JUSTYNA SZCZUDLIK-TATAR

Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

Determinants
The launch by Deng Xiaoping of the “policy of reform and opening” in 1978
is an important landmark in the contemporary history of China. An autarkic,
closed state associated with economic and social experiments of “the Great Leap
Forward,” “people’s communes” and the “Cultural Revolution” and underpinned
by Marxist theories of class struggle and export of revolution embarked, after
a protracted power struggle and the death of the chief ideologist of these doctrines,
upon the process of modernization. Freedom of economic activity—albeit
unaccompanied by political freedoms, with this state of affairs attributed to the
Confucian tradition—has been promoted by China as proof that it is possible to
build a modern Asian state that incorporates selectively Western values while
remaining faithful to its civilizational achievements. Deng’s reforms have been
continued by his successors. China has shown high economic growth year after
year, it is active on the international scene, engages in resolving global issues,
pursues economic and diplomatic expansion in developing countries, promotes
economic integration with Asian states and works towards solving border issues
with its neighbors.
These activities, as well as China’s growing spending on the military and on
a space program, have been giving rise to apprehensions in other states. The
early 1990s saw the emergence of perceptions of a “China threat,” chiefly in the
U.S. Attention was being drawn to the fact that China posed a threat to stability
in Asia, sought to change the balance of power in the region and to challenge the
United States.1 The China threat was highlighted during the first term of
G.W. Bush’s presidency, when the American administration treated China as
a rival. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke of China as a potential
threat to stability in the Asia and Pacific region and she maintained that China

1
K. R. Al-Rodham, “A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis,” Asian
Perspective, 2007, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 42–44.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

was not a status quo power.2 The realization by the Chinese authorities that the
country’s development could cause uneasiness worldwide was, presumably, the
foremost reason for deliberately using soft power tools to project a positive
image of the PRC.
The second factor was a drop in U.S. popularity resulting from the
G. W. Bush administration’s methods of conducting the war on terror and, in
consequence, from the reduced American involvement in Africa and Latin
America. This offered China a chance to use a particular space that had emerged
in these regions and to attempt a rivalry with the United States—an undertaking
made possible also by China’s economic successes achieved year after year and
making it increasingly confident of its position. The PRC launched a diplomatic
offensive, using soft power tools and focusing on the developing countries. The
stepping-up of activity in these regions was due both to their economic
attractiveness and to their need for development support, which China can offer.
What is more, China’s development level and potential—even its political
system—hold appeal for these states.
Using soft power is one of the ways to realize the most important Chinese
interests. Accordingly, soft power is subordinated to the foreign policy aims,
which include: to continue reforms and economic development and, in this
connection, to search abroad for a raw materials base and sales markets; to
ensure security in the region; to pursue the one-China principle (to establish
diplomatic relations with the states that still maintain official relations with
Taiwan); to win the developing states’ goodwill, so that they support China in
the UN (for instance, on human rights, on the isolation of Taiwan, or on blocking
Japan’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council). The strategic aim
is to regain the superpower status. The superpower issue has been an unchanging
element of China’s foreign policy since the empire era. It is worth noting that
since the early 1990s Chinese researchers and decision-makers have applied an
analytical construct known as comprehensive national power (CNP—in
Chinese, zonghe guoli) to assess the level of general power of a nation-state
using mathematical formulas. At present the United States comes first in CNP

2
C. Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 2000, vol. 75,
no. 1, p. 56.

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 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

ratings.3 Soft power is meant to help China move up to precisely this position.
Presumably Beijing wants to achieve this aim in 2049, on the hundredth
anniversary of the establishment of the PRC. 4

Defining Remarks and the Chinese Perspective

Joseph S. Nye defined power as the ability to change the behavior of others
to achieve the desired result by such means as reward, punishment, or attraction.
The first two are attributes of hard power consisting of a state’s military and
economic might, while attraction is the defining factor of soft power. Nye
describes soft power as a way to attain the desired results through appeal,
seduction and attraction. Soft power is neither persuasion, influence, sanction
nor a payment for proper behavior. It is not about inducing and coercing a certain
behavior, but about skillfully shaping the preferences of others. According to
Nye, three types of resources (sources) constitute soft power: culture, in particular
its elements having appeal for others; values, including political values realized
by a state in its internal and external policy; and foreign policies. The possession
of soft power resources does not automatically ensure the effectiveness of soft
power. It is the context of actions and the tools applied that matter. Depending
on the context and the recipient’s attitude, soft power can carry a positive
message, attract, and thereby help achieve the intended objective—but it can
also discourage and repulse. Soft power tools are not defined absolutely; they
are not confined within a single cohesive catalogue. Whatever leads to promotion,
increased attractiveness, and whatever attracts attention and, consequently,
shapes the preferences of others, can be classified as a soft power tool.
Even though soft power and its resources have been defined, this is a vague
concept giving rise to numerous controversies. The identification of its sources,
in particular the inclusion of economic issues in hard power, is debatable.
A question arises through the prism of which power—hard or soft— humanitarian
aid, or official development assistance (ODA) as an element of economic policy,
should be viewed. In view of numerous debates on the correctness of Nye’s
definition and typology, in literature on Chinese soft power economic issues are
almost invariably taken into account on the grounds that they are a meaningful

3
Hu Angang, Men Honghua, The Rising of Modern China: Comprehensive National Power and
Grand Strategy, 2002, www.irchina.org.
4
J. Rowiñski, “Chiny: nowa globalna potêga? Cieñ dawnej œwietnoœci i lat poni¿enia,” in:
A. D. Rotfeld (ed.), Dok¹d zmierza œwiat, Warszawa, 2008, p. 371.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

element of China’s diplomatic activity. Also in this study a proportion of

activities of an economic nature are included in soft power.
In China the soft power concept has met with considerable interest. Chinese
scholars and officials subscribe for the greater part to the Nye definition, even
though they differ on the resources and tools. In the debate on the Chinese
perception of soft power, launched in 1993 following the publication of the first
article on this issue,5 two strains of thought have developed. One, represented
mainly by Chinese sociologists and philosophers and shared by a majority of
Chinese decision-makers, regards culture as the paramount source of soft power.
The other strain, a minority one represented by experts on international relations,
suggests that soft power should be perceived through the prism of tools rather
than sources, since it is the former that determine the effectiveness of actions.
Proponents of this strain argue that political power—which they define as an
ability to create agendas, establish international institutions and propose new
solutions advantageous both to the initiator state and to other actors, and
projecting a positive image6—is the principal tool.
In the Chinese authorities’ official rhetoric soft power is perceived through
the prism of culture. However, practice shows that—besides using tools that
draw from cultural sources—political (diplomatic) and economic instruments are
also widely used. Their significance—and perhaps also changes in the perception of
soft power by the Chinese authorities—is evidenced by statements of PRC
Chairman Hu Jintao at the 11th conference of ambassadors in 2009, when he
referred (albeit indirectly) to the strengthening of soft power in the political and
economic fields and announced an expansion of China’s diplomatic activity into
other regions.7

