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Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
Innovation and Technology Set
coordinated by
Chantal Ammi
Volume 8
Edited by
Estelle Pellegrin-Boucher
Pierre Roy
First published 2019 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as
permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced,
stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers,
or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the
CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the
undermentioned address:
www.iste.co.uk www.wiley.com
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Estelle PELLEGRIN-BOUCHER and Pierre ROY
Chapter 5. Tale Me, Green Innovation for the Textile Industry . . . . 101
Arthur CARÉ
5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2. The theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.1. Green innovations: semantic diversity and definition . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2.2. The nature of green innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.2.3. Blue Ocean strategy and the strategic framework . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.3. The research method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.1. A sectoral qualitative study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.2. Data collection and processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4. The textile and clothing industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4.1. Historical landmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4.2. Textiles, the flagship of French industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.3. Fashion is passing, waste remains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.5. Ready to rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.1. Tale Me and clothing rental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5.2. Tale Me casts off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.6. Case lessons and good practices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6.1. “From cradle to plateau”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.6.2. Green Ocean strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Introduction
Because of their innovative nature and the value creation they generate,
these sectors represent a real source of wealth and job creation, particularly
since they are rarely relocatable. In addition, they require rare talents and
knowledge that is difficult to substitute, rooted in specific know-how,
heritage, etc. The figures also highlight that the development of these sectors
is linked to the increasing use of digital technologies (EY France Créativité
2013). Indeed, software, Big Data and artificial intelligence reduce technical
constraints and help creators to concentrate on their production while freeing
up their creativity. They also make it possible to get closer to the needs of
consumers.
Yet these sectors have long been neglected by academia and the business
media, partly because of their heterogeneity and apparent complexity. They
cover a wide range of activities, from film and publishing to the more recent
video game industry. The first objective of this book is to better define this
set of activities and give it greater visibility. Our second objective is to show
the innovative nature of CCIs and to identify useful best practices for
companies. We believe that, despite the specificities of each cultural and
creative industry, and precisely because of the innovative and avant-garde
nature of CCIs, some innovations are transferable to other sectors and
industries.
In this book, we have also sought to clarify what these activities represent
and what are their characteristics.
In our opinion, the first point common to all these sectors is creativity
(Busson and Evrard 2013). Indeed, all these industries are characterized by a
very strong capacity to produce a new, original solution, which draws on the
imagination of its creators and whose value is more symbolic than utilitarian
(Bouquillion et al. 2013). The second common point is an anchoring in a
particular artistic field and a strong cultural capital; for example, fashion and
video games have their roots in drawing and are influenced by the graphic
and visual arts. The intangible and symbolic aesthetic dimension may be
more or less strong in these sectors, but it is always present. It can also
override the effectiveness of the product or service being marketed. Finally,
the third point is the innovative nature of creative and cultural productions
(Evrard and Busson 2018). Indeed, the cultural and creative industries
produce objects and services that are new to their markets and create value
for consumers.
Based on these elements of definition, here are the sectors that we have
grouped together in the CCIs for this book (see Table I.1): architecture,
cinema, photography, the art market, plastic arts, design, fashion (textiles,
clothing, accessories, perfumes, cosmetics, luxury), heritage (museums,
monuments), advertising, performing arts (shows, theaters, festivals,
concerts), radio, TV, music, video games, gastronomy, living arts
(decoration, furniture, tableware), publishing (books, press). For greater
clarity, these industries can be grouped into 10 sectors of activity (BPI
2017).
In France, the CCIs embody a strong symbol of the country’s identity and
a lever for international influence. This is particularly linked to the weight of
culture in the country and its very rich heritage. Thus, more than 500,000
companies are active within the CCIs. The BPI France organization in a
study published in 2017 shows that these industries represent 104 billion
euros (or 5.3% of the national GDP) and have totaled more than 1.7 million
xii Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
As a % of
Added value Number
CCIs Description total value
(in euros) of jobs
added
Architecture Architecture 3.9 billion 40,000 4%
Textile, clothing,
Fashion,
accessories, 33.5 billion 593,000 32%
luxury, beauty
perfumes, cosmetics
Museums,
Heritage 1.7 billion 40,000 2%
monuments
Advertising Advertising 8.8 billion 149,000 9%
Live Shows, theaters,
7.5 billion 172,000 7%
performance concerts
Radio, TV, cinema,
Audiovisual
music, video, video 14.1 billion 125,00 14%
media
games
Gastronomy Wines 3.5 billion 61,000 3%
Photography, art
Visual arts market, plastic arts, 9.3 billion 179,000 9%
design
Tableware, furniture,
Lifestyle 10.6 billion 217,000 10%
decoration
Printed media Book, press 10.1 billion 134,000 10%
Table I.1. Cultural and creative industries in France (source: BPI France, based on
INSEE data (2017))
managers and employees involved in CCIs are more creative than average,
and companies’ strategies must necessarily benefit from this additional
creativity compared to other sectors. In other words, we are convinced from
our empirical research in these sectoral contexts that the profile of actors has
a positive effect on the innovative dimension of the strategies carried out
there.
