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G OA L SYS T E M S T H E O RY
“This book is a celebration of over 20 years of theoretical and empirical work studying
Goal Systems Theory. It is well worth celebrating. The initial ambitious vision for this
theory was to revise the study of motivation, and, impressively, it has done just that.
It is extremely rare for a theory to have the breadth and depth displayed here. We
used to call such theories ‘Grand’, and the research and ideas discussed in this book
are grand indeed. And inspiring. This is a milestone that is must reading for anyone
interested in motivation science.”
—E. Tory Higgins, Professor of Psychology, Columbia University,
Author of Beyond Pleasure and Pain: How Motivation Works
“Do you have more than one goal? Then this book is for you! Like the stars in the sky,
goals wax and wane, harmonize, conflict, or live next to each other. Diving into this
volume summarizing the unique research on goal systems, will give you access to a
new universe of discovery and surprise, of guidance and practical advice. A uniquely
fruitful collaboration of world-leading scientists over the past two decades will lead
you through their research journey into the sky of goal systems.”
—Gabriele Oettingen, Professor of Psychology, New York University,
Author of Rethinking Positive Thinking: Inside the New Science of Motivation
“Pursuing goals is one of the most universal and basic human activities. In this ex-
ceptional book, leading experts summarize their contributions to Goal Systems
Theory, grappling with diverse and fascinating aspects of how people think about,
select, desire, manage, and achieve (or fail to achieve) their goals. This book covers
the latest and most creative work in the field. It is an indispensable resource for an-
yone interested in human goal pursuit—which is to say, anyone interested in human
motivation.”
—Roy F. Baumeister, Professor of Psychology University of Queensland
“Goal psychology is emerging as a hub of many areas of scholarship in the behav-

ioral and social sciences. Goal Systems Theory has ushered a paradigmatic reo-
rientation of this field by uncovering the means-end architecture of the systems of
individuals’ goals. This timely book presents a comprehensive and integrative review
of the important lessons learned over the last two decades from research inspired
by Goal Systems Theory. The diverse programs of research by the contributors to
this book, renowned motivation science scholars, attest to the explanatory power
of Goal Systems Theory and its rich implications for the betterment of individual
and societal functioning. I recommend this authoritative book as a valuable resource
for advanced undergraduate students, graduate students, as well as researchers and
practitioners in psychology and the social sciences.”
—Yaacov Trope, Professor of Psychology, New York University
“Goal Systems Theory has been an especially generative model of motivation for the
field of psychology in general and for me in particular. Commemorating two decades
of research, this volume stands as testament to this theory’s breadth of influence as
well as a harbinger of advances to come. Required reading for anyone who wants to
know why and how people pursue the goals they do.”
—Angela Duckworth, Professor of Psychology,
University of Pennsylvania, Author of Grit
“Goal Systems Theory is a marvelous compilation of essays that will help readers better
understand, navigate, and achieve their multiple goals. Whether you’re a scholar of
motivation interested in the latest research or a curious novice ready to learn about
goal systems from the world’s experts, this book is for you.”
—Katy Milkman, Professor of Business at the Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania and author of How to Change
“Goal Systems Theory is the most important advance in decades in our under-
standing of human motivation. It revolutionizes classic ideas such as intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivation, how people juggle multiple goals, and the relation between means
and goal outcomes. This volume presents novel directions and the latest research on
goal systems, explaining political extremism, risk taking, flow, problem solving, and
identity. It is simply a must-read for all social and behavioral scientists as well as an-
yone interested in why people do what they do. I can’t overstate the significance of
this book.”
—Wendy Wood, Professor of Psychology and Business,
University of Southern California, Author of Good Habits,
Bad Habits: The Science of Making Positive Changes that Stick
“Goal Systems Theory is among the towering achievements of twenty-first-century

motivation science. Its power was readily apparent upon publication of the land-
mark 2002 paper introducing the theory, and yet its influence has grown in ways that
were hard to fathom at the time. This essential book captures the power and scope
of the theory across domains ranging from attitudes to problem-solving, from risky
behavior to extremism. These chapters are required reading for anybody seeking to
understand the nature of goals, motivation, or self-regulation.”
—Eli Finkel, Professor at Northwestern University and
author of The All-Or-Nothing Marriage
Goal Systems Theory
Psychological Processes and Applications
Edited by
A R I E W. K RU G L A N SK I
AY E L E T F I SH BAC H
C ATA L I NA KO P E T Z
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2023
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

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rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Kruglanski, Arie W., editor. | Fishbach, Ayelet, editor. |
Kopetz, Catalina E., editor.
Title: Goal systems theory : psychological processes and applications /
[edited by] Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022060618 (print) | LCCN 2022060619 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197687468 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197687482 (epub) |
ISBN 9780197687499 (online)
Subjects: LCSH: Goal (Psychology) | Motivation (Psychology) |
Cognition. | Decision making.
Classification: LCC BF 505 . G 6 G 64 2022 (print) | LCC BF 505 . G 6 (ebook) |
DDC 158.1—dc23/eng/20230222
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060618
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022060619
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197687468.001.0001
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Contents
Contributors vii
Introduction: The Principles of Goal Systems Theory 1

Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski
1. New Developments in Goal Systems Theory 9
Arie W. Kruglanski
2. A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior 25
Catalina Kopetz and Wesley Starnes
3. The Means–Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation 55
Kaitlin Woolley and Ayelet Fishbach
4. The Structure of Immersive and Engaging Activities:
Insights from a Computational Model of Flow 77
David Melnikoff, Ryan Carlson, and Paul Stillman
5. The Temporal Dynamics of Goal Systems: How Goal Progress
Changes the Drivers of Motivation 103
Szu-chi Huang
6. Paying for Goals and Means 130
Franklin Shaddy
7. Variety among Means: Advancing Understanding of
Equifinality in Goal Systems 150
Jordan Etkin
8. A Goal Systematic Approach to Persuasion:
Influencing Attitudes and Behavior 173
Birga Mareen Schumpe
9. Needs Find a Way: Means-Shifts, Domain Jumps, and
Leaps of Faith 190
L. Maxim Laurijssen and N. Pontus Leander
10. Problem Solving from a Goal-Systems Perspective 211
Benjamin A. Converse
11. Extremism and the Extreme Personality 239
Ewa Szumowska, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Catalina Kopetz
vi Contents
12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the

Goal Systems Theory 257
Katarzyna Jaśko
13. The Interplay between Goal Systems and Identities 280
Maferima Touré-Tillery and Jessica Gamlin
Index 307
Contributors
Ryan Carlson N. Pontus Leander

Yale University Wayne State University
Benjamin A. Converse David Melnikoff

University of Virginia Northeastern University
Jordan Etkin Birga Mareen Schumpe

Duke University University of Amsterdam
Ayelet Fishbach Franklin Shaddy

University of Chicago University of California, Los Angeles
Jessica Gamlin Wesley Starnes

University of Oregon Wayne State University
Szu-chi Huang Paul Stillman

Stanford University Yale University
Katarzyna Jaśko Ewa Szumowska

Jagiellonian University Jagiellonian University
Catalina Kopetz Maferima Touré-Tillery

Wayne State University Northwestern University
Arie W. Kruglanski Kaitlin Woolley

University of Maryland Cornell University
L. Maxim Laurijssen
University of Groningen
Introduction
The Principles of Goal Systems Theory
Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski
In the fall of 2021, between two waves of the COVID pandemic and univer-
sity closures, a group of people who study goal systems theory (GST) met at the
University of Chicago to discuss ongoing research and exchange ideas on where
to go next with the research.
The story of this group started more than 20 years before the Chicago
meeting. In the fall of 2000, Arie met Ayelet at the University of Maryland in
College Park. He was an established professor and a world expert on research
on motivation and cognition. She was a postdoc who wrote her dissertation on
self-control. In their first meeting, Arie expressed his vision that their group
would revise the study of motivation. Ayelet thought it would be nice if they
published a paper.
They started working on what they initially referred to as “goal networks.”
In just a few months, the group, which included Arie, Ayelet, James Shah, Ron
Friedman, Woo Young Chun, and David Sleeth-Keppler, published a paper titled
“A Theory of Goal Systems.” It came out in 2002, and for many of us, it marked
the beginning of long and productive research programs that supported, ex-
panded, and applied the original GST (Kruglanski et al., 2002).
The following year, a new graduate student arrived at the lab. Arie handed
Cata the GST paper and invited her to work on multifinality (a concept that, as
an international student, she could barely pronounce). Cata found the group’s
enthusiasm about the new theory contagious, and she soon became a true be-
liever in GST and an enthusiastic researcher of multifinality.
Our team was intrigued by what we found, curious about what we have yet to
find, and generally busy uncovering the relationships between goals and means
and the implications of these structures for motivation.
None of us could have predicted the breadth of discoveries that GST would
inspire in the 20 years that followed. We were clueless about the relevance of our
work and the number of questions that were inspired by it and that would still
Ayelet Fishbach, Catalina Kopetz, and Arie W. Kruglanski, Introduction In: Goal Systems Theory. Edited by:
Arie W. Kruglanski, Ayelet Fishbach, and Catalina Kopetz, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2023.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197687468.003.0001
2 Goal Systems Theory
occupy the field of motivation more than 20 years later. This book is a celebration
of the work in motivation science that was and is inspired by GST.
GST
A theory offers a set of general principles that explain some empirical observations
or phenomena. At times, the phenomenon begs an explanation. Humans asked
about the origins of diseases thousands of years before Louis Pasteur offered an
answer articulated in his work on germ theory. Other times, the theory informs
us what phenomena might exist and what to watch for. Because we have heard of
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), we expect people who supported
a political candidate to feel more (and not less) committed when this elected
politician’s performance fails to meet the general expectations of a person who
holds a public office.
GST was originated to explain why people pursue the goals they pursue
the way they pursue them. Why, for example, does one person find personal
meaning in planting a garden while their neighbor travels the world for that
same purpose? And why do some choose political extremism while others do
not even bother to vote in a democratic election? Beyond goal selection, what
guides people’s choice of means, that is, the activities or objects they choose to
facilitate their goals? Why, for example, do some health-conscious individuals
eliminate junk food from their diet while others sign up for the gym?
When there are multiple goals, research on GST asked when do people pri-
oritize one goal over others, and when do they seek a compromise between
goals? When there are different means to achieve a goal, GST research asked how
people prioritize these means. When will pursuing one means substitute for an-
other? For example, when will healthy eating substitute for exercising? In con-
trast, when will means complement each other such that pursuing one makes
pursuing another means more likely? To address these questions, GST offers sev-
eral principles and goal configurations.
The Principles of GST
An efficient motivational system operates to maximize goal attainment. The first

principle of GST is: People want to pursue actions, choose objects, and relate to
others who help them achieve more goals without compromising any of these goals.
For example, people prefer healthy food that is tasty and cheap and a job that is
interesting and supports them financially.
Yet, at times people choose the means that achieve less. They might prefer a
pen that is just a pen instead of one that is also a laser pointer (Zhang et al., 2007).
Introduction 3
They might even choose a means that undermines other goals. People some-
times choose a risky activity (e.g., substance abuse) to promote their social status
because, rather than despite, the fact that it undermines their physical health
(Kopetz et al., 2019). People behave as if they do not always prefer the means that
maximize goal attainment.
The reason for these observed anomalies is the second principle of GST: The
number of goals that a given means serves and the number of means that are
connected to a given goal are negatively related to the strength of a given means–
goals link. For example, if biking serves both commuting and exercising, it
will be less strongly connected and, hence, appear less instrumental for either
commuting or exercising. By the principle of maximizing attainment, a person
may spend hours on the exercise bike at the gym and yet commute to work by car.
Even more so, most gym-goers choose to park their car closer to the entrance to
minimize the walk.
This second principle implies that the configuration of a goal system—
the number of means that serve a goal and the number of goals served by a
means—will determine activity selection. Specifically, GST offers four basic goal
configurations.
Equifinality
Equifinal means all serve the same goal and can therefore substitute for each
other. This structure is best captured in the idiom “all roads lead to Rome.”
Equifinal means often seem redundant. Why would a traveler need more than
one way to get to Rome? Yet, equifinal means form a backup plan. When people
are presented with several equifinal means to a goal, they feel more confident
that they can reach the goal. Hence, the mere presence of these means increases
the goal commitment.
On the downside, the presence of equifinal means dilutes the cognitive as-
sociation between the activity and the goal it serves, resulting in less transfer of
properties such as commitment and positive experience from achieving the goal
to pursuing the means (Fishbach et al., 2004). Ultimately, when several activities
serve the same goal, we should expect lower intrinsic motivation to engage in
any of these activities (Kruglanski et al., 2018).
Multifinality
Multifinal means achieve more than one goal. This is best captured in the (less
famous, more animal-friendly) idiom “feeding two birds with one scone.”
Multifinal means maximize attainment, and therefore they should be superior.
In principle, getting more for the same unit of effort should always be the domi-
nant choice. Even if a person does not care for the additional benefits (e.g., they
only wanted to feed one bird), they should not oppose it either.
Take the example of kosher food. If a person learns that some food is kosher,
they should either see it as a benefit (i.e., if they observe the Jewish tradition) or
not; but this information should not undermine their interest in that food. And
yet it does. In a classic demonstration (Simonson et al., 1993), presenting infor-
mation on the status of an ice cream as kosher reduced consumers’ interest in it.
They concluded that it was less flavorful.
Indeed, people often prefer means that achieve fewer goals. The children in
Lepper et al.’s (1973) studies on overjustification were less interested in expressing
themselves through drawing after they learned that drawing is not only a means
for self-expression but can also win them a reward. And children as young as
3 years inferred that food that was said to make them strong cannot be delicious,
so they had little of it (Maimaran & Fishbach, 2014).
Unifinality
Unifinal means achieve only one goal. If only a single road led to Rome, it would
have been unifinal. Unifinal means are less efficient but offer one advantage—
they are strongly associated with the single goal that they help achieve. As a
result, people are often highly intrinsically motivated to pursue their unifinal
means. In this way, the disadvantage of equifinal means is the advantage of
unifinal means.
Counterfinality
Counterfinal means achieve some goals while undermining others. For ex-
ample, a homemade lunch may be healthier than dining out, but it undermines a
person’s goal to socialize with colleagues over lunch at a restaurant. Counterfinal
means are often non-optimal. Instead of maximizing, they minimize attainment.
They are the opposite of multifinal means.
Yet counterfinal means may seem more instrumental for the goal that they
facilitate exactly because they inhibit another goal. When a Canadian pharma-
ceutical company advertised its cough syrup as “it tastes awful and it works,” the
message was that because this cough medicine undermined the taste goal, it was
more instrumental for the goal of getting rid of the cough. Indeed, people often
prefer counterfinal means, and those who have high need for cognitive closure
are even more likely to display this preference (Kramer et al., 2012).
Introduction 5
Research Inspired by GST
The principles and configurations of goal systems helped us explain many of the
anomalies we observed in activity selection. Moreover, they inspired us to make
new predictions for phenomena we did not know existed. One of the earlier
examples comes from research on self-control. We predicted that temptations
might be cognitively associated with the goals that override them. For example,
to watch their weight, people should abstain from high-calorie foods. So, we
predicted and found that dieters associate “chocolate” and “cake” with “dieting”
(Fishbach et al., 2003). It was Arie and Ayelet’s first empirical publication,
coauthored with Ron Friedman.
In another paper, Cata, Ayelet, and Arie found that people who watched their
weight chose healthier foods mainly when no other goals (e.g., food enjoyment,
alleviating hunger) were salient and important. However, when alternative goals
become relatively more salient and important (e.g., people were hungry), the
weight-watching goal lost its pull so that people ate less healthy food (Köpetz
et al., 2011).
The chapters in this book describe research that the principles and
configurations of GST inspired. These chapters illustrate how having a theoret-
ical framework helped to predict phenomena we did not know existed as well as
explain what we often observed but were not sure why.
A Peek into the Discoveries in This Book
The essays included in this book cover part of the recent research in GST. They
connect research in motivation to the basic topics of psychological research, in-
cluding identity, persuasion, problem-solving, and political extremism, among
others. They further advance motivation theory by addressing topics such as in-
trinsic motivation, resource allocation, and means choice.
In Chapter 1, Kruglanski explores several new directions in goal systems re-
search, including identifying that political (and other) extremism stems from
motivational imbalance, a state in which a given need dominates other basic
concerns, and that intrinsic motivation stems from a psychological fusion be-
tween a goal and a means. Importantly, Kruglanski argues that one basic need—
the need for social significance—underlies many of the goals that people pursue
(from finding romance to political extremism).
In Chapter 2, Kopetz and Starnes explore risk behavior. They argue that risk-
taking is not irrational; neither does it represent self-regulatory failure. Instead,
risk behavior is a means to a goal. For example, the appeal of substance abuse
for adolescents (prior to addiction) comes from the perception that certain
substances signal high social status and belonging to the group. By their analysis,
risk behavior often results in focusing on one goal and the inhibition of alterna-
tive considerations for health or safety.
In Chapter 3, Woolley and Fishbach return to intrinsic motivation and ex-
plore the means-ends fusion model of intrinsic motivation. According to this
model, intrinsic motivation results from the strong association between an ac-
tivity (means) and its end goal; it occurs when the means and the ends collide.
They explore the antecedents of means–ends fusion and its consequences for ad-
herence to work, health, and academic goals.
In a related line of research, Melnikoff, Carlson, and Stillman explore flow in
Chapter 4. This chapter provides a goal systems analysis of psychological flow.
Building on the notion of means–end fusion, the authors offer an informa-
tion theory of flow, according to which learning tasks that induce the strongest
goal–means association are more effective at generating flow and, consequently,
learning.
Goals are not static, and neither is the process of pursuing them. In Chapter 5,
Huang explores the temporal dynamics of goal pursuit. Her temporally dynamic
goal pursuit model explains how various factors (e.g., the number of equifinal
means) influence motivation at the beginning versus middle versus toward the
end of a goal. Motivation is a function of expectancy and value, yet expectancy
matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, while value matters more once
expectancy has been established. It follows, for example, that having multiple
means matters more at the beginning of goal pursuit, when people are less con-
fident they can do it, than later, when their confidence and commitment are
established.
In Chapter 6, Shaddy explores resource allocation in goal systems. He argues
against the common perception that people invest resources only in means to a
goal. Instead, he documents instances where people can invest both indirectly
in the means and directly in the goal and that people prefer to invest in goals. He
then explores how the architecture of goal systems and the characteristics of the
individuals involved both influence resource investment.
Chapter 7 explores variety among means. Etkin describes the relationship
between equifinal means to a goal, asking how actual and perceived variations
among means to a goal influence motivation. She further explores means variety
as an end in itself.
Goal systems have important implications for attitude research and per-
suasion, which are topics Schumpe explores in Chapter 8. She explains how
GST helped develop persuasion techniques. For example, the principle of
counterfinality (e.g., presenting a mouthwash that causes burning sensa-
tion) inspires persuasion appeals that emphasize rather than hide the fact that
a product that facilitates one goal also inhibits others. Similarly, multifinality
Introduction 7
(adding a goal), equifinality (adding a means), and contrafinality (adding a

