks proper mechanisms for the management of these tensions
and potential crises that might emerge as a result of incidents at sea.
Southeast Asia has enjoyed a period of relative strategic stability; these
naval acquisitions contain the potential for upsetting regional strate-
gic stability. Certainly, without proper management of the respective
national acquisitions programmes, and without proper regional cri-
sis management mechanisms, strategic stability in Southeast Asia can
deteriorate.
Notes
1.
See, for instance: Richard Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race: Explaining
Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1, April 2010; Felix Chang, “A Salutation to Arms:
Asia’s Military Buildup, Its Rasons and Its Implications”, Foreign Policy
Research Institute, September 2013 (available online: http://www.

fpri.org/articles/2013/09/salutation-arms-asias-military-buildup-its-
reasons-and-its-implications, accessed 10 February 2015); Michael E
Wallace and Charles A Maconis, New Powers, “Old Patterns: Dangers
in the Naval Buildup in the Asia Pacific Region”, University of British
Columbia Institute of International Relations Working Paper 9, March
1995 (available online: http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/9Michael
WallaceandCharlesMeconis.pdf, accessed 10 February 2015).
2. Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 80.
3. In the 1990s, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas noted
“rather disturbing reports of increased arms purchases by several coun-
tries in the region”, and the then Singapore Defence Minister Yeo
Ning Hong noted that “No country in Southeast Asia … has declared
a peace dividend.” Cited in: Amitav Acharya, “An Arms Race in Post-
Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control”, Pacific Strategic Papers
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), p. 1. For the
regional arms race argument, see: Michael T Klare, “The Next Great
Arms Race”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 136–
152; Gerald Segal, “Managing new arms races in the Asia/Pacific”, The
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1992, pp. 83–101. For a rather
more nuanced reading of this issue, see: Desmond Ball, “Arms and
Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region”, International
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993–1994, pp. 78–112; Panitan
Wattanayagorn and Desmond Ball, “A Regional Arms Race?”, Journal of
Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1995, pp. 147–174.
4. Asian Defence Journal, August 1994, p. 86.
5. “Malaysia Chases Others in Refuelling Capabilities”, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 22 January 1997, p. 12.
6. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 August 1998, p. 19.
7. Richard A Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast
Asian Military Acquisitions”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1,
April 2010, pp. 50–69.
8. An example of this one-upmanship is the Malaysian acquisition of F/A-18
and MiG-29 combat aircraft in the 1990s; when the decision was
announced, then-Defence Minister Najib commented that this acqui-
sition allowed Malaysia’s air force to catch up with its neighbouring
counterpart. See Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “Transforming the Strategic
Landscape of Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27,
No. 3, December 2005, p. 396. Singapore unveiled its first AH-64D
Apache Longbow attack helicopters shortly after Malaysia announced its
own acquisition of PT-91 main battle tanks.
28 B.F.W. LOO
9. Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a
Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), p. 34.
10. Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-
Pacific Region”, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993–
1994, pp. 78–112. Ball was the first to posit the prestige argument
concering military acquisitions.
11. The concept of security community may be understood as a group of
states whose concepts of national security are “interdependent and that
excessively self-referenced security policies, whatever their jingoistic
attractions, are ultimately self-defeating.” See: Barry Buzan, People, States
and Fear (London: harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 208.
12. Data was obtained from the 1969–1970, 1979–1980, 1989–1990, 1999–
2000, and 2009 editions of The Military Balance.
13. Patrick Bright, “ASEAN—Naval Forces Overview”, in Naval Forces,
February 2001, p. 48.
14. Data was obtained from the 1989–1990 and 1999–2000 editions of The
Military Balance.
15. See Ball, “Arms and Affluence”.
16. Michael Richardson, “Indonesia to Acquire One-Third of Navy of Former
East Germany”, The New York Times, 5 February 1993.
17. Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia:
The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London and New York:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 139.
18. Amnon Barzilal, “A deep, dark, secret love affair”, Tha Haaretz, 16 July
2004 (accessed online: http://www.haaretz.com/a-deep-dark-secret-
love-affair-1.128671, 11 February 2015).
19. Speech by Rear Admiral, Richard Lim, Chief of Navy, at the Navy 20th
Anniversary Parade, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/
official_releases/sp/1997/05may97_speech.html#.VOGDGCiVOfQ,
accessed on 10 February 2015.
20. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/thailand/chaophraya.
htm, accessed 12 February 2015.
21. Bronson Pecival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in
the New Century (Westport and London: Praeger Security International,
2007), pp. 50–51.
22. Colin Gray defined an arms race as a situation where “two or more parties
perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increas-
ing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their
respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current
and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.”
Interestingly, later on, Gray would disown the concept, arguing instead
that the concept really described something that had never happened in
the history of international politics; see “Arms Races and Other Pathetic
Fallacies: A Case for Deconstruction”, Review of International Studies,
Vol. 22, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 323–335.
23. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, Middle Powers and Accidental Wars: A Study
in Conventional Strategic Stability (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press,
2005).
24. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, “Transforming the Strategic Landscape of
Southeast Asia”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 2005, Vol. 27,
No. 3, pp. 389–405.
25. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, p. 9.
26. See, for instance, Gwynn Guilford, “China’s Island Building Spree Is
About More Than Just Military Might”, DefenseOne, 22 February 2015
(accessed online: http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/02/
chinas-island-building-spree-about-more-just-military-might/105786/,
25 February 2015).
27. Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast
Asia (Singapore: RSIS, 2009).
28. Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, “Naval modernisation in South-east Asia:
nature, cause and consequence”, in Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan (eds.),
Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, causes and consequences
(London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 4.
Appendix
30 B.F.W. LOO
32 B.F.W. LOO
Source http://www.tradingeconomics.com/, accessed 20 November 2014
Author Biography
Bernard F.W. Loo is Associate Professor and Coordinator, Master of
Science (Strategic Studies) degree programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He
completed his doctoral studies at the Department of International Politics at the
University of Wales, Aberystwyth in 2002. He is the author of Medium Powers
and Accidental Wars: A study in Conventional Strategic Stability (Edwin Mellen,
2005), and the editor of Military Transformation and Operations (Routledge,
2009). The latter title was translated into complex Chinese. His other publica-
tions have appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, NIDS Security Reports, and Taiwan Defense Affairs. He is a regular com-
mentator on defence matters, and his commentaries have appeared in The
Straits Times (Singapore), The Nation (Thailand), and The New Straits Times
(Malaysia). He has been invited to speak at a variety of defence-related institu-
tions and conferences, in China, Estonia, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, and the
Philippines. His research interests encompass war studies, strategic theory, con-
ventional military strategies, strategic challenges of small and medium powers,
and problems and prospects of military transformation.
CHAPTER 3
A Common Setting for Naval Planning

