Christopher JAfferlot, Caste

You might also like

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 24

Caste and Politics

Author(s): Christophe Jaffrelot


Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (AUTUMN 2010), pp. 94-116
Published by: India International Centre
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23006438
Accessed: 02-02-2020 17:06 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

India International Centre is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to India International Centre Quarterly

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
QUARTERLY

Caste
and
Politics

to designate groups, which had earlier been given

The word 'Dalit' is now commonly used in India


many names, including 'Harijan' (literally 'sons
of god') in Gandhian parlance. The other usual
expression is 'Scheduled Castes', an administrative category that
the British introduced in 1935 when they established the lists
of those who were entitled to benefit from special programmes of
positive discrimination. But the oldest name - Untouchables - is still
employed because of its power of evocation.
Indeed, the notion of Untouchability immediately calls to mind
one of the mainstays of the caste system, the notion of ritual purity/
impurity. In oldest Sanskrit texts dealing with castes, including the Rig
Veda, Hindu society is divided into four varnas (colours): Brahmins
(the literati - including priests); Kshatriyas (the warriors); Vaishyas
(crafts- and tradesmen) with whom ends the dvijas (twice-born)

By Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

category; and the Shudras, servants of cate


The Untouchables are not part of this s
name they were known by in the past of '
of Untouchability is the logical outcome of
of the caste system, the degree of ritual pu
top largely because of the superior purity
through, for instance, a strictly vegetarian
are pure too - hence their 'twice born' st
are considered to be impure but 'toucha
are not referred to in the oldest texts,
institutions of Indian society. Their name d
they are not supposed to be in contact with
segregation finds a topographical expressio
neighbourhoods away from the village. T
use the village well, to enter the temples o
cross the Brahmin neighbourhood.
The relative (im)purity of each cast
occuption. Brahmins will work with their
administration of kingdoms where they w
as prestigious, but as powerful too. Kshat
territories, will become local suzerains
jagirdars or even Maharajahs). Vaishyas will
economic activities in general (as money-
Shudras are also artisans, sometimes in ver
jewellery. Untouchables are involved in the
and work as tanners, shoe makers, meat cu
But most of them are landless peasants.
Besides ritual (im)purity and occupat
of the caste system is its endogamous ch
continue, castes must not mix: inter marri
in the Dharmashastras, which present th
As a result, the varna system encompass
jatis, which are the real castes. The word ja
born: one is born in the caste both one's pa
organized in a hierarchical manner due to t
of ritual purity, according to a continuum
Untouchables. However qualitative leaps e
the varna system gives a structure to th
jati belongs to a specific varna. The jatis

95

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

naturally enjoy a higher status than those th


of Shudras and even more among Untouc
of inherited statuses goes together with t
sometimes extremely specialized, mention
the main Untouchable jati of the north of
leather workers who are particularly impure
the skin of the cow, considered a sacred anim

Before Independence, the British iden


a specific social category, as evident f
administrative notion, Depressed Classes,
less with them and that was used in the censu
time. In the 1931 census - the most detail
castes are concerned - the criteria defini
much to do with ritual impurity (access t
are taken into account, for instance). As t
from the rationale of the caste system, it
the Depressed Classes were rechristened S
Government of India Act (1935). The follo
jatis was established under this name. The
fine tune their positive discrimination agend
They had started caste-based affirmative
favour of Untouchables in the late nineteent
education. Schools were reserved to them
have remained illiterate because of caste discrimination.1 But it
turned out that educated Untouchables, though in small numbers,
could not get jobs in relation to their qualifications. A case in
point is Dr. B.R. Ambedkar who, after most successful studies in
the United States and England, established himself as an advocate
in Bombay but could not get many clients.2 As a result, the British,
under pressure from Dr. Ambedkar who gradually became the first
leader of the Dalits, a word he introduced to designate the members
of his caste group, introduced quotas for the Untouchables in the
administration. In 1934, the Government decided to reserve 25 per
cent of the vacancies in the administration for the Muslims and 8.3
per cent for other minorities, including Untouchables, who then
represented 12.5 per cent of the population according to the 1931

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

census. The latter quota was increased to th


in June 1946, which means that proportionalit
Dr. Ambedkar also wanted to improve the
of Dalits in the political sphere. During th
Conference he demanded a separate elec
him, such an electoral reform would have
fellows into a solid interest group. Gandhi
that this would mean the division of Hin
British government, through the 1932 Com
separate electorate to Dalits, Gandhi went on
Ambedkar had to resign himself to a compr
the Poona Pact. It established a system of rese
elections, which granted 148 seats (instead
in the Communal Award) to the Untouchab
assemblies, but which removed the principle
in 148 constituencies where the Untouchable
numbers the members of the Depresses Cl
persons amongst them and these would be c
electors of all the castes put together would b