The design of this collective work has led us to select authors who are
specialists and recognized within the field of CCIs. Prior to their
participation in this book, they all carried out empirical research in one or
more CCIs, and their work gave rise to different types of developments:
scientific articles, books, press articles, communication at conferences, etc.
This book also aims to create links between authors working on CCIs and to
promote the work of this community of established or future researchers.
The selection of authors necessarily leads us to focus on some CCIs at the
expense of others. The seven CCIs discussed in this book are video games,
books, music, museums, fashion, cinema and architecture. We are also aware
that this book embodies a first step in our desire to promote the work carried
out in the field of CCI strategy in the months and years to come. We intend
not only to fully pursue the exploration of the industries discussed in this
book but also to tackle those excluded from it.
xiv Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
Among CCIs, the music industry has also experienced major upheavals in
recent years. Alexandre Perrin explores some of these transformations in
Chapter 3 through the case of Daft Punk and the economic model developed
by the famous French electronic music duo. The author traces the group's
journey from its beginnings in 1993 to its recent successes and demonstrates
its ability to innovate in relation to the dominant models of the music
industry. The concept of the economic model and its components (value
proposition, value architecture, profit equation) serves as an anchor point for
Alexandre Perrin to compare the strategies of the various industry players
and the changes that have occurred. Based on Daft Punk’s accounting,
financial and organizational data, the author deciphers the various innovative
dimensions of their economic model. Thus, he highlights how the group has
been able to create a model adapted to the evolutions of the music industry.
Four key success factors embody the success of Daft Punk’s strategy
according to the author: an ability to “do things their own way”, to present
finished products, to finance their own work and to maintain close control
over it. Beyond the artistic aspects, the case thus reveals the role played by
the control of the financial dimension in both the creation and distribution of
musical works.
commercial type of logic versus those attached to the cultural and artistic
dimension of cinema. Tensions between the two cinema profiles as well as
that between geographical areas (city center versus suburbs) are discussed.
The case shows how cinemas position themselves, sometimes confront each
other and enter into games of aggression-reaction in terms of identities.
I.4. References
1.1. Introduction
The book by W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne entitled Blue Ocean
Strategy, published in 2004, was very successful from its publication.
Translated into 44 languages, more than 3.5 million copies of the book have
been sold worldwide. According to the authors, the Blue Ocean strategy is
taught in more than 2,800 universities!
Designed with and for practitioners in constant search for the “winning
strategic recipe”, the book aims to propose to leaders an approach that will
enable them to create new strategic spaces, “blue oceans”, as opposed to
“red oceans”, where competition is fierce. Management researchers, despite
showing a definite interest in the concept of the “blue ocean”, are perhaps
more likely to question the theoretical robustness of the approach and its
ability to systematically produce winning strategies.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to test the work of Kim and
Mauborgne through the analysis of the Nintendo case over a long period,
from 2006 to the present day. This analysis seems to us to be conducive to
highlighting not only the interest but also the limits of the Blue Ocean
approach, particularly in the creative industries.
This chapter is organized into five main sections. Section 1.2 briefly
presents the Blue Ocean approach, its principles and analytical tools. Section 1.3
presents the methodological framework and the video game industry.
Section 1.4 presents Nintendo’s strategy for launching its various console
generations and the results obtained. Finally, section 1.5 is devoted to the
discussion of the case, in the light of the Blue Ocean approach.
Table 1.1 requires some explanation. On the one hand, the creation of a
new strategic space is often associated with Schumpeter’s concept of
creative destruction: a new, more efficient technology replaces the old one
and the actors who mastered it. However, the authors note that it is also
possible to create a new market by disruption, as Christensen (1997) has
shown. In this case, a less efficient technology initially replaces the old one.