means that undermines the goal) offer distinct persuasion techniques.
In Chapter 9, Laurijssen and Leander explore means substitution. When
goals are disrupted, we should expect people to switch to a different means or
goal. Unlike Etkin’s analysis of choosing between equifinal means, this chapter is
about finding a route after the original one was frustrated. The authors present a
shifts–jumps–leaps perspective of means substitution, which distinguishes be-
tween three qualitatively distinct types of shifts: shifts between means within a
current goal domain, jumps to other domains, and leaps of faith into unexpected
or new directions. They next explore implications for the frustration-aggression
phenomena and how shifts can produce aggressive responding.
Chapter 10 discusses implications of GST to problem-solving. Converse
analyzes what theory on problem-solving can gain by incorporating motiva-
tion theory to its analysis. He highlights a key difference between a goal and a
problem, which is that a problem lacks a representation of the appropriate means
and their relationship to overriding goals. A problem arises when the goal system
is incomplete. Converse specifically addresses how viewing problem-solving
through a goal systems lens sheds new light on elements—the components of
problem-solving—and processes—the generic problem-solving cycle.
Chapter 11 explores extremism. Szumowska, Kruglanski, and Kopetz pro-
pose that motivational imbalance, in which one need dominates over the others,
releases pursuit of activities that would not be considered if the person was con-
sidering their entire set of goals. They use this principle to explain both violent
extremism and devoted humanism. They argue that similar principles also ex-
plain self-harming behaviors.
In Chapter 12, Jaśko focuses on political engagement. She identifies how the
principles of goal systems explain people’s decision to engage in all sorts of polit-
ical actions, from signing a petition to risking one’s life for a political cause.
Finally, Chapter 13 applies GST to the study of identity. In exploring the in-
terplay between these related but distinct areas of research, Touré-Tillery and
Gamlin note that both goals and identities are stored in memory in an inter-
connected, hierarchical structure. The cognitive structures that support goals
and identities are further intricately linked. Goal pursuit shapes identities, and
identities influence which goals are being pursued and which means are selected
in pursuing these goals. These authors’ work specifically demonstrates how goal
systems shape identities and how identities shape goal systems.
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Fishbach, A., Shah, J. Y., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). Emotional transfer in goal systems.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(6), 723–738.
Köpetz, C., Faber, T., Fishbach, A., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2011). The multifinality
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1
New Developments in Goal
Systems Theory
Arie W. Kruglanski
The year 2022 marks a 20-year anniversary of goal-systems theory (GST),

which made its debut in a 2002 paper at the Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology volume (Kruglanski et al., 2002). At a recent conference at the
University of Chicago dedicated to this event, colleagues whose work was in-
spired by the theory presented exciting papers on a wide range of topics attesting
to the theory’s usefulness and breadth. These presentations in their complete
form constitute the various chapters of this volume. In the present chapter my aim
is to review several theoretical and empirical developments in the goal systemic
framework that informed the research in my own lab over these last decades.
These include further exploration of the constructs of equi-and multifinality, as
well as the introduction of a new structural construct, counterfinality, and ex-
amination of its implications. They also include a new model of intrinsic mo-
tivation based on the structural properties of the GST. Both the structural and
allocational properties of the GST are drawn upon in a model of extremism that
we have recently presented (Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021); it identifies
a common psychological dynamic that underlies such different types of “ex-
tremism” as terrorism, engagement in extreme sports, embarking on extreme
diets, extreme love crushes, and extreme humanism. Finally, I tie the concept of
goal systems to the fundamental notion of basic human needs and show how this
conjunction can be used to understand and modify a wide range of behaviors,
including the aggressive response to frustration and romantic love.
The Architecture of Goal Systems: Equifinality,

Multifinality, and Counterfinality
The relations between goals and means can be mentally represented via several
different configurations, each with important psychological implications. Three
Arie W. Kruglanski, New Developments in Goal Systems Theory In: Goal Systems Theory. Edited by:
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197687468.003.0002
(a)
Goal
1
Means Means
1 2
(b)
Goal Goal
1 2
Means
1
(c)
Goal Goal
1 2
Means
1
Figure 1.1 (a) Equifinality configuration. (b) Multifinality configuration.

(c) Counterfinality configuration.
such forms, equifinality, multifinality, and counterfinality, were addressed by

work in our lab. Equifinality (see Figure 1.1a) refers to the case wherein several
means are attached to a given goal such that each of the means can on its own
accomplish (is sufficient condition for) goal attainment. Multifinality (see Figure
1.1b) represents the case wherein the same means simultaneously serves sev-
eral goals. Counterfinality (Figure 1.1c). Studies addressing these configurations
were reviewed at some length in a paper published by Kruglanski et al. (2015).
Here, I offer a thumbnail discussion of this work.
New Developments in Goal Systems Theory 11
Equifinality
A major implication of the equifinality configuration is the possibility of

substituting one means for another. This basic motivational concept, immanent
already in Freud’s (1920) notion of symptom substitution and Lewin’s (1935)
work on task substitution, was touched upon in several research domains in-
cluding work on different routes to dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957), dif-
ferent routes to persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and different methods of
self-esteem maintenance (e.g., Steele & Liu, 1983; Tesser, 2000), among others.
Substitutability work carried out in our lab examined the effects of multiple
means to a goal on commitment to the goal and to the means. This research found
that having alternative means to the goal increases goal commitment, while at
the same time reducing commitment to each of the separate means (Kruglanski
et al., 2011). The reduced commitment to the equifinal means is attributable in
part to the dilution effect—the reduced association strength of a given means to
the goal in the presence of alternative such means. Evidence for the dilution ef-
fect in the context of the equifinality configuration was obtained in a series of
studies by Bélanger et al. (2015) and a research program (Dugas & Kruglanski,
2013) about commitment to groups viewed as means to social identity.
A series of studies by Etkin and Ratner (2012) hypothesized and found that
individuals who perceive themselves as having made little goal progress prefer a
set of equifinal means that is high in variety as such means carry greater assur-
ance of goal attainment than a homogeneous means set. Finally, Milyavsky et al.
(2022) found that personal agency and social assistance can be viewed as alter-
native means of goal attainment such that reliance on one reduces reliance on
the other, with important downstream consequences for people’s social attitudes.
Multifinality
The simultaneous presence of several salient goals can lead to goal conflict and
require a choice as to which goal to prioritize. But often a means can be found
that accomplishes all those goals at once. One may find a job that is interesting,
offers good working conditions, and provides an opportunity to serve society.
One may cook a dish that is nutritious, tasty, and easy to prepare. On first glance,
finding a way to accomplish several goals at once may seem all good and to afford
greater value than the pursuit of each goal individually. But there is a downside
to this story in that the greater the number of goals connected to a given means,
the weaker the connection. In other words, the number of connections to a given
entity (goal or means) in a goal system dilutes the strength of the connections.
Further, because connection strength is typically construed as instrumentality of
the means with respect to the goal, the greater the number of goals that a given
means serves, the lower its perceived efficacy in serving those goals.
This dilution effect, mentioned earlier in reference to the equifinality config-
uration, was first discovered in a series of experiments by Zhang et al. (2007).
For instance, in a scenario, a means (e.g., eating tomatoes) was related with one
goal (e.g., preventing heart cancer or preventing eye disease) versus two goals (e.g.,
preventing heart cancer and preventing eye disease), which in turn affected the
means’ perceived instrumentality to the goal(s): A means said to serve one goal
was seen as more instrumental to that goal than a means said to serve two goals.
This effect was replicated in several studies that varied in the contents of the goals
as well as in the manner in which those goals were presented (self-generated vs.
described by the experimenter). Zhang et al. (2007) also varied the similarity
(vs. distinctiveness) of the goals to each other and the degree of association of
each of the goals to the focal means. The dilution effect was more pronounced
when two goals were distinct rather than similar, presumably because similar
goals activated each other. Too, the greater the manipulated association between
the means and one of the goals, the lesser was the perceived association between
the means and the remaining goal.
Zhang et al.’s (2007) experimental paradigm was used in a series of studies
by Orehek et al. (2012), who found evidence for moderation of the preference
for unifinal versus multifinal means. Specifically, individuals high on the loco-
motion tendency (the self-regulatory orientation that constitutes a desire for
movement and change) prefer unifinal means, whereas those high on the as-
sessment tendency (the self-regulatory orientation that involves a desire to crit-
ically evaluate alternatives) prefer multifinal means. This supported the authors’
hypothesis that high locomotors are particularly affected by the expectancy
component of motivation that affords quick progress toward the goal, whereas
high assessors are particularly sensitive to the value component that they strive
to maximize.
Catalina Kopetz’s doctoral dissertation explored another facet of the
multifinality configuration, thus discovering the multifinality constraint effect
(Kopetz, 2007; Kopetz et al., 2011). It has to do with the fact that the simulta-
neous presence of several active goals exercises constraints on means to those
goals such that means that serve some of those goals while undermining others
will tend to be avoided. Consider the co-active goals of satisfying one’s hunger,
satisfying one’s taste, and taking care of one’s health. This creates a situation in
which the selected foods will be those that, while nutritious, are also tasteful and
healthy, whereas unhealthy and tasteless foods would be avoided.
Kopetz et al. (2011) also investigated the case in which one of the active goals
becomes dominant. According to the allocational principle of finite mental re-
sources, this should result in the concomitant withdrawal of resources from the
alternative goals, thus weakening the constraints they would normally exercise
on means to the dominant goal. In consequence, the consideration set of means
to the dominant goal now expands, producing a situation in which nearly “any-
thing goes” that serves the dominant goal, including means that normally would
undermine (some of) the alternative goals. I revisit that point at a later junc-
ture when reviewing the GST-inspired work on the psychology of extremism
(Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021).
Counterfinality
Those latter means, ones that undermine some goals while serving others, are
therefore labeled as counterfinal. Often, those means are avoided, especially when
the goals they undermine are salient; but occasionally they are even preferred
over other means to a goal. Specifically, when one goal becomes dominant and
other goals are crowded, the counterfinal means that serve the dominant goal
(while undermining other goals) can be particularly attractive. Counterfinality
has intriguing psychological properties that “irrationally” enhance its ap-
peal: Such means often are alluring precisely because they are counterfinal. That
may be the case because the counterfinal means is perceived as uniquely, and
hence particularly strongly, attached to the focal goal (Kruglanski, 1996; Zhang
et al., 2007) and because it brings to mind the “cost heuristic” whereby costs are
seen as a proof of efficacy, along the lines of the “no pain no gain” slogan that
portrays pain (or cost) as the necessary condition of goal attainment (see Kruger
et al., 2004; Labroo & Kim, 2009). Along these lines, a set of studies by Freund
and Hennecke (2015) demonstrated that less enjoyable means (and in that sense
counterfinal to the goal of enjoyment) were viewed as more instrumental to the
goals they were assumed to serve. Another example of this phenomenon is the
so-called martyrdom effect whereby people believe that someone who suffers
while helping is actually more helpful (Olivola & Shafir, 2009).
Schumpe et al. (2018) demonstrated the counterfinality effect in five studies.
For instance, the more pain people experienced when getting tattooed, the more
they perceived getting tattooed as instrumental to the goals of being unique and
showing off. And the more counterfinal a consumer product was considered to
be (i.e., a “burning oral rinse”), the greater was its perceived effectiveness (in
fighting germs). Other studies in the Schumpe et al. (2018) series showed that
counterfinality resulted in a more positive attitude toward the means and that
a simultaneous commitment to both the focal and the alternative goals reduced
the preference for the counterfinal means. Research by Catalina Kopetz (see
Chapter 2 in this volume) also demonstrates that risk behavior is perceived as
more instrumental to one’s goals, particularly when it is seen as counterfinal.
Because counterfinal means are perceived as particularly instrumental to

