PERSPECTIVES
The Journal for Decision Makers
presents emerging issues
and ideas that call for action
or rethinking by managers,
administrators, and policy
makers in organizations
KEY WORDS
Fixed-term Employment
Fixed-term Contract
Code on IR
Standing Orders Act
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCom-
mercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-Commercial use, reproduction and distribu-
tion of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.
com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
The Future of VIKALPA
48(2) 87­–99, 2023
Fixed-term © The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
in.sagepub.com/journals-
Employment permissions-india
DOI: 10.1177/02560909231178162
journals.sagepub.com/home/vik
in India
Kanupriya Jain
Special Operations and Talent Acquisition, Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Mumbai,
Maharstra, India
Piyali Ghosh
OB & HR Area, Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, Ranchi, Jharkhand,
India
Shankha Shuvra Misra
Xavier Labour Research Institute, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, India
T
he industrial relations (IR) environment in India and its labour market, have
been undergoing significant transformations in multiple domains for around
two decades after the economic liberalization. Gillan and Lambert (2013)
observe several restructurings at the workplace level in the country. These include,
among others, farming out job functions or services to any third party through
outsourcing, engaging contract labour in the organized sector, the tendency among
managers to avoid acknowledging the right of trade unions to collectively bargain
and the prevalence of voluntary retirement schemes for having numerical flexibility
of the workforce.
In tandem with such changes, precarious forms of work are growing steadily, with
‘a generous use of flexi-category workers’ (Sapkal & Sundar, 2017 p. 342). One
such flexible work arrangement, namely fixed-term employment (FTE) has been
a subject of debates and controversies. The Ministry of Labour and Employment,
Government of India, introduced FTE in 2018 under the classification of workers in
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, 1946. Any FTE worker
is to be hired for a fixed period on an employment contract provided in writing.
Though the duration of employment is fixed, a worker under a fixed-term contract
(FTC) is to be treated at par with a permanent (i.e., regular) worker for all aspects
of service conditions like wages, allowances, other benefits, and hours of work.
This work arrangement is all set to get new emphasis with the introduction and
87
Table 1: Percentage Share of Overall Employment.
Share of Overall Employment
2004–2005
Self-employed 56.9
Regular salaried 14.3
Casual workers 28.9
Source: India Wage Report, (2018).
implementation of the upcoming Labour Codes (Code
on Wages, 2019; Code on Occupational Safety, Health &
Working Conditions, 2020; Code on Social Security, 2020
and Code on Industrial Relations, 2020).
Our study analyses the operational feasibility of having
FTCs in India by discussing their merits and demerits.
We have limited the scope of the article to issues like
unionization of workers on FTC, termination of such
workers and their inclusion in workers’ participation
in management (WPM) of industries. Ahead of the
introduction, the study briefly discusses the restructuring
process in the Indian labour market, followed by a
section that presents some of the advantages that FTE
could bring to employers and some pertinent concerns
related to workers in the Indian context. The section after
that, reviews the practice of FTCs in other countries, the
merits and demerits of these contracts and the prevalent
practices of duration and rules of renewal. A discussion
on policy options for regulating FTCs follows, and the
study ends with concluding remarks.
RESTRUCTURINGS IN THE INDIAN LABOUR
MARKET
Looking back at the evolution of the IR framework, we
observe a consistent context of regulations. Moving
from a pre-independence colonial setup, the legislative
framework for labour has also been evolving. Since 1991,
the Government has adopted several measures to reform
the existing regulations in the labour market, along
with more privatization and increased liberalization
in the industrial policies at the national level. The
overall objective of these measures has been to increase
industrial output and productivity significantly. Data
reported in various studies till 2019 indicate that this
objective has been met, albeit partially.
However, a prevailing neoclassical view is that labour-
related regulations are exogenous to a self-adjusting
labour market and disturb the operations of market
88
Years
2011–2012 2017–2018
52.2 52.2
17.8 22.8
29.9 24.9
forces (Deakin, 2009). Therefore, labour regulations,
more specifically the ones which aim to provide
employment stability, are hindering new investments
and economic and employment growth (Posner, 1984).
Counter to this laissez-faire proposition, there have
been ongoing debates citing the success of various state
initiatives to improve labour market indicators.
Labour productivity has been growing significantly
since 1991 in India. The real gross domestic product
per employed person has increased by three-and-a-
half times since 1991, while the average productivity of
labour in the organized sector has grown around three
times (Dasgupta & Kar, 2018). In contrast, the labour
force participation rate has gone down. Such factors,
coupled with a near-constant unemployment rate,
indicate that the proportion of the population looking
for employment has risen sharply. Real wages have also
increased, although at a variable rate, across various
skill levels. We consider this combination of increasing
real wages and growing unemployment as a unique
labour market outcome.
An analysis of the overall employment status in
the country from 2004 to 2018 (see Table 1) prima
facie indicates an increase in the number of regular
salaried workers and a decrease in casual workers as
a percentage of overall employment (Mehrotra, 2019).
Figure 1 presents the share of wages and profits of the
gross value added in manufacturing between 1993 and
2013. It is evident that the increase in wages has never
come at the cost of profits, thereby attesting to the
fact that firms, on the aggregate, are not suffering as a
consequence (Abraham & Sasikumar, 2017).
Though the increase in labour productivity and
decrease in the number of casual workers have not
happened at the cost of profits, this did not reflect in
the formalization of the workforce. A staggering 90–94%
of the labour force is still away from the protection of
labour regulations and benefits generated for formal
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
Figure 1: Share of Profit and Wages in Manufacturing gross value added (in percentage).
Source: Abraham and Sasikumar (2017).
employment. Evidently, the drop in agricultural
labour has not resulted in commensurate growth in the
organized sector workforce.
Since the past decade, the Government has been
attempting to overhaul the archaic and oft-cited rigid
labour laws, so that the regulatory framework gets more
in sync with the modern business landscape, pushing
for higher employment flexibility. As a part of labour
reforms, four categories of Codes have subsumed and
consolidated 25 central labour laws. The Labour Codes
are also expected to bring about better compliance
with legal provisions. Of these, the Code on Industrial
Relations (referred to interchangeably as Code on IR
from this point ahead) is already inviting criticism for
giving FTE legal sanction, on the grounds of further
reducing formal, stable and regulated employment
(Roychowdhury & Sarkar, 2021).
