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India and the European Union
in a Turbulent World

Edited by
Rajendra K. Jain
India and the European Union
in a Turbulent World
 Rajendra K. Jain
Editor

India and the

European Union in
a Turbulent World
Editor
Rajendra K. Jain
School of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi, Delhi, India

ISBN 978-981-15-3916-9    ISBN 978-981-15-3917-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3917-6

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 To My Parents
for always inspiring and supporting me
 Introduction

The world today is in geopolitical flux and in disarray. The 2008 financial
crisis and the economic rise of Asia underlined the redistribution and dif-
fusion of power and the emergence of a more multipolar world with the
G8 giving way to the more representative G20. The postwar liberal world
order established by the West—which was ‘neither liberal nor worldwide
nor orderly’ (Haass 2018)—is under unprecedented strain. It has been
eroded largely because the political, economic and security fundamentals
that undermined it are invalid, and there is no consensus on other global
issues (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: xii).
The world has entered a period of profound change and uncertainty
with the unpredictable behaviour of the Trump Administration, the rise
and growing assertiveness of China, Brexit, a divided Europe, a re-emerg-
ing Russia, an even more disturbed Middle East, and the backlash against
globalization. These developments, according to Foreign Minister
S. Jaishankar, have had/are likely to have a six-fold impact. Firstly, with
the broader distribution of power, the world has become increasingly mul-
tipolar with emerging powers demanding a greater voice in world affairs
and institutions. Secondly, the rise of nationalism is resulting in greater
economic friction as well as a ‘stronger multipolarity with weaker multilat-
eralism’ in many domains. Thirdly, the world is likely to witness a fallback
on balance of power as its operating principle which usually produces
‘unstable equilibriums’. The world will also witness ‘a proliferation of
frenemies … allies who publicly turn on each other or competitors who
are compelled to make common cause on issues’. Fifthly, we are likely to

vii
viii INTRODUCTION

witness the emergence of ‘a more transactional ethos [that] will promote

ad hoc groupings of disparate nations who have a shared interest on a
particular issue’. Finally, the combination of these developments will
encourage ‘more regional and local balances with less global influence on
their working’ (Jaishankar 2019).
The current world order, the emerging powers argue, needs to reflect
current economic and geopolitical realities. It has proven difficult to either
change or incrementally reform existing international institutions since
they have in-built rules that prevent the dilution of their influence and
role. However, emerging powers like India do not seek to overturn the
existing international order. They ‘do not want to contest the basic rules
and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more
authority and leadership within it’ (Ikenberry 2011: 57). New Delhi does
not seek to replace the existing international governance institutions with
new ones, but it seeks admission to increase its influence and protect its
interests. Thus, what New Delhi really seeks is a more inclusive multilater-
alism and a more inclusive world order.
In the first chapter, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri examines the reactions and
responses of India and the European Union to President Donald Trump’s
policies and assesses their impact on India-EU relations. Neither India nor
the EU Member States, he argues, were pleased with the Trump
Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s
three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military
alliance structure and their legitimizing values. The weakening of the
US-Europe relationship and Brexit, he maintains, has meant that India
and the EU have come much closer together in recent years on a number
of policy issues integral to the international order. The EU’s India Strategy
3.0 (November 2018) was driven by Brussels’ desire for middle power
cooperation to compensate for the unilateral actions of the United States
and China. It de-emphasizes the Broad-Based Trade and Investment
Agreement and lays stress on greater cooperation with like-minded coun-
tries like India and Japan in areas like climate change, terrorism, maritime
security, and support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations
and the World Trade Organization.
The EU joint communication on China (March 2019) and its mecha-
nisms to screen Chinese FDI and technology acquisition indicate how the
European Union is slowly aligning itself with the American approach
towards China. However, the EU, Pramit concludes, contributes very lit-
tle to India’s critical security needs. India continues to struggle to bring
 INTRODUCTION ix

Europe into the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, unlike Europe, only the United
States remains a credible partner in attempts to balance against China.
India, Pramit maintains, remains much more of ‘a realpolitik practitioner’
than the EU would like to be. New Delhi’s heterogeneity of thought and
policy signifies that it requires a lot of attention to be able to work with
EU on policy terms. Both Brussels, which lacks a common strategic cul-
ture, and New Delhi are reluctant to make such an investment in each other.
After tracing the evolution of the postwar ‘liberal order’, Patryk Kugiel
argues that the unilateral policy of President Donald Trump, an increas-
ingly assertive China and a resurgent Russia have combined to put the
postwar liberal order into crisis. He goes on to critically evaluate the posi-
tion of the European Union and India on four critical elements of the
liberal order—a rules-based order and multilateralism, free trade and glo-
balization, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and non-pro-
liferation. While India and EU have similar approaches towards many
global issues, he argues, structural and ideological differences tend to hin-
der cooperation. Thus, while they may not be ideal partners in preserving
the liberal order, they are nevertheless indispensable for its sustenance and
reform. In conclusion, Patryk argues that India and the EU apparently
have a broad convergence of views on the liberal international order, but
there are differences in detail largely because of historical legacies and
because they are at different levels of development. While India and the
European Union may not be ideal partners in preserving the liberal inter-
national order, they are, he concludes, nevertheless, indispensable for its
reform. They are, he argues, apparently ‘the best partners to work together
towards a new post-Western order, which would still be “rules-based”, but
not necessarily “liberal”’.
In the next chapter, Anna Wróbel argues that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) is confronting an existential crisis, which has consid-
erably weakened its role in global trade governance and accentuated the
symptoms of dysfunctionality of the multilateral trading system. The WTO
has lost not only its effectiveness in trade negotiations, but could lose its
ability to settle trade disputes, especially with the United States having
blocked the possibility of processing appeals in trade disputes by not filling
the vacancies in the Appellate Body. The chapter seeks to answer the ques-
tion whether the WTO is still an effective instrument for the realization of
trade interests of its members, especially the European Union and India.
The chapter examines the negotiating positions of the EU and India
towards the Doha Round, evaluates proposals made by the EU and India
x INTRODUCTION

to revitalize the multilateral trading system and highlights the elements of

convergence and divergence in their proposals for reform of the WTO. It
concludes that both the European Union and India have high stakes in the
stability and predictability of the rule-based multilateral trading system.
However, a WTO reform requires the involvement of all major powers,
including the United States.
Karina Jędrzejowska argues that the Asian financial crisis (1997–1998)
and the global financial meltdown (2007–2009) revealed serious deficien-
cies in global financial governance. The failure to provide credible crisis
prevention and crisis management mechanisms fostered the development
of alternative regional and plurilateral financial arrangements as well as the
emergence of new global financial actors and arrangements (e.g. the
Financial Stability Forum and its successor, the Financial Stability Board).
The chapter assesses the role of the European Union—a union of highly
developed countries—and a major emerging market (India) in the gover-
nance of international financial institutions, namely the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group and the Bank for International
Settlements. It examines their compliance with global financial regula-
tions, especially the Basel process as well as the convergence and diver-
gence in their interests in the governance and reform of the global financial
system. Global financial governance, she concludes, will have to contend
with key challenges including the rise of China, the shift towards unilateral
and bilateral governance mechanisms advocated by certain countries and
South-South financial governance.
Prior to the Brexit referendum (June 2016), Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
argues, UK-India trade for nearly two decades was static signifying the
lack of supply chain linkages. However, Indian foreign direct investment
in the United Kingdom has been greater than the rest of Europe, and the
UK has cumulatively been the single largest source of FDI in India. Britain,
according to a top Indian foreign diplomat he cites, was of consequence
largely because of the size of the Indian diaspora and because it had a veto
in the United Nations Security Council. India, Pramit argues, did not sup-
port Brexit and viewed it largely as a negative development. Brexit was
largely seen as undermining the influence and strength of Europe as a
whole, fostering global instability and insofar as it weakened the West-
centric international order; it tended to increase China’s international
influence. Brexit, he concludes, has had two key implications for Indian
foreign policy. Firstly, it has led to a recognition that New Delhi should
adopt a more proactive stance regarding weak trade ties and declining
 INTRODUCTION xi

immigration. Secondly, India has to revisit its policy towards the European
Union, strengthen links with France and Germany, and make a serious
effort at forging closer ties with secondary European countries, including
those of Central Europe.
Authored by one of India’s key negotiators of the Broad-Based Trade
and Investment Agreement (BTIA), Dinkar Khullar, former Ambassador
to the European Union, provides a succinct analysis of the salient aspects
as well as the points of convergence/divergence in the negotiations that
started in June 2007 and went on till April 2013, when they came to a
standstill. The author discusses the mismatch of respective perceptions and
ambitions, the different procedural mechanisms of the two sides and how
the two sides dealt with the difficult issues like agriculture, automobiles,
wines and spirits, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable devel-
opment and human rights. He examines the reasons behind India’s termi-
nation of Bilateral Investment Treaties with many Member States of the
EU. He discusses the issue of confidentiality in negotiations, the role of
civil society and the impact of Brexit on the BTIA. Khullar is somewhat
sceptical about an early conclusion of the BTIA, especially given the strong
reservations about FTAs at the higher levels of the Government of India.
If and when a free trade agreement with the EU is signed, he concludes, it
would be ‘a sui generis one’. He urges the Union to look for a balanced
and realistic outcome rather than an overly ambitious one.
India and the European Union confront similar challenges of interna-
tional terrorism, terrorist networks and global Islamic fundamentalism.
Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution and the degree of coopera-
tion with the European Union and key Member States in counter-terror-
ism. She discusses Indian efforts for a Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism and India-EU cooperation in counter-terrorism
since the Lisbon Summit (2000). The October 2017 joint statement on
cooperation in combating terrorism, she maintains, was a significant
breakthrough. She goes on to examine evolving cooperation through the
joint working groups on counter-terrorism with the EU and several
Member States. India and the European Union, she argues, have come a
long way in bypassing Pakistan as an impediment to cooperation and that
India is becoming a key partner for the West in developing a common
approach towards combating terrorism.
Manpreet Sethi argues that the European Union has been a key propo-
nent of non-proliferation whereas India was an outlier until a decade ago.
The divergent views on nuclear issues kept the two sides estranged over
xii INTRODUCTION

many decades. The India-EU strategic partnership gradually led to a bet-

ter understanding of each other’s positions on security matters, including
non-proliferation. Subsequently, India’s accommodation into the non-
proliferation regime was made possible with the support of European
countries. The chapter examines the issues that historically had kept them
apart and identifies the changed circumstances today. It identifies potential
areas of cooperation since the two entities have the clout to make a differ-
ence to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. This, the author argues, is
doubly important at a time when the United States appears to be with-
drawing from global issues, and China seeks to impose its own rules.
In Chap. 9, Bhaswati Mukherjee examines the evolution of a multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional relationship between India and the
European Union on human rights. She discusses their contrasting
approaches towards UN’s human rights mechanisms, including the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights and its successor—the Human
Rights Council. She assesses the nature and the reasons why India agreed
to an informal human rights dialogue. She analyses the role of India, the
EU and Pakistan during the 1994 UN Human Rights Council and assesses
the impact of the strategic partnership on human rights, the role of civil
society, and the linkage between human rights and the Broad-Based
Investment and Trade Agreement. In recent years, the human rights
debate within the EU underwent a fundamental change with the rise of
populism. The schism within Europe is becoming an increasingly toxic
debate between sovereignty of the individual in West Europe versus sover-
eignty of the nation in Eastern Europe. In conclusion, the chapter looks at
the EU’s 2018 India Strategy approach towards human rights and trade
and suggests a way forward.
In the next chapter, Vijeta Rattani argues that the climate agenda of
India and European Union is rooted in their own broader foreign policy
and developmental priorities. While the former has sought to set bench-
marks and strategies for the global community to follow in the form of the
European Trading Scheme and the European Climate Change Programme,
the latter has slowly but surely arisen as a credible climate change actor.
This chapter looks at the approach and the role of India and European
Union towards the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Paris Rule Book
adopted in Katowice Summit in 2018. It also examines how India and the
EU domestically implement and collaborate to meet their international
commitments and suggests a roadmap for the future.
 INTRODUCTION xiii

