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Ethics of
Computer
Gaming
A Groundwork
Samuel Ulbricht
Ethics of Computer Gaming
Samuel Ulbricht
Ethics of Computer
Gaming
A Groundwork
Samuel Ulbricht
Weinheim, Germany
This book is a translation of the original German edition „Ethik des Computerspielens“ by
Ulbricht, Samuel, published by Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE in 2020. The translation was
done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com).
A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will
read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works
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related technologies to support the authors.
ISBN 978-3-662-64396-9 ISBN 978-3-662-64397-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64397-6
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022

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For all players.
Foreword
More than a quarter of all Germans regularly play computer games.1 In view of this
fact, the question of the moral status of computer gaming2 has a high practical rel-
evance. If more than 20 million people in Germany alone regularly engage in a
specific activity, knowledge about the moral dimension of this activity is not only
interesting but necessary and normatively crucial. Especially because the practice of
computer gaming is often brought into a connection with morally highly problem-
atic situations in both private and public discussions; just think of the infamous
‘Killerspieldebatte’ in Germany or related debates in the context of rampages.3 In
view of this presence and explosiveness of the topic in everyday life, a differentiated
professional clarification of the phenomenon is becoming increasingly urgent. The
crucial moral-philosophical question at the heart of this, and also the core question
of the present study, is the following: Is it possible to do something immoral while
playing computer games?
An affirmative answer to this question would have considerable normative con-
sequences for our theoretical and practical approach to computer games. A negative
answer could also contribute to seeing the phenomenon of computer games in a
more differentiated light because moral concerns and fears in this regard would lose
their justification and would thus have to be attributed to other causes. And the
search for the right answer already delimits the normative dimension of computer
gaming and can specify what, if anything, we should pay moral attention to when
playing games. This is what the present study aims to do: The moral status of com-
puter game actions will be explored. Following this topic embodies a groundwork
in two senses. First, computer gaming as a specific form of action will be measured
in terms of the theory of fiction and the theory of action, which is a prerequisite (and
1
Cf. Quandt 2011; Quandt 2013. According to the Association of the German Games Industry
(deutsche Games-Branche), more than 34 million Germans currently play digital games at least
occasionally (cf. Game 2020).
2
By this I mean here and in the following all types of playing digital games and not exclusively
playing on computers. In recent (philosophical) research, the term ‘computer game’ has gained
acceptance in German over ‘video game’ or ‘digital game’ (cf. Feige 2015, 19; Ostritsch/
Steinbrenner 2018).
3
For a well-founded journalistic treatment of the debate in video form, see the three-part documen-
tary ‘Killerspiele’ by Christian Schiffer (2016), broadcast on ZDF. For an academic discussion of
the topic of ‘violence in computer games’, see Venus 2018.
vii
viii Foreword
thus a groundwork) for a moral analysis appropriate to the phenomenon. Secondly,

computer gaming will be examined morally from the perspectives of utilitarianism,
Aristotle and Immanuel Kant, thus, laying the groundwork for deeper ethical inves-
tigations. The three ethics and various other philosophical theories will be put to the
test in the process because they will be entrusted with the task of explaining a rela-
tively new phenomenon that has not touched them previously. In particular, it is
Elizabeth Anscombe’s and Donald Davidson’s theories of action, Kendall
L. Walton’s theory of fiction, Johan Huizinga’s theory of culture, and the ethical
considerations of Aristotle, Henry Sidgwick, Peter Singer, and Kant that are con-
fronted with the phenomenon of computer gaming. At the end of the study, there-
fore, it will be possible to take a clear view not only of computer gaming as a form
of action and its moral implications but also of the scope and applicability of com-
mon ethics and theories of action.
The study of computer gaming is carried out in three steps. In the first step, the
object of research is outlined terminologically. The questions of what exactly we
mean when we refer to something as a ‘computer game’ and which aspects of the
term are the focus of my investigation are addressed. Based on various definitional
problems on a descriptive level, a normative definition of ‘computer games’ will be
developed. The chapter concludes with a sharp terminological distinction between
computer games as objects and computer gaming as activity—only the latter is the
subject of the following considerations.
In a more extensive second step, the identified object of research—computer
game actions—will be subjected to in-depth analysis by means of action and fiction
theory. For this purpose, basic action-theoretical positions of older and more recent
philosophy are first presented in a cursory manner in order to construct a suitable
model for the analysis of the activity of computer gaming. Subsequently, with the
help of this model, three types of computer game actions are distinguished, each of
which has its action-theoretical and fiction-theoretical specifications: Virtual com-
puter game actions are characterized by the fact that they structurally resemble ordi-
nary actions because they aim at achieving real purposes. Their specificity lies in the
fact that they take a ‘detour’ via the fictive world of a computer game. Fictive
actions, on the other hand, are not real actions in the strict sense. They denote the
actions of fictive game characters that take place within a computer game and are
thus not (really) caused by a person’s will. Finally, fictional gaming actions are
performed by the player and differ from virtual actions in that their purpose is
located in the fictive world of the computer game. Here, fiction is not a ‘detour’ or
a mere means to achieve a real-world goal but forms the purpose of the action itself.
This is play in the true sense of the word.
In the third and final step of the study, the three types of computer gaming are
analyzed ethically. The focus of interest is on fictional acts, as they pose the greatest
moral-theoretical puzzle. While fictive acts are morally irrelevant and virtual acts
can be classified similarly to ordinary acts, fictional acts walk a fine line between
fiction and reality that seems to prima facie elude moral theoretical considerations.
This curiosity is attempted to be clarified in three ways: With the help of Aristotle’s
virtue ethics, utilitarian theory, and Kant’s ethics of duty. It will turn out that each
Foreword ix
ethics has its challenges in classifying the phenomenon on the one hand, and on the
other hand, can each contribute a different important component to the moral assess-
ment of computer game actions. In particular, Kant’s ethics of duty will have the
role of determining the intrinsic moral properties of fictional actions and translating
them into an appropriate ethical classification.
For the sake of better readability, detailed explanations of the computer games
mentioned have been omitted in the text. Uninformed readers may refer to the
attached glossary.
WeinheimSamuel Ulbricht
Acknowledgements
The groundwork for the ethics of computer gaming is a result of theoretical and
practical research on the phenomenon—the latter in the form of numerous hours of
active computer gaming. Without outstanding computer games, such as The Last of
Us (Part I and II), Detroit: Become Human, Grand Theft Auto V, The Legend of
Zelda: Breath of the Wild or The Witcher 3: Wild Hunt, which exploit the medium to
its full potential, there would have been no reason for me to develop an ethics of
computer gaming.
However, for moral intuitions and irritations to become a philosophical elabora-
tion in the form of this book, more is involved. A special circle of people who have
had a lasting influence on my philosophical education has contributed significantly
to the realization of the Ethics of Computer Gaming in its present form. First, I
would like to thank Philipp Hübl for frequent and lively exchanges on philosophical
theories of action, Jakob Steinbrenner for numerous illuminating discussions on the
theory of fiction, and Andreas Luckner for deep insights into Aristotelian doctrines.
Thanks to these three philosophers, I was able to get to know and appreciate analyti-
cal as well as creative approaches to diverse philosophical questions. To Daniel
Martin Feige I owe my early contact with the philosophical dimension of computer
games, my interest in their aesthetic side, and a continuous as well as productive
exchange about central problem areas of current games research and art theory. I
would like to thank Tim Henning for countless enlightening conversations in which
I was not only able to become familiar with an extremely elaborate approach to
questions and basic positions of ethics but also with the high art of presenting highly
complex issues in a clear and comprehensible way. Quite a few passages of this
study have benefited from his critical eye. I would especially like to thank Sebastian
Ostritsch for his years of support, motivation, encouragement and constructive dis-
cussion of my project. Without his continued interest, coupled with frequent and
always justified objections, the Ethics of Computer Gaming would not exist in
this form.
I am also deeply indebted to Springer-Verlag for including me in their publishing
program, especially Franziska Remeika, on whose warm and helpful cooperation I
could always rely, and Anupriya Harikrishnan, who was responsible for typesetting
this book in its German version. I especially thank Apurva Sarwade and Vinodh
Kumar for organizing the translation of the English version. I also thank the editors
of the series Techno:Phil—Aktuelle Herausforderungen der Technikphilosophie,
xi
xii Acknowledgements
who have honored my work with their trust, something I never dared to hope for. In
particular, I thank Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs for his valuable comments and the always
open, productive, and friendly exchange.
I would like to thank Anestis Fesatidis, Baris Elligüzel, Jonas Schmidt and Felix
Wolf for their appreciative and critical comments, which resulted in insightful and
instructive discussions. Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife Nikola
Dieter: Not only because I can always rely on your full support but because your
substantive comments, honest interest and unbiased intuitions could not be more
valuable to me.
Contents
1 What Computer Games Are�� 1

References�� 7
2 Computer Gaming as Activity�� 9
2.1 The Practical Syllogism�� 11
2.1.1 From Aristotle to Davidson�� 11
2.1.2 Will, Body Movement and Action�� 15
2.2 Three Types of Computer Gaming�� 20
2.2.1 Virtual Actions�� 23
2.2.2 Fictional Actions �� 28
2.2.3 Fictive Actions�� 36
2.3 Interim Conclusion�� 42
References�� 43
3 Ethics of Computer Gaming �� 47
3.1 Evaluative Dimension: Utilitarianism and Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics�� 50
3.1.1 Can Playing Computer Games Cause Harmful
Consequences?�� 51
3.1.2 Can Players Act Viciously?�� 59
3.2 Deontic Dimension: Kant’s Duty-based Ethics�� 68
3.2.1 The Role of Fiction �� 73
3.2.2 Can Quasi-Actions Be Morally Prohibited? �� 87
References�� 95
4 Concluding Remarks �� 99
References�� 102
Glossary �� 103

References�� 107
xiii
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Three types of computer game actions 39

Fig. 3.1 Three types of mental identification with fictions 87
xv
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming 43

Table 4.1 The morality of computer game actions 100
xvii
What Computer Games Are
1
This study is primarily concerned with computer gaming as a form of activity rather
than computer games as objects. This is not to say that these two things are com-
pletely independent of each other. Of course, computer games are needed in order
to be able to play (them). And even more: Each possible action in computer games
is elementarily predetermined by the game, which provides options and rules for
agency. And vice versa, a computer game seems to be constituted by the actions of
the player. Nevertheless, I would like to argue in the following that computer gam-
ing can be distinguished from computer games.1
Computer gaming is basically a type of play that has been practiced for thou-
sands of years by humans and (at least in elementary forms) also by (other) ani-
mals.2 However, it is necessary to differentiate terminologically with regard to this
general term. As soon as one begins the search for an appropriate definition, the first
hurdles immediately arise: Where to locate the boundary between play and non-
play? How do we conceptually reconcile the countless variants of play that have
developed to date and will continue to develop? What is the defining characteristic
of all play? What is generally meant by the terms ‘game’ or ‘play’ has always been
a very difficult question to answer, and one that will probably have to remain unre-
solved. All attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for when we are
dealing with a game fail at the latest when looking at particularly exotic variants of
the same. Different games seem, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s words, to be linked much
more by loose family resemblances (‘Familienähnlichkeiten’) than by constant
1
In German, there is only the noun ‘Spiel’, which describes both games (as objects) and play (as
activity). Out of this linguistic difficulty arose the main function of this section: to outline two dif-
ferent meanings of ‘Spiel’. In English, however, we have the terms ‘game’ and ‘play’ which quite
precisely refer to the differentiation between ‘Spiel’ as an object and ‘Spiel(en)’ as an activity that
I had in mind when writing this section in German. So, a few of the problems that I discuss in the
following are less problematic in English than in German.
2
“Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always presupposes human
society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them their playing. […] Animals play just
like men” (Huizinga 1980, 1).
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022 1