ISSUES IN FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT MODE IN
THE INDIAN CONTEXT
FTE is not new in India. In 2003, the Government
introduced FTE amidst stiff opposition from all central
trade union organizations (CTUOs). Consequently, this
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
scheme was withdrawn. More than a decade later, in
October 2016, the Government introduced FTCs in the
apparel manufacturing industry. The seasonal nature
of employment in the industry was put up as the
underlying rationale for flexible laws.
In 2017, the Government extended this form of
employment in the leather and footwear sectors under
the ‘Make in India’ Scheme and the National Skill
Development Mission. Now, with the 2018 notification,
the Government has elaborate plans to incorporate FTE.
The Code on IR, which will subsume the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, has included
provisions for FTE. As per Section 2 clause (l) of the
Code, FTE refers to ‘the engagement of a worker on the
basis of a written contract of employment for a fixed
period’.
FTE is now applicable to all industries to promote ease
of doing business. A worker on FTE shall get all the
statutory benefits that a permanent worker is entitled to.
Benefits like gratuity are to be given in proportion to the
service the FTE worker renders, even if the tenure is less
than the qualifying period of employment stipulated in
the respective legislation.
89
During a phase witnessing increasing ‘non-standard
work arrangements’ (International Labour Organization
[ILO], 2015) to bring about employment flexibility, we
perceive it imperative to understand the implications
of FTE contracts, both for employers and workers. This
section presents an elaborate narrative of the advantages
that FTE could bring to employers and the possible risks
to workers.
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF EMPLOYERS
Greater cost flexibility and better control over workers
are two economic advantages that FTE offers to
employers. From the neoliberal view, FTC as a work
arrangement would take out the burden of long-term
cost commitments of an employer (like pension and
tenure-induced wage velocity) associated with formal
employment, thereby paving the way for accelerated
job creation (Roychowdhury, 2019). The Government
has removed the original provision that prevented a
private establishment from converting a permanent job
to a fixed-duration job. The Code on IR does not have
this restriction as well.
With the job market already gloomy in the second year
of the pandemic, employers might prefer more tenure-
based workers over a regular workforce, thus having
a lesser burden of fixed costs. As the scheme of FTE
seems more in line with providing a business with
the flexibility to deal with a changing environment, it
is not surprising that employers have welcomed the
Government’s directive on FTE.
In developing and developed countries, FTE co-exists
with regular employment (ILO, 2015). As opposed to
FTEs, in regular employment, the job tenure is protected.
Wage velocity leads to a ‘decent wage’, as compared
with ‘acceptable wage’, and workers enjoy retirement
benefits in terms of pension and gratuity. This coexistence
enables employers to gradually shift jobs from regular
employment to FTE, without facing any shortage of
workers, given there is a lower-cost alternative ready and
waiting. As a result, the FTE system enables employers to
enforce discipline in their favour, exercising better control
of the workforce (Basu et al., 2021).
Another vital factor to note here is the role of the
government as an employer, especially for organized
labour through the public sector. Though employment of
regular workers in the public sector in India has steadily
declined since the onset of liberalization initiatives in
90
the 1990s (Niti Aayog, 2020), it still employs a significant
part of the labour force. One reason is the extensive use
of contracting out in public sector enterprises (Chandra
& Walton, 2020).
The private formal sector has been experimenting with
various policies on labour flexibility for a long time.
The more economically stable, reputed and older firms
have been following labour-related policies similar to
the public sector, thereby maintaining a certain parity.
It is the newer firms that are instrumental in driving
the present enactments. FTE could be suspected to be
a case for roundabout protectionist cover to such firms.
However, contemporary research has not found much
merit in favour of the role of rigid labour laws and the
inability to hire and fire as a deterrent to employment
growth (Roychowdhury, 2019).
Further, wherever the barriers to hire and fire are
high, workers continue to work in sectors that are
unproductive, the outcome of which is a loss of
competitiveness and less job creation. Employment
legislation that is rigid could push workers to some grey
area. On the contrary, reforms aligned with the World
Bank’s initiative—‘Ease of Doing Business’ have the
potential to spread the scope of regulation by including
employers and workers in the formal sector (World
Bank, 2006). We see this as a strong advantage that FTE
could bring to Indian private enterprises.
Among the other advantages to a employer, fixed-
term workers can now be hired directly without the
intervention of a contractor. FTE may be used as an
alternative to engaging contract labour, thereby giving
the simultaneous advantages of flexibility and reduced
transaction costs. It is argued that FTE would benefit
micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) as these
establishments face labour market rigidities. MSMEs
work in a complicated regulatory environment that
does not deter them from deploying FTE workers as
and when required (Financial Express, 2019). Introducing
FTE could thus help MSMEs generate employment.
Referring to the seminal work of Lepak and Snell (2002)
on HR architecture, we see FTE to be located in the third
quadrant of the matrix on ‘human capital characteristics
and employment modes’ (p. 520). This quadrant
‘contains human capital that is neither of particularly
high strategic value to a firm nor unique’ (p. 521). Our
logic is backed by the argument given by these authors
that such workers are fit for tasks that have limited
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
scope or duration. Employers would thus be keen on
engaging workers on FTC in tasks with low exposure to
risk and lesser focus on value.
Although the two principal advantages of FTE, namely
flexibility and control, are touted widely, there has been
no conclusive evidence of these advantages in the long
run. On the contrary, Wang and Heyes (2020) found
employers who do not deploy FTE in the European
Union (EU) record higher productivity advantages over
those who engage workers on FTC. Similarly, the rising
labour problems across establishments in India raise
doubt over the validity of the claim over control (Kazi,
2021).
ISSUES RELATED TO WORKERS
The policy decision of the Government on FTE is
purportedly non-discriminatory for any worker on FTC
in terms of wages and related benefits. Nevertheless,
there are several risks inherent to FTE for workers in the
Indian IR framework. We have summarized a few such
issues below.