In the concluding chapter, Sheetal Sharma seeks to address some of the

core issues and the challenges posed by legal and illegal migration as well
as the movement of refugees in India and Europe. The author seeks to
make a comparison between the scenario, mechanisms and success
achieved by India and Europe in coping with the influx of migrants. In
spite of economic and infrastructural limitations, India provided shelter to
over 10 million East Pakistani refugees during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis.
Europe however confronted an unprecedented challenge with the arrival
of over a million refugees in 2015. European responses, the author argues,
raised fundamental issues about the values and the human rights espoused
by Europe, the erection of national barriers, the rise of Islamophobia as
well as fears about the socio-cultural threat and the burden on social secu-
rity systems posed by migrants and refugees.
China has emerged as ‘the most prominent normative challenger’ of
the existing international order (Tharoor and Saran 2020a: 192, 250).
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen by many in India as an impor-
tant instrument in building the Chinese narrative of the inevitability of a
Chinese hegemonic order based on political authoritarianism and illiberal
values. Thus, the values that India and the European Union share become
important in the context of ‘an alternative authoritarian and state-con-
trolled model that President Xi Jinping is propagating today’ (Sibal
2019: 77).
Growing convergence between India and the European Union at the
October 2017 summit was spurred by eroding European romanticism
that greater engagement with and facilitating China’s rise would eventu-
ally lead to internal, democratic reform and the gradual acceptance of
Western values. From being the lone critic of the Belt and Road Initiative
at the time of the BRI summit in Beijing (May 2017), India’s concerns
why it disliked the BRI began to be echoed a few months later by others,
including Europe, Japan and the United States.
The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) will fur-
ther exacerbate the drawbacks of the existing world order. The pandemic
has highlighted the ‘waning legitimacy’ of international institutions, which
suffer from politicization, manipulation, a lack of representation, indepen-
dent leadership and purpose (Tharoor and Saran 2020b). It signified ‘the
unmistakeable demise of Pax Americana’, exposed the social and gover-
nance vulnerabilities of the West, and further widened the divide between
North and South Europe over economics, and Western and Eastern
Europe over values’ (Saran 2020). The coronavirus may have, in fact,
xiv INTRODUCTION

heralded the sudden onset of what Ian Bremmer calls ‘a “G-Zero” world—
one that is at once multipolar, leaderless, and likely besieged by renewed
geopolitical conflict’ (Bremmer 2011). The pandemic is leading to ‘a
smaller, meaner kind of world’ since in all polities, there is already ‘a turn-
ing inward, a search for autonomy and control of one’s own fate’ (Menon
2020; Borrell 2020).
The European Union, which in the past had tended to be seen by India
as an undervalued partner, is now increasingly part of most conversations
in fields like the economy, technology, standards, best practices, develop-
ment, defence and security. The renewed focus on Europe is the result of
changing geopolitics, India’s own priorities, Europe’s growing relevance
in the post-Brexit era, China’s expanding footprint in the continent, Brexit
and the search for alternatives to the loss of the UK as the gateway to
Europe. All these developments have compelled India to revisit, re-exam-
ine and rethink its own policies towards Europe and search for alternatives
to Britain. This realization has been accompanied by a more proactive
engagement of Europe—concentration on Germany, France and Spain,
the Nordic countries as well as Central and Eastern Europe, which had
hitherto received inadequate attention because of limited historical ties,
weak people-to-people links and marginal economic cooperation.
The US-China geopolitical contest and trade war is taking the world
towards a new Cold War. The uncertainties of a more turbulent world
have made both India and the European Union look towards each other
and towards like-minded partners with similar values, international out-
look and adherence to international law to strengthen multilateralism and
a rules-based world order.

References
Borrell, J. (2020). The Post-Coronavirus World is Already Here. ECFR Policy
Brief 320. Retrieved May 30, 2020, from https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/the_
post_coronavirus_world_is_already_here.pdf.
Bremmer, I. (2011). A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club will Produce
Conflict, Not Cooperation. Foreign Affairs, 90(2), 2–7.
Haass, R. (2018, March 21). Liberal World Order, R.I.P. Project Syndicate.
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism
after America. Foreign Affairs, 90(3), 56–62, 63–68.
 INTRODUCTION xv

Jaishankar, S. (2019, October 1). Remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington,

DC. Retrieved October 5, 2019, from https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/31895/External+Affairs+Ministers+remarks+at+Atlantic+
Council+Washington+DC+on+1+October+2019.
Menon, S. (2020, March 20). How the World will Look After the Coronavirus
Pandemic. Foreign Policy.com. Retrieved May 25, 2020, from https://for-
eignpolicy.com/2020/03/20/world-order-after-coroanvirus-pandemic/.
Saran, S. (2020, April 27). Order at the Gates: Globalisation, Techphobia and the
World Order. Raisana Debates. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from https://www.
orfonline.org/expert-speak/order-at-the-gates-globalisation-techphobia-
and-the-world-order-65227/.
Sibal, K. (2019). India and the European Union: Perceptions and Misperceptions.
In R. K. Jain (Ed.), Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception
and Misperception (pp. 61–78). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tharoor, S., & Saran, S. (2020a). The New World Disorder and the Indian
Imperative. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company.
———. (2020b, March 28). The New World Disorder. Raisana Debates. Retrieved
May 7, 2020, from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-new-
world-disorder-63803/.
 Contents

1 India, the European Union and the World Order  1

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

2 India, the European Union and the Postwar Liberal Order 27

Patryk Kugiel

3 India, the European Union and Global Trade Governance 59

Anna Wróbel

4 The European Union and India in Global Financial

Governance 75
Karina Jędrzejowska

5 Brexit and India-UK Relations 91

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

6 India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement:

Process, Issues, Prospects109
Dinkar Khullar

7 India, the European Union and Counter-­Terrorism:

Shifting Paradigms, New Cooperation127
Bhaswati Mukherjee

xvii
xviii Contents

8 India-EU Partnership for Security: Through the Prism of

Nuclear Non-proliferation147
Manpreet Sethi

9 India and the European Union: A Dialectical Approach to

Human Rights167
Bhaswati Mukherjee

10 India, the European Union and Climate Change: The

Paris Agreement and After187
Vijeta Rattani

11 Indian and European Responses to Migration and

Refugee Crises205
Sheetal Sharma

Index219
 Notes on Contributors

Rajendra K. Jain was formerly Professor and Chairperson at the Centre

for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has
been Director, Europe Area Studies Programme, JNU and the first Jean
Monnet Chair in India (2010–2015). He has also been Adjunct Research
Professor, Monash European and EU Studies Centre, Monash University,
Melbourne (2010–2015). He was formerly Visiting Professor, Asia-
Europe Institute, University of Malaya (2010) and Visiting International
Fellow, Monash Europe and EU Centre, Melbourne (2009). He was
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Fellow at the University of
Constance and Visiting Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, University of London (1993) and the Foundation for Science and
Politics/Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (1995), Ebenhausen, Germany.
He has been Visiting Humboldt Foundation Professor at Freiburg,
Leipzig and Tuebingen universities and at the Maison des Sciences de
l’Homme, Paris (2008, 2010, 2013). He has also been visiting professor
at the universities of Sofia, Warsaw and UPFM Barcelona. He was Adjunct
Professor (Research), Monash University (2010–2015) and Indian
Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR) Professor of Contemporary India,
Leuven University (2015). He is the author/editor of over 30 books and
has written 150 articles/chapters in books. He has most recently pub-
lished Changing Indian Images of the European Union: Perception and
Misperception (Palgrave 2019) and India, Europe and Pakistan (Knowledge
World, 2018).

xix
xx NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Karina Jędrzejowska is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and

Global Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies,
University of Warsaw. She is a graduate of the University of Manchester
(MsC Globalization and Development, 2008), Warsaw School of
Economics (M.A. in Finance and Banking, 2007), and an M.A. in
International Relations from the Institute of International Relations,
Warsaw University (2005). Since April 2017, she is a Governing Board
Member and Treasurer of the World International Studies Committee
(WISC). She is co-editor of the forthcoming The Future of Global Economic
Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an Age of Uncertainty (2020).
Dinkar Khullar studied Economics at St Stephen’s College, New Delhi
(1970–1973) and thereafter obtained a Master’s degree from the Delhi
School of Economics. Prior to joining the Indian Foreign Service in 1978,
he taught Economics at St. Stephen’s College for three years. Between
1978 and 1999, he worked in India’s Embassies in Moscow, Rome and
Seoul, interspersed with assignments in India in the Ministry of External
Affairs, Ministries of Finance and Commerce and the Office of the Prime
Minister. He was the Ambassador of India in Azerbaijan and Bulgaria. He
later served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the
UN Offices and International Organizations in Vienna, Austria
(2009–2012) and Ambassador of India to Belgium, Luxembourg and the
European Union at Brussels (2012–2013). He occupied the position of
Secretary (West), Ministry of External Affairs, with responsibility for India’s
relations with Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada
and Eurasia (2013–2014).
Patryk Kugiel is Senior Analyst in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the
Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Warsaw. He is a specialist
on South Asia and international development cooperation. His research in
PISM focuses on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, the secu-
rity situation in South Asia, US and EU policies towards the region;
implications of India’s rise on the global order as well as the develop-
ment cooperation policy of Poland and the EU. He is the co-editor of
India-Poland Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Vistas for Future
Cooperation (2014) and author of India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy
Strategy (2017).
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xxi

Bhaswati Mukherjee has had a distinguished career of over 38 years in

the Indian Foreign Service. She served as First Secretary, Permanent
Mission of India to the UN, New York (1986–1989) and Deputy Secretary
(United Nations, Political), Ministry of External Affairs, (1984–1989).
She was formerly Ambassador to the Netherlands (2010–2013) and
Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris (2004–2010). She was for-
merly Chef de Cabinet to the UN Assistant Secretary General for Human
Rights and Special Assistant to UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Centre for Human Rights, (subsequently renamed as Office of
High Commissioner for Human Rights) Geneva (1991–1997). She was
Joint Secretary (Europe West, EU and Commonwealth), Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi (1999–2004), during
which she piloted institutional linkages with the European Union. She
helped to shape and chaired from the Indian side several India-EU
Working Groups including on Counter Terrorism (three separate working
groups with France, UK and EU respectively) and India-EU Joint Working
Group on Consular Issues as well as the India-EU Joint Commission. She
has recently published India and the EU: An Insider’s View (2018).
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic
Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre and the Foreign Editor of the Hindustan
Times. He writes on political, security and economic issues. He was a
member of National Security Advisory Board of Government of India
from 2011–2015 and is a member of the Asia Society Global Council and
the Aspen Institute Italia, the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
and the Mont Pelerin Society.
Vijeta Rattani is Technical Expert on the issues of environment, climate
change and natural resource management in Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)—the Indo-German Bilateral Cooperation Agency.
Earlier, she was heading the climate team at the Centre for Science and
Environment. Her work profile includes tracking, analyzing and writing
on different aspects of climate change including global climate negotia-
tions, adaptation. She has been a regular contributor to Down to Earth
magazine. She obtained her PhD from JNU focussing on climate politics
from the European Union perspective. She has been a Visiting Scholar at
the Freie University of Berlin, Vrije University Brussels, Bremen
International Graduate Institute of Social Sciences, University of Bremen,
University of Bonn, and University Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. She is the
recipient of a German Academic Exchange Service fellowship during her
PhD research.
xxii Notes on Contributors