S. Ulbricht, Ethics of Computer Gaming,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64397-6_1
2 1 What Computer Games Are
essential characteristics.3 Since computer games are prima facie a digital type of
conventional games, they are at least as difficult to define. This is not to say that
there have been neither attempts nor advances in defining computer games in the
past. On the contrary: One could not state that there has been a lack of attempts at
defining within the branch of computer game research. For a long time, the debate
was dominated by a definitional dispute between so-called ‘narratologists’ and
‘ludologists’, which produced two definitions of computer games: On the one hand,
as a digital and playful narrative (narratological approach), and on the other hand,
as a digital (and sometimes narrative) rule-based game (ludological approach).4 It
became clear quite quickly that the definitions given do not form two mutually
exclusive alternatives but each emphasizes a different, potentially central aspect of
computer games. While a narratively ambitious game like Detroit: Become Human
has a lot in common with more conventional narrative forms like film, and thus a
narratological approach is certainly very fruitful here, hardly anyone is likely to
(mis)understand Tetris as a narrative. Conversely, it seems insufficient to reduce
Detroit: Become Human to its (comparatively quite meager) gameplay and rule-
based elements, whereas with Tetris this makes perfect sense.
The subsequent attempts at defining computer games that have grown out of the
debate are less concerned with correspondence to a specific school and more with
correspondence to the subject matter: The computer game as such is to be funda-
mentally contoured in terms of its peculiarities.5 In doing so, it is unavoidable to fall
back on the closely related attempts to define the traditional game, because—this
much must be conceded to the ludologists—on a basic level, all computer games are
a form of games. From this insight, however, prima facie hardly anything can be
concluded for a closer definition of computer games since the definition of tradi-
tional games is already confronted with immense difficulties, as I have already indi-
cated with Wittgenstein. Despite the constitutive indeterminacy of the term ‘game’,
however, the dividing line between games as objects and gaming as the activity
seems to be sharply drawn at first glance: A board game, for instance, is what one
finds and sets up when opening a game box. Playing is what one does with the game
after setting it up. Analogously, a computer game is what you start in one way or
another (depending on the hardware) and computer gaming is what you do with the
game afterwards. Physically, a computer game as an object can be reduced to soft-
ware as program code, while playing must be conceived as an event. However, even
this simple ontological demarcation faces difficulties. First, computer gaming as
activity also seems reducible to a level of code: My sharp braking in a race in Mario
Kart 8 is physically describable in terms of a displacement of various codes. Second,
3
Cf. Wittgenstein 1986, §66/31f.
4
Positions and development of the debate have been reconstructed in detail by numerous authors
(cf. Tavinor 2009, 15–25; Günzel 2012, 19–23; Feige 2015, 39–55), although there are also authors
in game research that point out that the ‘dispute’ was not conducted in such a sharp and polarizing
way (cf. Aarseth 2014).
5
For relevant approximations and attempts, see Tavinor 2009, 15–33; Feige 2015, 39–79; Ostritsch
and Steinbrenner 2018.
1 What Computer Games Are 3
a game as an object does not seem to be a static thing, but rather composed of
events—the actions of the players: Every game reacts dynamically to the actions of
the player, and this is what distinguishes it as a game. A computer game without
actions is (exaggerated) not a game, but a film. Where do these difficulties of a ter-
minological separation of game and play come from?
If one looks at relevant attempts to define the phenomenon in question, it becomes
clear that it is usually defined as an activity and not as an object. While Friedrich
Schiller speaks of a “merry realm of play and illusion”6 in which man is “released
from all that is called coercion, both physical and moral”7, Wittgenstein refers to
“proceedings that we call ‘games’”8 and not to objects. The influential definition of
the cultural theorist Huizinga also explicitly defines play as activity:
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite
consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious”, but at the same time absorbing
the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no
profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space
according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.9
Narrowing the focus to more recent attempts to determine computer games does not
make things any easier. Natascha Adamowsky, for example, states right at the begin-
ning of her remarks:
Every player knows when she is playing. Nevertheless, elements of play always manage to
stab scientific rationalizations in the back, presumably because play itself is a defining
activity. From the perspective of cultural studies, the question of what a game is therefore
shifts to an interest in knowing what people actually do when they play.10
Sebastian Ostritsch and Jakob Steinbrenner confirm this finding by defining “rule-
based interactivity (or gameplay)”11 as a necessary component of every computer
game (in addition to visual signs, a computer program, and corresponding hard-
ware), but a few paragraphs later (in reaction to Grant Tavinor’s disjunctive attempt
at a definition12) they also refer to computer games as interactive “artifacts in a
visual digital medium”13.
6
Schiller 2013, 27th Letter/120. Translated by DeepL.
7
Ibid. Translated by DeepL. Schiller refers here indirectly to the activities of play, since coercion
can only affect these (one is restricted in action by coercion) and thus a release from coercion must
also refer to activities.
8
Wittgenstein 1986, §66/31. Emphasis mine (S.U.).
9
Huizinga 1980, 13.
10
Adamowsky 2018, 27. Translated by DeepL.
11
Ostritsch/Steinbrenner 2018, 68. Translated by DeepL.
12
“X is a videogame if it is an artifact in a visual digital medium, is intended as an object of enter-
tainment, and is intended to provide such entertainment through the employment of one or both of
the following modes of engagement: Rule and objective gameplay or interactive fiction” (Tavinor
2009, 26).
13
Ostritsch/Steinbrenner 2018, 70. Translated by DeepL.
These attempts at definition, all of which blur the line between play (as activity)
and games (as objects), are countered by the robust intuition that ‘game’ is simply
not the same as ‘play’. There is a natural usage of ‘game’ that refers to objects rather
than activities: “I have twelve computer games on the shelf!” or “Which game do
you think is the most beautiful?”. It gets harder as it gets more narrow. For instance,
when it comes to individuating the computer games on the shelf and distinguishing
them from the films next to them. Where does the difference lie? Externally (apart
from the paratexts) there seem to be no distinguishing features whatsoever in terms
of disc and cover—the material is the same.14 The difference only becomes clear in
the way the respective storage medium is used; through reference to the special
activity of playing games, which differs from the activity of watching films: “Games
are instructions for action”15 in a strong sense and films are (merely) instructions for
watching. A game is, thus, that which can be played—this sounds analytical and not
informative. But this determination underlines the central difference between gam-
ing as action (i.e., play) and games as objects: All games are instructions for
action—and not the action itself.16 Our common usage grounds this meaning: Game
designers create objects to play—not play itself. And games as objects contain rules
that regulate activities—and are not the activities themselves.17 Whereas this sharp
demarcation becomes blurred again in the earliest forms of human play—children’s
play: In hide-and-seek, play is the game and the game is play. Here, not only do the
rules of the game regulate the actions of play, but the actions of play regulate the
rules of the game. This and similar examples highlight the fact that the concepts of
game and play, while theoretically distinguishable from one another, are practically
related to one another in the closest possible way.
It is immensely difficult to formulate a universally valid distinction between play
as activity and games as objects that covers each case. This is due, as we have seen,
14
The reference to a differing code level of the discs is not crucial to the intuitive distinction I am
concerned with here. When we distinguish computer games from movies, we typically mean not
that they integrate other code sequences, but that other activities are associated with them. In other
words: When we ask a friend whether this is a computer game or a movie, we do not expect an
explanation of the binaries involved, but of the activity in question.
15
Neitzel 2018, 225. Translated by DeepL.
16
Whereby ‘instruction’ is to be understood here in a broad sense. It is not meant that every game
contains concrete instructions for action (for example, in the sense of a demand formulated in the
rulebook: “Draw two cards!”). This is not the case with children’s free role play, for example. The
point is rather that it is constitutive for any game as a game to be an instruction to act, specifically:
To play. For without actions (of play) there is no game. I would like to thank Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs
for hinting at this.
17
Huizinga already refers to the elementary role of rules in games: “All play has its rules. They
determine what ‘holds’ in the temporary world circumscribed by play” (Huizinga 1980, 11).
Somewhat more precisely, using a classification that goes back to John Rawls, game rules can be
described as constitutive rules (as opposed to regulative rules) that organize activities whose exis-
tence depends on the existence of the rules (cf. Rawls 1955). More recently, and in relation to
computer games, Jesper Juul, in particular, points to the important role of game rules: “Video
games are a combination of rules and fiction. Rules are definite descriptions of what can and can-
not be done in a game” (Juul 2005, 197).
1 What Computer Games Are 5
to the constitutive indeterminacy of the terms ‘game’ and ‘play’, which in everyday
and academic usage can refer to both objects and activities.18 Given this difficulty, it
is not possible to establish a precise definition of these terms. However, this may not
be necessary. The terms ‘game’ and ‘play’ seem to belong to the category of ele-
mentary terms that are fundamentally closed to a sharp definition in the sense of
specifying necessary and sufficient conditions. These fundamental terms (in the tru-
est sense of the word) form the foundations of our language and cannot be broken
down into ‘smaller’ defining components. The task of a philosophical discussion,
therefore, lies not in defining them, but in explicating them—and this is what the
present text attempts to do with regard to the classification of computer gaming in
terms of action-, fiction- and moral-theory.
For this purpose, however, it is indispensable to at least individuate the activity
of playing a game more sharply. With regard to the important distinction between
game (as an object) and play (as an activity), I do not want to leave it at a definition-
ally unsettled intuition. The indeterminacy I have encountered in attempting a defi-
nition of ‘game’ or ‘play’ and, related to this, in the descriptive distinction between
the object of game and the act of playing, is now to be cleared up on a normative
basis, for differentiation from an aesthetic or moral point of view is quite possible
here. I can aesthetically admire the decoration of a chessboard or morally condemn
the depiction of violence in a computer game without referring to actions of play. At
the same time, I can take solely play activity into account, for example, by finding
my opponent’s move in chess elegant and discriminatory behavior in the multi-
player mode of Grand Theft Auto V immoral, without passing judgment on the
games as objects. From this perspective, separating play from game is not only pos-
sible but fundamental. This becomes particularly clear with regard to moral consid-
erations, which are my primary concern. For example, it does not seem appropriate
to morally condemn the action of a reporter when she plays a highly problematic
computer game, such as RapeLay (in which she has to rape women) for research
purposes in order to publish a critical article about the game and achieve a ban on
such games. The computer game seems clearly immoral here but not the reporter’s
research; the developers are to be morally blamed, not the player. Conversely, it
would be intuitively equally inappropriate to morally condemn a computer game
like Red Dead Redemption 2, which is complex narratively and in its gameplay, for
the fact that some players use the game’s nearly boundless mechanics for (prima
facie) reprehensible purposes, such as kidnapping women’s rights activists
18
In addition, the verb ‘play’ (‘spielen’) seems to be ambiguous at first glance. On the one hand,
we can understand it in the sense of ‘free play’ that takes place without artifacts or a prescribed set
of rules, because the player herself constructs her ‘game world’ in the course of playing—think of
children’s role-playing. On the other hand, when we play, we can also bind ourselves to a given
scenario including fixed rules and possibilities for action; precisely when we play a concrete game
(be it a computer game or Monopoly). From another perspective, however, it could be stated that
the supposed ambiguity of ‘play’ is nonexistent. After all, free play is also about playing a concrete
and rule-based game: A primarily produced and not received game, a non-repeatable game with a
variable set of rules and a particular structure, but nevertheless a definable game that can also be
named (for example: “My nephew is playing ‘Pirate’!”).
(in-game) and throwing them to alligators, or bullying other players in online mode.
Intuitively, the players are doing something wrong here, not the game. And even
with children’s play, away from the digital, I can problematize actions of the child
(such as not saving a drowning friend in the game) without thereby condemning the
game as such. These examples make it clear that a normative distinction can and
must be made between games as objects and playing as activity, even if definitional
clarity is lacking at the descriptive level. In the following, the terms ‘playing’ and
‘gaming’ are used interchangeably to describe the actions of players. The term
‘play’ equally refers to these actions while ‘game’ is used to describe objects.
The differentiation delimits my object of research: Computer gaming as activity,
whose moral status—independent of the morality of computer games as objects—is
to be clarified.19 Prima facie, computer gaming is naturally better suited for moral
investigation than games, because moral philosophy commonly focuses on “judg-
ments by which a human action is positively or negatively evaluated, approved or
disapproved.”20 In order to evaluate an action morally, it must be clearly determined.
Computer game actions, however, raise questions in this regard: (To what extent)
Do they correspond to everyday practices? Are we dealing with a new form of
action or can we refer to conventional models? I will address these and other ambi-
guities in detail in the following chapter. I am firmly convinced that the develop-
ment of comprehensive ethics of computer gaming that is appropriate to the
phenomenon is not possible without an in-depth action-theoretical investigation.21
19
By this, I do not mean to claim that the morality of a computer game is in any case irrelevant to
the morality of a gaming action. However, in order to be able to establish such a connection in an
individual case, the normative dimensions of the relations must first be clearly distinguished from
one another.
20
Birnbacher 2013, 13, emphasis mine (S.U.). Translated by DeepL. Whereby the moral judgment
of actions as the sole task of ethics is admittedly too narrow, as Dieter Birnbacher emphasizes:
“Although deontic judgments are primarily related to actions, evaluative value judgments, on the
other hand, have primarily motives, attitudes and character traits as their object” (ibid., 285, trans-
lated by DeepL).
21
Surprisingly, I do not know of any study on the ethics of computer gaming that does justice to
this claim. Although the necessity of a sufficient contouring of the object of investigation (in this
case: an action-theoretical determination of computer gaming) seems obvious before a moral anal-
ysis of the same, most authors refrain from a corresponding specification and examine the moral
status of computer game actions without sufficiently clarifying what exactly they are. Some posi-
tions can be partially excused by the fact that they ultimately seem to be more concerned with the
morality of the games or the people playing them than with the morality of playing as activity—
although they also tend to lack an appropriate differentiation here (cf. McCormick 2001;
Waddington 2007; Schulzke 2010; Patridge 2011), while others end up (consistently, since they do
not distinguish precisely enough between gaming actions and everyday actions) with a far too
strong moral classification of computer gaming (cf. Sicart 2009). Only recently have decidedly
action-theoretical analyses of computer gaming moved to the center of philosophical research (cf.
Börchers 2018), while computer gaming as a form of action has been a popular object of research
in game studies for a long time (cf. Venus 2012; Günzel 2012, 119–125; Hensel 2018). However,
contributions from this young and growing discipline, with their cultural and media studies focus,
are hardly fruitful for a theory of action of computer gaming as a fundamental conceptual
clarification.
References 7
References
Literature
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Bernard Perron, Mark J. P. Wolf. New York 2014, 185–189.
Adamowsky, Natascha: Spiel/en. In: Philosophie des Computerspiels. Theorie – Praxis –
Ästhetik. Edited by Daniel Martin Feige, Sebastian Ostritsch, Markus Rautzenberg. Stuttgart
2018, 27–41.
Birnbacher, Dieter: Analytische Einführung in die Ethik [2003]. Berlin/Boston 2013.
Börchers, Fabian: Handeln. In: Philosophie des Computerspiels. Theorie – Praxis – Ästhetik. Edited
by Daniel Martin Feige, Sebastian Ostritsch, Markus Rautzenberg. Stuttgart 2018, 97–122.
Feige, Daniel M.: Computerspiele. Eine Ästhetik. Berlin 2015.
Günzel, Stephan: Egoshooter. Das Raumbild des Computerspiels. Frankfurt am Main 2012.
Hensel, Thomas: Kunst. In: Game Studies. Edited by Benjamin Beil, Thomas Hensel, Andreas
Rauscher. Wiesbaden 2018, 379–387.
Huizinga, Johan: Homo Ludens. A study of the play-element in culture [Germ. 1944]. London 1980.
Juul, Jesper: Half-Real. Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds. London 2005.
McCormick, Matt: Is it wrong to play violent video games? In: Ethics and Information Technology
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Patridge, Stephanie: The incorrigible social meaning of video game imagery. In: Ethics and
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Rawls, John: Two Concepts of Rules. In: The Philosophical Review 64/1 (1955), 3–32.
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[1793]. In: Ders.: Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen.
Mit den Augustenburger Briefen herausgegeben von Klaus L. Berghahn. Stuttgart 2013.
Schulzke, Marcus: Defending the morality of violent video games. In: Ethics and Information
Technology 12/2 (2010), 127–138.
Sicart, Miguel: The Ethics of Computer Games. Cambridge, Mass. 2009.
Tavinor, Grant: The Art of Videogames. Singapur 2009.
Venus, Jochen: Erlebtes Handeln in Computerspielen. In: Gamescoop. Theorien des Computerspiels
zur Einführung. Hamburg 2012, 104–127.
Waddington, David I.: Locating the wrongness in ultra-violent video games. In: Ethics and
Information Technology 9/2 (2007), 121–128.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig: Philosophical investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe [Germ.
1953]. Oxford 1986.
Computer Gaming as Activity
2
Before subjecting actions in or with a computer game to an action-theoretical analy-

sis, it must become clear to what extent this undertaking is necessary at all. Why do
computer game actions deserve an independent investigation in their specificity? Do
they not resemble ordinary actions? Is it not possible to skip this laborious step on
the way to the ethics of computer gaming? While the previous chapter dealt with the
difference between computer games as objects and computer gaming as activity, it
is now necessary to distinguish the latter from ordinary actions.
Actions are basically those activities that we do intentionally.1 To approximate,
one could say: All those things we do that we could also refrain from doing are
actions. This includes omissions (for we can refrain from an omission—by acting),
but not involuntary reflexes or tics that happen to us rather than that we could per-
form or refrain from doing them.
It would be mistaken to take computer game actions extensionally as an indepen-
dent class of actions, as Fabian Börchers convincingly points out at the end of his
analysis: “Computer game actions are real actions. They meet all the criteria that
have been elaborated for human actions.”2 Against this background, it does not seem
very fruitful to make action-theoretical considerations in relation to com-
puter gaming:
Insofar as there are results to show in this endeavor, one will say, they will apply equally to
all human actions and thus trivially also to the action of playing computer games. Thinking
about computer games with action theory would thus be a pure application case, a retrieval
of what has already been generally described in the particular—and thus not very suitable
to reveal anything about the specificity of computer games.3
1
Cf. Anscombe 1963, §1/1; Davidson 2002b, 44–47; Henning 2016, 45–49.
2
Börchers 2018, 120. Translated by DeepL.
3
Ibid, 97. Translated by DeepL.
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022 9

S. Ulbricht, Ethics of Computer Gaming,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64397-6_2
10 2 Computer Gaming as Activity
However, there is also another perspective on the phenomenon, an intensional

one, which suggests a contrary conclusion and implies a sharp distinction between
computer game actions and ordinary actions:
Computer games […] are characterized by the fact that you do not really do anything in
them: You race over breakneck rally tracks (although you sit quietly on the sofa), you fight
in backyards (although you do not do anything more than bend a few fingers) or you run
into your own death three times in a row (and you really cannot do that as a real action).4
With regard to the aim of the present study to develop an ethics of computer gam-
ing, the question of whether there is a moral difference between computer game
actions and conventional actions is particularly significant. A specific action-theo-
retical investigation of acts of the first kind would only be worthwhile in this context
if there were at least intuitively a corresponding difference. And indeed, typical
cases suggest this finding: Prima facie, it (also) makes a big difference morally
whether I knock a person out in a computer game—say, in Tekken 7—or for real. Or
whether I declare war against Spain in Civilization VI or in reality. These simple
examples poke at the fact that we intuitively make a strict distinction between com-
puter game actions and their real-world counterparts. Murder in the game is not a
(real) murder. This means prima facie for a moral classification: What makes a
(real) murder morally reprehensible provides no yield for the moral classification of
corresponding in-game actions.5 If an in-game-murder turns out to be immoral, it is
so, presumably, for quite different reasons than a real murder.6 This argues for
4
Ibid. Translated by DeepL.
5
I use the terms ‘real’ or ‘reality’ to refer to the actual, sensually graspable world of experience. If,
on the other hand, I speak of ‘realistic’ or ‘realism’, I mean ways of representing fictions that are
oriented (as far as possible) towards reality (cf. Durst 2008, 29–51).
6
Curiously, the moral equation of in-game actions and their real counterparts is not infrequently
encountered in everyday, public and even academic discourse. Often, dangers as well as potentials
of computer gaming are attempted to be substantiated in this way. One horn of Morgan Luck’s
Gamer’s Dilemma, for example, is based on the assumption that the morality of gaming actions is
fed by the morality of their real counterparts, which is why we should morally condemn virtual
killings just as much as virtual pedophilia (the second horn takes the opposite position, that virtual
actions are morally irrelevant per se, cf. Luck 2009, 31f.). Even though this claim forms only one
horn of the dilemma, it represents a central foundation of Luck’s argument and is also taken very
seriously in the wider study of the dilemma as an option (cf. Bartel 2012; Luck/Ellerby 2013).
However, the thesis “In this computer game you kill people!” is in an essential sense as fundamen-
tally flawed as “In this computer game you learn to play football!”. Whatever computer game
actions may be—they are (in the vast majority of cases) neither motorically nor contextually simi-
lar to their counterparts in reality. Any ethics of computer gaming must take into account this ele-
mentary difference, which Daniel Feige also vividly emphasizes: “[T]he first-person shooter is not
per se a different way of shooting firearms, even if it is intended to train the use of weapons in the
context of very specific didactic computer games like America’s Army. […] A confusion between
the two practices comes from precisely not looking at the practice and what is essential to it, but
rather settling on a practice as fixed and all-encompassing that is in fact extraordinarily exotic”
(Feige 2015, 128, translated by DeepL). Another vivid (if slightly exaggerated) example is given
by Jochen Venus: “Just as little as one trains one’s locomotion skills by having a game character
run forward in the virtual world by constantly pressing the W key on the keyboard, so little are
2.1 The Practical Syllogism 11
differentiation of the types of action we are dealing with in each case, ergo: For a
specific, action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming, which will now take place.
2.1 The Practical Syllogism
Computer game actions formally resemble everyday actions: We are dealing with
events that are intentional and carried out by body movements.7 Using Davidsons
terminology, they can be rationalized by specifying a primary reason as the proposi-
tion and belief that cause the action.8 However, the examples in the last section
make it clear that a purely formal analysis of computer gaming is not sufficient to
capture its moral dimension in its entirety. In order to clearly draw the crucial nor-
mative dividing line between ordinary acts (murder) and gaming acts (in-game
murder), their contentual aspects must come into view: Why did the agent perform
the relevant act?9 To answer this question, a differentiated model for action-theoret-
ical analysis is needed, an appropriate repertoire of terms as a terminological tool,
which will be elaborated in the following sections in order to subsequently deal in-
depth with different ways of computer gaming.
2.1.1 From Aristotle to Davidson
One model that has become widely established for explaining actions is the so-
called practical syllogism, which goes back to Aristotle.10 According to Aristotle,
the formation of action by practical reasoning has similarities with the logical
deduction of a conclusion from two true premises. The first premise of a practical
conflict resolution models trained in the scenarios of virtual games” (Venus 2018, 336, translated
by DeepL). In short: The peculiarity and morality of computer game actions can only in excep-
tional cases be derived directly from analogous real actions (for example, in learning games for the
subject of mathematics, in which one de facto does nothing more than calculate).
7
Davidson identifies intentionality and traceability to (a broad concept of) bodily movements as
central intensional features of actions (cf. Davidson 2002b). Two things should be noted about my
citation of Davidson’s (not uncontroversial) theory of action: First, I will also increasingly address
differing views in action theory and will ultimately strongly modify Davidson’s approach. Second,
the causal role of reasons, which is elementary for Davidson (and most controversial), will play a
rather subordinate role in what follows, since I am primarily concerned with understanding com-
puter gaming on a normative level. In this context, Davidson’s remarks are far less contentious—
especially if one takes into account Davidson’s later essays on the subject, in which he revises
some of his earlier, more radical views (such as that causal explanations are sufficient for action
explanations, cf. Davidson 2002c, or that intentions can be reduced to ordinary desires and beliefs,
cf. Davidson 2002e).
8
Cf. Davidson 2002a.
9
That the ‘why-question’ is elementary to understand actions has been widely established in recent
action theory since Anscombe (cf. Anscombe 1963, §5/9–11; Henning 2016, 46f.; Börchers
2018, 101f.).
10
Cf. NE VI, 1143a–1143b/112–114.; NE VII, 1147a/122.
syllogism, as a general major premise of action, is determined by Aristotle for virtu-