Issues Concerning Wages and Other Benefits
Ideally, fixed-term contractual arrangements are
designed by employers to complete tasks that are time-
bound and tenured in nature. Therefore, the scenario
could be less favourable for unskilled and semiskilled
workers, who comprise the majority of the Indian
workforce (Times of India, 2020) in the immediate future
in terms of long-term employment prospects. This is
also compounded by the fact that these workers are
mostly exposed to unfair practices by their employers.
Compared to European nations, short-term workers
on low wages in India face a staggering 60% wage
penalty because of tenurial insecurity, in sharp contrast
with high-wage workers engaged in longer-term
employment contracts (Menon, 2019).
In fact, we foresee a rise in employment vulnerability
among workers with lower skills in the long run.
Without bargaining power and legislative protection,
fixed-term workers might be obligated to accept lower
wages (Jimeno & Toharia, 1993). In contrast, these
workers should ideally ask for higher wages because of
a lack of security, based on the logic of more risk, and
more returns. Hence, the possibility of a compensating
differential, owing to job insecurity, does not seem to
be relevant, given the massive unemployment rate in
India. Instead of a rising tide lifting all boats, perhaps
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
the biggest argument from the neoliberal camp, FTE can
effectively emerge as the legally sanctioned downward
spiral that can bring down the overall wage rates (Basu
et al., 2021).
A typical example is an increase in wage inequality for
regular urban workers from 1993–1994 to 2011–2012
(ILO, 2018), evident from a sharp rise in the wages of
skilled workers compared with unskilled ones. We align
with Sundaram (2018), who points out that FTE would
benefit the categories of highly skilled workers, as they
are in high demand in their specific industry.
On the benefits side of the argument, the Code on
Social Security claims to extend all admissible benefits
of a regular worker to one on FTC. But, in reality,
establishments that engage workers on FTC tend to
deprive the latter of provident funds and certain other
benefits that are the legal entitlement of any regular
worker. It would be interesting to briefly mention a
recent judgement by the Supreme Court of India in
its January 2020 judgement (Pawan Hans Limited and
Others vs. Aviation Karmachari Sanghatana and Others).
Herein, the apex court has clarified that all contractual
employees who are paid wages directly or indirectly by
the company are eligible for provident funds, irrespective
of the nature and periodicity of their employment.
Issues Related to Termination
Perhaps the most significant challenge would be
the termination of FTE workers (or retrenchment, as
per the Industrial Disputes [ID] Act, 1947). An FTC
implies that a worker is hired for a particular fixed
period, and employers do not have to give notice to the
worker before this period ends. Likewise, this would
mean that employers can terminate such workers
before the contract ends, possibly on the grounds of
non-performance and/or other misdemeanours.
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act, 1947, defines retrenchment
by clearly excluding ‘termination of the service of the
workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract
of employment between the employer and the workman
concerned on its expiry or of such contract being
terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained
therein’. This can easily be extended to the case of fixed-
term workers, the termination of whom is thus not
included within the ambit of retrenchment under this
Act. It follows that an employer does not have to pay
retrenchment benefits to these workers, which might
be construed as empowering employers to hire and fire
91
at will. Interestingly, the Code on IR also has excluded
FTE from the definition of retrenchment by specifying
‘termination of service of the worker as a result of the
completion of tenure of fixed-term employment’.
Issues Related to Unionization
For workers hired under FTE, joining or forming a
trade union is a pertinent issue. Low rates of union
membership among workers on FTC are of concern
for the trade union movement in many countries. For
instance, unions representing FTC workers in the UK
public sector have revealed that member-workers in
casual employment are among the most insecure and
exploited (Conley & Stewart, 2008). Booth and Frank
(1996) point out that most USA unions focus on members
who serve a relatively longer term in an establishment.
In India, the definition of a workman as per Sec. 2(g) of the
Trade Unions Act, 1926, refers to ‘all persons employed
in trade or industry whether or not in the employment
of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises’. For
the chapter on trade unions under the Code on IR, in a
similar vein, a worker means ‘all persons employed in
trade or industry’. The ambit of both these definitions
is wide enough to include FTE workers. Yet, there are
several points of concern that have to be spelt out.
The Indian labour market is still not favourable to
workers. Flexibilities through contractual work have
emerged as a ‘major irritant in the IR scenario of India
in the last decade’ (Sohani, 2015, p. 144). The majority of
the labour laws are applied only to large establishments,
to which, by and large, unions are also confined.
Compliance with labour legislation usually involves a
cost to the employer to revise wages, contribute to social
security, and so on. Unions further contribute to such an
increase in costs and lessening of functional flexibility.
Hence, there has been a tendency in establishments
in the organized sector to avoid applying labour laws
and the formation of trade unions by ensuring that the
workforce employed is small (Papola, 1994). Further,
within an establishment, the category of permanent
workers is mostly unionized and enjoys the best
social security coverage and emoluments compared
with the other types of workers (Vijay, 2005). Regular
contract workers mostly do not have a social security or
emoluments package, nor are they members of a trade
union within the establishment.
Another concern is that multinational companies
(MNCs) tend to victimize employees if they try to
92
unionize. In a study of eight firms operating in India,
including Japanese and Korean MNCs, Hammer (2010)
observes resistance in the management towards trade
union organizations and employers’ mobilization of
state interventions. In the same research, workers of one
of the Japanese firms expressed that the management
prevented them from forming their union and that such
workers were dismissed.
Historically, CTUOs have been affected by a
narrow membership base. They focussed on large-
scale enterprises and public sector workers in the
formal economy, which has been detrimental to the
interests of other categories of workers. However,
Gillan and Lambert (2013) observe a paradigm shift
in the composition, strategies and priorities of trade
unions in India, with specific plans to reach out to
women and contract labour. Unions are extending
their presence in the unorganized sector to include
urban workers from industries like construction,
and the service sector, including transport. Despite
renewed focus of unions on increasing their
membership base, it remains a question whether
FTE workers would be allowed union membership
with the regular workers of any establishment. If
not, how can these workers fight for their legitimate
rights otherwise?