Manpreet Sethi is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New
Delhi where she heads the project on nuclear security. Over the last two
decades, she has been researching and writing on nuclear energy, strategy,
non-proliferation, disarmament, arms and export controls and ballistic
missile defence. She is the recipient of the prestigious K Subrahmanyam
award, an honour conferred for excellence in strategic and security
studies. She lectures regularly at establishments of Indian Armed
Forces, Police and Foreign Services. She has been a Member of the
Prime Minister’s Informal Group on Disarmament (2012) and sev-
eral Track II initiatives. She has been Member of Executive Board of
Indian Pugwash Society and is a Consultant with the global Nuclear
Abolition Forum and Asia Pacific Leadership Network. Her publica-
tions include Code of Conduct for Outer Space: Strategy for India (2015)
and editor of Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World (2009), Global
Nuclear Challenges (2009) and Nuclear Power: In the Wake of
Fukushima (2012).
Sheetal Sharma is Assistant Professor, Centre for European Studies,
School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
She is coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module on Society, Culture, and
Social Change in Europe. She was previously lecturer at the Institute
of Technology and Management, Gurgaon, India. Her research inter-
ests include social and cultural issues in contemporary Europe and
India and their historical roots, multiculturalism and diversity, the
methodology of the social sciences, and gender issues and the empow-
erment of women. She has written a number of book chapters and
journal articles and is the author of Legal Profession and Women: A Study
in Professions and Gender (2006).
Anna Wróbel is Assistant Professor, Department of Regional and Global
Studies, Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University
of Warsaw. She holds a PhD on the policy of liberalization of international
trade in services. A Member of the Polish Association of International
Studies, she is also the co-editor of The Dragon and the (Evening) Stars:
Essays on the Determinants of EU-China Relations (in Polish) (2013) and
The Future of Global Economic Governance: Challenges and Prospects in an
Age of Uncertainty (2020).
 Abbreviations

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ASB Accounting Standards Board
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank of International Settlements
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BTIA Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement
CCIT Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
CEAS Common European Asylum System
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CFT Countering the Financing of Terrorism
COP Conference of Parties
CPPNM Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DSB Dispute Settlement Body
DDR Doha Development Round
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EBA European Banking Authority
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EIDHR European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority

xxiii
xxiv Abbreviations

ETS Emission Trading System

EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCF Green Climate Fund
GDP Gross domestic product
GI Geographical indication
GSP Generalised Scheme of Preferences
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HRC Human Rights Council
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
IB Intelligence Bureau
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IFI International Financial Institutions
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF International Monetary Fund
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
IOM International Organization for Migration
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPR Intellectual property rights
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISSBs International financial institutions and international standard-
setting bodies
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
JAP Joint Action Plan
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad
JS Joint Secretary
JSA Jal Shakti Abhiyan
JWG Joint Working Group
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC Line of Control
MFN Most favoured nation
MNRE Ministry of Natural and Renewable Energy
 Abbreviations  xxv

MSMEs Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFCC National Adaptation Fund on Climate Change
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPCC National Action Plan on Climate Change
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB New Development Bank
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
NNWS Non-nuclear weapon states
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NTBs Non-tariff barriers
NWS Nuclear weapon states
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
P5 Permanent Five
R2P Responsibility to Protect
R&AW Research and Analysis Wing
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RTAs Regional trade agreements
SAPCC State Action Plans on Climate Change
SCR Security Council Resolution
SDT Special and differential treatment
SPIPA Strategic Partnership on the Implementation of the Paris
Agreement
SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary standards
TBT Technical barriers to trade
TCPO Town and Country Planning Organisation
TDI Trade defence instruments
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VDPA Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO World Trade Organization
 CHAPTER 1

India, the European Union and the World

Order

Pramit Pal Chaudhuri

The election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States has
posed a major challenge to the Atlantic Alliance and the post-World War
II international order. A Europe used to the special bonding of an Atlantic
Alliance has been buffeted by Trump’s preference for a robust unilateralist
foreign and trade policy. India, more distant from the US, has perceived
some geopolitical benefits in Trump’s unorthodox ways in regard to
China. But the weakening of the US-Europe relationship, along with
upheavals like Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, has meant that
India and the European Union have come much closer together in the
past five years on a number of policy issues integral to the international
order. This trend was already evident before either Trump or Brexit, but
American external polices have accelerated the coming together of India
and the EU.

P. Pal Chaudhuri (*)

Distinguished Fellow and Head, Strategic Affairs at Ananta Aspen Centre,
New Delhi, India
Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, India

© The Author(s) 2020 1

R. K. Jain (ed.), India and the European Union in a Turbulent
World, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3917-6_1
2 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Views of the World Order

Neither India nor the EU Member States were pleased with the Trump
Administration’s unilateralism and hostility to the international order’s
three primary components: multilateral institutions, the postwar military
alliance structure and their legitimizing values (International Institute of
Strategic Studies 2018). But they had significant differences over which of
the American President’s actions was more objectionable and the reasons
why they disliked these actions. New Delhi’s relationship with Washington
had far less depth and background than the Atlantic Alliance and there was
thus less for Trump to disrupt in terms of bilateral ties. Moreover, com-
mon values were seen by the Europeans as the unique element of their
bond with the Americans and values were almost completely missing in
the US President’s pronouncements and policy. In the India-US relation-
ship, values were largely a rhetorical exercise as far as New Delhi was
concerned.
That India is less invested in preserving the postwar international order
is in large part because it has been a marginal player in that order for most
of India’s independent history. It initially rejected key economic elements
of that order and broadly saw its own economic and political development
best accomplished by minimizing international interaction. While this has
changed significantly since the opening up of the economy and the end of
the Cold War between 1989 and 1991, New Delhi continues to engage
with the international system cautiously (Kliman and Fontaine 2012).
India is far more sanguine about Trump’s attempts to delegitimize the
international system, so long as they do not go beyond a certain point, for
two reasons. One, India sees the decision-making bodies of the interna-
tional system as weighted against its own representation, whether the
United Nations Security Council or bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Trump-style attacks are therefore seen as useful in shaking up the
status quo. Two, lndia supports a soft balance of power structure in the
Indo-Pacific region as necessary to put limits on Chinese geopolitical
assertiveness. The present international order is seen as incapable of doing
so, in part because China sits at the high table of most multilateral bodies
and there is nothing like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in the western Pacific (Rajagopalan 2017; Paul 2018). The European
Union is seen as having negligible levers of influence in the Indo-Pacific
and no willingness to use the few levers, almost all economic, it has against
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 3

China. Trump’s China policy has proven to be remarkably forceful with its
sweeping imposition of tariffs and barriers on technology.
Two elements of the international order—climate and maritime secu-
rity—have seen the maximum amount of India-EU cooperation. In the
case of climate change, this was greatly enhanced following the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Both in terms of
the EU and with individual European countries, there has been consider-
able cooperation on the climate front (Khandekar 2018). India has also
raised existing maritime security cooperation with France and Britain, and
has even had its first naval actions with French warships flying the EU flag.
However, there has been a minimal degree of overlap on the issue of trade
and almost none in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, though both
multilateral systems have been deliberately targeted by Trump. New Delhi
and Brussels have sought to uphold the sanctity of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) against unilateral American trade actions. However,
India is a minor player in global trade and among the more protectionist
WTO members. Many of Trump’s grouses against India are also shared by
the European Union (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2003).
New Delhi has been indifferent to the fate of NATO, a key target of
Trump’s ire and a major source of concern for the EU. The one overseas
military operation that Trump wants to wind up which worries India—the
US military action in Afghanistan—is a war most Europeans also believe
should come to an end. The nascent military arrangements India has
invested in, whether the India-US-Japan trilateral or the Quad, are all
about the Indo-Pacific, where India sees the EU is seen as having little or
no role. The Trump Administration has remained fully supportive of these
efforts, if anything seeing India as the less aggressive participant in all three.
New Delhi and Brussels have both opposed the American abrogation of
the nuclear agreement with Iran and the subsequent imposition of US
sanctions. India lacks the economic wherewithal to defy the United States
on the sanctions and so has largely acquiesced, preferring to negotiate
temporary exemptions directly with Washington. European attempts to
set up parallel financial mechanisms to get around the US sanctions were
supported by India but proved abortive. The two sides were on the same
side but lacked the capability to do much about the US’s actions
(Emmott et al. 2019, 9 May).
On Trump’s decision to cancel the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, however, India and the EU were not on the same page. New
Delhi saw the INF Treaty through the prism of China and the fact the
4 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

treaty had allowed China a near monopoly in missiles of that range in the
western Pacific. Brussels saw it in terms of a breakdown of the post-Cold
War consensus on non-proliferation and destabilizing to their region.
India, a long-standing former sufferer of multilateral nuclear technology
sanctions, is generally cynical about the multilateral non-proliferation and
arms control regime.
Where the EU and India differ the most is the importance they place
on the ‘liberal’ prefix that is sometimes attached to ‘international order’.
Arguably, nothing distinguishes the Atlantic Alliance from similar arrange-
ments in the world more than the commonality of the United States and
the Union when it comes to values. This is a much weaker element even
with the five treaty alliances of the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
Constitutional democracy is well entrenched in the Indian polity today
but India remains ambivalent about liberalism and all that it entails, both
at home and abroad. Indian attitudes regarding liberalism are an ever-­
changing landscape though present trendlines show Indians becoming
more liberal in their economic views but less tolerant on social issues
(Meinardus 2019). Being ambivalent about the universal applications of
liberal democracy is one reason India does not support its export. Privately,
most Indian commentators will argue democracy is alien to the cultures of
both China and the Arab world. Therefore, the question of exporting
democracy to elsewhere has never been part of India’s foreign policy. New
Delhi prefers to emphasize that the world order should be ‘rules-based’
but not necessarily that it be ‘democratic’ at the nation-state level (Muni
2009; Press Trust of India 2019). While the Union was as enthusiastic
about democracy promotion as the United States in the aftermath of the
Cold War, that sentiment in Brussels has waned as other issues have
assumed priority and interventions in places like Libya have turned sour.
Trump’s enthusiasm for dictators and right-wing populists has shocked
Europeans but has been treated with indifference by Indians.
The international order has many elements and the Trump
Administration has wielded at least a verbal axe on most of its foundations.
India and the EU agree on the importance of only some of the pillars of
that order, but this has been enough to accelerate cooperation between
the two. India will seek ‘coalitions of the willing’, say senior Indian diplo-
mats, to rally around specific pillars of the international order.1 Another
reason for limited India-EU cooperation is continuing uncertainty by
both sides whether Trump’s policy will necessarily remain US policy after
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 5

his presidency is over. Even the mercurial US President’s views on the

world, as discussed below, have changed over the years.

Campaign Views
On the campaign trail through 2016, Trump laid out a worldview that ran
counter to the prevailing foreign policy consensus in Washington and the
major Western capitals. He made three major overlapping claims that posi-
tioned him even outside the mainstream of his own Republican Party. As
one of his early political backers explained after Trump’s inaugural address
and its America First theme, ‘Trump is repudiating the establishment con-
sensus. He is part of neither its rightwing nor its leftwing’ (Gingrich 2016).
Firstly, he expressed a preference for unilateral foreign policy action in
the context of an extremely narrow view of the national interest, labelled
as ‘America First’. While a belief in unilateralism is widespread among
conservative American politicians, in Trump’s case it encompassed a repu-
diation of almost all US bilateral and multilateral commitments, including
those in trade, defence and immigration and even bodies that the United
States had itself created.
Secondly, Trump claimed that American allies were exploiting the
United States by not shouldering their fair share of the costs of the alli-
ance. Unprecedented for a postwar US President, Trump expressed scep-
ticism about the utility of even NATO. He even remarked that the
European Union was created to take advantage of the US.
Thirdly, Trump espoused a crude version of mercantilism which saw
US trade deficits as signs of America’s wealth leaking out to other coun-
tries. He was critical of almost all multilateral trading arrangements as
being biased against the United States. Trump’s worldview was a throw-
back to a nineteenth-century American conservativism and consistent with
his own statements going back to the 1980s (The Economist 2016, 9
November; Sanger and Haberman 2016; Wright 2016). In other words,
unlike other postwar American presidents, Trump did not believe ‘a world
of expanding democracy and free markets’ was in American interests and
did not believe that the relatively low costs of the American alliance struc-
ture and investments in international institutions constituted a geopoliti-
cal ‘bargain’ (Kahl and Brands 2017).
6 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Symbolic Acts
During his first year in office, President Trump acted on some of his prom-
ises, but in a manner that seemed to indicate he was mostly interested in
symbolic victories. The most striking action was on trade policy. Right
after his inauguration, Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Four months later, he initiated a review of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). Trump maintained an unrelenting criticism, in
speeches and on social media, of the trade surpluses of a number of coun-
tries, including China and Germany, were running with the United States.
None of this caused too much alarm. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was
already in limbo because of Congressional opposition and Trump incor-
porated many of its new elements into the amended NAFTA. The US
leader made only a few passing references to the EU, India and the larger
international trading system. He even allowed a joint statement critiquing
‘protectionism’ at the G-20 summit in March (Schneider-Petsinger 2017).
On American overseas military commitments, Trump also seemed
more bark than bite. In July 2017, in a speech in Warsaw, he declared that
a strong Europe was in everyone’s interest. He called upon Europeans to
contribute ‘billions’ more because of him (Trump 2017). The following
month he publicly committed to sending more troops to Afghanistan
though he insisted their primary role would be counterterrorism.
There were a number of policy areas where Trump did turn the US ship
of state in a different path. The most obvious were in regard to West Asia.
In October 2017, the US president refused to certify Iran’s compliance
with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the formal name
of the agreement which had been negotiated between the West and Iran
over restrictions on the latter’s nuclear programme. But Trump did not
impose any actual costs on Iran; he merely called upon the US Congress
to consider sanctions. In December 2017, Trump announced the recogni-
tion of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and promised to move the US
Embassy to that city. Most European governments joined the majority in
the United Nations to censure the American move. India, which already
recognized Palestine but had developed a close relationship with Israel,
abstained. On both these issues, Trump was not out of line with main-
stream Republican views. Barack Obama had never been able to secure a
consensus in favour of his Iranian agreement during his presidency. Again,
neither of these decisions fundamentally affected regional stability.
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 7