ous men as the goodness (aretē) of the action in question: “for the syllogisms which
deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, namely, ‘since
the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature’, whatever it may be”11. Non-
virtuous people serve more or less contingent general principles, such as rules of
thumb derived from experience, as major premise.12 Aristotle specifies the object of
the second premise as “the last and variable fact”13, that is, as concrete action situa-
tions which are “the starting-points for the apprehension of the end”14: In order to
act consciously, an agent must first classify the situation by “perception, and this
perception is intuitive reason.”15
By weighing the (first-personal) general goodness of the action (first premise)
with the concrete situation of action (second premise), prudence (phronēsis), as
“reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods”16, yields the
conclusion: An action appropriate to the agent and the context.17 This is the process
of practical reasoning that an agent undergoes when acting. Let it be represented by
the following scheme:
1. Major premise: General principle ("dry food is good for every man" (NE VII, 1147a/122))
2. Minor premise: Structuring perception of the situation ("I am a man" (NE VII, 1147a/122))
3. Conclusion: Action (*Eating-The-Dry-Food*)
Modern action theorists developed the Aristotelian structure of practical reason-

ing further, including Anscombe and Davidson. On the one hand, Davidson’s
detailed conceptualization takes Anscombe’s insights into account on a normative
11
NE VI, 1144a/116. In recent research, there are numerous different interpretations of the major
premise of Aristotle’s practical syllogism. While for Andreas Luckner this consists of a “prescript
(which can be subjective principles/maxims, precepts, general norms, etc.)” (Luckner 2005, 91,
translated by DeepL), John McDowell insists on a ‘non-codifiability’ of the corresponding prem-
ise: “[T]he envisaged major premise, in a virtue syllogism, cannot be definitively written down
[…]: generalizations will be approximate at best” (McDowell 2002, 67). Anscombe determines the
major premise of practical reasoning as ‘intention in action’: The desired as the good of action to
be aimed at (cf. Anscombe 1963, §23/45–47; Henning 2016, 47–49). Davidson additionally refers
to the form of this desired, the desire as pro-attitude (cf. Davidson 2002e, 85–89).
12
Cf. NE VII, 1147a/122f.
13
NE VI, 1143b/113.
14
NE VI, 1143b/114.
15
Ibid.
16
NE VI, 1140b/106. In the non-virtuous person, this role is assumed by cleverness (deinotēs) as
the choice of best means to achieve the set end, which, unlike prudence, can also be reprehensible
(cf. NE VI, 1144a/115f.).
17
Here, too, recent interpretations differ. The common view, however, is that the conclusion of
practical reasoning consists in an action (and not in a judgment) (cf. Luckner 2005, 91; McDowell
2002, 65f.; Henning 2016, 47f.), which also seems to be in line with Aristotle (cf. Buddensiek
2016, 12f.).
level,18 but on the other hand, it also emphasizes the extensional side of practical
reasoning: Mental state changes as causative events. Due to this differentiated
approach, the following remarks are predominantly based on his considerations,
although they are not adopted congruently: With a view to the aim of the investiga-
tion to fathom the moral status of computer gaming, Davidson’s theory is firstly
simplified19 (though I address potential difficulties and further considerations in the
footnotes) and secondly heavily modified so that the normative explanatory power
of practical syllogisms comes into focus. The intended result of this approach is a
model that is, on the one hand, sound enough to be compatible with the main insights
of modern action theory as an analytical tool, and, on the other hand, facilitates a
fruitful investigation of computer game actions through its simplicity and clarity.
A first important insight of Davidson’s is that practical reasoning should not be
thought of as a process that necessarily precedes every action, but that every action
qua action only implies the possibility of such a process in principle:
We cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes through a process of
deliberation or reasoning, marshals evidence and principles, and draws conclusions.
Nevertheless, if someone acts with an intention, he must have attitudes and beliefs from
which, had he been aware of them and had the time, he could have reasoned that his action
was desirable (or had some other positive attribute).20
Davidson traces the premises of the practical syllogism back to the formulation
of the pro-attitude and belief that rationalize and cause the action as the primary
reason: “We are to imagine […] that the agent’s beliefs and desires provide him with
the premises of an argument”21. The major premise, as the pro-attitude of the action,
can be expressed by a value judgment concerning a certain action type B: “[A]n
action of type B is good (or has some other positive attribute)”22. The minor premise
consists of the belief that the specific action A to be performed corresponds to the
desired type of action B. Finally, the description of the action that rationalizes the
action can be derived from the two premises: “The description of the action pro-
vided by the phrase substituted for ‘A’ gives the description under which the desire
and the belief rationalize the action.”23
Regarding the last point, two possible misunderstandings must be avoided: First,
it is not Davidson’s view that the conclusion of a practical syllogism can be deduced
logically from the premises. On the contrary, he explicitly points out that the
18
While Davidson would agree with this thesis (cf. Davidson 2002a, 11–19)—he merely points out
in addition that besides a teleological explanation of action, the same must also be explained caus-
ally (cf. Henning 2016, 49f.)—other authors doubt the compatibility of both explanatory
approaches (cf. Börchers 2018, 100–110).
19
For example, I will not discuss Davidson’s considerations concerning prima facie judgments and
his conceptualization of the will (cf. Davidson 2002d) or pure intending (cf. Davidson 2002e).
20
Davidson 2002e, 85.
21
Ibid, 85f.
22
Ibid, 87.
23
Ibid.
conclusion—an all-out value judgment concerning the action to be performed—is

the result of deliberation.24 Davidson later calls this judgment intention: “[T]he
intention simply is an all-out judgment. Forming an intention, deciding, choosing,
and deliberating are various modes of arriving at the judgment, but it is possible to
come to have such a judgment or attitude without any of these modes applying.”25
Second, the premises of a practical syllogism are not to be understood merely as
judgments, but also as expressions of mental state changes. From this perspective,
the conclusion of practical reasoning is not an all-out value judgment toward action
A, but the action itself as an event. Davidson, thus, argues for a dual role of practical
syllogisms: “It is an important doctrine that the conclusion of a piece of practical
reasoning may be an action; it is also important that the conclusion may be the for-
mation of an intention to do something in the future.”26
We can, thus, view practical reasoning with Davidson from two perspectives: On
the one hand, as explained above, the premises can be understood as specific judg-
ments from which follows the unconditional, future-directed value judgment that
the action to be performed is good. On the other hand, the upper and lower proposi-
tions of the practical syllogism embody concrete mental events which directly cause
the action. From this perspective, the action itself is the conclusion of the practical
syllogism and implies only the possible formation of a corresponding value
judgment:
In the case of intentional action, at least when the action is of brief duration, nothing seems
to stand in the way of an Aristotelian identification of the action with a judgement of a
certain kind—an all-out, unconditional judgement that the action is desirable (or has some
other positive characteristic).27
Under both perspectives, knowledge of the agent’s pro-attitude and belief is cen-
tral to understand the action. As premises, they imply that description of action
under which the activity was intentionally performed, and as mental events, they
explain the causal occurrence of the same. It is this connection that is modelled by
the practical syllogism, whose conclusion extensionally forms the caused action and
intensionally a corresponding value judgement:
1. Major premise: Pro-attitude for action type B (“It is desirable to improve the taste of the
stew” (Davidson 2002e, 86))
2. Minor premise: Belief that action A corresponds to action type B (“Adding sage to the
stew will improve its taste” (Davidson 2002e, 86))
3. (Extensional) Conclusion: Action A (*Adding-Sage-To-The-Stew*) & (Intensional)
Conclusion: Unconditional value judgement about action A (“It is unconditionally desirable
to add sage to the stew”)
24
Cf. Davidson 2002d, 36–39; Davidson 2002e, 98f.
25
Davidson 2002e, 99.
26
Ibid, 96.
27
Ibid, 99.
This model must now be adapted to the purpose of a differentiated and stream-
lined analysis of computer game actions. Central to this is the clarification of the
following questions: Is it primarily the extensional or the intensional dimension of
practical reasoning that is relevant for the clarification of computer gaming? How
are pro-attitude and belief to be normatively defined? And how exactly can the
description be extracted from the model under which the action is intentionally
performed?
2.1.2 Will, Body Movement and Action
With Davidson’s model, it becomes apparent that the elementary explanatory power
of the practical syllogism cannot lie in its conclusion: That I season the stew with
sage or find it desirable to season the stew with sage is not an informative explana-
tion of my action, but the action itself or a mere marking of it as such. With mere
knowledge of the conclusion, only the following (alleged) explanation of action
could be derived: “She adds sage to the stew because she wants to.” While this dis-
tinguishes the event in question as an action, it is not sufficient to justify it norma-
tively. For this, the first-personal value of an action must become intelligible, which
Börchers, referring to Anscombe, emphasizes:
To experience an action as meaningful is to understand its value. It follows that what is

considered by some to be the fundamental justification of an action, namely ‘I do this
because I want to’, is in fact no justification at all […] but merely the formal suggestion that
the action in question is of the kind that a justification could be given. ‘Because I want to’
does not answer the why-question, but implies that it is permissible[.]28
If the conclusion of a practical syllogism as a value judgement does not explain

the action, then the view must be directed to the premises. This is in line with the
preceding remarks as well as with the majority of action theory: To justify an action,
the premises of a practical syllogism are crucial—because the conclusion of the
same is the action. From this perspective, it is appropriate to assign the place of the
conclusion to the action itself (that is: to its extension as an event): It is it that is to
be rationalized by reasons and morally evaluated by ethics—not a value judgment.
Let us turn, then, to premises. According to Davidson, the major premise of the
practical syllogism is an agent’s pro-attitude, the statement of which is sufficient in
most cases to rationalize an action.29 This includes:
28
Börchers 2018, 110. Translated by DeepL. For Anscombe on this point, cf. Anscombe 1963,
§51/90f.
29
Although Davidson insists that a complete explanation of action is only given by stating the pri-
mary reason as a statement of both pro-attitude and belief, he also allows for different variants—
such as the mere naming of a desire. According to Davidson, this always implies the existence of a
primary reason (cf. Davidson 2002a, 6–8).
[D]esires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic prin-
ciples, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and values in
so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a cer-
tain kind.30
Davidson’s enumeration is only of limited help in sharpening the explanatory

power of pro-attitudes because it contains two different kinds of entities: On the one
hand, mental states (‘desires’, ‘wantings’, ‘urges’ etc.), on the other hand, contents
of such states (‘moral views’, ‘goals’, ‘values’ etc.). For the justification of actions—
as a genuinely normative project—the reference to mental processes as an exten-
sional cause of the action is not decisive.31 For this reason, the above model of the
practical syllogism is insufficient: There, the premises are primarily addressed as
causative mental events and not as normative reasons for actions. It is true that every
explanation of action must imply a causal role of reasons in order to be able to ratio-
nalize an action, for only in this way is it possible to understand to what extent the
conclusion of a practical syllogism can be the action itself: It cannot be the conclu-
sion from judgments, for actions are events and events do not follow from judg-
ments but causally from other events. But an explication of the causal relation
between reasons and actions (as a statement of a specific causal law) is, as Davidson
himself points out, first, not necessary for the justification of an action32, and sec-
ond, because of categorically different patterns of explanation, not even possible.33
In this sense, the rationalization of action may be “a species of causal explanation”34,
because extensionally it always refers to a causal relation, but this aspect is irrele-
vant for the normative justification of action on the intensional level, which is my
primary concern. What matters here is the content of the agent’s mental states: Not
the desire, but what is desired. In other words, to understand an action, it is elemen-
tary to understand the value that the agent first-personally sees in his action. This
indicates, in the context of a value judgment (as major premise of the practical syl-
logism), the (central) description of the action under which the action is intention-
ally performed.35 Thus, to understand my action of putting sage in the stew, it is
necessary to understand the value I ascribe to that action: I want to improve the taste
of the stew, and this is what motivates me to act. In this sense, the effective pro-
attitude in the practical syllogism can also be called a will, which highlights the
elementary normative dimension of the same. We can have many mere desires with
respect to one and the same action (“I want to eat an ice-cream”, “I want to enjoy
the summer with an ice-cream”, “I want to please my son”, “I want to meet the ice-
cream seller”, etc.), but only one of them (or a specific combination of them) is
30
Davidson 2002a, 4.
31
Cf. Henning 2016, 51–54.
32
Cf. Davidson 2002a, 12–19.
33
Cf. Davidson 2002f; Davidson 2002g.
34
Davidson 2002a, 3.
35
With Anscombe, we can speak here of intention in action or intention with which, which deter-
mines the first-personal good of the action as the final answer to the ‘why-question’ (cf. Anscombe
1963, §23–§26/37–47; Henning 2016, 45–49; Börchers 2018, 100–110).
causal for the action and thus takes the place of the first premise in the practical
syllogism: “I buy an ice-cream because I want to please my son. That is the reason
for my action. Everything else is beside the point.” The determination of the will as
an effective desire is elaborated prominently by Harry Frankfurt: “[I]t is the notion
of an effective desire—one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way
to action.”36 It is with this meaning that the term ‘will’ will also be used in what fol-
lows: As an effective desire that forms the first premise of the practical syllogism
and, by specifying the first-personal value, gives the decisive description of action
under which the action is intentionally performed.37
If now the decisive normative function is assigned to the will, what role does
“believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering)”38 play as the second
premise of the practical syllogism? Christoph Halbig answers with reference to
Davidson’s considerations: “The motivational force of the pair of belief and desire
lies rather with the desire, while belief merely directs this force in a suitable direc-
tion (which promises precisely the fulfilment of the desire).”39 As the minor premise
of the practical syllogism, then, belief is fundamentally responsible (in the spirit of
Aristotle) for linking the will to the concrete situation of action. In this sense, the
belief can be understood as a minimal description of the action to be performed,
indicating how the agent’s will is to be put into action.40 But what is the minimal
description of an action? Here is an example: Klaus contracts his muscles. Klaus
moves his hand. Klaus pushes the handle. Klaus opens the door. Klaus airs the
room. Klaus frightens Schmitz. Klaus kills Schmitz.41 Assuming that all these
descriptions refer to the same event, two things, in particular, become clear: First, it
is noticeable that Klaus probably did not perform his action intentionally under all
these descriptions. It may be, for example, that he intended to open the door and air
the room, but not to frighten Schmitz, and certainly not to kill him. Klaus certainly
did not want to contract his muscles either. But which description is now relevant
for the justification of the action? With regard to the previous explanations, we can
say: Exactly that description of the action which corresponds to Klaus’ will as an
effective desire. This could be, for example, the desire to air the room. Under this
description, Klaus then intentionally performed the action, and it takes the place of
the first premise in the practical syllogism. Knowing this description of the action is
elementary not only in terms of action theory, but also ethically (at least with Kant):
36
Frankfurt 1971, 8.
37
Not only is this ultimately in line with Davidson’s considerations in terms of content, but also
terminologically he suggests a similar, crucial function of the will (cf. Davidson 2002d, 35). The
central explanatory and normative relevance of the first premise of a practical syllogism is already
emphasized by Anscombe (cf. Anscombe 1963, §23–§26/37–47; Henning 2016, 47f.).
38
Davidson 2002a, 3.
39
Halbig 2016, 137. Translated by DeepL.
40
Accordingly, Anscombe also understands the second premise of a practical syllogism as naming
the “means […] that the agent can immediately take” (Henning 2016, 47, translated by DeepL).
41
This is a variation of an example by Joel Feinberg (cf. Feinberg 1965, 146), which Davidson also
discusses (cf. Davidson 2002b, 55). Both authors refer to the phenomenon of being able to describe
one and the same action in a more or less embellished way as the ‘accordion effect’.
If Klaus only wanted to air the room, his action was not reprehensible, but only very
unpleasant. If, on the other hand, Klaus wanted to kill Schmitz, the matter looks
different.
Secondly, it is striking that no scenario seems conceivable in which Klaus would
not accept the following description of the action: Klaus moves his hand. This is not
to say that the hand movement was always the essential reason for which Klaus
performed the action. That would only be the case if his will related solely to the
hand movement (and that is hardly conceivable in the present case). In any (other)
case, the hand movement is simply the most minimal formulation of how Klaus
implements his will through intentional action: He airs the room by opening the
door. He opens the door by pushing the handle. He pushes the handle by moving his
hand. And stop—at Klaus’ body movement the successive explanatory chain breaks
off:42 We have landed at that description which, according to Davidson, embodies a
“primitive action”43, “in the sense that they cannot be analysed in terms of their
causal relations to acts of the same agent”44. In other words, we do not perform
primitive actions by performing another action. They form the end point of explana-
tions of actions because there is no point in asking further about the ‘how’. In any
case, Klaus will answer in the affirmative to the question of whether he intentionally
moved his hand. He will probably add that this was not the reason for his action, but
that he wanted to air the room. Nevertheless, he will accept the description of his
hand movement as an adequate description of his action, because it is the minimal
version of how an agent tries to realize his will in a concrete situation: by a body
movement.
It can be concluded that the minimal description of the action as intentional body
movement is the content of an agent’s belief and thus takes the place of the second
premise of a practical syllogism. Intentional body movement is an agent’s means of
putting his will into action. For a comprehensive explanation of action, it remains at
this point only to clarify the connection between will and minimal description:
What elements are interposed between the intended good and body movement?
How does the agent get from will to action? A successive answer to the question of
42
One might object that “Klaus contracts his muscles” describes the action in a more minimal
sense than “Klaus moves his hand”. This is true in a basal sense, of course. But in the context of
the practical syllogism, that is, in the context of the justification of action, what matters is the mini-
mal description under which the action was intentionally performed. And unlike Klaus’s action as
muscle contraction, which works as a first-personally adequate description of an action only in
absolutely exceptional cases (if at all), the hand movement is intentionally performed by Klaus in
every conceivable scenario. Thus, describing actions as body movements may not constitute the
most minimal description of them in principle, but it is the most minimal formulation that can
mark them out as intentional (cf. Davidson 2002d, 50–52). If muscle contraction were to occupy
this role in some exotic scenario, then there is nothing to prevent us from taking it in this case as
the minimal description and ipso facto as the body movement. Like Davidson, I also understand
body movements in a broad sense, so that, for instance, mental actions (such as calculating equa-
tions or various cases of omission) are also counted as such (cf. Davidson 2002b, 49).
43
Davidson 2002b, 49.
44
Ibid.
‘why’ forms a chain of reasons that fully explains a person’s action.45 Starting from
the body movement, the action can be traced back to the will through a relation of
‘in-order-to’; using Klaus as an example: Why does Klaus do this? He moves his
hand in order to press the handle, in order to open the door, in order to air the room.
In the opposite direction, as we have already seen, the action can be explained by a
relation of ‘by’: How does Klaus realize his will? He wants to air the room by open-
ing the door, by pressing the handle, by moving his hand.46 Taken together, the pre-
ceding considerations provide a detailed picture of an action:
1. Will: First-personal value of the action ("Klaus wants to air the room...")
[Explantory chain:
"...by opening the door..."
"...by pressing the handle..."]
2. Minimal description: Body movement ("...by moving his hand")

