The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic

Thought and Practice in the Digital Age

Francis Onditi
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The Palgrave Handbook of
Diplomatic Thought and
Practice in the Digital Age
Edited by Francis Onditi
Katharina McLarren · Gilad Ben-Nun
Yannis A. Stivachtis · Pontian G. Okoth
The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Thought
and Practice in the Digital Age
 Francis Onditi • Katharina McLarren
Gilad Ben-Nun
Yannis A. Stivachtis • Pontian G. Okoth
Editors

The Palgrave
Handbook of
Diplomatic Thought
and Practice in the
Digital Age
Editors
Francis Onditi Katharina McLarren
School of International Relations and MAGGI, Max Planck Institute for
Diplomacy Comparative Public Law and
Riara University International Law
Nairobi, Kenya Heidelberg, Germany

Gilad Ben-Nun Yannis A. Stivachtis

Global and European Studies Institute Department of Political Science
Leipzig University Virginia Tech
Leipzig, Germany Blacksburg, VA, USA

Pontian G. Okoth
Department of Peace and
Conflict Studies
Masinde Muliro University of Science
and Technology
Kakamega, Kenya

ISBN 978-3-031-28213-3    ISBN 978-3-031-28214-0 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28214-0
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 Foreword

Diplomacy forms an inseparable part of international relations (IR). The tradi-

tional core of IR concerns the mutual interaction of sovereign states in the
context of the larger global system. At times, this interaction is altered by the
disruptions induced by technological, societal changes as well personality dif-
ferences, subsequently influencing the character of diplomacy. It is expected
that over the years, the changes shape the theory and practice of diplomacy in
the sense as it is with other social science disciplines. Unfortunately, however,
in spite of its long ancestry and the evolution of how states relate to each other
in the digital age, diplomacy largely remains tethered around two things; it still
means a ‘kaleidoscope’ of things, including negotiations and meetings revolv-
ing around international conferences, treaties, state visits, summit meetings,
and other international events between sovereign states; secondly, it stands for
strategic political and policy actions taken in the context, interest and on the
basis of interstate officialdom.
The status quo and diplomatic tradition tends to make the practice of
diplomacy exclusive and overly formalistic and structured. Although it is also
true that in the context of real politics, the influence of forceful political
personalities and popular movements deeply influences these formalistic and
structured practices. This handbook has grown out of this esoteric focus of
diplomacy by state officials and other reductionist scholars of IR. However,
matters of trade, environment and climate change interstate management,
refugees, conflicts, or wars are not confined to state actors. Increasingly non-
state actors are now more involved in trade, environment, climate change
responses, peace and conflict dynamics than they have ever been. Moreover,
different regional formations such as the African Union Peace and Security
Council are actively shaping the security diplomatic architecture in the arena of
peace and security for example.
The influence of personalities in politics and the attitudes of individual political
leaders have historically not been at the center of our understanding of diplo-
matic thought and practice. Yet, through political ideology, rhetoric, and pol-
icy formulations, individual personalities appear to be crucial to the interaction

v
vi FOREWORD

of states and the establishment of stable and astute foreign policy initiatives. In
my experience as a diplomat, and in my reading of history, the impact and role
of personality on diplomacy has been enormous. Hitherto studies on the links
between the personality traits and foreign policy attitudes remain scarce. The
personality-political behavior factor is not far behind the dispensation of diplo-
macy and international politics, with several recent landmark examples across
the globe. The example of the difference between President Barack Obama and
President Donald Trump is a classic example of such a consequence, where the
diplomatic stance and methods of a nation change radically and the concrete
outcome of policy changes as well because of a change in political leadership.
The same could be said, for example, of President Jakaya Kikwete and his suc-
cessor John Pombe Magufuli of Tanzania where the personality of a leader
might upend years of diplomatic practice and behavior by a country. Although
the fundamental principles and frameworks of diplomacy remain more or less
the same, over time the impact of personality (mostly determined by the tenure
of a particular leader in power) can be hugely consequential in shaping foreign
policy dimensions, including, but not limited to, cooperative internationalism
versus isolationism and globalization versus nationalism.
To address these normative and practical concerns editors of this handbook
decided to assemble a group of scholars and practitioners who approached the
issues from a diverse disciplinary perspective, including diplomacy, political
psychology, international relations, gender and feminism, international devel-
opment, law, history, and political science. It is a handbook for both practitio-
ners and theorists. It has been compiled specifically with the purpose of helping
to increase access to diplomatic resources and to improve the quality of manag-
ing diplomatic services and foreign affairs. But it is also a body of knowledge
putting together thoughts and research from diplomatic reformists with per-
sonal viewpoint and perspectives which overall reflects the way former
diplomats-­turned-scholars recollect their memories of diplomatic practice; as
people who have both experience and training in diplomacy.The handbook
recognizes the fact that various peace and conflict situations require a unique
attention and resolution. The needs of every state whether in conflict or coop-
eration are different and the relevant diplomatic processes vary, but there are
some broad general principles that are exemplified throughout the handbook.
One of these is the primacy of formalization of the informal diplomatic prac-
tices and how diplomats ought to change tact and strategies in engaging non-­
state actors and those outside the purview of statehood. At the same time,
modern diplomacy has become very conscious of the importance of keeping
issues of gender, youth, race, and historical injustices in clear view. The role of
media and communication in diplomacy has also become singularly dynamic
and important. There is a deep complementarity between these socio-economic
issues and the dispensation of diplomacy. It is, therefore, important to give
simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual and group rights and
to the force of social factors as well as media writ large on the extent and reach
of diplomacy.
 FOREWORD vii

All these factors have a bearing on the future of diplomacy at a time when
states and multilateral arrangements and institutions continue to undergo geo-
political and strategic realignments and socio-economic transformation. In the
context of international peace and security for example, the deadlock in the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as countries like China and Russia
have taken a more emboldened stance and western democracies have conse-
quently entrenched in their engagement of these two other powers has left the
Council deadlocked and unable to make important decisions crucial to interna-
tional peace and security.This state of affair raises a host of both empirical and
normative questions regarding the effectiveness of UNSC and other multilat-
eral institutions in overcoming contemporary global climate change, environ-
ment, trade, peace, and security challenges; how to collectively protect and
advance human rights, how to deal with recalcitrant states; resolving challenges
around cooperation in protecting global goods, and collective responsibility
versus individual rights.
There are no obvious answers to these concerns. However, increasingly, we
have seen regional entities such as the African Union influencing key decisions
both at the regional level and at the UNSC. Article 53 gives the UNSC the
power to utilize regional arrangements to carry out enforcement under its
guidance for maintaining international peace and security. And where diplo-
macy is effective and cooperative we have witnessed significant success in global
corporation, for example, with humanitarian challenges and terrorism, and in
dealing with global emergencies and pandemics such as COVID-19. These,
among other issues, are what this volume tries to explore and examine.The
authors have endeavored to provide not only solutions to peace and security
complexes, but also reconfigure theoretical formulations in the light of other
such developments. This handbook is largely based on the work of eminent
scholars on the subjects, and it will serve as a model for using both formal and
informal diplomatic approaches in resolving some of the most challenging con-
cerns of our time.
I believe both practitioners and researchers will find this volume useful for
open deliberations and application in addressing and resolving unconventional
and traditional challenges and crises in the coming years.

Former Principal Secretary Macharia Kamau

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya 
 Contents

1 Introduction:
 Diplomatic Thought and Practice  1
Francis Onditi

Part I Foundations of Diplomatic Thought and Practice  33

2 Visibilizing
 African Heritage in Diplomatic Thought and
Practice 35
Edmond M. Were and Pontian G. Okoth

3 Afrodiplomacy:
 Collective Continental Communiqué 65
Dan Kuwali and Tapiwa Kuwali

4 Feminist
 Foreign Policy and Diplomacy 83
Marieke Fröhlich and Victoria Scheyer

5 Modifying
 Diplomacy for the Twenty-First Century: A New
Postmodern Approach105
Costa Georghiou

Part II Tools and Types of Diplomacy 125

6 The
 Increasing Significance of Public Diplomacy in
International Relations: New Types and Actors127
Lauren Maunder and Yannis A. Stivachtis

7 Sport Diplomacy147
Alexander Brand

ix
x Contents

8 Humanitarian Diplomacy173
Anna Felfeli

9 Vaccine Diplomacy201
Alexander Brand

10 Global Environmental Diplomacy223

George Atisa

11 Faith-Based
 Diplomacy as a New (and Old) Practice
in Foreign Policy: Concepts and Cases243
Joshua Lehmann and Katharina McLarren

12 Dynastic
 Diplomacy: Soft Suzerainty, Transdynastic
Relations, Nepotism265
Douglas A. Yates

13 Great
 Power Diplomacy in the Digital Age287
Yannis A. Stivachtis

Part III Diplomacy in a Dynamic World 311

14 African
 Union Non-Military Conflict Interventions313
Ulf Engel

15 How
 to Apply Kinetic Diplomacy to Gray Zone Conflict333
Francis Onditi and James Yuko

16 Africa’s Science Diplomacy359

Thokozani Simelane and Hilary I. Inyang

17 Neighboring
 Military Occupation: Modern Surrogate to
Conquest379
Gilad Ben-Nun

18 Negotiating
 with the Devil: Counter-Terrorism and the Rise
of Mediation Organizations399
Pierre Hazan

19 Diplomacy
 and Foreign Policy in the Digital Era: A Case
Study of the 2015 “Refugee Crisis” in Germany413
Elena Dück
 Contents  xi

20 Women
 and Feminist Diplomacy in Turbulent Times:
How France Coped with the Silent Pandemic435
Ruchi Anand

21 From
 National to International Actorness: International
Organizations and the Transformation of Public
Diplomacy—The Cases of the European Union and NATO459
Yannis A. Stivachtis

Part IV Experiences of Diplomacy 483

22 Foreign
 Service Officers: Are They Fit for Purpose?485
Anil Sooklal

23 Diplomats
 in Uniform: ‘Security Diplomacy’ Described
Through a Practical Experience Report501
Peter Christian Waldbauer-Hable

24 Conclusion:
 The English School and Diplomacy as
a Dynamic and Core Primary Institution521
Katharina McLarren

Index535
 Notes on Contributors

Ruchi Anand (PhD) is an Indian-born full professor at the American Graduate

School in Paris, France. She is also the Faculty Director at the international
business school Centre d’Études Franco-Américain de Management (CEFAM)
in Lyon. Anand holds a Doctorate in International Relations (2002) from
Purdue University, US; an MA in International Relations and an MPhil
in International Law (1994) from the Jawaharlal Nehru University Delhi;
and a Bachelor’s degree (Honors) in Political Science (1990) from Lady
Shri Ram College in New Delhi, India. Author of several published arti-
cles, her two books are entitled International Environmental Justice: A
North-South Dimension (2004) and Self-Defense in International Relations
(Palgrave 2009).
George Atisa is associate professor at the University of Texas Rio Grande
Valley in Texas. Atisa teaches in the Master of Public Administration in the
Department of Public Affairs and Security Studies. Prior to coming to
academia, he worked for WWF-International, Lutheran World Federation,
and International Rescue Committee for a total of 15 years. His research
spans across public management, governance, public policy, environmental
management, climate change, and sustainability.
Gilad Ben-Nun is a senior lecturer at Leipzig University’s Global and
European Studies Institute, holder of the Alfred Grosser chaired professorship
at Sciences Po Paris (2021–2022), and the guest professorship for Israel Studies
at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (2020–2022). He was previously
FORD Foundation senior research fellow at the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research in Geneva, a UNDP senior Program Officer, and an
EU Marie Curie individual fellow at Verona University’s Law Faculty
(2016–2018). He holds a PhD and Habilitation from Leipzig University.
Alexander Brand is Professor of Political Science/International Relations at
Rhine-Waal University of Applied Sciences, Campus Kleve, Germany. Starting
in 2018, he has been acting as one of two Principal Investigators in the research

xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

project EUFOOT (‘Becoming European Through Football?’ sponsored

through the German Research Foundation DFG). He is a long-time member
of ‘Sport & EU’, the former Association for the Study of Sport and the
European Union. Among his main research interests are foreign policy analysis,
the politics of development policy, mass media, discourse and international
relations, and sport/football and politics.
Elena Dück is a post-doctoral researcher at the Christian-Albrechts-University
in Kiel. She holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of
Passau. In 2020/2021 she was Mercator-IPC Fellow at the Istanbul Policy
Center at the Sabancı University, where she conducted a research project
on German External Cultural and Educational Policy in Turkey. She has
published on German and EU-Turkish relations, international relations
theory, and the Syrian War. Her focus is on security and foreign policy
analysis from post-structuralist and critical perspectives.
Ulf Engel is Professor of ‘Politics in Africa’ at the Institute of African Studies,
Leipzig University (Germany). He is also a visiting professor at the
Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University
(Ethiopia) and a professor extraordinary in the Department of Political
Science at Stellenbosch University (South Africa). Since 2006 he is advis-
ing the African Union Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department in
the fields of conflict prevention, early warning, preventive diplomacy, and
knowledge management.
Anna Felfeli is a PhD candidate at the University of Passau, Germany. Her
fields of interest include social constructivism in international relations, foreign
policy analysis, securitization theory, identity theory, and discourse analy-
sis. She gained practical experience in non-governmental and governmen-
tal humanitarian organizations, which includes managing humanitarian
relief projects in Haiti, Lebanon, and Sri Lanka and implementing
capacity-­ building activities in Jordan on behalf of the German Federal
Agency for Technical Relief.
Marieke Fröhlich (MA) is research associate for sociology and equal oppor-
tunity officer for the Faculty of Society and Economics at Rhine-Waal University,
Germany. Her research interests are feminist and postcolonial approaches to
international relations and peace research, particularly feminist foreign policy
and the women, peace, and security agenda. She is also active as an inde-
pendent gender expert and is the co-president of the German section of the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Costa Georghiou is an emeritus professor at the University of Johannesburg
(UJ) where he taught international relations. He was also the co-director of the
Centre for African Diplomacy and Leadership (CADL). Previously, as diplo-
mat, he represented South Africa in the 1980s as Vice-Consul at the SA
Consulate-General in Hong Kong. Later he served as First Secretary and
Charge d’Affaires a.i. in the 1990s at the SA Embassy in Athens, Greece,
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