Overall, the early Trump Administration was far from being radical.
Earlier Conservative US Presidents like Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush
had not shied away from unilateral action. Trade agreements had long had
a chequered political history in the United States though it was jarring
that a candidate of the Republican Party—the free trade party of America—
spoke of tariffs so welcomingly. The Iran nuclear deal had never attracted
bipartisan support in Washington. But there were warning signs that as his
presidency progressed Trump’s foreign policy would hew closer to the
extremism of his campaign speeches.

Climate Shock
The biggest shock for the international system was Trump’s decision in
June 2017 to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change.
While Republicans are the party of climate scepticism and generally
opposed to restrictions on US fossil fuel consumption, there had been
hope Trump would only demand some renegotiation. In the run up to his
decision, he had said he had ‘an open mind’ regarding the Paris Agreement.
In practical terms, the announcement in theory had no impact as the
American withdrawal would only come into force four years later. Trump’s
domestic decisions regarding carbon emissions were more damaging in
climate terms. The US decision was particularly traumatic for the EU,
which had put climate change front and centre in its external policy (The
Economist 2017, 6 July; Shear 2016).
The Narendra Modi Government’s response reflected an ongoing
debate within the Indian system. While no Indian agency opposed the
Paris Agreement, some policy-makers argued that the West as a whole had
fulfilled none of its funding promises for the developing world and an
Indian threat to follow the United States would give New Delhi leverage
at Paris. Reportedly Modi’s personal concern about climate change and
fears Paris would unravel altogether led the Indian leader to personally
insist New Delhi maintain its support for the Paris Agreement. ‘We earned
many brownie points with the Europeans in doing so’, added a senior
Indian diplomat afterwards.2 The main European governments rallied
around the Paris Agreement and made clear their determination to adhere
to if not tighten the Paris Agreement though India and other countries
noted this did not find reflection in increased EU funding or assistance to
least developed countries.
8 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Personal Biases
Arguably what upset Europe the most was Trump’s singular indifference,
bordering on hostility, to the Western alliance and disinterest in the special
status it held in US foreign and security policy. He treated NATO and the
EU not as the bedrock of US foreign and security policy but rather as a
millstone and a noose around America’s neck. The US President publicly
admitted he could not remember the name of Donald Tusk, President of
the European Council, after he rang him to congratulate him on his elec-
toral victory. The US President also saw nothing wrong in commenting
on domestic European politics. European governments were horrified at
Trump’s open endorsement of the new right-wing populist parties making
their mark in the continent. This was most evident in his support for
Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, the so-called Brexit vote of June 2016,
but also in his embrace of anti-immigrant conservative parties in Central
Europe and elsewhere. In an interview, Trump called the European Union
‘basically a vehicle for Germany’ and predicted that other countries would
join Britain in leaving (Esch 2017).
In contrast, Trump saw Modi and the 2014 landslide victory of his
right-wing nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as being an echo of his
own election. A number of his ideologues in the White House, notably
Steve Bannon, argued that Modi’s victory, the Brexit vote, Trump’s elec-
tion and the spread of right-wing parties in Europe were all part of a
global anti-establishment wave. Bannon said, ‘That centre-right revolt is
really a global revolt … I think you’ve already seen it in India’—a ques-
tionable claim as Modi was hardly a political outsider. Trump openly
endorsed the anti-immigrant fringe parties in France, Germany and
Britain, arguing his global revolt was evident in the ‘UK Independence
Party and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, whether it’s these groups
in the Low Countries in Europe, whether it’s in France, there’s a new
party in Germany. The theme is all the same’ (Feder 2016; Walt 2018).

Different Ways
This resulted in different approaches to Trump as an individual by the
political leaders of Europe and India. Modi, recognizing that the US
President rightly or wrongly saw him as one of his own, sought to embrace
Trump closer. In his first meeting, he invited Trump’s daughter, Ivanka,
to represent her father at a conference in India and avoided direct criticism
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 9

of any of Trump’s policies, including withdrawing from the Paris

Agreement. New Delhi was also struck by the strong sentiments in favour
of closer Indo-US strategic relations it encountered from most elements
of the Trump Administration, whether ideologues like Bannon or more
establishment figures like the Pentagon chief James N. Mattis, Secretary of
State Rex W. Tillerson and the National Security Advisor Herbert
R. McMaster3 (Desai 2018).
In the European case, the newly elected French President Emmanuel
Macron sought to create a working relationship with Trump through flat-
tery. When this failed, Macron began publicly calling for an EU that
strengthened itself domestically and militarily—as he did in a speech in
September 2017. German Chancellor Angela Merkel did little to hide her
personal disdain for Trump and preferred a more direct and confronta-
tional approach, both in private and in public. Trump, it seems, already
had a personal bias against Germany to the point that he sometimes denied
his own German origins and claimed to be of Swedish descent (Dempsey
2018). He bracketed Germany with China and Japan as the main coun-
tries which had used unfair trade practices to impoverish the United States.
He came to see the German leader’s policies as almost a challenge to his
own and would publicly revel in what he perceived to be her failures.
Merkel’s decision to allow one million Syrian refugees to enter Germany
in 2015 was derided as a ‘catastrophic mistake’ and apposite to Trump’s
decision to impose a travel ban on a handful of Muslim majority countries
(Hesch et al. 2017).
British Prime Minister Theresa May had the least amount of leeway in
her relations with Trump. Hobbled by her commitment to go through
with Brexit, her party’s irreconcilable differences over the nature of sepa-
ration and a belief she needed to maintain a close relationship with the US
for her own domestic credibility and to strengthen her negotiating posture
with Brussels, May sought only photo opportunities with Trump. It did
not help that the US President was open in his praise for the most extreme
proponents of Brexit, like Nigel Farage of the UK Independence Party
(Wright 2019).

Divided America
The European position in the Trump Administration was further com-
pounded by a lack of convergence with many members of the
Administration. Establishment figures like Mattis, Tillerson and McMaster
10 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

remained committed to the Western alliance, even while sharing the

President’s irritation with Germany’s continuing underspending on
defence and the general sense of policy drift in Brussels. However, many
of the White House ideologues were contemptuous of the mainstream
European political leadership and openly supportive of their right-wing
populist opponents. The result was often contradictory statements by the
Trump Administration on even simple issues like fighting the Islamic State
or handling Russia.
India benefited from the grand strategies unveiled by the Trump
Administration in January 2018—a National Security Strategy and a
National Defence Strategy—that spoke of a return of ‘great power rivalry’
to the international system and identified Russia and China as major stra-
tegic competitors to the United States. Both documents were cleared by
Trump. However, both policies built on the ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy outlined
by the Obama Administration in arguing that the US’s primary strategic
theatre of concern lay in the growing Chinese footprint in the western
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Both documents made a mention of the
Atlantic Alliance and declared that ‘a strong and free Europe is of vital
importance to the US’. But in the hierarchy of things, Asia was elevated
ahead of Europe. This meant there was a consensus between the ideo-
logues and the moderates in the Trump Administration as to the impor-
tance of India. There was less of an agreement on the importance of the
Atlantic Alliance (Joshi 2017).
All of this was to prove important when Trump began to purge the
moderate figures in his Administration from March 2018 onwards. The
major European states had been reassured these individuals represented
continuity in US foreign policy. These ministers understood that NATO
was the bedrock of American security, that the EU was in the American
interest and Brexit was not, that India was a nascent strategic relationship
that needed to be cultivated and so on. That much of US foreign and
security policy was, on the ground, relatively unremarkable in the first 14
months of the Trump Administration was in large part because these three
men, with assistance from Trump’s Chief of Staff John Kelly and his
daughter Ivanka, tempered the President’s more extreme positions. Much
of this was to change after February 2018.
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 11

Moderates Purged
Fourteen months into his presidency, Trump began refashioning his
Administration to reflect his worldview. In March 2018, he dismissed
Tillerson as his Secretary of State and, two months later, replaced his
National Security Advisor McMaster. There were similar personnel changes
on the economic side, notably the departure of White House economic
adviser Gary Cohn. Kelly was to hang on until year-end. Trump replaced
McMaster with the abrasive neoconservative and fervent unilateralist,
John Bolton. The new Secretary of State was a conservative ex-­
Congressman from Kansas, Mike Pompeo, who reinforced Trump’s dis-
like for the Iranian nuclear deal and opposition to multilateralism in
general. The new faces on the economic front did so on the understanding
they did not shirk from waging trade wars, supporting the use of tariffs
against the likes of China (Olorunnipa and Wadhams 2018).
This alarmed European governments as they were comfortable with the
moderates in the cabinet and the White House and saw them as the pri-
mary constraint on Trump’s more extreme points of view. India was less
concerned. Pompeo was a great advocate of the US-India relationship.
After some initial doubts, New Delhi was reassured about Bolton’s com-
mitment as well. Bolton developed a strong bond with his Indian counter-
part, Ajit Doval. Much of this was driven by the growing US belief that its
primary long-term strategic threat lay in the Indo-Pacific arena—a region
in which the EU had little or no role to play. But New Delhi was to learn,
as did other governments, that Trump kept a strict firewall between his
strategic relations and his trade policy. He saw no contradiction in attack-
ing a government for its trade actions even if he believed it important to
the US for military and defence reasons.