3. Action
This variant of the practical syllogism is not suited to reveal anything about the
fundamental connection between reasons and actions. The incongruity of referring
to the intensional dimension of actions in the premises, but the extensional dimen-
sion in the conclusion, stands in the way of this. I am concerned with the analysis
and justification of actions and not with a deduction of judgments about actions,
which is why the conclusion embodies not such a judgment but the action itself. For
the justification of an action, firstly, its normative dimension is decisive, which is
exemplified by the will, and secondly, its traceability to a body movement, which
allows the realization of the will in concrete action to be traced. Finally, for the
complete explanation of an action, the connection between the first and second
premise is relevant. With this differentiated repertoire of terms and the above model,
it is now possible to conduct a streamlined, well-founded and differentiated action-
theoretical analysis of computer gaming.
45
Cf. Anscombe 1963, §26/45–47; Henning 2016, 46f.; Börchers 2018, 102–104. To speak one last
time about the causal role of reasons: A ‘why’-question concerning the reason of an action is natu-
rally responded to with a ‘because’ answer. This relation between reason and action implies a
causal relation, which became clear from Davidson’s reflections regarding the dual function of
practical syllogisms: “Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea
that the agent performed the action because he had the reason” (Davidson 2002a, 9)—the best
candidate for specifying this ‘because’ is causality; a logical conclusion from premises cannot
explain a relation of events, but only of propositions. Explicating this causal relation with physical
vocabulary, however, is not crucial for understanding action as rationalization, as said, even for
Davidson (cf. ibid., 15–17).
46
Cf. Börchers 2018, 102–104.
2.2 Three Types of Computer Gaming
a) Maria changes binaries.

b) Maria pushes buttons.
c) Maria defeats Peter.
d) Maria plays a game.
e) Maria scores a goal.
f) Thomas Müller scores a goal.
Let us assume that all these descriptions refer to the same event: Maria is playing
the soccer simulation Fifa 19 against Peter on a video game console and has scored
the decisive goal with a game character modeled on the professional soccer player
Thomas Müller. The fact that one and the same action can be described in different
ways is not a unique feature of computer game actions. On the contrary, as the previ-
ous chapter made clear, descriptive relativity can be considered a central feature of
actions of all kinds. Now, what matters is under which description the action was
intentionally performed. In other words: Why did Maria do it? What description
would she choose to distinguish her action as reasonable? Which description
embodies Maria’s will? Answering this question is elementary to clarifying what we
actually do when we play computer games. As a reminder, an explanation of action
is not about physically individuating events or finding a strict causal law that relates
brain activity, muscle contractions, and code shifts. By this procedure, at best, con-
sistent incorporation of action events into a physical theory of the universe could be
achieved, but not a deeper understanding of actions as intentional activities. For an
action to be intelligible as an action, we need to understand, at a normative level,
the reasons that first-personally speak for the same and because of which it is per-
formed. This is a central result of the previous chapter. With these basic consider-
ations in mind, the action descriptions a) and b) seem unsuitable for rationalizing
Maria’s computer game action. Only in exceptional cases can we imagine Maria’s
will being directed towards a) or b) in the execution of her action. Under description
a), a scenario is conceivable in which Maria, as a developer, programs Fifa 19 or, as
a ‘cheater’, tries to manipulate the machine code in such a way that the fictive
Thomas Müller’s shot will definitely go into the goal. These are clearly exotic forms
of interacting with computer games, for which the term ‘playing’ seems inappropri-
ate.47 Action description b) is more suited to explaining the meaning of computer
gaming; for example, in the context of ‘Beat ‘Em Up-Games’, such as Tekken 7, in
which players can memorise various sequences of different button-press combina-
tions in order to defeat their opponents with complex and barely defensible attacks.
47
In this context, Börchers also emphasizes “that all considerations that go as far as to reductively
clarify the problem of the unresolved reality character of computer games by claiming that when
one plays computers, one is doing nothing more in an actual sense or ‘in reality’ than interacting
with the program code or shifting zeros and ones or changing physical states in the computer’s
processor and memory chips are hopeless from the outset” (Börchers 2018, 111, translated
by DeepL).
2.2 Three Types of Computer Gaming 21
In Maria’s case, you could also think of her as a beginner under b), having to con-
sciously execute each button press as she is confronted with Fifa 19 and its rules for
the first time. In general, however, we must also note here that these are rather
exceptional cases of computer gaming. Although every player must of course first
learn certain key combinations in order to play a computer game, there is much to
be said for not taking these learning processes as exemplary computer game actions:
The attack in Tekken 7 can only succeed as such when corresponding key combina-
tions have become ’second nature’ to the player and are no longer thought about;
when a player wants to attack and not press certain buttons in the right order. Maria
can only truly play Fifa 19 (and not just try to play) against Peter when she has
grasped the rules; when she is actually scoring goals and not merely pressing the
circle button, which also happens to be described as scoring a goal.
The descriptions a) and b) do not pose any action-theoretical riddles. They
describe—should they be essential for Maria’s primary reason—prima facie no
actions of play in the narrower sense because they can be explained without having
to refer to events internal to the game. Under description a), Maria could justify her
action by wanting to comprehend various code-level events. Under description b)
she could have performed the action to test the functionality of the controller. These
are rationalizations of the respective action that do not require any further informa-
tion, so they are understandable without any reference to Fifa 19. Maria could have
been playing any game, or no game at all: What happens on screen tends to be
irrelevant under a) and b). It is a different story with descriptions c) to f): While the
explanations of Maria’s action under c) and d) at least demand reference to Fifa 19
as a computer game, e) and f) embody explicitly in-game actions and can be willed
by Maria exclusively with reference to what happens in the game. Paradoxically, at
first glance, the rationalisation of the action under f) seems to be possible even with-
out reference to Maria as an agent, by referring solely to the (fictive) will of the
(fictive) Thomas Müller.
These cases pose puzzles for action theory. Using the example of a racing game,
Börchers describes the phenomenon as the ‘strangeness’ of computer gaming,
which consists in “explaining the arm and joystick movement in front of the com-
puter by avoiding a tree in the computer game”48. This includes a “leap in the levels
of reality”49 in the explanation of computer game actions. Börchers’ ‘leap’ is not
meant to imply that in explaining computer gaming one must refer to substance-
dualistically separate worlds of ‘fiction’ and ‘reality’. On the contrary, the real
action of pressing buttons on a controller and the fictional action of shooting a goal
are extensionally identical events. Only in this way can the events be understood as
justifiable action. In this context, the description in b) is relevant; not as an embodi-
ment of Maria’s will, but as a minimal description of her action: As an intentional
body movement. For, in principle, any computer gaming can be understood as a
48
49
Ibid. Translated by DeepL.
body movement of button-pushing.50 This is the commonality of descriptions c) to

f) and a crucial feature of computer gaming as a whole. What differs are the norma-
tive determinations of the actions; the will, which, on the one hand, refers to the
game-internal events but, on the other hand, cannot be understood without game-
external references:
The action of play necessarily invokes for its explanation a vocabulary that refers to con-
cepts, activities, and skills that have their primary place in, or at least derive from, non-play
reality. One would not understand what I do while playing if there were no familiarity with
the corresponding activities in the world beyond the game—and yet the act of playing is not
one of these activities, but precisely another activity in our lifeworld: Playing a particular
computer game.51
In any action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming, it must therefore be made

clear, on the one hand, in what sense someone does not act as he plays: In what
sense Maria does not score a goal, but presses buttons. On the other hand, it must
also become clear in what sense someone acts the way she plays. In order to under-
stand what Maria is actually doing, it is not enough to describe the action based on
reality. In order to understand that Maria plays with Peter and wins against him by
scoring a goal with Thomas Müller, it is necessary to change the level of descrip-
tion: To the level of fiction.52 Thus, in order to understand action descriptions c) and
50
Admittedly, there are some computer games that do not react to the push of a button, but to ges-
tures, movement, or speech. However, this does not change my action-theoretical analysis as a
whole. In these cases, ‘button-pressing’ is simply replaced by an alternative game-controlling body
movement. The determination of ‘button-pressing’ as a minimal description of typical computer
gaming underlines an interesting specific feature of according actions: The minimal description of
the player’s action as button-pressing is immediately obvious to every player. It embodies the
essential means of players to achieve their (in-game) purposes. A more minimal description—as a
finger or hand movement, for instance—seems ‘too close’ to us in play to function as a second
premise in the practical syllogism (cf. ibid., 111). The description of Klaus’s airing as a muscle
contraction is equivalent to the description of (the vast majority of) computer gaming as a finger
movement.
51
52
Juul and Tavinor prominently emphasize the elementary role of fiction with regard to computer
games. Juul describes computer games as ‘half-real’ and thus refers to their dual nature between
‘real rules’ and fictive, imagined events: “Video games are a combination of rules and fiction.
Rules are definite descriptions of what can and cannot be done in a game, and they provide chal-
lenges that the player must gradually learn to overcome. Fiction is ambiguous—the game can
project more or less coherent fictional worlds that the player then may imagine” (Juul 2005, 197).
Tavinor also emphasizes this connection, though here physical interaction takes the place of Juul’s
‘real rules’: “Videogames, because of their robust and contingent digital media, are interactive fic-
tions in two senses: their props engage players in an ongoing physical interaction, and they allow
the player to step fictionally into an imaginary world” (Tavinor 2009, 33). Although both authors
rightly point to the significance of fiction and its important relationship to the player’s imagination,
they are too imprecise when it comes to the role of reality and its constitutive relationship to fic-
tion. I would doubt, first, that the ‘real’ side of computer games can be sufficiently explained by
‘real rules’ or ‘physical interaction’. Secondly, computer games and computer game actions should
not be understood as diffuse ‘hybrids’ of fiction and reality. On the contrary, it must be made clear
to what extent computer games and computer game actions can be adequately described with a
d), it must be clear to what extent Maria is playing a game and referring to fiction in
her actions. Moreover, for the understanding of e) and f), it seems elementary that
Maria’s action is in some way situated within fiction. In the following chapters, the
aim is to shed light on these riddling connections.
2.2.1 Virtual Actions
Maria’s action under description c) could be rationalized by the following practical

syllogism:
1. Will: "I want to defeat Peter... "
["...by scoring a goal..."]
2. Minimal description: "...by pressing the buttons xyz."

3. Action
Some conclusions can be drawn from this account. Maria’s computer game
action formally resembles an ordinary action: Without problems, the practical syl-
logism can be constructed by specifying the first-personal value in the first premise
and the body movement in the second premise. Three descriptions are given under
which Maria performed her action (c) intentionally: i) ‘Maria defeats Peter’, ii)
‘Maria scores a goal’, and iii) ‘Maria pushes the buttons xyz’. The first and third
descriptions, as indications of first-personal value i) and body movement iii), refer
to reality; the second description, as the transition of will to minimal description ii),
refers to an in-game action. Without this transition, the action explanation would be
incomplete: It would remain unclear how Maria defeats Peter. Her intended victory
can only be understood as such with reference to the events of the game. Without
description ii) it would not be clear that the action described is a gaming action,
because both i) and iii) give no indication of this. Maria could also want to ‘defeat’
Peter without ii) in the context of drone warfare by pressing a button. But this kind
of button-pushing (and also this kind of victory) is massively different from what
Maria does when playing Fifa 19—and not just morally. The key difference is in the
explanatory chain, which in the latter case invokes a fiction with ii)—whereas in the
case of drone warfare there is no trace of fiction. Now, one could object that the
example of the drone war is badly chosen, because it is an event that is fundamen-
tally different from playing Fifa 19 and involves entirely different causal processes.
Similarly, it could be stated, playing Fifa 19 is not violent murder: The analogy is
not informative! The objection is a valid one. The simple example was merely meant
to suggest the fundamental normative role that fiction plays in actions of play. Now
follows a somewhat more complicated example that outlines this point more sharply:
terminology of the fictional or the physical, and what yields the respective explanatory patterns
bring to the phenomenon in question (see Sects. 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 3.2.1).
It is meant to show that the difference between computer game acts and extension-
ally identical non-computer game acts is based solely on the first-personal reference
to fiction—and that the physical event level has nothing to do with it.
Let us assume that Maria is a toddler and has never played a computer game: She
does not know what to do with a controller and does not understand the connections
on the screen. Unlike Peter, who already deals with video game consoles on a daily
basis. At kindergarten, Peter is Maria’s rival: He regularly disturbs her in the craft
room or the reading corner and competes with her for the best seat next to the
teacher. Maria’s big sister knows about this feud. One day, when Peter’s parents
visit Maria’s, Peter arrives at Maria’s home. Maria, worried about being degraded in
her own home, asks her big sister to help her teach Peter a lesson. The big sister
knows that Peter likes to play computer games and is always out to win. It would be
an embarrassment to him if he lost in Fifa 19. So, Maria’s big sister gets the two
children into her room and starts up the video game console. She sets the game so
that one goal is enough to win: Golden Goal. Maria does not understand any of this:
She does not know that her big sister is starting a game, she only sees that the TV is
switched on. To simplify matters, her big sister tells her that all she needs to do to
win against Peter is to press the circle button on the device (the controller) at the
right moment. And Maria wants to win against Peter—even if she does not know
what she will win against him in or how. She trusts completely in her sister. The
latter now plays Fifa 19 against Peter until she is in front of the goal with Thomas
Müller. “Now!” shouts the big sister. And Maria defeats Peter i) by pressing the
circle button iii).
Admittedly, this is a very exotic example. But the premises of Maria’s practical
syllogism are similar to the premises above. The resulting action as an event is also
extensionally analogous: The same muscles are contracted, the same binaries are
shifted, the same in-game event is digitally displayed. But in one case Maria is play-
ing, in the other, she is merely pressing a button, although in both cases she is win-
ning and she wants to win. The difference lies in the reasoning relation between the
premises: In the first case, it is related to fiction, to the in-game event of Fifa 19:
“…by scoring a goal…”. In the second case, we have an event that on the surface
appears to be a computer game action, but is first-personally not distinguished as
such, and is therefore not a computer game action: Maria does not know that she is
playing. She only knows that by pressing a button she defeats Peter (by listening to
her sister, not by scoring a goal). Therefore, Maria is not playing here, because she
does not refer to fiction in her actions.53
53
An agent must know in some way what he is doing. And this knowledge determines the action.
Anscombe in particular emphasizes this with reference to practical knowledge (cf. Anscombe
1963, §45/82f.; Henning 2016, 54; Börchers 2018, 104–106), but Davidson also takes up this
aspect in his discussion of beliefs (cf. Davidson 2002e, 91–96). In each of the cases discussed,
Maria knows that she wins but the knowledge of how she achieves victory is quite different depend-
ing on the situation and affects her rationalization. In this context, it could be argued that the cases
are not identical because the meaning of ‘winning’ and ‘defeating’ differs in the examples and
Maria wants to achieve something quite different depending on the case. Thus, the first meaning is
genuinely internal to the game and relates solely to an in-game victory. Winning and defeating in
Hereby, another decisive characteristic of computer gaming is found: It must