goal attainment, their attractiveness is more pronounced when the general ex-
pectancy of goal attainment is low. In this vein, Bélanger et al. (2015) found that
individuals high on depression or anxiety who are generally pessimistic about
their likelihood (expectancy) of goal attainment exhibit a strong preference for a
counterfinal means. Klein (2013) found that a goal that was portrayed as difficult
to attain (curing severe illness) led participants to prefer a counterfinal (expen-
sive) means more so than a goal that was easier to attain (curing a common cold).
The appeal of counterfinal means may in some cases promote dependency
and addiction. Thus, Connor et al. (2011) found that individuals who felt that
smoking cannabis has negative consequences (e.g., makes them feel insecure)
are more dependent on the drug. Similarly, Li and Dingle (2012) found on the
basis of survey data that beliefs about the negative consequences of alcohol con-
sumption (e.g., being hungover) were positively related to risky alcohol con-
sumption such as binge drinking.
The Psychology of Extremism
An important feature of the GST is its breadth and scope. In this way, it affords
a prism on a wide variety of phenomena, all of which are governed by the same
basic cognitive and motivational principles. A recent example of a GST-derived
insight into an important social phenomenon is the application of work on
counterfinality and the multifinality constraint effect to the psychology of ex-
tremism. In popular parlance, the term extremism has come to signify specif-
ically political violence and terrorism. Yet there are numerous other types of
behaviors generally regarded as extreme: extreme diets, extreme sports, extreme
(exceptional) humanitarianism, extreme substance or behavioral addictions, etc.
A goal systemic perspective allows a common understanding of all those extreme
behaviors (for extensive discussion, see Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska,
2021; Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al., 2021). That approach views extremism as
based on a motivational imbalance in which a given need dominates other basic
concerns. A motivational balance exists where all of the person’s basic needs are
in their region of satisfaction. Such well-rounded care for all one’s basic needs
defines the state of moderation. A state of motivational imbalance, which gives
rise to extremism, occurs where one of the basic needs gains dominance and
crowds out other basic concerns. As noted earlier, this liberates the means to the
dominant need from constraints exercised by those alternative (and now faded)
concerns. The resulting expansion of the consideration set of means to the dom-
inant goal comes to include now counterfinal means, ones that effectively under-
mine or sacrifice the alternative concerns. As most people attempt to maintain a
motivational balance, they refrain from carrying out counterfinal behaviors that
sacrifice some of their needs. As a consequence, counterfinal behaviors are typi-
cally rare, consistent with their labeling as extreme.
Extensive empirical evidence for the proposed motivational imbalance model
of extremism is reviewed by Kruglanski, Kopetz, & Szumowska (2021) and
Kruglanski, Szumowska, et al. (2021). It includes studies attesting to the neg-
ative relation between the motivation to pursue dominant versus alternative
needs as well as research examining cognitive, behavioral, affective, and social
consequences of motivational imbalance. The cognitive consequences included
studies of selective attention, inhibition, rumination, projection, and choice
expansion (in considered means to the focal goal). Behavioral consequences
included increased tendency to choose the counterfinal means when under
motivational imbalance and a decreased tendency for such a choice prompted
by the restoration of balance. Affective consequences included studies of con-
siderable emotional volatility when under a state of motivational imbalance,
the alternation between the proverbial “agony” and “ecstasy.” Finally, the social
consequences of motivational imbalance were attested to by the relative infre-
quency of protracted tendencies to perform counterfinal behaviors and by the
status of social deviants accorded to individuals who exhibit such tendencies.
The GST-based work on the psychology of extremism has resulted so far in two
conferences on this topic that brought together scholars with diverse interests
(from neuroscience to culture) yet sharing in common the focus on extreme be-
havior and in an edited volume on the psychology of extremism whose chapters
describe the varied extremisms and their underlying dynamics (Kruglanski,
Szumowska, et al., 2021).
The Means–Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation
Another important application of the GST is to the phenomenon of intrinsic mo-

tivation. According to the theory, the links that connect means to goals can vary
in strength. And the greater the links’ strength, the more the means brings to
mind the goal and vice versa. In fact, when the association between the means
and the goal is very high, the two are nearly indistinguishable, or cognitively
“fused” with each other. In other words, under such fusion, performance of the
activity (the means) is experienced as attainment of the goal, and the activity
is perceived as intrinsically motivated, that is, as an end in itself. Based on this
logic, Kruglanski et al. (2018) defined an intrinsicality continuum that reflects
the degree to which the means–end fusion (MEF) is experienced. The MEF
theory assumes that fusion is affected by four major factors: (1) repeated pairing
of the activity and the goal, (2) uniqueness of the activity–goal connection,
(3) perceived similarity between the activity and its goal, and (4) temporal im-
mediacy of goal attainment following the activity. Kruglanski et al. (2018) offer
evidence for each of the foregoing determinants of intrinsic motivation.
The idea that repeated pairing of a stimulus and a reward results in associa-
tion between the two has been the mainstay of classical conditioning theory, one
of the most robust and well-documented theories in the history of psychology
(for review of the relevant evidence, see, e.g., Hilgard & Bower, 1966). As a re-
sult of classical conditioning, the neutral stimulus acquires motivational value
and comes to serve as a secondary reinforcer (e.g., see discussion by Robinson &
Berridge, 1993), that is, a goal that the animal or the human would then strive to
attain.
Kruglanski et al. (2018) reasoned that a continuum of intrinsicality reflects
the degree to which the activity (the means) is seen as likely to result in goal
attainment, the upper bound of which is where the activity is itself perceived
as constituting goal attainment. To address this implication of the MEF theory,
Zhang et al. (2007, Study 4) repeatedly (and subliminally) flashed words re-
lated to the goal of strengthening muscles (e.g., muscle) concomitantly with a
(supraliminal) presentation of a specific means to that goal (i.e., jogging). This
procedure significantly increased the perceived instrumentality of the means
to the goal while concomitantly decreasing the perceived instrumentality of the
same means to an alternative goal (increasing blood oxygen). These findings
were conceptually replicated in research by Bélanger et al. (2015, Study 4).
Strengthening the means–end connection increases the perceived instru-
mentality of the means to the goal and, in this sense, increases intrinsicality. On
the other hand, establishing alternative links between the means and alternative
goals or between the goal and alternative means dilutes the strength of a given
means–end connection, and hence reduces the means’ perceived intrinsicality.
Work reviewed earlier on the dilution effect, in both the multifinality and the
equifinality contexts (cf. Bélanger et al., 2015; Kruglanski et al., 2011; Zhang
et al., 2007), yields findings supportive of this theoretical implication.
Goal attainment results in positive affect. Therefore, increasing the fusion be-
tween the activity and the goal should result in that positive feeling seeping into
the activity as well. This prediction of the MEF theory was supported in research
by Fishbach et al. (2004, Study 1), where participants reported more positive
affect toward the activity (means) in a condition where they generated a single
versus two means to the goal, the latter known to dilute the means–end connec-
tion, and hence to reduce the MEF (Zhang et al., 2007).
Other research supportive of the MEF theory is work by Woolley and Fishbach
(2018; see also Chapter 3 in this volume), showing that the immediacy with
which the goal follows the means increases the degree of the MEF and, hence, the
means’ instrumentality/intrinsicality to the goal. Specifically, it was found that
receiving the immediate (vs. delayed) reward for performing the experimental
task increased experienced enjoyment, interest, and intention to pursue the ex-
perimental task in the future—typical effects of intrinsic motivation to an activity
(e.g., Deci et al., 1999). Similarly, research by Fishbach et al. (2004) supported the
theoretical implication of the MEF model whereby the magnitude of affect to-
ward the fused activity should be correlated with the magnitude of affect that the
goal attainment itself engenders. Specifically, Fishbach et al. (2004) found that
the affect felt toward the means corresponded more to the affect toward the goal
when the two were strongly versus only weakly associated.
Studies also found support for the mediating role of fusion in effects of im-
mediacy on means instrumentality (Woolley & Fishbach, 2018) and for the im-
plication that for the fused means to be endowed with qualities that characterize
goal attainment, the goal needs to be active in the first place. In short, the MEF
model of intrinsic motivation is based on extensive and wide-ranging research
concerning its varied implications. In so far as intrinsic motivation toward activ-
ities is of considerable importance in multiple domains of human endeavor (e.g.,
in work, sports, and education), the novel insights that this model provides could
prove to be of considerable practical utility.
Applying the GST to Real-World Phenomena:

Current and Future Research Directions
On the Origins of Goal Systems. The Origin Question:

Where Do Goals Come From?
A fundamental assumption of the GST is that goal systems are hierarchical; that
is, all goals actually are means that serve a supreme goal at the apex of the hier-
archy. That supreme goal is nothing but a basic psychological need. Psychological
theorists from Freud onward (including Deci & Ryan, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Higgins,
2012; Maslow, 1943; McDougall, 1908) assume the existence of basic biolog-
ical and psychogenic needs, and from the GST perspective each goal system is
“crowned” by a basic need. This suggests that all our goals, at the end of the day,
are geared to serve basic needs. The basic needs are the “dogs that wag the tails” of
all that we ever do. We assume them to be universal and fixed, part and parcel of
“human nature,” the structure of our psyche if you will.
In contrast, the goal systems that serve those needs are fluid and highly var-
iable. They are culture-specific, context-specific, and socially constructed. They
are tied to the satisfaction of the basic needs via narratives that are validated by
one’s in-group or social network. The need, the narrative, and the network define
our 3Ns model of behavior that we believe to be quite general (see Kruglanski,
Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019). In other words, any behavior whatsoever is in

service of some need or need combination (the need component of the 3Ns); the
satisfaction of that need factor is guided by a narrative that specifies what goals,
subgoals, etc. would, in a given situation, serve the need(s) in question; in turn,
that narrative is socially validated by a network of significant others, members of
one’s in-group. This gives it credibility, and hence the power to guide behavior.
Different goal systems can be constructed to satisfy any basic need out of beliefs
shared within a network or a community of meaning. This is important because
it affords substitution of a given goal system regarded as problematic or undesir-
able in some sense by another goal system that is more desirable.
According to this analysis, a goal systemic understanding of any behavior
should start with identifying the basic need that ultimately drives it. This is the
departure point from which one can explore the goal systems that have been or
can be constructed to gratify that basic need. So you can always ask what basic
need does a given behavior serve? And are there other means that serve the same
basic need and that can be substituted for the current behavioral means?
In the past decade or so, my colleagues and I were interested in one such basic
need, the need for social significance and worth (arguably, the single most im-
portant social need), and examined it empirically in a series of papers in which
Pontus Leander, Kasia Jaśko, and other friends have participated, including our
comprehensive statement of significance quest theory, now published online in
the Perspectives on Psychological Science.
Terrorism
We have been studying this need in several contexts starting with the context of
terrorism. In the terrorism literature a major question has been that of terrorist
motivation: Why in the world do they do it? And terrorism researchers have
identified a variety of motivations (the perks of paradise, vengeance, adoration
of the leader, feminism). They concluded, therefore, that terrorism is multiply
determined. But there is a different, and potentially more useful and parsimo-
nious, way to think about it, namely that these are all means to the same end, sat-
isfaction of the same basic motive, the quest for significance. Take vengeance, for
example. Vengeance comes in response to a humiliation or a loss of significance,
and by avenging one’s humiliation one regains significance and shows that one
too matters and has the power to punish the original offender. Other causes, like
the perks of paradise or earning the leader’s appreciation, reflect an opportunity
for significance gain.
In multiple studies, we obtained evidence that manipulating the quest
for significance or measuring it in various ways promotes behaviors seen as
significance-enhancing often through violence. So, in one paper we estimated
suicide bombers’ quest for significance by gleaning from open-source data
evidence for their loss of significance or ambition for significance gain and found
that the stronger the quest, the greater number of people these suicide bombers
killed or wounded (Webber et al., 2017); and in another study, with members
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, one of the most cruel and
determined terrorist organizations in history, we found that the greater the sig-
nificance gain they experienced from a deradicalization program, including
vocational and language courses and other activities allowing them to reinte-
grate into Sri Lankan society, the greater was their degree of deradicalization,
illustrating the substitution of vocational preparation for terrorism as a means to
significance gain (Webber et al., 2018).
Frustration–Aggression
Whereas we have ample published data (see, e.g., Kruglanski, Belanger, &
Gunaratna, 2019; Kruglanski, Webber, & Koehler, 2019) attesting to the role that
the quest for significance plays in violent extremism, our lab is currently pursuing
two new topics from the significance quest perspective for which we do not yet
have sufficient data: the frustration–aggression hypothesis and romantic love.
Our novel analysis of both these issues is firmly grounded in the GST perspective.
With respect to the frustration–aggression hypothesis, the question is what logic
moved Dollard et al. (1939) to come up with the hypothesis that frustration leads
to aggression? What basic need does aggression serve? What is the end to which
aggression is a means? Why aggression, of all things, in response to frustration?
In response, we surmise that aggression is a primitive, primordial means to domi-
nance and that dominance or power is a form of significance or social worth.
This framing suggests several hypotheses: One is that, depending on the nar-
rative, and the network, frustration can lead to other significance-affording
responses. In a study that Pontus Leander and his colleagues published recently
(Leander et al., 2020) we manipulated frustration through failure on an anagram
task and then manipulated the norm presumably endorsed by college graduates
of whether the United States should intervene militarily in Syria. We found that
the frustrated participants more so than the controls tended to go more with the
narrative endorsed by the network, whether aggressive or non-aggressive.
A second hypothesis that follows from our analysis is that frustration will
elicit an aggressive reaction to the extent that the goal serves the significance
quest. Molly Ellenberg, of our lab, recently analyzed the survey responses of a
sample of 272 incels (involuntary celibates), men who feel unfairly rejected and
mistreated by women. She found support for a mediational model (see Figure
1.2) in which an index of significance loss (agreement with items such as “were
you ostracized,” “did you have trouble with sports,” “did you face rejection from
girls”) predicted an aggressive response toward women, namely agreement with
the statements “I sometimes entertain thoughts of violence” and “I would rape if
“I admire Elliot
Rodger for his
a = 0.1694* Santa Barbara
attack.” b = 0.45926***
Number of “I would rape if I

