Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2020) 16:195–211

https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-019-00146-2

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational

arguments: a PD radar to chart the terrain of public diplomacy
Juyan Zhang1

Revised: 24 April 2019 / Published online: 9 October 2019

© Springer Nature Limited 2019

Abstract
Public diplomacy (PD) as a field of practice and as scholarly subject appears to be extremely fragmented. The goal of the
current research is to develop a dual framework, named a PD Radar, in an attempt to bring coherence, interconnectedness, and
systematicity to our understanding of the terrain of PD practices and theories. The main framework of the PD Radar consists
of two crossing axes representing ethics (compassion and manipulation) and efficacy (narratives and rational arguments),
and five concentric circles that represent goals of PD, power of PD, “worldviews” underlying PD practices, and relevant
theories. The sub-framework depicts basic components of a PD program and their relationship to the main framework. The
PD Radar is a descriptive and normative model. It can be used to evaluate a PD program, PD tendency of a nation, and PD
trends in the world.

Keywords Public diplomacy · PD model · PD programming · International relations · PD radar

In the past decade, the world has seen significant growth in
public diplomacy (PD) practice and research as a result of
ever-increasing interconnectivity among nations, the U.S.
war on terrorism, continual regional conflicts, omnipres-
ence of social media, and economic integration and friction
between countries. Nations, large and small, have actively
invested in PD programs, campaigns, and personnel train-
ings. The players of PD are no longer limited to national
governments. Local government, non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), military, international organizations, celeb-
rities, and even private citizens have all joined the frenzy.
Scholarly research of PD has thrived and a growing body
of literature has developed, which includes numerous case
studies, theoretical models, and literature reviews. With
these being said, however, PD as a field of practice and as a
scholarly subject appears to be extremely fragmented. Many
seemingly very different practices are labeled as PD. Schol-
ars from different traditions proposed a myriad of concepts
and models from different perspectives. As Gilboa (2008, p.
73) observed in his extensive review of PD research:
* Juyan Zhang
juyan.zhang@utsa.edu
1
Department of Communication, The UTSA, One UTSA
Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA
Despite the growing significance of public diplomacy
in contemporary international relations, scholars have
not yet pursued or even sufficiently promoted system-
atic theoretical research in this field. They have devel-
oped models and tools for analysis in several relevant
disciplines but have not proposed a comprehensive
and integrated framework. Substantial gaps exist at
several levels and areas. Experts and practitioners in
public diplomacy have often ignored relevant knowl-
edge in communication and PR; while communication
and PR scholars and practitioners have often ignored
the relevant literature in international relations, diplo-
matic studies, and strategic studies. Both groups have
ignored the potential contributions of other social
and behavioral disciplines. A new research agenda is
clearly needed to close the wide gaps.
Similarly, Gregory (2008, p. 274) noted that “the proposition
that public diplomacy is becoming an academic field often
invites two responses. First, public diplomacy’s meaning is
evolving and contested; since there is no consensus on its
analytical boundaries, it is difficult to describe the contours
of an academic field that would be generally acceptable. Sec-
ond, focus on public diplomacy’s history as an instrument of
statecraft and a literature dominated by the writings of prac-
titioners and policy advocates begs the question, where is the

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academic research and where are the scholarly publications
that would give meaning to a field of study?”
Nearly a decade has passed since Gilboa and Gregory
made their critiques, yet their comments still seem to be
a valid diagnosis of the status quo of PD research. Image
cultivation continues to be the most dominant theme in the
PD literature (Yang et al. 2012). Meanwhile, there has been
a shift toward conceptualizing PD as relationship manage-
ment. Payne (2009) argued that effective PD is rooted in
strategic people-to-people communication in the effort to
establish a sustaining relationship, and that fundamental
to achieving success is a commitment to build a relation-
ship with the targeted public through grassroots encounters.
Gregory (2011, p. 353) defined PD as an “instrument used
by states, associations of states, and some sub-state and non-
state actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior;
build and manage relationships; and influence thoughts and
mobilize actions to advance their interests and values.” Ras-
mussen and Merkelsen (2012) defined PD as an expansion
of the core public relations practices such as relation build-
ing and image making. Melissen (2013) suggested that PD
is not just aimed at short-term policy objectives but also at
long-term relationship building. Zaharna and Uysal (2016)
observed that PD has shifted from one-way media and mes-
saging approaches that dominated the early post-9/11 era
to more relational approaches, which is captured in such
phrases as “competition to cooperation,” “battles to bridges,”
and “messages to mutuality.” Manor (2017) observed that
the emergence of relational approaches to public diplomacy
that place an emphasis on engagement between diplomatic
institutions and their SNS (social networking sites) follow-
ers. He argued that relational approaches may serve as con-
ceptual links between the fields of public diplomacy, nation
branding, and public relations. Ociepka (2018) defined PD
as a dialogical form of international political communication
aimed at creating mutually beneficial relations with the pub-
lic abroad in order to support the communicator’s objectives.
Some researchers highlight influence and impacts in con-
ceptualizing PD. For example, Semetko et al. (2011) argued
that PD targets at the foreign public that bear directly on
another government’s foreign policies, performed by both
government and private individuals and groups, through
influencing directly and indirectly those public attitudes and
opinions, and its ultimate purpose is to promote the national
interest. Pamment (2013, p. 6) argued that PD is about
“creating effects upon the conduct of diplomacy, indirectly
through public attitudes.” It is also about “bringing interest
groups from different nations into contact with one another.”
(p. 10). Sevin (2015) stated that PD is “fundamentally a
communication tool used by states to reach foreign publics.”
He defined PD as “the communication-based activities of
states and state-sanctioned actors aimed at non-state groups
in other countries with the expectation of achieving foreign
J. Zhang
policy goals and objectives.” Manor (2016) observed that the
ministries of foreign affairs in the world still favor influence
over relationship building and that their digital activities
often focus on message dissemination among elite audiences
rather than online publics. Hayden (2017) suggested that PD
“connotes a range of international programmes tasked with
cultivating influence for nation-states. It is typically framed
and justified within arguments that comprise the concept of
‘soft power.”
Some scholars emphasized alignment with the interests of
global publics in conceptualizing PD. For example, Fisher
(2013) argued that PD must find ways “to collaborate within
the multi-hub, multidirectional networks that exist between
communities around the world” (p. ix). He said that PD “is
the art of knowing what will make the collaborative network
successful” (p. ix). Lee and Lin (2015, p. 373) noted that
goals of PD have expanded from “inform and influence” to
“engagement, dialogue and relationship building,” and “by
communicating a country’s policies, values and culture to
the people of another nation, public diplomacy implicitly
recognizes the primacy of relationships and notions of co-
existence and mutual interdependence.” Fitzpatrick (2017)
proposed to conceptualize PD in line with public interests by
promoting an understanding of foreign publics, reconciling
a nation’s interests with those of its publics, and facilitating
collaboration among publics to inform policy decisions and
actions.
Taxonomy of practices is another approach to defining
PD. As Pamment (2014a) noted, taxonomies of PD prac-
tices are central to explaining the evolving research field.
In the research, he reviewed numerous PD taxonomies and
concluded that they are a prevalent and necessary means of
explaining practices and intentions of PD. In recent years,
network and collaboration have become another important
perspective to defining public diplomacy, which recog-
nizes the multi-hub, multi-directional networks that existed
between communities around the world. Zaharna et al.
(2013) predict that PD will increasingly adopt an approach
based on genuine cooperation and collaboration with these
interconnected communities. They labeled the shift in PD
as “connective mindshift.” Lee and Ayhan (2015) examined
non-state actors in relational, networked, and collaborative
PD. Gregory (2015) placed PD-related actors into four net-
works, namely trans-governmental networks, polylateral
networks, cosmopolitan networks, and private governance
networks.
In recent years, narrative has become an important per-
spective to conceptualizing PD. Pamment (2014b) argued
that storytelling is an important aspect of PD; a nation may
use “strategic narratives” to position itself and its goals when
engaging with foreign societies. A relevant concept Pam-
ment (2014a, p. 54) proposed is “articulation.” He defined
it as “how things are expressed, how they are connected
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart… 197