After Independence, Congress rulers could


past records in terms of the fight against Unt
Congress had inherited a certain ambivalence v
from socio-religious reform movements, such
the one hand, they considered Untouchabili
On the other hand, some of them - includ
wanted to reform the caste system, not to erad
ambiguous attitude was reflected in the makin
India whose Drafting Committee was headed
was also the Law Minister in Nehru's governm
The Constitution of 1950, through Articl
'"Untouchability" is abolished and its pr
forbidden'. 'Untouchability' is not define
stipulates that no citizen, on ground of cas
restriction with regard to '(a) access to shop
hotels and places of public entertainments;
tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of pu

97

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

wholly or partly out of State funds or de


general public' (Art. 15 (2). Similarly, 'f
including in the case of the so-called tra
servants' who, as members of service c
accompish the most polluting tasks.3
Several laws were passed after the promulg
in order to reiterate the egalitarian agend
India with respect to the Untouchables. In
(Offences) Act reasserted that Untouchable
from entering/visiting any public plac
respectfully. It was amended in 1976 and
Act. The same year, the abolition of forced l
letter, the Indian Parliament passed a law
System (Abolition) Act. In 1989, the Sched
Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was p
provisions protecting Dalits and Adivasis
abuse, and violence.4
The 1950 Constitution also introduced new rules in the realm
of positive discrimination. The most ambitious innovation that
was common to all the domains was regarding the principle of
proportionality. Reservations in favour of Dalits and Adivasis in the
education system, in the public sector and in the assemblies, had
to be proportional to their percentage in society.5 Correlatively,
the SCs - like the STs - were the only castes which continued to
be enumerated in the census every 10 years. This arrangement was
supposed to be temporary - for 10 years only - but it has been
voted again in Parliament every 10 years ever since. While the
number of the Scheduled Castes has increased steadily - 607 jatis
were registered in the first notification of 1950 of the Indian Union,
they were 1109 by 2002 - but the proportion of Dalits in the Indian
population has remained almost the same.
The frontiers of the SCs has changed for mainly two reasons. On
the one hand, some caste groups have claimed successfully that they
were Dalits (in order to benefit from the positive discrimination
programmes, mainly).6 On the other hand, new religious groups
have become eligible with the recognition of their Dalits as
Scheduled Castes. In 1956, Sikh Dalits have been admitted in this
social category. In 1990, it has been the turn of the Buddhists. Dalit
Christians and Dalit Muslims are still excluded from the Scheduled

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

Castes, allegedly because their religions


probably, because the inclusion of Chri
result in conversion to these two religions.

Table 1.1: Dalits in the population of India

Census year Total population Scheduled Castes pop. % of the SC pop.


(in millions) (in millions) To the total pop.
1961 439.2 64.4 14.7
1971 547.9 80.0 14.6
1981* 665.3 104.8 15.7
1991** 838.6 138.2 16.5
2001*** 1028.6 166.6 16.2
Source: Census of India.
* Excludes Assam; ** Excludes Jammu and Kashmir, *** Excludes the Mao
Maram, Paomata and Purul sub-divisions of the Senapati district in Manipur.

The Constitution of India undoubtedly opened up new


perspectives. It was progressive and even revolutionary to some
extent, in large part because of the key role that Dr. Ambedkar
played in its making. Yet, it also marked a certain regression so
far as the politics of reservation was concerned. Certainly, Dr.
Ambedkar had given up any hope for separate electorate (this
formula had become completely illegitimate in 1947 since it
was considered as the root cause for Muslim separatism and the
formation of Pakistan). But he was keen to retain the system of the
primaries, which enabled local Dalits in any reserved constituency
to select the four candidates who were to contest the elections.
Congress leaders wanted to abolish the primaries in 1948. Dr.
Ambedkar fought a losing battle by asking - through one of his
lieutenants - that in the reserved seats, no MP or MLA could be
elected if, besides the largest number of votes, he did not get at
least 35 per cent of the Dalits' vote. These precious safeguards
were ignored by the Congress party,7 which established a system
of reserved seats in which Dalit MPs and MLAs were not especially
accountable to the members of their community in any way, but to
the voters at large.

• • •

99

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

In post-Independence India, positive discr


relied mostly on the mechanism of reservati
advantages and obvious drawbacks. In the
were obviously not in a position to send MPs
them in any radical way in the Lok Sa
Sabhas simply because of the arithmetic o
delimitation of parliamentary constituencies
for Scheduled Castes candidates. The prop
made up by these castes in these constitue
but they were never in a majority, as evident