Nintendo in the Pursuit of the Blue Ocean 3
Remarks and
Tool Objective(s) Content/form
comments
Selection of key
competition
criteria in the
sector studied
(product attributes This tool is in
Represent the in particular). line with the
current state of Positioning in value analysis
the competition relation to the tools.
Strategic canvas in the strategic competition in Nothing is said
(diagnostic and action tool) reference area. terms of about how to
To establish the performance. Its select the
company’s value shape is a broken relevant criteria
curve. line joining the or areas to build
different criteria the curve.
placed at different
levels and forming
the company’s
value curve.
Prioritization of
Once again, the
criteria
Analyze possible tool is very
distinguishing
changes in the similar to those
between those to
characteristics of used in value
Grid of the four actions be reduced (pure
the new value analysis,
(tool for redefining the value and simple
proposition particularly
curve) mitigation or
(innovation- those focused
deletion), those to
value) proposed on customer
be strengthened
by the company. value analysis
and those to be
(CVA).
created.
This tool is only
The form is a
an extension of
matrix of four
the previous
Systematically boxes
one. Its different
identify the distinguishing
form gives a
criteria on which between the
ERRC grid systematic
value innovation criteria to be
character to the
will focus and to eliminated,
approach and
invent new ones. reduced, raised
forces the actors
and those to be
to make clear
created.
choices.
However, the use of these tools is not sufficient to allow the company to
create a Blue Ocean. It must be integrated into an overall strategic approach
based on six principles (see Table 1.3). Finally, in their latest book, and
probably in response to criticism about the lack of a framework for their
approach, Kim and Mauborgne (2017) propose a structured approach for
designing and implementing a Blue Ocean strategy.
Concrete implementation
Principles Objective(s)
modalities
Principles of formulation
Practice analytical exploration
in six areas: alternative
services on the market,
strategic groups in the sector,
Redraw the boundaries Find new strategic buyers present,
between markets. spaces. complementary offers
presented, emotional content
of communication in the
sector, time projection of
major sectoral trends.
Apply a four-step method
(visual awakening, visual
exploration, strategic canvas
competition and visual
Give priority to global Build the strategy
communication) in which
issues, not numbers. canvas.
communication aspects are
central. The authors also
propose a specific PMS map
(pioneer-migrator-sedentary).
Deepen the knowledge of non-
clients broken down into three
blocks (imminent non-clients,
Aim beyond existing Attract as many new
“anti” non-clients,
demand. customers as possible.
“unexplored” non-clients), to
attract them and transform
them into effective clients.
Formulate the strategy by
going through essential and
Build a business model ordered steps:
Successfully complete the robust enough to ensure 1) analysis of the usefulness
strategic sequencing. the profitability of for the buyer;
innovation and value. 2) price analysis;
3) cost analysis;
4) adoption analysis.
6 Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
Principles of execution
Practice “management by the
Overcome the four
tipping point” by choosing to
internal obstacles:
focus on levers (individuals,
cognitive (resistance to
Overcome major internal actions, activities) that have a
change), linked to limited
obstacles. strong influence on results
resources, insufficient
and make it possible to
motivation and finally
overcome the four previous
struggles for influence.
obstacles.
Practice “fair management”
Involve stakeholders in
based in particular on the
Integrate implementation the field in the
three E’s: engagement,
into strategic development. development of the
exchange and enouncing
strategy.
consequences.
Table 1.3. The six principles underlying the Blue Ocean strategy
(source: freely inspired by Kim and Mauborgne, 2004)
In their books, Kim and Mauborgne multiply the examples of Blue Ocean
strategies successfully implemented in a wide variety of sectors: automotive,
circus, viticulture, etc. At the same time, in the video game industry, Nintendo’s
spectacular recovery in the mid-2000s has often been presented as a perfect
illustration of the power of this type of strategy. Many authors have presented
the launch of the Nintendo Wii system as the example of the Blue Ocean
strategy (Hollensen 2008; Johnson et al. 2008; O’Gorman 2008; Bonneveux
et al. 2010). However, after the undeniable success of the Wii, Nintendo’s
situation deteriorated again from 2010 onwards. Thus, an analysis of the
Nintendo case over a long period of time seems appropriate to highlight
the interest but also the limitations of Kim and Mauborgne’s work. This is
the objective of the rest of this chapter.
least 20% on the selling price) accompanied by cash advances. Finally, by also
working as a publisher, manufacturers are exacerbating competition between
the games they sell.