and interrelated, and also to how things move and bend.”
Hartig (2016) defined PD as “a country’s engagement and
communication with foreign publics for the sake of com-
municating certain narratives and images of the country to
promote its soft power and thereby national interests.” Cull
(2016) argued that an important goal of the “New PD” is to
communicate a country’s power and stories.
In addition to the above research, some scholars resorted
to international relations theories to explore PD “world-
views.” For example, Yun and Toth (2009) introduced real-
ism, international liberalism, and sociological globalism as
PD worldviews. They argued that sociological globalism
will be a new background of future PD in an era of people
flow—migration. In short, each of the above conceptualiza-
tions of PD is valid in its own right when examined from a
particular perspective and level of analysis. When they are
presented together, however, we see the same fragmented
landscape that Gilboa and Gregory depicted a decade ago.
The complicated theoretical underpinnings of PD are par-
tially caused by the interdisciplinarity of the field, where
international relations, public relations, diplomacy, strategic
communication, and cultural studies intersect. They are also
caused by ever changing technologies, PD practices, actors,
and the global environment (Gregory 2015).
As a partial effort to address the issues that Gilboa and
Gregory noted, the current research has two goals. The
first is to develop a main framework that shows potential to
bring coherence, interconnectedness, and systematicity to
our understanding of the terrain of PD practices and theo-
ries. The second is to develop a sub-framework that may be
applied to analyzing and planning an individual PD program,
which is embedded in the main framework through a series
of nodes such as PD goals, PD powers, and worldviews of
international relations. I label this dual frameworks as a “PD
Radar” based on two grounds (see Fig. 1). First, its main
function is to chart and map the terrain of the PD practice
and research, just as a radar works as a system to determine
the range, angle, or velocity of objects. Second, the visual
representation of the framework is like a radar, thus making
it similar to a “radar chart,” a graphical two-dimensional
chart of displaying multivariate data. In presenting the PD
Radar, I will describe its “backbones” and the “dish,” which
constitute the main framework. I will explain each compo-
nent by outlining its nature and scope, its theoretical roots, as
well as real-world cases that illustrate the component. Next,
I will describe a sub-framework of the Radar, which can be
used to plan and analyze a PD program. I will show that the
basic planning process of a PD program is associated with

A PD Radar to Map the Terrain of Public Diplomacy

Raonal Arguments (Plato & Aristotle)
Efficacy

A. PD goals
B. Power of PD
C. Worldviews
D. PD Practices Domestic PR Model Environmental Two-way Symmetrical
E. Communication theories and PD models
Foreign Model (Grunig)
(Gilboa) diplomacy
lobbying

II
Foreign

I
assistance
Issue
Health
management
diplomacy Science
Military PD
diplomac

Public information PD publications Internet governance

Model (Grunig) diplomacy
Media relations Refugee
in negotiation diplomacy
Engagement Global public Corporate
Water and policy goods diplomacy
diplomacy agendas
Ethics A B C E

Conflict Gastrodiplomacy
Manipulaon PSYOPs resoluon, Compassion
propaganda Civilian diplomacy
(The Buddha)
(Machiavelli) International terrorism Nation branding

Advocacy PD through Cultural diplomacy &

Press Agentry education exchange
(Grunig) media relations
Faith diplomacy Two-way
Trolling of diplomatic issues & faith tourism symmetrical Model
Cold War (Grunig)
Model (Gilboa) Nuclear Rhetoric Celebrity diplomacy
Dialogical Model
Diaspora diplomacy (Kent & Taylor)
Nation building International broadcasting
(in conflict) (cultural and language)

III Mixed-motive
IV
model (Grunig)
Narraves (Walter
Fisher; Burke)

