The Political Economy of Intra-BRICS

Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects

Siphamandla Zondi
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The Political Economy of
Intra-BRICS Cooperation
Challenges and Prospects

Edited by Siphamandla Zondi

 International Political Economy Series

Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw , University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, MA,
USA;
Emeritus Professor, University of London, London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades.
It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on
indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable
resource for scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capi-
talisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies
and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities
as the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ‘the rest’, especially
the BRICS, rise.
NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!

More information about this series at

https://link.springer.com/bookseries/13996
 Siphamandla Zondi
Editor

The Political
Economy
of Intra-BRICS
Cooperation
Challenges and Prospects
Editor
Siphamandla Zondi
Institute for Pan-African Thought
and Conversation
University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-030-97396-4 ISBN 978-3-030-97397-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1

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 Preface

The book arises from a conversation among members of the South African
delegation to the BRICS Academic Forum in Brasilia, Brazil, in 2019.
The conversation was the question of the extent to which intra-BRICS
could be deepened and consolidated to make sure that BRICS is institu-
tionalised. We then agreed that this was a theme running through all our
presentations that needed to be published to stimulate broader discus-
sion in the world. As a leader of the delegation, I agreed to coordinate
the publication and take on the responsibility of an editor. We had a six-
month process in mind, but it was not realistic. It took almost a year to
have the manuscript in a shape that would be worth publishing.
The book is about possibilities and challenges related to deepening
intra-BRICS cooperation. It is inspired by the fact that work on ensuring
that BRICS had a strong international outlook, and a presence has gath-
ered momentum in 11 years of its existence. The agency of BRICS
in international affairs, often associated with such developments as soft
balancing, a search for alternative world order, a challenge to the global
power asymmetry or reinforcement of this asymmetry, a challenge to
imperialism or a platform for sub-imperialism, and its voice and positions
on global issues is receiving consistent attention.
We also realised that work on how each individual BRICS member
state was fitting in this maze or puzzle was ongoing. Perhaps, questions
about the leading (sometimes called the dominant) role of China and
Russia as major global powers have featured prominently in discussions

v
vi PREFACE

on BRICS, especially in the West where the BRICS is sometimes seen as

a mere extension of Russia and China. The positions of regional powers
like Brazil and South Africa have been analysed often based on the extent
to which they advance regional or parochial national interests. The agency
of India with BRICS has also been discussed and continues to be reflected
upon especially in relation to idea-making and innovation.
What seemed to be inadequately discussed in our view was the extent
to which cooperation among BRICS countries in terms of convergence
of interests or the wish to consolidate cohesion internally. This book
is an attempt to tackle this subject. A single book made up of chap-
ters contributed by specialists in various sectoral and thematic issues
related to this intra-BRICS cooperation issues, covering political, secu-
rity, economic, developmental, and social issues is a modest attempt to
instigate debate and more publications assessing ways in which BRICS is
growing not only in terms of its external agency in world affairs but also
in relation to functional and strategic cooperation internally.
There are many gaps that remain uncovered such as the role of internal
institutions, the utility of internal forums like sectoral meetings, poverty-
fighting efforts, health cooperation (in the context of Covid-19), the role
of chairs of BRICS in deepening cohesion, coordination of UN missions,
BRICS and knowledge management, and many other subjects that justify
a second volume of this book being conceptualised.
Work of this nature would not have been possible without financial
and logistical support from the National Institute for Humanities and
Social Sciences that supports my chairpersonship of the South African
BRICS Think Tank and the University of Johannesburg’s Strategic Initia-
tives & Administration that supports the UJ BRICS Studies Project. This
project would have not been a success without the assistance of Dr Odilile
Ayodele, Mr Sphumelele Duma, and Dr Tinuade Ojo at UJ and excellent
logistical help by Auriel Niemack and Senkhu Maimane at the NIHSS.
Several scholars commented critically on draft chapters in the process
of putting together this manuscript in 2020 and 2021. The team at
 PREFACE vii

Palgrave Macmillan led by Professor Timothy Shaw was excellent in their

guidance and support. However, all errors are mine.

Auckland Park, South Africa Siphamandla Zondi

October 2021 Former Chairperson of SA BRICS
Think Tank and UJ BRICS
Studies Project
 Contents

1 Towards Deeper Intra-BRICS Cooperation:

An Argument 1
Siphamandla Zondi, Odilile Ayodele,
and Siphumelele Duma
2 The BRICS Development Bank and Challenges
for development financing in BRICS—Issues
for Consideration 17
Modimowabarwa Kanyane
3 BRICS, Structural Power and the BRICS Bank
as a Potentially Progressive Instrument for a Passive
Revolution 39
John Mikatekiso Nelson Kubayi
4 Out of the Regime Complex: Practical Options
for Enhancing Cooperation in Climate Change
and New Frontiers in BRICS 61
Thulisile Ncamsile Mphambukeli
and Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie
5 Opportunities and Options for Energy Cooperation
Among BRICS Countries 79
Thokozani Simelane and Jurgen Knop

ix
x CONTENTS

6 BRICS Cooperation in Fighting Transnational Crimes 99

Nirmala Gopal
7 BRICS Countries’ Competitiveness in the 4IR:
Findings from Three World Economic Forum
Indicators 115
Bhaso Ndzendze
8 No One Left Behind: The Implications of the 4th
Industrial Revolution on the Developmental Agenda
of the BRICS Countries 137
Peliwe Lolwana
9 Tangible Economic Cooperation for South Africa
and the BRICS: Taking Stock and Looking Forward 155
Cyril Prinsloo
10 Financial Inclusion and Women Empowerment
in BRICS Countries: Perspectives on India and South
Africa 175
Tinuade Adekunbi Ojo
11 COVID-19 and the Counter-Cyclical Responses
of the BRICS Countries 205
Isaac Bheki Khambule
12 South Africa’s Vaccine Production Potential: Towards
an Intra-BRICS Vaccine Production Framework 231
Palesa Sekhejane and Vuyo Mjimba
13 Towards an Intra-BRICS Implementation
and Accountability Framework on Sustainable
Development Goals 251
Siphamandla Zondi

Index 273
 Notes on Contributors

Odilile Ayodele is a Senior Research Associate affiliated with the Depart-

ment of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannes-
burg. She was previously a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University
of Johannesburg’s South African Research Chair for African Diplomacy
and Foreign Policy. She is currently the convenor of the International
Relations and Diplomacy Research Committee for the South African
Association of Political Studies (SAAPS). Her research centres on South
Africa’s foreign policy, the digital component of subnational diplomacy,
and the international relations of technology. She recently co-edited
a special journal issue, “Digital Diplomacy in Africa”, for the South
African Journal of International Affairs. She is writing a book that looks
at the relationship between the African expansion of mobile telephony
companies and South Africa’s foreign economic policy.
Siphumelele Duma is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Pan-
African Thought and Conversation. His Ph.D. thesis with the Depart-
ment of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria investigated the
impact of developmental integration and the industrialisation process on
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He holds a
Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Pretoria,
which looked at Regional Integration and Challenges of Intra-regional
Trade within SADC. His research interests include regional integration;
south-south cooperation; north-south relations; diplomacy; and climate
change.

xi
xii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Nirmala Gopal is a member of the SABTT and a Professor in Crim-

inology at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban. Her combined
aggregate of 34 years of teaching between basic and higher educa-
tion. Her teaching and learning passion facilitates her current position
as a criminology professor. An NRF rated researcher, she enjoys scien-
tific writing and publishing. Her repertoire (in excess of 50 articles) of
research publications conforms to the DHET accredited list. Hence, she
ensures her work is published in nationally and internationally reputable
journals. She strongly commits herself to lifelong learning. Her most
recent research niche areas are peace and security including cybersecurity.
In addition, her frequent invitations to review national and international
journal articles, NRF rating applications and Ph.D. proposals have helped
shape her research trajectory. Thus, she is supervising a large cohort of
Masters and Ph.D. students. She is passionate about various facets of
transformation and is a keen researcher in the 4IR space.
Modimowabarwa Kanyane is the Executive Dean: Faculty of Manage-
ment, Commerce and Law at the University of Venda and former
Research Director at the Human Sciences Research Council. He is a
member of the SABTT and Chair of the BRICS Political and Economic
Governance Research Cluster. His research interests include public ethics,
accountability and public service delivery, local government, and inter-
governmental relations within the broader field of public administration,
management and development. He has published over 100 scientific
outputs, including client reports, books, book chapters and peer-reviewed
journal articles. He recently co-edited with Mzo Sirayi and Giulio Verdini
a book on Culture and Rural-Urban Revitalization in South Africa for
Routledge: London; and co-authored with VT Sambo (2021) on State-
Owned Enterprises’ Governance in BRICS Countries in the Politikon
journal.
Isaac Bheki Khambule is a Senior Lecturer and Academic Coordinator
at the School of Built Environment and Development Studies, University
of KwaZulu-Natal. He teaches political economy and economic develop-
ment and specialises on the state, institutions and development, with a
particular focus on the role of the state in economic development. His
recent publications focus on developmental states, the political economy
of COVID-19, democratic development, South African politics, BRICS,
and global governance. He is currently working on a DST-NRF-funded
project on the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 in South Africa. He
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xiii

recently authored a paper on COVID-19 and the counter-cyclical role of

the state in South Africa, published in Progress in Development Studies.
Jurgen Knop studied Electrical Engineering in Germany and has worked
most of his professional life in creating energy and recycling solutions.
Starting in the mid-eighties, in Texas, USA, he led a team that created
a project, which economically converted hazardous oilfield brine water
into clean potable water, whereby valuable minerals such as lithium were
recovered. Other innovative solutions that followed until 2010, which he
and his team developed, include the development of the first utility size
photo voltaic (PV) solar power plants. Between 2010 and 2012, he and
his team developed and partly installed over 400 PV projects, among them
is the largest PV plant in Europe and the world’s first biggest PV plant
in Libya. Since 2015, he and his team have been working on a solution
solve plastic waste pollution and the reduction of greenhouse gases.
John Mikatekiso Nelson Kubayi is a Researcher at the Institute for
Global Dialogue associated with UNISA (IGD). His current Ph.D. study
at the University of Johannesburg is on the New Development Bank and
structural power. He previously worked as Political Advisor in the Speak-
er’s Office under Hon Max Sisulu (Speaker of the National Assembly
RSA for six years). His research interests include power, global political
economy (global financial architecture), African political economy, and
BRICS. He holds a Master’s degree in Global Political Economy from
the University of Sussex (UK), and he is currently focusing on matters
of BRICS and global finance. He is a member of the South African
Association of Political Studies (SAAPS).
Peliwe Lolwana is retired and has been a Visiting Associate Professor,
past director, and founder of the Centre for Researching Education and
Labour (REAL), University of Witwatersrand. She chaired the SAQA
board and was the chair of the QCTO for the past 10 years. She has
established and managed several educational institutions. Currently, she is
a senior advising consultant with Youth Employment Services (YES) and
a member of the SA BRICS Think Tank. She has been and continues to
chair and participate in various commissions, committees, and task teams
in the entire education and training system. She writes on: youth unem-
ployment; skills development; informality; adult education; ICTs in skills
development; inequalities; and post-school education. She studied at the
former University of Transkei and University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

USA. She considers herself a “pedestrian academic” or an “academic

activist” than a decadent researcher.
Vuyo Mjimba is Chief Research Specialist at the Africa Institute of South
Africa in the Human Sciences Research Council. He is a development,
policy, and practice scholar with an interest in sustainable development.
His focus is on sustainable industrialisation, global value chains, policy
analysis, and climate change where he has worked in and with trans, inter,
and multidisciplinary research and teams.
Thulisile Ncamsile Mphambukeli is a National Research Foundation
(NRF)-rated international scholar and an Associate Professor in the
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Engineering &
Built Environment, the University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg. She
was previously with the Department of Urban and Regional Planning,
University of the Free State (UFS). She is a co-editor of the Journal of
BRICS Studies, a Review Editor, and a Topic Editor for Governance and
Cities for the Frontiers in Sustainable Cities Journal. She is a member
of the South African BRICS Think Tank. Her research interests include
social justice in planning, climate change, and agriculture; coloniality and
informality; human security and humanitarian response; integrated trans-
port planning and spatialisation of blackness; and urban anthropology.
She recently published on financing regenerative agricultural practices,
planning for sustainable quality infrastructure, applied systems analysis;
and apartheid.
Bhaso Ndzendze is Head of Department at the University of Johannes-
burg Department of Politics and International Relations. His work studies
Africa’s international trade, technology, and democratisation as well as the
varied determinants and outcomes of their interactions. His most recent
books include The BRICS Order: Assertive or Complementing the West?
(Palgrave Macmillan) and AI and Emerging Technologies in International
Relations (World Scientific Press).
Tinuade Adekunbi Ojo is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Insti-
tute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation at the University of
Johannesburg. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Univer-
sity of Pretoria. As a feminist political economist, her work explores the
gendered dimension of trade, financial inclusion, digital transformation in
policy, politics and digitalisation, international political economy, gender
inequality, and poverty reduction strategies. She has published a wide
 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

range of works on gender and development policy, the IMF’s external

relations with Africa, BRICS, Southern Africa, and West Africa, focusing
on the political economy of trade and aid. She currently acts as an Editor
and Research Associate for BRICS Studies Project.
Victor Ogbonnaya Okorie holds a joint Ph.D. in Development
and Anthropology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA.
Presently, he works for the Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria. He
was recently a fellow at the World Academy of Sciences, Italy; the Brown
International Advanced Research Institutes, Brown University, USA; and
the International Social Science Council, France. He was a laureate of
the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
(CODESRIA). He is an alumnus of the African Peacebuilding Network
in the Social Science Research Council, USA. He is presently a fellow
of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, USA, with research inter-
ests on greening Africa’s food system in the age of varnishing territories
and climate change. He recently published green economy-oriented agro-
nomic practices; impacts of COVID-19 regime on food systems: Whither
BRICS now and beyond? Youths’ violent resistance to the necropo-
litical landscape of COVID-19 in Nigeria’s vanishing foodscapes and
waterscapes.
Cyril Prinsloo is a Senior Researcher at the South African Institute
of International Affairs (SAIIA). His key research portfolios include
infrastructure finance and development in African countries and Africa’s
economic engagement with strategic global partners (US, EU, China,
BRICS). Previously, he worked as an economic development consultant,
providing technical assistance and capacity building support on trade
and investment, regional integration and infrastructure development to
various international development partners, governments and Regional
Economic Communities across Southern Africa. He holds an MA in
International Studies from the University of Stellenbosch.
Palesa Sekhejane is a Medical Technologist specialising in biophotonics,
applying light-based (laser) medicine to a biological system with special
focus on molecular signalling and immunology. Sekhejane is currently a
Strategic Partnerships’ Director at the Human Sciences Research Council.
Her research interests are in bioeconomy policy, biosciences, biomed-
ical innovation, and technology. She was part of the scientific committee
and organising committee of the first Gender Summit Africa in 2015.
xvi NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