and as Counsellor in Seoul, South Korea, from 1993 to 1997. Before his
departure from the Department of Foreign Affairs and joining UJ, he was
Acting-Director of the UN Desk.
Pierre Hazan is a senior advisor with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,
one of the main organizations in armed conflict mediation. He has advised
international organizations, governments, and armed groups on questions
related to justice, amnesty, reparation, truth commission, forced disap-
pearances, international humanitarian law, and human rights. In March
2022, he became a Richard von Weizsäcker fellow at the Robert-Bosch
Foundation in Berlin. His latest book, Negotiating with the Devil, Mediating in
Armed Conflicts, published in France in September 2022 (Textuel), received an
enthusiastic reception from the media.
Hilary I. Inyang is an internationally known geo-environmental researcher,
educator, and expert who is serving as US Ambassador’s Distinguished Scholar
to Ethiopia with a base at Bahir Dar University. Formerly, he served as the
President of the African University of Science and Technology in Abuja,
Nigeria, as well as the Vice Chancellor of the Botswana International
University of Science and Technology, in Palapye, Botswana. He is active
in several initiatives on global sustainable development and has authored
more than 275 publications on related matters.
Dan Kuwali serves in the Malawi Defense Force as Commandant of the
National Defense College. He is a visiting professor at the Raoul Wallenberg
Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Lund University;
Extraordinary Professor of International Law at the Centre for Human
Rights, University of Pretoria; adjunct professor and Founding Executive
Director, Centre of Strategic Studies, Malawi University of Science and
Technology; Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Lilongwe; fel-
low at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government; fellow and scholar, US
Army War College; Immediate Past President of the Governing Council of the
African Military Law Forum; and Executive Member of the African Bar
Association. Of his numerous peer-reviewed publications, his most recent one
is The Palgrave Handbook of Sustainable Peace and Security in Africa (2022).
Tapiwa Kuwali is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Lilongwe,
Malawi. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Public Management with Honors
majoring in Political Science from the University of Namibia. She is passionate
about community development, international affairs, and diplomacy. She
has received certifications in a leadership program from WEDU global
leadership development in and the role of women in politics, peace, security,
and economic institutions from the Young African Leadership Initiative.
Joshua Lehmann studies International Security and War Studies in Paris and
London and is employed as a student research and teaching assistant at Rhine-
Waal University. Next to his studies, he gained work experience at the German
Federal Foreign Office, the German Federal Ministry of Defense, and the
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Munich Security Conference. His research interest focuses in particular on

irregular warfare in thought and practice as well as the role of irregular forces
in interstate wars.
Lauren Maunder studies law at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri,
and serves as non-resident graduate research fellow at Virginia Tech’s Jean
Monnet Center of Excellence of European Union, Transatlantic, and Trans-­
European Space Studies (CEUTTSS). She holds a BA in International
Studies with distinction from Virginia Tech with a major in National
Security and Foreign Affairs (NSFA). While at Virginia Tech, she served
as undergraduate research fellow at CEUTTSS.
Katharina McLarren (PhD) is a senior research fellow in the MAGGI
research group at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law she is also a visiting fellow at the AIA NRW, Bonn. She pre-
viously held positions as lecturer and research fellow at the Rhine Waal
University of Applied Sciences and the University of Passau in Germany. She
was one of the coordinators of the DAAD-funded project on ‘Tunisia in
Transition’ and co-editor of the volume Tunisia’s International Relations Since
the ‘Arab Spring’. In her doctoral dissertation she focused on religion in inter-
national relations theories, particularly the English School. She is examining
the role of religion in international politics during the outbreak of war.
Pontian G. Okoth is Professor of History and International Relations at
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kenya. His PhD in
Diplomatic History is from the University of California, Los Angeles. Okoth’s
teaching and research interests lie in diplomatic history, diplomacy, foreign
policy, and international conflict management, areas in which he has pub-
lished over 180 publications, including books, book chapters, and peer-­
reviewed international journal articles. Okoth has been Vice Chancellor at
Lugazi University, Kampala, Uganda, and has received several awards,
including the Fulbright Scholarship and Carnegie Corporation of New York
Research Grant.
Francis Onditi is Associate Professor of Conflictology & Dean, School of
International Relations and Diplomacy, Riara University, Nairobi, Kenya. He is
also the recipient of the Erasmus Mundus Global teaching fellowship at Leipzig
University, Germany. He has been named the World’s Top 2% scientists of the
year 2022 listed by the Stanford University, USA. He is enlisted as a distin-
guished research author and professor of research at the Institute for Intelligent
Systems (IIS), University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Onditi has published
more than 70 articles in peer reviewed journals, several book chapters and
authored/co-edited 6 university level books. His epistemic research affiliation
is conflictology, specialising in the geography of conflict, institutional evolution
theory (tribal markets), regional integration, and civil-military relations.
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xvii

Victoria Scheyer is a PhD researcher at the Gender, Peace and Security Centre
at Monash University Melbourne. She works as research associate at Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt in a project about resistances and backlashes to gen-
der-sensitive human rights in peacebuilding. Her research interest is around
feminist peace research, feminist foreign policy, and resistances, such as anti-­
feminism in far right movements. She advocates for women’s rights and peace at
the German section of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.
Thokozani Simelane (PhD and DEng) is a principal investigator of South
Africa’s National Food and Nutrition Security Survey and a senior research fel-
low at University of Johannesburg: Institute for Pan-African Thought &
Conversation. His previous positions include Interim Research Director
at Africa Institute of South Africa; Manager at the Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research and South African Bureau of Standards; member
of the Standing Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Right of
South Africa. He has served as the PhD and MSc external examiner for
WITS University and has produced a total of 70 publications ranging
from journal articles to book chapters.
Anil Sooklal is the Ambassador-at-Large: Asia and BRICS at the Department
of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), and South Africa’s
Sherpa for BRICS as well as IBSA Sherpa and Focal Point for Indian
Ocean Rim Association. He holds a PhD and Oriental History as well as
DPhil in Religious Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Sooklal served as Deputy Director-General, Asia and Middle East, in
DIRCO until 31 January 2022 and during his career also served as South
Africa’s G20 Sherpa Ambassador to the European Union, Belgium, and
Luxembourg and served completed diplomatic assignments in Geneva
and New Delhi.
Yannis A. Stivachtis is Professor of Political Science and Jean Monnet Chair
at Virginia Tech. He is the Director of Virginia Tech’s Jean Monnet Center of
Excellence of European Union, Transatlantic, and Trans-European Space
Studies (CEUTTSS). He also serves as Director of the International Studies
Program, university coordinator of the Diplomacy Lab, and liaison with
the US Department of State. He is the editor of the Critical European
Studies book series and co-editor of the Athens Journal of Mediterranean
Studies. He has published several books, edited volumes, book chapters, and
articles in peer-reviewed journals.
Peter Christian Waldbauer-Hable (BA, MA) is a Senior Detective Chief
Inspector and the acting head of the Criminal Department for Economic
Crime, Financial Crime and Corruption of the criminal police directorate in
Passau/Bavaria/Germany. In 2003 he started to be engaged in international
missions for institutions such as the United Nations, the European Commission,
and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development. Furthermore,
he worked for NGOs and consulting agencies supporting the implemen-
xviii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

tation and execution of projects related to the security sector. During his work
in these projects, the author lived in countries of the Balkan Region, Central
Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Europe, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Edmond M. Were is Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kisii
University, Kenya. He has taught in public universities in East and Central
Africa and mentored several graduate students. He is a CIDA as well as DAAD
scholar. He is widely published in several peer-reviewed journals, contrib-
uted chapters in tertiary-level books, and edited and coauthored books,
including Reimagining Security Communities: A Systems Thinking Approach
for Africa (published by Palgrave Macmillan).
Douglas A. Yates (MA/PhD political science (Boston University 1994)) has
been a professor at the American University of Paris, American Graduate
School in Paris, and CY Cergy Paris University. Author of The Historical
Dictionary of Gabon, 4th ed. (2018), he became interested in dynastic rule after
the succession in that African republic of President Ali Bongo, publishing
‘Modern Dynastic Rule’, Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science (2016),
‘Dynastic Rule in Gabon’, Cahiers d’études africaines (January 2019), and
‘Dynastic Rule in Syria and North Korea: Nepotism, Succession, and Sibling
Rivalry’, International Political Science Review (June 2022).
James Yuko is an adjunct lecturer in the School of International Relations and
Diplomacy-Riara University, Kenya. He holds a BA degree (2010) and an
MA degree (2020) in Political Science and Public Administration with a
focus on Comparative Politics and International Relations—both from
the University of Nairobi. His MA dissertation is a longitudinal study
that examines the influence of devolution on access to public healthcare
services in Kenya, 2013–2018. He has published, together with others, a
journal article titled ‘Coronavirus Pandemic and Crisis Management: A
Cross-Country Perspective’, in the Political Science Applied (PSCA) jour-
nal, Issue XII, available at ­https://www.psca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/
12/Issue_XII.
 List of Figures

Fig. 8.1 The cluster approach (OCHA, 2020) 178

Fig. 12.1 The Bongos of Gabon 278
Fig. 12.2 The Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo 279
Fig. 15.1 Map of the disputed area (DW Africa, 2016) 339
Fig. 15.2 Declining export and import between Kenya and Somalia.
(Source: Field data) 345
Fig. 15.3 The Former Northern Frontier District, and Jubaland Province
(Somalia). (Source: Author’s compilation using the National
Geographic Data Base) 345
Fig. 15.4 U.S. Interventions by year and region (MIP, 2022) 347
Fig. 15.5 The quadruple nature of kinetic diplomacy tool
(Author’s own construct) 353
Fig. 16.1 Data storage and management systems that can support
diplomacy (Inyang, 2011) 372

xix
 List of Maps

Map 17.1 Ongoing Neighboring Military Occupations (NMOs).

(© Gilad Ben-­Nun 2022) 380
Map 17.2 Concluded Neighboring Military Occupations (NMOs).
(© Gilad Ben-­Nun 2022) 383
Map 17.3 Neighboring Military Occupations. (© Nick Danforth 2016) 392

xxi
 List of Tables

Table 7.1 Actors in sport diplomacy 154

Table 11.1 Typology of faith-based diplomacy 247
Table 12.1 States with ruling dynasties in 2023 by region and regime type 266
Table 16.1 Priority areas of the Science, Technology, and Innovation Strategy
for Africa (STISA) 2024 365
Table 20.1 France’s gender equality objectives 446
Table 20.2 Recommendations to governments and the UN by UN
Women 2020 452

xxiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Diplomatic Thought and Practice

Francis Onditi

Foundations of Diplomacy
In commonplaces, diplomacy is a ‘kaleidoscope’ of things. They include interna-
tional conferences, state visits, summit meetings, parliamentary activities and
other international events between sovereign states. This ‘kaleidoscopy’ has also
been reflected in the interaction among supranational and subnational entities,
all of which define the classic object of diplomacy. In western Europe, the prac-
tice of diplomacy was initially confined to the royal families, in which, the
prince would grant favors and documents to facilitate individuals representing
the monarch to travel. This mundane practice of diplomacy has evolved. As
noted by diplomatic historians (Helmers, 2016; Mowat, 1928), the practice of
diplomacy has advanced to be associated with official agreements between
states or institutions. After the Westphalian boom in the seventeenth century,
the practice of diplomacy begun to follow a canon-esoteric focus on the state
and diplomats (Murray et al., 2011).
The focus on state and its diplomats defined the identity of diplomacy, espe-
cially during the time of Abraham de Wicquefort (Keens-Soper, 1997).
Wicquefortian diplomatic identity persisted into the eighteenth century and
the early part of the Napoleonic diplomatic adventure in the nineteenth cen-
tury. It is on this basis that diplomatic historians (Bruley, 2009; Frey & Frey,
1993) have illustrated how the French culture adopted the term diplomate as a
framework to guide those who engaged in states’ negotiation. During this
time, although diplomats were not held in high esteem as military marshals,

F. Onditi (*)
School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Riara University, Nairobi, Kenya
e-mail: fonditi@riarauniversity.ac.ke

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
F. Onditi et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Thought and
Practice in the Digital Age,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28214-0_1
2 F. ONDITI

foreign embassies enjoyed inviolable rights and immunity, thus restricting dip-
lomatic space to the privileged (le conseil diplomatique) (Davis, 2015). This
restrictive approach, has, however, changed over time. Today, diplomacy is no
longer the preserve of the state. Its practice and intellectualism have spiraled
into the public. Colorful events, cultural exchanges and public engagements
have become the defining stature of modern diplomacy (Melissen, 2011; Scott-­
Smith, 2018). As aptly noted by Hedling and Bremberg (2021), the intersec-
tion of diplomacy and internet of things has led to the emergence of new
practices of ‘digital diplomacy in 21st century’. These changes and stability
continue to reconstruct and disrupt the international system.
How has this change-stability continuum impacted on the international sys-
tem? Otto von Bismarck, one of the leading German diplomats of the nineteenth
century, viewed diplomacy from a foreign policy lens, describing the former as
the never-ending negotiation of reciprocal concessions. In what seems to be a
Bismarckian extension, the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs (SWP) have in the recent past emphasized the need to view diplomacy as
a foreign policy tool for governments (Stanzel, 2018). Similarly, in the days of Sir
Robert Vansittart (1903–1930), British foreign policy was defined through three
key pillars of the state: the need to maintain balance of power; armed strength as
a means to diplomacy and interest versus position (McKercher, 1995). These
clichés reflect a recognition among leading scholars and practicing diplomats of
the central role diplomacy plays in managing relationships between states and
other institutions, but also the changing nature of diplomacy (Cohen, 1987,
2013; Sharp, 1999; Cooper et al., 2008; Sending et al., 2011).
Indeed, focusing on diplomatic thought and practice (DTP) contrasts the
narrow view of diplomacy, such as identifying it with negotiation and dialogue
or with conferences or with resolution of conflict or with state actors or with
official agreements. Negotiating and dialoguing on behalf of state or suprana-
tional entities can, of course, be very essential elements for influencing behav-
ior of foreign governments toward resolving conflicts amicably. Although
diplomatic thought goes beyond conferencing, negotiation and dialogue, it
encompasses other determinants such as geography, economy, security, mili-
tary, sociology, psychology, law, religion or knowledge production to name a
few examples. The accelerated tempo of societal and technological changes on
the global scale has, perhaps, discouraged scholars from performing systematic
analysis of these macro-issues that bear influence on the manner in which states
relate to each other in a multipolar word. Moreover, the very multiplicity and
diversity of thoughts pose intellectual problems to scholars and diplomats. As a
result, relatively few scholars have systematically examined diplomatic studies
from its diverse angles, that is, structure and practice. In this handbook, the
term diplomatic thought and practice has been developed to entail conceptual
and propositional structure (including attitudes, ideas, ideologies, values, skills,
pedagogies and methods) and application of this structure to the implementa-
tion of foreign policy of states and international institutions, as well as teaching
and research in the broader field of international relations and diplomacy.
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 3