in Southeast Asia? Two Case Studies
in Divergence
YingHui Lee and Collin Koh Swee Lean
Abstract Two examples of naval development (Thailand and the

Philippines) not treated elsewhere in the book are used to show that
although there are common threats and challenges in Southeast Asia,
especially growing competition between China and the United States
and the jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea, each country’s
approach to them is distinctive.
keywords Naval modernisation · Philippines · Thailand · Problems

Strategic Consequences · South China Sea
Y. Lee (*)
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
e-mail: lee_yinghui@hotmail.com
C. Koh Swee Lean
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School
of International Studies (RSIS), Blk S4 Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798, Singapore
e-mail: ISCollinKoh@natu.ed.sg

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58406-5_3
34 Y. LEE AND C. KOH SWEE LEAN
Introduction
Many Southeast Asian navies are expanding their fleets while at the same
time also acquiring more advanced platforms, weapons and equipment.
This is in part spurred by a general increase in military spending in the
region. Data by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) shows that military spending by Southeast Asian countries
increased 50% over the last 10 years, from in US$ 25.8 billion in 2004 to
US$38.7 billion in 2014.1 This has sparked off debates about whether a
naval arms race is underway in this region.2
However, naval modernisation programmes in Southeast Asia are
driven by a multitude of domestic concerns as well as strategic rationales.
It would also be over-simplistic to assume a one-size-fits-all model for
naval capability development in the region. A 2008 Australia Strategic
Policy Institute study on military modernisation in Southeast Asia cor-
rectly noted that “many different motivations exist concurrently, and the
resources that various countries can bring to bear vary markedly, result-
ing in a many-faceted picture”.3
Naval modernisation in this region is in part driven by structural fac-
tors such as the provisions outlined under the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the enduring
importance of safeguarding the sea lines of communications (SLOCs)
so critical for national socioeconomic development. There are also com-
mon maritime security concerns, for example piracy and armed rob-
bery against ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South
China Sea,4 which require responses from robust naval resources.
All these feature as important general considerations behind some
Southeast Asian navies’ quest for a “green-water” capability.5 However,
individual countries have different threat perceptions which determine
the amount of budgetary resources their governments are willing to
allocate to their navies. While the limelight has often focused on those
Southeast Asian navies—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam—
which has to date embarked on significant modernisation programmes
by virtue of the sophisticated capabilities procured to date, the efforts
undertaken by other, so-called “lesser players” should not be overlooked.
The Philippines and Thailand present interesting case studies in this
respect. Each of them confronts a different variation of traditional and
nontraditional maritime challenges and this is reflected in their naval
capacity development priorities—despite both being military allies of
Washington and equally facing severe resource constraints. Using these
3 A COMMON SETTING FOR NAVAL PLANNING … 35
two Southeast Asian navies, this chapter shows how countries in Southeast
Asia approach and prioritise their naval capacity development differently
as a result of differing threat perceptions in the face of fiscal constraints.
There is no one-size-fits-all model for naval capacity development in
Southeast Asia despite sharing some common driving forces.
The Case of the Philippines
Myriad of Challenges
The Philippine case is interesting because the country faces a myriad
of both traditional and nontraditional challenges. Manila has tradition-
ally been preoccupied with internal security concerns, especially in the
restive southern provinces. As such, the Philippine Navy (PN) has not
given as much attention to external defence vis-à-vis supporting the
ground forces’ counter-insurgency operations. However, in the recent
years, tensions have brewed up in the South China Sea (SCS), where the
Philippines contests territorial and sovereignty claims, compelling Manila
to pay more attention to external defence.
This was especially following April 2012, when the PN engaged in
a standoff with Chinese coastguards over the Scarborough Shoal and
Beijing has since taken de facto control over the feature—the worst
Sino—Philippine standoff in the SCS since the Mischief Reef incident
in 1994–1995. About 3 months after, Beijing officially established the
Sansha city and a prefecture-level municipal government on Woody Island
to administer Chinese-claimed SCS features and adjacent waters, includ-
ing the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal.6
At the same time, Beijing also approved the formal establishment of a
military garrison in Sansha city.7 According to Rory Medcalf, the “pro-
nouncement of a garrison is symbolic” as it signifies that Beijing is “placing
a firm military marker on China’s claim in the South China Sea”.8 These
moves added onto the supposed mention of the SCS as one of China’s
core interests—on a par with Tibet and Taiwan—by some Chinese officials
during closed-door meetings with the US in 2010,9 further raised fears of
possible military confrontations over the disputed islands and sea.
Meanwhile, although Manila managed to sign a peace agreement
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), there appears no relief
from its internal security concerns. Maritime terrorism has also become
a thorny issue, especially when militant organisations such as the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG) continue to be active, using waters bordering
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Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia :

Problems and Prospects for Small and

ISBN 978-3-319-58405-8 ISBN 978-3-319-58406-5 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017943482

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

1 Growing a Navy: Problems and Prospects. An

2 Naval Modernisation Versus Naval Development:

3 A Common Setting for Naval Planning in Southeast Asia?

4 Naval Development in Singapore 47

5 Naval Development in Indonesia 61

6 Naval Development in Malaysia 77

7 Naval Development in Vietnam 93

Geoffrey Till is Emeritus Professor of Maritime Studies at King’s

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

KEMHAN Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence

Fig. 5.1 The concept of Poros Maritim Dunia 63

Table 2.1 Defence Expenditure in Southeast Asia 18

Growing a Navy: Problems and Prospects.

Keywords Naval modernisation · Southeast Asia · Problems

There can be little doubt that a substantial process of naval modernisa-

© The Author(s) 2018 1

The focus of this chapter, though, is rather different. Instead it will

• Policy-making at the level of Grand Strategy

Tier 1: Deciding Grand Strategy or National

to gauge its requirements. Wide consultation with non-military sources

Tier 2: Implementing and Resourcing Grand Strategy

national power can most effectively contribute to the general policy

Tier 3: Military Policy and Strategy-Making

At this third, (‘Ministry’) level, the broader decisions taken higher up

Indian Administrative Service already referred to and, additionally by a

Tier 4: Naval Policy and Strategy-Making

long lead times normally required to produce sophisticated naval weap-

Nor can the problem of corruption, in which procurement deci-

the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan, 2012–2017, the fleet will

10. Vivek Raghuvaneshi, ‘Procurement problems Await Next Indian Gov’t,’

Naval Modernisation Versus Naval

Bernard Fook Weng Loo

Abstract The chapter reviews naval development in Southeast Asia as a

Keywords Naval modernisation · Southeast Asia · Problems · Strategic

B.F.W. Loo (*)

© The Author(s) 2018 15

increase in naval platforms, allowing these navies to move from primar-

Deconstructing the Naval Arms Race Argument

the domain of naval acquisitions, for instance, Malaysia’s acquisition of

Table 2.1 Defence Expenditure in Southeast Asia

1960– 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010– Total

Granted, the missile corvettes gave Singapore’s navy an anti-submarine

Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: A Long-Term

Table 2.2 Elements of Southeast Asian Navies

1969 1979 1989 1999 2009

destroyers, frigates and corvettes

pattern of relative neglect, growing significantly in terms of principal sur-

This pattern of relative neglect becomes more apparent when jux-

From Relative Neglect to Naval

it constitutes a slow-motion development of more or less full-fledged

Table 2.1 Defence Expenditure in Southeast Asia 18

Tier 2: Implementing and Resourcing Grand Strategy

Tier 3: Military Policy and Strategy-Making

Tier 4: Naval Policy and Strategy-Making

10. Vivek Raghuvaneshi, ‘Procurement problems Await Next Indian Gov’t,’

Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia: A Long-Term

From Relative Neglect to Naval

Implications for Strategic Stability in Southeast Asia