She was also a member of the woman and gender cluster of the African
Union’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). She is a
Research Associate to the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Johan-
nesburg. She is also a member of the Organisation for Women in Sciences
Development (OWSD), which champions and addresses the obstacles
faced by women in developing countries. She is the co-founder and the
co-chairperson of the UJ-led maiden International Conference on Food
Security and Safety. She was recently nominated through a competitive
process to participate at the BRICS Young Scientist’s Forum in Brazil
(2019), as one of the bioeconomy scientists. She also forms part of
the UNESCO L’Oréal sub-Saharan team for Women in Sciences. She
recently published on mycotoxin of contamination of maize and other
grains and gender dynamics in school mathematics achievements.
Thokozani Simelane is a Research Director at the Africa Institute of
South Africa. He is a resource person for the South African BRICS
think tank and has been a member of South Africa’s Standing Advi-
sory Committee on intellectual property rights. His speciality areas
are intellectual property management, systems science and system
dynamics modelling, sustainable development, biodiversity management
and science diplomacy. His recent publications are on Belt and Road
Initiative as an alternative development for Africa; poverty alleviation
pathways and sustainable development goals in Africa; system dynamics
models for Africa’s development planning; mathematical models showing
how socio-economic dynamics in African cities could widen or reduce
inequality; and analyses of mathematical models for city population
dynamics under heterogeneity.
Siphamandla Zondi leads the BRICS Studies Project at the University
of Johannesburg’s Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation.
He is the chairperson of the South African BRICS Think Tank. His areas
of research interest relate to ways of decolonising political thought and
practice in such settings as the national question, global south studies, and
Africa in the world. His recent publications include student protests and
the university; constraints of Marxism for African revolutions; Cabralian
theses on politics; monologue of liberal democracy; and African voices
that recenter Africa. He is a member of the Africa Decolonial Research
Network (ADERN).
 List of Figures

Fig. 5.1 Areas of possible collaboration among BRICS to enhance

technology transfer (Source Author’s compilation) 86
Fig. 7.1 WEF global competitiveness index framework (Source
Adapted from World Economic Forum 2014–2015
Report [see Schwab, 2014: 9]) 122
Fig. 7.2 Availability of latest technologies (Source Data from WEF
Global Competitiveness Reports, 2011–2017. Chart
by author) 124
Fig. 7.3 Capacity for innovation (Source Data from WEF Global
Competitiveness Reports, 2011–2017. Chart by author) 124
Fig. 7.4 Government procurement of advanced technological
products (Source Data from WEF Global Competitiveness
Reports, 2011–2017. Chart by author) 125
Fig. 7.5 Brazil (Source Compiled by Author) 126
Fig. 7.6 Russia (Source Compiled by Author 127
Fig. 7.7 India (Source Compiled by author) 127
Fig. 7.8 China (Source Compiled by author) 128
Fig. 7.9 South Africa (Source Compiled by author) 129
Fig. 7.10 New patent applications in BRICS countries (Source
Compiled by author) 130
Fig. 7.11 BRICS’ comparative GDP per capita growth, 2008–2018
(Source World Bank, ‘GDP per capita growth rate’
[2019]. Calculations by author) 132

xvii
xviii LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 9.1 South Africa’s total trade with select partners

(% of total trade) (Source Based on own calculations,
ITC TradeMap. 2020. Trade Database. Available at:
www.trademap.org [accessed 18 March 2020]) 157
Fig. 9.2 Direct investment in South Africa by country, share
of total (Source Based on own calculations. South African
Reserve Bank. SARB Database Query [accessed 20
February 2020]) 160
Fig. 9.3 South Africa’s total trade with the BRICs ($ billions)
(Source Based on own calculations. ITC TradeMap. 2020.
Trade Database. Available at: www.trademap.org
[accessed 18 March 2020]) 160
Fig. 9.4 South Africa’s Top 10 exports to BRICs, 2019 (Source
Based on own calculations. ITC TradeMap. 2020. Trade
Database. Available at: www.trademap.org [accessed 18
March 2020]) 161
Fig. 9.5 South Africa’s Top 10 imports from BRICs, 2019 (Source
Based on own calculations. ITC TradeMap. 2020. Trade
Database. Available at: www.trademap.org [accessed 18
March 2020]) 161
Fig. 9.6 South Africa-BRICS trade and investment (Source
Based on own calculations. South African Reserve
Bank Database Query [accessed 20 February 2020];
and ITC TradeMap. 2020. Trade Database. Available at:
www.trademap.org [accessed 18 March 2020]) 163
Fig. 9.7 NDB loan approvals by country and sector (as of March
2020) (Source New Development Bank. 2020. Investor
Presentation. Available at: https://www.ndb.int/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/General-IP-202031.pdf
[accessed 23 March 2020]) 171
Fig. 10.1 Percentage of BRICS account owners 185
Fig. 10.2 India financial inclusion approaches 195
Fig. 12.1 Key stages in the manufacture of vaccines (Source United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation [UNIDO]
White Paper [2017]) 235
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 Country DFIs in partnership with the NDB 54

Table 5.1 BRICS association to Lu De-Mings theory
of development relativity 87
Table 5.2 BRICS research and development investment
as a proportion of GDP 89
Table 6.1 Chronology of BRICS Summit Declarations
and Resolutions 106
Table 7.1 Net inflows of FDI into BRICS countries, 2008–2018
(in billions of US$) 126
Table 8.1 Literacy and secondary schooling in the BRICS 142
Table 8.2 Employment trends in BRICS countries, 2017 146
Table 8.3 The DII and IDI rankings in BRICS countries 148
Table 9.1 Solar and wind value chains in BRICS 166
Table 10.1 BRICS compounded annual growth rate for adult
account owners 185
Table 10.2 Gender account ownership 188
Table 10.3 Savings at financial institutions in BRICS economies 188
Table 10.4 Unemployment by race and gender 189
Table 11.1 BRICS COVID-19 statistics 208
Table 11.2 Counter-cyclical policies adopted by BRICS countries 215
Table 12.1 Some descriptions and definitions of human capital 236
Table 12.2 A comparison of distribution of public university
and TVET college attendance is selected fields
of education in South Africa, 2016 241

xix
 CHAPTER 1

Towards Deeper Intra-BRICS Cooperation:

An Argument

Siphamandla Zondi, Odilile Ayodele, and Siphumelele Duma

Introduction
The BRICS marks two auspicious anniversaries in 2021, the 20th anniver-
sary of the coining of the ‘BRICs’ acronym and the 15th anniversary of
the ‘BRICS’. In this period, the group has evolved from an economic
grouping on paper to a platform for cooperation in various areas,
reflecting changing global dynamics. In this chapter, we sketch the next
phase of BRICS development underscored by the need to deepen internal
cohesion, strengthen cooperation among BRICS countries in functional
policy areas and consolidate overall coordination in the absence of a secre-
tariat or central institutions. Our argument arises from the fact that much

S. Zondi · O. Ayodele (B) · S. Duma

University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: odi_onu@yahoo.co.uk; tnomvele@uj.ac.za
S. Zondi
e-mail: siphamandlaz@uj.ac.za

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Zondi (ed.), The Political Economy of Intra-BRICS Cooperation,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1_1
2 S. ZONDI ET AL.

has been discussed, at least, five questions/theses (to be outlined below)

about BRICS in the existing literature and the discussion under-estimates
the critical importance of internal cohesion. There is a risk that what the
BRICS promises by the virtue of its mere presence and posture, and what
it represents in the eyes of both its friends and foes, might not mate-
rialise in the absence of some level of institutionalisation of the BRICS
dream. While this institutionalisation can take the form of establishment
of concrete central organs of nature, other international organisations like
NATO, ASEAN and African Union do, but it may also take the form of
firming up and make semi-permanent, at least, functional and strategic
cooperation among BRICS countries internally.

The Prism
While all points of view on the significance and future direction of the
BRICS are welcome, there is an even greater need for discussion and
analysis that seeks to interpret development from within BRICS. Deliber-
ations on where BRICS seems to be moving or where it should move
are in the interest of all of those who are also concerned about the
direction of international relations, cooperation and the Global South.
The issues raised can be quite widely shared across the world as it were,
but there are particularities in perspectives from below or from within
BRICS. It may seem unnecessary to point this out, but we now know
how important it is that thinkers declare the vantage points they repre-
sent, the loci of enunciation from which they speak. Sometimes these are
broad and sometimes specific. In this case, this book is conceived from
a broadly South-centric perspective in that the very question that this
book responds to is framed by concerns of the South about its agency,
its initiatives, the challenges to its emergence and the opportunities to be
harnessed. Below, we briefly discuss the key theses that dominate conver-
sations on the BRICS as a rationale for adding, to this conversation, what
we consider to be a pertinent subject for further exploration.

BRICs as a Goldman Sachs Idea: An Economic Bloc

The BRICs that Goldman Sachs anticipated, in ground-breaking work
of expectancy and projection in the early 2000s, barely resembles the
BRIC born in 2009 and evolution into BRICS in 2010. While the
Goldman Sachs’ report correctly anticipated the advent of an alliance
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 3

of emerging economies imbued with a sense of responsibility for main-

taining, renewing and strengthening the current global economic order,
it did not anticipate that the BRICS that would be born would position
itself, at least in aspirations, as a leading voice in calls for transcending the
current order to create one that is inclusive and fairer.
It did not fully anticipate a BRICS whose existence would have a
disruptive effect on the liberal international order, first because the body
would not share the perspectives of the G8 on the desired international
order and second in that the BRICS that actually emerged toyed with
the idea of collective self-reliance among BRICS countries, one that
could lead to them depending less and less on the centre of the liberal
international order.
The Goldman Sachs’ idea was an emerging economic bloc in the form
that scholars mean by the semi-periphery, that set of countries seeking the
status of the centre without changing the whole world system. While the
BRICS cannot be said to be a radical bloc fully committed to breaking
the current world order immediately, it, however, is not committed to
maintaining the status quo in the form ‘middle powers’ are said to have
done. Unlike the likes of Australia, Japan and Germany, the BRICS have
displayed discomfort with the current Western-centric world system. It
is criticised for being a ‘sub-imperial’ bloc by the likes of Patrick Bond
because the BRICS has failed to present itself as a bloc of radical coun-
tries committed to a fundamental break with the capitalist world system.
Instead, it seems they are wedging their space for themselves in the
capitalist system while challenging its Western order.
The BRICS that actually emerged is also different from the Goldman
Sachs idea in that it has a clearly unsettling ideological orientation from
the point of view of the centre of the world system in which the bank
belongs. Not much work has been done to unpack the ideological make-
up of BRICS besides one that critiques it for not being radical enough,
work which assumes, therefore, the bloc has a capitalist outlook. A closer
look would suggest that the BRICS have an eclectic ideological outlook
that draws from a variety of ideological inspirations, which is a far cry
from what was anticipated, but it is not quite a monolithic ideological
character its critics assume it has.
Certainly, the BRICs in the Goldman Sachs mind was an economic
bloc, but what emerged is a broader power bloc signalling a potential to
be a political, cultural, economic and ideational alternative to the G7, for
instance. We have to refer to potential in this regard because the eclectic
4 S. ZONDI ET AL.

nature of the BRICS makes it unwise to make a definite call about the
direction that this power bloc is taking. But certainly, the BRICS have
emerged with a strong political and economic agenda, although it has
been slow in implementing it. At the centre of this agenda is not really the
markets or consolidation of an economic foothold in the world market,
but it is the high politics of global reform for which it has been criti-
cised by those who hoped it would limit itself to economic and market
integration. This global reform relates to the strengthening of all global
multilateralism including international economic and financial reforms
that threaten the current order in many ways. It is about shifting the
current order in order to serve the interests it was never designed to serve,
namely an inclusive, just, developmental and ethical world. In spite of
differences in nuances related to positions of individual countries, which
change from time to time too, there is a convergence of interests around
global reform. Critics are correct in arguing that the BRICS is reformist
rather than transformational, but being reformist is also an option in the
pursuit of a more progressive world system. It is an alternative to the
status quo, which has failed billions around the world and disadvantaged
the Global South, from four of the BRICS countries.