5
Wang Huning, “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: ruanquanli” (Culture as National Power: Soft
Power), Fudan Daxue Yuebao, 1993, no. 3.
6
B. S. Glaser, M. E. Murphy, “Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: The Ongoing Debate,”
in: Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: Competition and Cooperation
in the Developing World, CSIS, Washington, D.C., 2009; Yan Xuetong, Xu Jin, “Zhong mei
ruanshili bijiao” (Comparison of Chinese and American Soft Power), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi,
2008, no. 1; Yu Xintian, “Ruanshili jianshe yu zhongguo duiwai zhanlüe” (The Role of Soft
Power in Chinese International Strategy), Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, 2008, no. 2.
7
Dishiyici zhuwai shijie huiyi zai jing zhaokai (11th Conference of Ambassadors Held in Beijing),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 20 July 2009.

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 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

Tools of Chinese Soft Power

It seems that an appropriate criterion by which to classify the tools of
Chinese soft power is a division of the sources from which soft power is derived.
Based on the analysis of China’s activity, three groups of sources (resources) can
be identified: culture, foreign policy and economic policy.
The first group of tools is linked with cultural and educational diplomacy,
where China applies two strategies: of “inviting in” (qing jinlai) and of “going
out” (zou chuqu). The “inviting in” strategy concerns activities in China itself
and it consists in creating suitable conditions to attract foreigners to China. At
home these people become, owing to their personal experiences and direct
contacts, China’s “emissaries,” as it were. The “going out” strategy covers
activities conducted abroad and targeted at recipients outside China. The object
is to reach people hitherto not interested in China, to enhance their knowledge
about the country and to shape their views on China.
Under the “inviting in” strategy China employs tools of an educational
nature. They include: projects to improve the quality of education at Chinese
institutions of higher education with a view to attracting foreign students; the
development of Chinese language study programs for foreigners; an educational
offer for foreign students; and a program of government scholarships. Among
the tools of a cultural nature the promotion of tourism figures prominently,
including efforts to have as many historical sites as possible added to the
UNESCO World Heritage List.
In the “going out” strategy, a network of Confucian Institutes developed
since 2004 is the most visible instrument. The Institutes operate under the
auspices of the Ministry of Education and of the Chinese National Office for
Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (Hanban), with these institutions
known to have a substantial promotional budget. The objective of the Institutes
is to promote the teaching of Chinese abroad. Once a year the Institutes hold
Chinese proficiency competitions for foreign students, known as the “Chinese
Bridge” (Hanyu Qiao). The winners of national rounds take part in the final
competition in China. The Institutes also operate as foreign centers for the HSK
exam (Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi), a Chinese equivalent of the TOEFL test.
The tools of a strictly cultural nature include organizing festivals of Chinese
culture and exhibitions of Chinese art abroad, participation in international film
and theatrical contests and book fairs, as well as the China Book International
program to support the translation of Chinese literature into foreign languages
and its popularization abroad.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

The media are another important soft power instrument classifiable as

a “going out” strategy tool. Improvement of information policy, including media
targeted at foreign audiences, merits attention. For instance, a number of Chinese
web sites in many languages, targeted at foreign readers, have been set up. In
1992 the CCTV-4 television channel was established, broadcasting in Mandarin
Chinese language to the Chinese diaspora and the residents of Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Macao. It was the first Chinese TV channel available abroad. In
2000 an English-language information channel CCTV-9 was established,
followed in the following years by channels broadcasting in Spanish, French,
Arabic and Russian.
Major international events organized by China should also be regarded as
soft power tools. One example were the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, which
the PRC used as an opportunity to promote its cultural achievements (a monumental
pageant presenting the history of Chinese civilization shown during the opening
ceremony) and the country’s might (China ranked first in the medal table).
Another opportunity for China was the 2010 Expo Shanghai.
The second group of China’s soft power tools is derived from foreign policy
resources. Major and highly visible instruments include frequent official and
unofficial visits abroad by Chinese officials, both top- and lower-ranking.
Invitations are also extended to other states’ leaders, with rich media coverage
later provided for such visits. Besides official visits, China has organized
informal summits designed to highlight China’s role as an important partner and
the significance of a given country for the PRC.
The Chinese leadership attaches great importance to professional diplomatic
staff. Diplomats are prepared for being posted to a concrete state and region and
they remain linked with that region throughout their professional career. Rarely
are they appointed to culturally and geographically different states. The diplomatic
corps has been steadily rejuvenated and foreign posts have been filled by better
and better prepared officials, who usually command the language of the host
country.
Involvement in the work of international organizations is a tool through
which China wishes to be perceived as a responsible partner. The mistrustful and
passive attitude of the 1990s has been replaced by active participation in
numerous institutions. China is a member of global and regional organizations.
Significantly, not only has it joined the existing organizations, but it has also
initiated setting up new institutions or cooperation forums. Dovetailing with this

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trend is also a good neighborhood policy reflected in regional integration and in

resolving border issues or toning down the related rhetoric.
China has also changed its attitude towards UN peacekeeping missions.
Today participation in these missions is one of more important Chinese soft
power tools. Disparagement of these missions through emphasizing the principle
of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of other states, that hallmark
of the period between 1971 and 1978, began to change in the 1980s and 1990s.
After the authorities realized that staying away from the missions marginalized
China’s international position, damaging its image, arousing the sense of China
threat and obstructing the pursuit of its interests, China has increasingly been
involved in peacekeeping.8
The third group of tools draws from economic sources. China has been
applying economic diplomacy, or aid diplomacy, chiefly towards states in need
of support which find the Chinese offer attractive, predominately in Africa,
Latin America and Asia. Aid is provided by writing off debts and making
preferential-term loans, mainly for infrastructure projects, such as the
construction of roads, railways or public utility buildings. A loan is usually made
subject to recognition by the borrower state of the one-China principle and to
a guarantee that Chinese firms will have a sizable stake in project
implementation. The reason for the latter is that these firms (generally selected
by the authorities) use their own equipment and labor, often in exchange for
deliveries of raw materials. Chinese investment projects are another tool. It is
common practice for Chinese companies to form joint ventures with local
companies, mostly in construction, mining or the fuel industry. Humanitarian aid
provided by China in case of natural and man-made disasters is also significant
for China’s image. It covers both financial assistance and dispatch of Chinese
rescue teams to disaster-struck areas.