At the same time, players must take into account the fact that 50% of a
game’s sales are made during the first three months of its commercialization
and that 80% of its sales are made with 20% of the games. Thus, video
games can also be described as “hit economy” (Friès 2003, pp. 10–11). It
may be the only consumer industry where sales are made almost exclusively
on new products. Unlike music or cinema, catalog collections are relatively
unexploited and 99% of games disappear from distribution channels
(excluding second-hand sales) in less than a year (Le Diberder 2002).
While this type of situation can be very profitable (as long as the console
manufacturer remains an essential intermediary), it raises specific strategic
questions, particularly when launching a new generation of product1. The
main problem to be solved is the “chicken or egg dilemma”. When a new
console is introduced, players will be very sensitive to the number of games
available since a single console is not very useful. But on the other hand,
publishers will closely monitor the number of consoles sold before deciding
whether or not to launch the production of dedicated games. The challenge
for the console manufacturer is to have one category of actors initiate the
adoption process to encourage other categories to do the same. Three
strategies can be considered at the outset:
– take on a market side: some console manufacturers are involved in a
publishing activity to support the sales of their consoles;
– agree, at least for a time, not to gain anything on a market side: some
console manufacturers may be tempted to grant publishers operating licenses
at very low prices and/or offer console buyers very attractive prices;
– get a critical mass of users of an old technology involved by ensuring
compatibility with the new one: some individuals purchasing a new console may
be sensitive to the possibility of playing their old games with the new hardware.
1 Readers interested in these questions should consult Daidj and Isckia’s (2009) article.
Nintendo in the Pursuit of the Blue Ocean 11
future adoptions (future customers will benefit from making the same
choice). But on the other hand, if this process does not start, the
manufacturer may fall into a spiral of failure and, in the end, be out of the
market as Sega was after the catastrophic sales of its Dreamcast console
launched in 1998 and withdrawn in 2001.
Cumulative
Launch dates – Consoles Competitors (cumulative sales)
global sales
(1990) Generation 4 –
49 million Sega Megadrive (35 million)
Super NES
Table 1.4. Nintendo’s sales and competitors, 1985–2005 (source: based on data
compiled by the authors)
In December 2005, the era of the 7th generation of consoles began with
the arrival of Microsoft Xbox 360. Sony also entered the competition in
March 2007. Nintendo’s situation seemed to be difficult at this time. The
2 This section is largely based on two previous publications, by Aurégan and Tellier (2009)
and Aurégan et al. (2015).
3 Nintendo is also a leader in the handheld market (its current product on the market is the
DS). In order to simplify the following developments, this activity is not discussed in detail.
14 Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
relative failure of its Gamecube console (24 million units sold) seemed to
indicate an inevitable decline in a market that was nevertheless growing. On
the other hand, Microsoft, the latest entrant in this market, has managed to
become the second largest manufacturer (26 million Xboxes sold, see Table
1.4). Sony and Microsoft’s 7th generation projects built on the sector’s
traditional “ways of doing things”. Both consoles were presented as
extremely powerful and proposed major technological changes.
Microsoft
12/2005 400 14 22.5 24.5 36.5 43
Xbox 360
Nintendo
12/2006 250 18.5 36 42 80 100
Wii
In June 2011, Nintendo announced the arrival of its new model, the Wii U.
This console was the first to be equipped, in addition to the joysticks with
motion recognition, with a tablet (the Gamepad) that allowed players to use a
new device for certain games. The gameplay can thus be “asymmetrical”:
the player on the tablet has features and information that other players do not
have. The Gamepad also makes it possible to do without a television screen.
It is indeed possible to finish a game started on television on a tablet,
provided however that the player does not move more than a few meters
away from the console.
Nintendo’s new system was released in December 2012, just six years
after the Wii. Its price was €349. Even if it remained the cheapest console of
its generation (the Xbox One was sold for €499 and the PS4 for €399, see
Table 1.6), price differences were narrowing and, above all, the difference
with the Wii selling price was significant (€100). The commercial results
quickly became disappointing. In July 2013, the console had sold 3.45 million
copies (the initial target was to reach 5.5 million by the end of March); the
worst launch in Nintendo’s history. Even more worryingly, publishers did not
seem to show much interest in this machine and its asymmetric gameplay.