BRICS as a Russia-China Alliance Plus

The Western powers and those similarly aligned view the BRICS through
the lens of an emerging China-Russia axis. The axis has pivoted around
the need to challenge the interventionism of the West in the immediate
neighbourhoods of the two powers, as in Crimea, Georgia, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and South China sea areas. China and Russia’s battles with key G7
powers over their positions on these contested areas form part of a broad
battle between these two states and the Western world broadly. For the
West, both China and Russia are not democracies as is understood in
Western Europe and North America. The fact of a long-standing leader
in Vladimir Putin in Russia and long-standing governing power as the
Chinese Communist Party in Russia contradicts the practice of changing
leaders every 5 to 10 years in the West (especially the key Western powers
of the UK, France and the USA).
Western voices see China and Russia through the human rights lens
where this means the individuated liberal version of human rights prac-
tised in North America and Western Europe mainly, but which spread to
other parts of the world through processes that involved wars, slavery,
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 5

colonialism, capitalist exploitation and imposition via humanitarian aid.

Concerns about the violations of these rights and freedoms are a major
part of the China and Russia policy in Western countries engaged in
geopolitical competition for global power and influence with these two.
Of particular concern are allegations of suppression of dissent and free
political activities in both countries. Of course, we know the discourse of
human rights has been discredited by how it has been used by Western
powers to conceal geostrategic interests that have nothing to do with
concerns about the well-being of peoples of the South. This has unfor-
tunately generated a sense of scepticism every time the human rights
discourse is used in these geopolitical battles, the concern being whether
the concern is genuinely the welfare of the people of the South, or it is
just a weaponisation of human rights for ulterior motives.
This thesis thrives on the assumption that China and Russia have
a disproportionate influence on the three other member states that
are economically and politically weaker (with the exception of India in
economics, sometimes). This assumption diminishes the BRICS bloc into
an extension of the China-Russia axis whose influence and power within
BRICS are exaggerated. This also presumes that Brazil, India and South
Africa lack the ability to stand up to China and Russia, or at least they are
willing accomplices to the machinations of the two.
This is linked to another thesis that joins the last two theses, namely:
Brazil, India and South Africa are democracies while China and Russia are
non-democracies. The yardstick used to sustain this thesis is more declara-
tory than analytical and logical. It is a question of whether we have said
what we are convinced is the case. Sometimes this thesis is put forward
with optimistic motives in that voices that make it hope that India, Brazil
and South Africa (IBSA) will or should wake up from their slumber and
assert their distinct political character and either revive the IBSA forum
they have had since 2003 or force BRICS to become more democratic by
inviting more democracies to join in a process of democratic expansion,
which, it is hoped, will dilute the power of the China-Russia axis. This
ignores the stated reasons why the IBSA countries are in BRICS while
they keep the IBSA forum alive, including the possibility that the BRICS
and IBSA serve very distinct purposes for the IBSA countries.
6 S. ZONDI ET AL.

BRICS as a Platform for Regional Powers

There is an expectation that BRICS member states will use the plat-
form to address regional conditions including the needs of regions that
BRICS members come from, especially the developing country member
states—the IBSA countries. Regional powers have been touted as states
with the wherewithal, ambition and will to underwrite, promote, repre-
sent and advance the interests of its neighbours in international relations
and cooperation. These powers are said to carry regional interests on
their shoulders, engaging in battles and campaigns internationally for the
benefit of their neighbourhood. This can be done to advance the self-
interests of such a state in that it may be hoping to win acceptance as
a regional leader among its neighbours. Sometimes it is seen as a role
assumed as a sense of duty for those countries that have access to polit-
ical, economic and diplomatic capital all over the world to leverage it in
the interest of its surroundings.
Of course, the behaviour of South Africa where it brings Africa’s
broader interests into its foreign policy calculus provides some justifica-
tion for this thesis. South Africa hinges its policy on the pursuit of what is
called the African agenda, which is the interests of Africa codified in reso-
lutions and formal policy decisions taken by the African Union. It goes
into international relations via a pan-African lens that sees its interests as
invariably entangled with those of the continent. So, it thinks, pursuing
African interests is necessary for it to achieve its own interests. This is
partly born out of ideological orientation, pan-Africanism and the fact of
the economic integration of its economy in Africa, which has become the
country’s major trade destination after the democratic change in 1994.
Indeed, South Africa saw its invitation into the BRIC, as it was known
in 2009–2010, as an opportunity for it to trumpet African interests. It
routinely placed Africa on the BRICS agenda from inception. When it
finally got the opportunity to host the BRICS in 2013, it invited over 20
African countries to interact with BRICS countries in order to sell their
countries and economies to BRICS. It thus began the process of expan-
sion of BRICS’ sphere of influence in what became known as the birth of
the BRICS+.
While other BRICS countries do not see regional interests quite in
the manner South Africa sees it, BRICS countries have individually been
protective of their neighbourhoods as spheres of influence. They have a
regionalised outlook mostly in the sense of spheres of influence rather
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 7

than as representatives or mouthpieces of their region, unlike South

Africa. The idea of spheres of influence gives rise to a difficult relation-
ship some BRICS countries have with their regions, as they battle to
get accepted as regional reinforcers or leaders. They are often fiercely
contested because of the justified suspicion that BRICS countries have
their narrow interests in pursuit of regional leadership. Regionalisation of
BRICS remains a potential that is unlikely to be fully realised because the
regional power dynamics are marked by contestation rather than mutual
trust and willingness to mandate regional interests to a BRICS country.

Major Divergences Among BRICS Member States

The subject of differences among BRICS has tended to focus on the size
of the economy, geopolitical location and size of populations. It is said
that the BRICS configuration does not make sense since China, India and
Russia are major economies of note in the world, but Brazil and South
Africa are much smaller and more significant to their regions than to the
world economy. The thesis is that these are differences in areas that are
strategic for translating BRICS into an economic bloc with substance. It
is also shown that the difference is not just the size of the economy, but
the very nature of economies is distinct from country to country. The
demographic question is used to call into question whether South Africa
belongs to the BRICS or not, given its small population size compared
to other BRICS countries.
The divergences are used to explain the weaknesses in BRICS diplo-
macy globally including its inability to put action to its consensus on the
reform of the UN, the UN Security Council and the International Finance
Institutions. This explains why two of BRICS countries remain ensconced
in the permanent seats of the UN Security Council, an arrangement that
is generally seen among activists in BRICS countries as an unjust heritage
of the colonial order bequeathed to the post-1945 period. Some critics
have also seen BRICS as unable to act as a cohesive actor in interna-
tional negotiations including the negotiations on climate change where
BRICS countries excluding Russia helped save negotiations in Copen-
hagen in 2009, but BRICS as a whole have not acted as a leading catalyst
for consensus in other negotiations.
This leads to a thesis that is quite present in the literature, often subtle,
but strong all the same. This is that given divergences among them what
unites BRICS is the external enemy, the West. The idea of BRICS as
8 S. ZONDI ET AL.

anti-west undermines the view of BRICS being pro-something, including

being pro-global reform, pro-progressive change, pro-south, pro-equity
and so forth. It seems the view that the BRICS is just one of many anti-
western blocs that have emerged after the Cold War is quite serious. The
BRICS positions contradicting long-established Western consensus are
not seen as different readings of the situation and interests but as a sort of
enmity towards the West. This is sometimes blamed on the China-Russia
axis. Alternative voices have been at pains to respond to this by showing
that the BRICS have an agenda of their own, one that represents what
they believe is needed to change the world rather than just an agenda
against the West.

The Missing Link

What has been missing is a discussion on whether and how the BRICS
have been building and consolidating internal coherence and cohesion,
not against the West, but in order to deliver on the raft of their decisions,
programmes and declarations made over the past eleven years. Among
a number of subjects that have not received sufficient attention is the
matter of the extent of intra-BRICS cooperation, coordination and cohe-
sion. While the subject of competition and differences among BRICS has
been written about to an extent, how to deepen strategic partnerships
within BRICS could harness the full potential for BRICS to act cohesively
and in the interests of its populations and its neighbours has not. There-
fore, concepts of cohesion, coherence and cooperation do not appear
frequently in discussions about BRICS. Even discussions emanating from
within BRICS, very little has been done first to understand what areas of
strategic convergence are being harnessed to build functional intra-BRICS
cooperation and what are areas that carry the potential for such. These
concerns are the centre of the book. The idea of intra-BRICS cooperation
is used to make an argument that the next phase of BRICS development
is to deepen internal cohesion and strengthen cooperation among BRICS
countries in functional policy areas and consolidation of overall coordi-
nation among BRICS countries in the absence of a secretariat or such
central institutions.
This subject is explored through thematic chapters below, some of
which look at practical functional policy areas and others explore in
broader terms ways in which intra-BRICS cooperation might be realised.
Sometimes at issue is a sense of what actors might drive this deepening
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 9

of intra-BRICS cohesion and sometimes it is the ideas. The aim is not

to have a complete set of policy areas, ideas and actors, but merely to
begin the conversation and instigate further work on this subject through
a selected set of themes and issues explored in this book.

The Book Outline

The first chapter critically reflects on the question of strategic cohesion,
coherence and functional cooperation as critical conceptual devices by
which the level of intra-BRICS cooperation might be analysed. It seeks
to provide a sort of conceptual map for the book, one that could help
a reader interested in conceptual framing of discourses understand what
conceptually speaking lies at the heart of this book. It makes the argument
that in order to deepen internal cohesion, BRICS must strengthen and
deepen functional cooperation among BRICS countries in policy areas
already identified as shared strategic priorities. This should be designed to
consolidate overall coordination among BRICS countries in the absence
of a secretariat or such central institutions. The author argues that discus-
sion of internal cohesion within BRICS in relation to policy areas has
received limited attention, much less than even discussions on divergences
and convergences in the country’s ideological and political-economic
outlooks.
Chapter 2 focuses on the BRICS development bank and the challenges
it must navigate in enhancing the potential of development financing to
translate BRICS ideals into realities. It details the workings of the BRICS
Development Bank(BDB) as an international mechanism of innovation
in the field of international development financing. According to the
author, the existence of the BDB boosts BRICS position as an emerging
economic and political powerhouse. However, it is hobbled by insuffi-
cient reserve capital. Throughout this chapter, the author makes a case
for intra-BRIC cooperation over competing interests while addressing the
widespread criticisms against the BRICS and BDB, thus underscoring the
BDB as for inclusive development.
Chapter 3 focuses on development diplomacy, the set of activities
and measures that a diplomatic actor employs to promote a develop-
mental focus on global governance. The author premises their discussion
on Susan Strange’s concept of structural power framed by four dimen-
sions: security, production, knowledge and financial power. Although the
author focuses on the first three dimensions, any of these dimensions
10 S. ZONDI ET AL.

gives the possessor of structural power the ability to change the range
of choices open to others without putting pressure directly on them to
make decisions one way or another. It is thus an indirect form of power;
it is wielded through governance structures such as international financial
governance, which the paper details and illustrates with the dollar hege-
mony. The author further explores the counter-hegemonic potential of
the New Development Bank.
Chapter 4 examines the complex regime of climate change responses
within the BRICS. Impacts of climate change, such as the rising frequency
and intensity of water shortages, persistent drought, floods, storms and
increase in temperature, currently traverse the globe; they confront
the BRICS countries in serious ways. The authors base their approach
on Keohane and Victor’s concept of ‘regime complex’, which means
that instead of a fragmented set of bodies or institutions, the climate
change issue-area clusters around a single framework, the United Nations
Convention on Climate Change. This chapter makes a case for a new
approach to cooperation on climate issues. They argue that a typical top-
down approach would not be the most appropriate. They further under-
score the need for the BRICS to involve the youth at the various levels
of engagement, i.e. societal, institution, as well as personal. The chapter
shows that each member of BRICS has a responsibility to constructively
contribute to ways in enhancing cooperation among BRICS countries to
find solutions to impacts of climate change. It suggests that bottom-up
approaches rooted in both supply and demand mechanisms, in contrast to
a single comprehensive top-down approach, may provide practical options
to enhance cooperation that addresses climate change challenges, thereby
opening new frontiers for the BRICS.
Chapter 5 tackles energy security and energy cooperation oppor-
tunities, within the BRICS. By 2040, the BRICS are anticipated to
account for 45 per cent of global energy consumption. As massive energy
producers, they continue to be key role players in the energy security
debate; this includes oil, gas, renewable energy and nuclear energy. The
authors identify opportunities and options for energy security and policies
in BRICS. They look for trends in renewable energy patents registered
by BRICS states to underscore knowledge production patterns. They
conclude that energy production and consumption are catalysts for coop-
eration requiring cross-pollination of skills, capabilities, resources and
technologies. They also argue that BRICS would better serve African
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 11

states outside of commonplace bilateral agreements favouring cooperation

with regional economic blocs, or Africa as a common market instead.
Chapter 6 explores BRICS efforts to tackle the growing scourge of
transnational organised crime (TOC) in BRICS countries. The author
observes that TOC is increasingly conducted by fluid cartels using
cyberspace as a vector, which differs from how traditional organised syndi-
cates operate. They point out that the BRICS summit declarations against
this form of crime are yet to be translated into plans and measures
to translate them into action. There is yet to be firm measures for
intra-BRICS cooperation, especially coordination among security services
across BRICS countries. They also point out that critical to that coop-
eration will be efforts to improve the quantity and quality of statistical
data on cross-border crime at country level. The author concludes with
recommendations for tackling TOC via a multi-pronged approach that
recognises TOC as an element into a broader set of criminal activities.
Critical to achieving this is stronger intra-BRICS security cooperation.
Chapter 7 turns to the relationship between the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (4IR) readiness, as measured by World Economic Forum
indices, and new influxes of foreign direct investment in BRICS coun-
tries (operationalised as three independent variables). The author tests
the assumptions that 4IR increases the prospect of transformations of
existing industrial and technological development patterns. The indices
used include measuring the change in availability of the latest tech-
nology, change in capacity for innovation and government procurement
of advanced technological products. The chapter sets out to make two key
contributions: first, it determines the role of 4IR readiness-related indi-
cators in retaining or bringing in a new influx of FDI; second, it works
out the comparative role of the three indicators when measured against
another in bringing in new FDI. The author contributes to the discourse
on whether the current global economic patterns will shape the new
4IR era similar to the third industrial revolution. The data demonstrates
that South Africa appears to have the most robust observed correlation
between the operationalised 4IR competitiveness markers and new FDI.
Chapter 8 makes the case for the BRICS fully become active partic-
ipants, and not passive consumers, in the unfolding world of 4IR. To
this end, it argues, the BRICS countries have to strengthen their internal
capacities to develop and exchange in skills and assets needed in this area
of development in the first place. The task of strengthening each BRICS
12 S. ZONDI ET AL.