In the traditional Bismarckian and Sir Vansittartian’s state relations frame-

work, the central theme of diplomacy is the state. However, exclusive attention
to its officialdom tends to make the practice of diplomacy exclusive and formal-
istic. Diplomatic thought entails removing formality and officialdom, by
expanding diplomatic space to accommodate variety of actors, some of whom
do not etch etiquette. However, viewing diplomacy in terms of expanding
intellectual space redirects attention to the ends that make diplomacy inclusive
and accessible. Also, unconventional yet important actors such as development
and humanitarian agencies, as well as insurgence groups, would be left out of
the scope of diplomacy, if attention is narrowly focused on the state and inter-
governmental organizations. The complexity in the global system has mainly
been driven by what Sascha Lohmann (2017) described as the deployment of
economic instruments as a new ‘battlefield’. Social and technological changes
have altered the structure of international relations, making it inevitable for
scholars and diplomats to think new tactics of diplomacy.
The beginning of diplomatic thinking is often linked to western civilization,
particularly the medieval European societies (Watkin, 2008; Queller, 1967;
Mattingly, 1955), who associated diplomacy with spiritual relationship between
heaven and earth. But some aspects of secular diplomacy and statehood existed
among early societies with intertribal relations being bound by some elements
of international law (Hurd, 2011; Schweizer & Black, 2006). As Sir Herbert
Butterfield (1900–1979) rightly puts it, human relations have always thrived
through societal interaction (cited in Schweizer & Black, 2006). In African
societies, for instance, tribes negotiated marriages, trade, forgiveness and other
cultural mutual events were presided over by messengers who were considered
accredited, sacred and sacrosanct. They were accompanied by emblems as part
of diplomatic symbolism. Although no sign of modern diplomacy has been
documented in sub-Saharan Africa before ninth century, diplomatic historians
have traced elements of diplomacy in Egypt dating to the fourteenth century
(Schweizer & Black, 2006; Murray et al., 2011). This implies that diplomacy
has been part of societies’ attempt to live harmoniously and its thoughtfulness
is as old as organized social, political, economic and cultural set up of human
society. As different groups interacted, conflict was inevitable; however, they
were resolved through negotiation and mediation.
Like many other intellectual inquiries, diplomatic thinking has also been
traced among ancient Greek thinkers. However, diplomatic thought has been
traced among other societies including Chinese dynasty, Arab world and Indian
dynasty. The intellectual prowessness of Indian thinkers such as Kautilya toward
geometries, peace, war, non-alignment, alliances showcase their contribution
to diplomatic thought. Diplomatic thoughts of India and other parts of the
world have, however, remained glossed. Yet their contribution to modern
diplomacy pioneered diplomatic regulation of tribes, geopolitical matrix, con-
ciliation, seduction, subversion, coercion and acquiring clandestinely gems and
other valuables for their supreme political organizational leaders, akin to the
Greek proxenos. The uniting factor among the Arabs, Persians, Turks and other
4 F. ONDITI

Central Asian peoples that was occasioned by the bloody conflict with Christian
Byzantine was perhaps the defining epic of modern international relations.
DTP differ in different societies, but they all agree on one thing: the only glue
to intertribal and interreligious relations was the exchange of ideas and cultural
norms. It is clear, therefore, that in every society, there have been continuities
and discontinuities of diplomatic intellectualism that informed its practice.
Thus, the core of this handbook is to demonstrate how north-south and east-
west exchange continuous to pave the way for this global evolution of
diplomacy.
This handbook introduces the notion of ‘diplomatic thought and practice’,
as both a knowledge product and tool for engaging future studies in diplo-
macy. DTP is then concerned with individual diplomats, societies, concepts,
territories and spatial structures at national, regional and supranational levels,
including non-state actors. In the changing world, behavior of individuals or
groups and not necessarily formal state organizational units may influence the
mode of diplomacy of the state itself. There are three lingering theoretical
explanations for the changes shifting diplomacy from overly state-focused to
what we coin in this handbook, open diplomacy: realism (Gilpin, 1984;
Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 1948; Rose, 1998)—the development of
nuclear weapons led to rapid decline in the deployment of armed forces. The
armed forces turned out to be ineffective in dealing with unconventional
threats posed by activities of insurgencies in failed states, cyber warfare, resur-
gence of transnational violent extremists and growth of organized criminals.
Moralism (Levine, 2014; Blocq, 2006)—the actual use of armed forces—
became morally shunned to being ultima ratio. Within the UN Charter, its
force could only be used in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. Finally,
sanctions (Maller, 2010; Drury, 2001)—the use of economic sanctions—
allowed global powers to inflict equally effective cost on adversaries as a means
to influencing their decision making. The cost of diplomatic sanctions ranges
from loss of information, derailed intelligence, reduced interaction and dimin-
ished ability of concerned states to influence the target state. The result is usu-
ally foiled foreign policy. Maller (2010, p. 61) noted: ‘Ironically, diplomatic
sanctions may even undermine the effectiveness of other coercive policy tools,
such as economic sanctions’. These theoretical and foreign policy perspectives
develop an image of modern diplomacy and nature of actors that feature inter-
national relations stage.
It is, however, important to note that the intricate relationship between the
disciplines of diplomacy and international relations has constructed an intel-
lectual space that is not necessarily distinct from the convectional theories of
IR. In any case, the continued involvement of non-state actors in conflict and
warfare has led to increased interaction between states and non-state actors in
effort to broker diplomatic solutions. What has become even more profound is
that within this context of actors’ proliferation and confusion, the process of
negotiation, dialogue and mediation have been informalized to accommodate
the demands of non-state actors. This transformation of the diplomatic
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 5

environment is coined in this handbook, ‘informalization of diplomacy’.

Formal diplomacy assumes a club-like institution permeated by norms of con-
sensus, reciprocity, diplomatic discretion and diffuse reciprocity (Hayes-
Renshaw & Wallace, 2006, p. 12). In what Brandsma et al. (2021, p. 10) calls
‘institutionalization of trilogue’, institutional dynamics can spur intra-institu-
tional change. Emerging studies have affirmed this by observing that interac-
tion of different entities (for instance, state and non-state actors) within an
organizational set up could lead to internal tensions (Hagemann et al., 2019;
Novak, 2013). This form of negative socialization can either lead to formaliza-
tion or informalization of institutions (Manulak, 2019), depending on the
velocity of influence from either side. The ‘informalization of diplomacy’ is
driven by external forces, which in turn influences what we call, ‘diplomacying’
(activities, assets and processes of conducting diplomacy) by states in efforts to
pursue their foreign policy objectives; what type of global trends should inform
the current and future diplomatic thought and practice?

The Changing Tools and Types of Diplomacy

in International Relations

In this section, we identify five historical and contemporary global dynamics

which we argue should be reflected in any framework, mechanisms and tools
for thinking and conducting diplomacy. In our view, these dynamics should
inform future development in the field in terms of research, policy and curricu-
lum. Before we delve into the dynamics, it is important we examine the notion
of change and stability, both as concepts and lived experiences.
Tools of diplomacy are agreements or treaties that states sign in their efforts
to facilitate cooperation between them; they include arbitration, détente,
embargo, neutrality, shuttle diplomacy/flying diplomacy, secret diplomacy
and, increasingly, faith-based diplomacy. These tools are a means through
which states achieve their foreign policy objectives (Adesina, 2017). Therefore,
as a major instrument of foreign policy, diplomacy is a mirror for understand-
ing international system through which institutions are created or recreated,
systems are ordered and norms are produced or reproduced. Given that these
forces are constantly changing, tools are deployed to resolve conflicts emerging
between states or develop strategies for compelling states to respect others’
positions, interests or decisions. Diplomatic tools have implications on the
practice of diplomacy. The interaction of diplomatic practice and information
technology has given birth to the notion of digital diplomacy, as part of the
practice of diplomacy. Digital diplomacy has been defined on the basis of inter-
net, digital tools, digital media and technology and how these platforms and
tools influence diplomacy (Hedling & Bremberg, 2021). Scholars have identi-
fied several trends in diplomacy attributed to digital transformation: emergence
of new actors, who view diplomacy differently, hence proliferation of prefixes
such as, ‘cyber-diplomacy’, ‘net-diplomacy’, ‘e-diplomacy’ and ‘Twiplomacy’
6 F. ONDITI

(Hocking & Melissen, 2015). Digital diplomacy has also been perceived to be
disruptive; diplomats are not sure of the risks of engaging with unknown indi-
viduals. Perhaps the most illustrative application of digital diplomacy was dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic when states’ representatives adopted online
conferencing. This is what scholars have coined ‘zoom diplomacy’
(Naylor, 2020).
In regard to the practice of diplomacy, communication has deeper influence
on both the process and outcome of diplomacy. Diplomatic missions around
the world that have not succeeded as a result of ineffective communication are
evident. The new diplomatic space is no longer defined by its actors but by its
communication dynamics, hence, the necessity for diplomats to appreciate the
dynamics of these new diplomatic sites. Mastery of digital tools, linguistic acu-
men, appreciation of the culture of the host state and the fragmentation of
societies, meeting the needs of different publics, coupled with emotional intel-
ligence is equal to effective and efficient communication that leads to success
in diplomatic missions and shall define the personal profile of future diplomats.
Likewise, the implementation of a country’s foreign policy praxis is largely
dependent on the application of various communication strategies. Hedling
and Bremberg (2021) analysis of the practice of diplomacy included the con-
cept of ‘diplomatic agency’ to explain how diplomacy determines direction of
global politics—who counts as the influential diplomatic actor?
Talking of diplomatic influencers, Simons (2018, p. 157) highlighted the
fact that many different groups, including NGOs, are potentially ‘good rela-
tionship builders and may possess the necessary skills, networks and local
knowledge that are superior to the Ministry of foreign affairs’. He noted that
NGOs can be interlocutors for facilitating interactive communication, con-
ducting advocacy and promoting public diplomacy through practice analysis
tools. Practice analysis, as one approach to understanding the various compo-
nents of diplomacy, including, public diplomacy, has gained traction as it taps
from professional experience and skills of serving or retired diplomats. This
approach has been developed in the International Relations and Studies litera-
ture in the millennium, drawing on the recent work of ‘public diplomacy’
(Manor, 2019), and earlier work of Joseph Nye (1990) on soft power (cultural
attributes and values). Here public diplomacy actors are not confined to the
state but also others such as religious non-governmental organizations
(RNGOs) who represent a hybrid of religious beliefs and socio-political activ-
ism at various levels of the society. Berger (2004) contests that public mentality
has relegated religion to the narrow realm of private life, yet, RNGOs can, and
have, in the past influenced change in the international system, including play-
ing critical role in the establishment of the Rome Statute for the International
Criminal Court. The informal actors and activism in diplomacy are often more
intuitive and less systematic than the structured officialdom diplomacy con-
ducted by state representatives. Wiseman (2015) advances the argument on
how UN diplomatic practices should be reformed beyond the narrow context
of formal diplomatic corps of member states to also encompass an informal
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 7

wider community of non-state actors. On the question of diplomatic informal-

ity, Wiseman recognizes the role students of diplomacy can play toward build-
ing an innovative body of knowledge through informal activities often ignored
by established scholars and officialdom diplomats. Leijten’s (2017) analysis of
innovative/science diplomacy and exploration of the impact of knowledge-­
based economy on international politics and foreign policy praxis is perhaps an
emblematic example of a more systematized approach opening up space for
multidisciplinary skills in the management of foreign affairs and services, as
espoused by various chapters in this handbook.
Informal diplomacy, often referred to as amateur diplomacy, utilizes private
spaces and individuals to obtain information and exert influence on behalf of
the state one represents (Mathews, 1963). Much of the focus of informal
diplomacy has been non-official engagements with entities that are not directly
representing the state—activists, private sectors, scholars, retired state officials,
public intellectuals and opinion leaders (Berman & Johnson, 1977). The
method encourages negotiators and private individuals to meet in an off-the-­
record and unofficial setting to make common ground where normal diplo-
matic negotiators cannot (Keohane & Nye, 1973). It also involves forming
people-to-people connections, sharing expertise and building trust, all without
the bureaucracy of official diplomatic channels, pre-determined talking points
and the presence of the media (Jackson, 2020). It may entail a set of government-­
sanctioned but unofficial diplomatic activities that are intended to overcome
limitations of formal diplomacy (Montville, 2006).
Informal diplomacy has also been defined as the employment of largely non-­
political means by states to achieve their foreign policy objectives (Chang &
Tai, 1996). For countries with formal diplomatic relations with each other;
investment funds and economic assistance may be offered by one state to
another as inducements for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In some
cases, an affluent state providing economic assistance to another state may
strengthen the defense capacity of the recipient state in common defense
against a third state. Also, a state conducting cultural exchange with another
state may enhance the standing of the former in the eyes of the citizens of the
latter. In situations such as the one described in this book as ‘break-away ter-
ritories’ or spaces controlled by insurgence groups, informal diplomacy becomes
definitive action when such groups engage state diplomats. Here, non-state
actors are considered not only as interest groups but also as active or passive
players on the diplomatic scene who are also affected by the foreign policy of
the concerned state. Informal diplomacy analysis, in the light of diplomatic
thought and practice framework, provides a conceptualization which assists in
the analysis of interests and influence with a specific focus on informal actors.
In the broader DTP framework, the informal diplomacy analysis focuses on the
interrelations of informal actors and state actors and their impact on foreign
policy, within the broader security, economic, political and geographical
context.
8 F. ONDITI

In the recent past, there have been incidences or the need for an informal
diplomatic framework across the globe. For example, in the wake of COVID-19,
equitable distribution of vaccines could help foster a favorable country image
and likeability, as few areas of diplomatic goodwill connect more with the
humanitarian nature of international citizenship and medical assistance than
the conventional statecraft (Bier & Arceneaux, 2020). In this sense, ‘vaccine
diplomacy’ becomes an appealing instrument of soft power. Joseph Nye’s
(2008, p. 94) idea of ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one
wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment is one example of
informal diplomatic approach with a thoughtful perspective.’ The India’s
capacity and willingness to share COVID-19 vaccines have boosted its diplo-
matic heft. India’s informal diplomacy through the use of vaccines has extended
well beyond the Asia Pacific region and is now making a deep impact in Africa
(Pattanaik, 2018). New Delhi has delivered made-in-India vaccines to nearly
30 African countries and many have received them as gifts. Over the years,
India has provided low cost generic drugs to several African nations to combat
infectious diseases. The line between informal diplomacy and formal diplo-
matic engagements is blurred. The informal diplomatic approach deployed by
India has bolstered Africa-India’s trade relations from 5.3 billion US Dollars in
2001 to 62 billion US Dollars in 2018 (Pattanaik, 2021). India is also third
largest export destination and the fifth largest investor for the continent.
Another notable example is the Chinese relation with the rest of the world
in various forms, including the controversy surrounding the origin and spread
of the virus responsible for COVID-19. From the time the virus was first
reported in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, China has experienced a reputational
dent, garnering international sympathy, as well as accusations of fanning the
pandemic by silencing early reports. Beijing has continued to be dogged by
international criticisms that trace the origins of the pandemic to a leak from a
Wuhan lab. Thus, after a successful domestic COVID-19 mitigation, China
launched a public diplomacy campaign in April 2020 to brand itself as a global
health leader by sending masks, medical teams and test kits overseas (Lancaster
& Rubin, 2020). Besides, international cooperation in the health sector has
been a firm component of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy for
over five years. The Chinese leadership has been promoting this aspect of the
initiative (‘health silk road’) as essential to building a ‘global community of
common destiny’ (Rudolf, 2021). Beijing’s resurrection of the Health Silk
Road signature to promote its health leadership and redeem its international
image is a natural extension of its ‘mask diplomacy’. Beijing has been linking
measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic in aid recipient countries with
the prospect of post-pandemic cooperation within the OBOR framework. This
mix of both informal and statecraft approaches to diplomacy by Beijing sur-
vives on what has been termed as ‘natural axis’ for Sino-Africa commercial and
cultural relationship (Onditi & Nyadera, 2021, p. 418). Although China
attempted to turn its health crisis into a geopolitical opportunity, its vaccine
diplomacy raised more than a few eyebrows (Huang, 2021). China’s nation
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 9