have a reference to fiction in the practical syllogism in order to be comprehensible
as gaming.54 This reference is first-personally identified. That is, as soon as the
player himself understands aspects of his actions as fiction, he includes them in his
rationalization. It follows that a fiction-theoretical classification of the computer
game (as an object) plays only a minor role for the fiction-theoretical classification
of computer gaming (as an activity). For example, while it can be argued whether
Tetris is fictional or merely ‘abstract’, this debate is not crucial to the question of
whether or not a player of Tetris refers to fiction when acting.55 The latter depends
primarily on the player and her understanding of her actions. Maria’s actions under
descriptions a) and b), for instance, do not imply this understanding. In the case of
action description c), however, there is a corresponding first-personal reference to
the fiction, albeit hidden: It only emerges when Maria explicates the reasoning rela-
tion between will and body movement. Her will as such (and of course her body
movement) is indeed directed towards reality—she (really) wants to win. In the
deeper explanation of her action, however, Maria refers to the fiction of a soccer
game: She scores a goal.
From the preceding remarks, two important features of the type of action under
discussion crystallize: First, the explanatory chain refers to fiction; second, the will
aims at reality. Thus, this play behavior comes quite close to ordinary actions. In a
sense, Maria only takes a detour via fiction in order to achieve her real purpose: To
defeat Peter. It might even be possible to state: Maria is not actually playing at all!
At first glance, this suspicion is substantiated by our typical dealings with
this sense can thus only be intended when playing. In the second meaning, winning and defeating
can also be wanted outside of a game, because here it is primarily about the desire for superiority
over an opponent. Thus, to keep the examples discussed analogous, let us assume that for Maria
the second reading of ‘winning’ and ‘defeating’ is central in each case, which can be willed inside
as well as outside of play. Thus, as before, it is the reference to fiction alone—rather than Maria’s
will—that distinguishes the cases. I thank Sebastian Ostritsch for pointing out the different
readings.
54
My often synonymous use of ‘game’ or ‘gaming’ and ‘computer game’ or ‘computer gaming’ in
this research suggests that the central findings of my analysis can be made to apply not only to
computer gaming, but to activities of play in general. I cannot elaborate on this assumption in more
depth, but believe it to be true. For critical readers, let my use of ‘game(s)’ always be understood
as ‘computer game(s)’.
55
I put the term ‘abstract’ in quotation marks when I am referring to the form of representation of
an aesthetic object; in this sense, for example, paintings or films can also be ‘abstract’ (or kitschy
or realistic, etc.). Without quotation marks, I use the term when referring to the ontological status
of entities; in this sense, numbers, for example, are abstract. In academic discussion of whether
Tetris is fictional or merely ‘abstract’, primary reference is made to the first reading. But why
should the attribute ‘abstract’ exclude the attribute ‘fictional’? In this regard, I argue—contrary to
the common view that Tetris and similarly ‘abstract’ computer games do not constitute fictions (cf.
Juul 2005, 130–133; Tavinor 2009, 24)—for a broad concept of fiction that understands games of
any kind as fictional works, because every game constitutes qua game a ‘level of reality’ that does
not correspond to actual reality and that one has to engage with in order to be able to truly play: a
fictive level determined by rules of the game rather than laws of nature (I will discuss my concept
of fiction in more detail in Sect. 3.2.1).
corresponding player behavior: Who does not know them, the players who are only
concerned with profiling by winning and who (want to) break off a game when this
is no longer possible? These players are often accused of not getting involved in the
game, of being spoilsports. With the above model, the accusation can be made more
precise: Fiction serves them less as an elementary point of reference than merely as
an aspect of the action. They work with their play towards real, not in-game, goals.
I call this kind of computer game action virtual action. It is characterized by the fact
that it is basically similar to ordinary actions, not only in form but also in content:
The will is directed towards reality and the minimal description includes an inten-
tional body movement. The decisive difference lies in the detour that a virtual
action, in contrast to an ordinary action, takes via fiction.
However, I would like to reject the assumption that virtual actions are not actions
of play in the true sense: I also play a round of Fifa 19 against my brother when I
(only) want to win. I play The Witcher 3: Wild Hunt when I want to show my wife a
certain landscape from the game. I also play Fortnite when I want to be ranked
number one in the world. That is evidenced by common usage. Nonetheless, it is
worth turning our attention to a narrower sense of play to conclude this chapter.
With regard to the treatment of the beauty of art, Kant refers to the “free play of the
powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general”56, in
which “no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition”57,
whereby a pure, “ subjective universal”58 experience is possible. Schiller specifies
that our use of language “tends to designate by the word play everything that is
neither subjectively nor objectively accidental, and yet neither externally nor inter-
nally compelled.”59 Acts of play in this narrower sense are thus distinguished by the
fact that, as regulated (not accidental) and at the same time free acts, they are not
under the coercion of external ends. This suggests that, for the activity of genuine
play, it is precisely not enough to somehow involve fiction, but that, in addition, the
will in play should not aim at a purpose external to the game. Huizinga takes the
same line: “Not being ‘ordinary’ life it stands outside the immediate satisfaction of
wants and appetites, indeed it interrupts the appetitive process. It interpolates itself
as a temporary activity satisfying in itself and ending there.”60 The activity that
Schiller and Huizinga describe can be understood as a pure form of play. It is a
practice that is not reducible to actions or purposes external to play. Huizinga makes
this point very vividly:
Though you can “ein Spiel treiben” in German and “een Spiel doen” in Dutch and “pursue
a game” in English, the proper verb is “play” itself. You “play a game”, or “spielen ein
Spiel”. To some extent this is lost in English by the doublet play and game. Nevertheless the
fact remains that in order to express the nature of the activity the idea contained in the noun
must be repeated in the verb. Does not this mean that the act of playing is of such a peculiar
56
CPJ 5:217/102.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid, 5:217/103.
59
Schiller 2013, 15th Letter/60. Translated by DeepL.
60
Huizinga 1980, 9.
and independent nature as to lie outside the ordinary categories of action? Playing is no
“doing” in the ordinary sense; you do not “do” a game as you “do” or “go” fishing, or hunt-
ing, or Morris-dancing, or woodwork—you “play” it. 61
This does not mean that ‘pure’ playing is not also acting. It is acting that is dis-
tinguished by a special relation to fiction. Nor does it mean that playing is so self-
sufficient that one does not pursue any (other) purposes.62 Even in pure forms of
play, such as children’s sandbox play, there are of course purposes involved—for
example, baking a (sand) cake. But the purposes of these pure-play acts are distin-
guished by the fact that they are set within the realm of play: They are, in other
words, fictional. Virtual acts are thus not pure play, for Maria’s purpose of defeating
Peter is a purpose of ‘ordinary life’ and stands within ‘the immediate satisfaction of
wants’. However, since Maria’s goal is essentially achieved by playing Fifa 19, I
prefer a broader use of ‘play’ that is closer to our normal use of the term: Virtual acts
are also play acts because they involve fictions in their explanatory chain—I play
even when I just want to have fun or to relax. Only this is not playing in its
pure form.63
How is description d) to be classified against this background? Here Maria’s
action is referred to as follows: “Maria plays a game”. Suppose this description
embodies Maria’s will. Is it a virtual act or a playing in its pure form? This depends
fundamentally on how Maria understands the ‘game’: Either Maria refers to the
computer game Fifa 19 or the (fictive) soccer game in Fifa 19. If Maria wants to
play Fifa 19 and this forms the primary reason for her action, it is a virtual action.64
61
Ibid, 37.
62
This is also convincingly pointed out by Börchers (cf. Börchers 2018, 117f.).
63
The semantically disputable postulate of ‘playing in its pure form’ (‘spielen in Reinform’) can
hardly be avoided in the German language, among other things because of the wide range of mean-
ings of ‘Spiel’. In English a contentual distinction can be made between ‘game’ and ‘play’, which
is often done in research: ”According to this, play stands for the intensity and expressivity of
‘Spiel’, its capacity to make wild, while games, in contrast, denote an institutionalized structure in
which play can unfold, but does not have to, […] because unlike play, games can be negotiated
without reference to the players, their perceptions, experiences, passions” (Adamowsky 2018, 34,
translated by DeepL). This distinction is not entirely congruent with my remarks on virtual actions
and playing in its pure form, because—as I have shown—virtual actions are also actions of play
and, furthermore, I do not strictly differentiate between actions of ‘gaming’ and actions of ‘play-
ing’ for the sake of the reading flow. Nevertheless, one could make the differentiation more fruitful
for my distinction between the pure form of play (ultimately: fictional actions) and virtual actions.
Virtual actions would then rather be identified with gaming and pure play actions rather with play-
ing: Gamers act in an observable and understandable way in reality, their purposes of action are
comprehensible without reference to fiction or specific in-game experiences. They want to win,
they want to have fun, they want to overcome challenges. Their actions can be analysed without
much difficulty, because they can be described without reference to the in-game experience.
Players, on the other hand, move outside the ordinary realm and act in a specific way within the
game world that remains to be explored. But, as already noted, this terminological differentiation
is not used in this analysis, although it is promising.
64
The case is somewhat contrived, for typically the desire to play a computer game always func-
tions as a kind of overriding pro-attitude that first-personally prompts the activity of playing, which
then in turn allows for more differentiated game-internal ways of describing the course of playing.
If, on the other hand, Maria wants to play soccer in a specific way (which remains
to be clarified), it is a matter of playing in its pure form, which, like the gaming
action of baking sand cakes, does not contain a merely indirect reference to fiction,
but is itself elementarily fictional.65 This type of computer gaming will be explained
in the next section.
2.2.2 Fictional Actions
Maria’s action under description e) is an exemplary case of what I will, hereafter,

call fictional action:
1. Will: “I want to score a goal...”

2. Minimal description: “...by pressing the buttons xyz.”
3. Action
This practical syllogism differs from that of virtual (and ordinary) actions in that
Maria’s will relates to in-game events: The purpose of her action is fictional. The
reference to fiction is immediately apparent in the context of the game situation, and
not only through analysis of Maria’s explanatory chain, as was still the case with the
virtual action. Therefore, it is not necessary to list the intermediate steps from the
will to the body movement in the syllogism: If there were any, they would be
optional additions to the description of the action, which would contribute nothing
to the normative explanation of the action as play.
One might argue that a fictional action like the one above is unthinkable because
ultimately there must always be a real purpose to the action: Actually, Maria surely
wants to win or have fun or achieve anything real. This objection is not valid. First,
we have already seen that fictional descriptions of actions are not only possible but
essential (at least in the explanatory chain) to being able to identify the act of play-
ing as such. And if fictional descriptions can appear within an explanatory chain,
then why not at the beginning of one? Secondly, I fail to see (if only from personal
experience) why a player’s will should not be able to be directed towards fiction.
This is particularly evident in the context of narratively complex games, such as
Detroit: Become Human. Here, emotional identification with the characters is
almost inevitable due to the strong narrative ties. In addition, the death of a charac-
ter in this game actually means the death of the character: there is no retry; if the
player fails, the story continues with one less character. The fact that in the context
of well-written stories, recipients may wish for a character not to die (within the
65
Tavinor already points to the important difference between virtuality and fiction, but does not
expand on this distinction (especially with reference to ethical considerations) (cf. Tavinor 2009,
44–52). Examples of virtuality without fiction (ergo: outside of play, i.e., no virtual actions in the
sense defined here) are digital simulations for training pilots or Maria’s button-pushing on the
instructions of her sister.
fiction) is well known from experiences with other narrative media, such as movies
or novels. I do not see anything that speaks against these wishes becoming effective
in the case of computer games and forming the will of the player. In the case of
Detroit: Become Human, for instance, “I want to protect my foster daughter!” (“by
calming the man in front of me, by saying the right things, by pressing the buttons
xyz”). The burden of proof is on those who claim that such rationalizations are not
possible. They would have to show that no desires concerning fictions are possible
at all, since a will is nothing more than an effective desire. This project, however,
seems to me to be doomed to failure in view of various possibilities of emotional
reactions concerning fictions.66
Back to Maria. So let us assume that her will actually relates to the game as fic-
tion: She wants to score a goal. How is that possible? Most importantly, how can her
fictional will to score a goal be realized through her physical act of pressing a but-
ton? Two contexts seem incompatible here: First, that a physical movement influ-
ences fiction. Second, that a goal is scored by a finger movement—hardly two
movements are further apart.
Let us first come to the second point, which at first sight can be cleared up with-
out much difficulty: The goal-scoring and the button-pushing are not two different
actions, but one and the same action described in two different ways. This inten-
sional peculiarity of actions of all kinds has already been sufficiently discussed: Just
as I can describe murder as a hand movement, I can also describe a goal kick as a
finger movement. But this does not solve the problem completely. The last case
contains an incongruity that is missing in the first case: While the connection
between the execution of a murder and a hand movement is obvious (murder by
poisoning, murder by shooting, etc.), this intuitive relationship between a goal shot
and a finger movement is missing—it should rather be a movement of the foot or the
leg! The crucial clue to the solution is that Maria’s goal shot is not a common goal
shot, but a fictional goal shot within Fifa 19. And unlike a common goal shot, a
fictional goal shot within a computer game is not so closely linked to the movement
of the foot. How one performs a fictional goal shot when playing a computer game
seems to be more or less arbitrary (depending on the hardware and software). But
that still does not clarify what it actually means to scoring a goal fictionally. This
brings us to the first problem.
To specify the difficulty that arises when explaining Maria’s action as perform-
ing a physical body movement (second premise) in order to score a goal fictionally
(first premise), let us consider a striking example of Walton’s: Let us imagine
Charles watching a horror movie with a terrifying green slime monster. As the mon-
ster moves toward the camera—toward Charles—Charles panics, breaks out in a
sweat, and shrieks. By his admission, Charles was terrified, yet he did not flee the
room or call the police. Why not?
66
Walton elaborates convincingly on the sense in which we can feel emotions towards fictive char-
acters (cf. Walton 1978a), which I will discuss later in this chapter. With regard to computer games,
Bernd Bösel and Sebastian Möring provide a good overview of the role of affects (cf. Bösel/
Möring 2018).
There is a definite barrier against physical interactions between fictional worlds and the real
world. Spectators at a play are prevented from rendering aid to a heroine in distress. There
is no way that Charles can dam up the slime, or take a sample for laboratory analysis. But,
as Charles’s case dramatically illustrates, this barrier appears to be psychologically trans-
parent. It would seem that real people can, and frequently do have psychological attitudes
toward merely fictional entities, despite the impossibility of physical intervention.67
Charles’s case increases the difficulty regarding Maria’s fictional action: Physical
interaction between fiction and reality seems fundamentally impossible.68 This is the
reason why Charles does not flee or show any other reaction appropriate to a real
dangerous situation: He knows that the slime monster cannot harm him because it is
fictive. But how is it then possible for Maria to score a goal fictionally? A possible
solution emerges if we analyze Charles’s case a little more closely with Walton: If
Charles actually knows that the slime monster is merely fictive (for otherwise he
would run out of the room), why does he feel fear at all? Walton’s first assumption,
that while physical interaction between fiction and reality is impossible, a psycho-
logical one is possible, becomes a puzzle against this background: If there is no
danger and Charles knows it—where does the fear come from? Another case: If we
know that no one has actually died, why do we grieve when a lovable character in a
novel dies? One feels fear when there is danger, grief when there is loss. When
receiving fiction, we typically neither find ourselves in danger nor do we factually
lose anything. Ergo, the appropriate question is this: Do we really grieve? Does
Charles really feel fear?
At first glance, one could strongly argue for this. Most of us can think of moments
when fiction has triggered very deep and lasting emotional responses that feel no
different from ordinary emotions. And in Charles’s case, too, some symptoms sug-
gest that he is indeed feeling fear: His pulse is rising, his senses are heightened, his
tension is high, he speaks of ‘fear’. But: He does not flee—nor does he feel the need
to. These findings make it clear to Walton that it would be a mistake to accept psy-
chological interaction between fiction and reality in a strong sense: “We do indeed
get ‘caught up’ in stories; we often become ‘emotionally involved’ when we read
novels or watch plays or films. But to construe this involvement as consisting of our
having psychological attitudes toward fictional entities is, I think, to tolerate mys-
tery and court confusion.”69 To make a sharp terminological distinction between
67
Walton 1978a, 5f.
68
This should not be read too strongly. Of course, in both Charles’s and Maria’s cases, physical
interactions take place: Charles sees the slime because light waves hit his eye, activating certain
neurons in his brain that trigger what we call ‘fear’. And Maria’s action has already been discussed
in terms of the code level. So physical interactions take place with the physical basis of fictions.
But this physical description of the event does not yield any understanding of the mental or fic-
tional situation—we understand even less why Charles should be afraid of light waves than of the
representation of a monster. And Maria’s goal-scoring is not made intelligible as such by reference
to the activity of button-pushing or changing binaries. Physical terminology is simply inappropri-
ate for explaining mental (cf. Davidson 2002f; Davidson 2002g) or fictional phenomena in their
specificity (see Sect. 3.2.1).
69
Walton 1978a, 6.
emotions related to fiction and ordinary emotions, Walton refers to the former as
quasi-emotions.70 Analogously, we can call actions like Maria’s in (e), which are
distinguished by their particular relation to fiction, quasi-actions.71 The way Walton
solves the problem of quasi-emotions provides crucial clues to solving the problem
of quasi-actions. The cases are not as different as they might seem at first glance:
Although Walton is concerned with a paradox of psychological interaction and I am
concerned with a paradox of physical interaction, both bring up the same problem
in that their respective terminologies are inadequate for adequately grasping the
phenomenon of fictional interaction. Neither a conventional psychological nor a
physical classification is sufficient to fully explain Charles’s or Maria’s behaviors:
The fear of the slime monster and the goal shot elude traditional explanatory pat-
terns. This problem will be solved in the following, first in relation to quasi-
emotions, then in relation to quasi-actions.
An important observation that Walton makes is that each work of fiction has its
fictive world, constituted by the imaginative power of the recipient: “There is,
roughly, a distinct fictional world corresponding to each novel, painting, film, the
game of make-believe, dream, or daydream. All fictional truths are in one way or
another man-made.”72 The interaction with such a world takes place within the
70
Cf. ibid.
71
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it should be emphasized at this point that Walton’s term
‘quasi-emotion’ does not refer to an extensionally independent class of emotions. Nor do I under-
stand quasi-actions or fictional actions as an extensional independent class of actions. What Walton
and I are concerned with is a terminological specification at the intensional level in order to be able
to adequately describe and normatively determine the phenomena. It is not a matter of ‘discover-
ing’ physically novel events, but of a conceptual differentiation of already known ones.
72
Ibid, 10. Following Walton, I use ‘fictive world’ as a very broad term that can neither be suffi-
ciently explained by reference to counterfactual worlds (this position is held by David Lewis, for
example, cf. Lewis 1978) nor should it be understood too narrowly as a narratively structured,
‘narrated world’ (Tavinor, among others, holds this position, cf. Tavinor 2009, but this view is also
widespread in literary studies, cf. Martinez/Scheffel 2012, 22–28). In my view, every computer
game (as a work of fiction) can constitute a fictive world: A reality-system separate from (actual)
reality, with which players are confronted on the screen and which follows its own rules as well as
being elementarily characterized by incompleteness (which I will discuss in more detail in Sect.
3.2.1). This view faces the accusation of overstretching the concept of fiction, for instance, with
regard to the simple computer game Tetris: “Tetris does not seem to be a fiction, because it is no
part of that game that we imagine a corresponding fictional world; arguably, the game is just com-
prised of the real manipulation of virtual representations or symbols on a screen” (Tavinor 2009,
24). Börchers takes the same line by determining Tetris as ‘semantically flat’, since here, when
playing, “one simply does what one does: The game offers no other mode of description” (Börchers
2018, 112, translated by DeepL). I agree that Tetris as a game suggests that when playing, one
would merely “turn falling blocks and, if possible, sink them into gaps of already stacked blocks”
(ibid.). But first, this description can certainly be understood as fictional; in any case, it is not
physical—after all, one does not really stack blocks when playing Tetris. Second, this description
of action need not to be the dominant one in playing Tetris. Playing Tetris allows for different ways
of describing it besides the obvious one. It could, for example, be understood by an imagining
child as the efficient packing of a suitcase. In principle, there seems to be nothing to be said against
such a description of action, which the child would first-personally characterize as reasonable.
Whether and to what extent this description would be appropriate for Tetris as an object is another
framework of a ‘game of make-believe’: The recipients pretend that or act as if the