Significance Loss could get away
c’ = 0.13471
Items (Ostracism, with it.”
Rejection from
girls, Trouble with c = 0.2135*
sports, Bullying)
Figure 1.2 Readiness to commit rape as a function of Significance Loss and

approval of Rodger Manifesto.
I could get away with it.” This was mediated by agreement with the statement “I
admire Elliot Rodger for his Santa Barbara attack.” Notably, Elliot Rodger carried
out a misogynistic terror attack in Isla Vista California, in which he killed six
people, as well as himself.
Gabriele di Cico of our lab recently carried out a different project in which
he performed a linguistic analysis on 33,484 posts on the incels.co web forum.
Words indicating honor loss had a direct effect on words related to death
(indicating aggressive intentions), and the relationship was also mediated by the
number of words indicating anger (see Figure 1.3).
A third hypothesis is that this frustration–aggression relationship will be
moderated by the individual’s personal degree of significance quest. Finally, we
predict that the frustration–aggression relationship will be moderated by the de-
gree that the culture subscribes to the narrative that violence restores or brings
about significance (e.g., an honor culture), that is, the narrative that violence is
the means to the end of significance. Research bearing on this hypothesis is pres-
ently under way in our lab.
Anger Mediation Estimates

Effect Estimate SE Z p
Indirect 0.00 0.00 3.32 <.001

Direct 0.15 0.00 56.37 <.001
Total 0.15 0.00 56.98 <.001
‘Honor Loss’ Death
Figure 1.3 Relations between Significance Loss words, Death words, and Anger words.
This Thing Called Love

Ironically perhaps, the very motivation that leads to aggression could be the
main underlying force in its diametric opposite, namely love. People like to think
of love as an unfathomable mystery, a matter of fate, magic, or interpersonal
chemistry. But our role as scientists is to solve mysteries and explode myths—in
other words, to be joy spoilers and make everything seem rational and simple.
In this vein, our hypothesis, supported by the way in the writings of the great
early prophets of love, the 15th-century Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino
and the 18th-century thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is that love is a means to
the basic need of significance. You love someone or fall in love with someone in
order to be loved in return, and to be loved is to be truly appreciated as someone
very special, that is, to gain immense significance in that relationship.
A GST framing suggests several hypotheses about love. First, a person will fall
in love with people who have considerable social worth because being loved by
someone worthy is more significance-bestowing than being loved by someone
less worthy. We name it the trickle-down effect. Second, people will tend less to
fall in love with someone if they had alternative means of getting significance.
These could be alternative persons (i.e., possible alternative romantic partners)
or alternative sources of significance from an entirely different dimension (e.g.,
power, professional work).
Third, people who experienced significance loss in some domain should be
more likely to fall in love than people who did not. Also, fourth, people who lost
significance in a different domain would be ready to “lower” their love-falling
standards, that is, fall in love with less worthy people (on some dimensions),
that is, people less likely to bestow significance upon them. Our lab is presently
collaborating on these issues with Ed Lemay, a colleague at the University of
Maryland and an expert on close relationships.
In short, we assume that behavior, cognition, and affect are motivated: They
are driven by goals that serve basic needs. Because GST is a basic perspective on
goal-driven behavior, it affords insights into diverse psychological phenomena,
and I found it to be an exceedingly fruitful approach. This is amply attested by the
exciting work reported in the remaining chapters in this volume.
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2
A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior
Catalina Kopetz and Wesley Starnes
In 2002, Arie Kruglanski and his students and postdocs published the goal sys-
tems theory (GST), a theory about how people set and pursue their goals. This
volume celebrates the theoretical and empirical developments inspired by GST
in the years following its publication. Our chapter explains why we (the authors
of this chapter) are celebrating GST in the context of theories in psychology gen-
erally, and particularly in the field of motivation. We will argue that GST is one of
the few theories in psychology that comes close to what a theory should be: test-
able, coherent, parsimonious, generalizable, able to explain previous findings
while generating new testable implications (e.g., Higgins, 2004; Popper, 1935/
1959). We support this argument by discussing how GST provides a new and
parsimonious perspective on risk behavior, a phenomenon that has been fasci-
nating not only laypeople but mathematicians, economists, and psychologists for
decades. We will show how the basic principles of goal pursuit defined by GST ex-
plain and integrate previous findings across fields of inquiry and risk behaviors,
answer previously unanswered question, and generate new implications for un-
derstanding, preventing, and/or changing risk behavior.
GST and Theorizing in Psychology
Psychology in general, and social psychology in particular, has been criticized for
the weakness of its theories. For instance, while he acknowledged the difficulties
of theorizing about human behavior, Meehl (1978) suggested that our theories
are “scientifically unimpressive and technologically worthless” (p. 806), that they
“rise and decline, come and go, more as a function of baffled boredom than an-
ything else; the enterprise shows a disturbing absence of that cumulative char-
acter” (p. 807, emphasis in original) that characterizes other sciences. At the core
of his critiques stands not only the way we test our theories but also their lack of
deductive fertility.
Similarly, McGuire (1973) criticized both the methodological approach—
focus on social relevance and hypothesis-testing—and the theoretical approach
Catalina Kopetz and Wesley Starnes, A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior In: Goal Systems Theory. Edited by:
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197687468.003.0003
that characterized social psychology at the time. He was particularly concerned

that we focus on testing simplistic hypotheses rather than trying to formulate
and test theories that simulate “the complexities with which the variables are or-
ganized in the individual and social systems” (p. 448). He also pointed out that
social psychologists are more motivated to “churn out one little study after an-
other” (p. 455) rather than attempting to integrate isolated findings into more
meaningful pictures.
By looking at the dates of these references and quotes, one may wonder how
relevant these concerns still are. Interestingly, many years later, important so-
cial psychology scholars were lamenting about similar issues. Kruglanski (2001)
noted that we, as a field, are not very comfortable going beyond our data to
tracking and evaluating theoretical arguments; we tend to focus on phenomena
rather than attempting to discover the underlying principles and mechanisms
behind seemingly diverse phenomena. As a consequence, we keep reinventing
the wheel and giving new names to old concepts (N. Miller & Pedersen, 1999);
the field is fragmented (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997), with a large number of
distinct factors being “invoked to explain different phenomena, fostering a
highly differentiated conceptual landscape” (p. 74). In one of his presidential
columns, Walter Mischel (2008) referred to this as the “toothbrush problem” and
suggested that psychologists treat other psychologists’ concepts and theories like
toothbrushes—no self-respecting person wants to use anyone else’s, so they get
their own. Although amusing, this analogy reiterates the concerns regarding the
fragmentation of the field and suggests that this may be one important reason
why psychology is not a cumulative science. As Meehl (1978) pointed out, in
other sciences theories evolve. In psychology, we have a constant supply of new
toothbrushes.
Nowhere were these concerns more obvious than in the field of motivation.
Motivation and goals have always been a critical concept in psychology (Bruner,
1957; Lewin, 1935; Jones & Thibaut, 1958). Neisser (1967) suggested that the
person’s intent or goal was the primary determinant of cognition and behavior.
Despite the importance of the concept, psychology has been slow to develop
major theories of motivation and goal pursuit. Until recently, the concept was
vaguely defined; it was considered to be a starting point, an entity without any
specifications regarding what particular goal will be in place at any particular
point in time (e.g., Kimbel & Perlmuter, 1970; Wilensky, 1982). The field was
preoccupied with identifying motivation or goal contents such as need for
achievement (Atkinson, 1964); need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982);
and belonging, understanding, controlling, enhancing, and trusting (Fiske,
2003), to name just a fraction of them. Accordingly, people were classified as
if in a fixed motivational state, which would then predict a variety of relevant
outcomes.
A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior 27
In addition to the focus on motivational contents, the field often implies that
some motives were worth pursuing more than others (long-term vs. short-term,
health and fitness vs. indulgence, etc.). Difficulty in pursuing these motives
was studied as lack of self-control, impulsivity, and self-regulatory failure (e.g.,
Wagner & Heatherton, 2015).
Little attention was paid to the general motivational process. Without clearly
defining the goals and specifying when and why people have the goals they do
and through what processes they choose among alternative actions, the field ran
into what Neisser (1967, p. 292) considered to be “the problem of the executive”;
a “little man in the head, a homunculus” (p. 295), was responsible for selecting
the goals and the corresponding course of action.
This is particularly interesting given that Lewin (1935) warned against this
approach at the beginning of the 20th century. He lamented that psychology
was stuck in an Aristotelian mode of thinking characterized by a tendency to
focus on specific phenomena rather than on the general laws of behavior and
to classify concepts based on their value rather than according to the nature of
the psychological process involved: “a tendency to attack the actual psycholog-
ical process” (p. 4). Just as Aristotelian thinking distinguishes between heav-
enly and earthly bodies characterized by the highest forms of motion versus the
motion of inferior types, psychology has long distinguished between normal
and pathological, errors and true cognition, impulsive and deliberative thinking
characterized by lower-versus higher-order processes such as automatic, as-
sociative versus controlled, effortful, conscious. Accordingly, the essence of the
object or the concept was determined by its classification, and it was assumed
to be associated with positive or negative aspects. This tendency or mode of
thinking has the consequence of classifying together things with insignificant
communalities and separates things that objectively are closely and importantly
related. Lewin advocated instead for a Galilean approach, with no value concepts
and dichotomies but based on common psychological laws across behaviors and
on understanding the dynamic of human behavior at the intersection of multiple
forces that may be relevant on a moment-to-moment basis depending on the
situation.
The implications of these theoretical shortcomings were not immediately
obvious to the first author (Catalina Kopetz) as she was finishing her PhD and
starting her postdoctoral training. It was not until she was confronted with
the world of (research in) substance use and other risk behaviors that she un-
derstood the need for a coherent, parsimonious, and generalizable theoretical
framework. It became clear to her that in the absence of such a framework
to guide our understanding of major social and behavioral problems—
specifically related to the primary causes of mortality such as overeating,
smoking, alcohol and substance use, risky sexual behavior (RSB), driving
under the influence—we are very limited in providing solutions and run the
risk of being irrelevant.
Luckily, her training in the basic principles of goal pursuit provided such a
framework. Since 2009, she and her collaborators have worked to demonstrate
that an approach based on the principles of goal pursuit can integrate and ex-
plain previous findings, address unanswered questions, and generate new
implications for understanding, preventing, and/or changing risk behaviors like
those enumerated above.
How Does GST Address the Issues and Criticism Regarding

Theorizing in Psychology and Provide a Relevant Framework to
Study Risk Behavior?
1. GST does take a Galilean approach: It focuses on the motivational process

rather than the content; it describes the necessary and sufficient principles
to understand goal pursuit regardless of the goal content.
2. It acknowledges the complexity of goal-directed action by suggesting that
people pursue multiple goals, and it describes how multiple goals and
their attainment means are structured with important implications for
actions.
3. It is generalizable. As this volume attests, the organizational and mo-
tivational principles identified by GST account for multiple aspects of
goal-directed action (e.g., goal-setting, means choice, resolution of goal
conflict, goal progress, investment in goals and means). More impor-
tantly, the same principles apply to understanding a multitude of phe-
nomena such as romantic relationships, gun violence, risk-taking, and
extremism. Across all these phenomena, GST offers a parsimonious per-
spective that integrates and explains previous findings while generating
new implications.
A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior
GST approaches goals as cognition—mental representations of desirable end

states interconnected with their means and other goals (Kruglanski et al.,
2002). By “reuniting” motivation and cognition, GST derives basic cognitive
and motivational principles that work together to explain how people set goals
and pursue them regardless of the motivational content and across phenomena
(e.g., romantic relations, substance use, food choice, or intentions to buy and
use guns).
Principles of Goal Pursuit
Goal Activation
Goals are cognitive representations of desirable end states and, hence, abide
by the general principles that govern all cognition including accessibility,
interconnectedness between motivational constructs, and dependence on lim-
ited cognitive resources (for reviews, see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Kruglanski
& Kopetz, 2009a, 2009b). Goals can be adopted consciously or arise non-
consciously, especially upon exposure to environmental or internal cues cogni-
tively associated with the goal. Much like how the scent of freshly brewed coffee
automatically activates the goal of having a cup, exposure to certain sexual cues
can automatically activate a corresponding mating goal (Gillath & Collins, 2016;
S. L. Miller & Maner, 2011) and may result in RSB.
Means Instrumentality and Means Selection

Goals are cognitively associated with other relevant constructs, such as their
means of attainment resulting in different configurations (see Chapter 1). When
a goal becomes activated, the activation spreads to corresponding means that
are believed to be instrumental to goal attainment and stirs individuals to ac-
tion (Aarts et al., 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2002). For instance, when experiencing
negative affect, people may smoke or drink as a means to feel better (Tice &
Bratslavsky, 2000).
Means are selected and implemented depending on their perceived instrumen-
tality to one’s goals. The stronger the association between that particular goal and
the means is, the more instrumental the means is perceived to be, and thus the
higher the likelihood of selecting and implementing it when the goal becomes
accessible (Kruglanski, 1996; Zhang et al., 2007). A variety of cognitive and moti-
vational factors determine both the course of action that the individual deems in-
strumental at any particular moment as well as the phenomenological experience
associated with their choice. The factors include the number of goals and means
currently active, the strength of the associations among them, and the value or
importance of each goal, which may vary on a moment-to-moment basis.
The number of connections between means and goals determines the strength
of each connection; the greater the number of connections, the weaker each
single connection (fan effect; Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Reder, 1999). For in-
stance, a means (e.g., eating a salad) that is connected to, or serves, multiple goals
(e.g., satiating hunger and losing weight) is generally perceived as less instru-
mental to either goal (i.e., eating) than another means that is only related to that
particular goal (e.g., a burger; Zhang et al., 2007). Similarly, if multiple means
are connected to a single goal (e.g., running, biking, and swimming as means to
one’s fitness goal), each is perceived as less instrumental to the goal’s attainment
(Bélanger et al., 2015). These notions suggest that the associative strength be-
tween a means and its goal(s) follows a constant sum principle (Zhang et al.,
2007), which has implications for when and why a particular action is perceived
as instrumental to one’s goals as well as for preventing and changing behaviors.
Counterfinality
People often overestimate the instrumentality of a means to one goal when it
is detrimental to other goals. This intriguing aspect of the relationship be-
tween goals and means follows from the constant sum principle of associa-
tive strength between goals and means; it refers to the phenomenon in which
a means becomes perceived as increasingly instrumental to a focal goal to the
extent to which it is counterfinal, or it undermines alternative goals (Kruglanski
et al., 2015; Schumpe et al., 2018). Based on the constant sum principle of the
association strength between various nodes in a cognitive network, a negative
association between a goal and a means increases the connection strength of the
remaining goal–means connections in the network. Hence, the counterfinality
of a risky behavior to an alternative goal can increase its connection strength to
the focal goal—and result in the means being perceived as uniquely instrumental
to that goal (Kruglanski, 1996; Zhang et al., 2007).
Transfer of Affect
Behaviors that become associated with successful goal pursuit acquire positive
value through transfer of affect (Fishbach et al., 2004). The amount of emotional
transfer from goals to means and, consequently, the emotional experience of
engaging in that particular behavior depend on the importance of the goal that
they serve and the strength of the association between the behavior and the goal.
For instance, in one study, thirsty participants evaluated items that could sat-
isfy thirst directly (e.g., water and juice) more positively than items that were
only moderately instrumental to the thirst-quenching goal (e.g., coffee and beer;
Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Thus, one consequence of selecting and implementing
a behavior as a means to one’s goals is that behaviors that may be initially neu-
tral or even aversive (e.g., smoking) become desirable; they may be perpetuated
or even fuse with the goals (become intrinsically motivated; Kruglanski et al.,
2018) and may become capable of driving behavior in the absence of the original
motivation.
Substitution
During goal pursuit, different means that serve the same goal may be substituted
for one another (Kruglanski et al., 2002). For instance, one could exercise, read a
book, or use alcohol to alleviate negative affect. The strength of a given means–
goal association may be reduced by the simultaneous presence of alternative
means: The higher the number of means associated with a goal, the weaker the
association between any particular goal and means and the less likely that any
of the means is deemed instrumental and enacted toward goal achievement
(Kruglanski et al., 2002).
Goal Conflict Resolution