Lack of clarity on unionization for FTE workers could
bring multiple problems. The absence of a collective
forum in the form of a trade union could expose such
non-regular FTE workers to the risk of being deprived
of legitimate benefits. Even if these workers are allowed
to join a union, would an employer pay heed to the
issues peculiar and restricted to FTE workers? One
recent example is of FTE workers of Alliance Air, a
subsidiary of Air India. These workers were being paid
lower wages and given fewer benefits compared to
permanent workers. Air India reportedly ignored the
workers’ demands put up by the Centre of Indian Trade
Unions (Hemalata, 2018).
Other Issues
Workers engaged through a contractor could be on
the permanent rolls of the latter. Hence, removing
contractors as an intermediary at the cost of fixed-
term arrangements directly with the employer could
invite precarious employment status. We foresee an
interesting trade-off for workers on FTE, as they would
get legal recognition but would not have any right to
regularization on completion of the contract.
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
The economy has suffered from a sharp rise in
unemployment from 5.27% in 2019 to 7.11% in 2020, per
the Centre for Economic Data and Analysis. Although
skilled workers might opt for short-term employment
amidst uncertainties as recently thrown open by the
pandemic, they might prefer more stable, regular
employment in the long run, making FTE attractive
to only skilled workers in the short run. FTE assures
flexibility to employers and workers alike. However, an
in-depth look into the concept reveals that this flexibility
is detrimental to female workers. An employer would
like to hire the best talent in the market with competitive
wages and prefer someone for whom it has to be less
accountable in providing various employment benefits,
including maternity benefits. Under such circumstances,
would women willing to work under FTC benefit?
The Indian labour market is unique, with a vast
presence of unorganized labour. Since the past few
decades, the unorganized sector has grown faster than
the formal sector, and this phenomenon is termed
as ‘informalization of the formal sector’. Prominent
features of this sector are low wages, unproductivity
syndrome, and poor working conditions. Another
burning question is whether FTE will bring another
set of workers subject to exploitation similar to the
unorganized sector (NCEUS, 2007)?
For labour, one of the most prominent features of the
Constitution of India is workers’ participation in the
management of industries, laid down in Article 43A
as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The
very idea of empowering workers emanates from the
socialist principle enshrined in the Constitution. There
is a lack of clarity on whether FTE workers would be
allowed to be members of worker bodies like works
committees that promote joint decision-making as
a component of WPM. Furthermore, the legislation
on equal pay for equal work (Equal Remuneration
Act, 1976, which is getting subsumed under the Code
on Wages, 2019) is yet to spell out the rights for this
category of workers.
All the central trade unions have opposed the
directives of the Government on FTE. They argue that
the Government did not consult trade unions and
has ignored the tripartite mechanism. Union leaders
are construing this notification to the Government’s
legitimizing violation of the existing legislative
framework that protects workers’ rights. Unions also
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
translate this scheme to create a trend among employers
to convert permanent workers into FTC workers
(The Economic Times, 2018). Such a shift in workforce
composition could adversely affect those in regular
employment.
Overall, we are faced with several questions. Is the IR
framework in India ready for FTE? Is FTE poised to be a
new form of labour that could be subject to exploitation?
Would the IR system make appropriate changes to
absorb this new form of work arrangement?
FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN OTHER
COUNTRIES
Among the nations in which FTE is in vogue, Spain
stands out as an excellent example as non-standard
work arrangements account for around one-third of
the country’s total salaried employment. Most of these
arrangements are fixed-term, without any implicit or
explicit contract for long-term employment. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007) have assessed the
implications of a rise in wages in FTE in Spain. Their
results indicate that wage growth for workers on an
indefinite term mostly happens through job mobility.
Fixed-term workers, on the contrary, have wage gains
on the job and through job mobility. Jimeno and Toharia
(1993) have empirically established that using FTCs
in Spain brings the risk of greater bargaining and
discrimination against such workers in terms of wages.
Blanchard and Landier (2001) have studied the negative
impact of fixed-duration employment contracts in
France. Theoretically, the authors have posited that
such a reform may be perverse because it leads to higher
turnover and lower welfare. As per the 2015 report on
non-standard forms of employment by the ILO, in some
countries (like the Republic of Korea after the financial
crisis of 1998, Bangladesh in 2010 and Ireland in 2011–
2012), the economic downturn has led to growth in
hiring on very short, temporary contracts rather than
permanent hires, to keep labour costs flexible. The
outcome has been increased volatility in terms of both
employment and unemployment. Such volatility is
likely to make the public budget volatile and bring
severe implications for taxpayers, as more people could
claim unemployment benefits. De Matos and Parent
(2016) observed increased use of FTCs primarily by
start-ups in the early 2000s in Portugal, coinciding with
the country’s deteriorating business climate.
93
RULES FOR DURATION OF CONTRACT AND
RENEWAL OF CONTRACT
Without a proper legislative framework, there is no
doubt that exploitation of this category of workers
is bound to happen. Several countries have tried to
control such exploitation by incorporating appropriate
enactments. The practice of FTC varies widely, ranging
from giving complete flexibility to employers to
restricting the maximum duration of contracts to 18
months. Hoda and Rai (2015) have reviewed the legal
perspective of FTCs in emerging countries, especially
the OECD nations. They observe variations in regulatory
rigour in the legislative frameworks across countries.
For example, while the USA is liberal about all forms of
FTC, France is strict.
Legal provisions in several countries prevent engaging
FTE workers in regular tasks. FTC is permissible only
for a temporary assignment unrelated to an enterprise’s
core business in France. Countries that do not allow this
type of employment in regular, permanent tasks include
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Russia and India. Denmark’s
legal system does not have any statutory restriction on
fixed-term work. The legitimate scope for FTCs in Finland
is limited only to justifiable reasons, while Norway has a
strict regulatory framework (Numhauser-Henning, 2002).
Policies that impose an upper limit on the number of
renewals of any FTC usually aim to render job security.
Several countries have imposed limits on successive
FTE contracts, while some have a legal limit on the
maximum duration for which any worker on FTC
could be employed. Germany is the most liberal for
FTCs, permitting contracts for two years in general and
four years in new businesses. It allows four renewals,
with two years as the maximum cumulated duration.