fictive facts were actually true.73 Against this background, Charles pretends that a
green slime monster is attacking him and the resulting fear is a make-believe fear:
“Charles actually experiences his make-believe fear. I don’t mean that there is a
special kind of fear, make-believe fear, which Charles experiences. What he actually
experiences, his quasi-fear feelings, are not feelings of fear. But it is true of them
that make-believedly they are feelings of fear”74. According to Walton, then, Charles
does not feel fear in the actual sense, but he merely makes himself believe that he
feels fear in the actual sense. As quasi-fear, the dimension of Charles’s reaction can
only be adequately grasped first-personally: “Insofar as make-believe truths are
generated by a spectator’s or reader’s state of mind, he is no mere ‘external observer’
of the fictional world. Ascertaining what make-believedly is true of himself is to a
large extent a matter of introspection”75.
Walton thus assumes that, firstly, every fiction corresponds to a fictive world,
which, secondly, is imaginatively (co-)constituted by games of make-believe and,
thirdly, is thereby (only) first-personally accessible to the agents of these games. All
the emotions felt and interactions within make-believe are not ordinary emotions
and interactions, but quasi-emotions and quasi-interactions, which means nothing
other than that the agent pretends to have the respective experiences. This does not
imply that the intensity or relevance of these experiences is in any way diminished
or weakened. On the contrary, quasi-emotions can be profound experiences, and
quasi-facts do in some cases lend themselves to high (first-personal) relevance—as
anyone who has ever destroyed the (sand) castle of a playing child knows. The child
will not only be indignant and sad that a few minutes of work have been wasted, but
also that the king’s (fictive) castle is now destroyed. In special cases, quasi-events
might even be extensionally similar to their real counterparts, yet the categorical
difference would remain at the intensional level: A quasi-anxiety that neuronally
activates the same brain areas as real anxiety is not real anxiety because it is felt
‘within the fictive world’ to which we ‘descend’ in the context of make-believe, or
more precisely, “[W]e extend ourselves to their level, since we do not stop actually
existing when it becomes fictional that we exist.”76 Accordingly, a quasi-murder that
involves the same body movements as a real murder is not a real murder—however,
it is a real action (of play). Another, less drastic example: Even if the same muscles
are contracted when pushing buttons in the context of a fictional game situation as
question—I am primarily concerned with the actions of the players and their descriptions, which
in the case of fictional actions refer to fictive worlds that are essentially (co-)constructed by players.
73
Cf. Walton 1978a, 10–12.
74
Ibid, 22. Analogously, Maria’s quasi-goal-scoring is not a special kind of real goal-scoring (and
a quasi-murder is not a real murder), but she makes herself believe that her action is a
goal-scoring.
75
Ibid, 21.
76
Ibid, 23. This is not the case, however, if we completely forget that we are confronted with fiction.
In this case, we are no longer in a fictional action situation; there is no make-believe. This case,
however, should be extremely rare, if not unthinkable—for such a ‘brain-in-the-tank’-like immer-
sion in fiction, the media and technical conditions would have to be completely invisible.
in a (extensionally identical) non-game action of controller testing, the two activi-

ties can be strictly distinguished. The first case is a quasi-action and essentially
involves interaction with fiction, the second does not.
All these findings indicate that we are not dealing with a substantially autono-
mous world when faced with fiction (with which we could not interact at all), but
with a specific way of describing events, which is distinguished, among other things,
by the fact that its rules are constructed imaginatively. The process of creating fic-
tive worlds and their rules can be entirely free, such as in the context of children’s
play, or tied to works of fiction (as in Charles’ case)—in either case, they are imagi-
natively produced. Although every quasi-event can also be described as a physical
event of neuronal brain processes or as a mental event of imagining, the appropriate
explanatory pattern always lies first-personally in a genuinely fictional terminology:
Neither neurons are merely activated nor events merely imagined, but the fictive
events actually take place on the level of fiction. At the moment of play, from the
child’s perspective, it is, in a way, not a game that the sand cake is burnt, but the cake
is burnt. Nor will Charles say that he is merely pretending to be afraid of the mon-
ster, but that he is afraid of the monster. If he chose the first answer, it would imply
a very different situation from the one we have described: If Charles were first-
personally to describe the event as an ‘as-if-emotion’, then we would be dealing
neither with fear nor with quasi-fear. Charles would then be like a long-time actor
dying a martyr’s death on stage for the fiftieth time—there is no trace of fear or
quasi-fear here because any emotional reaction is absent. Unless, of course, the
actor is so absorbed in his role that he actually reacts emotionally to the fictive
events. Then he would have quasi-fear like Charles. And if the actor forgets his
lines—then he may feel real fear. Describing interactions with fictions as make-
believe is essential from the external perspective in the context of a mental explana-
tory pattern because here the action is framed in the context of rationality, reasons,
desires, beliefs, values, and purposes, but the internal perspective refers to a very
different frame: a fictional terminology.77
Enough about Charles, back to Maria: In what way does Maria score a goal?
Against the background of the previous considerations, there are three possible vari-
ants of description:
77
The peculiarities of different ways of describing actions by means of physical and mental termi-
nologies is inspired by Davidson’s corresponding reflections on anomalous monism (cf. Davidson
2002f; Davidson 2002g). However, it is not necessary to fully agree with Davidson’s remarks in
this context in order to follow my reflections on fictional terminology. All that is important at this
point is that physical descriptions refer to physical entities and mental descriptions refer to mental
entities—and, correspondingly, fictional descriptions refer to fictive entities. The specific charac-
teristics of fictions will be discussed in more detail in Sect. 3.2.1.
Another random document with
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te branden stonden in rosse gloeiing, verzwevend en wisselend,
soms oplaaiend in dampend rood, dan verflauwend plots, met
opdoeming van schaduw-schimmen wonder-wild en fantomig uit
schemerstraatje. Telkens als smidsjongen trok, aan blaasbalg, ijlde
’n metaalgloed als brandende oker over de huisjeskrommingen, heet
roodgoud neerschroeiend op ’n vuil-kronkelig gangpoortje. En
telkens stapten menschen, nu donkere straatfiguren, uit
zijweggetjes, in den lichtgloed, als magisch éven beschenen, met
opglanzing fèl, van rooie koppen, lachend en satanisch, onbewust
[61]van hun rossige kleur-huivering, die wonder-diep en vizioenig
gezichten en handen, vergroeien liet in vreemd avond-goud; alles
rondom, dan plots donkerend verdween in zijweggetjes buiten
brand-kaatsing. Het verweerde poortje stond even dan in gloed, als
burcht-ingang, geheimzinnig vergroot, met achter zich, spitsen en
tinnen in duisteren glimsels. En van overal kropen in rosse schijnsels
de straatkrotjes bijéén, fel in vuurlijn afgestreept tusschen hevige
schaduwen op kei en grond, angstig en ontzaglijk van geheim-
kleurig duister.… Tot plots de smidse stil uithijgde en voor ’n poosje ’t
straatje weer te droef-schemeren lag, stil en nietig, met z’n vuile
mosdakige schemerdroeve krotjes.
Guurt kon niet afzien van den rossigen brand, die telkens op den
vuur-verwilderden kop van den smid vóórop uitschoot, als de balg
aan ’t laaien ging. Ze hoorde àchter ’t hok-raampje, het getemperde
geluid van z’n hameringen op de gloei-lichtende wielen en hoepels.
—Met pret in ’r, zag ze ’t vonke-sterren, de vuurspatten om de
donkere hoofden en rompen van andere werkers dans-kringen en
zweven, en alles weer heelemaal wegduisteren als de smidse tot
rust kwam. Dan zocht ze in den zwakken zwaveligen nastroom van
den gloed, hun hoofden, maar zag niets dan vage vormen van
travaille, wiel-bonken en donkere karbrokken, groote hoefbogen,
ijzerrommel en walsen, die als vergramd in de halve werkplaats-
duistering zwarten uitlijnden.—Vrouw Hassel zag niets, zat met ’r
donker hoofd maar te staren in schemerstraatje, tot plots
vlammengloed van overkant haar kwam bebloeden, en wilden angst
gaf aan ’r suffe hoofd met ’r magere hand aan d’r mond gekneld.
Guurtje, tegenover haar, in ros-gouën schijn, begloeid als in
tooverballet, het fijne hoofd, met die weeke trekken, als ’n Elsa,
omlicht alleen, het gezicht en haardos. En plots weer schimden de
vrouwenhoofden weg, met stilte tusschen de lichamen. ’t Was als ’n
visioen van monsterachtige leelijkheid en vreemde sage-fijne
schoonheid, dat koppenleven der vrouwen, weggezonken in het
diepe zwart van kamertjes-donkerte. En zwaar tikte achter het hout
beschot, door de stilte, de staartklok, [62]langzaam, als wou ze
telkens blijven staan. Tot plots weer, het raam in gloed òpschoot en
de lichtkoppen uit de droomrige donkering van ’t kamertje
opdoemden, het star-oogende, grauw-rossige bevende kakement,
met den vertrokken breeden angst-mond, bevende skelet-hand van
vrouw Hassel en de zoekende oogen volgevloeid van rood licht;
daartegenover het sage-grillige prachthoofd van Guurt, in magischen
haarbrand tegen de rosgouën raampjesruit, enkel hoofd en buste
met verdonkering van lijf. Telkens en telkens zoo, verzinking van
gezichten in donkre kamertjes-diepte, als de smidsevlam kromp, en
vaag de halfduistere smeden weer heel gewoon te zien waren,
peuterend onder kleine gasvlammetjes op donkere draaibanken.
Moeder Hassel was vandaag nog stiller dan anders, en toch kon ze
helderder iets afdenken.… Nu juist voelde ze haar vreeslijk leed,
zwaar alléén-leed, dat niemand van ’r begreep. Ze was altijd een
gezonde vrouw geweest en, hoewel nooit heel slim, toch zuinige
huismoeder. Tot ze, voor twee jaar inéén zoo’n rare knellende
verdoffing in ’t hoofd had gevoeld, alsof er kruisbanden om ’r schedel
gingen striemen en telkens gloeiingen er tusschen door, heete
opstijgingen van iets naar ’t hoofd. Zoo, inéén, was ze zenuwachtig
bang en huilerig geworden. En dan àlles vergeten, vergeten. Soms
had ze de grootste moeite om te weten wat er in haar eigen
huishouen omging. En niemand geloofde of begreep hoeveel smart
ze had, hoeveel pijniging en marteling. Guurt was ’n meid die alleen
aan d’r zelf dacht, dat voelde ze nog wel. En de jonges, ruwe
kwinkkwanken die ’r afbluften.… Maar haar man was de ergste. Die
was opschrikkend woest tegen ’r, duivelig, venijnig. Die porde en
mepte ’r veel, altijd in ’t geniep. Dan kneep ie, maar valsch-bang, dat
anderen iets merken zouden. En nou, wist ze zelf niet wat ’r met ’r
gebeuren ging. Meestal kon ze niets denken, was ’t ’r dik en zwaar in
’r hoofd, watterig en benauwd.… Zoo zat ze nou weer te mijmeren.…
Nou.… wa’ mos ze nou puur van denke?.… da ha je’t,.. kwait!.…

kwait.… [63]
Wá’ kwait.…? Nou, kwam ’t er niks opàn.… Ze kon nie.… nie.…?

wá’ nie?.… Main kristus.… Skande!.… skande.… wácht.… wá’ had
ze ’t nou over?.. Stil,.… da gong ’t weer.… weg.… gut.… ja.… wacht
nou há’ s’m.—Dá’ ze t’met niks onthouwe ken.… wacht se mos sich
nou moar puur inprate da’t van selvers betert gong.… Zoo te
mijmeren zat ze, met heete knelling in ’r doffe hersens, te grienen in
het donk’re kamerke, voelde ze weer drukkende neveligheid in ’t
hoofd, vergat ze weer wat ze zoo voor ’n paar tellen nog bedacht,
kwam er licht gesnik in ’r keel, maar dàt hield ze in, uit angst,
instinktief al, voor geschreeuw, wetend dat ze d’r uitscholden en
snauwden als ’t gemerkt werd. Toch zat ze altijd in angst. Ze wachtte
altijd achter, naast ’r, ’n roep, ’n krijsch, ’n stoot of woede-slag. Die
wachtte ze nòu, uit ’t donker op ’r suffe kop, zoo pàl op ’r af, dat ze
schrok als ’r heelemaal niets was en ze uit ’r doffe staar tot
herinnering kwam, èven heel kort. Maar dan kwam indommeling
weer, bewusteloos en toch hoorend, als even vóór den slaap. In die
suizelige dommeling bleef ze voelen knaag-smart van iets dat ze niet
begreep van’r zelf, vooruit wetend, dat ze toch alles weer vergeten
ging, dat alles er door verkeerd zou gaan, maar zij ’t niet verhelpen
kon. ’t Bangst was ze voor de snauw-giftige duwen van Guurt, en
nog banger voor de driftige venijnige uitbarstingen van den Ouë. Zoo
opgejaagd, niet wetend wat te doen, wachtte ze weer op nieuwe
snauwen, voelde ze grimmiger aandreiging van vreeslijke rampen,
zoo vlak tegen haar lijf. Dàt gevoel vergat ze weer als feit, maar
bleef dan nog in nawerkenden vagen weedom, angstig zenuw-
spannend, eng ingekerkerd tusschen angst-gevoelens, in ’r
grommen. In haar week-watterig-dichtgestopt hoofd, spande en
ònrustte ’t, als knaging van ’n woord dat men kent, maar dat niet wil
invallen, toch door de ooren klankt, brandend op tongepunt. Al ’n
paar jaar leefde ze in zoo’n martelende angst-spanning, zich erger,
benauwder voelend, van maand tot maand, duizeliger, en doezeliger
achter in ’t hoofd, al sterker vergetend, stommer smart uitsnikkend,
van dingen die ze niet wist te [64]zeggen. De dokter was er bij
geroepen, had hooge rekeningen gestuurd, drankjes, drankjes uit
eigen apotheek, zonder eind, ook de jonge arts werd er bij gehaald
en in potjeslatijn hadden ze uitgemaakt dat ze ’r beide niks van
snapten. Alleen de jongste mompelde iets van.… dementie.…
hersenverweeking.… Toen ouë Gerrit ’m vroeg, wat ’t was, had ie z’n
schouders opgehaald en alleen gezegd: „maar geduld hebben.” In
dien tijd had zij alle moeite gedaan om er van af te komen, zonder
drankjes. Want eerst dacht ze ook dat ’t aan haar zelf lag. Toen wou
ze, wou ze onthouen, iets dat ’r eenmaal inzat. Ze groef ’t in ’r hoofd,
metselde ’t in ’r geheugen, met drift. Dan begon ze te zweeten, te
zwellen in onrust, in benauwing en lag ze in stille worsteling met de
dingen die ze hoorde en wist.. Ja.. ja, nou had ze ’t nog.. ’t bleef.. ’t
bleef.. nog.. nòg!.. Maar dan, heel zachtjes, kwam er verslapping,
was ze vreemd-ver afgedwaald van wat ze moest, wilde weten, ging
’r de heele boel ontglippen.… Dan wist ze plots niet waarvoor ze zich
toch zoo inspande. Er begon raar, wezenloos gedoezel in ’r hoofd te
broeien, gedruk en iets heet-suizends kwam in ’r opstijgen.. Eindelijk
dofte alles uit, ontspande en dommelde tegelijk wèg haar wil; begon
weer dat stille smart-geknaag, zonder dat ze wist waarom. Plots dan,
in het duister van ’r indommelen hoorde ze ’n schreeuw, zag ’n
woedegezicht, rammelde ’n vloek boven ’r hoofd, drong ’n vuist op ’r
aan;—nou hoorde ze stemmen van ’r zoons, ’r man, dat ze dat weer
en dit weer vergeten had. Niks meer kon ze zich herinneren.—Alles
klonk weer nieuw voor haar, en kort, heel kort dan, begreep ze, dat
ze weer die dingen vergeten mòest hebben. Dàt pijnigde ’r erger.
Sterker drong bij tijen de angst op ’r aan wàt ze beginnen moest, als
dat zoo door ging. Onder hun hoon, hun schimp bleef ze radeloos,
staar-bleek voor zich uitzien als levenlooze, omdat ze niet zeggen
kòn, met geen woord, tegen die woedende gezichten, wàt er in ’r
gebeurde. In die oogenblikken, dat ze om ’r heen dreigden in woest
gekrijsch met woede-gebaar, voelde ze, onder haar eigen staren of
ze stikken ging, dichtsnoering van ’r keel, met net nog ’n heel klein
beetje [65]lucht om te ademen. Bij elk nieuw verwijt sidderde ze,
voelde ze in zich ’n angst van ’n rat die achter traliewerk wordt
opgejaagd, wou ze zich ergens aan vastgrijpen, waaraan ook.
Vanmiddag zat ze in ’r donker hoekje, stil schemeruurtje, rustiger,

nou ze geen verwijt-stemmen hoorde, veiliger zich voelend omdat ’r
duisternis om ’r heenlag. Vandaag was alles weer beter gegaan. Ze
had veel meer onthouden, voelde zich ook vrijer in ’t hoofd, ruimer,
en stiekem had ze zich voorgenomen af te zien van ’n nieuw
doktersbezoek, omdat van zelf de boel wel zou beteren. Heel even
blij zat ze in ’t donker, dat ze nou wat minder gespan om ’r schedel
voelde, dat ze weer veel gemaklijker op de namen van de menschen
kon komen, beter op ’t eten had gelet, weer veel van ’r huishouding
zag.
’n Adem-zware stemmings-stilte suisde door ’t warme achterend,

paffig-warm en pik-duister. De smidse stond stil aan overkant. Dirk
en Piet ronkten lichtelijk tegen muur-duister aan. Guurt zat roerloos,
denkende aan ’n stoeipartij met ’n paar heertjes van de sekretarie,
kale ventjes, die in hun heerige poenigheid diepen indruk op haar
maakten. In d’r berekend verzet tegen hààr rijke, waarop zij loerde,
die doodelijk van ’r was, had ze afspraakjes gemaakt, voor donkere
laantjes-wandelingen om de tuinderijen. Maar zij wist wat ze deed,
bleef zonder hartstocht. Ze zou zich daar niet te grabbel gooien,
zooals zooveel meiden van de plaats, voor en zonder geld. Alles
was fijn spel bij ’r, berekend op prikkeling, nou es naar de
Wierelandsche Harmonie, dàn naar de kemedie. Daarvoor gebruikte
ze àllen, loerend toch op één. Al was heel Wiereland nijdig op ’r,
scholden ze ’r uit voor scharrelaarster, ’t liet ’r koud, ze wist wat ze
deed.
Ouë Gerrit was uit den dorsch naar den stal gesjokkerd.
—Heé Guurt, ’t lampie!.… schreeuwde ie zwaar-hol uit den grooten