country must be tackled with a spirit of cooperation, and not competi-

tion by the BRICS. The strength of each country depends on a range
of factors, from digital literacy to high-performance productivity in the
4IR. For each BRICS country to bring this strength to the table, there
must be cooperation among the BRICS countries to build this capability.
The process must not leave citizens, the working class and civil society
formations behind, but must integrate their agency.
Chapter 9 discusses enhanced and functional economic cooperation
within BRICS and posits that South Africa has a lot to gain. The author’s
argument centres on two premises. First, studies have tended to focus
on BRICS and the global economy, the outward-looking economic rela-
tions and how these demonstrate BRICS role in the global economy or
how the BRICS partnership enhances BRICS benefits from the global
economy. Little has been done to understand and promote tangible intra-
BRICS economic partnerships, especially in areas of trade and investment.
Second, South Africa’s membership of the BRICS economic framework
has been a boon for its economy, helping it diversify its exports to new
markets in the BRICS. Drawing from the case of South Africa, the author
investigates how intra-BRICS investment and trade could be deepened as
part of implementing the economic partnership strategy that the BRICS
have adopted. They further explore how a BRICS free trade agreement
would tie in perfectly with the recently launched African Continental
Free Trade Area to boost South Africa’s economic gains, expand BRICS’
economic cooperation with Africa, and enrich intra-BRICS economic
partnership.
Chapter 10 elevates the matter of women empowerment through
gendered financial inclusion, making the case that intra-BRICS social and
economic cooperation finds true meaning when it has financial inclusion
of women, especially women entrepreneurs at the centre. The author
accepts that with a sizable portion of the global population and global
market, the BRICS have a residual influence on the future direction of
the global economy and development including in relation to building
inclusive and equitably gendered futures. Financial inclusion is a tool for
both poverty eradication and socio-economic empowerment, which could
help BRICS give practical meaning to its stated commitments to inclu-
sive growth and development as well as to women empowerment. The
author reviews the approaches seen in India and South Africa to establish
cross-cutting possibilities that might lead to a BRICS-wide approach to
women’s financial inclusion and empowerment.
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 13

Chapter 11 discusses how BRICS countries have responded to the

threat of Covid-19 on economies, and by implication, on quality of life.
The pandemic accounts for a rise in global unemployment, adding up to
14 million new people into the numbers of the unemployed. The author
underscores the divergence in how BRICS countries have responded to
the pandemic as a health crisis and an economic calamity, resulting in
different economic trajectories. BRICS economies are at varying levels of
development. States have various capacities, which complicate the political
economy of BRICS and Covid-19, especially as far as economic recovery
is concerned. Key to broadly shared counter-cyclical responses in BRICS
is expansionary fiscal policies adopted in fiscal stimulus packages, job
protection and creation and social security. The author draws lessons
for enhancing intra-BRICS cooperation on post-Covid-19 economic
recovery.
Chapter 12 discusses the potential for intra-BRICS cohesion in vaccine
development, especially in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. It
notes the fact that the 10th BRICS Summit agreed to establish a human
vaccine research centre. The centre was proposed as a point for collab-
orative human vaccine research and development seeking to benefit not
only BRICS nations but the world, particularly the developing countries.
Through this agreement, South Africa sought and received permission
to commercially produce human vaccines. As the world awaits the full
implementation of this landmark agreement, and noting the technical
complexities of producing vaccines, this chapter analyses the feasibility
of vaccine production in South Africa under the present human capital
base and the prevailing policy conditions. It draws implications for other
BRICS countries and identifies opportunities for cooperation in this area.
Chapter 13 makes a case for the implementation and accountability
framework that would enable BRICS to ensure the implementation of
their development commitments, including those arising from the sustain-
able development goals. The author points out that a crucial opportunity
for strategic intra-BRICS partnership and cohesion may be in using
the lessons learned from the millennium development goals (MDGs) in
organising a coordinated implementation of the sustainable development
goals (SDGs) and concerted accountability mechanisms for monitoring
implementation. The BRICS have an opportunity to show agency and
actorness by championing a mechanism that will assist the world imple-
ment SDGs better than the MDGs. The chapter concludes by saying
that what the BRICS do today to strengthen intra-BRICS accountability
14 S. ZONDI ET AL.

and agitate for an international system of accountability based on lessons

learned from the MDGs years will determine whether the BRICS can be
regarded as exemplary in the pursuit of Agenda 2030.
Cutting across all these inputs is the interest in understanding internal
cohesion within BRICS, but one that is not built just on similarities
and lack of divergences, but on shared interest in promoting cooperative
behaviour for the benefit of the peoples of BRICS. Therefore, the diver-
gences that the BRICS countries, about which we can say much, do not
diminish the potential for great cohesion and stronger intra-BRICS coop-
eration in areas where the BRICS countries have shared interests in and
in areas where they have a comparative advantage. So, this can happen in
spite of increasing tensions between China and India over developments
in their shared border for these tensions are specific and have to do with
matters the two can resolve. This is why China and India continue to
cooperate in economic, social and even political spheres in spite of the
conflict, simply because there are shared interests in all those areas.
Of course, the clash during 2020 between second ranked and fourth
ranked Asian militaries, also BRICS members, threatens global stability.
Nothing suggests that the recent conflict of June 2020 will be handled
differently than the border conflict has been handled since the 1950s. This
is partly the reason why the whole world has been generally silent on this
tiff even during the UN General Assembly in September 2020. The two
countries, India and China, have established a number of initiatives and
participated in major efforts in global governance in spite of this eight-
decade-old conflict. The BRICS has tended to stay clear of this issue,
considering it as a bilateral issue between two member states capable of
de-escalating it. We can expect that BRICS meetings are being used as
confidence building opportunities to make that de-escalation possible.
Other divergences that have been observed of a less magnitude than
the ongoing China-India border conflict. These include massive chal-
lenges that a number of BRICS countries face on the domestic front
with countries like Brazil, India and South Africa seeing a rise in socio-
economic inequality before Covid-19, which pandemic has since exacer-
bated, and the growing contestation of political visions in most BRICS
countries. These issues undermine the internal cohesion of individual
member states and by extension threaten cohesion among the leaders of
BRICS (Quiliconi et al., 2016). There are also differences arising from the
uneven levels of economic development, divergent paths of industrialisa-
tion and approach to social policy (Naudé et al., 2015), which this book
 1 TOWARDS DEEPER INTRA-BRICS COOPERATION: AN ARGUMENT 15

sees as opportunities for building intra-BRICS cooperation to manage

shared challenges and differences.

Conclusion
Time has come to explore how the BRICS might reach a sufficient level
of internal cohesion through functional cooperation, practical strategic
cooperation and policy/programmatic coherence. To get to this, we must
begin a conversation that seeks to make a case for this cooperation, either
by identifying shared challenges and opportunities for such collabora-
tion or by exploring ways in which cohesion might happen. The idea
was not to be prescriptive, excessively technical, for it is not the task of
researchers to translate ideas into policy programmes—that is, the task
of intellectuals within the public service of these countries. Ours is to
reason visions and possibilities based on concrete data and a clear analyt-
ical framework. As this chapter suggests, the focus on external dynamics
of BRICS and internal conflicts or divergences deserves attention, but
so does the subject of internal coherence through functional coopera-
tion among BRICS countries. As the chapter has said, this book only
makes opening thoughts on the subject in the hope of instigating further
deliberation, deeper studies, and a more comprehensive treatise of the
subject.

References
Naudé, W., Szirmai, A., & Haraguchi, Neds. (2015). Structural change and
industrial development in the BRICS. OUP Oxford.
Quiliconi, C., Saguier, M., & Tussie, D. (2016). BRICS: Leadership in the
making. In S. Kingah & C. Quiliconi (Eds.), Global and regional leadership
of BRICS countries (pp. 29–47). Springer.
 CHAPTER 2

The BRICS Development Bank

and Challenges for development financing
in BRICS—Issues for Consideration

Modimowabarwa Kanyane

Introduction
At the fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2012, the leaders consid-
ered the formation of the New Development Bank hereafter referred to as
the BRICS Development Bank. Following the 2014 sixth BRICS Summit
in Fortaleza, the leaders signed the Agreement establishing the BRICS
Development Bank with headquarters in Shanghai, China and regional
offices in Johannesburg, South Africa. The establishment of the BRICS
Development Bank is to close the gap of infrastructure needs in BRICS
and developing countries. The bank was established in July 2015 by the
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The

M. Kanyane (B)
University of Venda, Thohoyandou, South Africa
e-mail: barwa.kanyane@univen.ac.za

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

Switzerland AG 2022
S. Zondi (ed.), The Political Economy of Intra-BRICS Cooperation,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97397-1_2
18 M. KANYANE

bank aims to mobilise funding for infrastructure and sustainable develop-

ment. Its ownership and governance structure are unique, as the BRICS
countries each have an equal share, and no country has any veto power.
The backdrop to its creation is rooted in the continuing power shift in the
global system, from the developed industrialised world towards emerging
market economies. The bank is a physical expression of the desire of
emerging markets to play a more prominent role in the global space
(Maasdorp, 2019).
Yafei (2016: 16) confers three motives of the BRICS Development
Bank. Firstly, to enable BRICS members to obtain funds for development.
Secondly, financial exchanges realisation such as currency swaps among
BRICS members that expand the capacity of their economies and curren-
cies to withstand the impact of global economic turbulence, and lastly, to
provide new financing channels for other developing countries. Formerly
known as the BRIC bank, the BRICS Development Bank’s purpose is to
create a platform for BRICS nations to develop a win–win cooperation
with other states. The establishment of the BRICS Development Bank
represents an international mechanism of innovation in the field of inter-
national development financing. Understandably, BRICS is a rising power
with the BRICS Development Bank joining the Bretton Woods elite—
ending Western dominance over the global economy as a fresh alternative.
Though a decade old, the BRICS can solve problems of infrastructure
and funding by themselves through the robust BRICS Development Bank
financial mechanism. Given new mechanism for financing development to
be used to foster BRICS cooperation agenda, a great part of the discus-
sion should continually focus on increasing financial cooperation and
trade flows among BRICS members through South–South cooperation.
Rather than opposing or replacing current Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank
(AsDB) and others, the 10th BRICS Summitry insists on cooperating
with them. The BRICS Development Bank acts as a modernised interna-
tional financing mechanism that meets the demands of developing nations
in infrastructure, green bonds and sustainable development (Jiejin,
2015: 1). The BRICS Development Bank was founded with an autho-
rised capital of USD$100 billion and initial subscribed capital of US$50
billion, with contributions equally distributed between the five founding
members (US$10 billion each) (Agreement on the BRICS Development
Bank, 2014).
 2 THE BRICS DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHALLENGES … 19

In addition to the Bank, the BRICS grouping also announced setting

up a financial safety net (with an initial size of US$100 billion) through a
Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) among BRICS countries aimed
at addressing short-term liquidity pressures and strengthening existing
international arrangements as an additional line of defence (Ibid). The
CRA is mooted to pool reserves based on individual contributions from
China ($41bn), Brazil, India and Russia (US$18 billion each) and South
Africa ($5bn). The membership of the BRICS Development Bank has
been kept open to borrowing and non-borrowing countries which are
UN members. However, the admission of new members has been subject
to terms and conditions set by the Board of Directors (BoD) (Kundu,
2016: 2) with a special majority. The BoD of the BRICS Development
Bank in their 23rd meeting on 18 February 2020 is fully committed
to supporting China in the time of calamity to assist in fighting the
novel coronavirus pneumonia COVID-19. The Bank stands out ready to
provide its full support, including emergency financing or an emergency
sovereign loan to China to support its prevention and control measures
against the coronavirus (BRICS Development Bank, 2020).
With BRICS embracing South–South cooperation, there is an enor-
mous growth of developing economies and the new international
economic system. The BRICS Development Bank operational system is
different from the Bretton Woods system in which China and India, for
example, usually contribute more capital shares, but all BRICS countries
have equal recognition. The BRICS Development Bank members have
equal voting powers with no provision for a veto, unlike the Bretton
Woods institutions (Humphrey, 2015: 7).
This chapter first discusses the BRICS Development Bank as a
formidable, consolidated force for inclusive development. This is followed
by the discussion of the role of the MDB in the financing, presenting an
argument for intra-BRICS cooperation to prevail over competing inter-
ests. Governance and shareholding structure of the BRICS Development
Bank then is discussed consequently together with new mechanisms for
financing development and cooperation of BRICS as well as their instru-
ments and products. Against this backdrop, this chapter then ends by
tackling criticisms levelled against the bank and provides the basis for the
BRICS Development Bank to thrive despite such criticisms and challenges
it is compounded with to inform the way forward and conclusion at the
end.
20 M. KANYANE