Tehran and Tariffs

In May 2018, a new Trump foreign policy was unveiled: the President
began to act on what he had previously only spoken about. The US fully
withdrew from the JCPOA and announced two sets of sanctions against
Iran that would start in August and November. This was fiercely criticized
by the EU and its major Member States. India also opposed the American
move but confined its public statements to saying that, on principle, it
opposed sanctions not approved by the United Nations. At a meeting in
Sofia in May 2018, EU leaders spoke of finding a means to save the JCPOA
12 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

by limiting the economic damage to Iran. France and Germany announced

plans to create an alternative financial payments system to circumvent
American sanctions, which largely depended on the American strangle-
hold on cross-border payments. The European system was created but
because it exempted oil and gas it has so far been ineffective. Iran, after
determining that the EU had no real response to the US actions,
announced it would breach the terms of the JCPOA as well. India, after
receiving assurances on price stability and alternative oil supplies from the
United States and its Arab allies, sharply reduced its oil imports from Iran
(Farmanfarmaian 2019; Financial Express 2018).
Trump also began to widen his unilateral trade policy to encompass
almost all of the major trading partners of the US. In late November 2017,
when asked who his ‘biggest foe globally right now’ was, Trump said, ‘I
think the EU is a foe, what they do to us in trade’ (Glor 2018). In March
2018, the US imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium on a number of
countries for unfair trade practices, notably China. After a few months
these tariffs were extended to cover India and the EU as well. The Union
retaliated by imposing similar duties on the US though it earned itself no
points with India by taking the opportunity to impose similar duties on
Indian imports. New Delhi, determined to not let its relationship with
Washington fray beyond a point, held back from retaliation for a full year.
While both sides were unhappy with American actions, there was sufficient
trade friction between India and the EU to ensure they did not join a
common front against the US. Trump proposed a ‘zero tariff, zero sub-
sidy’ trade agreement at the G-7 summit in June. Next month, Jean-­
Claude Juncker, the EU Commission President, agreed to not impose
further tariffs and stated that the two sides should work to a double zero
agreement as well as begin talks on reforming the structure of the WTO
(Miner 2018).
The US President had been critical of India’s protectionist trade poli-
cies from the start of his Administration, focussing in particular on tariffs
on Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Modi had quietly reduced motorcycle
tariffs but this did little to appease Trump, who continued to publicly
attack India on this. The US motorcycle firm manufactures in India, a
point lost on the US President, but the US Trade Representative’s Office
used the opportunity to pick up other long-standing trade disputes with
India over price controls, market access and other issues. After two failed
rounds in the fall of 2018 and early 2019, the US withdrew special market
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 13

access privileges India received under the Generalized System of Preferences

(GSP) just after Modi was re-elected for a second term (Business Line 2019).
The US’s trade battles reflected different sets of policy environments.
The largest and most bitter trade battle was between the US and China in
which tariffs affecting billions of dollars of trade were being imposed.
However, Trump was fully supported by all parties in Washington in this
struggle because of a larger geopolitical rivalry between the two countries
and a sense that China was the most egregious violator of global trade
rules. In the case of the EU, the Trump Administration was more agree-
able to coming to terms because of the sheer volume of trade involved, the
establishment’s continued support for the relationship and the desire to
bring the EU on board the long-term US Trade Representative’s plan to
reform the paralysed WTO system. India was a much smaller trade rela-
tionship—its surplus with the US rarely went beyond $20 billion a year—
and there was a desire not to disrupt the strategic relationship. The Modi
Government’s own intransigence led the trade dispute to snowball through
the latter part of 2018 but there was a strong desire for the US system to
get the dispute wrapped up as quickly as possible. But Washington, going
by India’s obstructionist policies in most multilateral trading bodies,
tended to see New Delhi as an adversary in issues like WTO reform. The
EU was arraigned on the US’s side when it came to its problems with drug
price controls, e-commerce investment restrictions and electronic tariffs
(Business Standard 2019, 12 July).

The European Union: The Foe

The Trump Administration elevated its attacks on the EU and its main-
stream political leadership through 2018 and 2019. Part of this stemmed
from the increasing policy dominance of the President’s right-wing ideo-
logues and Trump’s own instincts. Mattis, the last representative of estab-
lishment thinking, left the Administration in December 2018. It also
seems to have been a consequence of the Trump team’s belief that this is
what his political base desired—and keeping this base on his side was
essential if he was to win the Congressional elections of November 2018.
But there seems little doubt that the US President’s already parlous per-
sonal relationship with the most important European leaders deteriorated
even more. Through 2018 and 2019, the Trump Administration took a
more aggressive, verbal assault on the EU and liberal internationalism as
a whole.
14 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

Trump signalled this new phase during the G-7 summit in Canada in
June 2018. He assailed Germany, questioned the purpose of NATO ask-
ing ‘Why do we need it?’, called for Russia to be re-inducted into the G-7
and then tried to block the summit’s traditionally unanimous communi-
que (The Economist 2018b, 16 June). In December, Pompeo, in a speech
in Brussels, strongly attacked the existing postwar international system
and its institutions ranging from the United Nations and the World Bank
to the European Union. The central question, he said, was ‘whether the
system as currently configures, as it exists today, and as the world exists
today—does it work?’ Multilateralism had ‘too often become viewed as
end unto itself’. While praising NATO and warning against Russia and
China, Pompeo called Brexit a ‘political wake-up call’ as to whether the
EU was working for its member citizens (Pompeo 2018, 4 December).
That same month, the EU envoy to Washington found the US had down-
graded his diplomatic status (Emmott 2019, January 8). US Vice-President
Mike Pence echoed Pompeo a few months later at the Munich Security
Conference, and was met with a stony silence from the European delegates.
The Trump Administration continued to withdraw from multilateral
agreements and commitments under its America First stance. The US
withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council and the INF
agreement. Trump announced American plans to withdraw its troops
from Afghanistan and Syria. Washington barely consulted with its closest
allies, like those in Europe, on any of these decisions. It was similarly
uncommunicative with India and other related governments about
Afghanistan, the only one of these issues New Delhi was concerned about.
All of this fit into a larger pattern of refusing to support multilateral group-
ings that did not jibe with US interests and, in the case of conflict zones,
a determination by Trump to reduce US overseas military commitments
in which the US was shouldering the bulk of the cost (Schieffer 2019).
The Trump Administration’s sense is that its policies are largely success-
ful. NAFTA was successfully renegotiated and a number of countries,
including the EU and India, have agreed to bilaterally rework their trade
policies with the US. The EU, Japan and others have agreed to relook at
the WTO’s structure though India continues to resist such moves. It is
another thing that these have had no major impact on the trade position
of the US as the latter is determined by macroeconomic factors that are
largely separate from tariffs and other trade barriers. The US President has
had limited success in terms of reducing the American overseas military
footprint, with only relatively small operations in Africa so far affected.
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 15

What seems to matter most is the perception to his white working-class

base that Trump is shaking up a ‘treasonous’ cosmopolitan governing elite
(Mead 2017). The US President has steadfastly held on to a 40 per cent
approval rating and many commentators believe he has a very good chance
of getting re-elected in 2020.

European and Indian Responses

Handling Trump
Europe and India have both struggled to handle the radical change in the
tone and tenor of US foreign policy under President Trump. But given the
much closer and longer relationship that exists between the US and its
European allies, the US President’s attitude has been much more trau-
matic for Europe. Indian officials privately praise key elements of Trump’s
policies, most notably his hardline on China and commitment to the
Indo-Pacific in general.
Europe has been bothered both by Trump’s hostility to the multilateral
institutions that were jointly created by the West and by his personal hos-
tility to the EU. Trump’s on-and-off praise for Russia and his arguments
against the utility of NATO have shaken a Europe that has come to assume
their security will be handled by the US. As European Parliamentarian
Guy Verhofstadt admitted, ‘Transatlantic relations have adhered to a per-
verse, unspoken dynamic, whereby the more active the US has been, the
more Europe has dozed off’ (Verhofstadt 2016). Trump’s open support
for the new right-wing populist parties led Europeans to ask whether the
standard differences over tactics with the US were now being comple-
mented by a more fundamental disagreement over values, a gap that would
go right to the heart of the Atlantic Alliance (Newman 2018).
India has drifted closer to the US over the past two decades, strategi-
cally because of common concerns over China and economically because
the US has emerged as the country’s largest partner when investment,
remittances, trade and technology are all taken together. New Delhi, how-
ever, is conscious that since the Obama Administration there has been a
question mark over the US’s commitment to its presence in the western
Pacific. Major differences also exist between the two governments over the
American belief, which has stretched back to the Obama years and contin-
ues under Trump, that Pakistan’s facilitation is needed to ensure a US
withdrawal from Afghanistan. India assumes Pakistan’s price for such
16 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

assistance will be to the detriment of India and therefore has placed limits
on its defence relationship with the US as far as its western frontier goes.

European Unity
European observers recognize that many of Trump’s complaints about
unequal burden-sharing and a trading system that does not deliver are
long-standing bipartisan grouses in the United States. Until now they
have not had to face a US President prepared to dilute the Atlantic Alliance
in his determination to get Europe to take these complaints seriously.
Many continue to believe that Trump is a temporary phenomenon and
that future US presidents will return to the status quo. Others recognize
that Trump’s policies echoed in large part that of Obama before him and
reflect changes in the global order. Norbert Rottgen, Chairman of German
Parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, admitted that ‘Mr Trump is
not the cause, but a symptom of the tectonic shifts in geopolitics that have
led to the return of great power rivalry and centrifugal forces away from
multilateralism’ (Erlanger and Bennhold 2019).
Many European leaders have argued publicly that the EU should be
motivated by Trump’s behaviour to become a more coherent body when
it comes to foreign and security policy (Bravo et al. 2018).
So far, despite many speeches and op-eds, a more externally oriented
EU has not gone very far for three reasons. Firstly, France and Germany
have major differences over what this would entail with Paris calling for a
more centralized EU and Berlin opposing such moves. Secondly, uncer-
tainty over Brexit makes the idea of a common European defence force
questionable. Britain and France are the only European countries with
military capability. The German sense of themselves as a civilian power
means if Britain leaves a European military would be overwhelmingly
French. Noticeably, despite Trump’s exhortations, Germany has reduced
its defence spending even further and its military is treated almost as a joke
in Western circles. Thirdly, the political rise of the populist right-wing,
especially in Central Europe and places like Italy, has meant a coherent
European response to Trump is almost impossible. Many of these govern-
ments believe in embracing Trump’s views on Islam, immigration and
multilateralism. While polls show that anti-Americanism has risen in the
major European countries as has support for the EU as a whole, tangible
policy responses remain awaited (Buras and Janning 2018; Deutschmann
and Minkus 2018). The weakness of the EU’s response, despite many
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 17

defiant statements, to the Iranian sanctions and US trade policies has been
noticed by other governments (The Economist 2018a, 17 May).
India has stayed the course regarding its desire to align closer to the US
and preferred to see Trump as a matter of problem-solving rather than a
source of despondence. New Delhi has accepted that its trade relations
would be much more contentious and Trump can be expected to come up
with throwaway statements—like an oft-repeated desire to mediate over
the Kashmir dispute. But the former would run on a separate track from
its strategic relations while the latter did not necessarily reflect actual US
Government policy. It helped that Modi’s political mandate at home also
made him more or less impervious to any criticisms of his US policy or his
relationship with Trump (Bagchi 2019; Pal Chaudhuri 2019).
New Delhi was also less invested in the global status quo. It was not a
major trading state and held the view that much of the present system was
inherently discriminatory to emerging powers like India. The Modi
Government was impressed with the Trump Government’s tough response
to Chinese assertiveness, including its intolerance with Beijing’s serial vio-
lations of international trading rules and theft of technology. Indian offi-
cials, in contrast, were often privately critical of Obama’s failure to stand
up to China. While Trump’s tactics were seen as unusual, such as the
imposition of tariffs, his general China policy was something India both
supported and encouraged. The endorsement of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ by the
United States was seen as a sign that Trump and the Washington establish-
ment had aligned on tackling China.