stal, ’t achterend in, waar z’n stem geweldig in het duister kamerke
stortte, tusschen de schemermenschen, in de pafrust. Gauw had
Guurt je ’n lampje op schouwrand boven den stalhaard geschoven,
haastig weer in ’t donker terugwijkend. Ze zat zoo lekker, zoo lekker
d’r kansen te berekenen. [66]De Ouë sukkelde en bonkte nog wat
aan den haard, die vlak bij den stal rookte, op steenmiddenwegje,
naar achterend. Met den vuurlepel rammelde ie dof en bonkend
tegen den beugel, waar boven, zwart verbrande buik van konkelpot
glimmerde.—Knetterend speelde er blauwig gevlam tusschen
takkenhout. Duister-ruim schemerde de stal, en ronde ruitjes, hoog,
als wilde oogen-sperring, in den bleekvuilen muur, staarden, nog
doorlatend schemer-avond van buiten, groenig schemerlicht dat in
valen schijn tegen de oograampjes opzweefde. In dàt licht, lijnden
nog even donker op, takkronkels, stronken en schors-bulten van
boomen op erf, bij brokken te zien door de starre-oogen van
raampjesrond, uitkrampend in avondlijk schemergroen.
Ouë Gerrit moest melken, de eenige vaste arbeid ’s avonds aan hem
overgelaten. Uit den duisteren hoogen dorsch, waar kouë vocht van
de hooge dak-welving afvloeide, donker en griezelig-vreemd, midden
in, hooiberg-gevaarte opsteeg, had ie luk-raak uit den hoek een arm
vol hooi gegrepen, op den tast, en het in den stal-voorgang onder de
donkere koe-koppen gesmeten. Ellendig vond ie ’t in den dorsch.
Daar was ie altijd onrustig, in die zwarte ruimtekilte. Dan was ’t
lekkerder in den broeiwarmen stal. Zware urinelucht en meststank
zoog er doorheen, met bijtenden ammoniakgeur, verzwevend door
het donker. Heel achteraan, in ’n hoek, stonden de twee koeien op
hoogtetje.—Guurt kwam brommend uit het donkere achterend, waar
de jongens nog ronkten, en moeder te suffen lag, het kleine
petroleumlampje nadragen.
Voorzichtig zette ze ’t neer op ronde raampjesrichel. Hol klonk

gestap van Guurt op steenen groep, en dof-schimmig onhoorbaar
sloop Hassel op z’n paars-wollen kousen, door de leegte, dwars
tusschen kleur-schimmige rempalen heen. Uitgestorven donkerde de
stal, die gebouwd was voor twintig koeien. Zooveel had ie ’r vroeger
bezeten. Nou maar, in verarming twee, die ie niet eens houen kon op
de wei.—
Dirk kwam loom uit ’t achterend, de stal in, gapen uitstootend die hol
vergalmden in de halve duistering. Met z’n handen, [67]diep
weggefrommeld in z’n groote zakken, bleef ie, lijzig koeiig kijkend,
om den Ouë heen en weer drentelen.
—Hâ je nog wà’ vangst op vailing Ouë, vroeg Dirk.
—Hoho!.… ho.… ho.… niks te meer.… smeer’ge boel.… allegaer

els.… saa’k moar segge.… els.… vier en vaif en nie g’nog.…
skorumsootje.…
—Zoo, bromde Dirk, zich uitrekkend, onder heviger

gaapuitstootingen.—Toen, kijkend naar de beesten, leunde ie tegen
den muur, onder het lampje, in geel-schemerig stallicht verdoezeld,
bij een van de oog-starende raampjes.
Guurt scharrelde rond bij de pomp, op steenen middenwegje, naast
den haard, klompklotsend. Ring.. ring.. ring.. ring.., stompte ’t uit
donkeren hoek daar, met knarsingen van overhalenden slinger
tusschen geweld-klettering van waterstroom in emmer. Even lichtte
rossig òp soms ’n hand, ’n brok gezicht, ’n rokpunt, als ze overbukte
dicht bij den haard. In den hoek, vóór de groep, schemerde ’t zwak-
geel lampschijnsel op koei-kruisen en schonken, die heuvelig
afschaduwden tegen beschot áán en op dwarsmuur, als
drommedarisbulten, vaal-zwart. In de stank-uitwasemende groep lag
koevuil te dampen, om den kruiwagen, die nog vol mest, beklonterd
achter de beesten, op achtergang stond. Plots viel er stilte, toen de
pomp uitgeklaterd had, en de dreunende ring-rings stomden. Overal
door den groot en hollen stal, ging kruip’rig schaduwspel over
steenen vloer en muurhoeken. De Ouë had eindelijk, lijzig, ’t
melkblok op de stalstoep gelegd. Zacht op de koebil patsend, schoof
ie ’t blok tusschen de warm-wasemende snoffelende dierlijven. In
licht vreugdegeloei dat zacht-bazuinig en weemoedig-zangerig
verhuilde in den stalschemer, draaide één koe d’r kop naar ’m toe,
zich loswringend van ’t touw dat vastgesnoerd zat aan de groen- en
blauw beverfde rempalen. Met z’n smoel duwde de andere koe, de
loeiende terug. Wolkerig woelde op ’t hooi, dat de beesten uit
vóórgang van den een naar den anderen kant trokken en scherp
sneed door de stilte, hun grissend grazen en kauwen, [68]hield soms
plots even op, druischte dan weer ààn, als vloeide ’t zeis-geruisch
van ’n maaier door ’t donker heen.
Lijzig nog bond de Ouë ’t spantouw om de achterpooten van ’t dier,

voor ie melken ging, en lijziger ging ie zitten op ’n melkblok, als ’n
stratenmaker op éénpootig krukje, met de melkketel tusschen z’n
knieën gekneld, èven òpgelicht, van zich af. Z’n handen eerst nat-
sabbelend in z’n mond kneep en trok ie tegelijk in maatgang aan de
spenen. Zacht-regenend in bleeke straaltjes, spoot sis-scherp ’t
melk-zoet den emmer in. Piet was ook ingeloopen, rugde naast Dirk
tegen den muur. Hij hield er van zoo na ’t melken ’n paar lauwe
glazen in te slaan. Daar loerde ie nu al op, gulzig maar stil. Dichter
had hij ’t lampje naar z’n vader geschoven. Het profiel van ouë Gerrit
kwam nu zwart-fijn en scherp op het inslinkende onderkruis van de
koe schaduwen, fijn boerenprofiel met lokkenhang, puntig, dat
lichtelijk mee-trilde met huid-siddering van koebeest. Maar telkens
doezelde schaduwprofiel weg, of verwrong in woeste karikatuur op
zwarte dijplekken tusschen huidwit in, als de Ouë, stram voorover
bukte op melkblok, naar andere uiers, den emmer in schuineren
stand knelde om de straaltjes beter te vangen. Dàn donkerde z’n
ingebogen lichaam schaduw-bevracht wèg, tusschen de zwak-
belichte schoften van het andere warme koebeest, dat tegen ’m
aangedrongen stond, zacht loeide, in wellust om ook gemolken te
worden.
—Wa bliksems mooie makelai hep ie tug, heé Ouë, stem-zong Piet.
—Oftie.… huhu.… huhu!.… dofte beklemd stem van Gerrit tusschen

flanken-inknelling van de beesten uit.—Onrustig bewoog de
wachtende koe z’n achterpooten, drong nauwer òp tegen den Ouë,
zacht zwiepend met staart, die opgebonden kronkelde, aan ’t
bindtouw. Urinelucht zoog zwaarder door den stal, en het koevuil
plompte vet en zwaar-dampend in de groep, vlak voor de kou-
uitrookende monden der loom-kijkende kerels.
Telkens vielen er bonkende geluiden in de stal-stilte uit het

achterend, en als de koeien met hun ringen schoven waarmee [69]ze
vastgetouwd snoerden aan rempaal, echo’de het gebonk doffer door
de licht-schemering.
Wemelende reuze-gestalten schaduwden door elkaar, toen de Ouë

opstond, strammig van z’n melkblok, z’n vette vuile vingers
beschuimd afdoopte in de ketels, Dirk en Piet vlak voor het lampje
elkaar over groep en achtergang speelsch-woest heentrokken.
Scherp-zwarte profielen, dàn klein omgetrokken en zuiver-gelijkend,
dan grof-vage, achteruit verbleekende monsterlijke boerentronies
onkenbaar, vervluchtigend ijl, op vuil-wittigen kalkmuur. Koppen
braken of zwollen, als de kerels in wilden stoei vooruitsprongen, in
vlakke, verdeukte schedelbobbels, tegen bruin-morsig beschot.
Groote neuzen, flauw, en zware goliath-handen, ijlden schimmig
over den wand, boven bultige silhouet-schonken van koe-beesten.
Zoo holde, warrelend en wemelend, een donker spel van schimmen
op vale muurbleekte, en de kerels zèlf, zwak-geel belicht, met
verduisterde tronies, grof-knuisterig, adem-ingeperst, hijgden uit, in
de stal-duistering, stoeiend over de dampende groep.
—Jullie làikt kinders, driftte midden in de Ouë,—neem jai mestkep

en kuil wat àn.… ’t loopt er ’tmet over.… eenmoal.… andermoal.
In de voorgang stond Piet te gichelen tegen Guurtje die zenuwachtig

haastig doende was in keuken en achterend.
—F’rslik je ’r nie an, Dirk.… de Ouë sòanikt.… hep puur tait tut
mur’ge.… nou.… mi stróói-oàfend!.…
Vlak op den kruiwagen liep ie aan, z’n adem, als gouën stoom, fel
beschenen door lamplichtstraaltje, tegen achterlijven van koeien
opblazend. Z’n gladde komieke kop rimpelde wreed en zijn mond,
donker open, boorde duistere schaterlachen, snorkend door den
stal. Een narocheling van lol, barstte z’n strot uit. Danserig sprong
weer z’n grof-komiekige boerentronie in scherp silhouet op vuilen
muur. Dirk bleef staan, lijzig, lachloos.
—Hep tait tut murrige, schaterde Piet weer, krullend met z’n lippen
als ’n nijdige aap.
—Daa’s net, terug-deunde met luie stem Dirk.

—Daa’s nèt, bauwde Piet na.… je suster.… [70]
Guurt was juist weer met pompstraal ringkinkend, ingedreund. En

weer holde Piet speelsch op Dirk aan, vlak bij ’t lampje springend,
dat z’n kop scherp-zwart weer troniede op den lichtschemermuur.
Plots gaf Dirk onder jolig geschater van Piet en Guurt, z’n broer ’n
fellen tik op z’n schoften, dat die woest achteruit sprong, met z’n
gezicht naar de stalraampjes, en z’n hoofd-silhouet weg-reusde als
angstige goliath-kop. Maar méé trok Dirk, die lui zich sleideren liet
met z’n beenen in mestvuil, naar ’t hoekje van Guurt toe, waar ze
zingend en lach-schaterend, bek-af, met geweld neerstommelden.
Guurt had aldoor èven gekeken, was met ’r hoofd, voorover bukkend
in boen en emmergeploeter, tegen blauw-rood van steenen
voorgang, soms net te zien geweest in zwak schijnsel, schimde dan
plots weg, klomp-klepperend naar keuken, om met nieuwen
boenrommel in ’r handen, weer den stal in te donkeren,—want ’t
liefst was ze bij lolligen Piet. Piet, ongedurig, jongen van negentien
met botten van rijpen kerel, wou alles aanraken, belollen.
Als ze niet werkten de kerels, zoo in den wintermiddag al, wisten ze

met hun leege handen geen raad. Dan stonden ze, uren achtereen,
te gapen, te rekken, te smoken, de lange winteravonden verzeurend,
tegemoet; avonden, die, als ze niet kaartten of dronken, slakkerig-
langzaam over hen heenkropen. Maar stoeilol kwam meestal los in
broeiend warmen stal, met dien prikkelenden ammoniak-geur, ’t
zoetige hooigeurige onder den heeten diepen stank van
uitwasemende dieren.
’t Was onbewust, alsof eigen natuurdrift losgromde, in geilen

vechtlust, als voor hen, de opene natuurlijkheid der koeien in vreten
en ontladen, zich schaamteloos opgulzigde en weer uitplompte.—
—Seg, skarreloarster, hai je t’met je vraier op sterk woater zet, ’k
hep ie sien.… f’rdomd.… met die blaike stadsmuil van ’t staa’thuijs.
—Daa’s jokkes, stem-gilde Guurt uit hoek-donkerte de stal in, onder

zwaar geboen, uit ’t duister te hooren, op rinkelige emmers. [71]
—F’rdomd.…
—Daa’s jokkes, ikke daan niks.… niks daan ’k.…
—Nou stuif nie soo.… jai hep-er t’met an ieder vinger ein..
—Tog hep-ie main nie sien.… jài nie—.. en niement nie..

schreeuwde Guurt, die nu met boender in d’r hand en losfladderende
haren van ’t bukken, naast Piet in scheem’ring kwam staan, één arm
in heup-zwaarte gedrukt. En hijg-zacht naar adem, woedde ze uit.…
—Neenet Pietje, dà’ hai je mis.… glad en al mis.… main sien

niement.… je sel Annie sien heppe.… daa’s puur ’n lekkere.… daa’s
’n kreng.… daa’s s’n kwinkkwanker.… mo je hoore.… nou binne se
in ’n f’raasderantie.… sel ’k moar segge.… en nou sait sain.… Nou
dat de Ouë.… die laileke suipert.…
—Dà’ kenne wai.… onderbrak Piet grimmig.… Maar Guurt vertelde

door, afgevend op ’r vriendin Annie. Piet keek telkens schuin naar
den Ouë en Dirk stond roerloos, vadsig, tegen den muur geleund.—
Guurt lach-praatte, telkens haar adem-stoom even beschenen, van ’t
donker hoekje uit naar schemeringslicht waarin Piet stond, opjagend
de kerels. Hol brokkelde haar hooge vrouwestem af, in wije,
klankende stalruimte, gelende schemerdiepte,waar de
woordplonsjes instortten, uit niet-zichtbaren menschenmond. Ze had
uitgerateld en Piet begon weer of ze niets gezegd had.
—Nou skarrel jai moar roak, se weite ’t.… je bint t’r ’n dunne!.… jai
mi je faine snuut.… Kaik, daa’s nou main weut! moar.… jai jài.…
kraigt nooit ’n man.… mit je witte lintjen goan jai de kist in.… beduuf’l
jai nog moar soveul.… jai knikkert mit je vraiers.…
—Dà’ lieg je.… heftigde Guurt weer, uit donker hoekje op ’m

afspringend van ’r bukkig hijgend geboen.
—Louw.… allegoar louw.… die tochtige maide.… an ieder vinger d’r

éin.… en allegoar moak je hullie dààs.… Jesis Dirk.… wa trek jai
roar smoel.… aas ’n bunsem op de sprenkel.… gierde Piet’s stem.
—Hait puur lol, bromde Dirk goeiig, onverschillig even [72]met z’n
schoften schurkend tegen den muur,.… suinigies an.… suinigies
àn.… goan se gangetje.… se gangetje.…
Ouë Gerrit was heelemaal klaar met melken, ’t viel ’m nog mee. Niks
meer noodig, voor se aige ’n paar kan, en de rest veur de venter.
Nou g’n zorg meer an z’n kop.… ’t potloodje zat er.… stilletjes.—
Twee koebeesten was genog, tege Maart moste ze tug weer weg.…
Met woede-woelingen boorden de koeien hun snoeten in ’t hooi,

zoekend naar lijnkoek, die komen moest. Dirk had er al ’n paar uit
den dorsch gehaald, waar ze half lagen te broeien naast de
voerbieten, op ’n berg. Vóór de drinkgang zat ouë Gerrit op z’n knie,
naast ’m ’t lampje, tusschen beschot en voor-loop, nauw
opgedrongen. De grillig vlekkerige koekoppen sloegen wilder hun
ringen tegen de rempalen dat ’t echo-bonkte. Zwaar-woest en gretig
stonden hun oogbollen, donker, vol lust, en van uit hun geketenden
neergedrukten stands wrongen de koppen zich òp, in wild geronk
besnuffelend de halfduistere handen van den Ouë.—
In brokken duwde ie de lijnkoeken in hun vadsige, lebberende

kwijlbekken, of liet ze vallen tusschen het hooi. Woelig omwolkten de
beesten dan den dorren stapel, in woest gesnuffel. Toen de koek op
was sneed de Ouë de bieten in groote blanke plakken, ze tusschen
het voer werpend. Gretiger gulzigden de donkere koppen in rauw-
raspend geslik. Lijf-wasem sloeg overal van de beesten af, en hun
bekken dampten zwaar. Vocht droppelde langs het beschot, warm-
broeiend, tot vèr van de dieren àf. Woest bleven ze omlekken de
donkere handen van den Ouë, die in z’n hoek, geknield, suffig ze zat
te bekijken, niet meer denkend om z’n beesten, alleen, stil-zalig, en
roezerig na-genietend, om wat ie weer zou te zien krijgen vannacht.
En nou, in die warmte, oog-soezend in ’t dunne licht-straaltje, viel ’m
ineen in, ’t heele tooneel. Hoe hij had gestaan, de notaris, en hoe
raak z’n greep was geweest, met al dat zand en die rotte bladeren.
Guurt kwam de melktesten aansjouwen, die in hun lichtig [73]glazuur,