Table 1.2: Distribution of the constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes

according to the percentage of Scheduled Castes

% of Scheduled Castes Number of Constituencies


[0-10] 4

[10-20] 25

[20-30] 33

[30-40] 10

[40-50] 3

Source: M. Galanter, 'Compensatory Discrimination in Political


Representation', Economic and Political Weekly 14 (7-8), Feb. 1979, pp. 438

Besides, 75 per cent of the Scheduled Castes were in non-reserved


constituencies. A coalition of high and intermediate castes could very
well have their SC candidate returned, even if the SC did not vote for
him. Now, Congress had become adept at co-opting SC leaders and
to have them returned by mobilizing non-SC voters.8 One such SC
leaders co-opted by the Congress, Jagjivan Ram, admitted that 'since
one had to depend on the non-SC vote, one went along with the
fortunes of the party'.9 As a result, Dalits had no real spokepersons
advocating their case in Parliament. For instance, the 'official' Dalit
representative the Congress promoted, Jagjivan Ram, was very pliable.
Reservations in the administration posed different problems. While
in the assemblies, the 15 per cent quota was immediately fulfilled, the
situation was not that favourable in the bureaucracy, especially so far
as the highest classes were concerned. The situation was satisfying
in terms of aggregates (see table 1.3) but like the varna system, the
Indian bureaucracy has four classes and Dalits have been very poorly
represented for a long time in its upper echelons (table 1.3).

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

Table 1.3: Number and percentage of Dalits


employment (1960-2003)
Year Numbers (and %) of SC in Central government employment
1960 228 497 (12.24)
1969 359 943 (15.24)
1970 291 374(11.66)
1979 467 712 (15.12)
1980 490 592 (15.67)
1989 568 600 (16.41)
1990 590 108(16.41)
1999 591 839 (16.70)
2000 582 446 (16.05)
2003 540 220 (16.52)
Source: S.K. Thorat and C. Senapati, Reservation Policy in India - Dimensions
and Issues, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, 2006, p. 9 (Coll.
'Working Papers Series').

Till the 1980s, Dalits were well represented in Class C and D of


the administration. In the 1980s, Class B crossed the 10 per cent
threshold, something that happened in the 1990s in the case of Class
A. For decades, the quotas were not fulfilled, allegedly because there
were too few skilled candidates for the posts of the upper classes of
the administration.

Indeed, Dalits were affected by a massive under-education till the


1980s. Between 1981 and 1991, the proportion of Dalits who knew
how to read and write jumped from 21.38 per cent to 37.41 per
cent. This trend accelerated in the 1990s, so much so that by the
turn of the twenty-first century, almost 55 per cent of the Dalits were
literate, men reaching the remarkable figure of 66.6 per cent while
women were lagging behind with a poor 41.9 per cent. While the
gap between Dalits and the general population in terms of literacy
was 15 percentage points large in the 1960-1990s, it is now ten
points large only. In some ways, Dalits are catching up.
Better education has been one of the reasons for the presence of
Dalits in the administration in larger numbers. The reduction of the
backlog and the fulfilling of most quotas are also due to changes
of policies. In 1974, for instance, reservations were extended to
promotion by selection from Class C to Class B, and from Class B
to Class A. In 1989, the Supreme Court ruled against reservations in

101

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

Table 1.4: Percentage of Dalits in Central Governm


(1965-2003)

Class A
Year Class B Class C Qass D

(excluding
sweepers)

1965 1.64 (318 people) 2.82 (864) 8.88 5(96114) 17.75 (201073)
1968 2.11 3.11 9.22 18.32
1971 2.58 (741 people) 4.06 (1794) 9.59 (136259) 18.37(212248)
1972 2.99 4.13 9.77 18.61

1973 3.14 4.51 10.05 18.37

1974 3.25 4.59 10.33 18.53


1975 3.43 4.98 10.71 18.64

1981 5.46 (2883 people) 8.42 (5298) 12.95 (243028) 19.35 (238985)
1982 5.49 9.02 13.39 23.41

1984 6.92 10.36 13.98 20.20

1985 7.65 10.04 14.88 20.81

1987 8.23 10.41 14.45 20.04


1988 8.67 11.18 14.80 19.88

1989 8.51 (5204 people) 11.65 5(10021) 14.85 (330330) 20.41 (223045)
1990 8.64 11.29 15.19 21.48

1991 9.09 11.82 15.65 21.24

1992 9.67 11.57 15.74 20.88

1993 9.80 12.17 15.91 20.73

1994 10.24 12.06 15.74 20.47

1995 10.15 12.67 16.15 20.53

1996 11.51 12.30 15.45 20.27

1997 10.74 12.90 16.20 24.06

1998 10.80 12.35 16.32 18.65

1999 11.29 (10558 people) 12.68(13306) 15.78 (378115) 20.00 (189860)


2000 10.97 12.54 15.88 17.38

2001 11.42 12.82 16.25 17.89

2002 11.09 14.08 16.12 20.07

2003 11.93 (10256 people) 14.32(26040) 16.29 (345718) 17.98(158206)


Source: Ibid., p. 11.

: Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

Table 1.5: Literacy rates of those who are mo


general population and among Scheduled Cast
Year Scheduled Castes
National average
1961 24.02 10.27
1971 29.45 14.67
1981 36.23 21.38
1991 52.10 37.41
2001 64.8 54.79
Source: Census of India.

promotions. But the government had the Constitution amended in


1997 to continue reservations in promotion for SCs and STs till the
representation of each of these social groups reaches the prescribed
quota. These measures can only be explained by the growing
bargaining power of Dalits on the political scene.