BRICS Development Bank---A Consolidated

Formidable Force for Inclusive Development
Buzzwords such as inclusive development and growth as well as sustain-
able development characterise contemporary global policy approaches.
Inclusive development is a complex concept with many dimensions that
go far beyond economic growth captured by the GDP statistics. It also
goes beyond BRICS Development Bank financing of infrastructure and
green projects. It is a concept that advances equitable opportunities for
economic participants during economic growth, with benefits incurred by
every segment of society. This concept expands upon traditional economic
growth models to include a focus on the equity of health, human capital,
environmental quality, social protection and food sovereignty (Hasmath,
2015: 2–3). Inclusive development is thus critical for the improvement of
the distribution of well-being of the society with a sense of belonging
(Ranieri & Ramos, 2013). While these soft socio-economic issues are
crucial, the BRICS Development Bank focuses on financing infrastruc-
ture and green projects to drive social transformation and inclusive
development.
The BRICS pursuit of building a community of shared future is crucial
to shift the landscape towards shaping a new vision for international
development. This comes at a time when Africa is adamant to emerge
with regional integration, which was a long-forgone conclusion. In Africa,
several regional groups have developed, namely Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC) as well as Common
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). These regional group-
ings have been around for some time and can demonstrate that regional
integration and cooperation are possible and desirable in the continent.
For effective regional integration to be achieved, there should be a reason-
able consensus on the form of democracy and political economy that
should prevail in the region (Kanyane, 2018: 205). Therefore, the Africa
regional integration project through BRICS developmental agenda is an
added potential to catalyse and drive change in the region through the
BRICS Development Bank financial instrument. Both government insti-
tutions lie at the heart of building a community of shared future within
an inclusive development paradigm to attain better lives for all.
 2 THE BRICS DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHALLENGES … 21

Brazil, India and Africa within the BRICS community share socio-
economic characterisation, i.e. the large size of the economy, unemploy-
ment and slow economic growth. Although sustainability and inclusion
have been a key policy driver, these socio-economic development chal-
lenges still stubbornly persist among significant proportions of their
populations. China and Russia, to a certain extent, are not an exclu-
sion. The BRICS Development Bank comes in as a potential catalyst to
break the past with new developmental interventions. The willingness of
political leaders and government institutions in BRICS to cooperate and
strengthen relationships will be required to support the transition towards
inclusive and sustainable development (van Voorhout & Wetzling, 2013).
Therefore, building synergies through knowledge sharing and skills trans-
fers to reduce inequalities, poverty and unemployment will be important
highlights of the BRICS member states to foster inclusive develop-
ment especially in Africa, India and Brazil where there are persistent
socio-economic challenges.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), officially known as trans-
forming our world, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
(United Nations General Assembly, 2015) based on the principles popu-
larly known as ‘the future we want’, largely built from the experiences of
15 years of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus, the SDGs
should not be seen as a disconnect but to draw from the MDGs experi-
ences, which showed the value of planned and goal-driven development
effort though many goals were not met. As such, Africa framed within
Agenda 2063 should not be left behind in pursuit of developmental
projects supported by the BRICS Development Bank. The SDGs provide
a useful framework for the advancement of inclusive development within
the BRICS member states. An emphasis on inclusivity—especially on
equality of opportunity in terms of access to markets, resources, and an
unbiased regulatory environment is an essential ingredient of successful
growth. Unlike China and Russia, the inclusive growth and development
in both India, Brazil and South Africa, especially in the continent would
of course take a longer lifespan as the focus is on productive employment
and skills transfer to increase the incomes of the poor and marginalised
and thereby raise their standards of living (Ianchovichina & Lund-
strom, 2009). This calls for government institutions and corporations to
rally around as a mixed approach to advance inclusive development for
emerging economies (Vandemoortele et al, 2013: 16–57).
22 M. KANYANE

The Role of National, Regional

and Multilateral Development Banks
The mandates and operations of the MDBs have evolved over time and
expanded in recent decades. Many were created in the 1960s, during the
period of decolonisation, while others came into being after the end of
the Cold War to support reconstruction, development and regional inte-
gration. MDBs were called upon to step up these efforts in the pursuit of
the then MDGs ended in 2015 and continued by the ambitious, universal
and cross-sector SDGs and Agenda 2030. Given their mandates, sector
and country coverage and knowledge, MDBs have a potential to play a
role as a catalyst for other financing—private sector, domestic revenues—
encapsulated in the idea of scaling up resources from ‘billions to trillions’
to domesticate the SDGs into a reality. While MDBs are considered to
have a wide geographical scope across several regions, Regional Devel-
opment Banks (RDBs) extends their operations across one entire region
(with some spill over to neighbouring countries) such as African Devel-
opment Bank (AfDB) in Africa as an example (Engen & Prizzon, 2018:
8–9).
The National Development Banks (NDBs) apart from MDBs and
RDBs are financial institutions that are at least 30% state-owned with an
explicit legal mandate to provide long-term financing or facilitating the
financing of projects that contribute to achieving socio-economic goals in
a region, country or a particular sector of an economy (UNDESA, 2005;
World Bank, 2012). The NDBs are banks within each BRICS member
states (Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) in South Africa,
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Russian Regional Development
Bank in Russia, Industrial Development Bank of India). RDBs, like AsDB,
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and AfDB are among those banks
in the BRICS plus regions, but MDBs such as the WB and AsDB, for
example, are not necessarily BRICS Development Bank affiliates.
Article 1 of the Agreement on the BRICS Development Bank (2014)
states that the purpose and functions of the bank is to mobilise resources
for the infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and
other emerging economies including developing countries. This comple-
ments existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions
for global growth and development. The bank also supports public and
private projects through loans, guarantees, equity participation and other
 2 THE BRICS DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHALLENGES … 23

financial instruments. It also cooperates with international organisations

and other financial entities to provide technical assistance for projects.
Bonn (2018: 35) states that the BRICS Development Bank’s financing
and executing role is to be (a) pipeline builder: With an extensive reach in
the local market and with dedicated institutional, operational and gover-
nance structures for primary due diligence, national development banks
could function as a direct lender, or ‘lender of record’. This role can
also facilitate the crowding-in of private sector actors interested in the
specific pipeline being built by the BRICS Development Bank. They can
also be seen as a risk mitigation option in private–public co-financing,
with a rebalancing of risk-return analyses, (b) Executing entity: The
executing entity function includes managing, administering, supervising
and directly reporting on activities deployed on the ground. It must be
stated that this is a specific function that gives contractual and operational
responsibilities to national development banks, (c) Lenders of record: In
their role as lenders of record, national development banks assume legal
ownership of the resources and take on the accountability role for the
delivery of the project, as well as monitoring and evaluation of financial
returns and impacts on the ground and (d) Project developers: also sees
these public national institutions assuming the role of project developers,
working directly with end borrowers and entities on the ground. This also
entails that there is increasing, although in our judgement still insufficient,
technical, legal and financial capacity.
Having the BRICS Development Bank roles in mind, it outpaces
other development institutions with a concise organisational structure
and efficient workflow. For example, the loan procedure takes only six
months for it to be approved allowing projects to start as soon as
possible (Batista, 2016: 28). The new cooperation between the South–
South among developing countries is the central element of the BRICS.
Hence, the North–South cooperation in solving financial problems of the
emerging nations has been limited. As such, this South–South financial
mechanism is a refreshing alternative to the emerging economies and
developing countries to thrive with minimal hassles of loan approvals.
The financing of the BRICS Development Bank comes from the
world’s major developing economies. Simply put, the finance from one
developing country to another can be realised within the framework of
new South–South cooperation. MDBS is focusing on reducing global
and regional poverty along with other agencies. The emphasis of equal
and balanced developmental partnership between developing countries
24 M. KANYANE

calls on the use of market-oriented operations to reduce loan costs and

provide innovative loan facilities so that developing countries will have a
more robust, flexible and customer-oriented development finance service
(Jiejin, Op Cit: 2). The BRICS Development Bank mandate is evident
that it seeks to endorse development projects. It is not only limited to
infrastructure development but focuses more on developing other sectors
such as renewable energy, solar, wind, small hydroelectric plants, energy
efficiency, clean transportation, urban mobility, sanitation and water and
waste management (Batista, Op Cit: 26). As such, the green space is given
attention along with climate change consciousness underpinned by the
UN SDGs.

Governance and Shareholding Structure

of the BRICS Development Bank
Article five of the agreement between the countries states that member-
ship shall be open to members of the United Nations (UN) at such times
and in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Bank shall deter-
mine by a special majority at the Board of Governors and membership
of the Bank shall be open to borrowing and non-borrowing members.
Article 6 discusses that the Bank shall have a Board of Governors, a
Board of Directors, a President, Vice-Presidents as decided by the Board
of Governors and such other officers and staff as may be considered neces-
sary (BRICS Development Bank, 2015). KV Kamath from India was
appointed president of the BRICS Development Bank on the 11th of
May 2015.
Founding members of the Bank are borrowing countries from BRICS.
The BRICS Development Bank has actually chosen a very similar model
for linking capital and governance with each capital share translates into
one vote while decisions taken based on a simple majority, and no single
member has veto power over any matter (Humphrey, Op Cit: 8). The
BRICS Development Bank reflects a principle of fairness among equals
unlike WB hegemonies of economic superpowers dominating the cham-
bers. It boasts an innovative governance structure in that its stock rights
are divided equally among the BRICS countries, thus delinking the divi-
sion of stock rights from the proportion of BRICS countries’ GDP in
global GDP (Jiejin, Op Cit: 3).
The BRICS Development Bank’s governance structure helps to
streamline the decision-making process. The Bank is operating at the
 2 THE BRICS DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHALLENGES … 25

outset with a non-resident Board of Directors, which reduces adminis-

trative costs and helps the Board to focus on high-level policy issues and
particularly complex projects rather than routine day-to-day operations.
Shareholders reserve the right to move to a resident Board if deemed
necessary (Article 12 (g) of the Articles of Agreement (Humphrey, Op
Cit: 8)).

New mechanisms for Financing

Development and Cooperation of BRICS
BRICS countries implemented powerful incentive measures assisting to
remain afloat during challenging times. However, these measures can
stifle initiatives and result in harming long-term economic development.
For example, Brazil lowered its benchmark lending rate for 16 consecu-
tive months, dealing a heavy blow to Petrobras, a semi-public petroleum
company that accounts for 10% of the country’s economy (Liqun, 2016:
26). The BRICS Development Bank has strategic importance, and it
allows developing countries and emerging economies, which are often in
an unfavourable position when faced with complicated global economic
and financial situations, a financial risk prevention and control mechanism
that they can independently run and fully control (Yi, 2014: 46).
Griffith-Jones (2014: 8) states that rigorous evaluation of projects by
the BRICS Development Bank, as well as a strong professional approach
to such evaluations, is extremely important. Autonomy of management of
a BRICS Development Bank for approving only technically well-designed
projects is equally crucial. In addition, Yafei (2016: 14–15) explores three
mechanisms. First, unity and cooperation among BRICS members to
develop the rights of developing countries to have a voice and make
decisions on global political and economic affairs. Second, the BRICS
mechanism of global governance is important for promoting transforma-
tion from that of governance by west to co-governance by west and east.
The BRICS cooperation mechanism’s innovation of both the concept
and model of global governance is expected to improve international
order. Moreover, active participation by developing countries is crucial to
building a fair system of global economic governance. The BRICS cooper-
ation mechanism highlights the importance of South–South cooperation.
Third, the BRICS nations will promote and lead the common devel-
opment of developing countries, which is conducive to long-term,
sustainable global economic growth, neutralising the negative impact
26 M. KANYANE

of globalisation and narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor
(Ibid: 15). The BRICS Development Bank can both increase the amount
of financing available to developing countries and break the monopoly
of developed countries over the international financial architecture. In
this way, it will help to establish a new mechanism for international
development financing that is more beneficial to developing countries.
The BRICS Development Bank has not co-financed any investment
projects with other MDBs (Wang, 2019: 227), as an alternative largely
because the bank is still entrenching itself on the ground. For the bank to
gain experience and capacity, it must work closely with other MDBs. This
will require cooperation and existing multilateral development banks to
reform and transform. BRICS’ recent approach of integrating with other
emerging countries in the BRICS Plus model is a new mechanism of
fostering a cooperation agenda with BRICS countries inviting developing
states from three continents Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to boost
dialogue and discussion about cooperation between BRICS and other
developing states. ‘The mode will enrich the BRICS cooperation mecha-
nism. Particularly, against the current backdrop of anti-globalisation and
protectionism, it will offer the wisdom of developing countries for global
economic governance’ (Lintao, 2017: 15).
Xiaoyan (2017: 17) argues that there is a necessity for e-commerce,
services trade and investment cooperation to strengthen BRICS economy
because this will promote industrial upgrade, create jobs and help devel-
oping countries as well as small medium-sized companies integrate into
the global value chain. However, this is possible if there is construc-
tive cooperation on people-to-people exchange of information and skills
within the BRICS space. The BRICS Think Tanks should be actively
involved in scientific research and policy development to create fertile
grounds for such exchanges.
There are MDBs currently operating worldwide comprising the WB, a
number of regional development banks and several specialised or sub-
regional banks (Humphrey, Op Cit: 2). The number of borrowing
countries varies. The large global MDBs, WB, European Investment Bank
(EIB), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), OPEC
Fund for International Development (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries) (OFID), reach well over 100 countries, with the
WB’s borrowing countries totalling 144. The large regional banks (AfDB,
AsDB, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Islamic Development
 2 THE BRICS DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CHALLENGES … 27

Bank (IsDB) finance between 25 and 54 countries, and the smaller sub-
regional and specialised MDBs serve fewer than 25 countries. When
combined, and considering overlap, the legacy RDBs (AfDB, AsDB,
EBRD and IADB) serve a total of 146 countries, slightly more than the
WB (Engen & Prizzon, Op Cit: 22). All these MDBs existed before the
formation of the BRICS and BRICS Development Bank.
Therefore, close collaboration with existing RDBs and MDBs would
be vital for the BRICS to strengthen its governance and sustenance,
hence, there has been a lot of emphasis on public–private financial part-
nerships with equally or links between multilateral, regional and national
development banks. The cooperation between the MDBs and BRICS
Development Bank can be a new strategy for not only financing devel-
opment but also to promote mutual benefit, while enabling the BRICS
Development Bank to gain expertise and experiences from the existing
banks. In turn, the BRICS Development Bank could also offer innova-
tive, effective and efficient perceptions on the reform of banks in order to
meet the needs of developing countries and emerging markets.