Chinese Soft Power in Practice Illustrated by Selected Regions

China directs the broadest spectrum of its soft power tools to where the
scope for its action is relatively wide (whether due to other states’ lower interest
in a given region or to failures of other states’ policies) and where it sees

8
China’s National Defence 2008, Appendix III, China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping
Operations, January 2009, www.gov.cn; B. Gill, Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding
Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the Policy Implications,” SIPRI Policy Brief, February
2009, p. 2; J. Rowiñski, P. Szafraniec, “ChRL a misje pokojowe ONZ,” Stosunki Miêdzy-
narodowe, 2008, nos. 1–2 (vol. 37).

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a chance of realizing its economic and political interests. It has been active in
Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia—though it should be noted that it has
also been engaged in the Middle East and in Central Asia, i.e. in areas where the
influences of the U.S. and Russia are fairly strong. It can be said with much
certainty that China will gradually expand its involvement to the remaining
regions, including Europe; this, presumably, will be the task of a new Chinese
leadership to emerge in 2012 and 2013. 9
The following sections will outline Chinese soft power activity only in three
regions where China’s presence has been relatively long for reasons of historical
experience or geographical proximity: in Latin America, Africa and Southeast
Asia. Given the variety and large number of undertakings in these areas, this
study does not aspire to presenting all of them. The purpose is to analyze the
phenomenon itself, and the examples presented are but a modest fragment of the
catalogue of activities undertaken by the PRC.

Latin America
Underlying China’s activity in Latin America are economic aims, first of all
to ensure access to raw materials, sales markets and investment opportunities.
Additionally, China seeks to turn the one-China principle into reality by
establishing diplomatic relations with those states in the region that still maintain
official relations with Taiwan. Of the 23 countries which recognize Taiwan, as
many as 12 are Latin American.
In 2008 China adopted a document which laid down the objectives and tasks
of its policy towards the region. The document, permeated with Aesopian
rhetoric, contains a significant passage which refers to Latin America as a region
abounding in natural resources that constitute a large development potential—an
indirect indication of China’s main interests in the region.10 China has taken
efforts to emphasize the importance of relations with individual states through
the tightening of bilateral relations—a purpose served by mutual visits at the
level of heads of state and government. These contacts have expanded demonstrably
since 2001, when PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin paid a nearly two-week visit to
countries in the region. Thereafter many Chinese delegations have come to Latin
America, including two visits (in 2004 and 2008) by Chairman Hu Jintao

9
Hu Jiantao’s term as secretary general of the CPC ends in 2012, and his term as PRC chairman
—in 2013.
10
China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, www.gov.cn.

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himself. In 2009 PRC Vice-chairman Xi Jinping visited Jamaica, Colombia,

Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico, while Chinese Vice-premier Hui Liangyu paid
a visit to Argentina, Barbados, Ecuador and the Bahamas. The PRC signed
bilateral strategic partnership agreements with Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico and
Argentina; free trade agreements with Chile, Peru and Costa Rica; and numerous
sectoral agreements.11
The PRC has been involved in the work of regional organizations. Since
2004 it has been a permanent observer in the Organization of Latin American
States, a member of the East Asia-Latin America Cooperation Forum
(FOCALAE), and a member of the APEC. Also, China cooperates with the
Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank,
a relationship facilitating the distribution of aid in countries of the region.
China’s participation in the United Nations stabilization mission in Haiti
reflects its involvement in the region and its responsibility for security there.
This is the first UN mission in Latin America with China’s participation.
That said, the most widely used instruments are those of an economic nature.
They are meant to help realize China’s economic interests, “link” states in the
region with China and convince them of the benefits of China’s activity. The
accompanying rhetoric, assurances of cooperation based on mutual benefits
(“win-win” strategy) and the principle of non-interference in other states’
internal affairs are designed to create a positive image of the PRC. Concrete
tools range from preferential loans—chiefly for infrastructure projects, in
exchange for access to raw materials—to debt-forgiving and investment. China
is interested in receiving from the region oil, natural gas, copper, iron, lead,
nickel and aluminum; these resources are obtainable mainly from Brazil, Chile,
Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Cuba and Ecuador.
China has been increasing its investment in the region. Three Chinese oil
groups: China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) are present in Latin America. For instance, in 2004 Sinopec invested
US$1 billion in a joint venture with Petrobras of Brazil to build an oil pipeline
connecting the north and the south of Brazil.12 The Chinese company Baosteel

11
China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and Africa. A Study Prepared
for Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 16.
12
A. Castillo, “China in Latin America,” The Diplomat, 18 June 2009; China’s Foreign Policy...,
op. cit., p. 24.