Similarly, Belgium, Portugal and Slovakia allow up to
four renewals; the Czech Republic, Romania, Greece
and the Netherlands permit three renewals (Aleksynska
& Muller, 2018). In the Netherlands and Belgium, if
an employer fails to comply with the provisions that
regulate FTE contracts, it is mandated to change them
into open-ended employment contracts (Blanpain, 2008).
Countries like Spain, Brazil, Korea and the Netherlands
permit a maximum of two years for FTCs, including
renewal. Earlier, Sweden had a complicated pattern
of restrictions by justification for and/or maximum
duration of such contracts imposed by legislation.
However, since July 2007, Swedish employers may
not cite any objective reason for fixed-term contractual
employment. A new format, namely ‘fixed-term-at-will’
94
has been introduced, by which an employee can work
on such contracts for the same employer for up to two
years within five years. There would be no statutory
protection against the abuse of successive temporary
contracts (Engblom, 2008).
FTCs in Japan generally extend to 3 years. Such an
extension can be up to 5 years for employees above 60
years of age or highly skilled employees, but the number
of renewals has no legal limits. Brazil permits only one
extension, though the cumulated duration must be
restricted to two years. In France, FTCs are allowed only
one renewal, with the maximum term only 18 months.
Zhao and Zhang (2010) have analysed how the
Labour Contracts Law of 2008 in China has influenced
employment relations therein. Workers with 10 years of
continuous work can enter into the second or successive
FTC with a non-FTC. Countries with the norm of two
successive FTCs include Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
Brazil and Vietnam. At the other end of this continuum,
South Africa has no legal restriction on the cumulative
duration or the number of renewals permissible.
MERITS AND DEMERITS OF FIXED-TERM MODE
OF EMPLOYMENT
Flexible forms of work find support from employers on
several grounds. Among the variants of employment
flexibility, fixed-term or a temporary contract
arrangement is of particular interest to organizations
(Guest, 2004). For example, in an investigation of the
Australian black coal mining industry, Waring (2003)
has commented that a rise in temporary employment
arrangements represents an essential remodelling of
employment relations, with the potential to change
bargaining structures in favour of employers. In
countries like Indonesia and China, FTCs are used as a
stepping stone to regular employment in the future, as
employers hire at entry-level using such contracts (Basu
et al., 2021).
FTCs are applied as a flexible mechanism to adjust
employment with business cycle fluctuations in an
economy (Blanchard & Landier, 2001). FTE increases
competition among workers and boosts labour turnover
(Schomann et al., 1998; Blanchard & Landier, 2001). Some
sections of the Indian information and communication
technology (ICT) sector that are dependent on project
workers employed on a fixed-term basis have witnessed
turnover rates as high as 50–75% (Machado & Kourakos,
2004, c.f. Ross & Ali, 2011). As per the International
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
Commission for Labour Rights (2013), auto factories in
India rehire workers repeatedly on completion of their
contracts instead of offering permanent employment.
Basu et al. (2021) describe this phenomenon as
permanent temporary employment.
Fixed-term workers have lower wages and lesser job
stability than their full-time counterparts (Handler,
1995; Peck & Theodore, 2000, c.f. Amuedo-Dorantes &
Serrano-Padial, 2007). These workers do not have any
legal or contractual guarantee of permanent employment
(Basu et al., 2021). Jobs on fixed-term represent ‘one
of the most visible manifestations of job insecurity’
(Scheuring, 2020, p. 92). Kiersztyn (2020) observes that,
especially in occupations that involve highly complex
tasks, early on-the-job experience gained by the Polish
youth could bring better chances of achieving job
stability. In sharp contrast with workers in permanent
contracts (usually referred to as open-ended contracts),
those on FTCs are exposed to a higher risk of job loss
because they have ‘a predetermined expiration date’
(Ruiz-Valenzuela, 2020). Fixed-term and outsourced
ICT workers in Malaysia have less loyalty to their firms
than full-time employees (Ross & Ali, 2011). As Gebel
and Giesecke (2011) argue, this form of employment
has increased inequalities further.
According to ILO (2015), FTE in many countries
increases the risk of unemployment. For example, 2.5%
of permanent workers in Spain reported a loss of jobs
in the last quarter of 2008, vis-à-vis 15% of fixed-term
employees. Workers in ‘non-standard arrangements’
face the consequences of economic adjustments
disproportionately more than regular workers as
employers avoid renewing temporary contracts during
an economic downturn. Another glaring issue against
the fixed-term mode of employment is unionization.
The capacity to hire temporary workers throws open
the risk of reducing the core workforce to a minimum
and could dilute collective bargaining (Waring, 2003).
In a market where employers can choose between
permanent and fixed-term (having short duration and
uncertainty of rehiring) contracts for their workers,
theory predicts that firms tend to invest less in
developing workers on FTCs than their permanent
counterparts (Guadalupe, 2003). Jimeno and Toharia
(1993) highlight a de facto ranking between permanent
employment and FTE, with permanent workers having
the upper hand. The distinction also involves de facto
ranking regarding dismissal as a worker on FTE would
be the first to be dismissed. Labour market reforms in
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
Italy since 2015 have introduced a new type of open-
ended contract that renders increased protection against
unfair dismissal (Pizzoferrato, 2015).
DISCUSSION
The previous sections have highlighted some of the
merits and significant risks associated with FTE as a
‘non-committal’ nature of employment, both globally
and in the Indian context. This section etches out some
specific policy options for regulating FTCs in India.
Apart from the lack of clarity on its implementation
procedure, aspects like the duration of an FTC, provision
for renewal of such a contract, and implications of such
renewal are still not spelt out by the Government of
India. There are some urgent requirements at the policy
level concerning FTCs. These include, among others, a
proper framework guiding the renewal of these contracts
and defining in clear terms the operations in which FTE
workers could be engaged in an establishment. If FTE
is introduced to control the labour costs associated with
termination, what could be the limit at which it can be
said to be illegal? What would be the legal remedies
available in such situations? The Government needs to
clarify whether FTC is to be allowed only in non-core
activities in an establishment.