brand has consistently deteriorated, and the huge investments in public diplo-
macy have not resulted in a proportionate increase in its international image to
help it overcome the structural weakness it faces in the global opinion market
(Nye, 2015). In the latest Global Soft Power Index released on February 25,
2021, China fell three places from fifth place in 2020 to eighth in 2021 (Yin,
2014). The Chinese ‘non-interference’ and ‘low-profile’ tenets of its foreign
policy seem to be waning as it deploys its armed forces abroad (Nantulya,
2020), to protect the ever-growing contractors, particularly in Africa where
over 200,000 Chinese workers have relocated in support of the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). This is in addition to the over 10,000 Chinese companies
operating on the continent (Nantulya, 2020).
The increasingly unstructured (informal) approach to diplomacy reflects the
changing nature of context, and a resultant pragmatism. However, Montville
(2006), writing about informality of diplomacy from the perspective of power
asymmetry, cautions about the delicate nature of foreign policy and political
power structures (Montville, 2006). For instance, in times of war, engaging
rivaling groups informally can take too long to yield results, hence, has limited
ability to influence change at the war stage of a conflict. Also the participants
rarely have resources necessary for sustained leverage during negotiations and
for the implementation of agreements. More so, informal diplomacy may not
be effective in authoritarian regimes where leaders do not take advice from
technocrats (Carter, 1995). Finally, due to their lack of political power, infor-
mal diplomatic actors are in most cases not accountable to the public for poor
decisions.
Despite the limitations associated with informal diplomacy, this form of
engagement can be relied upon when handling sensitive relationships between
states or non-state actors. Informal diplomacy provides insulation to states that
do not want to incur the costs of diplomatically engaging politically unpalat-
able opponents in a public manner, thus, is effective in facilitating formal inter-
national cooperation (Chen, 2021). Notably, the series of meetings that led to
the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine began as a set of track two dia-
logues initiated by private citizens when official talks stalled (Agha et al., 2003).
Informal diplomacy complements formal engagements because its low public
visibility insulates states from unwanted domestic audience costs. It is also
established that during third-party mediation to protracted conflicts, informal
mediation have both independent and synergistic effects with track one (i.e.,
formal or official) efforts in increasing the likelihood of peaceful settlements
(Bohmelt, 2010). Also, informal diplomatic meetings are low-commitment
and not publicly noticeable, hence, they are effective diplomatic tools for
exploring sensitive areas of international politics (Jones, 2015). The partici-
pants are also not inhibited by political or constitutional power; therefore, they
can express their own viewpoints on issues that directly affect their communi-
ties and families.
The global diplomatic practices, tools and thoughts as well as the informal-
ity of diplomacy underscore the need for a renewed diplomatic framework that
10 F. ONDITI

spells out alternative mechanisms and tools to accommodate new actors in

diplomacy and address unique challenges in the international system. What
challenges and opportunities are presented to diplomats as they navigate the
realities of informal diplomacy? Can digital diplomacy mitigate the challenges
of diplomatic informality? How should new virtual realities interact with diplo-
mats? How can emerging technologies be utilized to enhance efficiency in the
management of foreign affairs and diplomatic services?
The United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, posits that
changes in the tactics of diplomacy have been occasioned by deteriorating
international security environment, unrestricted arms competition, increasing
gray zone activities and the re-surgency of strategic tensions between the major
powers (Rydell, 2020). The change and stability in international system is not
limited to these global processes, rather, change is an evolutionary process,
dependent on several factors, including interactive nature of states. The post-
modern approaches to the analysis of change and stability, which is the core of
this book, posits that global system is not necessarily discrete entity, rather, it is
an on-going dynamic process. Although change and stability approaches and
concepts have been articulated within international politics (Cohen, 1987), the
use of the concepts change and stability in international relations and diplo-
macy is relatively a recent phenomenon (Sinha, 2018; Gunitsky, 2013). Change
theorists (Gunitsky, 2013) postulate that change is both incremental and dis-
ruptive. Transformationalists (Gordeeva, 2016) have maintained that approach-
ing study of international relations using change-stability continuum can be
useful in examining drivers of change and stability in international processes—
competition, cooperation and socialization of various norms. Internationalists
(Sinha, 2018) observe that cooperation and competition are products of
change as an outcome of globalization, occurring through creation and recre-
ation of universal values. Within this context of change and stability, pragmatic
approaches have evolved and utilized by states to resolve conflicts, namely,
negotiation, dialogue and sometime kinetic diplomacy. Albeit, some critiques
have cautioned against intensification of kinetic diplomacy as it has remained a
paradox in southeast and central Asia (Chang & Jenne, 2020). In this view,
diplomacy is characterized as ‘engine room’ within which the world power
politics operates (Cohen, 1987). Although these frameworks and perspectives
recognize the link between statecraft and the survival of states in the changing
international system, the emerging shocks in the international order, the revo-
lution of internet of things (IoTs), unilateralism vs multilateralism and the mul-
tiplicity of actors beyond the state have made it difficult to limit the scope of
diplomacy to state relations. Even for discourses on international relations and
system (Hall, 2002), literature falls short of adequately addressing three impor-
tant issues: (a) conceptualization of change and stability, (b) defining the typol-
ogies of change and stability in the international system and (c) identification
of diplomatic thoughts and practices impacted upon by these changes and sta-
bility. Still, efforts by Felix Grenier (2015) to explain development of interna-
tional relations through the various reflexive perspectives (geo-epistemic,
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 11

historiographical and sociological) are limited to methodological typologies,

leaving out interrelated, yet important phenomenon of change and stability.
Reflexive studies on IR and diplomacy examines the IR agenda developed
between 1980s and 1990s by the generation of post-positivist and critical
scholars (Booth, 1991). What is the nature of these trends?
Multilateralism vs unilateralism proliferation of actors. How do you ensure
the existing multilateral system, the UN, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), the Bretton Woods institutions and others work within the rap-
idly changing international environment? How should the key players in the
global system address frustrations emerging from the nationalistic groups con-
cerned about the slow reforms? Proliferation of actors including the need to
negotiate with non-state actors is equally a pressing issue facing the world
today. In post Bismarck’s era, diplomacy is no longer the preserve of embassies,
attaches and consular, non-state actors (including NGOs, humanitarian agen-
cies, civil society organizations, religious groups and business community) are
increasingly becoming indispensable part of modern diplomacy. The broader
question therefore is how to ensure each actor counts when conducting nego-
tiation, mediation, dialogue and other diplomatic engagements?
Internet of things and 4IR (Fourth industrial revolution). Systems scientists
have posited that the fifth iteration of the industrial revolution will pave the
way to a synergy between autonomous machines and humans. This interaction
is likely to increase efficiency and provide opportunity to harness human poten-
tial capability in various work flows. Management of foreign affairs and services
is one of the areas that could benefit from the internet of things by reintroduc-
ing AI (artificial intelligence) and Blockchain. Among the instruments of diplo-
macy, digitization is rapidly shaping the practice of diplomacy in various
ways—shortening time for decision making, the big data analytics distilling
large volume of information and the influence of social media on the image and
conduct of diplomats. These opportunities also raise important questions on
the future of diplomacy: How do you harness this human–machine interaction
to increase efficiency of diplomatic service delivery? Does application of IoTs
increase harmonious relationship between states, groups and institutions?
Growth of gray zone conflict and pandemics. Gray zone conflicts entail the
activities by quasi-revisionist states that seek to alter the status quo of the inter-
national order through coercive military or political means just below a thresh-
old that would elicit a conventional military response (Popp & Canna, 2016;
Mazaar, 2015). Nations undertaking gray zone campaigns make strong efforts
to justify their actions under international law. Notable examples include the
Chinese legal claims in the South China Sea (SCS), where they recruit other
countries to their point of view, even when the legal standing of their claims in
the international community is tenuous. The global leading powers (US and
China) have deployed kinetic diplomacy (diplomacy by armed forces) as a des-
perate measure in tackling the growing threats of gray zone (Toft, 2018).
During President Trump Administration, the US appointed 149 special opera-
tion forces (SoFs) in 2018 from 138 during Obama administration in 2016.
12 F. ONDITI

The number of ambassadorial appointees was much lower (75) than those
deployed for SoFs. However, despite this robust deployment of SoFs, the
world has witnessed increased insurgency, terrorism and civil war, mainly in the
Middle East, Central Asia (Afghanistan), Africa and other troubled areas. As
noted by Toft (2018) and Lowther (2010), in different occasions, kinetic
diplomacy, therefore, presents a notable paradox: on the one hand, it is a mili-
tary activity that could be utilized for humanitarian, preventive and deterrence
diplomatic engagements and thus positively shape state relations in which for-
eign policy operates. On the other hand, kinetic diplomacy also involves com-
petition on the basis of military power, which may contravene states’ goal of
building cooperation and undermine trust between states or institutions. What
is an effective framework for conducting constructive kinetic diplomacy in the
gray zone environments?
From MDGs to SDGs and pandemics. In 2000, the terms of global coopera-
tion changed as the UN ushered in the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) aimed at fighting poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, discrimination
against women and environmental degradation. Given the conceptual and
practical limitations of the MDGs, the world demanded a paradigm shift in the
development framework that would transform the world, putting the word
‘together’ at the center of negotiation. On September 25, 2015, the 193 mem-
ber states of the UN unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Kamau et al.,
2018). The ravaging effects of the COVID-19 and the phenomenon of pan-
demic disinformation that accompanied its management and vaccination cre-
ated a platform for broadening the scope of crises that diplomats confront in
the course of their duty to include diseases and other disasters. There are les-
sons learnt from this pandemic and MDGs that are yet to be addressed within
the SDGs framework, for instance, with increased informal actors and themes
(infectious diseases) in the international peace and security space, including
insurgencies and militant groups, how do you ensure inclusivity in negotiating
for the implementation of the various goals and strategies? How do you ensure
fairness and equity in the management and control of the emerging infectious
diseases and pandemics?
The uncertainty of a multipolar international system and growth of the United
Nations’ membership. Throughout the history, the world has gone through
two levels of power distribution—bipolar and unipolar. Power distribution in
the international system determines key decisions at various levels—the United
Nations Security Council, the UNGA or even within the bilateral and multilat-
eral arrangements. The bipolar world was dominated by the United States and
the Union of Society Socialist Republics (USSR). However, with the collapse
of the USSR and the end of Cold War in 1989, the US’s influence remained
unchallenged in the unipolar global system. However, the resurgence of mul-
tipolar international system has increased great powers rivalry and opportuni-
ties for proxy wars, and regional nemesis, particularly in East Asia (Mearsheimer,
2001). The instability of this region has been attributed to weak alliances and
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 13

institutions (Mearsheimer, 2001). The rise of China in the advent of a falling

US, is a balancing factor, that threatens survival of Japan, South Korea and
other allies of the US. Given that China and Japan do not share common
global values and cultural appreciation, it is not difficult to predict that the
future of the region is bleak. Post-Cold War scholars have in fact predicted that
multipolar international system is prone to war than the two previous systems
(Friedberg, 1993; Ikenberry, 2005). This proposition raises a fundamental
question of how modern diplomatic thought and practice should be designed
to navigate the multiple angles of power, especially in culturally heterogenous
societies of the world? The other related issue is the growth of UN membership
from 51 in 1945 to 193 in 2021. The implications of this increase in the mem-
bership of the United Nations are the contribution to development, but also
the complexity in the decision-making process undertaken at the UN General
Assembly (UNGA). Although the UN Charter as articulated in Article 1 is
indicative of the need for member states to cultivate friendly relations based on
respect and self-determination, the evolution of other actors other than states
and intergovernmental organizations calls for thinking new diplomatic tactics.
What is an ideal institutional framework for conducting diplomacy among
armed rebels or militant groups?
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (denoting
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in its 2018 report highlights the
‘domestic’ problems of diplomacy and the proliferation of international orga-
nizations (IOs) as well as the informalization of global engagements through
arrangements such as the G20. These changes have not entirely defined mod-
ern diplomacy. Stability has also been observed in the international system,
with the liberal internationalism continuing to glue states together in an inter-
dependence fashion. Besides the usual non-state actors (NGOs, CSOs and
MNCs), the international system continues to be enriched with philanthropic
entities such as the Gates Foundations. Rather than promoting attributes of
hegemony and unipolarism, the plurality of actors has ushered in what we coin
in this handbook, ‘lukewarm multipolar international system’. This emerging
type of international system has been observed in various parts of the globe as
illustrated in the following case examples, frameworks and diplomatic practices.

Case Studies, Frameworks and Practice of Diplomacy

This handbook develops an image of a diplomatic thought and practice (DTP)
in the twenty-first century which is not only facing structural changes (infor-
malization) but also continues to be shaped by the macro forces discussed
above. From the analysis, it is clear that both the practice and theory of DTP
require significant change in configuration and architecture. For instance, due
to the event of 9/11, Afghanistan emerged as an important US foreign policy
concern in 2001 (Thomas, 2021). In the light of this concern, the US intensi-
fied its efforts to broker an intra-Afghan peace talk. However, while the talks
were going on in Doha, Qatar, the Taliban advanced swiftly and captured the
14 F. ONDITI

capital city—Kabul August 15, 2021. President Ashraf Ghani flew out of the
country to seek refuge in Qatar; meanwhile, the entire country fell into the
hands of the Taliban. This phenomenon would interest scholars of interna-
tional relations and diplomacy in different ways: what type of diplomatic tools
are required to engage informal formations declared terror groups during
peace negotiations? What diplomatic mechanisms are needed to guard against
defection, cheating and subversion during negotiation with terror formations?
But we must also prepare current and future diplomats to deal with ideological
objects in peace talks. There are also ideologically driven formations across the
world (Schweitzer, 1944), including Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Boko
Haram (northern Nigeria) and Antifa (anti-fascist protest movement) in the
United States, whose grievances may not be resolved through the officialdom
diplomatic engagements. Yet they threaten the fabric of the society and pose
real threats to the international peace and security.
Scholars and practicing diplomats contributing to this handbook make an
attempt to evaluate how the changes or stability of the international system
influences and is influenced by the various diplomatic propositions and prac-
tice. We consider whether the existing diplomatic thought can navigate the
informal diplomatic activities or the very thought of diplomacy requires some
form of informalization in order to address the informality of the formal. In
line with the need to reimagine current and future diplomatic thought and
practice, from all different cultural orientation and intellectual perspectives,
whether in terms of geography (south, north, east or west) or development
(industrialized and least developed countries, LDCs), or official vs. informal
diplomacy, our contributors and research fields are fairly distributed across the
globe. Our main contribution in developing this handbook, then, is to rein-
force the need to develop a balancing mechanism between formal and informal
diplomatic thought and practice. Informality of diplomacy is particularly cen-
tral to this work, as advocated by David Chang and Hung-chao Tai (1996),
Joseph Mathews (1963) and Adam Grydehoj (2014). Informal diplomacy as
articulated by these scholars, deploy non-political methods and tools by the
state and other institutions to achieve its foreign policy objective. Chang and
Tai (1996, p. 148) elaborate this approach to diplomacy: ‘a state conducting
cultural exchange with another state may enhance the standing of the former
in the eyes of the citizens of the latter’.
On August 2, 2019, a classic example of cultural informal diplomacy
occurred between Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania in East Africa.
President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya received four peacocks from his Tanzanian
counterpart President John Pombe Magufuli. The ornamental birds were
delivered to the Head of State by Tanzanian High Commissioner to Kenya Dr.
Pindi Hazara Chana. The two countries have constrained relationship with
Kenya accusing Tanzania of restrictive trade barriers against the provisions of
the EAC (East African Community) cooperation Treaty (2000). This cultural
exchange was therefore viewed as a way of deepening the relationship and
brotherhood between the two states for the current and future generations.
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 15