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jointly with Vale do Rio Doce of Brazil invested in the construction of a steel
mill in the state of Espirito Santo in the south of Brazil. This US$3-billion
project was financed by the Chinese company (60%) and by the Brazilian
partner (40%).13 During PRC Vice-chairman Xi Jinping’s 2009 visit to Brazil the
two sides signed an agreement under which the China Development Bank
undertook to lend Petrobras US$10 billion to finance oil exploration, while
Brazil agreed to deliver 100,000 barrels of oil per day to China.14 In Venezuela
the CNPC set up a joint venture with the state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela;
this arrangement enabled China to extract oil from 15 oil fields in the country. In
Peru the CNPC bought shares in Pluspetrol, which holds oil fields along the
border with Ecuador. Chinese firms are also interested in modernizing Peru’s
pipelines to facilitate the transport of oil to ports on the Pacific coast.15
Moreover, China Aluminum Corporation (Chinalco) will invest, over 30 years,
more than US$2 billion in one of the world’s most productive copper mines at
Toromocho in central Peru. The extraction of this raw material necessitates the
removal of the local population. The Chinese company offered compensation of
US$1,000 and dwellings elsewhere. In a referendum held among the inhabitants
a majority accepted this arrangement.16
Aid provided by China is a very important instrument of building a positive
image of China and of “linking” Latin American states economically. Support
provided to Grenada in reconstruction after the Ivan hurricane in 2004; to Peru
after the 2007 earthquake; and to Haiti after the powerful earthquake in 2010 are
cases in point. Aid is provided also to states which have severed diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, as a reward, as it were, for supporting the one-China
principle—but also to those which continue to maintain official relations with
Taipei, as a means of persuading their governments to recognize the PRC. For
instance, before the 2007 cricket World Cup, China helped build sports stadiums
in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Jamaica—and even in Saint Lucia, which
maintains official relations with Taiwan.17

13
Jiang Shixue, “The Panda Hugs the Tulcano: China’s Relations with Brazil,” China Brief,
15 May 2009, vol. 9, no. 10, p. 8.
14
Ibidem; E. Ellis, “China’s Maturing Relationship with Latin America,” China Brief, 18 March
2009, vol. 9, no. 6, p. 5.
15
J. Kurlanzick, “China’s Latin Leap Forward,” World Policy Journal, fall 2006, p. 38.
16
E. Ellis, “China’s Maturing Relationship...,” op. cit., p. 5; J. Simpson, “Peru’s ‘Copper Mountain’
in Chinese Hands,” BBC, 17 June 2008.
17
China’s Foreign Policy..., op. cit., pp. 26–27.

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It is difficult to state unequivocally how effective the Chinese soft power

activities have been. One way to approach the assessment of their effectiveness
is to analyze China’s diplomatic successes and failures in a given region or state,
and international opinion surveys.
In 2004 Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela granted China market
economy status (MES). Also, the severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan
by three Central American states and the establishment of relations with China
should be seen as China’s diplomatic success. In 2004 the Dominican Republic
established official relations with Beijing—presumably under the influence of
a promise of over US$100 million in Chinese aid. In 2005 Grenada broke
relations with Taiwan, and in consequence it received from China an assurance
of substantial financial aid after the 2004 Ivan hurricane, plus support to its
agriculture and a scholarship program.18 In 2007 Costa Rica established diplomatic
relations with China. The PRC offered to purchase US$300 million worth of
Costa Rican bonds, provide US$130 million in financial aid and set up a scholarship
program; it also declared itself interested in building an oil refinery in this
country, and Costa Rica cancelled Dalai Lama’s visit scheduled for 2008. 19
Signs of effectiveness of Chinese soft power notwithstanding, there have
been noticeable failures. It should be regarded as a failure that 12 states in the
region maintain official relations with Taiwan.20 China’s hope for a domino
effect to follow the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Dominican
Republic, Grenada and Costa Rica has not materialized. It should be seen as
a failure that Saint Lucia re-established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2007
after ten years of official relations with Beijing. Yet another example is the
emerging displeasure in states in the region with the growth of the Chinese
diaspora, whose members take jobs away from local workers, with low safety
standards in Chinese firms in the region, and with too intensive exploitation of
natural resources detrimental to the natural environment. What is more, states in
the region claim that cheap imports from the PRC have been hurting their
economies. In 2005 the president of Brazil authorized the introduction of
anti-dumping tariffs and temporary restrictions on imports of Chinese goods,

18
Ibidem, pp. 17 and 26–27.
19
D. P. Erikson, “China’s Strategy toward Central America: The Costa Rican Nexus,” China
Brief, 27 May 2009, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 6–7.
20
These are: Belize, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines.

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mainly textiles, to Brazil.21 Some states have also been concerned that they
might become too dependent on Chinese investment and that local firms entering
into joint ventures with China might be treated merely as sub-contractors. These
concerns have been voiced in Ecuador. Following the investment by China in
2006 of about US$1.5 billion in the acquisition of the Ecuadorian assets
of EnCana, a Canadian group, the government of Ecuador rescinded China’s
oilfields rights which had been part of the agreement and made it sign a new
agreement permitting oil production only. A Hong-Kong-based company
Hutchison Whampoa was also forced to give up its concession to operate the
Port of Manta in connection with a pending dispute over the fulfillment by the
government side of its contractual obligations.22 However, in 2009, with Ecuador
plunged in a grave economic and financial crisis, the president of Ecuador
mollified his attitude towards China and he encouraged China to invest. 23
Opinion polls, that seemingly most reliable measure of the effectiveness of
soft power activities, indicate that perceptions of China by the states in the
region are for the greater part positive. In a poll conducted by the BBC in 2005
in Chile, Argentina and Brazil, positive views of China dominated (respectively,
56%, 44% and 53%).24 A similar poll conducted in 2009 by the same center
showed 62% of positive perceptions of China in the Central American countries
and 60% among the population of Chile. A similar trend emerges from Pew
Global [Attitudes Project] surveys. In Brazil, favorable views of China
accounted for 50% in 2007, for 47% in 2008 and again for 50% in 2009. In
Argentina positive opinions of China reached 32% in 2007, 34% in 2008 and
42% in 2009. Also, Brazil and Argentina treat China as a partner (poll results
being, respectively, 49% and 45%).25
Based on the above examples of effectiveness and ineffectiveness of China’s
soft power activities a thesis can be ventured that despite positive opinions about
China in the region, China’s position there is neither strong nor well-established.
This is evidenced by shifts in the different states’ attitudes in response to
external determinants (such as the economic crisis or modifications of U.S.

21
Jiang Shixue, “The Panda Hugs the Tulcano...,” op. cit., p. 9.
22
E. Ellis, “China’s Maturing Relationship...,” op. cit., p. 5.
23
J. Llangari, “Hit by Crisis Ecuador Makes Sales Pitch to China,” Reuters, 13 February 2009.
24
22 Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries, www.worldpublicopinion.org.
25
Most Muslim Publics Not So Easily Moved. Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the
World: 25-Nations, www.pewglobal.org, pp. 44–45.