FTE owes its origin to the textile industry owing to
the seasonal nature of work inherent to the industry.
Extending this practice to all industries in the economy,
many of which may not be seasonal, raises several
doubts. Another glaring issue that could assume critical
importance in the future is the regularization of FTE
workers.
Policymakers could elaborately examine FTCs’
experiences of countries that are similar to India in socio-
economic conditions and labour market indicators. The
maximum legal duration for which FTE workers can
be hired ranges between 1 year or less (as prevalent
in Pakistan, Chile and Zimbabwe) to 10 years or more
(common in China and Switzerland). Renewal of FTC is
seen to range between one to four times. Any standard
of duration and renewal of FTCs could be decided upon
by studying the success (or failure) of such a work
arrangement in any nation as per trend analysis of
various socio-economic parameters.
At the same time, it is essential to give cognisance to
countries such as Sweden, Japan and Germany, as
pointed out by Maira (2014), that have a long-term
95
orientation towards their human resource. In these
countries, there is a significant commitment to the
continuity of service of employees. ‘Flexibility in
employment’ connotes employees’ ability to learn new
capabilities, duly supported by employers, instead of
flexibility to employers to terminate employees easily.
The Government of India can customize and adapt
the philosophy of flexicurity implemented by the EU
for more than two decades. Flexicurity is one of the
mechanisms in the EU to increase the flexibility of labour
markets and enhance the adaptability of employees and
enterprises (Muda, 2010).
The most impactful way to tackle the various challenges
thrown open by FTE is perhaps through an enactment
exclusively for FTE workers in the future, just like
circumstances had paved the way for legislation on
contract labour (Contract Labour [Regulation and
Abolition] [or CLRA] Act, 1970). If all the stakeholders
accept the practice of FTCs, an explicit legal framework
for regulating this type of employment contract is
perceived to be quintessential.
Regulatory guidelines on FTE contracts are laid down
in the Termination of Employment Convention,
1982 (No. 158), and its accompanying Termination of
Employment Recommendation, 1982 (No. 166) by ILO.
The Government of India and its legislative body need
to refer to both to bring about any policy on FTCs.
Further, any policy related to FTE, legislation proposed
exclusively for FTE workers, or an amendment in
the existing legislation must be in consultation with
all central trade unions as vital stakeholders in the
country’s industrial scenario. The needs of employers
and workers should be balanced. Maintaining equality
and non-discrimination in wages, access to collective
bargaining, and social security benefits must be
ensured. Besides, policymakers could consider any
provision by which FTE workers can be offered
permanent employment to increase their morale and
productivity.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the CLRA
Act (which will be subsumed under the Code on
Occupational Safety, Health & Working Conditions,
2020; e.g., failure to register the establishment of hiring
contract labour), fetches only penal consequences
equivalent to imprisonment and fine. Nowhere does
the Act provide for regularization of contract labour in
such an establishment. Policymakers have to be careful
in framing any guidelines regulating a FTC regarding
whether the failure of compliance could have only penal
96
measures or could result in converting the FTC into a
regular employment contract. Such a contract should,
in clear terms, spell out the remuneration, duration,
provision for renewal (like the number of renewals
permissible and the cumulated duration of such
renewals), and other characteristics. For transparency,
it must ideally be signed by both the employer and
the worker as parties to the contract. Alongside this,
to avoid complications, it would be better if employers
engaged FTC workers in non-core activities.
In conceptual terms, the central issue with FTE seems to be
the ‘right’ of employers to exercise hire-and-fire flexibility,
or, in other words, to change the size of their workforce
whenever they choose. Laws limiting or banning FTE
impose formal restrictions on this flexibility or encourage
employers, especially in India, to evade the prevailing
laws through informal (often illegal) actions. Employers
prefer FTC, as these contracts do not include any long-
term cost commitments like formal employment. In
India, much of this debate has involved the hire-and-
fire restrictions on regular workers under the Industrial
Disputes Act and other related issues, such as attempts to
liberalize the CLRA Act, wherein an employer claims that
contract labour systems are necessary due to the excessive
restrictions under the ID Act. Perhaps the design and
implementation of any new policy framework covering
FTE have to be understood in this context.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index
presents a ranking of countries based on the level of
business-friendly environments. Roychowdhury and
Sarkar (2021) note that a country’s ranking would
improve if, among other parameters, its industries
offered FTE in place of regular employment. India
moved up the rankings from 130 in 2017, 100 in 2018 to
63 in 2020. The Government has recently set the target to
reach the top 50, for which it has prescribed around 90
reforms; FTE is one such measure.
Apart from the lack of clarity on its implementation
procedure, aspects like the duration of an FTE, provision
for renewal of FTE, and implications of such renewal
are still unclear. Termination of FTE workers could
also be challenged as it contravenes the existing legal
provisions. It would be interesting to see the wage/
salary structure of workers on FTC. Establishments
that engage such workers, once the Labour Codes are
effective, have to strategically plan out wage/salary
payment. The choice between a consolidated pay or a
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
regular pay scale, monthly or otherwise, must be framed
to avoid legal repercussions.
Any policy guidelines or Act (or amendment of an
existing Act) on FTE, when framed, must keep in
perspective the socio-economic conditions peculiar to
the Indian labour market. A fixed-duration contract
needs to include the duration of the contract, the number
of renewals permissible, and the cumulated duration of
such renewals. As guidelines, policymakers may refer
to the international instances of FTCs. Further, any
guidelines for FTE workers are ideally to be framed in
consultation with all CTUOs.
We have attempted to portray FTE as an ambitious
flexible work arrangement in the Indian IR system
through this narrative. It is somewhat evident that FTE
reflects state-level initiatives to enhance employability
rather than generate regular employment. Trade unions
perceive this to be conservative and restrictive, against
the interests of workers. Unions apprehend that FTE can
spoil significantly more than it could serve to impact the
labour market indicators positively.
FTE can undoubtedly provide employers with an
escape route to reduce risks and costs, we argue that
this work arrangement need not be seen in isolation.