Several laws voted by the Indian parliament have remained dead


letters. The Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction
of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993, is a case in point. It was
supposed to eliminate the degrading practice of manual scavenging
of human excreta by some Dalit castes (called Bhangis in North
India) but has not been implemented in many places. Ten years
after the Act was passed, the Union Ministry for Social Justice and
Empowerment had to admit to the existence of 676,000 manual
scavengers in India (according to unofficial estimates, the number of
manual scavengers in India may be as high as 1.3 million).10
Similarly, atrocities against Dalits continue in spite of the 1989
law. The practice of atrocities has a long history in India. One of the
most infamous cases took place in 1968, in a village of Tamil Nadu,
Kilvenmani (Tanjore district) where 42 Dalit agricultural labourers,
who asked for better wages, were locked in a hut and burnt alive
by upper-caste local dominants.11 Almost four decades later, in
September 2006, a similar development occurred in a village of
Maharastra, Khairlanji (Bhandara district where upper-caste people
killed four members of a Dalit family (including the mother, her
two sons and her daughter) who were resisting land expropriation.
Obviously, the upper-caste people of the village resented the growing

103

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

assertiveness of this family whose children


According to the Campaign on Dalit Hum
committed against Dalits every day: 13
week, 5 Dalits homes' or possessions bu
are kidnapped or abducted every week,
everyday and 11 Dalits beaten everyday.
fact that besides the Anti-Atrocities A
of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, framed und
comprehensive legislative mechanism t
Anti-Atrocities Act.

Dalits continue to be submitted to atrocities because the police


refuse to register their complaints. When they do, the intimidation
techniques of the upper castes dissuade the witnesses from testifying
before the judges. And the judiciary itself is known for its biased
approach towards Dalit issues. As a result, according to the
National Human Rights Commission annual report, 27,894 cases
were registered under the Atrocities Act in 2002 and only 2.31 per
cent of cases resulted in conviction. Even when the guilty men are
condemned, their sentences may be commuted into less severe
ones after some time. For instance, the six accused who had been
sentenced to death in the Khairlanji case have seen their sentence
commuted into a 25-years of imprisonment by the Nagpur bench of
the Bombay High Court in July 2010.
The continuation of atrocities is also due to the fact that, in spite
of reservations, Dalits remained among the weakest parts of society,
especially in villages, where positive discrimination programmes
have made little difference. Certainly, caste and class do not coincide
in India. But they largely overlap, as is evident from table 1.6.

Table 1.6: Social groups stratified by monthly per capita consumption


expenditure classes, rural India (1999-2000)
MPCE Class ST SC OBC Hindu upper castes All groups
Below poverty line 50.9 42.9 33.7 16.9 33.6
Rs 329-470 30.8 34.4 35.8 32.5 33.8
Rs 470-775 15.6 19.2 24.5 36.6 25.3
Rs 775 or more 2.7 3.4 6.1 14 7.3

Total 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Reports no. 468 and no. 469, NSSO, Sept. 2001

: Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

Almost 43 per cent of the Dalits lived b


the turn of the twenty-first century, ag
of the Hindu upper castes. These figure
economic status of the former who wo
others as landless labourers. In 2003, th
owned by the SCs was 9 per cent only,
OBCs, 44 per cent; and others, 36 per c
fact that the per-household land area o
lowest, 0.304 ha, against 0.767 ha in the
for the OBCs, and 1.003 ha for the other
Under these conditions, some Dalits opt
joined the Naxalite movement. This trend
Bihar where class conflicts coincided wit
between Bhumihars and Dalits. The form
such as the Ranvir Sena while Dalits part
Maoists. This opposition resulted in caste
armed Ranvir Sena activists entered 14 D
Bathe village (Arwal district) and kill
including 16 children and 27 women. Th
as a response to the killing of 37 upper-c
Bara (Gaya district). However, it appears th
to seize 50 acres of land that had been earmarked for distribution
among the landless labourers of the village. On 7 April 2010, the
Additional District and Sessions Judge of the Patna Civil Court
sentenced 16 men to death and 10 to life imprisonment for the
massacre of Laxmanpur-Bathe.