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policy towards the region). Given the geographical distance between China and
Latin America and the region’s traditionally strong relations with the U.S., there
seems to be little promise of China’s deep and long-term involvement.
Presumably China is aware of this, as implied by the focus it puts on economic
issues while steering clear of issues of a political or ideological nature. Under
the circumstances, the overriding aim is to use to the greatest possible extent the
region’s natural resources as a prerequisite for the PRC’s further economic
development.

Africa
The African continent is another area of China’s activity. China’s increased
involvement in Africa has been in evidence since 2000. The underlying
considerations are, like in Latin America, economic: to ensure the supply of
resources for the burgeoning Chinese economy and to build markets for Chinese
goods. China’s policy towards Africa has been determined by its thirst for
resources. Its political aims—to enlist the support of African states as non-
permanent members of the UN Security Council, or (albeit to a lesser extent than
in Latin America) to have Taiwan pushed into diplomatic isolation—are
subordinated to the economic objectives. At present four African states maintain
official relations with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Swaziland, Gambia, and São Tomé
and Príncipe. China also wants to build up its international position by
demonstrating its responsibility for states in the region.
China has been pursuing its targets through both bilateral and multilateral
contacts. In 2000 a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established
at China’s initiative. The FOCAC meets every three years, alternately in China
and in one of the African states. The third FOCAC meeting held in Beijing in
2006 assembled representatives of 48 African states—a symbolic event in that it
emphasized these countries’ rank in relations with China. During the forum
Chairman Hu Jintao presented the essential tasks China wanted to realize by
2009 with a view to tightening its relations with Africa. They were: to double aid
to Africa through the provision of US$3 billion in preferential-term loans and
US$2 billion in credit; to establish a US$5 billion China-Africa development
fund as a way of supporting Chinese businesses and encouraging their
investment in Africa; to build an African Union conference center; to cancel the
poorest African countries’ debts; to continue the opening of the Chinese market
to African products and to increase (from 190 to 440) the number of
duty-exempt products exported by the poorest African countries to China; to
create three to five trade and economic cooperation zones. Furthermore, there

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

were declarations to build 30 hospitals, to provide a RMB300 million grant for

the construction of 30 malaria prevention and treatment facilities, to build 100
schools in rural areas, and to increase the number of state scholarships for
African students, from 2,000 to 4,000 annually.26 The meeting adopted an action
plan for 2007–2009 which set down in detail the targets presented by Chairman
Hu Jintao.27
The most recent FOCAC meeting took place in October 2009 in Egypt. At
the meeting an action plan for 2010–2012 was adopted. China offered African
countries a US$1 billion loan for the development of small and medium-sized
African businesses; the cancellation of debts of the poorest countries having
diplomatic relations with the PRC; US$1.5 billion in financial support to health
programs; an increase, to 5,500 by 2012, of the number of government
scholarships. Furthermore, China undertook to train African personnel and it
offered African scientists opportunities to conduct research in China. 28
In January 2006 China published an official document defining its policy
towards Africa. The document emphasizes the importance of Africa to China
and the similarity of historical experiences (colonialism). Noteworthy is
a provision on an important role in the UN of the African states, “which strive
for the realization of the principle of equality of states.” With respect to the
economy as an area of cooperation, emphasis is placed on the development of
trade, investment, assistance, debt cancellation and cooperation with resource-
rich states.29
The rank of African states in China’s policy is borne out by Chinese leaders’
frequent visits to the region. Besides top-level political meetings, the PRC
organizes business forums with African entrepreneurs. For instance, at one such
meeting held in Ethiopia in 2003 contracts worth about US$680 million were
signed.30
United Nations’ peacekeeping missions in Africa are China’s important soft
power tool. At present more than 75% of Chinese personnel participating in

26
Full text: Address by Hu Jintao at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, 4 November 2006, www.focacsummit.org.
27
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009), 16 November 2006,
www.fmprc.gov.cn; China’s Foreign Policy..., op. cit., p. 110.
28
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sharm El-Sheik Action Plan (2010-2012), www.focac.org.
29
China’s African Policy, 12 January 2006, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
30
J. Eisenman, J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” Current History, May 2006, p. 221.

58 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2010, no. 3

 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

missions abroad is deployed in Africa.31 The PRC participates in missions in

Western Sahara, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan,
and Sudan’s Darfur.32 It also offers de-mining assistance by training personnel
and providing equipment in such regions as Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Burundi,
Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia.33 As yet another noteworthy initiative,
China has sent three of its ships to the waters of Somalia to protect commercial
vessels against pirates. This is a precedent: for the first time the Chinese Navy is
operating outside the Pacific.
Broadly construed aid is yet another soft power tool. It is provided on
a package basis. China has granted preferential loans without demanding
commitments in respect of democratization or observance of human rights, and
it has cancelled existing debts. As in Latin America, lending is usually for
infrastructure projects and loans are offered subject to guarantees of Chinese
firms’ considerable participation in the implementation of contracts.34 Chinese
firms carry out contracts using their own equipment and they employ Chinese
workers—a practice resented because, while unemployment in the host country
remains high, jobs go to the growing Chinese diaspora. The Chinese expatriate
communities are estimated to have grown in the past ten years to 30,000 (from
3,000) in Zambia and to 300,000 in South Africa. Aid is usually disbursed
during informal meetings of the ambassadors of African states to Beijing, or
before Chinese officials’ African visits. It is distributed via the Export-Import
Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, or Chinese diplomatic missions in
African countries. Eligible for this aid are the authorities of a given state, state
institutions, or state-owned enterprises. Aid to non-governmental institutions is
not part of the established practice.35 In return for the support received, African
states provide China with access to raw materials. Prominent examples of aid
include: the sports stadiums built in Gambia and Sierra Leone; the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ building in the capital of Mozambique, Maputo;36 the

31
D. H. Shinn, “Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones,” China Brief, 2 April 2009,
vol. 9, no. 7, p. 7.
32
B. Gill, Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role...,” op. cit., p. 2.
33
D. H. Shinn, “Chinese Involvement in African Conflict Zones,” op. cit, p. 8.
34
J. Kurlantzick, “Beijing’s Safari: China’s Move into Africa and Its Implications for Aid,
Development, and Governance,” Policy Outlook, November 2006.
35
Ibidem.
36
J. Eisenman, J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” op. cit., pp. 219–221.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