The design of this mode does seem to be conservative,
but we perceive ample opportunity for the state to be
experimental about FTE. In this context, we foresee that
with time, employers could shift to the fourth quadrant
on HR architecture, in which, as per Lepak and Snell
(1999), they would ‘rely on alliances/partnerships for
human capital that is unique but of insufficient strategic
value to employ internally’ (Lepak & Snell, 2002, p. 521).
What has to be ensured is that the escape route to
employers does not end up being an avenue to increase
workers’ exploitation. We must say that FTE is still
experimental, and it is too early to glorify or condemn it.
Only time will tell if this new form of employment can
withstand all challenges. Adequate consultation with all
stakeholders could establish FTE as a pro-worker change,
and not as a signal of hire-and-fire. All-round initiatives
are necessary within the IR framework so that FTE does
not end up as a policy decision that was designed to fail.
DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest
with respect to the research, authorship and/or
publication of this article.
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
FUNDING
The authors received no financial support for the
research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
REFERENCES
Abraham, V., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2017). Declining wage
share in India’s organized manufacturing sector: Trends,
patterns, and determinants [Working Paper No. 67]. ILO
Asia-Pacific.
Aleksynska, M., & Muller, A. (2018). Nothing more permanent
than temporary? Understanding fixed-term contracts,
inwork and governance. Policy brief no. 6, ILO, Geneva.
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_
protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/
wcms_357403.pdf
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., & Serrano-Padial, R. (2007). Wage
growth implications of fixed-term employment: An
analysis by contract duration and job mobility. Labour
Economics, 14(5), 829–847.
Basu, A. K., Chau, N. H., & Soundararajan, V. (2021). Contract
employment as a worker discipline device. Journal of
Development Economics, 149, (in press).
Blanchard, O., & Landier, A. (2001). The perverse effects of
partial labor market reform: Fixed duration contracts in France
[Working Paper No. 8219]. NBER. https://www.nber.
org/papers/w8219 .
Blanpain, R. (2008). Fixed-term employment contracts: The
exception to the rule? International Journal of Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 24(1), 123–131.
Booth, A., & Frank, J. (1996). Seniority, earnings and unions,
Economica, 63(252), 673–686.
Chandra, R., & Walton, M. (2020). Big potential, big risks?
Indian capitalism, economic reform and populism in the
BJP era. India Review, 19(2), 176–205.
Conley, H., & Stewart, P. (2008). Representing fixed-term
workers: The anatomy of a trade union campaign.
Employee Relations, 30(5), 515–533.
Dasgupta, I., & Kar, S. (2018). The labor market in India since
1990s. IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of
Labor (IZA), Bonn, Issue 425.
Deakin, S. (2009). The evidence-based case for labour regulation
[Paper Presentation]. Regulating Decent Work
Conference, ILO, Geneva.
de Matos, A. D., & Parent, D. (2016). Which firms create fixed-
term employment? Evidence from Portugal. Labour
Economics, 41, 348–362.
Engblom, S. (2008). Fixed-term-at-will: The new regulation
of fixed-term work in Sweden. International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 24(1),
133–149.
97
Gebel, M., & Giesecke, J. (2011). Labor market flexibility
and inequality: The changing skill-based temporary
employment and unemployment risks in Europe. Social
Forces, 90(1), 17–39.
Gillan, M., & Lambert, R. (2013). Labour movements and the
age of crisis: Scale, form and repertoires of action in India
and beyond. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,
36(2), 180–198.
Guadalupe, M. (2003). The hidden costs of fixed-term contracts:
The impact on work accidents. Labour Economics, 10(3),
339–357.
Guest, D. (2004). Flexible employment contracts, the
psychological contract and employee outcomes: An
analysis and review of the evidence. International Journal
of Management Reviews, 5/6(1), 1–19.
Hammer, A. (2010). Trade unions in a constrained environment:
Workers’ voices from a new industrial zone in India.
Industrial Relations Journal, 41(2), 168–184.
Handler, J. F. (1995). The poverty of welfare reform. Yale University
Press.
Hemalata, K. (2018). Fixed-term employment for promoting
ease of doing business. https://www.newsclick.in/
fixed-term-employment-promoting-ease-doing-business
Hoda, A., & Rai, D. K. (2015). Labour regulations and growth of
manufacturing and employment in India: Balancing protection
and flexibility [Working Paper No. 298]. Indian Council for
Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER),
New Delhi. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176316
International Labour Organization [ILO]. (2015). Non-standard
forms of employment: Report for discussion at the meeting
of experts on non-standard forms of employment. Geneva,
February 16–19, 2015, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/
documents/meetingdocument/wcms_336934.pdf
International Labour Organization [ILO]. (2018). India wage
report: Wage policies for decent work and inclusive growth.
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---
asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-new_delhi/documents/
publication/wcms_638305.pdf
Jimeno, J. F., & Toharia, L. (1993). The effects of fixed-term
employment on wages: Theory and evidence from Spain.
Investigaciones Economicas, 18(3), 475–494.
Lepak, D. P., & Snell, S. A. (1999). The human resource
architecture: Toward a theory of human capital allocation
and development. Academy of Management Review, 24(1),
31–48.
Kazi, D. (2021). Informal wage labour and capital-labour
struggles in Karnataka’s automotive sector. Journal of
Labor and Society, 24(1), 76–106.
Lepak, D. P., & Snell, S. A. (2002). Examining the human
resource architecture: The relationships among human
98
capital, employment, and human resource configurations.
Journal of Management, 28(4), 517–543.
Machado, V., & Kourakos, G. (2004). IT offshore outsourcing
practices in Canada. Public Policy Forum, Ottawa.
http://www.ppforum.ca/sites/default/files/it_
outsourcing.pdf
Kiersztyn, A. (2020). Who moves from fixed-term to open-
ended contracts? Youth employment transitions in a
segmented labour market. Acta Sociologica, 64(2), 198–214.
Maira, A. (2014). Rethinking labor law reforms. Indian Journal
of Industrial Relations, 50(1, Special Issue on Labor Law
Reforms in India), 24–32.
Mehrotra, S. (2019). Informal employment trends in the Indian
economy: Persistent informality, but growing positive
development. International Labour Organization.