While some Dalits take to arms to fight their oppressors - mostly in


the countryside - others prefer to mobilize in a constitutional way
and develop their struggle in the political arena. Here, Dr. Ambedkar
- who has always advocated a legalistic approach - showed the
way as early as the 1930s-'40s when he started political parties.
He, however, oscillated between two strategies: either building a
political party that would advocate the cause of the working class at
large or concentrate his attention on Dalits alone. The Independent
Labour Party (ILP) founded by Ambedkar in 1936, reflected the
first perspective: as its name suggests, it aimed to represent workers

105

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

and peasants (especially landless ones). Ho


succeed in attracting support beyond D
Ambedkar's caste fellows. In 1942, Ambed
by the Scheduled Castes Federation (SCF) t
to promote the cause of Dalits. This appro
limits in the 1950s. The first general elec
only that the SCF remained confined to M
of Ambedkar - but that it could not attr
Mahars either. The latter thus conceived an
year of his death, the Republican Party
meant to combine the distinctive features of SCF and ILP to the
extent where, on the one hand, it targeted ascriptive groups, as the
SCF that aimed at Dalits, and, on the other, it was open, as was the
ILP, to other groups such as religious minorities, lower castes and
aborigines, rather than only to Dalits. This approach would ensure
the rise of RPI in 1960s. It is this perspective that the Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP) was to follow even more successfully in the 1980-90s.

In 1957, the RPI mobilized popular support in favour of the


redrawing of the map of the Bombay province according to the
linguistic criterion, a movement that gave birth to Maharashtra
and established the party on the political scene of the new state.
However, its first breakthrough was in Northern India in the 1960s,
highlighted by its performance in the Uttar Pradesh elections of 1962
and 1967, when it won 8 and 10 seats respectively in the assembly of
the largest state of India, as against 3 and 5 in Maharashtra. In 1962,
it was so because in Uttar Pradesh, RPI was supported by Muslim
voters whose faith in the Congress - for which they usually voted
- had been shaken by a major riot between Hindus and Muslims
in Aligarh in 1961, an event during which the government had not
responded with necessary promptness. This alliance between Dalits
and Muslims dovetailed with the logic of Dr. Ambedkar's project,
aiming for the coalition of status groups from lower castes to
religious minorities.
The RPI did not abandon the socio-economic stakes that it
continued to address with the logic of class. In 1959, it campaigned

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

in Maharashtra for a new redistribution


recognized by all impartial observers - that
had been a decoy. In 1964, the fourth ses
Ahmedabad, addressed this issue as its top
the manifesto drafted by the RPI befor
advocated for a nationalization of land an
collectivist structures.
The growing importance of socio-econo
agenda displeased the old guard of forme
who, faithful to the philosophy of SCF
of Dalits as specific and regretted that t
others.14 The leader of this group, B.K
Mahar of Nasik district who had been the a
of RPI in Maharashtra, was opposed to a
both more urban and better educated, o
lawyer from Bombay, was the leader.
The conflict over strategy quickly dou
struggle; the death of Ambedkar crea
from which RPI never emerged. Fact
several divisions, so that by early 197
were in existence, including the one he
Bhaiyyasaheb. Their competition was a
decline. In 1971, only 3 of their candidat
Assembly of Maharashtra.
The RPI had failed in its efforts to exp
and to broaden its base. Not only would
even among them, it would be confined
Untouchable castes, especially the Chamar
the Congress or the Shiv Sena. Past mast
Untouchable leaders, the Congress also k
Ambedkarists' - whose defection only w
RPIs ended this coup by collaborating wi
of elections of 1977, but without gaining
1980 to mid-1990, not a single RPI (cand
Prakash, the grandson of Ambedkar, who t
death in 1978, however, managed to unite t
RPI, which enabled him to win 4 seats in
general elections of 1998. Nevertheless, the

107

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

rut of factionalism of the past the following


the 3 new RPIs could only win one seat in
lacklustre performance in contrast to the ir

Another party claiming Ambedkar's legacy,


(BSP), was indeed a success story of the 1980
Ram, was from a Chamar family of Punj
had benefitted from the opening of the a
colonial era - his father and uncles had he
Ram had also benefited from the policy of p
post-independence India. He got a BSc deg
as an assistant chemist in a laboratory under
Transferred to Poona, in Maharashtra, he
condition of Mahars there. They were in a si
of Punjab. Kanshi Ram read the works of
RPI shortly after. But soon he turned away
its rampant factionalism and alliance with th
was critical.
Kanshi Ram launched the Scheduled Caste
Other Backward Classes and Minority C
Association in 1971. Its name reflected his
project, aiming to aggregate all religious
Castes, tribes and even low castes - all vi
related to their status. The components of w
Samaj (literally: 'Society of those who are t
clearly found there. With the same logic, Ka
equally eloquent organization on behalf of
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Ot
and Minority Communities Employees Fe
movement, known as BAMCEF, defend
Bahujan officials. Its success reflected th
assertiveness of the beneficiaries of rese
people, gradually, were forming a Dalit m
BAMCEF, which would claim up to 200,00
the prevalent power structure. Faced with
Ram transformed BAMCEF into a secret o
a parallel political party for which BA

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

cadres. The Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh


the committee of Dalits and oppressed) tend
of Kanshi Ram on his original targets, the D
set up a new party, the Bahujan Samaj Part
Masses) whose name was more consistent with
Ambedkar: rally support from all segments of
The BSP met with growing electoral succe
2009, despite large regional disparities. The
lay in Uttar Pradesh, the largest state of India
12 to 66 seats between 1989 and 1993. Such a score enabled it to
form the government in association with the Samajwadi Party (SP -
Socialist Party), a regional party particularly well established among
OBC. However, this coalition broke up two years later because of
personal rivalries among leaders of the BSP and the SP, and because
of a class conflict between the OBC and Dalit in the countryside
where, in many cases, the latter, landless peasants, were working for
the former.