India and the EU

Even before Trump was elected, New Delhi and Brussels had been in the
process of reassessing their bilateral relationship. Both sides acknowledged
that relations had become overly focussed on the tortuous negotiation of
a free trade agreement (FTA). An earlier phase where the EU harped on
human rights issues had also come to a close. There was interest in moving
the relationship to other areas. The unilateralist bent of the US today
helped accelerate these trends. The two now seek to improve cooperation
in climate change and security in part to compensate for the Trump
Administration’s erratic views on such issues. The EU also downgraded
the importance of the India FTA. Brussels concluded that given the chal-
lenge the US was posing to the international trading system it needed to
focus on negotiating large numbers of bilateral and plurilateral trading
18 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

agreements. The India FTA was seen as a lower priority because of the
smaller likelihood of success and European Commission President Jean-­
Claude Juncker, in his meeting with Modi in October 2017, privately said
the EU was prepared to put off a final agreement.4
Much of this new thinking was to be found in a new EU policy paper
on India—‘Elements for an EU Strategy on India’—issued in November
2018. While its origins predated both Brexit and the election of Trump,
the two events gave the document a sense of greater urgency. The paper
was driven by the EU’s desire for ‘middle power cooperation’ to compen-
sate for the unilateral actions of US and China. India was seen as a major
contributor on climate policy, maritime security, nuclear non-proliferation
and support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the
WTO. Importantly it argued ‘the EU has an interest in India playing a
greater role in a multipolar world, which requires a multipolar Asia’. In
other words, supporting India’s ‘sustainable modernization’ was implicitly
accepted as in the EU’s strategic interest. In return, India and the EU
would work together in places like Africa, West Asia and the Indian Ocean
and other areas where their ‘extended neighbourhoods’ overlapped5
(European Commission 2018).
Brussels found New Delhi was more open to discussions on these issues
as well. India was arguably as much influenced by the imminence of Brexit
as it was by Trump. Until 2016, India had tended to see and treat Britain
as its gateway to Europe and even its window on the EU. Indian invest-
ment in Britain was greater than its investment in the rest of Europe com-
bined, the Indian diaspora there was by far the largest in the continent
and, though France was a closer defence partner and Germany a larger
trading partner, Indians tended to conflate Europe with Britain. The
Brexit vote, however, forced a major rethink in New Delhi about how it
would engage with Europe. During a four-nation tour in May 2017, Modi
met the newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. As
Indian officials explained, this was partly to start developing a triangle of
relationships in preparation for a post-Brexit Europe.6 Italy was kept out
of the equation at the time because of an ongoing dispute with India over
the detention of some Italian maritime guards and a lack of a functional
government in Rome. Rajoy fell from power soon after, but Modi’s visit
was still noteworthy as no Indian Prime Minister had visited that country
for 29 years. Modi followed this up with a ‘Nordic summit’, where he met
the heads of five Nordic countries in a joint summit in Stockholm in April
 1 INDIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WORLD ORDER 19

2018. In other visits, the Indian Prime Minister has gone to Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and Ireland. As an EU diplomat
noted, ‘India’s reconnect with Europe is a recognition that even without
Britain this is India’s primary source of trade, foreign investment and tech-
nology’ (First Post 2017; Hindu Business Line 2018).
European countries have belatedly also become more active in strategic
issues that matter to India, especially in developing strategies to counter
the rising influence of China in the Indian Ocean and Africa. European
states were slow to accept India’s thesis that China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) had dangerous geopolitical overtones but came around to
the view by late 2016. France, the only European state with a physical and
military presence in the Indian Ocean, was the most active on this front.
Germany also announced an ‘Indian Ocean strategy’ in 2017 though it
was largely economic in nature, as did Britain though the latter’s had a
military facet (Pal Chaudhuri 2017; Pant and Kaura 2019).
In other matters, New Delhi does not see a convergence with the
Europeans. The latter are supportive of Trump’s initiatives to hold talks
with the Taliban and facilitate a US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
Europeans are also internally divided over how to handle China’s technol-
ogy challenge. While the United States, India and Japan are considering
working together on developing a 5G alternative to China, EU Member
States remain internally divided on the issue even though their fellow
European states, Sweden and Finland, have 5G capabilities (Cerulus and
Bishop 2019).
A more fundamental issue is the latent belief among Europe’s leader-
ship that Modi and his right-wing party represent illiberal and religio-­
nationalist values that are incompatible with those of the EU and Europe’s
elite as a whole. Modi’s political rise has seen European public attitudes
about India, often negative because of cultural stereotypes, worsen.
Europeans may question whether there is a widening gap between them-
selves and the United States, but they feel there is a yawning chasm
between themselves and the India that Modi represents. This is arguably
exaggerated—the World Values Survey shows that Indian values are clos-
est to those of East Europeans, notably Poland—but is a perception that
inhibits India and the EU from working beyond a certain point (Weizel-­
Inglehart 2015).
India remains much more of a realpolitik practitioner than the EU
would like to be. This is one reason New Delhi is less alarmed by Trump’s
policy than is Brussels. India’s heterogeneity of thought and policy means
20 P. PAL CHAUDHURI

it requires a lot of attention to be able to work with it in policy terms. The

EU continues to struggle to make such an investment. The same holds
true for India. The EU is surrounded by external challenges today. India
is wooed by a myriad of foreign governments. As S. Jaishankar, then a
corporate executive but today the Foreign Minister of the Modi
Government, said in an interview, Europe needs to recognize that there is
an Asia that goes beyond Japan and China. India, he noted, was 60 per
cent of the trade of Japan and 80 per cent of its investment as far as Europe
was concerned, ‘so Europe needs to give it a little bit more attention’
(Kostaki 2019).

Notes
1. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 6 June 2019.
2. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi,
December 2018.
3. Private conversations with German diplomats, New Delhi, December 2017.
4. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, June 2017.
5. Private conversation with a senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, June 2017.

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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
only a few of the many who are mentioned by the minutes up to
1700 as having left donations for the school. There were indeed
many others. In that year (1702) it was considered advisable that an
account be kept of all legacies which had been granted to the use of
the public school, as also those granted for the poor. Isaac Norris
was appointed to prepare this account. Its purpose was probably to
straighten out the tangle into which some of them had fallen
(especially that of Robert Wade) and that one man might be held
responsible for the expenditure of funds. No funds were to be paid
out for the use of schools by Norris, except on the order of the
overseers. Funds for the poor might be expended at the order of the
monthly meeting.[235]
The appointment of some one to see that an [Sidenote: Trouble
account of legacies be kept, resulted in some over the R. Wade
investigation of those already granted. It appears legacy]
that that of Robert Wade, who probably died before
1686,[236] had not been paid at all according to the stipulation of the
donor, which stated that £5 should be paid yearly for the use of the
school. The first record of a payment of the £5 was in 1699.[237]
David Lloyd and John Jones were accordingly appointed to attend to
it.[238] Their success does not seem to have been very marked as in
1704 the minute again urges them to treat with John Wade (brother)
concerning the legacy.[239] This was done, but their efforts met with
a refusal to pay the money,[240] so a committee of three Friends was
appointed with others to advise whether it should be sued for or not.
Such activity continued without any significant variant features until
1707, when it was proposed by those “concerned,” presumably his
brother, to buy off the legacy. Having been unpaid for several years
past, it was considered best that something be gotten out of it, so a
committee of three of the overseers was appointed to treat with the
buyers and make as satisfactory terms as they could.[241] The
minutes point to the fact that it was not settled to any one’s
satisfaction. In 1712 it was still before the meeting and again in 1727
the overseers are directed to use “their care to get the legacy left by
Robert Wade secured.”[242] Among other legacies, obtained more
easily, was one devised by Jonas Langford, which was brought to
the attention of the meeting in 1711. The amount of it was £50 in
Antigua money.
The Public School, established by charter, was [Sidenote: Negro
not the only recipient of such permanent school likewise
endowments. The Negro School was a popular and received gifts]
proper object of philanthropy and was benefited by
bequests very early after its establishment in 1770.[243] The first
donation came in 1771 when £2, Pennsylvania currency, were given
to Israel Pemberton and Anthony Benezet or their executors to be
appropriated for the promotion of the school for Negroes, and to be
paid to such trustees as might be appointed to the care of the said
school.[244] In the year following another legacy of £10 was left for
the instruction of the Negroes, and paid to Richard Blackham,
treasurer of that institution.[245] Anthony Benezet at his death left a
considerable sum as a legacy, which, added to the amount of salary
which was still owing him for services in the said school, had
amounted by 1800 to £103 and 4s.[246] The amount of other
donations to that institution up to date amounted to £117/5/11.[247]
In addition to the ways already mentioned there [Sidenote: Funds
was also occasional recourse to a bond issue for also raised by
raising funds, but the last was not common, being bonds, rarely]
used only in emergency cases. The first example of
it, which has come to the writer’s attention, was in 1701, when it had
been decided to build a school house and the work being begun, a
lack of funds occurred which prevented continuing. To meet this
emergency it was agreed that the committee having charge of the
financial matters should “take up 100 pounds upon interest for one
year, giving bond jointly for the same and this meeting does engage
to indemnify them for the payment.”[248]

BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS

Various items on buildings and grounds occupy a [Sidenote: Place
considerable amount of attention on the part of the of first school]
monthly meeting though the minutes are usually of
[Sidenote: School
general nature. The place of Keith’s school (1689) in loft of the
was doubtless no more than an ordinary house meeting house]
procured for the use of his family and the school at
the same time.[249] This proved satisfactory only for a short time, and
to remedy Keith’s complaint (1690)[250] of its “straightness” another
more convenient room was arranged for by the committee with John
Fuller for the rent of £13 a year. The former had cost but ten.[251] It is
likely that the school continued to be held in the same house, others
similarly, for about seven years; there is, at any rate, no mention of
change of place or location for that period of time. At the end of that
time the meeting made preparation to receive the school into the
“inner chamber over the meeting house,” the expense of fitting it up
being paid out of the meeting’s stock.[252] It was in this school in the
loft of the meeting house that Daniel Pastorius and Thomas Makin
first taught the school together.[253] The meeting house served thus
as schoolhouse until early in the year 1698, when property was
purchased for the purpose, the meeting minute of the transaction
being as follows:
[Sidenote:
Whereas Friends have purchased an house Property
and lot of Lionell Brittain for the service of the purchased for the
public schools, according to that has already Public School]
been agreed to by this meeting, and the said purchase is
approved, and David Lloyd is desired to draw the writings for
confirmation of the same unto Edward Shippen until he be
secured the money, and then he to reconvey it again for the
use aforesaid.[254]

In 1701 we find the first record for building a [Sidenote: First

house for the sole use of the school, presumably record of house
built for school]
on the lot previously purchased by the meeting.[255]
Robert Burrough and Nathaniel Edgcomb were appointed to get the
subscription for the building and pay to Anthony Morris, who was to
agree with suitable workmen for the building.[256] The dimensions,
“20 feet wide by 60 feet long,” were, at first consideration, thought to
be satisfactory, but it was finally decided to build it 24 feet by 60 feet.
[257] The work was at first to be supported by subscriptions, but
before its completion it became necessary to issue bonds for the
amount of £100.[258]
The acquisition of property, this time by gift, [Sidenote:
continued. In 1701, Daniel Lloyd reported that a Property acquired
deed for the lot in High Street, given by Samuel by gift]
Carpenter to Friends for the use of the free school,
was signed to the said Samuel, and the meeting directed him to get
another drawn to the overseers of the school.[259] It might easily
appear that the new schoolhouse, just proposed, was to be built on
this lot and not that previously purchased of Lionell Brittain. After due
consideration it seems, however, that the greater weight is in favor of
its having been built on the Lionell tract. The minutes show that as
late as 2d month, 24th, 1708, the deed for the lot from Samuel
Carpenter to the meeting had not been drawn up.[260] But as was
previously mentioned, Anthony Morris had been told to engage
workmen (3d, 30th, 1701)[261] and the statement that £100 had to be
raised by bond to carry on the work (2nd month, 28th, 1701)[262]
would indicate that the work had actually been begun and was
perhaps well towards completion by the end of that year. It seems
quite impossible that any such building program would have been
carried on so long before the transfer of property was properly drawn
up and signed. The years 1704 and 1705 are busy with the details of
getting several pieces of property, purchased and received as gifts,
confirmed by the commissioners of property.[263] Late in 1705 it is
stated:
[Sidenote:
All is done, viz.: a patent for a front lot, a High Property
Street lot and twenty acres of liberty land and confirmed]
also a patent for a bank lot.... But this meeting
house, ground and schoolhouse ground, being only in the
name of Edward Shippen, in case of mortality, Friends think
there is a necessity for a speedy reconveying thereof to more
 hands and for the particular use intended ... desired that the
said Edward Shippen may convey them to Samuel Carpenter,
R. Hill and Anthony Morris, being the persons in whose name
the Patents are granted unto, adding the names of all the
overseers of the Free School in the part belonging to the said
school.[264]

Some light is thrown upon the interior [Sidenote:

arrangement of the school. In 1712 Thomas Griffith Heating facilities]
was ordered to pay Christer Thomason 12 for
[Sidenote: An iron
“making” a stove in the schoolhouse,[265] stove placed in
presumably an old fashioned brick stove, such as a the school]
few years later was condemned by William
Robbins as being “injurious to many of the scholars.”[266] Mr.
Robbins proposed that a “chimney might be erected,” and Samuel
Preston was appointed to have it done, if not inconvenient or
expensive. He reported that it would be a greater charge than
represented and would hardly answer the end proposed nearly so
satisfactorily as an iron stove, which he had thought necessary and
had accordingly had set up, to be removed however if the meeting
did not approve of his action.[267] The charge for the iron stove was
£7.[268] Such items as the foregoing were brought up in the monthly
meeting which appointed some one to attend to this or that detail; as
the schools grew these were left more in the hands of the school
committee or overseers, who reported occasionally thereon.
This tendency on the part of the meeting to turn [Sidenote:
over the details of management to the overseers Overseers
assume greater
came to a head about 1725,[269] when it was responsibility]
agreed by the meeting that all titles to the
schoolhouses and other property be conveyed the overseers of the
public schools and a minute be drawn up relating to such decision.
[270] In the month following, the minutes of the committee’s report
were made referring to the transfer:
[Sidenote: Titles
to property to be
 Anthony Morris, Ebenezer Sorge, Samuel transferred to the
Powell and Jones being appointed by the overseers]
Monthly Meeting of Philadelphia the 2-30-1725,
to meet with the overseers of the public school, do acquaint
them that the said meeting being concerned for the promotion
of the public school have unanimously agreed that the title of
the school house and ground with the lots, tenements ... now
in the tenure of Evan Owen and Thomas Cannon with all the
other titles of real estate and annuities appertaining to the
public school, be vested in the overseers thereof and desire
for the future distinct accounts may be kept of all legacies and
donations made to the said schools in order that the same
may be duly applied pursuant to the intentions of the donors
respectively.