Noting the low level of sales, they gradually abandoned their projects for the
Wii U.
These poor results were all the more worrying as, in 2013, competitors
Sony and Microsoft officially launched their new consoles: the Xbox One
and the PS4. In line with the historical choices of these companies, these two
new machines were clearly intended for experienced players and once again
offered much higher performance levels than the Wii U. The arrival of these
new-generation consoles was likely to make it even more difficult for
Nintendo to convince new players.
as a home console; a player can easily start a game at home and continue it
in mobile mode. To promote a nomadic mode, the games are offered in
cartridges.
This hybrid product is a real change in the history of the video game
industry where manufacturers traditionally maintained strict boundaries
between the “home consoles” and “handheld consoles” markets to avoid
cannibalization phenomena. The element of risk is real for Nintendo, which
has always been able to profitably exploit the mobile market, particularly
with its Gameboy, DS and then 3DS consoles. However, since the arrival of
Apple’s iPhone, this very profitable market for Nintendo has been
challenged. In 2016, for the third year in a row, the Nintendo 3DS mobile
phone recorded a drop in sales.
First of all, for Kim and Mauborgne (2004, p. 37), the adoption of a Blue
Ocean strategy implies a break with the “competitive rules” in force. We
have already mentioned the five main rules that have governed the
4 The following verbatim account is an extract from an interview with Satoru Iwata, then
CEO of Nintendo. It appeared in the magazine Venturebeat (June 9, 2009), offering a good
example of this almost constant reference to the Blue Ocean. “Take the example of Wii Fit.
When we talked about it two years ago, a lot of people thought the Wii Balance Board was
crazy. They thought Nintendo would start selling a bathroom scale. But Wii Fit became a
success because we saw a ‘blue ocean strategy’. But now a lot of companies are fighting in
the red ocean of follow-up exercise games. When we introduced the Wii controller, we were
in the blue ocean and this year is still the blue ocean. But the year 2010 may become the red
ocean for motion-sensing controls, based on what Microsoft and Sony say. The advantage for
Nintendo is that we always try to do things that other companies don’t try to do.”
Nintendo in the Pursuit of the Blue Ocean 19
Average
Weak
Price Hard DVD CPU High definition Motion sense Family User
disk integration power Connectivity controller oriented friendliness
For Kim and Mauborgne (2004), four typical actions lead to such an
original positioning. These actions involve eliminating, reducing, raising or
creating criteria that are characteristic of the sector. In our case, the
exclusion and mitigation actions have allowed Nintendo to reduce
design/production costs and thus offer a cheaper product while ensuring
margins. At the same time, actions carried out to strengthen and create
criteria were considered to increase the perceived value of the service.
Unlike its competitors, Nintendo has abandoned the “race to performance”
and designed an offer for a widely renewed audience. For example, in 2008,
Nintendo introduced the Wii Fit, a foot pressure-sensitive board that
determines the player’s center of gravity, weight, position and movement.
This has allowed the development of fitness programs, balance games, etc.,
all market that had not previously been tapped by manufacturers.
In the end, the analysis of the genesis and success of the Nintendo Wii
seems to show how this case corresponds to a Blue Ocean strategy,
characterized by the detection of untapped strategic space, the creation of
new demand and extremely profitable growth. The undeniable success of the
console even seems to reinforce the two authors’ thesis on the “three
characteristics of a good strategy” (Kim and Maubogne 2008, p. 45). There
is indeed a “focus” on a few criteria valued by the target audience, a
Nintendo in the Pursuit of the Blue Ocean 21
The Wii U console did not have the same fate as its predecessor. This
failure is irrevocable and has been acknowledged by Nintendo’s
management. Different questions then come to mind. Has Nintendo
intentionally abandoned the Blue Ocean approach for a more conventional
strategy? If so, why? If not, is Kim and Mauborgne’s approach robust
enough to replicate previous successes? Various arguments lead us to put
forward another hypothesis: Nintendo has inadvertently returned to the red
ocean it had tried to leave with the Wii, due to unclear or insufficiently
asserted strategic choices:
– poor customer targeting;
– an unsatisfactory attempt at technological convergence;
– an unclear value proposition;
– Nintendo’s inability to involve game developers in the new system.