Informal diplomacy is not a recent development. During the time of King

Solomon in the Bible, whenever he would receive back the trading vessel from
far countries, it was accompanied by ornaments (gold, silver, ivory) and of
course peacocks. This illustrates the importance of soft power in pursuance of
strategic goals of States and Kingdoms.
The handbook is one of its kind paving the way for Palgrave to initiate a
series of Handbooks on DTP. This new development is preceded by a volume
on Diplomacy: Theory and Practice by G.R. Berridge (2015). No doubt,
Berridge assembles terrific tools and processes on how practitioners need to
conduct diplomacy methodically. However, Berridge presents a micro-cosmic
‘world’ of diplomacy narrowly focusing on processes, procedures, diplomatic
pedagogics and protocols. The art of negotiating agreements, which is
Berridge’s main concentration in his book, ignores the exogenic interaction of
diplomatic processes with the macro environmental forces shaped by politics,
technology, culture and general evolution of the society. Furthermore, it nei-
ther captures the ‘informality’ of things in the international system, nor reflects
on the unfolding changes in the international peace and security architecture.
For example, the difficulties that was experienced by the American plus allies’
diplomats during the Afghan-Taliban negotiation in Doha, Qatar, is perhaps a
monumental reflection of how the current frameworks, mechanisms and tools
of conducting diplomacy are limited to officialdom, yet, the informality of
things is increasingly occupying diplomatic space. The Routledge textbook
edited by Jan Henning and Tracey Sowerby (2017) on Practices of Diplomacy
in the Early Modern World c. 1410–1800, is a seminal historical account of the
diplomatic practices within the cultural and historical context of the time. No
doubt Henning and Sowerby’s work contributes to the reassessment of diplo-
matic history and chronological account of diplomatic events and processes.
However, these textbooks assume the bird’s eye view perceptive on critical
global forces impacting on diplomatic practices between nineteenth and
twenty-first centuries, including emergence of non-state actors, the multifac-
eted nature of international security and the complexity of diplomatic pro-
cesses. These developments have been triggered by technological and societal
changes happening in the modern digital age. In other words, much remain to
be done in developing frameworks, mechanisms and tools of diplomacy that
are capable of navigating these changes, stabilities, shocks and risks in the inter-
national system. Many of the chapters in the current handbook explicitly
address this lacuna. At the same time, we recognize that developing an ideal
DTP framework without considering the micro-cosmic aspects of diplomacy is
insufficient if we have to develop a comprehensive body of knowledge and
tools for scholars and practitioners in twenty-first century. In this regard, this
work explores structural issues regarding efficiency in the management of for-
eign affairs and services, personnel as well as proposing tools that would
enhance efficiency of service delivery, including digitization, simulation and
alternative pedagogics in teaching and researching international relations and
diplomacy in a rapidly changing world.
16 F. ONDITI

Diplomatic Thought and Practice

This overview introduces the four themes explored by authors in this hand-
book. First, we discuss how the theory and practice of diplomacy has evolved
over time, and especially how this evolution has been shaped by changes or
stability in the international system. Second, we consider tools, practices and
the informality of diplomacy as they are in practice and what needs to be done
in order to match them with the changing realities. Third, we address the ques-
tion of whether the entity of foreign affairs and personnel are fit for purpose in
the everchanging diplomatic environment. Fourth and finally, we identify and
engage emerging issues, disruptions and development in the international sys-
tem and their implications on the DTP.
Diplomatic theorists and historians have long been aware of the importance
of thinking about frameworks, tools and mechanisms of conducting diplomacy
and the need to characterize the exogenous forces which influence state rela-
tions (Anderson, 1993). The general discussions on how these forces impact
on state relations continue to grow. However, scholars are yet to agree on the
origin of diplomatic thinking and practice; there are those who trace it to the
early modern Europe (Watkin, 2008; Zeiler, 2009), yet historical anecdotes
exist to suggest modern diplomacy had its origin on both sides of the
Mediterranean stretch (Egypt, Greek and Roman) (Elman & Elman, 1997). In
sub-Saharan Africa, evidence of DTP is hinged on three quests: justice and
equality in foreign relations, the development imperatives and peace for African
solidarity, unity and integration (Spies, 2018). Spies (2018, p. 1) noted: ‘diplo-
macy has its ancient roots firmly in Africa, the cradle of humanity’.
In all the above historical perspectives, DTP aimed at achieving economic,
political, religious and strategic goals. Achieving these goals required skills
beyond the rulers—ambassadors, consuls as well professional diplomats. Later
on, at the beginning of nineteenth century, states, particularly leading powers,
began to conduct diplomacy in other friendly states through congresses, con-
ferences and summits. As the appetite for close interaction between states grew,
states began to commission permanent representatives in foreign countries in
pursuance of national interests. Diplomatic thinkers’ works have been compli-
mented by historians, who analyze major developments from ancient time to
the contemporary period. The seminal works of De Souza and France (2008)
are perhaps the most ideal literature for students and scholars interested in
gaining insight on ancient and medieval diplomacy. Others who have devel-
oped chronological overview of diplomacy through stages—ancient, early and
modern diplomacy—include Anderson (1993) and Hamilton and Langhorne
(1995). Perhaps, Henry Kissinger’s (1994) work is a classic example of how to
draw a convergence between theory and practice of diplomacy. Kissinger’s per-
sonal experience as a diplomat over the years has been seamlessly integrated in
his work. Other than Lauren (1979) and Barston (2006) who theorize the
object of diplomacy, many of the scholars contributing to the DTP have focused
on conventional themes in diplomacy—war, peacemaking and treaties. This
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 17

handbook addresses this knowledge gap by developing frameworks for con-

ducting informal diplomacy as well as drawing on voices of students of diplo-
macy and other unconventional actors in international relations.
International relations and political scientists have also contributed to the
thinking of diplomacy, the evolving role of diplomatic practice in the interna-
tional system. Lauren’s (1979) work seeks to bridge the gap between the his-
tory and theory of diplomacy. Lauren views diplomacy as a bridge between
decision making and other important processes in international system—
bureaucracy, coercion and alliance building. Scholars who pursue this line of
thinking have posited general but relevant question: does diplomacy matter for
international relations? (Musgrave, 2017). But a more critical question would
be whether some of the fundamental themes studied in international relations
(international law, humanitarianism, global hierarchism, power) influence
diplomacy. At the core of this question lies the quest for diplomats and scholars
to understand whether and if so, how the practice of diplomacy facilitates state
relations in the world politics. Other important themes that try to link IR and
diplomacy have explored the role of small states in the international system.
The vulnerability of small states and especially the landlocked has to continu-
ously negotiate with powerful states in order to mitigate the possibilities of
marginalization. To this end, a good read would be Iver Neumann’s (2012)
work on diplomatic engagement by small states. There are scholars who view
diplomacy as a form of governance in the international system. This school of
thought relies on Francois de Calliers, who positions personalities and indi-
vidual characteristics as the defining character of diplomacy; a good diplomat
should have sound mind, sound judgment, a good listener, courteous and a
good negotiator (cited in Baylon, 2016; Wilson & Chew, 2002). It is, there-
fore, not by chance permanent representatives function not only as representa-
tives of their governments but also as governors of the global institutions when
participating in key decision making, for instance, at the UN Security Council.
Yet critiques argue that the focus of diplomacy on personalities and interna-
tional life is an underestimation of the global dynamics driven by complex
forces—balance of power, institutional dynamics and global governance
(Pouliot & Cornut, 2015).
The chapters in this section reflect this thinking and practice of diplomacy.
A criticism of some of the approaches overtaken by changes in the international
system is also provided to illustrate how the changing environment influence
the thought and practice of diplomacy. They additionally reflect on implication
of these changes to the future diplomacy as a tool for states to achieve their
foreign policy objectives. How does the changes in the global peace and secu-
rity architecture impact on the DTP? How can these changes inform the devel-
opment of frameworks, mechanisms, tools and skills required for an effective
diplomatic practice in the dynamic global system?
18 F. ONDITI

Experiences of Diplomacy in the Dynamic World

In diplomatic practice, management of foreign service has been traditionally
positioned as a tool for the state to achieve specific foreign policy objectives and
goals through service delivery and representing the state in foreign land (Leira,
2019; Stanzel, 2018). However, with the emergence of digital diplomacy and
internet of things, scholars have questioned the posterity of diplomatic mission
abroad (Hedling & Bremberg, 2021). For small countries, the problem of
expense means that there must be a clear and rational policy governing the
establishment of diplomatic missions, their geographical location, how they
will be staffed and the outputs that will be expected of them in terms of deliver-
ing on the promises of the country’s foreign policy (Mwagiru, 2006). It also
includes the need to adequately protect embassy employees and their families
overseas. The potential monetary requirements for security enhancement and
logistical requirements could be enormous, as well as the management and
technological challenges.
Communication is a vital aspect of diplomatic engagements. New forms of
communication, such as email, video calls and direct messaging, all lead to an
increase in verbal exchange outside of formal reporting channels, especially in
times of crisis. This availability of new communication pathways has changed
the mode of operation within foreign ministries, the role of embassies as well
as other ministries (Stanzel, 2018). For instance, in the EU, during immediate
and time-sensitive cases, communication has been increasingly conducted
directly between capitals. Consequently, bilateral embassies in EU member
states have become more marginalized participants in these processes and are
not involved at all.
Modernization of the obsolete information technology infrastructure within
the ministries of foreign affairs remains top agenda among states. Most depart-
ments are dependent on outdated IT systems that cannot effectively support
critical mission requirements. This has significant impact on the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ (MOFAs) personnel ability to perform key functions, includ-
ing verification of visa applicants, sending and receiving vital communications,
establishing secure information systems, providing efficient, flexible and timely
national security reporting as well as ensuring robust interaction between
states. Trump’s handling of North Korea offers an example of foreign policy
failure using informal diplomacy. After exchanging some self-indulgent taunts
on Twitter with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, rather than orchestrating
a systematic negotiation to limit North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs,
Trump opted for a pair of ‘reality show summits with Kim that were long on
spectacle and short of substance’ (Walt, 2020). Convinced that his personal
charm and deal-making skills could convince Kim to give up the nuclear deter-
rent on which the survival of his regime depends, US lost the opportunity to
tighten the negotiation around de-proliferation of nuclear projects. Although
the summit produced the sort of media attention that Trump craved, they suc-
ceeded only in enhancing Kim’s stature and underscoring Trumps gullibility.
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 19

Trump lost interest in the issue as soon as his public relations stunt failed.
North Korea has unabatedly continued with its nuclear arsenal and missile
capability development.
The failure in foreign policy goals has been attributed to the architecture
and functional structures of the MOFAs. Moses and Knutsen (2001) have
decried that the institutional arrangement of MOFAs is both obsolete and inef-
fective (Moses & Knutsen, 2001). Mosses and Knutsen are of the view that the
current institutional arrangements for the production and implementation of
foreign policies are relics of a time when national sovereignty was relatively
well-defined, where international interactions were mostly channeled through
official and diplomatic networks and where security (or so-called high politics)
issues dominated the foreign policy agenda. However, the emerging face of
diplomacy characterized with non-state actors, new types of communication as
well as the changing nature of international peace and security architecture, the
need for rethinking organizational and conceptual model of foreign office lies
in how the DTP will be framed.
Other scholars with similar view (Keohane & Nye, 1973; Stopford &
Strange, 1991) have pointed economic integration as the key driver of change
in the world of diplomacy. The NGOs and religious organizations, to name just
two prominent examples, are increasingly part of the diplomatic dialogue.
Hence, the MOFAs’ own statecraft is no longer exclusively involved in the
foreign policy process and that the decision-making process has increasingly
moved out of the ministry’s offices and into the antechambers of civil society.
At home, foreign policymaking has tended to increasingly involve domestic
civil society organizations and other actors ‘outside’ the official territorial space.
Because such changes correspond to an incredible dynamic context, the
transformative nature of diplomacy suggests that its practice protrudes in all
sorts of different directions—negotiation, dialogues, peacebuilding, peacemak-
ing and peacekeeping. Furthermore, what happens if these myriads of activities
in all their variety occur, not between identifiable states actors, but within mul-
tiplicities of actors? What type of diplomatic tools should be deployed? Does
this multiplicity of actors change the nature of negotiation, and if so, how?
What contextual factors should diplomats consider when handling multiple
actors in the dynamic world?
In order to address the above questions, we need to interrogate the changes
in the world order (economic, political, cultural and technological) and how
this has impacted on how states conduct diplomacy. In short, the question is,
are there changes in the international system? The answer we try to give to this
question is: yes. In other words, we seek to understand how these changes in
the international system influences the thought and practice of diplomacy. The
claim is that what we are dealing with is not a simple phenomenon of the poly-
semy of the term ‘change’, rather we are concerned with an integrated phe-
nomenon related to two (change and stability) different yet inextricably
interwoven aspects of the same phenomenon of DTP. It will therefore be nec-
essary to elaborate the notion of change that includes but not same as stability.
20 F. ONDITI

As forementioned, change is defined on the basis of economy, politics, society

and technology. For the sake of illustration, this section will introduce the
notion of New International Economic Order (NIEO) as the tour de force in
analyzing dynamism in the international system. We focus on the NIEO
because it represents a rich field of inquiry to which all other facets of change
and stability in the international system is anchored. Economic diplomacy and
NIEO research for example have made valuable contributions to the study and
practice of diplomacy. NIEO will also be contrasted with the notion of Third
World as ipso facto. The relationship between NIEO and Third World move-
ment was mooted during the Algiers conference of the Non-Aligned countries
in 1973 (Cox, 1979). The idea was then backed by the UN as an important
change agent of the World Political Economy (Singer, 1978). The proponents
of NIEO advocate for a shared value system of shifting the global economic
center of gravity from North-West to South and East and pursue diplomacy
based on fair and equitable rule-based international trade regime (Montanaro
& Violi, 2020). Through the Third World platform, Eastern-oriented eco-
nomic frameworks such the OPEC (oil exporting countries) has managed to
forge a united front with the rest of the developing countries in compelling a
dialogue on the West to pursue what is commonly known as fair diplomacy. As
an agent of change, the push for the institutionalization and continuity of the
NIEO is justified on the view that the current system is lopsided in favor of the
west against the interests of the developing countries (Montanaro & Violi,
2020). This aggressive approach to global equalization, ignited new economic
diplomacy thinking leading to the formation of the ‘Third World Forum’ com-
prising the leading social scientists and intellectuals of Africa, Asia and Latin
America (Nash, 2003; Berger, 2004).
From a theoretical point of view, ‘NIEOISM’ is interesting precisely because
it permits us to enhance our understanding of diplomatic thought and practice
as simultaneously a change and stability phenomenon. The literature is full of
interesting linkages between NIEOISM and Third Worldism. Byrne (2016)
views Third Worldism from NIEO prism by linking it to structural inequalities
in the international system and the world economy. He believes that initiatives
such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Afro-Asian movement
(AAM) are a judicious response to this global disequilibrium. And so, the Third
World could easily create ‘united front’ in the struggle against hegemonist and
imperialist superpowers, in a way fixing the market imperfection, lopsided
industrial development that threaten to put the prevailing NIEO into jeopardy.
On this characterization of the Third World, Reynolds noted:

… the dominance of subsistence production and self-employment; low per capita

incomes and unequal distribution of incomes, imperfect markets, low productiv-
ity, dependence on export earnings and foreign capital flows, and small public
sectors and minimal modern industrial sectors … There are wide variations on
such variables but a median behaviour of these countries should be focused upon
rather than on the particular characteristics of one or a few countries. (1983, p. 97)
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 21

In the contemporary NIEO, advocates of Third World emancipation have

taken transnational approach on anti-Bretton Woods and anti-neoliberal move-
ments of the 1990s and 2000s (Nash, 2003; Berger, 2004). The anti-west
rhetoric through Third World struggle cuts across regions. Such ideologies
have been incubated in the intellectual paradigms of Négritude, pan-­Africanism,
African socialism and Afro-Marxism in Africa and the Caribbean and in pan-­
Arabism and Maoism in the Middle East and Central Asia. This sociological
prism has been advanced by scholars such as Waylen (1997), who believe the
concept of Third World is outside Europe and North America, and it is not an
extension of the power values and interests of greater Europe (Europe, North
America, Japan and Australia); a future world order in which the primitive,
peripheral or subordinate no longer exist (Onditi et al., 2019).
This hopeful image of what Third World emancipation could change has not
been without glitches. There are fears that with entrenchment of the term
global south, all the Southern States might just regress into the global village,
hence giving room for another form of neoliberalism where the economically
powerful nations would enjoy the status of what we coin, ‘emerging unbal-
anced diplomacy’, at the expense of the underprivileged ones. If this prognosis
stands the test of time, then the notion of Third World risks disestablishment.
There are reasons, however, to believe that the notion of Third World is not
obsolete: the world continues to witness the multipolar balance of power
(China and Russia on one side and US and allies on the other) and interna-
tional organizations put pressure on regimes in Latin America to drop the sort
of nationalistic whims that have been perceived as dictatorial leadership.
Regimes such as Venezuela may not be honest in their dispensation of justice
and fairness to her citizens, but the level of jostling between the leading powers
gives appetite for an expanded Third World movement. Moreover, in the awake
of economic diplomacy, Africa has become a playing field between govern-
ments and Euro-US companies on the one hand, and the Chinese and other
members of the BRICS on the other. In the Middle East, the winding armed
conflict continues to degrade humanity. The ‘schism’ that defined Third
Worldism during colonial period remains active. The concept is associated with
several other Marxists ideologies; national liberation, Pan-Asianism, Pan-­
Arabism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Americanism. The international community
through UN defined Third World from an economic perspective. The endorse-
ment of the NIEO by the sixth UN General Assembly in 1974 transformed
perceptions of the notion of Third World.
Greene (1980) discusses Third World in terms of factors of economic pro-
duction; nations which lag behind in industrial development, low in per cap-
ita income, exporters of only raw materials which are subject to extreme price
oscillation and whose markets are ‘basic needs’ driven as opposed to value
additions. This is NIEO. In Greene’s world view, fair diplomacy is achievable
within the context of NIEO; sovereign equality, interdependence, common
interest of cooperation and justice to all; and elimination of widening gap
between the developed and the developing countries. Kalter (2017) views
22 F. ONDITI

emancipation of Third Worldists as a psychological problem relating to the

mobilization myth that survived on promises, achievements and disenchant-
ments of decolonization. The agenda of this initiatives was to dismantle the
‘First World’ societies. The other dimension in Kalter’s analysis is sociological;
the solidarity of the poor people, who suffered effects of Cold War competi-
tion had to resist heroically and proved the unbending moral, military and
political power of Third World liberation.
In providing criteria for Third World, Smit (2013) appears to be referring to
all the four dimensions of Third World (geopolitical, sociological, psychologi-
cal and NIEO), when he posits, ‘… Third World concept could connotes polit-
ical, powerlessness, economic poverty and social marginalization’ (Smit, 2013,
p. 2). The ‘correctedness’ embedded in the Euro-Americanism hegemony was
the reason for Third World–countering capitalist modernity and a mobilization
platform for reorganizing global relationships. Patel and McMichael (2004)
coined the term politico-diplomatic unity to mean a sign of emancipation
against the western domination in negotiations and key global decisions. Other
scholars defined Third World as an adventure to create new institutions for
managing global economy and remove any forms of structural imbalances
(Randall, 2004; Mbaku, 1999; Thomas, 1999; Tomlinson, 2003; Weber,
2004; Wolf-Phillips, 1987). The need for countries in the global south trans-
forms into ‘late developers’ by imitating the newly industrialized countries
(NICs) (Berger, 2004) is a recent debate countering the NIEO narrative. This
view is reinforced by Hans-Henrik Holm (1990) assertion that the notion of
Third World has been rendered obsolete with the emerging powers such as
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea.
However, Africa and large portion of Latin America, save for Brazil and
Mexico, are still under the chains of underdevelopment, hence the term remains
relevant from all dimensions including the question of liberalizing essential
commodities such as vaccines. In the awake of ravaging impacts of COVID-19
and the need to recover from the impacts of the pandemic, the international
effort to achieve global COVID-19 vaccination goals faces a dilemma.
Stakeholders in this space are at odds over how to treat intellectual property
(IP) rights now that viable vaccines are on the market but are inaccessible to
vulnerable populations in low- and middle-income countries (LMICS). A key
aspect of this debate is whether to grant patent waivers for COVID-19 vaccines
and therapeutics. For instance, there has been substantial pressure from NGOs
and debate between EU member states to buy and share the ownership of vac-
cine patents to disentangle the global public health from the fortunes of a
handful of private companies. This is because the EU holds a strong position at
the negotiating table given its massive efforts in vaccine production and regula-
tory power, and therefore has an important role to play in worldwide response
to future pandemics or similar crises. While member states disagree over the
U.S. proposal for a broader liberalization of COVID-19 vaccine patents (Tai,
2021), Germany fears a negative impact on IP, while Italy and France support
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 23

Washington. This diplomatic spat obviously requires innovative framework of

negotiation beyond the officialdom approach.
On a similar note, the Asian countries may have escaped Third Worldism,
but that is only as far as ‘economic diplomacy’ is concerned. The Indian and
Chinese principles for the global co-existence seem to be a convergence of all
the four important attributes of change in the NIEO: (a) mutual respect of
each one’s full autonomy, within a world of nations with equal rights; (b) equal
benefits, that is, non-exploitative economic interaction; (c) the territorial sov-
ereignty of all states through the principle of non-interference and (d) mobili-
zation of groups. But the principle of territorial sovereignty is controversial,
especially in Africa, which has effectively changed this to the principle of non-­
indifference. This is because some of the peace and security threats facing the
continent require innovative solutions outside the principle of territorial integ-
rity. Perhaps the most recent example here is the tensions over utilization of
River Nile. Ethiopia unilaterally launched the construction of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the main Blue Nile River (Abay) in
April 2011. As a result, there is a protracted dispute over the GERD. This is a
long-standing feud between Egypt and Sudan, the downstream states, on the
one hand, and Ethiopia and the upstream riparian on the other, over access to
the Nile’s waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of people living in
Egypt and Sudan (Abtew & Dessu, 2019). The GERD is portrayed by Egypt
as an existential threat to its water security. Despite the intense disagreements,
Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelec-
tric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly.
In the so-called First World, the vulnerabilities of technologically interde-
pendent societies became particularly evident during the COVID-19 pandemic
and require a diplomatic response framework. For instance, in December 2020,
cybercriminals targeted the European Medicines Agency. The EU registered
around 450 attacks on critical infrastructures in the energy and water supply
sectors as well as information and communication technologies in the health,
transport and finance sectors (Bendiek & Kettemann, 2021). The United
States suffered 65,000 ransomware attacks in 2020. Organized cyber criminals
are finding it easy to locate sophisticated malware in dark corners of the web
and are taking advantage of digital money transfer methods such as cryptocur-
rencies (Bitcoin) to evade law enforcement and financial regulators.
Clearly, the dimensions of ‘Third World’ and ‘First Worlds’ are not operat-
ing in isolation. In some settings, geopolitics may be closely tied to economics.
Yet the various dimensions may be applied differently depending on level of
development and shift in ideological aspirations. In explaining why Asian coun-
tries and some Latin Americas (Brazil and Mexico) do not find aspiration in
global economic disparities, the most suitable dimension is often economics
and not geopolitics. In contexts where the level of poverty is high with unfair
global trade dealings, countries in the global south may find it necessary to
resist hegemony (geopolitics) or shift trading partners (economic), or altogether
24 F. ONDITI

mobilize support (psychological) to resist against domination and spatial

inequalities (sociological). The four dimensions surely represent interrelated
web, which explains why they have been treated as ipso facto.
In addition to the notion of the New International Economic Order (NIEO),
three additional elements of change in the post-Cold War era should be noted.
The first has been the transformation of the Cold War bipolar international
system to initially a unipolar world order—with the United States serving as
the main pillar of this new international order—and then gradually to a multi-
polar international system with the inclusion of powers such as China, Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union as a whole,
as well as Japan, India, Brazil and South Africa. This development has led to
the strengthening of great power diplomacy and especially to multilateral and
summit diplomacy.
The second element of change in the post-Cold War era has been reflected
in the fact that economic, financial and trade issues gained prominence in the
international agenda. As a result, economic, commercial and financial forms of
power have been recognized as important as military power. The impact of this
change resulted in the rise of economic diplomacy, trade diplomacy and finan-
cial diplomacy.
The third element of change in the post-Cold War era has been the growing
importance of regionalism. Current interest in regional security analysis stems
primarily from the widespread assumption that in the post-Cold War era the
shift away from bipolarity toward a more polycentric power structure at the
system level will have profound consequences for regional security. It is
expected that the diffusion of power to the regional states will increase the
importance of regional security dynamics relative to those of the great powers.
The reasoning behind this assumption is that the collapse of bipolarity has
removed the principal organizing force at the global level. The remaining great
powers are no longer motivated by ideological rivalries, and they all show signs
of wanting to avoid wider political engagements unless their own interests are
immediately and strongly affected. This situation creates weak leadership at the
global level and, consequently, leads to the assumption than more than before,
regions will be left to sort out their own affairs. Reinforcing this tendency is the
fact that the weakening of the commitment to global engagement among the
great powers is matched by ever rising power capabilities in most parts of the
world. The long period of European and Western power advantage is being
steadily eroded by the diffusion of industrial, military and political capability
among an ever wider circle of states and peoples (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 14). As
a result, diplomatic interaction at the regional level gained strength, which was
reflected both in bilateral and multilateral forms of diplomacy. Most impor-
tantly, multilateral diplomacy, taking place within the framework of regional
international organizations, became a dominant form of contemporary diplo-
matic practice.
 1 INTRODUCTION: DIPLOMATIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 25

Conclusion
In conclusion, this book contributes to the development of diplomacy, both as
a practice and theory by not disparaging the role of micro-cosmic diplomatic
processes and old order of things, but by devoting substantive amount of con-
tent in reconciling these old practices with the contemporary norms and forces.
We have also learnt that the more we belittle and embellish the context influ-
encing diplomacy, and particularly the ‘informal diplomacy’, the more such
practices are needed in resolving the unconventional forms of conflicts and
wars. All these put together, should lead to evolution of resonate framework,
mechanism and tools for practicing and theorizing diplomacy in twenty-first
century, and beyond. The future diplomatic thought and practice (DTP)
should endeavor ‘informality of diplomacy’ (Chang & Tai, 1996; Mathews,
1963; Grydehoj, 2014), ‘digital diplomacy’ (Kampf et al., 2015; Adesina,
2017; Hedling & Bremberg, 2021), ‘diplomatic transformation’ (Pouliot &
Cornut, 2015; Hedling & Bremberg, 2021) and ‘dialogic communication’ as
part of transformation in the management of foreign affairs and diplomatic
services (Kent & Taylor, 2002; Sommerfeldt & Yang, 2018). Thus, it is inevi-
table that the frameworks, mechanisms and tools which try to redefine diplo-
macy as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its truistic nature, rather
than as it was initially conceived, must overcome shadows cast by minimalistic
thinking and processes.
A book devoted to diplomatic thought and practice (….and hence, DTP),
therefore requires special approaches, alternative realities and theoretical expla-
nation. This handbook contends that, if diplomatic thought seems to be lacking
in the current diplomatic practice, its interaction with societal and technologi-
cal changes appears to offer the thoughtful buoyance needed in the practice of
diplomacy as an epistemic framework for interpretating the complex configura-
tion of contemporary global system. This handbook is a culmination of an
interdisciplinary adventure through south-north collaboration among academ-
ics, research scientists, lawyers, scholars and diplomats to create the first piece
of work that develops formats for informal diplomacy and recognizes ‘students’
voices’ as an important visage in the study and practice of modern diplomacy.
The scholars and diplomats worked diligently to have this handbook developed
in record time, albeit COVID-19-related travel restrictions. We hope that this
work will succeed in signifying the new character of diplomacy in the twenty-­
first century.