Parliament building and the country’s largest sports stadium in the Congo; and
roads, railways and telecommunication systems built or modernized in many
other countries in the region. 37
Angola, a state with the second-largest oil deposits in Africa, is an example
of Chinese investment known as aid-for-resources. In 2004 China offered
Angola a US$2 billion loan for the upgrading of infrastructure, on the condition
that 70% of related contracts were set aside for Chinese firms. By 2007 the loan
was increased by another US$2 billion. Angola has been repaying it with
deliveries of oil to China at a rate of over 520,000 barrels per day.38 Following
China’s offer of support, Angola, which had been negotiating terms of aid with
the International Monetary Fund, broke off these talks.
A survey conducted by the BBC in 2009 in Ghana and Nigeria showed that
the majority of opinions about China were positive (75% and 72%,
respectively).39 According to a Pew Global survey 75% of the Nigerians had
a favorable view of China in 2007, and 85% in 2009. In Kenya the figures were,
respectively, 81% and 73%.40 Moreover, it should be seen as a success of
China’s African policy that a number of states broke off diplomatic relations
with Taiwan in favor of the PRC: the Republic of South Africa, the Republic of
Central Africa and Guinea-Bissau in 1998; Liberia in 2003; Senegal in 2005;
Chad in 2006; and Malawi in 2007. 41
Yet African states have also indicated their displeasure with Chinese activity
in the region. China has been accused of causing environmental degradation by
too intensive mining, and of disregard of working conditions. Zambia is a case in
point. Since 2005 protests have been staged there against the presence of
Chinese firms, with the protesters claiming that working conditions are poor,
pay low and payments overdue. During Hu Jintao’s 2009 visit a scheduled trip to
a mine was cancelled for fear of worker protests.42 During recent elections in
Zambia an opposition candidate who accused Chinese firms of exploiting local

37
Wenran Jiang, “Chinese Inroads in DR Congo: A Chinese ‘Marshall Plan’ or Business?” China
Brief, 12 January 2009, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 9.
38
J. L. Parenti, “China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century,” JQF, 2009, no. 52, p. 119;
J. Kurlanzick, “Beijing’s Sarafi...,” op. cit.
39
Views of China and Russia Decline in Global Poll, www.worldpublicopinion.org.
40
Most Muslim Publics…, op. cit.
41
J. L. Parenti, “China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century,” op. cit.
42
“Exploited Workers Protest Against Chinese Company,” Asia News, 3 May 2008.

60 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2010, no. 3

 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

labor has won considerable support. He also championed breaking off

diplomatic relations with Beijing and establishing relations with Taipei. China
intervened, warning that a victory of the opposition candidate would result in the
severing of relations and in the withdrawal of Chinese aid and investment (China
is Zambia’s important investor, in particular in the copper sector).43 Similar
objections to China have been voiced by other states. The Republic of South
Africa objects to cheap imports from China, Gambia accuses Sinopec of having
concealed data on the actual impact of oil mining on the environment, while in
Ethiopia there have been kidnappings of employees of Chinese oil companies.
Notwithstanding indications of displeasure with Chinese presence in the
region, and despite the distance separating China and Africa, this is an area
where China has a chance to stabilize and strengthen its position. A tradition of
mutual contacts (viz. the Bandung conference or China’s foreign policy strategy
of the 1960s seeking cooperation with developing countries, including in Africa)
works in China’s favor. China’s future in Africa will depend on how it makes use
of its potential. By putting its seal of approval on the aid-for-resources system
—a corruption-breeding, non-transparent scheme which, as in Nigeria, increases
the indebtedness of the aid-recipient country—it will undermine its position in
the region. On the other hand, if it works towards a better balance between the
soft and hard tools, responding promptly to a given country’s or a given region’s
needs, and—as in Angola44—implements more fully the “win-win” strategy, it
will improve its chance of succeeding in Africa.

Southeast Asia

Asia remains the priority direction in China’s foreign policy. The paramount
objective of the activity in Asia is to ensure security and stability in the region as
a prerequisite for China’s further economic development. This objective has
been pursued by resolving border issues with its neighbors, by integration
(mainly economic) via organizations of a regional nature, by setting up free
trade zones, or through Asian business forums. Furthermore, China is seeking to
establish itself as the region’s leader and, consequently, to have the region
recognized in fact as a Chinese influence zone.

43
J. L. Parenti, “China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century,” op. cit.
44
For more on China’s policy in Nigeria and Angola see A. Vines, L. Wong, M. Weimar,
I. Campos, Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and Angola,
London, 2009.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

The different methods of winning Asian states’ goodwill are wrapped in

a rhetoric invoking common Asian roots (Asian values: Confucianism, Buddhism),
similar historical experiences, and the principle of mutual advantages (“win-
win”), which is emphasized in all areas of China’s activity. China’s activities in
Asia have been dubbed the Chinese “Monroe Doctrine” for an alleged similarity
between the PRC’s current policy in the region and the building of an American
influence zone in the western hemisphere in the 19 th century.45
The beginnings of China’s soft power activities in Asia date back to 1997,
i.e. to the Asian crisis. The absence of firm activity by the U.S. in curbing the
crisis and misguided decisions by the International Monetary Fund offered
China an opportunity to demonstrate its position. At the time the PRC refused to
depreciate the yuan, a stance which enabled the economic situation to stabilize
and major problems on the international capital market to be averted. This
decision earned China the goodwill of Asian states, particularly members of the
ASEAN, an organization China has been cooperating with since the early 1990s
and in which it has enjoyed a partner status (ASEAN Dialogue Partner) since
1996. In 2000 China put before the ASEAN countries a proposal to set up a free
trade zone, one of the largest in the world. Two years later a framework
agreement was signed, providing for the establishment of a free trade zone
comprising China and the ASEAN. In 2010 the zone embraced six relatively
developed countries: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand. In 2015 the other ASEAN countries will join in.46 The importance
of the ASEAN and of other states in the region in the policy of the PRC is
confirmed by other forms of institutional cooperation with these countries.
China participates in meetings of ASEAN+1 (the Association members plus
China), ASEAN+3 (the Association members plus China, Japan and South
Korea), in the East Asia Summit comprising the ASEAN states, China, Japan,
South Korea, India, New Zealand and Australia, and in the ASEAN Regional
Forum, which draws together the Association members and 17 states in Asia and
in the European Union, as well as Australia and the U.S. Moreover, China has
initiated other forms of cooperation with the ASEAN countries, such as the
annual China-ASEAN Expo with its accompanying event, the China-ASEAN

45
J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief, June 2006,
no. 47, p. 4.
46
T. Lum, W. M. Morrison, B. Vaughn, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia,” CRS Report for
Congress, 4 January 2008, p. 15; A. Gradziuk, “Implications of ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement (ACFTA),” PISM Bulletin, no. 8 (616), 19 January 2010.