Multiple goal representations may become simultaneously activated and may
produce competing behavioral tendencies (Kopetz, Hofmann, & Wiers, 2014).
In such situations, the person may try to find multifinal means that satisfy mul-
tiple goals at the same time (e.g., riding a bike for transportation and exercise;
Kruglanski, Kopetz et al., 2013). When one goal becomes more important than
its alternatives, its activation can inhibit competing alternatives (goal shielding;
Shah et al., 2002). Such mechanisms facilitate mobilization and allocation of the
resources necessary for goal pursuit (Kruglanski et al., 2012).
Motivated Distortion
One consequence of goal shielding is that information relevant to goal pursuit
is actively distorted to fit with the current motivational state (Bélanger et al.,
2014). For instance, a smoker may be fully aware of the negative consequences
associated with smoking but may actively emphasize the relaxing aspects of the
behavior.
Mobilization of Resources
Goal pursuit is dependent on resource mobilization and executive control
(Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Kruglanski et al., 2002,
2012). Resources are mobilized as a function of goal accessibility and impor-
tance; this may happen automatically without an individual’s conscious aware-
ness and control (Bijleveld et al., 2009; Brehm & Self, 1989; Wright et al., 1986);
resources support people’s goal pursuit by facilitating the processing of relevant
information, the implementation of appropriate means, persistence in the face
of obstacles, and inhibition of alternative goals and information that may thwart
goal attainment.
In what follows, we provide empirical evidence that risk behavior follows
the principles outlined above. Our discussion will highlight how these princi-
ples allow us to answer previously unanswered questions and to understand how
risk behavior is initiated and maintained as well as how it can be prevented and
changed.
Risk Behavior Follows the General Principles of Goal Pursuit
Risk-taking refers to a choice whose outcomes, positive or negative, are uncer-

tain (Figner & Weber, 2011; Holton, 2004; Lopes, 1987). Laypeople and scientists
recognize that risk-taking is a ubiquitous experience crucial to dealing with

changing conditions across one’s life span but also with social, environmental,
and technological changes (e.g., Beck, 2009). However, risk behavior has been
mainly studied for its “bad reputation,” or the potential negative consequences
associated with it (Beck, 2009). As a result, risk behavior has been frequently
examined in terms of irrationality, biases in our thinking, impulsivity, or lack of
self-control (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982; Reyna, 2004; Wagner & Heatherton,
2015). However, people have reasons for what they do; their behavior—be it nor-
matively good or bad—responds to their motivations and represents attempts to
attain goals. Thus, although risk behaviors may undermine health and safety and
may appear irrational from the societal perspective—be it smoking, using drugs,
RSB, gambling, or engagement in extreme sports—they also satisfy important
goals that the person has in the moment. From this perspective, risk behavior
could be understood by applying the basic principles of goal pursuit.
Indeed, previous research as well as research from our lab support the no-
tion that risk behavior, regardless of its form, follows the principles identified
by the GST. Specifically, (1) it is enacted when perceived to be instrumental to a
goal that is momentarily or chronically active and important, and its instrumen-
tality (and hence likelihood of being selected and enacted) varies depending on
the accessibility of alternative means (substitution) or alternative goals that the
behavior either serves (multifinality) or interferes with (counterfinality), with
behaviors that are instrumental to goal pursuit becoming desirable and possibly
perpetuated or even becoming a goal in themselves (transfer of affect); (2) the
pursuit of goals, via risk behavior, requires goal conflict resolution and may re-
sult in the inhibition of alternative considerations for health or safety, and the in-
hibition of alternative goals may result in distorted beliefs about the risk behavior
that could in turn contribute to its initiation and maintenance; (3) these goal
pursuit processes are resource-dependent, such that risk behavior as a means to a
goal might increase (rather than decrease) in the presence of cognitive resources
for control (see Table 2.1).
Risk Behavior Is Enacted When It Is Perceived as an Instrumental Means

to People’s Goals
Risk behavior has often been discussed in relation to a wide variety of goals
ranging from basic survival and reproduction needs (Mishra, 2014) to social
acceptance (Baumeister, 1997), prevention-related goals (Scholer et al., 2010),
achievement goals (Atkinson, 1957; Lopes, 1987), and regulation of negative
affect (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Tice et al., 2001). When these goals become
accessible, risky options might be considered if they represent instrumental
means to goal attainment (Kopetz & Orehek, 2015; Kopetz, Woerner, Starnes, &
Devukaj, 2019).
Table 2.1 The Principles of Goal Pursuit Apply to Understand Risk Behavior Initiation, Maintenance, Prevention, and Change
Questions addressed Principles of goal pursuit Phenomena
When and why does risk- Goal accessibility: Goals can be adopted consciously or Obstacles in goal pursuit increase the likelihood of risk behavior.
taking become a means? arise non-consciously upon exposure to cues cognitively
associated with the goal.
Counterfinality: A means is perceived as increasingly The potential negative consequences of risk behavior might
instrumental to one’s goals to the extent to which it paradoxically increase its perceived instrumentality to one’s salient and
interferes with or undermines other goals. important goals.
How is engagement in Transfer of affect: Behaviors that become associated with Risk behavior, as a means, acquires positive value through transfer of
risk-taking perpetuated? successful goal pursuit acquire positive value. affect and becomes desirable itself, able to automatically drive behavior.
Why and how is risk Goal shielding: When one goal becomes more important The saliency and immediacy of the goal that the risk behavior serves
behavior initiated and than its alternatives, its activation can inhibit competing reduce the saliency and importance of alternative goals (e.g., safety,
maintained despite alternatives. health), allowing for the initiation and maintenance of risk behavior.
potential negative
consequences? Mobilization of resources: Active goals mobilize resources Cognitive resources (executive functions) enhance the likelihood
that support processing of relevant information, of engaging in risk behavior as a means to one’s goal by facilitating
implementation of appropriate means, persistence in the (1) inhibition of alternative goals (e.g., health and safety) and
face of obstacles, and inhibition of alternative goals and (2) distortion of potential negative consequences and an overemphasis
information that may thwart goal attainment. of potential benefits.
How can risk behavior be Substitution: A given behavior’s association strength with Introducing alternative means to the goals that risk behavior serves may
prevented and changed? a particular goal (and therefore the likelihood to engage in decrease the behavior’s perceived instrumentality and therefore the
that behavior) decreases when it can be substituted out for likelihood that it is enacted.
some alternative behavior that serves the same end.
Multifinality/goal shielding Enhancing the saliency and importance of alternative goals such as
health and safety could reduce the likelihood of risk behavior. When
such goals are chronically accessible, they will constrain people’s
behavior and reduce the likelihood of adopting risky behaviors.
For instance, across multiple perspectives people will opt for risky options to
deal with loss and restore status quo (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mishra,
2014; Mishra & Lalumière, 2010; Scholer et al., 2010). Men from disadvantaged
social and economic backgrounds engage in significantly more risk-taking and
criminal conduct (M. Wilson & Daly, 1997), whereas people with lower income
relative to others are more likely to spend a large portion of their income on
gambling behavior (e.g., Blalock et al., 2007). However, in line with the notion
that risk behavior is enacted only when it is perceived as an instrumental means
to one’s goal, it is noteworthy that a state of loss does not necessarily result in
risk behavior. Even in a state of loss, risk behavior is not a preferred option for
people whose main goal is to move forward rather than to prevent losses and
who focus on advancement and gains rather than on losses (Scholer et al., 2010;
Zou et al., 2020).
Drugs are taken to socialize and fit in, to achieve a pleasant drug “high,” to
escape an aversive withdrawal “low,” or to cope with negative affect (Kopetz
et al., 2013). Indeed, the goal of socializing increases the accessibility of alcohol
for participants who regularly drink alcohol in social situations (Sheeran et al.,
2005). When craving is experimentally induced, opiate-dependent participants
respond faster to drug-related versus neutral words (Weinstein et al., 2000), pre-
sumably because drug use represents the most instrumental means to reduce
craving and alleviate the negative affect associated with it. Marijuana users re-
port stronger motivation to use marijuana and spending less time reading drug
prevention information after being presented with social cues (i.e., the name of
individuals who use marijuana), especially when such cues represented close so-
cial relationships (Leander et al., 2009).
RSB, including sex with multiple partners, with casual and commercial part-
ners, and unprotected sex, occurs when it is perceived as instrumental to goals
such as drug obtainment and use (Kopetz et al., 2015), intimacy, and communion
(Cooper, 2010; Kopetz, Pickover, et al., 2014; Kopetz et al., 2010; Woerner et al.,
2016). Indeed, in several studies, across community samples, college students,
and substance users, we found that women who have experienced interpersonal
violence are more likely to engage in RSB (Woerner et al., 2016, 2019). This may
be the case because interpersonal violence is a humiliating experience that may
result in loss of significance (Kruglanski et al., 2022). Victims of violence may de-
velop low expectations of secure relationships and may become vigilant for harm
in relationships which could manifest as fear of being rejected by others (anx-
iety) and/or discomfort with closeness (avoidance). In such cases, RSB may be-
come a convenient means to interpersonal significance and connection without
closeness or emotional intimacy. Interestingly, these effects did not extend to
other risk behaviors (i.e., substance use), supporting the notion that RSB may
represent a means to interpersonal connection rather than a general tendency

for risk propensity.
RSB is often associated with drug use and is often attributed to the pharma-
cological effects of the drugs. However, recent evidence suggests that engage-
ment in RSB occurs when it is perceived as instrumental to individuals’ goals of
drug obtainment. In one study increased accessibility of the drug obtainment
goal (through cocaine-related primes) resulted in faster approach tendency to-
ward sex exchange targets in a joystick task. Notably, this effect emerged only for
participants for whom sex exchange represented an instrumental means to drug
obtainment despite their self-reported intentions to avoid such behavior (Kopetz
et al., 2015).
The notion that risk behavior is enacted as an instrumental means to goals
is also supported by evidence suggesting goal attainment following engagement
in risk behavior. For example, negative affect was alleviated following gambling
behavior, independent of winning or losing (Mishra et al., 2010). Alcohol use is
instrumental to emotion regulation; it enhances positive emotions and alleviates
negative emotions (e.g., Cooper et al., 1995). Moreover, the “cheater’s high” ef-
fect suggests that engaging in morally risky conduct actually provides affective
benefits (Ruedy et al., 2013).
Approaching risk behavior as an instrumental means to one’s goals has impor-
tant implications for understanding (1) why and when people are willing to take
risks (as opposed to choosing non-risk means) to accomplish their goals, (2) how
risk behavior is perpetuated, and (3) how it can be prevented or changed. In what
follows we discuss how the principles underlying the relationship between goals
and means can be applied to address these issues.
When and Why Does Risk-Taking Become an Instrumental Means

to Individuals’ Goals?
Obstacles in Goal Pursuit Increase the Likelihood of Risk Behavior People

have a preference for balance and moderation whereby they attain as many im-
portant goals as possible (nutrition, safety, meaning, etc.; Kruglanski et al., 2021).
They tend to avoid risk behaviors because these behaviors satisfy one need while
undermining or neglecting other needs. A key question is what prompts people
to shift from risk aversion toward risk-seeking. Prospect theory suggests that
people are typically risk-averse but seek risk under conditions of loss (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Psychologically, loss represents
failure to attain one’s goals. When goal pursuit is blocked or when one perceives
lack of progress, one’s motivational balance is upset. Thwarted goals take priority
at the expense of other goals. The motivational strength of a goal increases over
time until the goal is attained; this allows the organism to mobilize resources to
increase its effort toward goal attainment (Brehm, 1966; Fishbach & Finkelstein,
2012; Higgins, 2006), to persist in the face of obstacles, and to resume goal pur-
suit after disruption (Bargh et al., 2001; Lewin, 1926; Wicklund & Gollwitzer,
1982). Consequently, the person might be more inclined to search for the most
instrumental means to satisfy their unfulfilled goals. When one’s motivational
space is dominated by a particular need, while the other needs are momentarily
less salient or active, extreme means including risk behavior become particu-
larly instrumental (see next section about the mechanisms that may explain this
phenomenon; Kruglanski et al., 2021). In other words, people might turn to risk
because they perceive that they lack alternative means.
Indeed, across multiple domains, cues that signal a failure to attain a goal
prompt more risk-taking. Failing at an intellectual ability task increases one’s
preference for risk behavior compared to non-risk behavior (i.e., a bet with 50%
chance to win $1000 vs. a bet with 100% chance to get $500; Mishra et al., 2014).
Among intravenous drug users, failing to alleviate craving increases its strength
and results in the taking of even more risks, including theft and sharing needles
(Connors, 1992; Ready et al., 2020). Failure (compared to winning) in previous
gambling trials leads individuals to be quicker to initiate subsequent gambling
trials (Verbruggen et al., 2017). Finally, gun owners who failed on an achieve-
ment task or who expected job loss were more likely to perceive guns as a means
of personal empowerment, shoot an unarmed target in a shooter task, and justify
the use of a gun in an ambiguous threat scenario (Leander et al., 2019, 2020).
The Potential Negative Consequences of Risk Behavior Might Paradoxically