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Another random document with
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camp—would stand with hands in pockets, staring after in silent
admiration. Uncle Hank was wiry and grizzled and storm-beaten; his
pointed beard stood out at a strong angle to his determined nose; his
eyes were of a mild and pleasant blue, but the fire in them awaited
only the flint. His laugh was merry, but he had a voice that would
make the most obstreperous horse remember that he was but as the
dust of the earth before this master.
Uncle Hank was at the helm of the transportation system of
Paradise Bar; he and his stage the connecting link between camp
and civilization, the latter represented by the county seat, Meadow
Lark.
Uncle Hank, recognizing his importance in both communities, and
especially in Paradise Bar, was as gracious as an only hope—he
was never forlorn. He was an absolute dictator, it was true; he even
decided the locations of the passengers on the stage, and settled
disputes as to outside and inside. But he was autocratic wisely, and
there was really no reason why he should have been called upon to
divide his sovereignty. Yet, one sad day the Alladin Bonanza
Company built a lumber road down from Paradise Bar to Lone Pine.
At Lone Pine the new road connected with the line of the Gray Eagle
Stage Company, which, as Uncle Hank put it, flopped its way up
from Meadow Lark. So, when the Gray Eagle extended its tri-weekly
service from Lone Pine to Paradise Bar, trouble outcropped on Uncle
Hank’s trail at once. George William Pike, of the Upper Basin, was
the driver to whom Uncle Hank referred as the dry goods clerk who
handled the ribbons for the opposition corporation.
George William surmised here and there and elsewhere, when he
cornered an audience, that the new route was two miles the shorter,
and the grade, calculating ups and downs, at least five per cent
better. The report reached Uncle Hank by air line, of course. He was
silent a little while, and then with elaborate courtesy thanked his
informant, adding that he was greatly obliged, not for the news itself,
but because he had for a long time been trying to recollect the name
of the chap who left Placerville after trying circumstances without
advising his bondsmen. It was indeed strange that a man caught
stealing garments from a poor washerwoman’s clothes line should
be directing horses; remarkably odd, when it was evident that he
was cut out for a Chinaman and not a stage driver. So saying, Uncle
Hank awoke an echo unusually far off, making it jump startled from
the hillside at the crack of his whip, and drove on.
There was some difference of opinion in Paradise Bar concerning
the merits of the two lines; so long as they ran on different days and
at different hours, the question could not be satisfactorily settled, and
the Bright Light kept open an hour later in the evening to permit a full
discussion of the subject—thereby saving shutting up at all. The real
trouble began when the Gray Eagle line, perceiving that Uncle Hank
continued to carry the larger part of the business, borrowed his
schedule and started to operate upon it with their new yellow coach
with vermillion trimmings and four white horses, to say nothing of
George William Pike with his curled mustache, red necktie and
stand-up collar. He would have worn a silk hat too—the owners of
the line were aristocrats, with ideas and winter residences in Lunnon
—but Morosin’ Jones who squirmed his shoulders and clasped his
hands like an awkward maid of fifteen when he talked, begged him
to desist; he, Morosin’, had such an unconquerable inclination to
perforate high hats with his forty-four wherever they might be.
George William wisely desisted. Uncle Hank’s stage had nothing but
a faint recollection of paint, and was written over with history
recorded by bullet holes; the harness was apt to be patched, and
Nebuchadnezzar, the off leader, was wall-eyed, and his partner,
Moloch, sway-backed and short maned. Of the wheel horses, one
was a gray with hoofs that needed constant paring; the other had the
appearance of a whitewashed house at which mud had been flung
with startling effect. Of the two, Rome and Athens, no god could
have decided which was entitled to the palm of ugliness; but Uncle
Hank, who loved them all with the love a man may have for a homely
dog, declared that the wheel-horses were beauty spots in nature
alongside the leaders.
It was a memorable morning on which the two stages left Paradise
Bar together. The yellow stage, with its nickel-plated harness and
white horses and tan-gloved driver, started three minutes first; and
then, as if gathering up his horses and the stage and the reins
altogether, Uncle Hank went down the line. It was a lively experience
for the passengers; bends they went around on two wheels, creeks
they took at a leap, bowlders and ruts only they avoided, and that
because a scientist was using his science. The grade of the other
line must have been at that time very good, for Uncle Hank had been
only four minutes hitched in front of the Elysium Hotel when the other
stage drew up. It was true that he picked his teeth as if he had been
in to lunch, and casually enquired of a passenger, so that George
William might hear, if they had stopped for dinner on the road, or did
they expect to get it at the hotel; whereat the passenger, jolted and
jarred beyond good manners, roared: “Stop for dinner! Great Scott!
We stopped for nothing—bowlders, rivers, landslides and precipices;
if his Satanic Majesty was after us, he found the worst trail he ever
traveled—and I can’t imagine what other reason there could be for
such driving.”
The passenger went into the hotel. George William said something
below his breath, and Uncle Hank smiled. Alas for vanity! Ever it
goes before a stumble, a broken spring or a sick horse. The stages
had different schedules for the upward trip, but on the next journey
downward disaster overtook Uncle Hank. Seven of the nine hours’
ride were accomplished, and the stage was at the mouth of the
canyon. Here a point of rock thrusts itself forward, marking a sharp
turn in the road. Around this turn galloped the horses, and twenty
feet before him, sunning itself in the road, Moloch saw an eleven-
button rattler. He knew what that meant, and sat down and slid with
all four feet plowing the mountain road. They stopped short of the
snake, that had coiled and awaited their coming, and then perceiving
the enemy otherwise engaged, had wisely slipped into the
manzanitas by the roadside. Fifteen precious minutes were used in
repairing the disaster to the harness—and the race was lost. That
night, for the first time in the ten years in which he had been the
oracle of two communities, Uncle Hank, instead of telling stories and
expounding wisdom for the benefit of the unenlightened below, went
up to his room immediately after dinner and retired without lighting
his candle. George William put on a new pink necktie and his
beloved silk hat, and went about, stepping high like one of his white
horses, but casting wary glances abroad for the appearance of one
Morosin’ Jones, who was coy and fidgety and could perforate a
dollar at one hundred feet.
In Paradise Bar every game was settled by the best two out of
three. Life was too feverish and too short to await three out of five,
and it was against the principles of the camp to leave any questions
undecided. Therefore, it was tacitly understood that the winner of the
next race would be the standard of comparison thereafter in matters
pertaining to travel. Other stage lines would be second-class,
ranking just above a mule train. There was another reason: Paradise
Bar was exceedingly fond of excitement, but it had no mind to risk its
neck in stage racing down the mountain-side forever and ever;
precipices yawned too many invitations. The personal feeling and
the betting both heavily favored Uncle Hank, both gratifying and
troubling to him.
There is little doubt that in the third race, under fair conditions,
Uncle Hank would have won; he would either have won or gone over
a precipice. But Rome, who had never before been known to have
anything the matter with him save an abnormal appetite for grain, fell
slightly lame. All day before the race, Uncle Hank worried over this,
all night he tossed in his blankets, and was only partly relieved the
next day when Rome appeared again to be all right, and ate hay as if
under the impression that the sun was shining and there was plenty
more being made. The last two days had greatly changed Uncle
Hank; he carried his head so that his beard touched his breast; his
hat was slouched low over his eyes; he kept his hands in his pockets
and spoke in monosyllables. He ate little and had a far-away look in
his blue eyes. He saw his fame departing, his reputation collapsing,
all that a man may build in this life, whether he creates empires or
digs post-holes, crumbling—the reputation of “being onto his job.”
The next morning with the fear of that lameness in his heart, Uncle
Hank hitched up and drove down the main street. He saw the yellow
stage also ready. There was no evidence of lameness in Rome as
he drove up to the door of the express office, nor when the stage
stopped at the Record Nugget for the hotel passengers. Uncle
Hank’s despondent face became more cheerful; he looked older and
grayer and even bent a little that morning, but he climbed up on the
box with his old-time energy. His courage and spirit were never to be
doubted; only that lameness in Rome worried him. He gathered up
the lines and loosened his whip; but the four did not go with their
accustomed dashing display. Instead there was confusion and
hesitation; in fifteen yards the slight lameness of the right wheel
horse was apparent, and Uncle Hank drew up. He dropped the lines,
and for a moment his face was in his hands.
The other stage had gone. Nothing could ever convince the public
satisfactorily, he thought, that after starting he had not given up the
race through fear. The limp was scarcely apparent. He perhaps
would not have noticed it for some miles had it not been for his
haunting dread and the false start. Yet he knew what it would mean
before the level was reached—a steep down grade and he would
have to go walking into Meadow Lark, a loser by an hour.
Uncle Hank, a broken old man, climbed down from the stage.
“Take ’em, George,” he said to the hostler. “There won’t be no stage
down to-day.” He said no more, but passed amid a dead silence
along the road through the population of Paradise Bar which had
turned out to see the beginning of the deciding race. Some guessed
at the reason; and to all it became apparent when the horses were
taken back to the stable and carefully examined. That day Uncle
Hank did not appear, nor the next; So Bob Allen went up to his cabin
in the evening and, receiving no response to his knocking, kicked
open the door and went in. Uncle Hank lay in his bunk, his face to
the wall. To Bob’s expressions of sympathy and encouraging
remarks, he made no reply; they were to him as the expressions
engraved on tombstones, and but added bitterness now. To his
arguments, Uncle Hank vouchsafed single words in return, and
never turned his face from the wall. From sympathy to argument,
from argument he drifted into bulldozing; alluded to Uncle Hank as a
man afraid of things, among which he specified a large number in
language that I will not reproduce; and when three connected words
was the most he could get out of Uncle Hank even by this, Bob knew
the case was desperate, and retired, defeated.
The friends of Uncle Hank, the entire population of Paradise Bar,
gravely discussed the situation. It was unanimously decided that the
yellow stage should thereafter stop outside of the camp limits, and
Morosin’ Jones publicly announced, his shoulders working up and
down most nervously, that George William would immediately cease
from wearing stand-up collars and red neckties; he would come into
camp with a slouch hat, a flannel shirt and teamster’s warranted-to-
wear gloves—or it was quite likely he would never go out again. This
statement met with the silent approval of the entire assemblage; and
George William, hearing of it, puzzled and bewildered, wisely
refrained from coming into the camp limits at all, but remained by the
stage. He explained in Meadow Lark that Paradise Bar had gone
crazy; and a cheerful miner from that camp acquiesced, but added
that some of the lunatics were not yet corralled, but still straying
about; and said it looking so significantly at George William that the
latter went home and hunted up a flannel shirt at once.
The next morning a committee waited on Uncle Hank, prepared
with arguments that would show him the error of broken-heartedness
—the easiest thing in the world to cure if its victims would but live to
tell us of it. Uncle Hank still lay with his face to the wall, and in a little
while the news was abroad in the camp that Uncle Hank, still with his
face to the wall, had resolutely died. It was a gray day in Paradise
Bar; the melodion in the Red Light was hushed; friends nodded
instead of speaking as they passed by; the camp began to realize
what it had lost. It was determined, as a last mark of the camp’s
esteem for Uncle Hank, to make the journey to the place of the final
tie-up simple but impressive. No formal meeting was held; the boys
just gathered together and acted on a common idea. The whole
camp would be in the procession, and they would go down to
Meadow Lark over the old familiar road. Uncle Hank’s stage carrying
the old stage-driver, would be at the head, of course; then there was
an awkward pause. More than one felt that it would add to the dignity
of the occasion to have two stages, but finally, when Major Wilkerson
arose and suggested that the Gray Eagle stage, carrying leading
citizens, be placed next, there was a murmur of dissent. Then Bob
Allen arose in his place and made the only known speech of his life:
“Friends, you are on the wrong trail and will hit a blind canyon,
certain. Of course we should have the other stage, and Pike to drive
it. Uncle Hank wasn’t the kind of a man to carry jealousy with him
into camp. ’Twasn’t being beat by Pike that broke Uncle Hank’s
heart; it was partly p’haps being beat at all, and partly, to my way of
thinkin’, because Paradise Bar didn’t stand behind him. That was the
main reason, gentlemen; he just died of pure lonesomeness. When
this yaller ve-hicle comes into camp, does we say to it: ‘You’re purty
and you’re new, and probably your springs is all right and maybe
your road; but you might jest as well pass on. Do you observe this
old stage with its paint wore off and its bullet holes? Do you see that
it’s down a little on one side and some of the spokes is new and
some are old? Do you know that these four old hosses have been
whoopin’ her up for Paradise Bar and for nothin’ else these ten years
—and a sunshiny day and one chuck full of snow and sleet was all
the same to them? Be you aware that this is our Uncle Hank, and
that he has been workin’ our lead for us these fifteen years, and
never lost a dollar or a pound of stuff or spilled a passenger, or
asked one of the boys to hoof it because he hadn’t no dinero? Those
bullet holes—men behind masks made ’em, but Uncle Hank never
tightened a ribbon for the whole caboodle. The paint’s been knocked
off that stage in our service, and it’s ours. Therefore, though you be
yaller and handsome, with consid’ble silver plate, we can’t back you
against our own flesh and blood. And that settles it.’ Did we talk that
way, boys? No, we jest stood off and gambled on the result as if
Uncle Hank was a travelin’ stranger ’stead of the best friend we had.
We stood off impartial like and invited the white hoss outfit to git in
and win if it could. And now, gentlemen, have we got the nerve to
dynamite this opposition stage line, when the whole gang of us ought
to be blown sky high?
“Uncle Hank wouldn’t have had it so. He didn’t cherish any ill
feeling pussonly against anybody; whatever he said was because
they was takin’ away from him what he had worked all his life for. He
wasn’t jealous of George William, but of him as a stage driver,
because we made him so. Boys, he loved us and was mighty proud
of our regard—and we didn’t show it in the time of trial. And he’s
gone over the great divide with tears in his eyes, and we are to
blame. Who among any of us poor fools has a right to say that the
other stage shouldn’t follow?”
 Bob sat down amid absolute silence, wiping his face vigorously.
Major Wilkerson rose to his feet. “I renew my suggestion,” said he,
“that we have the Gray Eagle stage. I think you’ll all agree that Bob’s
right.”
Morosin’ Jones rose from his stump, suffused with emotion. “In
course he’s right,” he said, huskily, “but the stage ou’t to be painted
black.” A murmur of assent greeted this speech.