BRICS Development Bank Projects,

Instruments and Products
Despite the challenging dynamics among the BRICS members, they have
been able to institutionalise the BRICS as an informal institution and
have demonstrated real progress in formally institutionalising the BRICS
Development Bank. It approved loans for seven projects in 2016 in US
dollars in all BRICS countries and the BRICS Development Bank BoD
approved US$300 millions to the Republic of India for the Assam Bridge
Project. The Bank reached US$10 billions of approved loans for infras-
tructure and sustainable development projects (BRICS Development
Bank, 2019). The year 2018 marked the third consecutive successful year
for BRICS Development Bank since its establishment. While continuously
building its institutional capacity with a focus on quality and technical
rigour, that year BRICS Development Bank approved 17 projects in all
member countries, more than the total number of projects approved
during the preceding two-and-a-half years. The Bank’s overall portfolio
expanded to 30 projects, valued at about US$8 billion (BRICS Develop-
ment Bank, 2018: 10). Some of these projects are discussed hereunder as
follows according to BRICS Development Bank (2018):
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
taivuta heidät, koska he eivät enää ole kristityttä eivätkä halua auttaa
kreiviä hänen hädässään, päästämään minut vihdoinkin rukoilemaan
tuon miesraukan puolesta, joka luultavasti on suuresti Jumalan avun
tarpeessa.»

»Tulin tänne, isä, viemään teidät kirkkoonne tahi tuonne kauhealle

paikalle, josta juuri tulen ja jonne heti lähden takaisin, mutta
puhumaan noille konnille en rupea. Heidän paljas hengityksensäkin
saastuttaa sekä minut että Csillagin. Te ja minä, isä, lähdemme
takaisin tuonne, missä vanha mies-raukka vaimoineen ja tyttärineen
katselee, miten hänen omaisuutensa tuhoutuu kokonaan, missä
säikähtyneet eläinraukat juoksevat avuttomina sinne tänne
joutuakseen lopulta surkean kuoleman uhreiksi tulessa, jonka nuo
helvetin tulevat asukkaat ovat sytyttäneet. Heven maakunnan ja
koko Unkarin tasankojen ylpeys on mennyttä kalua, kun
raukkamaiset ihmiset kostavat alhaisesti viattomille eläimillekin.
Tulkaa nyt, isä, niin lähdemme. Te voitte sitten palata, kun olette
lopettanut rukoilemisenne, mutta minä, ellen ole niin onnellinen, että
voin haudata itseni ja häpeäni noihin liekkeihin, jotka hävittävät tätä
rakastamaani maata, tätä ylpeyteni esinettä, kokoan huomenna
talouskapineeni ja lähden kuin mustalaiset hakemaan jotakin toista
paikkaa, jossa jälleen voin puhella kunniallisten miesten kanssa.
Päästäkää isä Ambrosius tulemaan! Hän odottaa ovellaan!»

Talonpojat eivät olleet milloinkaan kuulleet niin julmia sanoja, jotka

olivat niin terävät ja leikkaavat kuin kaksiteräiset sirpit ja niin hirveän
halveksivat ja nöyryyttävät, että he tunsivat pimeässäkin, miten
heidän poskensa kuumenivat häpeästä.

Mitä András tarkoitti, hän, joka kaikissa heidän suruissaan ja

vaivoissaan oli aina ollut heidän puolellaan, valmiina lohduttamaan,
selittämään ja lieventämään? Mikä olikaan nyt mielessä hänellä, joka
aina iloisesti hymyillen oli kaatanut jokaisen aidan, jollaisia hänen
rikkautensa ja vaikutusvaltansa olisivat muussa tapauksessa
rakentaneet hänen ja noiden nöyrien hänelle suurta palkkaa vastaan
työskentelevien ihmisten välille? Miksi ei hän nyt luvannut heidän
lausua hänen nimeäänkään eikä koskea hänen hevoseensakaan,
ikäänkuin heidän sanansa ja kosketuksensa olisivat olleet mitä
alentavimmat ja saastaisimmat? Mitä kauhistavaa he sitten
oikeastaan olivat tehneetkään? Oliko heidän kostonsa todellakin niin
alhainen, kuin hän sanoi? Oliko se vain rikos, eikä mikään oikeus?
Oli kyllä totta, ettei kreivin puolisolla eikä tyttärellä ollut mitään osaa
pirullisiin laitoksiin, eikä noilla eläinraukoillakaan — noilla kauniilla
unkarilaisilla hevosilla — Bideskuty’n tallien maine oli levinnyt
tasangolta tasangolle — joista useilla tammoilla oli varsatkin, eikä
härilläkään, jotka eivät voineet juosta ja jotka pelästyivät ja
säikähtivät niin pian…

Joukko hajautui vaitiollen tehdäkseen tietä isä Ambrosiukselle,

joka saavuttuaan Andráksen luo aikoi nousta hevosen selkään
hänen taakseen. Sillä aikaa tarkasteli kumminkin András tyynesti,
muuttamatta kuitenkaan halveksivaa käytöstään ja nähtävästi
välittämättä miehistä sen enempää kuin tien tomusta, miten hänen
ankarat sanansa vaikuttavat noihin, joita hän heidän hullusta
työstään huolimatta myötätuntoisesti rakasti. Koska hänellä ei ollut
varaa tuhlata aikaa taivuttelemiseen eikä todisteluihin, oli hän
turvautunut tähän keinoon, jolla hän luuli varmasti parhaiten
voivansa vaikuttaa noihin vastahakoisiin ja tyhmiin, mutta ei
kumminkaan kokonaan turmeltuneihin luonteihin. Kreivi Bideskuty’n
kodin kohtalo joutui hetkiseksi kysymyksenalaiseksi ja siinä ehkä
epäröitiin noin minuutti, mutta kun András todellakin hyppäsi
Csillagin selkään ja miehille selveni, ettei hän halunnut puhua heille
eikä katsella heihin päinkään, sanoi joku pelokkaasti:

»Aiotko todellakin poistua Kisfalusta ikuisiksi ajoiksi, András»?

»Kuka puhui»? sanoi hän katsahtaen välinpitämättömästi olkansa

yli. »Onko kukaan milloinkaan kuullut minun sanovan toista ja
tekevän toista? Tulkaa nyt, isä. Istutteko vakavasti. Kiertäkää
käsivartenne lujasti ympärilleni, sillä Csillag laukkaa nopeasti».

»Ei, András, et saa lähteä».

»Mihin me silloin joudumme?»

»Haluatko todellakin poistua luotamme»?

»Tahdotko, että kuolemme nälkään?» kuului kaikilta suunnilta, ja

todellakin hyvin levottomina ja peloissaan Andráksen uhkauksesta,
joka epäilemättä olisi aiheuttanut heille suuren onnettomuuden,
kokoutuivat miehet suosikkinsa ympärille kiihkeästi, uskaltamatta
vielä koskea tammaan, koska hän oli kieltänyt, mutta estäen
kumminkin sen viemästä Andrásta pois ikuisiksi ajoiksi.

»Luulimme sinun ymmärtävän huolemme. András», sanoi vanha

Vas Berczi vieläkin hieman äreästi, mutta kumminkin jo melko
nöyrästi. »Olet mennyt vihollisemme puolelle ja halveksit nyt meitä
köyhiä raukkoja».

András huokaisi tyytyväisyydestä. Tuo oli jo antautumisen alkua.

Hän oli saavuttanut tarkoituksensa, ja lopusta hän suoriutuisi
helposti.
 »Olen aina ottanut osaa kaikkiin huoliinne, ystäväni, sillä surunne
ovat minunkin surujani», sanoi hän jo ystävällisemmin. »Mutta teidän
olisi pitänyt ymmärtää silloin, kun läksitte rikoksien teille, että tiemme
eroavat silloin auttamattomasti ikuisiksi ajoiksi. Hyvästi nyt ja
päästäkää Csillag menemään»!

»Tulet kai takaisin»? huusivat he, kun Csillag kohosi takajaloilleen

sen isännän painaessa polvellaan sen kylkiä.

»En milloinkaan, ellen saa jälleen puristaa kunniallisten miesten

käsiä»!

»Meidän, András, meidän»! huusivat he jälleen, kun tamma läksi

nopeasti laukkaamaan kylän valtatietä poispäin.

András kääntyi kerran vielä puhuttelemaan heitä.

»Tervehdin vasta vain niitä, jotka tulevat auttamaan minua

Bideskuty’n asuinrakennusten pelastamisessa».

»Minua, András, minua»! huusi nyt jokainen, ja kaikki, sekä nuoret

että vanhat, unhottaen huolensa, taikauskonsa ja pelkonsa, ja
ikävöiden vain tuota luvattua kädenpuristusta, läksivät innoissaan
juoksemaan tamman ja sen kaksinkertaisen kuorman jälkeen.

Mutta András oli pysähdyttänyt tammansa jo pienen kirkon luo,

jonka nelikulmainen torni kuvastui mustana loistavaa ja kauheata
taustaa vasten.

»Jumala teitä kaikkia siunatkoon, lapseni», sanoi isä Ambrosius,

»mutta meidän on odotettava ja otettava Herramme mukaamme».
 »Nopeasti nyt, isä, sillä emme saa hukata hetkeäkään», sanoi
András kiirehtien, mutta otti kumminkin kunnioittavasti lakin
päästään, kuten muutkin. Kun isä Ambrosius oli aikansa kolistellut
avaimiaan, sai hän raskaan oven auki ja meni kirkkoon. Hän jätti sen
selkoselälleen, että tuo hänen erehtyväinen laumansa saisi nähdä
Jumalan huoneessa vallitsevan täydellisen rauhan villin ja
kostonhimoisen vihanpurkauksensa jälkeen. Kirkko oli melkein
pimeä, lukuunottamatta tuota epätasaista valoa, jota virtasi sinne
pienistä syvällä seinissä olevista goottilaisista ikkunoista. Mutta
vanha pappi tunsi tien hyvin karkeasti veistettyjen penkkien välitse
vaatimattoman alttarin portaille, joilta hän melkein puoli vuosisataa
oli rukoillut Jumalan siunausta yksinkertaiselle kuulijakunnalleen.
Polvistuen nopeasti avasi hän äkkiä pyhäkön kannen ja otti sieltä
kultaisen rasian, joka sisälsi Kaikkivaltiaan ruumista kuvaavat
öylätit».

»Kiiruhtakaa nyt Jumalan nimessä, isä»! kuului Andráksen ääni

ulkoa, ja kiedottuaan nopeasti pyhän rasian mekkonsa helmaan
kiipesi isä Ambrosius jälleen nuoren talonpojan taakse.

Miehet olivat seisoneet kunnioittavasti vaitiollen tämän lyhyen

toimituksen kuluessa, mutta kun Csillag jälleen läksi nopeasti
laukkaamaan, läksivät he huutaen juoksemaan sen jälkeen. Heitä oli
noin pari- kolmesataa tahi koko tuon pienen kylän työkykyinen väki,
joka oli nyt hyvin innokas sovittamaan menneisyytensä ja
korjaamaan rakastamansa tasangon maineen, jonka he olivat
konnantyöllään tahranneet; ja kun he vihdoin kuumissaan ja
hengästyneinä saapuivat Bideskuty’yn, muodostivat he ketjun ollen
valmiit tottelemaan häntä, jolle he halusivat näyttää, että he vielä
olivat hänen kunnioituksensa ja myötämielisyytensä arvoiset.
 Bideskuty oli sillä aikaa seurannut Andráksen antamia ohjeita, sillä
nyt voitiin jo nähdä selvästi, että vanhaa päärakennusta uhkasi
pohjoisesta päin suuri vaara. Sillä suunnalla oli melko suuri
maissipelto, josta osa oli jo tulossa ja levitti tulipaloa nopeasti
ulkohuoneita ja talleja kohti. Tämän hävitetyn maan onneton
omistaja oli koonnut ympärilleen kaikki saatavissa olevat apuvoimat,
ja sillä aikaa kuin hänen haavellisiin vaatteihin pukeutuneet
miesvieraansa koettivat pelastaa tätä hänen omaisuutensa osaa, toi
hän paikalle kaikki kamaripalvelijansa ja vahvimmat palvelijattarensa
suojelemaan talon muita osia.

He koettivat kaataa maissia maahan niin paljon kuin suinkin

viikatteilla, sirpeillä ja lapioilla, mutta vaikka tuo pieni joukko
työskentelikin kovasti ja vauhdikkaasti, työskenteli kumminkin
vihollinen kovemmin tullen yhä lähemmäksi, ja puolen tunnin
kuluttua huomattiin selvästi, ettei leikattu alue ollut tarpeeksi leveä
estämään tehokkaasti liekkien etenemistä.