Table 1.7: Results of BSP in the general elections from 1989 to 2009.
Year Candidates Winning Candidates % of valid votes
1989 246 3 2.07
1991 231 2 1.61
1996 117 11 3.64
1998 251 5 4.7
1999 N.A. 14 4.2
2004 435 19 5.33
2009 500 21 6.17

Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Ninth General Elections


to the House of the People in India, 1989, New Delhi, Government of India
Press, 1990; p. 7, Election Commission of India, Report on the Tenth General
Elections to the House of the People in India, 1998, New Delhi, [no date];
p. 9, Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections,
1996 to the Eleventh Lok Sabha, Vol. 1, New Delhi, 1996; G.V.L. Narasimha
Rao et K. Balakrishnan, Indian Elections: The Nineties, Delhi, Haranand, 1999;
Y. Yadav and S. Kumar, 'Interpreting the Mandate', Frontline, 5 November
1999, p. 120-126; and Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, 'Between Fortuna and Virtu:
Explaining the Congress' Ambiguous Victory in 2009', Economic and Political
Weekly, 26 Sept. 2009, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, p. 33

109

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

Table 1.8: Electoral performance of the BSP in


during the general elections of 1989-2009, in p
in terms of seats (in parenthesis)

States Haryana Punjab Uttar Pradesh Madh


% of SC 19.75 28.31 21.05 14.5 -

in 1991
1989 1.62 (0) 8.62 (1) 9.93 (2) 4.28 (0) -

1991 1.79 (0) No election 8.70(1) 3.54(1) -

1996 6.6 (0) 9.35 (3) 20.61 (6) 8.18(2) -

1998 7.7(1) 12.7 (0) 20.9 (4) 8.7 (0) -

1999 1.7(0) 3.8 (0) 22.1 (14) 5.2 (0) -

2004 4.9 (0) 7.67 (0) 24.6 (19) 4.75 (0) 6.8 (0)
2009 15.7 (0) 5.75 (0) 27.4 (20) 5.85(1) 15.3 (0)

The BSP had shown great pragmatism - called opportunism by its


detractors - by getting into alliances with any party — including
the BJP - which would agree to support a government headed by
Mayawati, the Dalit woman who led the BSP in Uttar Pradesh and
then nationally after Kanshi Ram suffered from a stroke in 2003
(he was to die 3 years later). Mayawati was chief minister of Uttar
Pradesh, at the helm of coalition governments, three times: in 1995
(between June and October, with the support of the SP), in 1997
(between March and September), in 2002-2003 (between May 2002
and August 2003 with the support of the BJP). In 2007, for the first
time, the BSP won an absolute majority in Uttar Pradesh.
The feeling of social revenge that the supporters of BSP drew from
this conquest of power consolidated the electoral base of the party.
But these subjective feelings were not the only reasons for the BSP's
growing success in Uttar Pradesh. Besides these symbolic reasons,
social and economic policies mattered a lot. Mayawati implemented
public policies, which benefited mostly the lower castes. The
Ambedkar Village Scheme, that harks back to the mid-1990s is a
case in point. It consisted in special development drives (in terms of
roads, schools, irrigation, etc.) in the villages where Dalits were in
large numbers. As soon as she took over as chief minister, Mayawati
also issued a Government Order on 31 May 2007 to clear the
backlog quota of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs.
In July of the same year she increased the daily agriculturalist wage
from Rs. 58 to 100 - a measure benefiting mostly Dalits. Last but

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

not least, the government returned to a st


Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prev
by making the administration, including th
to Dalits - many Dalit policemen have b
in rural thanas (police stations). This las
by the upper and dominant castes who a
were Dalits were asserting themselves eco
so psychologically, under Mayawati.
The rise of BSP was based primarily
Chamar community (the caste of Kansh
gradually other Dalits (including Pasis i
in Maharashtra), and even significant c
Muslims rallied around the party (see tab

Table 1. 9: The Dalit vote for the BSP in seven


States % of Dalit votes
Chhattisgarh 27

Delhi 23

Haryana 57

Madhya Pradesh Jatavs: 27


Other Dalits: 6
Maharashtra Mahars: 15
Buddhist Dalits: 37
Other Dalits: 9

Punjab Hindu Dalits: 21


Sikh Dalits: 14
Uttar Pradesh Jatavs: 85
Pasis: 64
Other Dalits: 61

Source: Rahul Verma, 'Dalit Voting Patterns', Economic and Political Weekly,
26 Sept. 2009, vol. XLIV, No 39, p. 97.