Fig. 1  The PD radar

198
and conditioned by the main framework of the Radar. Lastly,
I will discuss the use of the PD Radar.
Backbones of the PD radar: ethics
and efficacy
PD and public relations seek similar objectives and use simi-
lar tools (Signitzer and Coombs 1992). Effectiveness and
ethics are the most important concerns for public relations
(Grunig 2001; Huang 2004). As with public relations, ethics
and efficacy are the two most fundamental concerns for PD.
Ethics are the moral principles that guide the PD activi-
ties. It ranges between the two extremes of compassion and
manipulation. Efficacy refers to the overall communication
paradigms within which PD is carried out. It ranges between
the narrative paradigm and the rational argument paradigm.
The ethics continuum and the efficacy continuum cross each
other and demarcate four “Spheres.” Together they form the
backbone of the PD Radar.
The ethics continuum
Ethics of PD ranges between manipulation and compassion
(loving kindness). (1) Manipulation may take the form of a
hoax, lies, exaggeration, or “black propaganda.” Here I use
Niccolò Machiavelli to represent the end of the continuum
because he is synonymous to scheming and manipulation.
Lesser forms of such PD practices may include the subtle
propaganda tricks identified by the Institute of Propaganda
Analysis (IPA) in 1937, which include name-calling, glit-
tering generalities, transfer, bandwagon, card stacking,
plain folks, and testimonial. The IPA’s findings are based
on the practices borrowed from foreign anti-democracy
propaganda, which is a form of PD (Lee and Lee 1939). (2)
Compassion. The other end of the ethics continuum, com-
passion, or loving kindness is not rare in contemporary PD
practices. Examples include the international community’s
response to epidemic diseases in a less-developed country,
international campaigns by NGOs to ban landmines, interna-
tional anti-war movements, and faith diplomacy by religious
organizations. I use the Buddha as a symbol to represent
this end, because historically he was involved in diplomacy
with compassion and loving kindness in his lifetime (Zhang
2012). PD practices that fall into the range between the two
extremes may bear characteristics of both compassion and
manipulation. One example is that during the 2004 Asian
tsunami catastrophe, major world nations provided humani-
tarian assistance to the victim nations, and at the same time
they engaged in power competition and manipulation (Zhang
2006).
J. Zhang
The efficacy continuum
Efficacy is defined here as the communication paradigm that
PD practice relies on. The two ends of the efficacy con-
tinuum are, respectively, the rational argument paradigm
and the narrative paradigm. The range in between are dif-
ferent degrees of combination of the two paradigms. (1) The
rational argument paradigm. The argumentative persuasion
(logos) tradition has its roots in ancient Greece. As such, I
use Plato and Aristotle to represent the paradigm of “rational
argument.” The prevailing rational-world paradigm since the
times of Plato and Aristotle are characterized by the fol-
lowing characteristics: “People are basically rational; we
make decisions based on arguments; the speaking situation
determines the course of argument; rationality is determined
by how much we know and how well we argue; and finally,
we can solve the world’s problem through rational analy-
sis” (Fisher 1987, cited from Griffin et al. 2019, p. 300).
(2) The narrative paradigm. On the other end of the effi-
cacy continuum is the narrative paradigm. A narrative in its
basic form is a story, and it is a universal human experience.
Barthes (1977, p. 79) observed that “Narrative is present
in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy,
drama, comedy, mime, painting (think of Carpaccio’s Saint
Ursula), stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news items,
conversations. Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity
of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place,
in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind
and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narra-
tive. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives…
narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: It
is simply there, like life itself….” Walter Fisher proposed
that in contrast to the rational-world paradigm, the narrative
paradigm suggests that “people are essentially storytellers;
we make decisions based on good reasons; history, biogra-
phy, culture, and character determine what we consider good
reasons; narrative rationality is determined by the coherence
and fidelity of our story; and finally, the world is a set of
stories” (Fisher 1987, cited from Griffin, p. 300).
The narrative paradigm has received increasing interest
in PD research. For example, a report by Rand Corporation
suggested that, “strategic narratives provides a reasonable
starting-point for understanding, informing and influencing
foreign publics and countering adversaries, and may help to
improve effectiveness of USG communication efforts” (Lar-
son 2011). Nye (2013) suggested that “Narratives become
the currency of soft power.” He cites John Arquilla as saying
that in the global information age, victory may sometimes
depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins
(Nye 2014). Roselle et al. (2014) argued that the concept
of strategic narrative helps solve many of the fundamental
questions associated with the understanding and analysis of
soft power. Through studying the Indian government’s use of
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
digital diplomacy, Natarajan (2014) argued that PD should
be used to construct a strategic narrative of Indian foreign
policy and counter narratives inimical to Indian interests.
Using the case of Russia, Klyueva (2017) explored the rela-
tionship between soft power and strategic narrative. She sug-
gests that strategic narratives projected via PD efforts can
be used as tools for the enactment of soft power when they
emphasize different soft power sources: policies, values, and
culture. With all these being said, defining PD as strategic
narrative has its limitations. First, not all narratives in PD are
strategic, which means purposiveness. For example, Ameri-
can movies, a typical form of narrative, play an important
role in PD but their use is seldom strategic. Second, rational
persuasion continues to play a fundamental role in PD, and
it cannot be replaced with strategic narratives.
Goals, powers, and worldviews: forces
that empower the PD radar
The dish of the PD Radar consists of a number of concentric
circles. In the current shape, it has five circles. They, respec-
tively, represent (A) Goals of PD; (B) Forms of power that
PD manifests; (C) “Worldviews,” or schools of international
relations into which the PD practice may fall; (D) Specific
PD practices; and (E) Relevant public relations, communica-
tion, and PD models. Among these, the three inner circles,
the goals, the powers, and the worldviews, constitute the
fundamental forces that motion the PD Radar.
(A). Goals of PD Goals are placed in the center because
they justify the existence of a PD program. PD goals may
include the following:
1. PD for global public goods. Global Public Goods
(GPG) refers to the common goods of the humankind.
It is a way of understanding trans-border and global
problems and the need for a coordinated international
response to issues from global environment, international
financial stability, market efficiency, health, knowledge,
peace and security, and humanitarian rights (Long and
Woolley 2009). The concept is crucial to effective public
policy under conditions of increasing economic openness
and interdependence among countries (Kaul et al. 1999).
Through persuasion, mainly PD, nations may develop
shared knowledge, expectation, and understanding on
global issues threatening human common legacy and
therefore reach consensus over the GPG. Historically, such
efforts are limited to traditional diplomacy. In the post-
Cold War era, the globalization of health risks and natural
disasters has become non-traditional threats to national
security and demanded reexamination of the objectives
of national foreign policy (Yach and Bettcher 1998). In
dealing with such issues, PD plays an important role by
facilitating global cooperation, creating and building
199
agendas, promoting mutual understanding, and involving
non-governmental actors and international organizations
(Zhang and Swartz 2009). In general, to achieve such PD
goals, goodwill, candidness, and rational arguments are
necessary (Sphere I).
2. To improve a nation’s image or to brand a nation. Typi-
cal examples of image-centered PD include international
educational-exchange programs sponsored by the U.S. gov-
ernment; Saudi Arabia’s campaign to change its image in the
United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks; Thai-
land’s PD programs to change its image as a destination of
sex tourism (Nuttavuthisit 2006); the World Expo as a venue
to project nation brands. Similar examples include: Germany
brands itself as “The land of ideas”; Mexico rebrands itself
with a slogan “Mexico: The place you thought you knew”;
Thailand uses gastrodiplomacy (“Kitchen of the World”) to
promote the country’s food-related exports. To achieve such
PD goals, in general, goodwill, honesty, and an appealing
narrative are desirable (Sphere IV).
3. PD for engagement and policy agendas. PD may be
used to facilitate engagement in non-conflict diplomatic,
economic, and financial relations and to achieve a specific
policy agenda. First, engagement in PD aims at “inject-
ing new thinking and ideas; creating shared resources; and
promoting dialogue; fashion a common language” (Evans
and Steven 2010, p. 56). It depends to a significant degree
on positive incentives to achieve its objectives (Haass and
O’Sullivan 2000). It significantly overlaps with the concept
of smart power. For example, the Obama administration
established the Global Engagement Directive to “leverage
diplomacy, communications, international development”
(Hughes 2009, July 2nd). Second, PD may be used to pro-
mote a specific policy agenda or to accomplish a specific
task. To achieve such PD goals, rational arguments and cost-