Increase Its Perceived Instrumentality Obstacles might prompt people to con-
sider risk behavior as a means to their goals. The interesting question is what
makes risk behavior particularly appealing or instrumental compared to alterna-
tive means. One possibility is that risk behavior’s negative consequences can en-
hance its appeal. This possibility is suggested by the principle of counterfinality
(Kruglanski et al., 2015; see Chapter 1 of this volume) and captured by the “No
pain, no gain” heuristic. Accordingly, a means is perceived as increasingly in-
strumental to one’s goals to the extent to which it interferes with or undermines
alternative goals. In other words, information about the potentially negative
consequences of risk behavior or its detriment to some goals (e.g., health and
safety) may be misinterpreted as evidence of the behavior’s instrumentality for
other goals that are momentarily salient and important (e.g., alleviating negative
affect or fitting in) and may therefore increase the likelihood of that behavior (see
Chapter 1 for evidence).
In line with this idea, our research shows that (1) people are more likely to
engage in risk behavior and self-harm when (a) relevant goals (e.g., belonging)
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Am Mittag kam der Hausherr sehr naß geregnet heim. »Ist das ein
Hundewetter! Ach, und heute ist ja wohl eure Festvorstellung, und
ich soll in den Klub! Wieder in das Hundewetter raus? Fällt mir nicht
im Traume ein! Ich bleibe in meinem Zimmer, und die Gören
verhalten sich hübsch ruhig, damit ich nicht gestört werde!«
»Gören?« wiederholte Lena sehr pikiert. – Aber die Mutter
versetzte ihr einen kleinen Stoß, den Verstimmten nicht noch mehr
zu reizen, denn das Schlimmste stand ihm noch bevor. – Als er sich
seiner nassen Sachen entledigt hatte und in seinem Zimmer Ruhe
suchte, fand er dort Zustände vor, die ihm die Haare zu Berge
trieben. »Seid ihr denn ganz verdreht! Ist hier Jahrmarkt?«
Von seinem Schreibtisch waren Bücher und Akten weggeräumt,
und in buntem Durcheinander lagen dort ungezählte kleine
»Nichtse«, bunte Sächelchen, die man einmal neugierig besieht, um
sie dann völlig ohne Interesse beiseite zu legen.
»Wir machen eine kleine Lotterie, Väterchen. Etwas Amüsement
müssen sie doch haben. Bei Kählers haben sie im Garten gespielt –
aber der fehlt uns ja leider!«
»Und was ist hier los?«
»Ja, das geht nun wirklich nicht anders, wir mußten heute schon
einmal auf deinem Sofatisch decken. Sieh, die eine Tochter hast du
doch auch noch nur!«
»Ja, Gott sei Dank! Wenn diese heillose Wirtschaft sechsmal im
Jahre sein sollte, ginge ich lieber auf und davon!«
Übrigens blieb ihm auch heute nach der schnell und stumm
erledigten Mahlzeit nichts anderes übrig, denn seine Damen
erklärten, die Flügeltüren, die seine Stube vom Eßzimmer und Salon
trennten, dürften auf keinen Fall geschlossen sein. Es sehe zu wenig
herrschaftlich aus, wenn man nur noch in ein einziges Zimmer
hineinsehen könnte.
Mit dem grollenden Ausruf: »Wenn bei euch nur alles ›aussieht‹,
dann seid ihr zufrieden. Wie es ›ist‹, das bleibt Nebensache!« verließ
er die Wohnung. – Er tat ganz gut daran, denn viel Freude hatte an
diesem Nachmittag kein einziger von den Veranstaltungen, am
allerwenigsten Hulda, die schon ganz erschöpft war vom Hin- und
Herspringen. Als aber Lena ihr zum dritten Male mit großer
Wichtigkeit Anweisungen gab, wie sie die Tassen zu reichen und die
Torten zu bringen hätte, und daß sie um Himmels willen keine
Schokolade verschütten möchte, da riß der Geplagten ihr
Geduldsfaden:
»Einen solchen Aufstand zu machen um solche dummen Dinger!
Da mögen sie sich alleine bedienen, wenn alle so klug sind; ich
wenigstens tue es nicht!«
Es bedurfte einer aufgeregten und langen Auseinandersetzung,
um sie überhaupt wieder in Gang zu bringen. Und zur Harmonie des
Festes trug auch dann noch ihr verweintes Gesicht nicht bei.
Als am Abend Hanni und Käte Arm in Arm heimgingen, seufzte
letztere: »Ach, Hanni, mir ist so bange, wie es nach deinem
Fortgehen werden wird. Von Lena hat man doch zu – zu wenig!«
»Käte, wir wollen jetzt nicht darüber sprechen. – Sieh, sie haben
uns doch heute eine Freude machen wollen!«
»Glaubst du das so sehr?«
»Ja, warum haben sie sich denn sonst alle die Mühe gemacht?
Sie selbst haben doch, glaube ich, nicht so arg viel Freude davon
gehabt! Sie sahen nicht so aus.«
»Nein, das glaube ich auch nicht!«
»Ja, für wen tun sie es dann eigentlich? – Manche Menschen
verstehe ich doch nicht.«
»Nein, ich auch nicht!« –
Am Sonntag nach dem Kindergottesdienst kam Ilse von Herder
schnell auf Hanni zu: »Du, heute nachmittag könnt ihr nun doch
leider nicht bei mir sein. Es ist mir zu leid. Aber es kommen
hochgestellte Gäste von außerhalb, da muß Mama ihre Gedanken
ganz darauf richten. Und auch die Leute haben keine Zeit für uns.
Ein rechter Jammer! – Aber ade! ich muß auch Lena und Herta noch
erwischen. Bitte, sage du Käte Bescheid!«
Eigentlich waren die beiden Freundinnen über diesen Ausfall nicht
so sehr traurig. Es war ihnen immer reichlich steif und feierlich bei
Herders; sie mußten so sehr »manierlich« sein, was besonders Käte
sehr störend fand.
»Dann hast du nun doch noch einen Abend für mich frei, nicht
wahr?« meinte Käte entzückt. »Letzthin wollte deine Mutter nicht
gern davon hören, weil sie meinte, es würde zuviel Unruhe für dich.«
Frau Gerloff tat ihrem Liebling von Herzen gern den Gefallen, und
auch ihr selbst war es lieb, noch einen Abend mit der Cousine ihres
Mannes zusammen zu sein, von der sie sich so ungern trennte. Sie
wußte, wie schmerzlich die einsam lebende junge Witwe die
Verwandten entbehren würde, bei denen sie stets Trost und Anhalt
gesucht in den dunkelsten Stunden. – Als vor Jahren die zarte,
fünfundzwanzigjährige Frau in tiefstem Gram ganz versank – rings
umher war Siegesfreude nach Sedan, aber sie beweinte den, der
ihres früh verwaisten Lebens Licht, der Vater ihrer so kleinen Kinder
gewesen –, da war Frau Gerloffs stets gleiche, teilnehmende Liebe
das einzige gewesen, was ihr noch Halt gab. Erst ganz, ganz
allmählich hatte sie eingesehen, daß es ihre Pflicht sei,
weiterzuleben für ihre Kinder; – und noch viel allmählicher war ihr
eine Ahnung aufgegangen von der Kraft, die in den Schwachen
mächtig ist. Aber zaghaft und schüchtern war ihr Sinn immer
geblieben.
Ihre Käte war anderer Art. Sie hatte die krausen Haare und den
geraden Sinn ihres Vaters geerbt. Fest sah sie ins Leben. Wenn ihr
jemand in den Weg trat, ballte sie die kleinen Fäuste und wich nicht
zur Seite. Wo ihre zarte Mutter zögerte und schwankte, griff sie ohne
weiteres zu; und das Verhältnis hätte leicht verkehrt werden können,
wenn sie nicht ihr Mütterchen so glühend geliebt hätte – fast mit
einem ritterlichen Gefühl – gerade wie ihr Vater!
Leidige Zusammenstöße hatte sie oft mit ihrem Bruder Ernst, der
die sensible Natur der Mutter geerbt hatte und leicht gereizt und
verstört war. Empören konnte sie sich über sein ängstliches Zögern
bei der kleinsten Schwierigkeit. O, man konnte ja aus der Haut
fahren bei so viel Umständen und Nöten! Und dies Gefrage: »Was
soll ich nun tun?« »Wie soll ich dies anfangen?« – »Mensch, hilf dir
selber!« herrschte sie ihn oft rauh an. Und wenn sein wehklagendes:
»Es geht nicht!« erscholl, so fuhr sie ihm heftig an den Kragen und
schüttelte ihn derb.
Dabei kam ihr niemals in den Sinn, wie schwer der kleine
Pessimist an sich selber zu tragen hatte, und welche Hilfe ein
ermunterndes Wort, eine bereitwillige Hand ihm gewesen wären. –
Da waren die Zwillinge doch andere Kerlchen; mit denen mochte sie
spielen! Selig rannten sie der großen Schwester entgegen, so oft sie
ihren Schritt auf der Treppe hörten, und es gab ein Jauchzen und
Lärmen, daß Ernst sich jammernd beklagte: »Dabei kann kein
Mensch Rechenarbeit machen!«
Ein Sonnenstrahl fiel jedesmal in sein oft beschattetes Leben,
wenn Hanni Gerloff zum Besuch kam. Die neckte ihn nie und hatte
immer ein Auge für seine Angelegenheiten.
An dem bewußten Sonntagabend spielte sich gerade wieder ein
kleiner Streit zwischen Bruder und Schwester ab. Die Kinder
standen auf dem Flur, als die Gäste eintraten, und Hanni sah auf
den ersten Blick Ernsts nur notdürftig getrocknete Tränen. »Käte ist
zu greulich!« platzte er recht unritterlich heraus; »sie will nicht, daß
ich Mutti bitte, aufbleiben zu dürfen. Kleine Kinder gehörten ins Bett!
– Und was ich überhaupt wollte – ich störte euch beide nur!« –
Neues Schluchzen.
»Nein, Erni, greulich ist Käte gewiß nicht, ich würde mich sonst
doch hüten, sie zu besuchen! Aber ich glaube, sie ist ein klein
bißchen dumm, daß sie meint, du würdest uns stören – das fällt dir
doch nicht ein? Und dann erst, wenn du erfährst, was in meiner
Tasche steckt! – Nein, nein, halt! Nach dem Tee! Jetzt wollen wir erst
deine Mutter tüchtig bitten, daß du aufbleiben darfst!«
Dazu gehörte nicht viel Überredung. Die kleine Frau sagte sehr
viel lieber »ja« als »nein« zu den Wünschen ihrer Kinder – und bald
saß alles behaglich beim Tee. Die beiden Mütter hatten sehr viel zu
besprechen, Großes und Kleines, und die jungen Mädchen zogen
sich bald in den traulichen Winkel zurück, der Kätes Besitztümer
barg. Von Ernst sah und hörte man nichts. Er war ganz versunken in
die Herrlichkeiten eines Briefmarkenalbums, das Hanni ihm vererbt
hatte. Viel zu früh für alle verging der gemütliche Abend, und als
beim Abschied die Herzen gar zu schwer werden wollten, sagte Frau
Gerloff: »Käte, hole doch eben den Kalender. Wo sind wir jetzt?
Sieh, hier: 5. Juni! – Noch eins, zwei, drei, vier Wochen! – Beginnen
nicht da eure Ferien? Gut! Nun gehen wir nicht eher weg, als bis
Mutti uns fest verspricht, am 10. Juli, wenn ihr aus der Schule
kommt, schon alle Koffer gepackt zu haben und Max und Moritz
gestiefelt und gespornt. Und dann geht’s zum Bahnhof – und abends
seid ihr in Schönfelde – soll es so sein?«
Frau von Platen wollte Einwendungen machen, es sei zu bald, und
mit den vier Trabanten auch zu viel Unruhe. Im Grunde konnte sie
das Glück kaum fassen, aufs Land zu sollen, für Wochen aus allem
Kleinkram und Druck des täglichen Lebens heraus – mit ihren
Kindern von Morgen bis Abend in Gottes schöner Natur, was hier
doch höchstens ein paarmal im Jahre und auch dann nur unter
großen Schwierigkeiten möglich war! Es schien fast zu schön, um
wahr zu sein. Aber nun geriet auch Hanni in Feuer:
»Liebe, liebe Tante, du mußt es fest versprechen! Es wird zu
schön, hörst du? Max und Moritz bekommen einen Sandhaufen, so
groß wie –«
»Wie ein Omnibus!« half Ernst aus.
»Ja, und du, Ernst, darfst den ganzen Tag reiten und fahren!«
»O ja, o ja!«
Gegen all diese Argumente war es unmöglich, länger
standzuhalten, und noch zur selben Stunde wurde der Plan für die
»himmlische« Ferienreise ganz festgesetzt.
»Mutti,« rief es am späten Abend aus Kätes Kammer, »bitte, setz
dich noch eine Minute auf mein Bett! Sag mal, wie ist das eigentlich
mit Hanni? Man merkt doch im Grunde, wenn sie da ist, gar nicht so
arg viel von ihr, nicht?«
»Nein, hören tut man meistens nur dich!«
»Mutti, wirklich? Ich will auch anders werden! – Aber, weißt du, es
liegt so etwas in der Luft bei Hanni! Wo sie ist, da ist es immer nett;
keiner mag eklig sein, wenn sie ihn so fragend ansieht. Und wenn
sie weggeht, fühlt man etwas, als wenn der Sonnenschein
schwindet!«
Als die todmüde junge Frau sich endlich auch zur Ruhe legen
wollte, schreckte erregtes Rufen aus Ernsts Bett sie auf: »Er will
nicht stehen! – Halt, halt! – O weh, der Pony rennt mir weg!« Der
Schweiß perlte auf seiner Stirn. Mit weicher Hand strich sie die
blonden Haare zurück und knöpfte das Hemdchen über dem heftig
klopfenden Herzen zu. »Muß denn alles, auch die Freude, nur dazu
dienen, unsere Unruhe zu mehren?«
Als sie an dem breiten Gitterbettchen der Zwillinge vorbeikam, zog
ein heller Schein über ihr müdes Gesicht. Wie zwei rote Äpfel lagen
die süßen Köpfchen einander zugekehrt auf den runden, rosigen
Ärmchen. Die beiden schliefen in seligem Vergessen all dem noch
unbekannten Glück entgegen.
* *
*
»Na, Lisbeth, ist die Petersilie verhagelt?« fragte am nächsten