Bideskuty käveli edestakaisin peltojensa läheisyydessä

tarkastellen levottomasti taivaanrantaa, josta avun luultiin
lähestyvän. Hän ei halunnut ajatella enää pahaa eikä epäillä, sillä
hän tiesi nyt liiankin hyvin, että jos hänellä tämän peloittavan yön
jälkeen on katto päänsä yläpuolella ja vielä hieman muutakin
omaisuutta, oli se tuon miehen ansiota, jota hän iltapäivällä oli
loukannut ja lyönyt kasvoihin. Oli aivan varmaa, että tulipalo oli
ihmisten sytyttämä, ja jäljellä oli ainoastaan toivo, että tuo rikas
talonpoika voi taivuttaa rikolliset sovittamaan oman konnantyönsä,
ennenkuin se oli liian myöhäistä.

Naiset olivat kaikki peräytyneet puutarhan porttien sisäpuolelle. He

olivat liian levottomat mennäkseen sisälle, ja parittain tahi kolmisin
kävelivät he akasiakujannetta edestakaisin arvaillen, saapuisiko tuo
luvattu apu, ja katsellen isiään, veljiään ja miehiään, jotka vielä
työskentelivät uhattujen tallien katoilla.

Bideskuty kuuli jo kaukaa talonpoikien huudot, kun he seurasivat

juosten Csillagia, jolla András ja isä Ambrosius ratsastivat.

András pysähdytti hevosensa nopeasti Bideskuty’n viereen ja

laskeuduttuaan sen selästä huusi hän:

»Kreivi, isä Ambrosius ja minä olemme tuoneet tänne kolmesataa

innokasta apulaista, jotka Jumalan avulla voivat ehkä suojella
asuinrakennukset ja tallit tulelta. Nyt miehet», lisäsi hän viitaten
maissipelloille, »on teidän saatava tuo tulenarka aine syrjään.
Hakatkaa, leikatkaa, repikää, polkekaa ja näyttäkää minulle, kuka
parhaiten voi hävittää muutamia maakunnan parhaimpia
maissipeltoja. Ottakaa kaikki saatavissa olevat työvälineet
hukkaamatta aikaa, ja suokoon Jumala menestystä työllenne».

Isä Ambrosiuskin laskeutui maahan. Luottavaisesti otti hän

kauhtanansa alta pyhän astian ja kohotettuaan sen korkealle päänsä
yläpuolelle niin, että kaikki tulisivat osalliseksi jumalallisesta
siunauksesta, rukoili hän kunnioittavasti apua Jumalalta tämän
kauhean hävityksen lopettamiseksi.

Muutamissa minuuteissa hajautuivat kaikki vastailleet innokkaat

työmiehet pelloille, ja pian kuultiin kaukaa terävien viikatteiden
synnyttämää ääntä, kun ne leikkasivat maissin sitkeitä varsia.

Bideskuty näki paikoiltaan, miten miehet kumartuivat työhönsä,

niittivät ja leikkasivat levähtämättä hetkeäkään. He olivat aloittaneet
työnsä melkein tulen vierestä, vaarallisen läheltä, ajatteli Bideskuty.
Näytti siltä kuin he olisivat halunneet uhrata elämänsäkin
pelastaakseen nyt nuo maakappaleet hänelle, ja uhmata vaaraa
osoittaakseen selvästi, miten tottelevaisia ja katuvaisia he nyt olivat.
Ja varmasti pakotti syyllisyyden tuntokin heitä nyt taistelemaan
kovasti tuota säälimätöntä tulta vastaan, jonka heidän rikolliset
kätensä olivat sytyttäneet. Bideskuty katsoi melkein kateellisesti
tuohon vierellään seisovaan reippaaseen talonpoikaan, joka niin
helposti oli taivuttanut nuo niskoittelevat miehet tottelemaan
tahtoaan. Hän olisi halunnut ilmaista hänelle kiitollisuutensa
saamastaan odottamattomasta avusta, mutta vieläkin kytevä viha
tukahdutti jollakin tavoin sanat hänen kurkkuunsa. Tuo ylpeä ylimys
ei voinut taivuttaa itseään tällaistenkaan olosuhteiden vallitessa
osoittamaan, että hän jollakin tavoin oli velassa vieressään
seisovalle alhaissyntyiselle talonpojalle.

Pian huomattiin selvästi, että tulipalon alue alkoi melkein

huomaamatta supistua. Kuiva tasanko ja leveä korkea tie
muodostivat sekä etelässä että idässä sellaisen voittamattoman
esteen tulelle, ettei se enää voinut levitä niille suunnille. Pohjoisessa
olevat kaukaisemmat tallit, joiden katot oli kasteltu, muodostivat
myöskin tehokkaan esteen. Toivo alkoi jälleen kyteä Bideskuty’n
sydämessä, kun hän näki nuo leveät maissipeltojen poikki leikatut
urat, joiden reunoilla taloa kohti uhkaavasti levinneet liekit ensin
lepattivat ja sitten sammuivat. Miesten työskennellessä ei isä
Ambrosius lopettanut hetkeksikään rukouksiaan eikä Bideskuty
katselemistaan. Ylpeä kreivi oli sanomatta sanaakaan vastaan
luvannut Andráksen ohjata pelastustöitä.

Kiihtyneestä Bideskuty’sta tuntui, että tuo nuori talonpoika oli

yhtäaikaa joka paikassa. Toisen kerran oli hän tuolla miesten luona
ohjaamassa heidän työtään ja toisen kerran taasen puutarhan
porteilla lähettämässä lohduttavia tietoja puutarhassa oleville naisille.
Taistelu ihmisten ja luonnonvoiman välillä kesti viisi tuntia, ja tuuma
tuumalta pakotettiin luonnonvoima taipumaan. Nyt voitiin nähdä jo
kaikkialla mustia ja savuavia läikkiä, jotka olivat kuin autioita
tulimeressä uiskentelevia saaria. Kirkas hehku oli jo tummennut.
Pimeys, joka nyt tuntui monta kertaa synkemmältä verrattuna tuohon
muutamia tunteja sitten vallitsevaan kaameaan valaistukseen, oli jo
peittänyt suurimman osan taivaanrannasta. Kukistettu vihollinen
koetti pari kertaa valloittaa takaisin menettämäänsä aluetta ja
parissa paikassa syttyikin maissin sänki tuleen ja paloi hetkisen,
mutta leikkaamisen jälkeen voitiin nuo savuavat jäännökset pian
tehokkaasti sammuttaa. Kun liekit pienenivät, yhtyivät naamioitetut
talonpoikiin, ja pian muuttui tulen leviämistä estävä salpa yhä
kiinteämmäksi. Bideskuty ei suostunut lähtemään mihinkään niin
kauan kuin kipinäkin vielä voitiin huomata, vaan tarkasteli
lakkaamatta, miten hänen peloittava vihollisensa työnnettiin takaisin
ja tukahdutettiin. Hän ei tuntenut ollenkaan väsymystä katsellessaan
kaikkea tuota kuin unennäköä, eikä hän koettanutkaan lisäytyvässä
pimeässä saada selville tuon kauhistuttavan hävityksen suuruutta,
joka nyt levisi hänen eteensä siinä, missä vielä eilen komeat vehnä-
ja maissitähkät olivat lainehtineet iloisesti kesätuulessa.

Hän ei halunnut tietää pohjoisessa päin sijaitsevien viinitarhojensa

kohtaloa eikä saada selville, miten hänen monien kilometrien
pituisille turnipsi- ja kaurapelloilleen oli käynyt, sillä mahdotonta oli
vielä kenenkään tietää, miten paljon ne olivat kärsineet tulen
raivosta.

Tasangon takaiselle itäiselle taivaanrannalle alkoi ilmestyä heikkoa

punaa, joka tunkeutui lisäytyvän pimeyden läpi. Ilma oli täynnä
tukahduttavaa savua. Kaukana sammuttelivat talonpojat ja
naamioitetut, jotka nyt näyttivät vielä hullunkurisemmilta nokisine
kasvoineen ja käsineen ja repeytyneinä koristeineen, viimeisiä
kipinöitä maissipelloista, jotka olivat olleet maakunnan ylpeyden
esineet. Hän kiitti Jumalaa, ettei hän voinut nähdä häviötä, ja oli
tyytyväinen, että hän voi siirtää huomiseen runsaan satonsa
mitättömien jäännösten tarkastelun ja tyytyä vain tänään toteamaan,
että asuinrakennukset, tallit ja ehkä eläimetkin olivat pelastuneet.

Kaukaa voi hän jo kuulla, miten niitä nyt ajettiin takaisin talleihin,
mutta hän ei halunnut kysyä, montako niistä tuli ja savu olivat
tappaneet. Kaiken tuon sai hän kyllä tietää tarpeeksi pian — jo
huomenna. Tänään ei hän luullut kaipaavansa enää muuta kuin
lepoa. Hän totesi, että useimmat talonpojat olivat poislähdössä
palatakseen jälleen Arokszállakseen. Tuo taivaanrannalta näkyvä
ruusunpunainen juova alkoi levetä ja kirkastua, ja savunkin läpi voi
hän nähdä, miten tähdet himmenivät auringonnousun lähestyessä.
Isä Ambrosius sanoi hänelle monta lohduttavaa sanaa, ja jokainen
talonpoika nosti kunnioittavasti lakkiaan mennessään vararikkoon
joutuneen kreivin sivu.

»Gyuri, etkö tule jo sisään»? sanoi lihava kreivi Kantássy hiljaa ja

hyvin ystävällisesti. »Väsymys ja levottomuus ovat nähtävästi sinut
kokonaan uuvuttaneet. Tulen juuri linnasta taivutettuani naiset
menemään levolle».

Bideskuty katsoi epämääräisesti vanhaan ystäväänsä

ymmärtämättä täydellisesti hänen tarkoitustaan. Yön jännitys ja
vaivat olivat väsyttäneet hänen mieltänsäkin yhtä paljon kuin hänen
ruumistaankin.

»Nyt ei ole enää mitään vaaraa huomattavissa, mutta vartijoita on

asetettu eri paikkoihin hälyyttämään, jos tuli sattuisi uudestaan
riehahtamaan palamaan».

Bideskuty tuskin tiesi, kuka puhui. Joku nuorukainen se kumminkin

oli, joka näytti äärettömän hullunkuriselta raskaassa märässä
satiinihameessaan ja avokaulaisissa kureliiveissään, päärmätyissä
röyhelöissään, nauharuusuissaan ja nauhoissaan. Bideskuty nauroi
niin, että hän horjui ja melkein kaatui Kantássyn käsivarsille, jotka
tukivat häntä hellästi kuin juopunutta, joka ei pysy seisoallaan.
Lihava vanha kreivi koetti taluttaa ystävänsä pois.

»Tule nyt, Gyuri, täällä ei ole sinulla enää mitään tekemistä».

Mutta vaikka Bideskuty olikin hyvin väsynyt ja levollemenon aika

varmasti oli jo käsillä, tunsi hän kumminkin, että hänen oli vielä
tehtävä jotakin ennen taloon menoaan, mutta hän ei voinut muistaa,
mitä se oli. Hän kieltäytyi itsepäisesti liikkumasta mihinkään ja tuijotti
epämääräisesti hymyillen nuoriin vieraihinsa ja heidän märkiin
pukuihinsa, noiden iloisten naamiohuvien jäännöksiin, joille hän oli
nauranut niin sydämensä pohjasta eilen, josta tuntui kuluneen jo
kokonainen iankaikkisuus.

Muudan palvelijatar ilmestyi juosten puutarhan portista. Hän toi

kreivittäreltä sellaisen viestin, että kreivi tulisi heti sisään, sillä ei hän
eikä neiti Ilonka voineet nukkua, ennenkuin he olivat puhutelleet
häntä.

Bideskuty valmistautui lopultakin lähtemään.

»Kreivitär käski kreivin tuoda Keményn Andráksen Kisfalusta

mukanaan», lisäsi tyttö, »sillä kreivitär haluaa kiittää häntä muutamin
sanoin ajoissa saapuneesta avusta».
 Silloin muisti Bideskuty’kin, mitä hänen oli tehtävä ennen taloon
palaamistaan. Joukossa oli ollut muudan mies, joka ei ollut
ainoastaan nähnyt vaivaa hänen puolestaan pelastaakseen hänen
kotinsa täydellisestä häviöstä, vaan hän oli myöskin taivuttanut
muutkin tehokkaaseen ja vapaaehtoiseen apuun, ja niin muuttanut
hänen perinpohjaisen häviönsä vain osittaiseksi. Tuo mies oli kyllä
alhaissyntyinen talonpoika, joka polveutui orjista ja sitäpaitsi
juutalaisesta äidistä syntyneestä saidasta koronkiskurista, ja joka
juuri äsken oli ollut niin hävytön, että Bideskuty’n oli ollut pakko
kurittaa häntä, mutta tuo riita oli nyt unhotettava, koska mies oli
koettanut sovittaa rikoksensa. Bideskuty tunsi olevansa hänelle
hyvin kiitollinen.

Hän kääntyi etsimään Andrásta ympäröivästä joukosta, mutta

talonpoikaa ei näkynyt. Hän kysyi Andrásta ja huusi häntä nimeltä,
mutta András oli jo lähtenyt kotiinsa.

TOINEN OSA
XVI

PÄÄSIÄISAAMU.

»Kyllä se nyt jo näyttää lakkaavan»!

»Ei vielä tänään, luullakseni»!

»Pisaraakaan ei ole pudonnut viimeisten minuuttien kuluessa».

»Katsohan tuota rakoa pilvissä»!

»Ei se levene, vaan sulkeutuu pian jälleen».

»Nyt sataa taasen».

»Uneksit, Laczi, sillä tuoltahan näkyy jo sinistä taivastakin».

»Mistä?»

»Tuolta Kisfalun yläpuolelta. Tänään ei enää sada, siitä saat olla

aivan varma».