In other words, Nintendo found, with the Wii, that it was not enough to
discover a blue ocean of new players to automatically induce high and above
all sustainable growth. That is why the Wii U was designed to satisfy all types of
players. The new console was therefore technologically more advanced
(graphics quality, Wi-Fi connection, integrated camera, etc.) and comparable
to the PS3 and Xbox360. But the equation turned out to be impossible to
solve because gamers and casual players do not have the same expectations
and it is difficult to offer a product that can meet both targets at an attractive
price. As a result, price differences between competitors were narrowing and
the selling price of the Wii U rose to €349 compared to €250 for the Wii.
Moreover, as soon as the PS4 and Xbox One consoles were launched the
following year, the Wii U experienced a significant technological decline.
Gamers had undoubtedly anticipated this situation and preferred to postpone
their purchase for consoles that they knew would better meet their needs.
Casual players did not find in the Wii U the simplicity of use and user-
friendliness of the Wii. They were disrupted by the Gamepad and the
asymmetric gameplay it allowed. In fact, the value proposition developed for
the Wii U proved to be very difficult for these players to identify. Many first
thought that the Gamepad was an additional accessory for Wii, just as the
Wii Fit could have been. Its usefulness was also challenged by players who
essentially appreciated the detection of movements with the Wii and the
possibility of mimicking certain gestures. Finally, the possibility of playing
on the tablet screen while remaining close to the console (and therefore to
the television) was hardly highlighted. To create a blue ocean, it is certainly
necessary to offer a leap in value, but this must also be perceived by
customers. Obviously neither gamers nor casual gamblers have understood
this.
On the other hand, given the aforementioned factors and the low sales
volumes, game publishers did not follow Nintendo. For their part, it was the
concept of asymmetric play that was the main problem. Since the Wii U was
less powerful than its announced competitors, and had a new tablet, it was
extremely difficult for publishers to develop cross-platform games. The
dilemma of the “chicken and egg” disadvantaged Nintendo here. Very low
6 Nintendo, Financial Results Briefing for Fiscal Year, April 27, 2012.
Nintendo in the Pursuit of the Blue Ocean 23
7 Nintendo was a very powerful publisher when the Wii began to be developed. In 2000, Nintendo
published 6 of the 13 games that exceeded €25 million in turnover, including the top four in the
ranking (the Pokémon series) (Natkin et al. 2002, p. 3).
8 Le point.fr, April 30, 2018.
24 Innovation in the Cultural and Creative Industries
Obviously, Nintendo has learned from the failure of the Wii U. Unlike
the previous system, Nintendo has been very careful to define a clear value
proposition, target customers, and provide a game offer rich enough to
accompany the launch of the system. Here are the ingredients that have
contributed to the Wii’s commercial success and that are likely to explain the
very encouraging debut of the Switch.
the great classics of video games (races, action games, etc.) without
abandoning movement recognition, which is now an essential feature in the
world of video games and which allows the design of complementary
products: “toy-cons” (guns, fishing rods, etc.). This attempt to exploit a new
Blue Ocean is once again leading Nintendo to abandon rules of the
competitive game which have been historically established. The failure of
the Wii U made it necessary to accelerate the development of the next
console (the Switch was announced less than three years later). The power of
the new console remained significantly lower than that of its competitors.
The use of cartridges limited the possibilities of compatibility with other
electronic products.
1.6. Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to discuss the scope and limitations of
Blue Ocean strategies in a particular creative industry, that is, video games.
After a review of the work of Kim and Mauborgne, who started this type of
strategic approach, we proposed a historical study of the strategies deployed
by the console manufacturer Nintendo. This study showed that Nintendo
developed a Blue Ocean strategy with the Wii and that this has led to a
spectacular recovery. However, the events that have occurred since 2010,
and in particular the resounding failure of its Wii U model, raise questions.
In their book, Kim and Mauborgne (2004) write that in most cases the
company behind the Blue Ocean strategy can maintain a competitive
advantage for 10 to 15 years. They add (Kim and Mauborgne 2004, p. 216)
that the rapid imitation of a Blue Ocean strategy is very rare. These claims
must be put into perspective, to say the least, in view of Nintendo’s situation
from 2010 onwards.
Two main questions then emerge from the case analysis. How can we
explain the short duration of the competitive advantage obtained in the Wii
project? Why did the industry players (publishers, studios, etc.) agree to
participate in the Wii and Switch projects, and not in the Wii U project?
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