Then follows a minute of the overseers stating their appreciation of

the meeting’s coöperation in the work of the school.
[Sidenote: An
The Monthly Meeting of Philadelphia account of funds
expressing the same kind inclination to to be made]
encourage that at first led them to erect the
public school and to procure the same to be established by
the proprietor’s charter, as it is now under the care of the
present overseers, having thought it necessary that an exact
account should be taken of all the benefactions intended by
the several donors for the use of the said school, the moneys
or effects whereof might have come under the direction of the
said meeting. In order thereunto appointed some friends to
adjust the said accounts with the overseers, which being
carefully done, it appears the meeting has received of such
benefactions as aforesaid for the use of the school the sum of
£226 ... and that they expended in the building the school
house which was begun, carried on and finished under their
care and direction the sum of £264 and 3d, whereby the
meeting is in disburse for the public schoolhouse, above what
they received in the sum of £37/15/3, which last sum or
 balance they were pleased freely to ... grant and release to
the said school, together with the lot belonging to it and all
those (equipages) and tenements now in the occupation of
Evan Owen and Thomas Cannon with their appurtenances
and all the rents, profits and issues thereof, and have
accordingly ordered the persons who are by legal deeds or
instruments vested with the right to the said tenements in trust
for the meeting to (grant) and absolutely convey the said
schoolhouse and ... with the lots and grounds on which they
stand and appurtenances to the overseers of the school, to be
held by them and their successors for the use of the public
school founded by charter in the town and county of
Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, forever.[271]

This transfer was at once acknowledged by the [Sidenote: Papers

overseers in a minute of the same date, and to be executed
Thomas Griffiths and John Goodson were desired conveying
properties]
the

to execute the proper papers conveying the

properties to the said overseers of the public schools, which was
accordingly done before the next meeting (4th month, 1725).[272]
By this time (1733) the old building erected in [Sidenote: New
1701 was badly in need of repairs, but on a closer building
examination it was decided more economical to proposed]

pull down the old and build a new one, more

convenient, on the north side of the school lot.[273]
The work was begun immediately, though a lack [Sidenote: and
of funds hindered its completion for some time.[274] begun]
The demand for an increase of building space [Sidenote: New
seems to have been regular and urgent, indicating meeting house
a healthy growth of the system. In 1740, when the built large to
consideration for a new meeting house came up, it contain
rooms]
school

was decided to build it large, “with chambers over it

commodious for school rooms.”[275] In 1744 the overseers, finding
the old school building inconvenient in divers respects, requested the
monthly meeting to name a committee to confer with them on a plan,
location and dimensions of a new building. Michael Lightfoot and
twelve others were named.[276] The committee decided to locate the
building on the south side of the lot devised by William Forest, the
dimensions to be about 60 feet by 35 feet in the clear and two stories
high, also a cellar under it, rising three feet above the surface of the
ground. This quite pretentious building was not to be finished entirely
at this time. The plan was to enclose all of it and finish the interior as
the size of the school demanded.[277]
For twelve years apparently no further building [Sidenote: New
projects were launched. Then the overseers school building
appealed to the meeting for permission to erect a requested
Fox lot]
on the
school on the middle of the lot left to them by
George Fox. This was agreed to by that assembly [Sidenote:
and a committee named to remove the present Tenement
buildings erected
incumbent of the lot who had not paid the rent for on lots as an
some years past.[278] Their next building was investment for the
begun, not for the purpose of a place of instruction, school]
but as investment: It was proposed to the monthly
assembly in 1760 that several houses be erected on the
schoolhouse lot fronting Chestnut Street, expenses defrayed out of
the treasury of the overseers, for the purpose of increasing the
yearly income of the property.[279] The suggestion was well received
and the liberty granted to erect one or more such houses.[280] In
1767 the accommodations for the Girls’ School, being unsatisfactory,
the overseers of the school requested permission to have the
chamber of the meeting house fitted up as a place for them, which
was taken under consideration by a committee of the meeting
appointed for that purpose.[281]
The Negro School, established 1770, was first [Sidenote:
housed in a building rented for that use,[282] in Building for negro
school requested
which it continued for nearly a year. The plans for a about 1771]
permanent school made a building for that purpose
desirable, and in 1771 the committee on education of the Negroes
requested that a house be built on the lot where the alms-houses
were situated, which was granted.[283] This house was occupied by
the school until charge of it was assumed by Anthony Benezet
(1782), who held the school in his own house.[284]
In the foregoing pages we have mentioned some [Sidenote:
of the facts of the establishment and development Restatement of
of the school in Philadelphia, with reference to (1) points considered]
founding, (2) support, (3) masters, (4) properties,
buildings and grounds. It is deemed advisable to omit from this
chapter any presentation of curriculum, excepting as that has been
mentioned at a few places, reserving such presentation to a chapter
comprising all the schools established in Pennsylvania. As a fitting
close to the previous discussion of the century’s development, we
present, almost entire, one of the reports returned by the committee
of the meeting, which in a fair way will tell the reader more about the
growth up to, and the status of the system in 1784, than will any
discussion. Portions of the report are discussed in other chapters.
[Sidenote: The
The schools under their direction and care report to the
within the limits of this meeting, are: monthly meeting
(1784) indicates
(1) One under the tuition of Robert Proud, by status of schools
on that date]
whom about 30 boys are instructed in the Latin
and Greek languages and some branches of
the mathematics; his salary is fixed at £250 per annum,
having an usher who is allowed £80 per annum, at the
expense of the estate under the care of the overseers. The
present £6 per annum for each scholar for which he accounts
to the said overseers and has for one year past received one
Guinea entrance to his own use and charges 5/ for fuel. We
had some conversation with him on the case necessary to
guard against the use of such books, whose contents have a
tendency to prepossess the youthful minds with sentiments
unfavorable to the Christian faith and the true spirit of the
gospel; which appears had his attention, having observed a
care therein agreeable to what the occasion requires. In this
school are read Barclay’s Apology in Latin and the Testament
in Latin and Greek. The overseers have enjoined the
attendance of the scholars who are chiefly members of our
own religious society, at our meeting on the fifth day of the
week, but it had not been sufficiently observed.
(2) One under the care of John Todd, in which are taught
reading, writing, the English Grammar, Arithmetic and some
other branches of the mathematics. It consists of 88 boys on
this list, for 83 of whom he has 20/ per quarter, 2/6 for pen
and ink, 5/ for fuel; on the entrance of each 15/ except where
the parents or guardians are not of ability to afford it, the other
5 being put to him by the school corporation, he teaches for
10/ per quarter. He remarked there are each day about 70
together. The master appears careful to observe good order
in his school and frequently attends our meeting on the 5th
day with his scholars. He also kept a night school in the winter
season consisting of 82 scholars.
(3) One by Isaac Weaver consisting of about 28 boys,
being limited to 10/ per quarter, 2/6 for pen and ink and 5/ a
year for fuel, he takes no entrance fee and teaches reading,
writing, and arithmetic, and is careful to keep good order in
the school, also frequently brings his scholars to the meeting
fifth day.
(4) William Brown teaches girls reading, writing and
arithmetic, language, 8 whole days at 30/ per quarter 14 in
mornings 15/ per quarter 13 in afternoon 15/ per quarter and
for some time has been in the practice of taking 7/6 entrance
fee, except for those placed with him by the school
corporation—he represents some difficulty in enforcing the
rules and regulations provided for the schools on account of
the greater number of his scholars children of persons not
professing with us.
(5) Sarah Lancaster has a school for young children of both
sexes consisting of about 64 scholars of whom:

35 attend whole days at 15/ per Q.

18 attend, sent by school corporation, 10/ per Q.
11 attend half days, also sent by them, 7/6 per Q.
 Also pay for fuel. She teaches both sexes to spell and read
and the girls to sew and appears to have an orderly school.
In all the foregoing schools, which are under the direction of
the school corporation, 41 poor children are taught at their
expense. We also visited the following schools, the masters
and mistresses of which are either members or make
profession with our religious society, but are not immediately
under the care of the board. (I give here only a digest of their
report).
(1) Mary Harry.

School in Charters Alley; 15-16 children at 15/ per Q.

Income is about 40 pounds per year.
Not a Friend but attends our meetings.

(2) Joseph Clarke.

School in Fifth St.; about 30 girls.

Curriculum—reading, writing and arithmetic.
For 25 he receives 30/ per Q. and others gratis.

(3) Mrs. Clarke (wife) and Joseph Clarke.

Same house; 15-16 boys reading; and the girls, sewing

at 15/ per Q. each; they try to attend our fifth day
meetings.

(4) Anna Marsh.

50 (approximately) girls and boys.

Taught reading, and the girls, needlework; 20/ per Q.
Each has a right of membership with Friends.

(5) Mary McDonnell.

 15 young children at 15/ per Q.

In the most of the schools there are nearly one-half if not

more of the children of the people of the societies and we
wish Friends children may not be too frequently excluded for
want of room, evident inconvenience being very observable in
the present mixed state of schools, it is much to be desired
that a more select mode of education could be effectually
promoted; in the meantime it would be well that master be not
too lax in the observance of the rules.[285]

The other item of very great interest, though not [Sidenote:

in reality immediately connected with the schools in Boarding school
Philadelphia, concerns the establishment of a encouraged
Owen Biddle]
by
boarding school, which was to be founded and
planned after one of the oldest and largest schools [Sidenote:
of the society, the great Ackworth School in Approved by
quarterly and
England.[286] The project was greatly encouraged yearly meetings]
by Owen Biddle, who (6th month, 10th, 1790)
published a pamphlet of 52 pages in which the plea [Sidenote: Rules
drawn up therefor]
for such a school was elaborated.[287] A committee
was appointed to confer with him, and reported they wished to
present their wishes also to the other monthly meetings of the city,
[288] and they concurring, to present the wishes of the monthly

meetings to the quarterly and so on to the yearly meeting.[289] The

report, when presented to the other two monthly meetings, met with
favor,[290] and it was accordingly agreed (1792) to bring the matter
before the quarterly meeting.[291] The approval of the quarterly and
yearly meetings[292] in the time immediately ensuing resulted in the
plans being set on foot for a subscription of £5000 and which was
made open to all members of the yearly meeting in whatsoever
quarter; the amount of these, in 1797, was £247/10.[293] The school
established at Westtown on the tract of land purchased by the yearly
meeting, was opened in 1800,[294] with Richard Hartshorne as the
first superintendent.[295] Rules and regulations for its conduct had
been drawn up by a committee appointed by the yearly meeting in
1794.[296]