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 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

Business and Investment Summit held in China since 2004, or the Boao
economic forum in the Hainan Island in China—an event modeled after the
Davos forum in terms of organization and format.
Serving to ensure stability in Asia is a “good neighborhood policy.” It is
reflected primarily in efforts to ensure stability in the neighboring countries
through solving border disputes or softening their rhetoric. At the 2002 summit
under the ASEAN+3 formula a declaration was signed on the conduct of parties
on the Spratley Archipelago, which is an object of a dispute among China,
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Although the
declaration merely preserves the status quo rather than settle the dispute, China
recognizes as a fact the right of other states to raise claims. In January 2009
China ended a dispute over land borders with Vietnam and has toned down the
rhetoric of its dispute over the Paracel Archipelago. In 2003 the PRC acceded to
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia which promotes respect
for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states in the region, non-interference in
their internal affairs and renunciation of the use of force. Improvement in
China-Taiwan relations in the wake of the island’s 2008 elections and growing
economic integration between those two actors also dovetail with the good
neighborhood policy. Regular direct air and sea connections have been
established between the PRC and Taiwan, and China has consented to the
island’s participation—in an observer capacity and under the name of Chinese
Taipei—in the World Health Assembly (WHO’s decision-making body).
Close bilateral relations maintained with Asian states and the provision of
economic aid are important soft power tools. For instance, China has provided
aid to Burma in the form of loans (in 2006 it promised US$200 million in loans)
and support to infrastructure projects in the extraction industry (natural gas, oil)
and road, railway and airport construction.47 In addition, Burma received US$10
million in aid after the cyclone that had hit it in 2008.48 In return, it signed in
2007 an agreement with China on oil and gas exploration off Burma’s coast.
Moreover, China undertook to build pipelines from Burma to the cities of
Kunming and Chongqing in China.49 This is a project of strategic importance

47
T. Lum, W. M. Morrison, B. Vaughn, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia,” op. cit., p. 6.
48
H. H. M. Hsiao, A. Yang, “Transformations in China’s Soft Power toward ASEAN,” China
Brief, 24 November 2008, vol. 8, no. 22, p. 12.
49
T. Lum, W. M. Morrison, B. Vaughn, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia,” op. cit.,
pp. 11–12.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

because the pipeline, bypassing as it will the Malacca Straits, will reduce
dependence on U.S.-controlled sea routes. Similar practices have been employed
in relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, resulting in agreements between
Chinese and Vietnamese firms for the exploitation of oil and gas reserves in the
Tonkin Gulf and a similar agreement with the Cambodian side on the extraction
of these resources from deposits in Cambodia.50 The much-promoted principle
of non-interference in internal affairs of other states helps realize China’s
interests in Asian countries, because it enables China to invest in countries under
sanctions as well as in those where other states’ activity (U.S. in particular) is
lower. For instance, following the withdrawal of Philippine troops from Iraq in
2004, the United States markedly scaled down its aid to this country. The PRC
then came up with its offer during a visit paid by Philippine President Gloria
Arroyo to Beijing.51
China is perceived by the Asian states as an important partner in the region.
This is evidenced by such moves as Cambodia’s giving up in 1998 its informal
relations with Taiwan or cancellation of Dalai Lama’s visit in 2002 at the request
of the Chinese authorities. In 2001 the Thai government refused to allow
a meeting of Falun Gong activists to be held in Thailand, and Indonesia and
Malaysia followed suit.52 China’s growing role in the region was borne out by
the 2008 appeal by the leaders of Cambodia, Laos and the Philippines for more
Chinese investment in the region to stabilize the situation in the face of the
global crisis.53 As yet another proof of the efficiency of Chinese soft power,
ASEAN is said to adopt decisions upon considering China’s position or potential
reaction—in particular concerning Burma, Cambodia and Thailand.54. What is
more, opinion polls confirm China’s positive image in the region. In a survey
conducted in Thailand in 2003, China was indicated as the country’s closest
friend by more than two-thirds of the respondents, while only 9% named the
U.S.55 In BBC surveys conducted in 2005 in Indonesia and the Philippines,

50
Ibidem.
51
J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” Current History, September
2006, p. 272.
52
Ibidem, p. 275.
53
H. H. M. Hsiao, A. Yang, “Transformations in China’s Soft Power toward ASEAN,” op. cit.,
p. 13.
54
J. Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive...,” op. cit., p. 140.
55
Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power,’” Survival, summer
2006, vol. 48, no. 2, p. 24.

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 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

positive views on China dominated (68% and 70%, respectively).56 In Malaysia

a Pew Global survey conducted in 2008 revealed that 83% of the public had
positive opinions on China. 57
On the negative side, China’s involvement in the region could be causing
excessive degradation of the environment through over-intensive mining of raw
materials and river regulation. Standing out as a potential source of failures of
Chinese soft power are China’s activities in the Mekong Delta. This area,
encompassing China’s Yunnan province and parts of Burma, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Vietnam, is a food basket for the countries in the region—an
important source of river fauna and an arable land. The proposed construction by
China of new dams upstream the river could change significantly its
watercourse, affecting adversely the water level and fish resources in Cambodia,
just as it could interfere with rice farming in Vietnam. China refused to join the
Mekong River Commission, an inter-governmental agency comprising four
riparian states situated on the lower reaches of the river.58 To date, despite the
controversy over the construction of dams on the Mekong, the authorities of the
Delta states have been disinclined to criticize China’s conduct for fear of losing
aid and political support. Yet this is a potential source of disagreements in the
region and it undermines the effectiveness of China’s soft power.
Yet another factor likely to weaken the effectiveness of China’s soft power
are ethnic disagreements between China and the region’s countries with large
Chinese diasporas. The number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries is
estimated at some 30 million, with the largest expatriate Chinese communities in
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The diaspora is accused of transferring
profit to China, a practice strongly resented by native populations, of Sinizing
the host countries (these concerns are reflected in the Chinese diaspora being
described as the fifth column), and so on. Yet, unlike Latin America, where
geographic distances and the involvement of other actors in the region undercut
the effectiveness of activities, the Asian area has been linked with Chinese
influences for centuries. In the face of globalization processes Southeast Asia
seems to have no alternative to cooperation with China. It seems that the

