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Adj Order - Elma Park BC V Erf 195 - v3
Adj Order - Elma Park BC V Erf 195 - v3
and
ADJUDICATION ORDER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Relief applied for in terms of the CSOS Act:
• Order:
o In terms of Section 54 (1)(a) the order is refused.
INTRODUCTION
1. The Applicant is Sonja Pranger-Grantham an adult female in the employ of Eagle Blue
Management Agents, the duly appointed representees of the Trustees of the Elma
Park Body Corporate with its place of business at Elma Park, corner of Boeing and
First Avenue, Edenvale, Gauteng.
2. The Respondent is Erf 195 Elma Park, corner of Boeing and First Avenue, Edenvale,
Gauteng.
3. The community scheme is the Elma Park Body Corporate, a body corporate
contemplated in the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (“STSMA”).
The scheme is residential.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
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15. This matter is adjudicated in terms of the CSOS Act and Practice Directive on Dispute
Resolution, 2019 as amended and more specifically the amended Practice Directive
dated 23 June 2020 which provides under paragraph 8.2: - “Adjudications will be
conducted on the papers filed by the parties and any further written submissions,
documents and information as requested by the appointed Adjudicator”. The parties
were requested to make written submissions.
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17. Applicant alleges that sections 1 and 2 of Elma Park is in a state of disrepair in light
of damages such as water corrosion in consequence of lack of waterproofing, broken
windows, pests and structural concerns.
18. Applicant alleges that notwithstanding the repairs been the responsibility of
Respondent, the broken windows have been repaired at the expense of body
corporate, while other repairs have been done through donations
19. Presently, the Body Corporate does not have any funds to repair the two sections.
20. Applicant seeks an order that section 1 and section 2 of Elma Park are repaired to a
reasonable state of repair, and the sections must be maintained on a regular basis
going forward.
Respondent’s Submissions
21. A response was received from Goodes and Co Attorneys on behalf of Respondent.
The letter advises that Erf 195 Elma Park Limited is in liquidation and liquidators have
been appointed by the Master of the High Court.
22. The response further advises that there is other pending litigation between the parties
and there is currently an application by Respondent to commence business rescue
proceedings.
23. The response further states that this application should be rejected in terms of Section
42(d) of the CSOS Act as it may best be dealt with in a Court of law or other Tribunal
of competent jurisdiction.
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24. The Respondent further avers that the Respondent has been cited incorrectly
because Respondent has been cited as Erf 195 Elma Park c/o Honey Attorneys,
notwithstanding .
25. With regard to the water corrosion and water leaks, the response states that it is the
duty of the body corporate to ensure that the roof is free of leaks and not the
Respondent. The same goes for the structural integrity of the building.
26. The response also points out that in the second to last paragraph, attached to the
letter from Applicant, a disclaimer is inserted that states:
“We wish to place on record that this application was drafted without prejudice. The views
expressed herein relate to the application at hand and do not express the opinions of the Elma
Park Body Corporate, its representatives, trustees, employees or agents.”
“(1) Each trustee of a body corporate must stand in fiduciary relationship to the body
Corporate.
(2) Without derogating from the generality of the expression “fiduciary relationship”, the
provision of sub-section (1) implies that a trustee that-
(a) must in relation to the body corporate act honestly and in good faith, and in
particular –
(i) exercise his or her powers in terms of the Act in the interest and for
the benefit of the body corporate; and
(ii) not act without exceeding those powers; and
(b) …”
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31. In Body Corporate Le Chene D'or v Carim 2019 JDR 0304 (GJ) it was held:
“[32] In fact, the Applicant has a duty to take all reasonable steps to ensure that an
owner of a section does not use a section so as to cause a nuisance, in breach
of his duties as envisaged in Section 13(1)(e) of the Management Act; nor make
alterations to a section or an exclusive use area that are likely to impair the
stability of the building or interfere with the use and enjoyment of other sections,
of the common property, or an exclusive use area, nor do anything to a section
that has a material negative affect on the value or utility of any other section or
exclusive use area.”
“Duties of Owners
(1) An owner must –
(a) …
(b) forthwith carry out work that may be ordered by any competent authority in
respect of his or her section other than such work as may be required for the
benefit of the building generally, and pay all charges expenses and
assessments that may be payable in respect of his or her section.
(c) repair and maintain his or her section in a state of good repair and, in respect
of an exclusive use area, keep it in a clean and neat condition.”
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35. Body Corporate of the Solidatus Scheme No SS23/90 v de Waal and Others (1997)
3 ALL SA 91 T, the court found that the intention of the legislature was to place the
burden for the upkeep of EUAs where the benefit lay, in other words on the owner of
the section to which those exclusive use rights were attached. The court found that
it would be unfair to expect the other occupants in the scheme to contribute to the
costs of repairs and maintenance of an EUA, in respect of which they could neither
access nor derive any benefit from.