OTHER SCHOOLS IN PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

The date of the first school in Byberry has not [Sidenote: First
been definitely determined, though it can surely be school probably
placed at a very early period in its history, as early as early as 1710
or 1711]
as 1710 or 1711. Richard Brockden, who later
taught school in Philadelphia,[297] was a teacher in the school at
Byberry, for a minute of Abington monthly meeting states in the 4th
month of the later year that “At this meeting Richard Brockden, late
schoolmaster at Byberry, had a certificate granted him in order to go
to England.”[298]
This would indicate that the said Richard had [Sidenote:
been teaching at Byberry, and it is quite probable Greater activity
that he had, but it is not conclusive evidence that near middle of
century]
he did so. About the middle of the eighteenth
century the Byberry Meeting became very active in schooling the
children of poor Friends. This movement, it seems from all records
found, was due in large measure to an apportionment received from
a legacy left by William Carter to the charge of Abington Meeting, for
the schooling of the children of Friends in poverty.[299] In 1755, it
was:

... agreed that Horsham, Germantown, Byberry meetings shall

have 40 shillings each for the ensuing year, and Oxford
twenty shillings, Abington three pounds for the same time, (of
the annuity left by William Carter) in order that the same may
be employed in paying for the schooling of such children as
the said meetings may think proper objects thereof if they find
any, and the Friends of the said meeting are desired to see
that the same be well applied and that the children who
partake of the benefit thereof do go regularly to school.[300]
 The money thus devised to the meeting was in [Sidenote:
the care of the committee appointed by the same, Donations under
whose duty it was to receive requests and to care of trustees,
used for schooling
investigate all cases where help was requested or poor]
found to be necessary. The accounts of the said
committee were audited at a period when necessary by Friends
appointed especially for that purpose.[301] This form of philanthropy
became very popular here, as in other meetings, almost every
meeting bearing forward a new record of it. In 1758 James
Thorntown and Giles Knight reported that they had received of
James Paul (treasurer of Abington Monthly Meeting) the sum of £6,
part of the donation left for the poor children’s schooling, and had
applied £2/5 of the same to that use, leaving a remainder of £3/15 in
the hands of Knight.[302] In 1770 the records run in this manner:

It appears that Phillip Wells stands in need of some of the

moneys that were given to the use of schooling poor Friends
children; Thomas Townsend is therefore ordered to pay forty
shillings of the money in his hands.[303]

Though very few references are made throughout the early period
of the schools, it is quite certain from the nature of these reports on
education of the poor that the schools were continued regularly.
When the yearly meeting began to demand reports on the condition
of the schools, there was no stir about the matter whatever, the first
report being that those who have our school under care “report that it
is in good order.”[304] The requests coming into the preparative
meeting for information on schools, were referred to the standing
school committee.[305]
The standing committee performed all duties in [Sidenote: Case
connection with the school, with the exception of of schools under
certain cases of difficulty, where it was necessary standing
committee]
to call on the meeting for assistance, at which time
that body coöperated with them through specially appointed
committees.[306] The Byberry Preparative Meeting was, of course,
not independent in this matter of school organization; their place was
very much in accord with that suggested by a committee report to
the various preparative meetings in 1790:
[Sidenote:
We of the committee appointed to attend the General plan for
preparative meetings with the extracts in order encouragement of
to spread the concern of our last yearly better schools]
meeting, have attended to the appointment and taken into
due consideration that part of them relating to schools, and
being desirous to adopt it in so far as our present
circumstances will admit, and in order to encourage any
charitably disposed persons who may incline in their last will
and testament or otherwise to give or bequeath something
towards so laudable a purpose as to raise a certain fixed
union for the support of schools, it is our desire that it may be
safely counted to the care of the preparative meetings, he or
she appointing, if they see fit, their own trustees and that
Friends earnestly endeavor to provide for the schoolmasters a
house lot, ground, etc., either purchasing or renting,
whenever it may be necessary, and that our minds being
deeply impressed with a sense that a guarded religious
education of the rising youth is a matter of great importance it
is our sense of judgment that Friends within the compass of
this meeting should be pressingly urged to consider the
necessity of employing conscientious and pious persons as
schoolmasters, being members of a religious society and that
the preparative meeting continue to appoint committees from
time to time as occasion may require to have the care and
oversight of such schools and that they visit the respective
schools at least once in six weeks to see that good order be
observed, and for the encouragement of the children in their
learning, and render an account thereof to the preparative
meeting once in six months. Signed the 28th of the 4th month,
1790.
By Samuel Gummere, Silas Walmsley, Thos.
Walmsley,
 John Townsend and Naylor Webster.[307]

In the month following the reception of these suggestions from the

monthly meeting’s committee, the Byberry school trustees made the
following report on the conditions of the schools, and the nature of
their own activities.
[Sidenote:
We, the trustees appointed by the meeting to Byberry report on
have the care of the schools under the direction schools]
of the meeting, do inform, agreeable to our
trust, we have several times met within the year past at the
school in order to encourage the children in their learning,
also to see that good order be kept by the master and
children and we believe this a good measure complied with,
and we further inform, that we have endeavored to comply
with the intentions of the donor, by distributing the donations
of William Carter, by schooling such children as we
apprehended proper objects and have engaged as many as
to take most of the money now in hand. (Clerk asked to give
the committee a copy of the monthly meetings extracts that
they comply with the regulations concerning schools.)[308]

The gist of their report six months thereafter is as [Sidenote:

follows:[309] Summary of a
later report]
1. The trustees have met several times at the
school in the last six months.
2. Afternoons are usually spent hearing the scholars read and in
examining their learning.
3. The masters keep strictly the rules, which the trustees have laid
down.
4. We believe the school is kept in good order.
In 1792 it was considered necessary to enlarge [Sidenote: School
the schoolhouse to make adequate facilities for the house to be
enlarged]
increasing number of children. The committee
appointed on the subject decided there should be an addition of ten
feet for the length; their suggestion was approved and a subscription
begun to carry forward the work as speedily as could be done.[310]
Thomas Walmsley was appointed to have oversight of the work.[311]
The status of the school at the end of the century is stated in the
report to Horsham Monthly Meeting, as follows:
[Sidenote:
We have one school under the care of the School’s status at
meeting, to which our members send their end of century]
children, except some Friends who live remote.
It is supported by subscription; the tutor is a Friend and we
believe endeavors to discharge the important trust committed
to him. The children of such as are in straightened
circumstances are schooled by donations left for that purpose
—A committee appointed by the meeting frequently visits the
said school and reports the state thereof.[312]

GERMANTOWN
It has already been mentioned that Francis [Sidenote:
Daniel Pastorius taught in the Friends School at Pastorius in
Philadelphia during the period from 1697 to 1700. Philadelphia]
[313] While in the school at Philadelphia it appears
that he left his residence at Germantown vacant and took up his
abode in the city. The following letter, written by his children, to their
grandfather in Windsheim, indicates their longing for their “own
home” at Germantown and the tedium of their school days in the
Philadelphia school.

Wir Wünschen gar offt bey dir zu seyn / ach dass du hier
wärest und in unserm Hause zu Germanton Wohntest /
welches einen schönen Obsgarten hat / und der Zeit leer
stehet / indeme wir zu Philadelphia wohnen / und täglich 8
Stunden lang in die Schul gehen müssen / ausgenommen
 den letzen Tag in der Wochen / da wir Nachmittag daheim
bleiben dörffen.[314]

The school at Germantown was opened on [Sidenote: Early

January 11, 1702, though Dr. Seidensticker thinks school at
that this must have been preceded for some time Germantown]

by an evening school.[315]
The first overseers chosen were Aret Klincken, [Sidenote:
Peter Schumacher, and Paul Wulff.[316] Those who Contributors]
contributed voluntarily to the school were: Anton
Loof, Peter Schumacher, Paul Wulff, Jacob Delaplaine, Jonas Potts,
Isaak Schumacher, Walter Simons, Levin Herberdink, Johann
Bleikers, Dirck Jansen ... Johannas Umstett, Heifert Papen, Jan
Lensen, Peter Bon, Hermann Bon, Dirck Keyser, Claus Tamson,
Gerhard Ruttinghusen (and two others whose names can not be
deciphered).[317]
The patrons of the school for the first year were: [Sidenote:
Aret Klincken, Reinert Tysen, Tünes Künders, Patrons of the
Wilhelm Strepers, Paul Kästner, Reinier Hermans, school]
Abraham op de Graeff, Christian Warmer, Arnold
van Vossen, Johann Cunrad Codweiss, Cornelis Sivert, Aret Küster,
Jan Doeden and Lanert Arets.[318]
The school admitted both boys and girls for [Sidenote: Tuition]
instruction. The amounts paid by voluntary
contributors varied from 2/ to 15/ per year, while the [Sidenote:
Evening school]
tuition charged was from 4d. to 6d. per week.[319]
The evening school was intended for those who were forced to work
during the day time, or for others who, because of their age, could
not enter the regular day school.[320] Among the patrons from 1706-
1708 there are to be found a great number of English names,[321]
which may no doubt indicate that the school under the German
master was recognized by English inhabitants to be of very high
standard. His experience in Philadelphia would speak for that.
 Some question has been raised as to whether [Sidenote: The
Pastorius taught the school in the English or the school probably
German tongue. Though in his manuscript it is taught in English]
found that he did use somewhat broken English,
[322] we know that he taught the English school at Philadelphia,

where most of the children were English.[323] The majority of his

pupils at Germantown were, of course, German,[324] and doubtless
German was spoken between them, and the teacher at times. The
fact, however, that the titles of Pastorius’ school books were written
in English, is pointed out by Seidensticker as an indication that the
language of the province was given preference in the school.[325] It
is also to be noted that the General Court had in 1696 ordered that
the minutes of the Ratsbuch be transcribed into English, lending
further evidence to the idea that the importance of the official
language was recognized.[326] The length of continuation of the
Friends’ school at Germantown is not known, though it seems likely
that Pastorius may have continued in its service till the time of his
death, or at least until 1718.[327]

SCHOOLS AT EXETER MONTHLY MEETING

Exeter Monthly Meeting, established 1737, being [Sidenote: Youths
set off from Gwynedd Monthly,[328] did not have meetings
established 1758]
any schools under their jurisdiction at a very early
date. The first indication that the subject of education was being
seriously considered was about 1758 when youths’ meetings were
established, two each year, one at Exeter and the other at Maiden
Creek.[329] These youths’ meetings, sanctioned by the quarterly
meeting,[330] and another at Robeson several years later,[331] were
the first steps taken for education of youth, and controlled by the
meeting. It is true, there was a school (day school) even at this time
situated near Samuel Lea’s, as we learn from a chance reference,
[332] but though it was attended by Friends children in part, it was
neither controlled by them, nor under the monthly meeting. This
condition lasted until the recommendations of the yearly meeting of
1777 and 1778 caused the monthly meeting to look into the
educational situation.
In accord with the recommendations concerning [Sidenote:
“the proper education of youth” published in these Committee
years, and sent out, the meeting at Exeter appointed schools]
on
appointed Samuel Hughes, Abel Thomas,
Benjamin Pearson, Mordecai Lee, James Thomas [Sidenote: A new
and John Scarlet to take the question under their committee to visit
the preparatives]
consideration.[333] For two years and a half the
substance of the reports of the above named committee and its
successors, was to the effect that not much had been accomplished.
[334] In 1781 the committee reported they had visited the preparative
meetings (two of them), and recommended to them the careful
consideration of the youths’ education, under good moral tutors.[335]
A year later, the committee was released, having, according to
reports, accomplished nothing.[336] Those delegates who attended
the quarterly meeting in 1783, brought back new advices, and were
directed to furnish each preparative meeting with a copy and request
a report on school conditions among them; at the following monthly
assembly more of the preparatives were ready to report.[337]
Despairing of any report, unless of their own making, the monthly
meeting appointed a committee of nine men to visit all the
preparatives and report what they thought of their schools.[338] They
produced the following statement.
[Sidenote: Report
Most of the committee appointed two months of the committee]
ago to take into consideration and report the
state of schools have given attention to the [Sidenote: No
school of Exeter
service; and divers of us have attended each of Preparative]
the preparative meetings belonging to this
meeting and after a time of conference thereon, [Sidenote: A
school at Maiden
’tis agreed to report, there is no school within Creek]
the village of Exeter Preparative Meeting under
the care of Friends; But we are of the mind that [Sidenote: School
it is necessary that one be established there; at Reading]