Morgen der Major gutmütig, als das Stubenmädchen mit
rotverweinten Augen den Tee brachte. – Verstört stürzte sie aus dem
Zimmer, um neue Tränen zu verbergen.
»Ja, was hat denn die für Jammer?« wandte er sich nun an Hanni.
»Lisbeth sagt, sie könne auf keinen Fall mit aufs Land gehen, sie
hätte die ganze Nacht vor Angst kein Auge zugetan.«
»Was soll denn das bedeuten? Warum sagt sie das nicht gleich?
Es hat sie doch niemand gezwungen? Nun solche Quackelei im
letzten Augenblick! So recht Weiberart!«
»Nein, Vati, hieran hat allein Franz schuld. Er ist auch vom Lande
und hat ihr nun alles gesagt, wie es dort wäre: Ihre hübschen
Lackschuhe sollte sie ruhig hier lassen; sie müßte barfuß die Gänse
hüten; auf dem Bilde im ›Daheim‹ könne sie es ja sehen!«
»Sie, Gänse hüten? Ha, ha, ha! Sie ist ja selber ’ne Gans!« –
»Und jeden Morgen um vier würde geweckt. Dann müßte Lisbeth
in den Stall, die Kühe zu melken – zwölf nacheinander! Einige
schlügen so mit dem Schwanz, daß von ihrer Haarfrisur überhaupt
nichts nachbliebe – aber sie dürfe nicht mucksen, denn wer etwas
von der Milch verschütte, dem ginge es übel. Um sechs gebe es
Frühstück! – Aber Kaffee oder gar ihren geliebten Kakao kenne man
dort nicht. Mehlsuppe mit faustdicken Klütern – dabei rieb er sich
ordentlich den Magen vor Wonne – und dazu Schwarzbrot. Davon
hätte er die weißen Zähne und brauchte nicht sein Geld zum
Zahnarzt tragen wie die zimperlichen Stadtpuppen! – Dann, sagte er,
ginge es ins Heu. Lisbeth müsse mit solcher großen Gabel oben auf
einem Fuder stehen, und wehe, wenn sie das Heu schief hinpackte.
Im Galopp würde heimgefahren, und wenn sie nicht ordentlich
aufgepackt hätte, flöge sie mitsamt ihrer Gabel herunter und spießte
sich auf oder würde von den Pferden zertreten! – Und wenn sie ihre
rote Schürze mitnähme, die sie so schön findet, dann ginge es ihr
ganz elend: Auf dem Hof käme der Puterhahn und kratzte ihr die
Augen aus, und wenn sie sich in den Stall flüchten wolle, so nähme
der Stier sie auf die Hörner, und dann sei es mit ihr aus!«
Der Major hielt sich die Seiten vor Lachen. »Aber das ist ja ein
ganz infamer Esel, ihr so was vorzulügen. Dem werde ich den Kopf
waschen, daß ihm das Flunkern vergeht!«
»Weißt du, Schatz,« meinte Frau Gerloff, »ich finde, wir mischen
uns gar nicht in diese Dummheiten. – Hanni, soviel Erinnerung hast
du doch noch an Schönfelde, daß du ihr erzählen kannst, wie es dort
zugeht. Und dann sag ihr, von Franz wäre es der reine Neid, daß er
nicht mitkönne, sondern noch zwei Jahre im bunten Rock stecken
müsse! – Was würde ihre gute Mutter sagen, wenn aus dem
schönen Plan nichts würde, dem blassen Stadtkind endlich rote
Backen anzupflegen. Geh und setze ihr den Kopf zurecht, und dann
nehmt alle Gedanken zusammen, daß wir nichts Nötiges
versäumen!«
So zerstreuten sich auch diese Wolken, und mit steigender
Erwartung sah alles dem Tage der Übersiedlung entgegen.
3. Kapitel.
Auf dem Lande.
Kennt ihr das Leben auf einem schönen, alten,

mecklenburgischen Rittergut? –
Wenn ihr von Reisen lest oder von interessanten Begebenheiten,
so sitzt ihr wohl manchesmal nur halb auf dem Stuhl und schlagt
hastig eine Seite nach der anderen um. – Jetzt müßt ihr euch einen
behaglichen, stillen Winkel suchen, wo euch niemand stört – oder
noch lieber eure Hängematte unterm Nußbaum festbinden, wenn ihr
so glücklich seid, einen zu besitzen. Die Sonne flimmert durch die
dicken, grünen Blätter, und wenn ihr die Augen schließt, glaubt ihr
das Gurren der Tauben auf dem Dache zu hören – das ganz ferne
Läuten der schwarzbunten Herde – das Scharren und Gackern der
Hühner, die ihr Futter suchen.
Auf dem Giebel des Herrenhauses holt die alte Uhr zu lautem
Schlage aus – viermal – aber einen Menschen seht ihr noch nicht!
Die Leute sind alle beim Heu. Ihr tretet in die nur angelehnte
Haustür; eine Klingel gibt es dort nicht, denn zu Fuß kommen selten
Gäste und einen Wagen, der vorfährt, wird das Hausmädchen schon
bemerken. – Auch die große, hohe Diele ist leer und still. Ernst
sehen die Hirsch- und Renntierköpfe von den Wänden mit ihren
mächtigen Geweihen. Ein paar prachtvolle Fischreiher und Falken
sehen aus, als wollten sie zu euch herunterfliegen mit ihren
ausgebreiteten Schwingen. Aber zum Glück sind sie nur
ausgestopft! – Durch mehrere große, stille Zimmer führt euch der
Weg. Überall nicken Rankrosen und wilder Wein in die Fenster. Auf
einmal fahrt ihr erschrocken zurück: dort kommen euch eure eigenen
Doppelgänger in ganzer Länge entgegen! – Aber es war nur die
Spiegeltür gegenüber, die euch neckte und in der ihr nun auch den
wundervollen, alten Ofen mit dem kleinen Säulentempel oben drauf
und die weißen und goldenen Wände des Eßsaals erblickt. Schnell
brecht ihr den Bann und durcheilt die Tür – aber dieselbe Stille auf
den langen, winkeligen Korridoren und der breiten Eichentreppe, die
frei nach oben führt zu dem weiten Vorsaal, auf dem oft bei
festlichen Anlässen mehr als 60 Personen tafelten. Aber nur im
Sommer. Im Winter war er grausam kalt mit seinen vielen hohen
Fenstern.
Ja, ja, so war es einmal! Manches wohl unbequem und weitläufig
– und deshalb muß ich euch auch mit schwerem Herzen
anvertrauen, daß die jetzigen Besitzer das Haus nicht mehr
zeitgemäß fanden, womit sie wohl recht haben mögen. – Die alte
Uhr ist abgelaufen, der schwere Messingklopfer an der Haustür
verstummt. Ein neues, schönes Schloß reckt seine Giebel höher als
früher das alte Haus. Zentralheizung und elektrisches Licht sind
sicher bequemer als die vielen Öfen und die Petroleumlampen oder
gar die Talglichter, mit denen wir noch in früher Jugend zu Bett
gehen mußten und die nicht schön rochen, wenn man ihnen den
Lebensfaden buchstäblich abschnitt. –
Ob aber das neue Geschlecht bei allem Komfort glücklicher ist, als
die alten waren, weiß ich nicht. Gäste traulicher aufnehmen und vor
Unbill gastlicher schützen – im Sommer wie im Winter – alle Jahre
hindurch – kann auch das neue, stattlichere Dach unmöglich! Viele
Herzen schlagen warm und dankbar, wenn sie an das alte, liebe
Haus denken, und die schönsten Stunden, die sie verlebt, werden in
ihrer Erinnerung wach.
Gerloffs hatten seit Jahren wenig in der alten Heimat gelebt.
Es war ein zu furchtbarer Sommer gewesen, als die Diphtheritis im
ganzen Kirchspiel wütete. Keine von den Tagelöhnerfamilien war
verschont geblieben; – aus dem einen Hause hatten sie alle Kinder
fortgetragen auf den Gottesacker. Hart und stumpf waren manche
von den rauhen, stillen Leuten geworden. Der Doktor riet dem
damaligen Rittmeister zu eiliger Flucht nach Berlin. Aber davon
wollte der gar nichts wissen: »Die miteinander arbeiten, teilen auch
die Gefahren miteinander! Das ist so bei Gewitter und Feuer; das
war so im Feldzuge, wie sollte es jetzt anders sein, wo es gilt, für
das Leben der Liebsten zu kämpfen!«
Er wie seine Frau, die ebenso tapfer von Geist war wie zart von
Körper, suchten mit Hilfe des Arztes alles zu tun, was sich zur Pflege
der Kranken und zum Schutz der noch Gesunden erdenken ließ.
In solchen Zeiten braucht der »kleine Mann« einen Halt und
Führer, er verliert sonst den Kopf. So fest und ausdauernd die Leute
bei ihrer harten Arbeit sind, so verzagt und unberaten, ja töricht sind
sie oft bei Gefahr und Not. Da war seine leitende Hand ganz
unentbehrlich.
Die Kinder im Herrenhause wurden streng abgeschlossen, und sie
hatten trübe Tage, wo sie die sonst so frohen Eltern wenig sahen.
Aber als dann doch der Tod an das bisher so ganz glückliche,
immer sonnige Herrenhaus anklopfte – als der herzige kleine Hans,
der noch nie krank gewesen, sich Tage und Nächte in den
schrecklichsten Qualen wand – da konnte der junge Vater nicht
glauben, daß dies Wahrheit sei.
Wenn noch vor zwei Wochen der stramme, kleine Pony mit dem
fünfjährigen Bürschchen neben dem schönen Pferde des Vaters
hertrabte, dann hatte jeder Arbeiter auf dem Felde, an dem sie
vorbeikamen, einen Augenblick die Hände ruhen lassen und dem
Paar nachgesehen. Über die teilnahmlosesten Augen war ein heller
Schein gehuscht, wenn sie bemerkten, wie der Kleine – das
Ebenbild des stattlichen Vaters – Zügel und Peitsche genau so faßte
wie der, und dabei so treu und ehrenfest aus den blitzblauen Augen
sah.
Das konnte doch nicht alles vorbei sein, zerstört werden?
Unmöglich!
Der Rittmeister hielt es nicht mehr aus in den dumpfen Zimmern –
der Sommer war auch zu heiß! Ziellos schritt er über den Hof. Da
kam ihm ein junger Tagelöhner mit verstörtem Gesicht entgegen.
Schon als Jungen hatte er ihn gut leiden können; der zwei Jahre
ältere hatte ihm geschickt geholfen, Borkenschiffe und Weidenflöten
zu schnitzen. – Diesen Augenblick sah er aus wie ein alter Mann.
»Wat is, Hinrich?«
»Herr, mit Paul iss’t uk vörbi! – min Letzt,« fuhr es ihm mit rauher
Stimme heraus.
»Ne, Hinrich, – is’t möglich? – Gott bewohr dien arme Fru!«
»Gott?« – lachte der arme Mensch heiser auf, »wenn dei noch
lewt – üm uns kümmert hei sik nich mihr!«
»Still, Hinrich, du weißt nich, wat du sprickst!«
Rasch ging jeder seines Weges. – Viel Worte zu machen, liegt
dem richtigen Mecklenburger nicht, zumal wenn ihm das Wasser bis
an die Kehle geht.
Aber der Rittmeister reckte sich auf, als er merkte, daß er ebenso
gebeugt hinging wie sein Vorknecht. Nein, das durfte nicht sein! Gott
würde ja helfen.
Als dann der kleine, schwarze Sarg aus dem Herrenhaus
herausgetragen wurde, war es, als seien all die großen, hellen
Räume eiskalt und dunkel – mitten im Sommer. Alle Leute sahen
völlig verstört aus, und der Hausherr fühlte sich wie betäubt. Er
wußte später nicht, wie diese Tage herumgegangen. Das erste, was
ihm in Erinnerung wieder deutlich vor Augen stand, war, wie er
neben Hinrich Kurt, dessen Haare grau geworden, hinter einem
Sarge herging. Die vergrämte junge Tagelöhnerfrau war ihren vier
Lieblingen gefolgt.
Es war nie Sitte gewesen, daß der Herr sich einem Leichenzuge in
seinem Dorfe anschloß. Er hatte es sich auch gar nicht weiter
überlegt, – es schien ihm so natürlich. Ihm selber war noch sein
geliebtes Weib geblieben – und doch auch seine süße, kleine Hanni,
die eben so arglos allein im Sande spielte. – Dieser arme Mensch
hatte alles verloren.
Auf dem Wege hatten beide kein Wort gesprochen. Als sie aus
dem Kirchhofstor traten, sagte der Rittmeister: »Hinrich, dei Gang
wir surer, als dei Dag vör Gravelotte, as uns de Kugeln üm den Kopp
susten!«
»Ja, Herr!«
»Öwer Gott hätt uns donmals hulpen, hei lewt nu ok noch!«
»Ja, wenn de Herr dat hüt seggt, wo lütt Hans begraben is, möt ik’t
woll glöben – letzt künn ik’t nich!«
Am anderen Tage trat der Vorknecht an seinen Herrn heran, was
sonst ungerufen nicht geschah. »Herr, ik meint so« –
»Wat meinst du, Hinrich?«
»Ja, Herr, dei Roggower Inspekter sähr mal, son’n lütten frommen
Pony müggt hei woll vör de oll gnädig Fru ehren Parkwagen hebben.
– Ik mein, ob ik em nu nich röwer bringen süll, dat man uns’ Madam
em nich mihr vör Ogen kreg! – Hei kriegt dat dor gaud – und denn
is’t doch beder, dei oll Dam’ hätt em, as wenn anner lütt Jungs –«
Der Rittmeister wendete sich rasch ab, und der gutmütige Knecht
fürchtete, etwas Verkehrtes gesagt zu haben. Aber gleich darauf
kehrte der Herr um und drückte dem Getreuen hastig die schwielige
Hand, was er noch nie getan.
»Bring min Pird, Hinrich, – ik will na dei Roggenmieten seihn – und
wenn’t düster watt, kannst du den Pony röwer bringen.«
Am selben Abend ließ die bleiche, junge Frau den vereinsamten
Vorknecht auf die Diele rufen: »Hinrich Kurt, der Herr hat davon
gesprochen, daß der alte Kutscher Wilhelm gern aufs Altenteil will,
und daß dann wohl Sie Kutscher würden.«
Hörte er recht? Dies war das Ziel seiner Wünsche gewesen – jetzt
war ihm alles gleich. – Aber die schöne, junge Frau sah ihn so
teilnehmend an, daß ihm warm ums Herz wurde.
»Dann wäre es wohl besser, Sie wären immer dicht bei der Hand.
Deshalb habe ich Mamsell Bescheid gesagt, daß sie die Stube
neben dem Gärtner für Sie herrichte. – Es ist auch besser, wenn Sie
nicht immer allein sind,« fügte sie leiser hinzu. »Überlegen Sie sich’s
mal.«
»Ne, dor is nix tau öwerleggen,« meinte Hinrich, der die ganze
Zeit über seine Mütze zu einem Knäuel gedrückt hatte. »Wenn
Madam dat so inseih’n, denn is’t gaut – dat sähr Rieke ok ümmer.«
So vergaßen Herr und Knecht auf Stunden das eigene Leid über
dem Schmerz des anderen. Und dann waren Jahre gegangen und
gekommen mit Sommer und Winter, Frost und Hitze – und in vieler,
ernster Arbeit hatten die Herzen wieder Ruhe gefunden.
Aber eins war anders als früher. Alle Leute hatten früher »den
jungen Herrn Rittmeister« gern gehabt und geachtet. Jetzt sahen sie
zu ihm auf. Sie hatten in der Not den Kopf verloren – er nicht. Sie
waren in Gefahr gewesen, Gott zu verlieren. Er hatte ebenso gelitten
wie sie und hatte seinen Blick fest auf Gott gerichtet behalten – das
hatten sie gefühlt. Sie haben ein feineres Gefühl, als die Städter
meinen.
Und noch eins war anders geworden: Seit alters hatten die
Gerloffs ein Herz für ihre Leute gehabt. Das war ihnen ganz
selbstverständlich. Auch die getreuen Haustiere versorgt man gut
und gibt ihnen, was sie brauchen. Wer täte das nicht!
Aber mit ihnen denken und sprechen kann man nicht.
In jenem Sommer hatten Herr und Knecht in dunklen Stunden
gefühlt, daß sie dieselben Schmerzen litten. Sie hatten miteinander
gesprochen als Mann zum Mann – Vater zum Vater. Da waren die
Schranken gefallen und nicht wieder aufgerichtet. Nie war hierüber
gesprochen, man fühlte aber, es gab Punkte, wo alle hergebrachten
und ererbten Formen nichts bedeuten. Es war ein tieferer Ton in das
gegenseitige Verhältnis gekommen. Der Gehorsam war größer und
freier geworden, – mehr aus innerem Bedürfnis als aus Zwang. Das
Befehlen mehr ein Anordnen, bei dem man stets auch die Achtung
vor der Persönlichkeit des anderen durchfühlte.
Und so hatte sich zu einer Zeit, wo ringsumher bitter geklagt
wurde über schlimme »Leuteverhältnisse«, in Schönfelde ein
Vertrauen zwischen Arbeitern und Herrschaft gebildet, was manche
der Nachbarn gar nicht begreifen konnten. Und wenn der Rittmeister
und seine Frau das warm und beglückend empfanden, so wurde
ihnen klar, daß der Herr oft, indem er herbes Leid auferlegt, zugleich
auch tief verborgenes Glück schenkt.
4. Kapitel.
Der Einzug.
An dem wichtigen Tage, der die jungen Herrschaften in die alte