effective calculation are needed (Sphere II).
4. PD in conflict. PD may be used to facilitate conflict res-
olution, to serve as misinformation in armed conflicts, func-
tion as deterrence, or serve as terrorist propaganda. When
South Korea–North Korea relations saw clear improvement
in 2018, South Korea took down the propaganda speakers at
the border as part of the goodwill to consolidate the achieve-
ment of conflict resolution (BBC 2018, May 1). When the
United States threatened a trade war against China, President
Trump tweeted that he maintained great personal relation-
ship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The PD aspect of
the tweet is to facilitate the ongoing conflict resolution. In
an armed conflict, PD may become a part of psychological
operations (PSYOP). During the invasion of Iraq, the U.S.
military employed a myriad of PD tactics as part of its psy-
chological operations. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S.
presidents used nuclear rhetoric as part of the U.S. strategic
deterrence. Terrorists’ use of propaganda also falls into this
category because terrorism is essentially a communication
200
phenomenon to win “hearts and minds.” All such PD goals
are characterized by manipulations and narratives.
(B). Power of PD Three types of powers are generated by
PD: soft power (Nye 2004, 2008), smart power (Nye 2013),
and sharp power (Walker and Ludwig, 2017). The last con-
cept is relatively new and scholars disagree on its nature.
1. The concept of soft power has spawned numerous
PD research and programs. Nye (2013, p. 566) defined soft
power as “the ability to affect others to obtain preferred out-
comes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, per-
suasion, and positive attraction.” The soft power of a country
rests heavily on three basic resources: “its culture (in places
where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it
lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign poli-
cies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral
authority)” (Nye 2013, p. 567). Soft power can be achieved
through use of both narrative and rational persuasion, but
invariably it requires ethics, because lack of it will not gen-
erate attractiveness.
2. Smart power. Facing criticisms of the shortcomings
of the concept of soft power, Nye proposed a new con-
cept of smart power, which combines soft power and hard
power. According to Nye (2009, p. 160), “Hard power is
the use of coercion and payment. Soft power is the ability
to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction. If a state
can set the agenda for others or shape their preferences,
it can save a lot on carrots and sticks. But rarely can it
totally replace either. Thus the need for smart strategies
that combine the tools of both hard and soft power.” Nye
placed power behavior on a continuum ranging from com-
mand of hard power to co-opt of soft power, showing that
hard power and soft power are not mutually exclusive. He
says, “In general, the types of resources that are associated
with hard power include tangibles like force and money,
while the resources that are associated with soft power
often include intangible factors like institutions, ideas,
values, culture, and perceived legitimacy of policies. But
the relationship is not perfect. Intangible resources like
patriotism, morale, and legitimacy strongly affect the
capacity to fight and win. And threats to use force are
intangible, but a dimension of hard power.” (Nye 2013, p.
6) Rational persuasion and cost-effective calculation are
necessary for effectively integrating soft power and hard
power. According to Crocker et al. (2007, p. 13), smart
power involves “the strategic use of diplomacy, persua-
sion, capacity building, and the projection of power and
influence in ways that are cost-effective and have politi-
cal and social legitimacy.” In this sense, it significantly
overlaps with the concept of “engagement,” which is one
of the four goals of PD as defined earlier. According to
Haass and O’Sullivan (2000), engagement diplomacy does
not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy
instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice,
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there is often considerable overlap of strategies. As such,
for smart power, rational arguments along with different
degrees of manipulation are necessary (Sphere II).
3. Sharp power. Against the background of rising authori-
tarian influence in the world, Walker and Ludwig (2017,
p. 17) proposed a concept of “sharp power” to define “the
malign and aggressive nature of the authoritarian projects,
which bear little resemblance to the benign attraction of soft
power.” Such powers are “sharp” because they “pierce, pen-
etrate, or perforate the information environments in the tar-
geted countries.” According to the authors, “Through sharp
power, the generally unattractive values of authoritarian sys-
tems—which encourage a monopoly on power, top-down
control, censorship, and coerced or purchased loyalty—are
projected outward, and those affected are not so much audi-
ences as victims.” Walker and Ludwig (2017) use China and
Russia as examples. They argue that in the case of China,
“educational and cultural initiatives are accompanied by an
authoritarian determination to monopolize ideas, suppress
alternative narratives, and exploit partner institutions.” (p.
13) As such, sharp power involves manipulation and use/
abuse of narratives. It is necessary to note that scholars have
disagreed on the nomenclature of “sharp power.” Nye (2018)
argued that sharp power is a type of hard power because it
is the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes. He
also noted that they work in different ways and the distinc-
tion is hard to discern. Rawnsley (2017) argued that soft
power is already an adequate concept and the “sharp power”
concept is not necessary.
(C). “Worldviews”: Relevant schools of international
relations PD goals and practices may be conditioned and
defined by different worldviews. Such views are systemized
into theories ranging from realism to constructivism.
1. Realism For the realism school of international rela-
tions, the international system is anarchic. Nation states are
the dominant actors; they always seek to maximize their
power and self-interest (Frieden and Lake 2002). As such,
PD practices that manifest smart power and sharp power
largely fall into the realism school of international relations
(Sphere II and Sphere III). Such PD practices may use both
rational arguments and narratives, but in general they use
manipulation instead of demonstrating compassion.
2. Idealism The idealism school is an optimistic doctrine
that seeks to transcend the international anarchy, and cre-
ate a more cosmopolitan and harmonious world order. The
idealists emphasize the power of reason to overcome preju-
dice and counteract manipulation. They argue that power
politics can be replaced with reason, because there exists a
natural harmony of interests between all peoples. They also
argue that international relations should be based on moral-
ity, international law, and international institutions (Wilson
2011). As such, PD that is based on such assumptions mani-
fests compassion and rationality (Sphere I).
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
3. Liberalism The liberalism school emphasizes mutual
benefits and international cooperation. It argues that inter-
national organizations and non-governmental actors may
play important roles in shaping state behavior; international
institutions would improve mutual trust among states; inter-
national norms, rules, and decision-making procedures can
help states coordinate their policies for international pub-
lic goods; and formal international institutions, such as the
United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute
to peace (Doyle and Recchia 2011). PD practices based on
such assumptions in general fall into Sphere I. They manifest
compassion and reason.
4. Constructivism The constructivism theory of interna-
tional relations argues that the social world is constructed,
not given (Zehfuss 2002). In Wendt’s (1999, p. 1) words,
“(1) [T]he structures of human association are determined
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2)
that the identities and interests of purposive actors are con-
structed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”
Constructivists believe that norms shape and change for-
eign policy rather than security, as argued by realists.
When actors’ actions diverge from the norms, they could be
pressured to modify actions to comply with the norms. In
addition, constructivism makes moral reasoning in interna-
tional relations (Price 2008). Hopf (1998, p. 181) noted that
“constructivism assumes that … power is both material and
discursive.” As such, identity, ideas, perceptions, as well
as their social constructions are important to determine the
actors’ behaviors in international relations. PD practices that
are based on such assumptions in general manifest compas-
sion and narratives and therefore fall into Sphere IV.
PD practices in four spheres
Circle (D) and (E) of the PD Radar, respectively, represents
specific PD practices and relevant theoretical models. As
stated earlier, a PD program’s success is contingent upon its
ethics and efficacy, which, respectively, range on two con-
tinuums. In the real world, there is seldom a case where a
PD practice resorts only to rational arguments or narratives.
Nor would it only demonstrate compassion or manipulation.
This means that the location of a PD practice in the PD
Radar may be dynamic. With this being said, however, it
is still possible to largely chart where a PD practice may
likely be located in the Radar. First, for example, in real-
ity, a PD program to cultivate national reputation is most
likely to use narratives than rational arguments, and it would
least likely use manipulation. Second, normatively, narra-
tives and compassion will make such a PD program more
ethical and effective. As such, such a PD practice is more
likely to be found in sphere IV. Although a counterexample
can be found, the probability is relatively low. For example,