The day was beautiful. The procession went slowly down the old
stage road, past Lime Point, through the Roaring River canyon,
beyond up Reddy’s grade, over the First Summit and then through
Little Forest to the watering-place at the head of the last canyon.
Every stream, every tree, every rock along the road was known to
Uncle Hank. He was going home over a familiar way. The pine trees,
with their somber green, were silent; the little streams that went
frolicking from one side of a canyon to another seemed subdued; it
was spring, but the gray squirrels were not barking in the tree-tops,
and the quail seemed to pipe but faintly through the underbrush. The
lupines and the bluebells nodded along the way; the chipmunks
stood in the sunlight and stared curiously.
All would have gone well had not George William Pike been a man
without understanding—and such a man is beyond redemption. He
did not appreciate the spirit of the invitation to join in this last simple
ceremony in honor of Uncle Hank. He accepted it as an apology
from Paradise Bar and growled to himself because of the absurd
request to paint the coach black—which he would not have done
except for an order from the superintendent, who was a man of
policy. A year could have been wasted in explaining that the
invitation was an expression of humility and of atonement for the
camp’s treatment of its own. So he came and wore his silk hat and
his red necktie, and Morosin’ Jones almost had a spasm in
restraining himself.
Down the mountain-side they went, slowly and decorously.
Nothing eventful happened until the mouth of the canyon was
cleared, and then George William became impatient. He could not
understand the spirit of the occasion. Meadow Lark and supper were
a long way off, and the luncheon at Half-Way House had been light.
So he began making remarks over his horses’ heads with the
intention of hurrying up Gregg, who was driving the old stage. “Well
fitted for this kind of work, those horses, ain’t they?” he said. “Seems
curious they were ever put on the stage.” Gregg said nothing, but
tightened rein a bit. “Where will we stop for the night?” asked George
William presently, flicking the off leader’s ear with his whip.
Gregg turned around angrily. “If you don’t like the way this thing is
bein’ done, you can cut and go on in town alone; but if you don’t
keep your mouth closed there’ll be trouble.”
“I don’t want to go into town alone,” rejoined George William
pleasantly, “but I reckon we’d go in better fashion if we was at the
head of this percession.”
“Maybe you’d better try it,” said Gregg, reddening, and thereupon
George William turned out his four white horses and his black stage,
without saying anything to his two passengers, and proceeded to go
around. Gregg gathered in the slack in his reins. “Go back!” he
roared. But Pike, swinging wide to the right to avoid the far-reaching
whip, went on. Nebuchadnezzar pricked up his ears. Rome looked
inquiringly at Athens, and Moloch snorted indignantly. Athens’
expression said very plainly: “Are we at our time of life going to
permit four drawing-room apologies for horses and a new-fangled
rattletrap to pass us on our own road?” The negative response could
be seen in the quiver that ran down each horse’s back. The leaders
gently secured their bits between their teeth. So absorbed was
Gregg in the strange actions of George William that he paid little
attention to his own horses.
Up and down the line behind him men were waving and
gesticulating and shouting. “Don’t let him pass you!” yelled
Wilkerson. That instruction ran up and down the line, clothed in a
variety of picturesque and forcible utterances. But no instruction was
needed by the horses in front of Gregg. They understood, and
scarcely had the other stage turned into the main road ahead when
they at one jump broke from a walk into a gallop. George William
saw and gave his four the rein and the whip. Glancing back, Gregg
watched the whole procession change from a line of decorous
dignity to one of active excitement. Dust began to rise, men on
horseback passed men on mules; men in buckboards passed men
on lumber wagons. George William held the road, and with it a great
advantage. To pass him it would be necessary to go out among the
rocks and the sage-brush, and the white four were racing swiftly,
rolling out behind them a blinding cloud of dust. Gregg set his teeth,
and spoke encouragingly to his horses. George William turned and
shouted back an insult: “You needn’t hurry; we’ll tell them you’ll be
there to-morrow. ’Tend to your new business; there is nothing in the
other for you. We’re going into town first.”
“Maybe,” said Gregg grimly—and loosened his whip. The four
lifted themselves together at its crack; in another half mile they were
ready to turn out to go around. Gregg watched for a place anxiously.
Brush and boulders seemed everywhere, but finally he chose a little
sandy wash along which ran the road for a way.
Turning out he went into the sand and lost ten yards. He heard
George William laugh sarcastically. But the old stage horses had
been in sand before, and had but one passenger besides their driver.
In a little while they were abreast the leaders, and here they stayed
and could gain no farther. For George William laid on the lash, and
the road was good. On they went, the one stage running smoothly
on the hard road, the other swaying, bounding, rocking, among the
rocks and gullies. A little while they ran thus, and then the road
began to tell. Pike shouted triumphantly. Gregg, with despair in his
heart, watched with grief the loss of inch after inch. “What can I do?”
he groaned—and turning, he found himself face to face with Uncle
Hank. The reins dropped from his nerveless hands, and his face
went white.
“Give me a hand!” shouted Uncle Hank, and over the swinging
door he crawled on the seat—and Gregg perceived he was flesh and
blood. The old fire was in his eyes, he stood erect and loosened his
whip with his left hand easily as of yore. And then something else
happened. The line behind was scattered and strung out to perhaps
a mile in length, but every eye was on the racing coaches. They saw
the familiar figure of the old stage driver, saw him gather up the
reins; saw and understood that he had come back to life again, and
up and down that line went a cheer such as Paradise Bar will seldom
hear again. Uncle Hank sent the whip waving over the backs of his
beloved. “Nebuchadnezzar! Moloch! Rome! Athens! Come! No
loafing now. This is our road, our stage—and our camp is shouting.
Don’t you hear the boys! Ten years together, you’n me. Whose dust
have we taken? Answer me! Good, Athens, good—steady, Rome,
you blessed whirlwind. Reach out, Neb—that’s it—reach. Easy,
Moloch, easy; never mind the rocks. Yo-ho! Yo-ho-o-o! In we go!”
At the first words of the master, the four lifted themselves as if
inspired. Then they stretched lowly and ran; ran because they knew
as only horses can know; ran as his voice ran, strong and straight. In
three minutes they turned in ahead of the white horses and the
funeral stage. The race was practically won. Uncle Hank with the
hilarious Gregg alongside, drove into Meadow Lark ten minutes
ahead of all others—and Meadow Lark in its astonishment almost
stampeded. After a while the rest of Paradise Bar arrived, two of its
leading citizens, who had started out in a certain black stage drawn
by four horses, coming in on foot. They were quite non-committal in
their remarks, but it was inferred from a few words dropped casually
that, after the stage stopped, they lost some time in chasing the
driver back into the foothills; and it was observed that they were
quite gloomy over their failure to capture him.
“Oh, never mind,” said Morosin’ Jones, in an ecstasy of joy.
“What’s the good of cherishin’ animosity? Why, for all I care he kin
wear that red necktie now if he wants to”—then after a pause—“yes,
and the silk hat, too, if he’s bound to be a cabby.”
Uncle Hank was smiling and shaking hands with everybody and
explaining how the familiar motion of the stage had brought him out
of his trance. “I’m awful glad to have you here, boys; mighty glad to
see you. The hosses and me are proud. I’ll admit it. We oughter be.
Ain’t Paradise Bar with us, and didn’t we win two out of three, after
all?”—From The Black Cat, June, 1902, copyright by Short Story
Publishing Co., and used by their kind permission.
 HUMOROUS DIALECT SELECTIONS IN POETRY

PLAIN LANGUAGE FROM TRUTHFUL JAMES

POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE HEATHEN CHINEE
TABLE MOUNTAIN, 1870
By Bret Harte

Which I wish to remark—

And my language is plain—
That for ways that are dark
And for tricks that are vain,
The heathen Chinee is peculiar,
Which the same I would rise to explain.

Ah Sin was his name;

And I shall not deny,
In regard to the same,
What that name might imply;
But his smile it was pensive and childlike,
As I frequent remarked to Bill Nye.

It was August the third,

And quite soft was the skies;
Which it might be inferred
That Ah Sin was likewise;
Yet he played it that day upon William
And me in a way I despise.

Which we had a small game,

And Ah Sin took a hand:
It was Euchre. The same
He did not understand;
But he smiled as he sat by the table,
With the smile that was childlike and bland.
Yet the cards they were stocked
In a way that I grieve,
And my feelings were shocked
At the state of Nye’s sleeve:
Which was stuffed full of aces and bowers,
And the same with intent to deceive.

But the hands that were played

By that heathen Chinee,
And the points that he made,
Were quite frightful to see—
Till at last he put down a right bower,
Which the same Nye had dealt unto me.

Then I looked up at Nye,

And he gazed upon me;
And he rose with a sigh,
And said, “Can this be?
We are ruined by Chinese cheap labor,”—
And he went for that heathen Chinee.

In the scene that ensued

I did not take a hand,
But the floor it was strewed
Like the leaves on the strand
With the cards that Ah Sin had been hiding,
In the game “he did not understand.”

In his sleeves, which were long,

He had twenty-four packs—
Which was coming it strong,
Yet I state but the facts;
And we found on his nails, which were taper,
What is frequent in tapers—that’s wax.

Which is why I remark,

And my language is plain,
That for ways that are dark,
 And for tricks that are vain,
The heathen Chinee is peculiar—
Which the same I am free to maintain.

—Copyright by Houghton Mifflin & Co., Boston, and used by their

kind permission.

PARODY ON “THAT HEATHEN CHINEE”

[The following remarkable parody was written by the Reverend
Father Wood, Professor of English Literature at St. Ignatius College,
San Francisco. For the annual exercises of his class, a debate was
to be held as to the respective abilities of the various authors and
poets studied during the year. Each had his advocates and
strenuous adherents. The final test adopted was that each adherent
should write out Bret Harte’s Heathen Chinee in the form his favorite
author would have followed. These verses are after the style of
Samuel Lover, the Irish poet.]

Did ye hear of the haythen Ah Sin,

Maginn?
The bouldest of bould Chaneymin,
Maginn?
Oh. He was the bye
Who could play it on Nye
And strip him as aisy as sin,
To the skin.
Oh. ’Twas he was the gossoon to win.

It was euchre we’d play, me and Nye,

Me bye!
An’ the stakes was uproariously high,
Me bye!
Nye’s sleeves they was stocked,
An’ me feelin’s was shocked,
But never a whisper said I—
You know why!
For Bill is outrageously sly!

The game to the haythen was new,

Aboo!
He didn’t quite know what to do,
Aboo!
With the cyards in his hand
He smiled childlike and bland,
And asked us of questions a few,
Wirrastheu!
Which we answered as bad as we knew.

We tuk it the game was our own,

Ochone!
We’d pick him as cleane as a bone,
Ochone!
But the hands that he played
An’ the p’ints that he made,
Made me feel like a babby ungrown,
I must own!
An’ dull as I’d shwallowed a stone!

Nye wud give him a three or a four,

Asthore!
But niver a better cyard more.
Asthore!
Yet he’d dhrop down a king
Just the aisest thing,
An’ jokers an’ bowers galore
By the score!
You may lay he’d been there before!

He was happy as haythen cud be,

Machree!
His manner surprisingly free,
Machree!
But William looked sour
When he played the right bower
Which William had dealt out to me,
Do ye see!
For to euchre the haythen Chinee.

Then William got up in a stew,

Hurroo!
An’ shlated Ah Sin black and blue,
Hurroo!
An’ shuk out of his sleeve,
I’m not makin’ believe,
Of picture cyards quite a good few!
It is thrue—
This shtory I’m tellin’ to you.

We had danced to the haythen’s own tune.

Aroon!
Oh! It’s lucky we got out so soon,
Aroon!
He had twenty-four packs,
On his fingers was wax—
An’ this in Tim Casey’s saloon!
The ould coon!
How he played us that warm afternoon,
Aroon!

KENTUCKY PHILOSOPHY
By Harrison Robertson

You Wi’yam, cum ’ere, suh, dis instunce. Wu’ dat you got under dat
box?
I do’ want no foolin’—you hear me? Wut you say? Ain’t nu’h’n but
rocks?
’Peahs ter me you’s owdashus p’ticler. S’posin’ dey’s uv a new kine.
I’ll des take a look at dem rocks. Hi yi! der you think dat I’s bline?
I calls dat a plain water-million, you scamp, en I knows whah it
growed;
It come fum de Jimmerson cawn fiel’, dah on ter side er de road.
You stole it, you rascal—you stole it! I watched you fum down in de
lot.
En time I gets th’ough wid you, nigger, you won’t eb’n be a grease
spot!

I’ll fix you. Mirandy! Mirandy! go cut me a hick’ry—make ’ase!

En cut me de toughes’ en keenes’ you c’n fine anywhah on de place.
I’ll larn you, Mr. Wi’yam Joe Vetters, ter steal en ter lie, you young
sinner,
Disgracin’ yo’ ole Christian mammy, en makin’ her leave cookin’
dinner!

Now ain’t you ashamed er yo’se’f, sur? I is. I’s ’shamed you’s my
son!
En de holy accorjan angel he’s ’shamed er wut you has done;
En he’s tuk it down up yander in coal-black, blood-red letters—
“One water-million stoled by Wi’yam Josephus Vetters.”

En wut you s’posen Brer Bascom, yo’ teacher at Sunday school,

’Ud say ef he knowed how you’s broke de good Lawd’s Gol’n Rule?
Boy, whah’s de raisin’ I give you? Is you boun’ fuh ter be a black
villiun?
I’s s’prised dat a chile er yo’ mammy ’ud steal any man’s water-
million.

En I’s now gwiner cut it right open, en you shain’t have nary bite,
Fuh a boy who’ll steal water-millions—en dat in de day’s broad light
—
Ain’t—Lawdy! its green! Mirandy! Mi-ran-dy! come on wi’ dat switch!
Well, stealin’ a g-r-e-e-n water-million! who ever yeered tell er des
sich?

Cain’t tell w’en dey’s ripe? W’y, you thump ’um, en we’n dey go pank
dey is green;
But w’en dey go punk, now you mine me, dey’s ripe—en dat’s des
wut I mean.
En nex’ time you hook water-millions—you heered me, you ign’ant,
you hunk,
Ef you doan’ want a lickin’ all over, be sho dat dey allers go “punk!”

—Harper’s Magazine.

OH, I DUNNO!
Anonymous

Lindy’s hair’s all curly tangles, an’ her eyes es deep en’ gray,
En’ they allus seems er-dreamin’ en’ er-gazin’ far away,
When I ses, “Say, Lindy, darlin’, shall I stay, er shall I go?”
En’ she looks at me er-smilin’, en’ she ses, “Oh, I dunno!”

Now, she knows es I’m er-lovin’ her for years an’ years an’ years
But she keeps me hesitatin’ between my doubts an’ fears;
En’ I’m gettin’ pale and peaked, en’ et’s jes from frettin’ so
Ovur Lindy with her laughin’ an’ er-sayin’, “I dunno!”

T’other night we come frum meetin’ an’ I asks her fer a kiss,
En’ I tells her she’s so many that er few she’ll never miss;
En’ she looks up kinder shy-like, an’ she whispers sorter low,
“Jim, I’d ruther that you wouldn’t, but—er well—Oh, I dunno!”

Then I ses, “Now see here, Lindy, I’m er-wantin’ yer ter state
Ef yer thinks yer’ll ever love me, an’ if I had better wait,
Fer I’m tired of this fulein’, an’ I wants ter be yer beau,
An’ I’d like to hear yer sayin’ suthin’ else but I dunno!”

Then I puts my arm around her an’ I holds her close and tight,
En’ the stars away up yander seems er-winkin’ et th’ sight,
Es she murmurs sof’ an’ faintly, with the words er-comin’ slow,
“Jim, I never loved no other!” Then I ses, “Oh, I dunno!”
 RORY O’MORE
By Samuel Lover

Young Rory O’More courted Kathleen Bawn,

He was bold as a hawk, she as soft as the dawn;
He wish’d in his heart pretty Kathleen to please,
And he thought the best way to do that was to tease.
“Now, Rory, be aisy,” sweet Kathleen would cry,
(Reproof on her lip, but a smile in her eye),
“With your tricks I don’t know, in troth, what I’m about;
Faith, you’ve teased till I’ve put on my cloak inside out.”
“Oh! Jewel,” says Rory, “that same is the way
You’ve thrated my heart for this many a day;
And ’tis plazed that I am, and why not, to be sure?
For ’tis all for good luck,” says bold Rory O’More.

“Indeed, then,” says Kathleen, “don’t think of the like,

For I half gave a promise to sootherin’ Mike;
The ground that I walk on he loves, I’ll be bound—”
“Faith,” says Rory, “I’d rather love you than the ground.”
“Now, Rory, I’ll cry if you don’t let me go;
Sure I drame ev’ry night that I’m hatin’ you so!”
“Oh,” says Rory, “that same I’m delighted to hear,
For drames always go by conthraries, my dear;
Oh! jewel, keep dramin’ that same till you die,
And bright mornin’ will give dirty night the black lie!
And ’tis plazed that I am, and why not, to be sure?
Since ’tis all for good luck,” says bold Rory O’More.

“Arrah, Kathleen, my darlint, you’ve tazed me enough,

Sure I’ve thrashed for your sake Dinny Grimes and Jim Duff;
And I’ve made myself drinkin’ your health quite a baste,
So I think after that, I may talk to the priest.”

Then Rory, the rogue, stole his arm ’round her neck,
So soft and so white, without freckle or speck,
And he looked in her eyes that were beaming with light,
And he kissed her sweet lips;—don’t you think he was right?
“Now, Rory, leave off, sir; you’ll hug me no more.
That’s eight times to-day you have kiss’d me before.”
“Then here goes another,” says he, “to make sure,
For there’s luck in odd numbers,” says Rory O’More.

HOWDY SONG
By Joel Chandler Harris

It’s howdy, honey, when you laugh,

An’ howdy when you cry,
An’ all day long it’s howdy—
I never shall say good-by.

I’m monst’us peart myse’f, suh,

An’ hopin’ the same fer you,
An’ when I ketch my breff, suh,
I’ll ax you howdy-do!

It’s howdy, honey, when you sleep,

It’s howdy, when you cry;
Keep up, keep up the howdyin’;
Don’t never say good-by!

I’m middlin’ well myse’f, suh,

Which the same I hope fer you;
Ef you’ll let me ketch my breff, suh,
I’ll ax you howdy-do!

“IMPH-M”
Anonymous

When I was a laddie lang syne at the schule,

The maister aye ca’d me a dunce an’ a fule;
For somehoo his words I could ne’er understand’,