Heimat führen sollte, herrschte vom frühesten Morgengrauen an
rege Tätigkeit in Schönfelde. Einfahrt und Haustüren wurden mit
Girlanden geschmückt, der ganze Hof aufs sauberste geharkt, und
im Hause war ein geschäftiges Rennen und Laufen. Von Tante Ida
bis zur Mamsell, und von der bis zum kleinen Küchenmädchen
wollte jeder sein Reich so blitzblank abliefern wie nur möglich. Der
Gärtner hatte die schönsten Blumen für alle Vasen gebracht, und
Tante Ida hatte das beste Porzellan und Silberzeug aus den
eichenen Schränken geholt und das feinste Damastgedeck aus der
übergroßen Leinentruhe. Wieder und wieder hörte man ihr
Wahrzeichen, den elfenbeinbeschlagenen Handstock, mit dem sie
das rechte Bein unterstützte, hin und her eilen. Wie klopfte ihr das
Herz bei dem Gedanken, ob der heißgeliebte Bruder mit allem
zufrieden sein würde, ob die zarte Schwägerin, die so viel jünger und
verwöhnter war als sie selber, sich nun dauernd heimisch einleben
möchte in der alten Heimat, die sie selber mehr liebte als alles in der
Welt! Von Herzen freute sie sich, für ihren allmählich etwas müde
gewordenen Körper mehr Ruhe zu bekommen, die große
Verantwortung loszuwerden.
Aber wie würde es ihr nun eigentlich vorkommen, wenn nicht mehr
an sie jede der ungezählten Anfragen sich richtete, wenn das große
Schlüsselbund in anderen Händen klirrte – wenn die Leute aus dem
Dorfe nicht mehr mit jeder Not zu Fräulein Ida kamen, wie sie hier
seit ihrem vierzehnten Jahre – seit bald vierzig Jahren – hieß! Sie
preßte die Hand auf das unruhig klopfende Herz, wie um ihm Ruhe
zu gebieten. »Das findet sich alles – die Hauptsache ist, daß sie sich
hier einleben!«
So hatte sie auch betreffs der häuslichen Anordnungen gedacht.
Der Bruder war immer schwer für eingehende Besprechungen zu
haben, und die Schwägerin war zu zartfühlend und zu vorsichtig
gewesen, um von fern und schriftlich Anweisungen geben zu mögen
über die künftige Einrichtung des Hauses. Beide hatten noch einmal
kommen wollen, um alles zu bereden. Als aber eine leichte
Erkrankung der Majorin das vereitelte, hatte der Bruder mit
militärischer Kürze geschrieben:
»Die Sachen kommen Mittwoch auf dem Bahnhof an. Schickt für
jeden Möbelwagen vier Pferde und ladet vorsichtig aus. Auf der
Diele der roten Scheune kann alles stehen bleiben, bis wir da sind.
Mündlich mehr. – Else läßt bitten, die Damastmöbel aus ihrem
Zimmer zuzudecken, damit sie nicht leiden; na, Du weißt,
Stadtdamen sind vorsichtig für ihre Prachtstücke. Dein Hans
Günther.«
Sie hatte doch den Kopf schütteln und lachen müssen. Die
prachtvoll geschnitzten Möbel ihrer Schwägerin tagelang auf der
Scheunendiele stehen lassen; die braven, aber nicht gerade
sauberen Hände der Knechte auf dem zarten, gelben Seidenstoff! –
Nein, Bruder, bei allem Respekt vor deiner Einsicht – das geht nicht!
Und sollte sie erst alles lassen, wie es zu der seligen Eltern Zeit
gewesen? Und dann müßte die so weich empfindende junge Frau
die durch die Erinnerung geheiligten, aber für nüchterne Augen
natürlich teils altersschwachen Sachen beiseite schieben? Das
würde schwere Stunden verursachen und konnte einen Schatten auf
den ganzen Anfang werfen. Da hieß es, lieber dem Herzen einen
Stoß geben und selber den schweren Schritt tun!
Sie rief ihre braven Truppen zusammen: die Frau des Saathalters,
des Schäfers, des Kuhhirten und des Vorknechts, die alle in ihrer
Mädchenzeit auf dem Hofe gedient hatten und mit jeder Einzelheit
bei der Arbeit ganz genau vertraut waren. Mit ihrer Hilfe wurde eine
wahre Sintflut veranstaltet; und als dann die Möbelwagen
vorgefahren waren, konnte jedes Stück gleich an Ort und Stelle
gebracht werden. Die schönsten von den alten Sachen waren in den
Saal gekommen und in die beiden danebenliegenden Zimmer, die
hauptsächlich für größere Geselligkeit benutzt wurden und für die die
Möbel der Geschwister nicht ausreichten. Deren Sachen kamen in
die früheren Zimmer der Eltern, denen sie einen unbeschreiblichen,
neuen Reiz verliehen. Tante Ida mußte das Ganze immer wieder
bewundern. Ja, sie hoffte, die Lieben sollten zufrieden sein! Was
würde Hans Günther wohl zu der Diele sagen? Früher war sie mehr
nur Durchgang gewesen. Jetzt sah sie unendlich anheimelnd aus mit
des Vaters uralten Eichenmöbeln. Noch einmal wollte sie alles
prüfend durchwandern, da knirschten draußen die Räder auf dem
Kies und die Jagdhunde schlugen an.
Erschrocken eilte sie an die Klingel. Aber da kannte sie Marieken
schlecht! Die stand bereits an der weitgeöffneten Haustür und strich
verlegen und brennend rot an der weißen Schürze herunter, bis der
Wagen hielt und sie ihren Gefühlen Luft machen konnte, indem sie
hastig und dienstbeflissen Decken, Schirme und Taschen an sich riß.
»Halt, halt – meinen Handstock laß mir! Die Waffe gibt ein Soldat
nicht her!« wehrte der Major vergnügt ab, und hob dann seine Frau
selber aus dem Wagen. Aber Hanni wartete nicht auf irgend eine
Hilfe, sondern sprang eilig an allen vorbei auf ihre Tante zu.
»Tante Ida, Tante Ida! Endlich sind wir da!« jubelte sie. »O, es ist
zu, zu schön!« Es war ein stürmisches Durcheinander, und erst nach
geraumer Zeit konnten die Angekommenen sich näher umsehen.
»Wie ist es doch gemütlich und heimisch hier!« rief der Major aus,
sich glücklich in der alten Diele umsehend. »So schön hatte ich’s gar
nicht in Erinnerung! Hier lasse ich mich häuslich nieder und gehe
überhaupt nicht weiter.«
»Vater, Vater, o komm hierher,« rief Hanni erregt. »Nein, ganz wie
zu Hause!« Sie stand mitten in ihres Vaters Zimmer und sah durch
die Flügeltür in das schöne Wohnzimmer ihrer Mutter. – Jetzt erst
begriffen die Eltern die Veränderung gegen früher, und tief gerührt
faßte der Major seine treue Schwester um die Schulter.
»Liebe, gute Seele – was hast du denn gemacht? Das ist alles
schon in schönster Ordnung für uns, und wir brauchen uns bloß
reinsetzen in das warme Nest! Das ist ja zu schön! Sieh doch, Else –
dort dein Nähplatz am Fenster – dein Schreibtisch! – Nein, sieh
doch, die Sessel dort am Kamin! Du bist ja eine goldene Schwester!
Das vergeß ich dir nie! Else war so müde seit der Krankheit neulich
und hatte so große Angst vor all der Umwälzung! Aber wo ist denn
Mutters Zimmer geblieben?«
»Kommt mal mit! Ich dachte, es würde euch so recht sein: Mutters
Sachen habe ich ganz nach oben genommen. Ich bin ja nun selbst
ein altes Mütterchen und gebrauche einen bequemen Winkel! Und
für meine kleinen, zierlichen Möbel aus der Mädchenzeit hatte ich
eine andere Verwendung.«
Auch oben wurde mit größtem Behagen alles in Augenschein
genommen; aber auf einmal wurde die Gesellschaft durch einen
lauten Schrei des Entzückens aufgeschreckt. Hanni war ans Ende
des kleinen Korridors vorgedrungen, an dem Tante Idas Zimmer
lagen – seitwärts vom großen Vorsaal, auf den alle Gaststuben
führten. Als sie nun die Tür zu dem kleinen Raum öffnete, wagte sie
nicht, den Fuß hineinzusetzen, so schön erschien ihr das, was sie
dort sah!
Alles war klein und zierlich, sogar die weißlackierten Fenster, die –
weit geöffnet – einen entzückenden Ausblick boten über den in
herrlichstem Frühlingsschmuck daliegenden Park, auf die grünen
Rasenflächen, die weißen Brücken, die zwischen dunklen
Taxusbüschen in leichtem Bogen über die klaren Teiche führten.
Duftende Rosen und Goldlacktöpfe standen in einem zierlichen
Blumenständer; am Fenster lud ein altmodisches Nähtischchen, mit
allem angefüllt, was fleißige Hände nur wünschen können, zum
Gebrauch ein. Ein kleines Sofa war mit hellgeblümtem Stoff
überzogen, ebenso der verlockend bequeme, alte Sessel in der
Ecke unter dem Schatten der Stubenlinde. Aber das Allerschönste
schien das Schreibpult aus hellem, glänzendem Birkenholz mit
schönen Elfenbeineinlagen. O, all die Schubfächer oben und unten –
und noch ganz versteckte, die erst das kundige Auge entdecken
konnte! – Und über allem der rosige Schein der Ampel, die an feinen
Ketten von der Decke hing.
»Tante Ida, Tante Ida! Was ist das hier? Wohnt hier eine Fee?«
»Ich glaube nicht! Oder bist du eine? Seht,« sagte sie, »dies sind
meine kleinen, alten Sachen. Hans Günther, kennst du sie noch?«
»Nein, wirklich nicht, – in diesem neuen Gewande nicht! – Bloß
hier das geheime Fach! O ja, das weiß ich noch genau! Das wollten
wir so gern aufmachen, weil du dein Tagebuch dort verwahrtest.
Aber dazu gehörte ein heimlicher Schlüssel, oder ein Kniff – ich weiß
nicht mehr!«
»Sollst du auch nicht, das kriegt niemand zu wissen als Hanni! Es
liegt wieder ein Tagebuch drin, aber ein leeres.«
Hanni brauchte viel Zeit, bis sie alles gesehen und bewundert
hatte. Sie drückte und preßte ihre Tante so, daß der Vater meinte,
sie solle sie doch wenigstens heute noch am Leben lassen. Endlich

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Goal Systems Theory: Psychological

Processes and Applications Arie W.

“Goal psychology is emerging as a hub of many areas of scholarship in the behav-

“Goal Systems Theory is among the towering achievements of twenty-first-century

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2023

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America

Introduction: The Principles of Goal Systems Theory  1

12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the

Ryan Carlson N. Pontus Leander

Benjamin A. Converse David Melnikoff

Jordan Etkin Birga Mareen Schumpe

Ayelet Fishbach Franklin Shaddy

Jessica Gamlin Wesley Starnes

Szu-​chi Huang Paul Stillman

Katarzyna Jaśko Ewa Szumowska

Catalina Kopetz Maferima Touré-​Tillery

Arie W. Kruglanski Kaitlin Woolley

The Principles of GST

An efficient motivational system operates to maximize goal attainment. The first

Research Inspired by GST

A Peek into the Discoveries in This Book

(adding a goal), equifinality (adding a means), and contrafinality (adding a

The year 2022 marks a 20-​year anniversary of goal-​systems theory (GST),

The Architecture of Goal Systems: Equifinality,

Figure 1.1 (a) Equifinality configuration. (b) Multifinality configuration.

such forms, equifinality, multifinality, and counterfinality, were addressed by

A major implication of the equifinality configuration is the possibility of

Because counterfinal means are perceived as particularly instrumental to

The Psychology of Extremism

The Means–​Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation

Another important application of the GST is to the phenomenon of intrinsic mo-

Applying the GST to Real-​World Phenomena:

On the Origins of Goal Systems. The Origin Question:

Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019). In other words, any behavior whatsoever is in

Number of “I would rape if I

Figure 1.2 Readiness to commit rape as a function of Significance Loss and

Anger Mediation Estimates

Indirect 0.00 0.00 3.32 <.001

This Thing Called Love

GST and Theorizing in Psychology

that characterized social psychology at the time. He was particularly concerned

How Does GST Address the Issues and Criticism Regarding

1. GST does take a Galilean approach: It focuses on the motivational process

A Goal Systems Approach to Risk Behavior

GST approaches goals as cognition—​mental representations of desirable end

Principles of Goal Pursuit

Means Instrumentality and Means Selection

Goal Conflict Resolution

Risk Behavior Follows the General Principles of Goal Pursuit

Risk-​taking refers to a choice whose outcomes, positive or negative, are uncer-

recognize that risk-​taking is a ubiquitous experience crucial to dealing with

Risk Behavior Is Enacted When It Is Perceived as an Instrumental Means

Questions addressed Principles of goal pursuit Phenomena

represent a means to interpersonal connection rather than a general tendency

When and Why Does Risk-​Taking Become an Instrumental Means

Obstacles in Goal Pursuit Increase the Likelihood of Risk Behavior People

The Potential Negative Consequences of Risk Behavior Might Paradoxically

»Na, Lisbeth, ist die Petersilie verhagelt?« fragte am nächsten

Kennt ihr das Leben auf einem schönen, alten,

Introduction: The Principles of Goal Systems Theory 1

12. Political Behavior from the Perspective of the

Szu-chi Huang Paul Stillman

Catalina Kopetz Maferima Touré-Tillery

The year 2022 marks a 20-year anniversary of goal-systems theory (GST),

The Means–Ends Fusion Model of Intrinsic Motivation

Applying the GST to Real-World Phenomena:

GST approaches goals as cognition—mental representations of desirable end

Risk-taking refers to a choice whose outcomes, positive or negative, are uncer-

recognize that risk-taking is a ubiquitous experience crucial to dealing with

When and Why Does Risk-Taking Become an Instrumental Means