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President Obama’s speech in Prague on eliminating nuclear
weapons is full of compassion and rational arguments
(Sphere IV), but in most cases, nuclear rhetoric is featured
with manipulation and narrative (Sphere III).
The following are lists of PD practices that may be
located in the four spheres. The location of a PD program is
charted by asking two sets of question: On the ethics con-
tinuum, where is the PD practice most likely located, realis-
tically and normatively? On the efficacy continuum, where
is it most likely be located, realistically and normatively?
Sphere I
PD practices that fall into this sphere are in general charac-
terized by rational arguments, emphasis of mutual benefits,
goodwill, candidacy, and compassion. Such PD practices
may include:
Health diplomacy
The World Health Organization (WHO 2018) defines global
health diplomacy as bringing together “the disciplines of
public health, international affairs, management, law and
economics and focuses on negotiations that shape and man-
age the global policy environment for health. The relation-
ship between health, foreign policy and trade is at the cutting
edge of global health diplomacy.”
Science diplomacy
The British Royal Society and the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) developed a taxonomy
for science diplomacy that consists of three dimensions: Sci-
ence in diplomacy, through which science provides advice to
inform and support foreign policy objectives; Diplomacy for
science, through which diplomacy facilitates international
scientific cooperation; and Science for diplomacy, through
which scientific cooperation improves international relations
(Gluckman et al. 2017).
Internet governance diplomacy
Internet governance refers to “the making and enforcement
of collective policies for the global Internet community”
(Cogburn et al. 2005). Although much of it boils down to
physically managing the Internet’s system, very often civil
society, business, the technical community, along with
international organizations and national governments, are
involved. The Obama administration announced in 2014 that
it would no longer renew the contract with the Internet gov-
ernance body ICANN, a move widely regarded as showing
goodwill toward international critics.
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Environmental diplomacy
According to the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), the central aim of international environmental
diplomacy is “to stimulate international cooperation in
order to generate international agreement on complex
transboundary environmental problems; bridging differ-
ences in cultural, social and political values, vested inter-
ests and scientific uncertainty” (Mrema and Bankobeza
2012).
Foreign assistance
The U.S. government, for example, defines foreign assis-
tance as “aid given by the United States to other countries
to support global peace, security, and development efforts,
and provide humanitarian relief during times of crisis. It is
a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United
States and vital to U.S. national security” (Foreignassitance.
gov 2018).
Corporate diplomacy
Corporate diplomacy includes a variety of activities to gen-
erate favorable conditions for carrying out a corporation’s
goals. Such activities include “influencing economic and
social actors in order to create and exploit business oppor-
tunities, to collaborate with public authorities and regula-
tors that affect commercial and investment processes, and
to prevent possible conflicts with external stakeholders and
minimize related political risk, and attract the favor of the
media and opinion leaders to safeguard corporate image and
reputation” (Asquer 2012, p. 55).
Refugee diplomacy (humanitarian diplomacy)
The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines its mission as to
protect, assist, and find solutions for refugees, internally
displaced persons, stateless persons, and other persons of
concern to the agency. Specifically, its roles include promot-
ing the conclusion and ratification of international conven-
tions for the protection of refugees, promoting the admis-
sion of refugees, not excluding those in the most destitute
categories, to the territories of States, and keeping in close
touch with the Governments and inter-governmental organi-
zations concerned (Maley 2013). Since accepting refugees
normally goes against the country of origin, refugee diplo-
macy is about multilateral diplomatic commitments rather
than bilateral diplomacy with country of origin.
J. Zhang
Sphere II
In general, PD in this sphere is characterized by rational
arguments and different degrees of manipulation.
Foreign lobbying
In the case of the United States, foreign principals may hire
U.S. public relations firms to lobby the executive and the
legislative branches to hold off protectionist moves threaten-
ing their company industry; to defeat legislation affecting the
sale of a client’s product; to support expansion of the client’s
markets in the United States; and to provide ongoing infor-
mation on political, social, and commercial development in
the United States that could bear on the client’s business
interest (Wilcox and Cameron 2009). The U.S. law, Foreign
Agent Registration Act (FARA), requires that such activities
be registered with the Department of Justice.
PD issue management
Very often PD practitioners not only need to determine the
nature of the present environment, but also need to predict
and manage future issues. The process involves issue identi-
fication through scanning and monitoring, issue analysis by
examining its potential impact, strategy option, action plan,
and evaluation. These need highly rational reflection, and
strategic options may involve manipulation.
Media relations in international negotiations
International negotiations are increasingly subject to the
scrutiny of world media and global public opinion. Govern-
ments involved in international negotiations may use media
relations to explain their standings, defend their actions, test
their messages, and influence the outcome of the negotia-
tions. For example, when Japan decided to enter the then
Trans-Pacific Pact (TPP) negotiations in 2013, its Prime
Minister, Shinzo Abe, made the announcement through a
press conference that, “I will firmly defend Japan’s sover-
eignty and, through the negotiations, achieve the best way
based on our national interests” (Abe 2013).
PD publications
National governments often publish white papers and reports
to articulate their standings on international issues. Such
publications are often out of PD purpose or may have PD
effects. Examples include the Human Rights Report and the
International Religious Freedom Report published by the
U.S. Department State; the U.S. Human Rights Report issued
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
by China to rebuff the U.S. criticism on its record of human
rights; and the annual report on the state of world human
rights published by Amnesty International.
Military PD in peacetime
During peacetime, military may engage in PD. Such efforts
are called Military PD. For example, NATO has used PD
programs to “brand” itself (Mihaita and Sebe 2011). Such
PD is a form of engagement and a part of the smart power
that seeks to integrate hard power and soft power.
Water diplomacy
Water diplomacy involves diplomatic engagement in the
cooperative management of shared water between countries.
Through water diplomacy, states seek shared understand-
ings of acceptable practice around water (Grech-Madin et al.
2018).
Sphere III
PD in this sphere are generally related to conflicts or poten-
tial conflicts. They are featured with manipulation and
narratives.
Nation‑building
Nation-building refers to “the process whereby a society
with diverse origins, histories, languages, cultures and reli-
gions come together within the boundaries of a sovereign
state with a unified constitutional and legal dispensation,
a national public education system, an integrated national
economy, shared symbols and values, as equals, to work
towards eradicating the divisions and injustices of the past”
(Gounden 2015). In some cases, foreign nations are involved
in the nation-building process through PD programs.
For example, the United States and European countries
employed PD programs for nation-building in post-war Iraq
and Afghanistan. Nation-building is likely located in Sphere
III because of its involvement with conflict and narrative.
International terrorism
Terrorism is essentially a communication phenomenon, as
is demonstrated by some of its definitions: “Terrorism func-
tions to send a message from terrorists to a target audience.
Symbols play a key role in this communication, through vis-
uals that terrorist organizations use to represent themselves,
as well as the meaning and significance in the selection of
targets”; “Terrorism is a symbolic act of which the objective
203
is to manipulate people’s political behavior”; “Terrorism is
not an ideology, but a cruel method of communication to
fulfil ideological, political, economic, or military goals”
(Matusitz 2014, p. 22). International terrorism represents
such perpetrations across a nation’s border.
Psychological operations (PSYOPs) in armed
conflicts
The U.S. military defines PSYOP as “planned operations
to convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign govern-
ments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose
of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objec-
tives” (Munoz 2012, p. 7). The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Spokesperson’s Unit (ISU) has served as an integral factor
in Israel’s PD (Magen and Lapid 2018). The military–media
relations are often characterized with one-way information
dissemination, control, and manipulation.
Nuclear rhetoric
Nuclear rhetoric was a major component of the PD during
the Cold War, through which the superpowers justified the
nuclear weapons as a national security solution. U.S. gov-
ernment and military officials have traditionally promoted
the “deterrent” value of nuclear weapons as instruments of
national security since their advent in 1945 (Taylor 2007).
After the September 11th terrorist attack, the Bush adminis-