Apart from its poor outreach in many Indian states, the BSP's
main weakness, similar to Ambedkar's parties, was its poor
organization. This handicap went hand in hand with a striking
taste for personalization of power: the BSP has gradually become
identified with its leader, Mayawati, who rules in a rather solitary
and authoritarian way.

111

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

With 21 per cent of the Dalits voting for th


cent voting for the Congress), the party has bec
of India, before the Communist Party of India (

Today, Dr. Ambedkar has become an inescap


for all politicians, including BJP and Congr
discovered him recently but often pay allegianc
than to their own founding fathers. Dalits se
at the top of the state: India has become fam
ministers, such as Mayawati; Dalit ministers
Ambedkar and Jagjivan Ram as early as 1947; Da
Bangaru Laxman on the BJP side and Jagjivan
side; Dalit chief justice, like the outgoing one
presidents; Dalit Planning Commission membe
president of the Republic, K.R. Narayanan.17
However, these personalities represent only the
as evident from the pervasiveness of mass pover
the oppression they are subjected to. They a
public policy of positive discrimination which ar
to create elite groups among social categories
emerge otherwise.
The challenges ahead are directly related to
this public policy. First, this policy is applied
only. Now, this sector is on the decline becau
the game introduced by the post-1991 liberal
including a few privatizations and the growin
work. In 2002, the public sector employed
against 19,467,000 in 1995. The private sector,
slightly increased from 8,058,000 people in
2002. The number of Dalits in public sector en
from 428,491 in 1990 to 236,618 in 2004 (see
Hence the demand spelled out by Dalit lead
positive discrimination in the private sector, som
government has initiated indirectly since in
public/private partnership project - where th
cannot be less than 11 per cent and more than
cent of the posts would be reserved to the Sc

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

Table 1.9: Numbers and percentage of employe


(1971-2004)
Year Number (and %) of SC in the Public
1971 40640 (7.42)
1979 300405 (16.90)
1980 317401 (17.44)
1989 423879(19.51)
1990 428491 (19.58)
1999 336140 (17.45)
2000 324140 (18)
2004 236618 (16.03)
Source: S.K. Thorat and C. Senapati, Reservation Policy in India - Dimensions
and Issues, New Delhi, Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, 2006, p. 18,
(Coll. 'Working Papers Series').

cent to the OBCs and religious minorities and 10 per cent to the
upper caste poor.
The second problem posed by the reservation policies can be
captured by one word: co-option. As mentioned above, these policies
aim at generating elite groups; as a result they are very vulnerable
to the strategies of dominant groups, which can deprive Dalits
of their leaders by offering lucrative and prestigious posts in the
establishment. This mechanism has been observed for decades in the
political domain where the ruling party, the Congress, minimized
the competition coming from Dalit parties by attracting the leaders
of the latter in its rank. In the early 1970s, Indira Gandhi lured B.P.
Maurya, the most important leader of the Ambedkarite Republican
Party of India by promising him a ministerial portfolio. In one go,
the RPI lost its momentum in Uttar Pradesh, the state where he had
made the maximum gains in the 1960s. When the elite are tiny,
such things can happen. And generating tiny elite is in the nature of
positive discrimination programmes.
The third issue concerns the ambivalent relationship that the
beneficiaries of reservations entertain with their caste fellows.
Reservation programmes enable them to join the privileged classes
at university and in the administration. Their life style changes, not
only in terms of material gains, but also in terms of values. They
tend to be cut off from their original milieu and, moreover, they tend

113

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

to marry upper-caste women when they a


Today, some of these who behave that w
more of their attitude. They argue that, by
means they prove to the world that a Dal
caste individual. That may be a great achie
their links with their caste brethren they
substantial leadership.
The last challenge pertains to the notion
Today, the quotas are cornered by those D
mother have already benefited from positiv
They often come from one special jati in
Pradesh, Jatavs are in the forefront; in M
similar role. Such a situation tends to defeat
whole purpose since it prevents other Dali
access to the reservations. Bhangis and K
Chambhars in Maharashtra remain massi
in the State apparatus. In February, the S
that the creamy layer of the Dalits be exclu
done with the OBCs. The entire political cl
However, to be fair to the non-elite Dalit
will have to be evolved sooner or later.
The challenges ahead may be negotiated by India's society and
government. The rise of the BSP has already upgraded the bargaining
power of Dalits, as is evident from the way job quotas have been more
effectively filled. The stakes are very high since Maoists may be in
a position to attract Dalits who will be deprived of any hope in the
regular functioning of the constitutional polity.

Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CASTE AND POLITICS

ENDNOTES:

1. For an overview of the reservation policy of the British, see B.A.V. Sharma,
'Development of Reservation Policy', in B.A.V. Sharma and K.M. Reddy (eds.),
Reservation Policy in India, New Delhi, Light and Light Publishers, 1982.
2. Dr. Amdedkar, who had registered at the Bombay High Court in 1923, had to
teach at Sydenham College to supplement his revenue (C. Jaffrelot, Dr. Ambedkar
and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste, New York/Columbia University
Press; Londres/Hurst; New Delhi/Permanent Black, 2004, p. 29).
3. In Maharashtra, Dr. Ambedkar had fought against this caste-based division of
labour known as baluta.

4. The list of the offences which were made illegal by this act give an idea of the
kind of oppression Dalits and Adivasis were still suffering from in 1989: forcing
the SC/ST members to eat inedible or obnoxious substances, dumping excreta or
obnoxious substances with intent to cause injury, insult or annoyance, stripping,
dishonouring or outraging modesty of SC/ST women and sexual exploitation,
forced or bonded labour, intentional public humiliation, property-related offences
like wrongful cultivation or dispossession of land, wrongful eviction from land,
premises, house or other place of residence or village, unauthorized interference
with the enjoyment of rights over land and water, offences like intimidation or
coercion of voters to either abstain from voting or to vote for a particular candidate,

enforcing social disabilities like corrupting or fouling water used by members


of SC/STs, denial of rights of passage or entry to public places, abusing legal
process like insulating false, malicious or vexatious legal proceedings, furnishing
false or frivolous information to a public servant are made punishable with an
imprisonment for a term not less than six months but nor more than five years
and with fine. (Ajay, 'Atrocities on Dalits - A Human Rights Perspective', ILI Law
Review, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 63-64 (http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1578221)
5. 'At the time of Independence, instructions were issued on 21.9.1947 to provide
reservations of 12.5 per cent for Scheduled Castes in respect of vacancies arising
in recruitment made through open competition. However, for recruitments made
otherwise than open competition reservations of 16.66 per cent was fixed.
After the Constitution was promulgated, the then Ministry of Home Affairs in
its resolution of 13.9.1950 provided 5 per cent reservation for Scheduled Tribes
apart from the reservation that was already in effect for the Scheduled Castes.
According to the population ratio of these communities, based on 1961 Census,
the government on 25th March, 1970, increased the seats reserved for SCs & STs
from 12.5 per cent and 5 per cent to 15 per cent and 7.5 per cent, respectively'
(Report of the National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities, New
Delhi, Ministry of Minority Affairs, p. 115).

: 115

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
lie QUARTERLY

6. This race to backwardness is also evident from the t


which allows non-Dalits to profit by the reservation sy
7. C. Jaffrelot, India's Silent Revolution - The Rise of
New York/Columbia University Press; Londres/Hurst
2003, p. 93.
8. M. Galanter, 'Compensatory discrimination in pol
and Political Weekly 14 (7-8), Feb. 1979, pp. 438-439
Equalities - Law and the Backward Classes in India, D
11984], 1991, p. 549.
9. Interview cited in F. Frankel, 'Caste, Land and Domin
and M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a
Social Order, Delhi, Oxford University Press, p. 83.
10. Human Rights Watch, Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination against India's
Untouchables, 83 (2007), http://www.chrgj.org/docs/lndiaCERDShadowReport.pdf
11. Manoranjan Mohanty, 'Kilvenmani, Karamchedu to Khairlanji: Why Atrocities on
Dalits Persist', available at: http://www.boell-india.org/download_en/mohanty_
amrita_corrected.pdf
12. Anand Teltumbde, Khairlanji: A Strange and Bitter Crop, Delhi, Navayana, 2008.
13. '27 Atrocities against Dalits', available at: http://www.ncdhr.org.in/esdi/2-dalit
houses-are-destroyed (visited on 17 Oct. 2009).
14. J. Gokhale, From Concessions to Confrontation. The Politics of an Indian

Untouchable Community, Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1993, p. 220.


15. On the BSP, see S. Pai, Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution.
The Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, New Delhi, Sage, 2002; K. Chandra,
Why Ethnic Party Succeed. Patronage and Ethnic Head Counting in India,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
16. G. Omvedt, 'Kanshi Ram and the Bahujan Party' in K.C. Sharma (ed.). Caste and
Class in India, Jaipur, Rawat, 1994,163.
17. Narayanan, of Paravane caste, a caste of fishermen of Kerala, had known an
early career comparable to that of Ambedkar as it was because of a philanthropic
organization and then a Tata firm and a letter from Nehru to Harold Laski he could
continue his studies at the London School of Economics. But he then opted for
the Indian Foreign Service (an elite body of the Indian administration which led
him to the post of ambassador in USA). After entering politics, he was elected
under the label/ticket of Congress the year of his retirement in 1992. He died in
2005 (R. Krishnakumar, 'A Long Journey. From Uzhavoor to Rashtrapati Bhavan',
Frontline, 11 July 1997, pp. 12 and 161).

: Christophe Jaffrelot

This content downloaded from 202.41.10.5 on Sun, 02 Feb 2020 17:06:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

You might also like