Menon, R. (2019). Short-term Contracts and their effect on
wages in Indian regular wage employment. The Economic
and Labour Relations Review, 30(1), 142–164.
Muda, M. (2010). Estonian labour law reform: The successful
implementation of the idea of flexicurity? International
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations,
26(3), 347–366.
NCEUS (2007). Report on conditions of work and promotion
of livelihood in the unorganised sector. http://dcmsme.
gov.in/Condition_of_workers_sep_2007.pdf
Niti Aayog. (2020). Annual report 2019–20. https://www.
niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2020-02/Annual_
Report_2019-20.pdf
Numhauser-Henning, A. (2002). Fixed-term work in Nordic
Labour Law. International Journal of Comparative Labour
Law and Industrial Relations, 18(4), 429–458.
Papola, T. S. (1994). Employment growth and social protection
of labour in India. Indian Journal of Industrial Relations,
30(2), 117–143.
Peck, J. A., & Theodore, N. (2000). Commentary: ‘Work
first’: Workfare and the regulation of contingent
labour markets. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 24,(1),
119–138.
Pizzoferrato, A. (2015). The economic crisis and labour law
reform in Italy. International Journal of Comparative Labour
Law and Industrial Relations, 31(2), 187–205.
Posner, R. (1984). Some economics of labor law. University of
Chicago Law Review, 51, 988–1011.
Ross, P., & Ali, Y. (2011). Antecedents of employee loyalty in
an emerging economy: The Malaysian multimedia super
corridor. Labour & Industry: A Journal of the Social and
Economic Relations of Work, 22(1–2), 25–51.
Roychowdhury, A. (2019). Application of job security laws,
workers’ bargaining power and employment outcomes
in India. The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 30(1),
120–141.
THE FUTURE OF FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA
Roychowdhury, A., & Sarkar, K. (2021). Labour reforms in
a neo-liberal setting: Lessons from India. Global Labour
Journal, 12(1), 58–64.
Ruiz-Valenzuela, J. (2020). Intergenerational effects of
employment protection reforms, Vol. 62, 101774. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2019.101774.
Sapkal, R. S., & Sundar, K. R. S. (2017). Determinants of
precarious employment in India: An empirical analysis.
In A. L. Kalleberg & S. P. Vallas (Ed.), Precarious work
(Research in the Sociology of Work, Vol. 31, pp. 335–361).
Emerald Publishing Limited.
Scheuring, S. (2020). The effect of fixed-term employment
on well-being: Disentangling the micro-mechanisms
and the moderating role of social cohesion. Social
Indicators Research, 152, 91–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11205-020-02421-9.
Schomann, K., Rogowski, R., & Kruppe, T. (1998). Labour market
efficiency in the European Union: Employment protection and
fixed-term contracts. Routledge Studies in the European
Economy.
Sohani, S. S. (2015). Changes in the Indian economy: Impact
on HR practices & industrial relations. Indian Journal of
Industrial Relations, 51(1), 137–149.
Sundaram, S. (2018). Fixed-term employment in India: An
analysis of industrial employment (standing orders) central
(amendment) rules, 2018. International Journal of Business
and Management Invention (IJBMI), 7(8, Version I), 10–12.
The Economic Times. (2018, March 21). Fixed-term employment
extended to all sectors to boost ease of business. https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/
Kanupriya Jain is presently working as Assistant
Manager (Talent Acquisition & Special Initiatives) with
the Larsen & Toubro Group in India. She graduated with
MBA in HRM from the Indian Institute of Management
Ranchi, Jharkhand, India. Prior to this, she obtained a
BTech Degree in Energy Engineering from the Maulana
Azad National Institute of Technology, Bhopal, India.
e-mail: kanu.mathwiz@gmail.com
Piyali Ghosh is an Associate Professor in the OB/
HR Area of the Indian Institute of Management (IIM)
Ranchi. Prior to this, she worked with the Motilal Nehru
National Institute of Technology Allahabad, Prayagraj,
from where she earned her PhD degree. At IIM Ranchi,
Dr Ghosh is teaching courses on labour laws. Her
research interests include industrial relations, employee
VIKALPA • VOLUME 48 • ISSUE 2 • APRIL-JUNE 2023
government-extends-facility-of-fixed-term-employment-
for-all-sectors/articleshow/63382807.cms?from=mdr
The Financial Express. (2019, November 21). Fixed-
term employment a win-win for workers and
companies; Trade body explains how. https://www.
financialexpress.com/industry/fixed-term-employment-
a-win-win-for-workers-and-companies-trade-body-
explains-how/1771015/
Times of India. (2020, December 17). With 1 in 5 workers ‘skilled’,
India ranks 129 among 162. https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/with-1-in-5-workers-skilled-
india-ranks-129-among-162/articleshow/79769587.cms
Vijay, G. (2005, May 28–June 10). Migration, vulnerability and
insecurity in new industrial labour markets. Economic &
Political Weekly, 40(22/23), 2304–2312.
Wang, W., & Heyes, J. (2020). Flexibility, labour retention and
productivity in the EU. The International Journal of Human
Resource Management, 31(3), 335–355.
Waring, P. (2003) The nature and consequences of
temporary and contract employment in the Australian
black coal mining industry. Labour & Industry: A
Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work,
14(2), 83–96.
World Bank (2006). Doing business in 2006: Creating jobs.
https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/
doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/English/DB06-
FullReport.pdf
Zhao, S., & Zhang, J. (2010). Impact of employment contracts
law on employment relations in China. Indian Journal of
Industrial Relations, 45(4), 566–584.
engagement, and training and development. She has
co-authored a book on Industrial Relations, besides
having to her credit more than forty research papers
published in international journals, including the
International Journal of Manpower and Personnel Review.
e-mail: piyali.ghosh@iimranchi.ac.in
Shankha Shuvra Misra works with ITC Limited
as General Manager, Corporate Human Resources
Department. He completed his post-graduation from
the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, and is
pursuing the Doctoral Program from XLRI, Jamshedpur,
India. His broad research theme is Conflict in Gig
Work—Perspective from a Global South Context.
e-mail: Shankhashuvra.Misra@itc.in
99