Tämä viimeinen puhuja oli nähtävästi hyvin kokenut ilmojen

ennustaja, sillä hänen ympärilleen kokoutuneet nuoret miehet, jotka
tarkastelivat taivasta levottomasti, eivät uskaltaneet sanoa suoraan
vastaankaan. Ainoastaan muudan uskalsi pelokkaasti huomauttaa:

»Muistat kai, Berczi, että viime sunnuntaina sanoit sateen

loppuvan, ennenkuin isä Ambrosius sanoo 'Ite Missa est', mutta kun
tulimme kirkosta sitten kuin kätemme oli siunattu, satoi yhä ja on
satanut aina tähän hetkeen asti»?

»Niin, mutta nyt se on kumminkin loppunut, eikö olekin»? sanoi

Vas Berczi itsepäisesti. »Vai vieläkö tunnet kastuvasi, Laczi
poikaseni»? lisäsi hän hyvin ivallisesti.

Ja todellakin näytti siltä kuin ilmojen profeetta olisi puhunut

viisauden sanoja tänään. Epäilemättä leveni tuo pilvien rako ja siitä
näkyvä taivaankaistale oli kieltämättä hyvin kirkkaansininen. Joskus
tunkeutui raosta muudan pelokas ja vaalea auringonsäde valaisten
surullista maisemaa.

»Ensimmäiset auringonsäteet pariin viikkoon, lapsukaiseni», sanoi

vanha Berczi nostaen lakkiaan muka hyvin vakavasti. »Lakit päästä
ja tervehtikää vieraita»!

Nuoret talonpojat tottelivat nauraen, ja lyöden kantapäänsä yhteen

kumarsivat he vakavasti aurinkoon päin.

»Isten hozta!» sanoivat he kaikki kohteliaasti.

»Herramme aurinko, olet tervetullut»!

»Toivomme teidän korkeutenne viipyvän kauan luonamme»!

»Hei», lisäsi vanha Berczi huoaten, »teidän korkeutenne on tullut

katsomaan surullista näkyä».
 »Onkohan maantiellä ollut milloinkaan niin paljon lokaa kuin nyt»?
sanoi muudan talonpoika pudistaen päätään.

»Rattailla ei voida ollenkaan kulkea ja eilen upposivat härkäni

polviaan myöten likaan. En saanut niitä kääntymään enkä
kulkemaan eteenkäänpäin. Luulin viime hetkemme koittaneen, sillä
tunsin vajoavani yhä syvempään, ja ajattelin, että härät menevät
suoraan lian läpi helvettiin vieden minut mukanaan, suomatta minulle
aikaa syntieni anteeksisaamiseen ja rukoilemiseen».

»En ymmärrä, miten Keményn András aikoo tulla kirkkoon

tänään».

»Hänellä on hyviä hevosia. Hän ratsastaa Csillagilla ja tuo Etelkan

mukanaan».

»Tiedän, ettei Etelka mitenkään jää pois

pääsiäisjumalanpalveluksesta.
Hän on hyvin hurskas».

»Eikä András salli hänen lähteä yksinään».

»Oletteko huomanneet, lapsukaiseni», sanoi tuo viisas vanha

profeetta, »ettei András ole ollut oikein oma itsensä viime aikoina»?

»Hän näyttää todellakin hyvin vakavalta», sanoi Laczi. »En muista

kuulleeni hänen nauravankaan pitkiin aikoihin».

»Luultavasti johtuu se siitä», sanoi eräs vanha talonpoika, »ettei

hän ole vielä antanut meille anteeksi tuota tulipaloa».

»András ei ole pitkävihainen»! sanoi muudan nuorukainen

kiihkeästi. »Hän ei ole puhunut tuosta tulipalosta sanaakaan sen
jälkeen kuin se tapahtui».

»Mutta sitä kai et voine kieltää», sanoi vanha Berczi, »että juuri
tuona tulipaloyönä muuttui András tuollaiseksi omituiseksi ja
vakavaksi»?

»Hän on ehkä huolissaan uudesta sadostaan. Lopetimme

kylvämisen
Kisfalussa juuri, kun tämä kirottu sade alkoi».

»Tulva ei kohoa mitenkään hänen pelloilleen».

»Tarnan rannoilla on Kisfalulla vain muutamia maissipeltoja.

Hänen vahinkonsa ovat vielä mitättömät».

»Mutta vesi nousee vielä».

»Pauhu oli hirmuinen viime yönä. Eilen kävin aivan kreivin talleilla
asti ja minusta näytti, että koko Bideskuty on veden vallassa».

»Kreivillä on todellakin vastuksia».

»Jumala rankaisee häntä, ymmärrät kai sen. Meidän ei olisi

tarvinnut sytyttää hänen vehnäänsä palamaan viime vuonna, sillä
Jumala näkyy itse huolehtivan, ettei jyvääkään jauheta tuossa
saatanan rakentamassa myllyssä».

Talonpojat seisoskelivat kylän kirkon edustalla parhaissa

sunnuntaipukimissaan odottaen äitejään, sisariaan, vaimojaan ja
morsiamiaan, joilla meni tänään paljon aikaa pukeutuessaan
komeihin pääsiäisvaatteihinsa. Aurinko oli nähtävästi ilmestynyt
näkyviin pysyäkseenkin poissa pilvien takaa, sillä se paistoi hyvin
kirkkaasti kylään, joka viimeisten viikkojen kuluessa oli näyttänyt
hyvin autiolta. Oli satanut lakkaamatta neljätoista vuorokautta, ja
raskaat vesipisarat olivat rikkoneet tasankojen äärettömän
hiljaisuuden ja muuttaneet koko maiseman likajärveksi. Kaukaa
pohjoisesta kuului Tarnan surullinen kohina, kun sen vihaiset
vesimäärät, joita tuo yhtämittainen sade oli lisännyt, syöksyivät
raivokkaasti eteenpäin tulvien matalien rantojen yli ja upottaen
mutaisiin syvyyksiinsä Bideskuty’n hedelmälliset pellot, joiden
aikainen kevätkylvö oli juuri saatu lopetetuksi.

»Tuolta tulevat Kisfalun miehet», sanoi Laczi viitaten tielle. »He

näyttävät olevan ravassa sekä yltä että alta».

»Tytöt ovat kumminkin pukeutuneet hyvin sievästi», sanoi eräs

nuorempi mies katsoen ihailevasti kirkasvärisiin hameihin
pukeutuneita kauniita tyttöjä, jotka juuri kääntyivät kylän valtatielle.

»Sárilla ja Katilla on kummallakin uudet punaiset kengät».

»András on lahjoittanut ne, tiedän sen. Hän ratsasti Gyöngyösiin

juuri ennen kylvämistä ja osti sieltä äidilleen uuden silkkipuvun ja
palvelijattarilleen uudet kengät».

»Se mies on tehty rahasta», huokaisi vanha Berczi kateellisesti.

»Hän käyttää sitä kumminkin hyviin tarkoituksiin», sanoi toinen.

»Hän maksoi koko talven äidilleni täyden palkan vehnän
poimimisesta, vaikka äitini on nyt aivan sokea eikä voi erottaa viljan
seassa kasvavien kukkien siemeniä oikeasta viljasta».

»On helppo harjoittaa hyväntekeväisyyttä», sanoi vanha Berczi

ytimekkäästi, »kun on rikas».
 »Eipä niinkään helppoa», sanoi muudan nuorempi mies, »koska
kreivistäkin se on selvästi vaikeampaa kuin Andráksesta. Tiedän,
ettei hän viime talvena lahjoittanut juuri mitään».

»Kreivillä ei ollut mistä lahjoittaakaan. Muistat kai, että tulipalo

turmeli melkein koko hänen satonsa ja tappoi paljon hänen
elukoitaan».

»Tulipaloa ei olisi sytytetty, ellei hän olisi rakennuttanut tuota

pirullista myllyä, jonka tarkoitus oli riistää meiltä palkka käyttämällä
saatanaa apuna työssä», totesi Laczi kiihkeästi.

Kisfalusta tulijoiden oli sillä aikaa onnistunut kahlata likaisten

teitten poikki, ja he huusivat jo kaukaa tervehdykseksi kirkon portilla
seisoville ystävilleen. Tämän pienen tasangon kylän talonpojat
näyttivät hyvinvoivilta valkoisissa pellavapaidoissaan ja housuissaan,
jotka oli hienosti poimuteltu ja päärmätty, kauniisti koruompeleilla
kirjailluissa lyhyissä nahkatakeissaan ja leveissä vöissään, joissa oli
suuret auringonpaisteessa kimaltelevat messinkisoljet, ja suurissa
lampaannahkaviitoissaan, jotka riippuen heidän hartioiltaan lisäsivät
heidän tanakkojen vartaloillensa avokkaisuutta. He olivat vahvan
näköisiäkin leveine hartioineen ja pienine rintavine jalkoineen, jotka
oli pistetty kiiltäviin korkeakantaisiin saappaihin, joiden kannukset
kilisivät heidän kävellessään, ja puhuaksemme tytöistä, ei
varmaankaan mistään muusta Unkarin maakunnasta voitu löytää
heidän vertaisiaan, sellaisia kirkkaita silmiä, niin valkoisia käsivarsia
ja sellaisia pieniä jalkoja, eikä mistään muusta kylästä voitu löytää
tyttöjä, joilla olisi ollut niin monta värillistä hametta yllään kuin näillä.
Siellä olivat esimerkiksi Sári ja Kati, puhumattakaan useista muista,
joilla voi tänä pääsiäisaamuna olla yllään ainakin kolmekymmentä
hametta. Ne muuttivat heidän länteensä niin leveäksi ja heidän
vartalonsa niin hienoksi, että jokainen poika tunsi vastustamatonta
halua kiertää käsivartensa heidän ympärilleen. Heidän pienet
jalkansa olivat aivan ravassa, sillä Kisfalusta oli pitkä matka, mutta
käsissään kantoivat he ylpeästi uusia punaisia kenkiään, noita
tasankojen tyttöjen ilon ja onnen kapineita. Ei ainoakaan tyttö, jolla
on punaiset kengät, salli niiden tahrautua likaan, vaan kantaa ne
huolellisesti kirkkoon rukouskirjansa ja parhaimman nenäliinansa
kanssa, ja vetää ne vasta jalkoihinsa portilla voidakseen kävellä niillä
kirkkoon, muiden vähemmän onnellisten mustia kenkiä käyttävien
ystävättäriensä kateudeksi.

Jokaisen asunnon ovesta tuli nyt tielle kauniita tyttöjä, jotka olivat
pukeutuneet koko sunnuntaikoreuteensa. Leveät silitetyt pellavahihat
kiilsivät ja kansallisväriset, punaiset, valkoiset ja viheriät nauhat
liehuivat tuulessa. Kaunis huntu, joka oli sidottu niskaan suurella
nauharuusulla, täydensi kuningatarmaisen pienen pään kauneutta.
Tukka oli kammattu sileäksi ja letitetty kahdeksi paksuksi palmikoksi,
pusero oli edestä kauniisti koruompeluin kirjailtu ja hoikan vartalon
ympärille oli napitettu ahtaat liivit. Lukemattomat hameet heiluivat
iloisesti tyttöjen kävellessä omituisesti lanteitaan heiluttaen, suuret
kultaiset korvarenkaat, useat helminauhat ja liivien kirkkaat soljet
loistivat auringossa yhtä kirkkaasti kuin kauniit silmät ja lumivalkoiset
hampaat. Vanhemmilla naisilla oli hieman tummemmat puvut ja
pitemmät hunnut, kirkkaanväriset huivit peittivät heidän hartioitaan ja
kaikilla oli käsissään suurilla joko messinki- tahi hopeahakasilla
varustetut raskaat rukouskirjat.

Kirkon portilla vaihdetaan tervehdyksiä ja siunauksia naisten

istuutuessa porraskiville ja vetäessä kauniit kenkänsä likaisiin pieniin
jalkoihinsa.
 Isä Ambrosius ei ole vielä saapunut. Pieni kello kaikuu kumminkin
jo, lähettäen kauaksi iloisia säveleitä ja kutsuen siten yksinkertaista
kansaa jumalanpalvelukseen tänä kauniina pääsiäisaamuna.
Muutamat naiset ovat jo menneet kirkkoon saadakseen hyvät
istumapaikat karkeasti kyhätyissä puupenkeissä, joista he voivat
nähdä kreivin perheineen istumassa tilavassa penkissään, sillä kreivi
tulee aina pääsiäisenä tähän pieneen kirkkoon kuulemaan messua,
ja tuo samalla karitsansa ja pääsiäismunansa isän siunattavaksi.

Ulkona lörpötellään yhtämittaa. Kirkkomiehiä saapuu kaikilta

suunnilta eikä tervehdysten vaihdosta tahdo tulla loppuakaan.

»Tuleekohan kreivi»? kysyy eräs vastasaapunut.

»Hän tuli kyllä tänne viime vuonna, mutta en tiedä, tuleeko hän
tänään», sanoi eräs nuori Bideskuty’n paimen. »Kun sivuutin
päärakennuksen, odottivat vaunut ja hevoset portaitten edustalla,
joten on varma, että kreivitär ja nuori neiti saapuvat».

»Jalo Ilonka on hyvin kaunis», sanoi muudan kaunis tyttö

vetäessään punaisia kenkiään jalkoihinsa.

»Ei puoleksikaan niin kaunis silmissäni kuin sinä, Panna», kuiskasi

eräs nuorukainen nopeasti hänen korvaansa.

»Auta minut ylös, Rezsö, äläkä puhu tyhmyyksiä. Olen varma, että
jalo
Ilonka on aivan alttarilla olevan pyhän neitsyen näköinen».

»Mutta sinä, Panna, et ole etkä saakaan olla kenenkään näköinen.

Ei ainoallakaan muulla tytöllä ole niin kirkkaita silmiä kuin sinulla»,