tration continued such rhetoric. On a rare occasion, President
Obama used a “nuclear-free world” speech to improve U.S.
image (Zhang 2010).
Advocacy through media relations
Through media briefings, news conferences, social media,
and face-to-face interviews, politicians and government
spokespersons may directly address international publics by
defending or advocating a policy. For example, when Presi-
dent Trump claimed some illegal immigrants are “animals,”
his harsh rhetoric caused uproar in Mexico. Trump clarified
his comment through a tweet that he meant to say the “MS
13 Gang Members.”
Trolling of diplomatic issues
This is a new form of PD that becomes possible in the social-
media era. Diplomats and personnel hired by governments
post provocative comments (trolling), promote news articles,
and spread memes to influence opinion about global events
and to undermine public confidence in rival countries. The
204
Chinese government reportedly hires more than two mil-
lion people to surreptitiously insert large amount of pseu-
donymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of
real social-media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions
of ordinary people (King et al. 2017). Such activities may
target foreign audiences or diasporas. The alleged Russian
meddling of the U.S. Presidential campaign in 2016, which
took place via social-media sites such as the Facebook, is
another example.
International broadcasting in conflict
Such broadcasting is featured with manipulation and narra-
tives. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union used international broadcasting to attack each other
and to shape favorable attitudes toward their ideologies.
Powers and Samuel-Azran (2014) conceptualized interna-
tional broadcasting as a form of information intervention
through which governments compete for influence among
foreign citizens in foreign information markets.
Sphere IV
PD programs that fall into this sphere are in general charac-
terized by goodwill, compassion, and appealing narratives.
Cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges
Examples include the American Cultural Center, British
Council, the Goethe Institut, the Confucius Institute, and
South Korea’s King Sejong Institute. Such programs are
aimed at cultivating national images. The U.S. Department
of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
defined its mission as “to cultivate mutual understanding
between the people of the United States and the people of
other countries to promote friendly, and peaceful relations.”
It states that such programs are “part of America’s larger
story” of respect for—and interest in—all cultures and faith
(Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 2018).
Nation branding
Nation branding is “the strategic self-presentation of a coun-
try with the aim of creating reputational capital through eco-
nomic, political and social interest promotion at home and
abroad” (Szondi 2008, p. 5). It goes beyond tourism promo-
tion to encompass additional functions such as investment
attraction, and export promotion (Dinnie et al. 2010).
J. Zhang
Civilian diplomacy
In 2010, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
called for the strengthening of U.S. “civilian power,” or the
combined force of civilians working together across the U.S.
government to practice diplomacy (Clinton 2010). Using
their deep knowledge of key fields, the civilian specialists
could jointly pursue diplomacy and international develop-
ment for purposes of solving global challenges related to
health, agriculture and food insecurity, environmental deg-
radation, drugs and organized crime, energy, and climate
change (Hotez 2011).
Celebrity diplomacy
Celebrities sometimes take an active role in advocating for
particular actions or policies related to foreign affairs and
present them to the public (Kogen 2015). Since 1953, the
United Nations has employed celebrities as its Goodwill
Ambassadors to raise funds, affect diplomatic agendas,
and draw attention to development causes. One of the most
famous Ambassadors is Actress Angelina Jolie.
Faith diplomacy and international faith tourism
Faith diplomacy includes international propagation of faith
by religious organizations and state-sponsored programs to
boost a country’s soft power using religious faiths. Inter-
national faith tourism refers to international travel for pil-
grimage, missionary, or leisure purposes. Faith tourism has
become a rapidly growing industry. The World Tourism
Organization estimates that 300 to 330 million pilgrims visit
the world’s key religious sites every year (UNWTO 2016).
Cultural and language programs of international
broadcasting
Government-funded international broadcasters often carry
cultural and language teaching programs. Such programs are
often narrative-based. Their goals are to cultivate national
images and to promote mutual understanding. For exam-
ple, the Voice of America’s (VOA) “Arts and Culture” is a
weekly program about music, pop culture, society and life.
Gastrodiplomacy
In gastrodiplomacy, nations use food to promote their cul-
tures, build their images, globalize their food industries,
attract foreign tourists, and build relations with foreign pub-
lics (Pham 2013). The term gastrodiplomacy was first used
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
when Thailand launched an international campaign in 2002
to promote its food (The Economist 2002). The actors are
not limited to state politicians and their chefs, but included
food corporations, celebrity chefs, tourist agencies, public
relations firms, PD practitioners, TV cooking shows, as well
as social-media networks (Zhang 2015).
Diaspora diplomacy
Diasporas are often an important target audience of PD. In
diaspora diplomacy, sending states may enroll their dias-
poras to lobby for the national interest, facilitate bilateral
mediation, or as a resource for information-gathering by
intelligence agencies. Migrant-receiving states may enlist
the diasporas of other countries to extend their influence in
those migrant-sending countries (Ho and McConnell 2017).
Sports diplomacy
According to the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), sports diplomacy
“uses the universal passion for sports as a way to transcend
linguistic and sociocultural differences and bring people
together,” and that “sports diplomacy exchanges increase
dialogue and cultural understanding between people around
the world. The use of sports as a platform exposes inter-
national exchange participants to American culture while
providing them with an opportunity to establish links with
U.S. sports professionals and peers. In turn, Americans learn
about other cultures and the challenges young people from
other countries face today” (US Department of State 2018).
A sub‑framework for planning and analyzing
a PD program
In the above section, I introduced the “backbone” and the
“dish” of the PD Radar. The question is: In actual practice,
how does a particular PD program, which distributed in Cir-
cle D across the four spheres, relate to the ethics and efficacy
continuums, PD goals (Circle A), PD powers (Circle B),
worldviews (Circle C), and the communication theories and
models (Circle E)? After all, specific PD programs are what
practitioners are concerned with, and they constitute one
of the basic units of analysis for researchers. In the follow-
ing, through synthesizing public relations models and theo-
ries, I propose a sub-framework to analyze and plan a PD
program. The sub-framework will show that a PD program
is shaped and conditioned by each of these components of
the PD Radar (see Table 1).
PD and public relations often pursue the same objective
(Signitzer and Coombs 1992). There are substantial similari-
ties in both knowledge and skills between the two, and the
205
conceptual and practical links between them are empirically
shown to be real (Fitzpatrick et al. 2013). As such, the basic
planning process of a PD program is similar to a public rela-
tions program. There are many models of public relations
programming, including RACE (Research, Action, Commu-
nication, Evaluation); ROPE (Research, Objectives, Plan-
ning, Evaluation); and RPIE (Research, Planning, Imple-
mentation, Evaluation). For the current research, RPIE is
used because it is the largest portion of the APR computer-
based Examination for Accreditation in Public Relations
(My PRSA Learning, n.d).
Research
1. Issue research In terms of PD, issue research relates
to Circle A of the Radar. The key question is: Is the
issue related to national image, a particular foreign pol-
icy agenda, an international conflict, or a non-conflict
engagement situation?
2. Organization research It relates to Circle B and Circle
C: What is the organization’s (governmental or non-gov-
ernmental actors) perception of the power in interna-
tional affairs? Does it believe in hard power, soft power,
smart power, or sharp power? What is its “worldview”
of international relations? Does it believe in realism,
liberalism, idealism, or constructivism? How much is it
committed to PD, as is manifested by its investment in
PD?
3. Audience research This also relates to Circle A, B, and
C. Research: What are the audiences’ perceptions of
issue (national image, policy, engagement, or conflict)?
What are their perceptions of power? What are their
worldviews of international relations?
  Secondary research and primary research may be
employed for the above research. Information gathered
through research should be evaluated within the SWOT
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats)
framework, in which Strengths and Weaknesses are for
the internal environment, Opportunities and Threats are
for the external environment.
Planning
1. PD goals PD goals relate to Circle A and can be catego-
rized into reputation management goal (e.g., national
image), task management goal (specific policy agenda or
conflict resolution), and relationship management goal
(relationship building or negotiation) (Smith 2005, p.
69).
2. Objectives PD objectives are quantitative breakdowns
of the goals in Circle A. They are specific milestones to
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Table 1  PD program planning and the dimensions of the PD radar