steen-bruin glanzerden in het scheemrig lamplichtje. Sieperend
zeefde ze melk uit den ketel in de testen. Poesje, was zacht
aangeslopen en geestig-fijn, tast-sluipend met z’n kopje in de test,
bleef ’t in drinkbuiging, zacht ingehouen, met z’n bedonsde pootjes
op testrand staan, schuchter, terugkrimpend in z’n blank poes-dons,
bij elk stal-geluid, bàng dat ze ’m snappen zouen in z’n snoep. En
fijner nu, herhaalde ’t z’n snoep-beweeg, vlak bij het lampje dat op
steenen kleurgrond lichtte. Fijner schaduwde z’n kopjes-rond,
snorlijntjes en punt-oortjes tegen beschot, en in schuchteren snoep-
stand, boog méé, scherp zwart silhouetje, gratielijk met staart en
sluippootjes.
[Inhoud]
III.
Het half-zesje stond klaar in de woonkamer. Vrouw Hassel en Guurt
hadden hompen brood met kaas en roggebrood, zoo maar, op kale
tafel klaar gesneden. De koffie stond te bakken op petroleumlichtje
dat knepperde en stonk. Zwaar stoelgestommel rumoerde voor allen
rustig zaten en gebeden hadden. Met handpalmen verkreukten en
trokken ze hun brood af. Moeder Hassel schonk koffie.… koffie was
haar eenige troost. De dokter had gezegd, dat ze ’t niet moest
drinken, maar ze vergat ’t. Vroeger al had haar hevige
drinkhartstocht elk bezwaar overrompeld. Ze mòest drinken. Den
heelen dag dronk ze, dronk ze, spoelde ze iets weg in ’r, door dien
heet-zoetigen smaak. Wel dertig kommetjes sloeg ze in. Dat was ’t
eenige dat ’r staande hield, en ’r verdriet verdoofde. Daarom stond ’t
wit-steenen koffiepotje, koud en bruin-besopt aan alle kanten, roetig-
ingebrand bij den bodem, den heelen dag op ’t stinkende
petroleumpitje. Bakken mòest ze. Water bij eerste treksel, water bij
tweede treksel, al slapper, valer, viezer sop, klonteriger en grondiger;
daarop weer nieuw gedrop. Zoo klieterde heel Wiereland bij de
koffie. Overal in de tuinders- en werkmanskrotjes stonden de
bemorste petroleumstelletjes, duffig en roetig-vies; stond vaal-bruin
blad met grauw-steenen kopjes, [74]uitgeschulpt en bepuist, naast ’n
nikkel komfoortje, vuil-verbrand of pracht-blinkend.
—Skenk main nog wa’ leut, snorkte Piet tegen Guurt, met ’n bons z’n
kopje op tafel dreunend.
—Nou, lachte Guurt, jai hep t’met ’n dam lait.… se kenne d’r puur ’n
spaiker op je moag glaikkloppe.… wat ’n pens!..
—Kaik die, waa’t hekkepunter.… wat ’n bemoeial, sou je d’r nie ’n

druil om d’r hoet ketse?.…
Vlug, lacherig nog om Piet’s vraatzucht, schonk Guurt in. Stil

gesmak zoog door ’t kamerke, dat sufte in z’n dof-geel lamp-
schijnsel, waarin de staartklok alléén, met z’n koperslagwerk, zacht
òpglimmerde in lichte, schichtige glans-veegjes. Telkens nog
bonkten ringrukken van de koeien uit den stal, of het snikken even
van ’n herkauwende, zuchtte tegen de half-opene kamerdeur. Bij
nieuwe broodhompen sperden wijer open de kaken, lebberden de
monden, lui en vadsig in de broeiige kachel-warmte en loom tiktakte
de friesche, met iets van winterigen slaaplust in z’n slingergang.
Vrouw Hassel zat jammerlijk stil en verlaten te kijk-suffen onder het

scheefhangende lampje, met z’n geel-rood vuil vlammetje en
naargeestig schijnsel. Half afgezakt van haar stoel zat ze, in ’r vettig
bruinige huisjapon, die bochelde op ’r rug. Haar afgeleefd
rimpelgezicht leek grauw-zwart. D’r grijzig groezel-haar, dat flodderig
los uitslonsde onder de smerige, bij de ooren gepunt-kruide
steekmuts, die schedel-naakte gleuven door het gaas schemeren
liet, overhuifde zwaar en donker ’r klein monsterlijk gezicht. Telkens
gulzigde ze ’n slok koffie in, dat ’r magere keelkrop er van natrilde en
beet dan weer op de punt van ’r vettig schortje.
Tranen pinkelden plots in ’r brandende oogen die gloeiden, alsof er

kalk ingewaaid was. Om ’r breed-dunnen kwijl-mond, waar op
afzakte, pappig wangvleesch, dat als los vel zwabberde op
kakement, in teistering doorgroefd, doolden trekken van
verlammenden angst, spanning om te willen volgen wat om ’r heen
gebeurde, vast te houen wat ze dof hoorde. [75]Even na ’t
schemeruur hadden ze d’r weer geknauwd, waren, ze ’r weer op ’t lijf
gevallen met vergeet-dingen.
En Guurt had ’t hardst meegekrijscht, blind voor d’r smart, zelf zich
lekker, sterk, frisch, jong voelend. Nou was vrouw Hassel weer uit
haar beetje opgeleefde vreugd gestooten. In één zag, hoorde ze
weer alles veel slechter, vatte ze niets, ging ’r ’n lijm’rige verbinding
van woorden door ’t hoofd, suizelde en spande ’t overal in ’r, hoorde
ze geruisch, verdoffend om ’r héén, van stemmen en àldoor
achteréén, fluiterig gegil door de hersens diep in ’r ooren. En telkens
slokte ze gulziger ’r koffie-vocht lekker, warm, smakkend en
opzuigend de zoetige vuilheid, die ’r niks zei, niks verweet, niet aan ’t
schrikken maakte.
Paf-rust loomde ’r weer in ’t kamerke, waarin de dingen, boers-knus

aanglinsterden. Klein-stijf stond in ’n dwarshoek, schuintjes, ’n
pronkschoorsteentje, zelf-getimmerd plankje, omspannen met
vaalrood lapje, koper-bepend. Om de lakzwarte glimkachel lag
morsvuil, ingetrapt kolengruis en ’t plaatje dofte blikkig. Glanzerig
van politoer-lichtvleksel, in rood-bruine gladheid stond er tegenover
mahoniehout linnenkastje, parmantig-stijf, op klein-breed poot werk,
aan hoeken versierd met poppetjes-spul, fel-kleurig steen, en tegen
het blom-grof, geel behang, hingen los-opgehaarspelde gore
haarwerkjes en kleur-stervende chromo’s, koningen met pelzen en
Zwitsersch meer-blauwsel. Alles bakte en loomde ’r vergeten in
boerenknusheid. De grof-rooie stoelen, met hevig geel bies-
streepsel stonden te drenzen in den doffen lampschijn. Alleen de
kwikzilverige vaasjes, buikig-rustig, op het mahonie-kastje,
vroolijkten met breed-mondige lichtstreepjes. Naast de kachel,
achter vuilen kolenbak, pronkte rijk-ongedeerd, koperen standaard,
met schep, koperen tang en pook, sierlijk gebogen en zacht-
beflonkerd, smetteloos voornaam lachend tegen den vuil-roetigen
pook die ernaast op ’n stoel lag. In ’n anderen hoek van laag-
balkend kamerke wemelde ’t van portretten, op klein tafeltje met
goor-stijf-krullig haakwerk belooperd. En vlak achter vrouw Hassel
donkerde ’n korf met tortelduifje, dat uit z’n beduisterd kamerhoekje
klagelijk koekeroede. [76]
Tusschen stemgepraat en eetgesmak, bij stilte-poozen,

weemoedigde ’t duifje, uit ’t licht geschoven, in z’n korfje, op ’n
voetstuk van gebroken bloemstandaardje, dat sidderde als ’t diertje
sprong. Zacht klagelijk koekeroede z’n zwel-kropje, als ’n kindje, dat
ergens ver, zacht te schreien en te snikken lag. Plots trok Guurt ’t
meer in den lichtkring, toen ’t juist, wil-venijnig zich-zelf in z’n
veertjes zat te snavelen, hals verdraaiend diep. Bij ’t geschuif, plots
vooruit, in ’t licht nu, dat z’n korfje inschemerde, dook z’n kopje
onder de veeren weg, begon ie stil te loeren voor zich uit, stil, als
luisterend naar wat gezegd werd door Guurt. Dan weer keek ie bijzij
àf met z’n donkere karmijn-oogjes, die kniploos stonden, staàr, stil.
In één weer kropte dan, uit teeder donsborstje klagelijk
kindergekreun, heel zacht en als van ver, koekeroekoe,
koekeroekoe, melancholiek in de paffende, scheemrige kamerke-
rust. Guurt, met dikken vinger, krauwde z’n nekje, door korf-tralie
heen onder staal-blauw glans-kraagje vol violette weerschijntjes en
groenige schubbetjes. En geestig, onder ’t krauwen, vonkten donker,
z’n rooie gloed-oogjes van lekkerheid, ging dommig-dwars z’n teer
kopje als om te luisteren, weemoedden weer z’n koekeroe’s klagelijk
kamerke in.
Plots gaf Guurt ’t korfje weer ’n duw achteruit, dat tortelduifje

wegdonkerde in ’n hoek, en schrik in z’n wijnrooie oogjes stolde.
Ouë Gerrit had Guurt wat gevraagd, die lijmerend onverstaanbaar
antwoordde met vollen mond.
—Nou joa.… sel ’k moar segge.… fa’n koniggin Fillemientje.… hai je

nog wat lese kenne.… eenmoal.… andermoal.…
Klank van groote onderdanigheid was er in z’n stem gaan beven, en

met vreemd-rilligen eerbied sprak ie den naam van Wilhelmina uit.
Dirk schoof stil Guurt z’n koppie toe.—Kijkend naar d’r vader, schonk
ze gedachteloos in, gansch bevangen door het denken aan de rijke
almachtige koningin.…
—Hée doedelsak, lachte Piet, haar tegen den arm stootend, genog,
je skinkt t’r snof’rjenne noast.…
—Aa’s se nouw t’met trouwe goat Ouë, schokkerde Guurt, [77]alsof
ze niets gehoord had, door,.… aa’s sai nouw trouwe goat de
koniggin.… hep sai dan d’r femilje.… en magge die d’r na kaike?.…
Ouë Gerrit schaamde zich altijd ’n beetje voor de groote kerels en

z’n meid dat ie d’r niks van wist, en dat tie nie lezen kon. Brutaal,
lukraak stootte ie ’r maar uit:
—Wel joa.… sel d’r ommirs puur niks.… skele kenne.. dà moak niks,
loa se kaike!.… je hep ’r ven dit.… en ven dàt.… op soo’n dag.…
hoho.… ho.… se komme uit de hooge!.… sel ’k moar segge.… en
mit hoarlie pakkies àn.… afain.… fiere en vaife en nie genog.…
enne.…
—Nou joa, hield Guurt vol, die nog niets wijzer was.
—Toe maid, gromde Dirk, die nauwelijks wist dat ’r ’n koningin

bestond, skenk in, je skenkt t’r noast.…
—Nee, jokkes, verdedigde Guurt, maar nog niet loslatend haar

vader:
—Moar .… enne.… nou.… aas d’r puur hooge.…
—Kaik tug veur je.… doedelsak, je skenkt op main poote, helhoak.…
—Main kristus, waâ jokkes.…
—Nou grinnikte Piet, skeelt t’met gain koe.… skeelt t’met gain koe.
—Jesses wà’ kerels.… wa hep jai smoor in.… en jullie.. jullie.… wete
d’r ook gain snars van.… weet jai ’t moeder?.…
Ze schrok op, vrouw Hassel. Niemand vroeg haar ooit wat over zulk
soort dingen.
—Gut.… schokte ze stemhaperend.… da wee’k nie.… al t’met.…
Schuw brak ze af, gejaagd, want nou, waarachtig, nou wist ze niet
eens meer waarover ’t ging, wàt Guurt gevraagd had. Haar leerig
gezichtsvel fronste samen in monsterlijke rimpeling, en haar grijs-
grauwe brauwen dottigden krampend. Vergeten, vergeten, smartte ’t
stil in ’r, met ’n snikhuil, maar uiterlijk bleef schrei-loos haar gelaat.
Alleen lichtelijk sidderden haar kaken. Plots sprong Dirk woest op,
bonkte z’n [78]stoel tegen den muur dat duifkorfje trilde en vrouw
Hassel opschokte van ’r zitje.
Met rumoer ging ie den stal in, achteruit op straat. Guurt was gretig
in Wierelandsch krantje gaan koekeloeren of ze ook iets van de
koningin lezen kon, van wie ze boven haar slaapstoel twintig
beeltenissen had hangen, in al andere standen en leeftijden. In ’r
egoïstische voorstellingen, waan-zeker en achterhoeksch-bedompt,
wemelde ’t van licht, goud en juweel, als ze aan de koningin dacht.
En hoog, op ’r verheven stoel zag ze Wilhelmientje zitten. Van de
kranten-berichten begreep ze niet veel; uit ’n behoorlijken zin kon ze
juist niet wijs worden.… Als t’r zoo stond, in die deftige krantentaal,
voelde ze zich kregel, ’t verwarde hààr voorstellingen, want die
alleen leefden voor haar. ’n Paar dingen maar, licht, juweelen en
goud, overal goud en ’n hooge stoel, ’n troon,—dat alles omgedraaid
en omgedraaid in allerlei variaties, bedacht en bekeken met haar
achterhoekschen weelde-hartstocht, dat ’t sterde en fonkelde voor
d’r oogen. En nou die kranten! Maar half lezen had ze geleerd. Dirk
voelde heelemaal niets voor ’t feest; wist niet eens waar Den Haag
lag. Toch zou ze doorlezen. Knusserig schonk ze zich nog ’n kopje
leut in, en naast ’r, schoof bevend-gulzig, de blauw-doorpeeste
grauwige beef-hand van ’r moeder, die ook weer hebben wou. Plots
kwam Dirk weer in, plompte zich weer neer bij de kachel. Guurt
frommelde ’t krantje op zij. Niks snapte ze ’r van. De Ouë zat met
ingezakt lijf in z’n op schoot gedrukt en tabakspot te morrelen,

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Samuel Ulbricht Ethics Of Computer

Gaming A Groundwork Palgrave

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022

thus a groundwork) for a moral analysis appropriate to the phenomenon. Secondly,

1 What Computer Games Are��������������������������������������������������������������������� 1

Fig. 2.1 Three types of computer game actions 39

Table 2.1 Action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming 43

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022 1

Before subjecting actions in or with a computer game to an action-theoretical analy-

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2022 9

However, there is also another perspective on the phenomenon, an intensional

2.1 The Practical Syllogism

2.1.1 From Aristotle to Davidson

syllogism, as a general major premise of action, is determined by Aristotle for virtu-

3. Conclusion: Action (*Eating-The-Dry-Food*)

Modern action theorists developed the Aristotelian structure of practical reason-

conclusion—an all-out value judgment concerning the action to be performed—is

2.1.2 Will, Body Movement and Action

To experience an action as meaningful is to understand its value. It follows that what is

If the conclusion of a practical syllogism as a value judgement does not explain

Davidson’s enumeration is only of limited help in sharpening the explanatory

2. Minimal description: Body movement ("...by moving his hand")

2.2 Three Types of Computer Gaming

a) Maria changes binaries.

body movement of button-pushing.50 This is the commonality of descriptions c) to

In any action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming, it must therefore be made

2.2.1 Virtual Actions

Maria’s action under description c) could be rationalized by the following practical

1. Will: "I want to defeat Peter... "

["...by scoring a goal..."]

2. Minimal description: "...by pressing the buttons xyz."

Hereby, another decisive characteristic of computer gaming is found: It must

2.2.2 Fictional Actions

Maria’s action under description e) is an exemplary case of what I will, hereafter,

1. Will: “I want to score a goal...”

framework of a ‘game of make-believe’: The recipients pretend that or act as if the

in a (extensionally identical) non-game action of controller testing, the two activi-

Nou.… wa’ mos ze nou puur van denke?.… da ha je’t,.. kwait!.…

Wá’ kwait.…? Nou, kwam ’t er niks opàn.… Ze kon nie.… nie.…?

Vanmiddag zat ze in ’r donker hoekje, stil schemeruurtje, rustiger,

’n Adem-zware stemmings-stilte suisde door ’t warme achterend,

—Heé Guurt, ’t lampie!.… schreeuwde ie zwaar-hol uit den grooten

Voorzichtig zette ze ’t neer op ronde raampjesrichel. Hol klonk

—Hâ je nog wà’ vangst op vailing Ouë, vroeg Dirk.

—Hoho!.… ho.… ho.… niks te meer.… smeer’ge boel.… allegaer

—Zoo, bromde Dirk, zich uitrekkend, onder heviger

Lijzig nog bond de Ouë ’t spantouw om de achterpooten van ’t dier,

—Oftie.… huhu.… huhu!.… dofte beklemd stem van Gerrit tusschen

Telkens vielen er bonkende geluiden in de stal-stilte uit het

Wemelende reuze-gestalten schaduwden door elkaar, toen de Ouë

—Jullie làikt kinders, driftte midden in de Ouë,—neem jai mestkep

In de voorgang stond Piet te gichelen tegen Guurtje die zenuwachtig

—Daa’s net, terug-deunde met luie stem Dirk.

Guurt was juist weer met pompstraal ringkinkend, ingedreund. En

Als ze niet werkten de kerels, zoo in den wintermiddag al, wisten ze

’t Was onbewust, alsof eigen natuurdrift losgromde, in geilen

—Daa’s jokkes, stem-gilde Guurt uit hoek-donkerte de stal in, onder

—Daa’s jokkes, ikke daan niks.… niks daan ’k.…

—Tog hep-ie main nie sien.… jài nie—.. en niement nie..

—Neenet Pietje, dà’ hai je mis.… glad en al mis.… main sien

—Dà’ kenne wai.… onderbrak Piet grimmig.… Maar Guurt vertelde

—Dà’ lieg je.… heftigde Guurt weer, uit donker hoekje op ’m

—Louw.… allegoar louw.… die tochtige maide.… an ieder vinger d’r

1 What Computer Games Are�� 1

Fig. 2.1 Three types of computer game actions 39

Table 2.1 Action-theoretical analysis of computer gaming 43

2.1 The Practical Syllogism

2.1.1 From Aristotle to Davidson

3. Conclusion: Action (Eating-The-Dry-Food)

2.1.2 Will, Body Movement and Action

2.2 Three Types of Computer Gaming

2.2.1 Virtual Actions

2.2.2 Fictional Actions