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36. Accompanying the Dispute Application are several photographs of the damage to the
sections. It is apparent from the photographs that the sections are in a state of
disrepair, and it appears that there is extensive damage as a result of the water leaks,
and there is also structural damage to the roof, possibly from the water leaks.
37. Taking the aforementioned legislation into account and the response by Respondent,
I am not convinced that the damage is solely the fault of respondent because it is
apparent from the photographs that the roof is damaged which may have caused the
other damages including the structural damage.
38. It is trite that roofs in Body Corporates such as these, are common property and
subject to maintenance at the expense of the Applicant. However, Applicant simply
seeks an order against Respondent for the entire costs of the repairs without
apportioning any of the damage to the Body Corporate, who had a duty in law to
maintain the roof which forms part of the common property. In the circumstances, this
application cannot succeed.
39. If I am wrong on that score, Applicant has not cited Respondent correctly. In Body
Corporate of Duroc Centre v Singh 2019 (6) SA 45 (KZP) a matter where the appeal
was upheld due to lack of locus standi, it was held:
[13] Conradie J in Watt v Sea Plant Product Bpk and others [1998] 4 All SA (C) at 113h -
114d distinguishes between locus standi and authority succinctly. The court held:
‘Locus standi in iudicio is an access mechanism controlled by the court itself. The standing of
a person does not depend on authority to act. It depends on whether the litigant is regarded
by the court as having a sufficiently close interest in the litigation. In Jacobs en ’n Ander v
Waks en andere 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) at 533J-534A Botha JA described the requirement for
locus standi as “ ’n voldoende belang … by die onderwerp van die geding om die hof te laat
oordeel dat sy eis in behandeling geneem behoort te word”. In Jacob’s case the question was
what interest the applicants had in the invalidation of a resolution of a local authority. The court
commented-
“Aldus beskou, spreek die férte sterk ten gunste daarvan dat die Hof toe- ganklik
behoort te wees vir hierdie applikante, en gevolglik moet die bevinding wees dat hule
wel locus standi het om die nietigverklaring van die besluit aan te vra”(536C-D).
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The question then, to be posed in casu is whether at the time summons was issued the
trustees’ interest in the trust was too remote. The answer to this question depends upon the
nature of a trustee’s appointment. Where a trustee has been appointed – in a trust deed or
otherwise – the appointment is not void pending authorization by the Master in terms of section
6(1) of the Act (cf. Metequity Limited and another v NWN Properties Limited and others [1997]
4 All SA 607 (T) at 611a-d). Although a trustee’s power to act in that capacity is suspended by
section 6(1) of the Act, he or she would, in my view, have a sufficiently well defined and close
interest in the administration of the trust to have locus standi in iudicio. Any conclusion that
the second and third defendants were by section 6(1) of the Act deprived of locus standi in
iudicio (which would mean not only that they could not be sued but also that they could not
approach the court to protect the interests of the trust) would not give effect to the intention of
the legislature. Whilst recognising the desire of the legislature to regulate the rights and duties
of trustees in the Act, one should, I think, be slow to conclude that it would have desired to
accomplish this by controlling their access to, or accountability in, a court of law.’
40. The Liquidators ought have been cited. Accordingly, a judgement against
Respondent will not be executable.
41. Prag N.O and Another v Trustees for the time being of the Mitchell's Plain
Industrial Enterprises Sectional Title Scheme Body Corporate and Others
(A260/2020) [2021] ZAWCHC 132 (16 July 2021), held at paragraph (28) that:
“If one considers the terms of the CSOS Act as a whole, and the kinds of matters in respect
of which an adjudicator can make orders in terms of s39 of the Act, they either concern
regulatory/governance issues, pertaining to the administration of a sectional title scheme, or
behavioural issues, pertaining to the conduct of members of the scheme inter se (which
commonly would cover so-called nuisance or neighbour disputes). It was clearly not intended
that the Ombud would have the power to adjudicate on delictual claims for damages, which
involve weighty considerations pertaining to wrongfulness (which depend on prevailing
societal norms and public policy) and fault, and the quantification and determination of the
quantum of any damages which may have been sustained pursuant thereto, which are matters
which are best left for judicial officers and Courts.”
42. Again, if I am wrong, I am of the view that despite the facts been relatively straight
forward, the matter is complicated by various legislation such as the Companies Act,
which governs business rescue and Insolvency and the Insolvency Act. Even if an
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43. I agree with Prag N.O and Another that matters such as these should be litigated
before a different forum, as contemplated in Section 42(d) of the CSOS Act.
COSTS
ADJUDICATION ORDER
RIGHT OF APPEAL
47. Section 57 of the CSOS Act, provides for the right of appeal-
(1)An applicant, the association or any affected person who is dissatisfied by an adjudicator's
order, may appeal to the High Court, but only on a question of law.
(2) An appeal against an order must be lodged within 30 days after the date of delivery of the
order of the adjudicator.
(3) A person who appeals against an order, may also apply to the High Court to stay the
operation of the order appealed against to secure the effectiveness of the appeal.
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