Research Organization (Related to Circle A) Belief in power (hard power, soft power, smart power, or sharp power)? Worldview (realism, liberalism, idealism, or con-
structivism)? Is it committed to PD?
Issue (Circle A and B) Perception of the issue (national image, foreign policy agendas, international conflict, or non-conflict engagement situa-
tion)?
Publics (Circle A, B, and C) Belief in power (hard power, soft power, smart power, or sharp power)? Worldview (realism, liberalism, idealism, or con-
structivism)? Belief in PD?
SWOT analysis Overall evaluation of findings (Strengths and Weaknesses for internal environment; Opportunities and Threats for external
environment)
Planning Goals (Circle A) Reputation (quadrant IV) Task Management (quadrant I, II, III, IV) Relationship (quadrant II)
Objectives (Circle A) Impact objectives Key elements: Desired outcome, level of accomplishment, target public,
and timeframe
Output objectives Largely the same as tactics
Positioning (to differentiate a nation or an issue Country positioning examples: “Israel: The Land of Creation”; “Mexico: The Place You Thought You Knew”; and “Thai-
from competitors) land: Kitchen to the World”
Issues positioning examples: “Color Revolutions”; “Revisionist Powers.”
Messaging: Narrative versus Rational argu- Slogans, taglines, logos, etc. to crystalize the Spokesperson (e.g., UN Goodwill Ambassadors)
ments (Efficacy) positioning
Narratives: Story line, narrative structure, theme, characters (e.g., heroes v. villains)
Rational arguments: Ethos, Logos, and Pathos
Strategies Effective Communication Principles manifested in strategies
Elements of a strategy should include course of action, resources to be tapped, scope of action, and expected effects
Relevant theories, e.g., Framing, Excellence Theory, Dialogical Theory, Agenda building; Agenda setting
Tactics (Three ways to categorize tactics) Events, controlled, uncontrolled
PESO (paid, earned, shared, and owned)
Interpersonal communication, organizational communication, news media, advertising, and promotional media
Communication Materials, budget, timing, and message repeti- Message repetition pattern: continuity, bursting, pulsing, massing
tion patterns Timing: Immediate PD, intermediate PD, long-term PD (Gilboa 2008)
Evaluation Explanatory mode: Effects are measured against the objectives; Measuring Tools: Soft Power 30 (major nations’ soft power), Anholt-GFK Roper Nation Brands Index (NBI)
and the Fombrun-RI Country Reputation Index (CRI)
Interpretive mode (Pamment 2014a, b): outputs, outcomes, perceptions, and networks
J. Zhang
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
achieve the goals and they should be measurable. Objec-
tives can be categorized into impact objectives (specific
intended effects) and output objectives (What is to be
produced by the planner) (Hayes et al. 2013, pp. 25, 27).
Statement of an objective should follow the SMART
(Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-
bound) principle and include the four elements, namely
desired outcome, level of accomplishment, target public,
and timeframe.
3. Positioning Through positioning, PD may be used to
differentiate a nation, a cause, and an issue from the
competitors by creating a unique image in the minds of
the target audience. It is usually represented by a slogan
for which an organization is known. It is the specific idea
that first comes to mind about the product/organization
and the characteristic that sets the service apart from its
competitors. Examples include “Turkey: Where Europe
Becomes Exotic”; “Israel: The Land of Creation”; “Ger-
many: The Land of Ideas”; “Mexico: The Place You
Thought You Knew”; and “Thailand: Kitchen to the
World.” In terms of issue positioning, China positioned
its rapid rise as “Peaceful Rise”; the United States posi-
tioned the political movements in former Soviet repub-
lics as “Color Revolutions”; and Trump administration
positioned China and Russia as “Revisionist Powers.”
Such positionings constitute the source of PD messag-
ing, which could be rational arguments, narratives, or
the combination of the two.
4. PD messaging: rational arguments (key messages) ver-
sus narratives As the PD Radar shows, PD messaging
ranges between rational arguments and narratives. Both
rational arguments and narratives use verbal cues (e.g.,
clarity, structure, and ethical language) and non-verbal
cues (e.g., symbols and logos), and ethically both range
between compassion and manipulation.
  Rational argument is typified by logos in Plato and
Aristotle’s writings. It appeals to publics by logic and
reason in the form of key messages. It may use analo-
gies, comparison, examples, statistics, testimonials, and
endorsement. For example, when Saudi Arabia launched
its image-polishing campaign in the United States after
the September 11 terrorist attacks, it used extensive
arguments by listing the actions it has taken to crack
down on terrorism.
  In contrast, a narrative contains characters, a setting,
a plot, and a theme. It is a broader concept than key
messages. As stated earlier, narratives become the cur-
rency of soft power (Nye 2013). In its image-polishing
campaign in the United States, for example, Colombia
defined its role in the war on drugs using a narrative
that turned itself from a villain into a victim, then into a
hero, and finally a leader (Zaharna and Villalobos 2000).
In combating terrorism, as Nye argues, it is essential
207
to have a narrative that appeals to the mainstream and
prevents their recruitment by the radicals (Nye 2013, p.
564).
5. PD strategies A strategy is the overall course of action
to fulfill a campaign objective. A sound strategy should
not only be ethical, but also reflect some of the effective
communication principles, such as use of opinion lead-
ers, group influence, audience participation, selective
exposure, two-way communication, source credibility,
and salient information (Hayes et al. 2013, p. 36). These
principles are derived from communication models and
theories (Circle E). Some theories, such as the Framing
Theory and Agenda Building Theory, are related to PD
practices in all four spheres. Some may be associated
with a particular sphere. For example, the Press Agen-
try model (Grunig 1993), Mixed-motive model (Grunig
2001), and the Basic Cold War model (Gilboa 2008) are
most likely associated with PD in Sphere III. The Pub-
lic Information model (Grunig 2001), the Domestic PR
model (Gilboa 2008), and the Strategic Issue Manage-
ment Approach to Social Media (Zhang 2013) are more
likely related to PD in Sphere II. The Dialogical Theory
(Kent and Taylor, 2002) and Two-way Symmetrical
Model (Grunig 2001) are more likely related to PD in
Sphere IV.
  A clear PD strategy should contain the following ele-
ments: Overall course of action, resources to be used,
scope of action, and the expected impacts. For example,
a PD campaign may adopt a strategy that “builds coali-
tion (course of action) with the target country’s (scope
of action) activist groups (resources) to raise awareness
on issues of human trafficking (expected impacts).”
6. PD tactics Tactics are specific tools to implement the
strategies. There are different ways to categorize tactics.
One way is to categorize them into interpersonal com-
munication, organizational communication, news media,
and advertising and promotional media (Smith 2005).