56
22 Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries, 5 March 2005, www.world
publicopinion.org.
57
Global Economic Gloom—China and India Notable Exception: 24-Nation Pew Global
Attitudes Survey, www.pewglobal.org, pp. 39–46.
58
M. Richardson, Dams in China Turn the Mekong Into a River of Discord, 16 July 2009,
www.yaleglobal.yale.edu.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

employment of soft power tools meant to project a warmer image of the PRC
and the playing down of conflict-breeding issues reflect a rational approach by
Chinese diplomacy, as this increases the likelihood of attaining the most
important aims in the region.

Conclusions

The deliberate employment of soft power tools by Chinese diplomacy

reflects growing pragmatism of Chinese foreign policy and could be a challenge
to other actors—first of all to the U.S., but also to the European Union. The very
scale of Chinese activities as well as their multidirectionality and the multiplicity
of the tools employed warrant such a conclusion. In summing up these
deliberations on Chinese soft power it is worthwhile to consider its strengths and
weaknesses, because their definition could be helpful in taking action designed
to enhance, for instance, the European Union’s soft power and to derive benefits
from China’s diplomatic activity.
The strengths of Chinese soft power include:
– diplomatic offensive in regions “neglected” by other actors, notably by
the U.S. and the European Union. China’s involvement in many regions, such as
Africa, Latin America or Asia, is a specific effect of scale not to be disregarded
by other states;
– centralization of activities, which improves decision-making and
implementation and prevents a protracted negotiation process;
– highlighting of common bonding elements. One example here is the
practice of invoking the colonial past, which makes possible the building of
a community of experience, or even of a victim mentality;
– aid in the form of preferential-term lending or implementation of
infrastructure projects. The visible evidence of this aid are newly-built roads,
schools, hospitals and other public utility facilities (a kind of product
placement);
– de-linking aid from democratization processes, or from plans for its use
and future settlement;
– highlighting the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal
affairs of other states and the freedom to choose a political system and
development model;
– frequent visits by Chinese leaders to the target countries of the PRC’s
diplomatic offensive. These visits boost the partners’ self-esteem;

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 Soft Power in China’s Foreign Policy

– initiating integration processes (mainly in Asia) through setting up new

organizations, cooperation forums, or informal regional and sub-regional summits;
– involvement in matters of security and peace, reflected in the changed
attitude towards UN peacekeeping missions; projecting the image of a state
responsible for global security;
– broad catalogue of cultural and educational diplomacy activities, as a way
to broadening the understanding of China and overcoming negative stereotypes;
– promoting Asian values as functional and pacifist, as an alternative to
Western values; promoting Confucius as a symbol of China is a case in point;
– Chinese leaders’ public address rhetoric with its “peaceful development”
and “harmonious world” catchphrases.
Some of China’s activities described as “soft” are in fact “hard.” This could
restrict the PRC’s impact. Accordingly, the following can be classified as
weaknesses:
– small impact of non-governmental organizations, evidencing the
weakness of Chinese public diplomacy. This situation can cause Chinese soft
power to be perceived as a “rulers’ mouthpiece” and act as a factor undermining
China’s relations with, for instance, the European Union member states or the
United States;
– imbalance of soft and hard activities evident, for instance, in too intensive
exploitation of raw materials (e.g. in Africa and Latin America); non-compliance
with environmental protection standards; implementing infrastructure projects
with Chinese labor, thus adding to unemployment in the host countries and to
the growth of the Chinese diaspora. This could create an image of a China
exploiting the weakness of other countries’ institutions and conducting
a plundering policy;
– interference in other states’ internal affairs, reflected (despite a rhetoric to
the contrary) in aid being conditional upon access to resources and sales markets
and upon project implementation predominantly by Chinese firms; influencing
the political systems of other states;
– presence in international political debate on sensitive issues, such as Tibet
and Xinjiang, human rights, intellectual property, or product safety.
Now that the Chinese leadership has signaled that soft power activities will
be stepped up and expanded into more directions, the moment is apposite for the
EU, for instance, to develop a model of cooperation with China that will enable
benefits to be drawn from Chinese activity and potential threats to be eliminated.

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Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar

Accordingly, the EU should:

– adopt an open attitude and remain oriented towards cooperation with
Beijing, while rejecting solutions aimed at isolating China;
– rest its policy on pragmatism, eliminate stereotype thinking;
– act as a community, minimize disputes that arise from national thinking
and cause divisions undermining the EU’s position;
– develop a mechanism to respond promptly to Chinese activities and
engage in Chinese undertakings alongside proposing its own solutions;
– monitor Chinese policy and predict its directions with a view to taking
a specific “pre-emptive action;”
– develop its own soft power strategy competitive to China’s.
The establishment in 2008, at Brussels’ initiative, of a China-Africa-
European Union cooperation forum heralded the Union’s pragmatic approach to
China’s activities. Even though the decision to create the forum can justifiably
be regarded as belated, considering that China has been present in the region
since 2000 while the forum has received no enthusiastic reception in Africa, yet
this was a manifestation of deliberate use of soft power by the Union—which
seems to augur well for the future.

Translated by El¿bieta Go³êbiowska

68 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2010, no. 3

CONTRIBUTORS

Andrzej Szeptycki, Ph.D.—assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations,

Warsaw University; member of the Council of the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership
Forum
Patryk Kugiel—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Jaros³aw Æwiek-Karpowicz, Ph.D.—analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs

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