The second categorization includes events, controlled
media, and uncontrolled media (Hayes et al. 2013). The
third one is PESO (Purchased, Earned, Shared, and
Owned) (Luttrell 2014). Among the tactics, social media
(shared media) has become increasingly important.
Implementation
The main concerns in implementing a PD program include
time range, message repetition pattern, production of PD
materials, and budgeting. Gilboa (2008) distinguishes
among three time dimensions of PD: immediate, intermedi-
ate, and long-term. PD at the immediate level reacts within
hours or a few days to developing events; PD at the inter-
mediate level allows much more time for proactive planning
208
and implementation; PD in the long-term range is the closest
to traditional PD. Nye (2013) uses similar categorization.
Relating to this, PD message repetition pattern can be conti-
nuity (presenting message at a consistent level throughout a
period of time), bursting (presenting message in waves with
periods of intense communication interspersed with dark
periods), pulsing (a combination of continuity and bursting),
and massing (bunching messages in a short period of time)
(Smith 2005, p. 220).
Evaluation
Pamment (2014a) noted that research on the methods used
for evaluating power and their theoretical grounds is very
limited. He contrasted two approaches toward the evaluation
of PD effects, one being the explanatory modes of analysis
that typically uses positivist methods, and the other being
interpretative approach that may use rhetorical and criti-
cal methods. With the first approach, PD effects are gener-
ally measured against the stated objectives, which could be
improvement of national image, achievement of a policy
agenda, resolution of a conflict, or successful international
engagement. Some indices have been developed for this
purpose. For example, Soft Power 30, an annual index pub-
lished by Portland Communications and the USC Center on
Public Diplomacy, ranks major nations’ soft power (Soft-
power30 2018). The Anholt-GFK Roper Nation Brands
Index (NBI) developed by Simon Anholt in coordination
with the GFK group measures a country’s reputation through
culture, governance, people, exports, tourism, investment,
and immigration (Anholt 2006). The Fombrun-RI Country
Reputation Index (CRI) measures a country’s reputation
using six dimensions, namely emotional appeal; physical
appeal; financial appeal; leadership appeal; cultural appeal;
and social appeal (Passow et al. 2005). With the interpretive
approach, Pamment (2014a) proposed four types of “articu-
lations,” namely outputs, outcomes, perceptions, and net-
works, as an alternative approach to evaluate the impacts
of PD.
Use of the PD radar
In summary, as the sub-framework of PD shows, each PD
planning process is associated with and conditioned by
the two continuums and the concentric Circles of the PD
Radar. If the continuums and the Circles are the “hardware”
of the Radar, then the sub-framework is a “software” that
is embedded in it. Together they constitute a useful instru-
ment for mapping the terrain of PD and planning/analyzing
a specific PD program.
J. Zhang
In using the PD Radar, the following features of it need
to be highlighted. First, the Radar is descriptive. It depicts
the terrain of PD with a radar map that largely reflects PD
practices in the real world. Second, it is normative and
evaluative. It locates various types of PD practices and
models in four spheres that are demarcated by ethics and
efficacy. Third, it is dynamic instead of static. The distri-
bution of PD practices in the four spheres of the Radar
is based on probability instead of categoriality, which is
visually represented by dashed instead of solid lines in the
graph. To cite the example of nuclear rhetoric again: most
of the time it is used with manipulation for the purpose of
deterrence (Sphere III), but occasionally it may be used
with compassion to improve national images (Sphere IV),
as President Obama’s “nuclear-free world” speech in the
Czech Republic shows. Fourth, the sub-framework of the
PD Radar can be used to plan and analyze a particular PD
program. It can also be used detect the overall PD tendency
of a country. For example, China’s PD programs aimed at
increasing its image in the early 21st century (Sphere IV)
has shifted toward “sharp power” as it becomes increas-
ingly restrictive at home and assertive in the world (Sphere
III). The doctrines underlying the U.S. PD transformed
from Obama era’s liberalism and constructivism (Sphere
I and II) toward Trump era’s realism (Sphere II). Fifth,
the PD Radar may be used to detect the overall PD trends
in the world. For example, in the 1990s, with the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union and a China seeking to eco-
nomically integrate into the world, the West visioned a
bright future. President Clinton predicted “a world full
of free markets, free elections and free peoples working
together.” The growth of the internet would undermine all
authoritarian attempts to control its populations (Davis,
July 27, 2018). The global sale of Francis Fukuyama’s
work, “The End of History,” became a PD phenomenon
representing U.S. optimism. Overall, such a trend may be
best reflected by Sphere I and Sphere IV of the PD Radar.
However, the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. inva-
sion of Iraq, the Russian operations in the Ukraine and
its alleged meddling with the U.S. election, and China’s
protectionist mercantilism and state control of the Internet
have all dampened the progressivism of the 1990s. In the
PD Radar, all these mean more manipulation and distorted
narratives; less compassion and rational arguments; more
realism; and less liberalism, idealism, and constructivism.
The world sees a shift from pursuing soft power to smart
power and sharp power. Together, they mean a shift of
global PD trends from Sphere I and IV toward Sphere II
and III. Sixth, in the PD Radar, a nation may engage in all
types of PD practice at the same time. They do not neces-
sarily deny each other’s legitimacy, although one practice
may undercut another’s effectiveness. For example, manip-
ulation in psychological operations by the United States in
Compassion versus manipulation; narratives versus rational arguments: a PD radar to chart…
Iraq occur at the same with its nation-building PD, but in
the long run it may undercut U.S. soft power. Seventh, in
terms of academic research, the PD Radar may generate
numerous hypotheses and research questions that explore
the relations between the constructs in the radar, includ-
ing the relationship among narratives, rational arguments,
manipulation, compassion, power, and worldviews, among
others. Last but not the least, the Radar has its limitations.
For example, communication technology is ironically not
manifested in the Radar because it is omnipresent in PD.
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author
states that there is no conflict of interest.
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jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Dr. Juyan Zhang is Professor of Communication at the University of
Texas at San Antonio and Contributing Scholar at the USC Center on
Public Diplomacy. His research coveres public diplomacy, strategic
communication, faith tourism, and Buddhism.
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