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The Range of Reasons

The Range of Reasons

in Ethics and Epistemology
DA N I E L W H I T I N G
1
1
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Contents
Acknowledgements vii
1. Introduction 1
2. Reasons and Their Roles 10
3. Justifying and Demanding 36
4. A Modal Theory of Reasons 58
5. Possessing Reasons 74
6. Subjective Reasons 99
7. Truth 123
8. Knowledge 148
9. Rational Belief 171
10. Conclusion 197
References 201
Index 225
Acknowledgements
The seeds of this book were planted more than ten years ago. Initial attempts to
germinate them failed. Later efforts were more successful at first, but the sprouts
did not develop to maturity. Eventually, after several trials involving grafting,
aggressive pruning, and repeated fertilization, the ideas started to bear fruit.
Whether or not that fruit will be found palatable, I am grateful to those who
helped me to get this far.
For engaging with my research, conversations that helped to shape it, or other
forms of intellectual support and encouragement over the last decade or so, my
thanks to the following: Maria Alvarez, Tony Booth, Jessica Brown, Timothy
Chan, Julian Dodd, Pascal Engel, Davide Fassio, Guy Fletcher, Daniel Fogal,
Philip Fox, Hanjo Glock, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin, Javier González de Prado Salas,
Alexander Greenberg, Anandi Hattiangadi, Ulrike Heuer, Tsung-Hsing Ho, Frank
Hoffman, David Hunter, Chris Kelp, Benjamin Kiesewetter, Simon Kirchin,
Clayton Littlejohn, Errol Lord, Miriam McCormick, Susanne Mantel, Neil Mehta,
Anne Meylan, Alex Miller, Anders Nes, Christian Piller, Duncan Pritchard, Jonas
Olson, Eva Schmidt, Thomas Schmidt, Mark Schroeder, François Schroeter,
Laura Schroeter, Matthew Silverstein, Mona Simion, Justin Snedegar, Daniel Star,
Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Pekka Väyrynen, Åsa Wikforss,
Daniel Wodak, Alex Worsnip, and Weiping Zheng. Sincere apologies to those
whose names should appear in this list but do not.
My colleagues in Philosophy at Southampton make it a supportive, harmoni-
ous, fun, and intellectually stimulating place to work. Over the years, I have sub-
jected every member of the department to more or less inchoate versions of one
or more of the ideas in this book. I am grateful to them for their patience, good
humour, and insightful criticisms.
I am especially grateful to Denis McManus and Aaron Ridley. In their stints as
Heads of Philosophy, and with persistent self-effacement, their efforts helped to
make the department as energetic and collegial as it is. Despite the all-consuming
nature of their roles, they each made time to share advice, encouragement, and
the occasional drink.
Alex Gregory, Brian McElwee, Conor McHugh, Kurt Sylvan, and Jonathan
Way also deserve special mention. Our many, many discussions of matters nor-
mative have deepened, informed, and, on more occasions than I care to count,
corrected my thinking on the issues this book concerns.
In the closing stages of this project, I imposed a complete draft of the manu-
script on a reading group at Southampton. Its regular members included Alex,
viii Acknowledgements
Brian, Jonathan, Kurt, and Giulia Felappi, while St. John Lambert, Andrew
Stephenson, and Kevin Wallbridge made welcome appearances. Although Conor
could not attend in person, he provided written comments on each chapter. The
critical scrutiny of all involved was searching and constructive in equal measure.
With Conor and Jonathan, I was fortunate to lead Normativity: Epistemic and
Practical, a project supported by a research grant from the Arts and Humanities
Research Council (AHRC) (AH/K008188/1). This provided much needed time
and (head)space to read, reflect, discuss, and develop. It also afforded welcome
opportunities to interact with and learn from talented philosophers from around
the world.
In a further stroke of luck, I secured a second grant from the AHRC, in this
case to lead a network on Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and
Aesthetics (AH/S006338/1). While the stated concerns of that network are less
central to the present work, its activities and the conversations they prompted
helped significantly to shape and deepen my understanding of the theory of
reasons and related issues.
Thanks to the AHRC for its generous funding and to the many participants in
both projects for their contributions.
In 2015, I held a visiting position at Northwestern University. While there, my
views on the nature and norms of rationality went through significant change,
due in large part to a reading group on the topic. Thanks to Sandy Goldberg,
Jennifer Lackey, Baron Reed, and Nathan Weston for their time and hospitality.
While all the writing is new, this book draws on previous research, indeed, on
just about every article I have published since (Whiting 2010). In the present
work, I have changed significantly the way I approach the issues, and the ideas
and arguments differ in details small and large from their ancestors. In several
places, the views I commit to here represent a significant change of mind.
Nevertheless, in writing this book I inherit the debts incurred in writing the earl
ier articles. While, I hope, those debts were duly acknowledged at the time in
print, I am happy to take this opportunity to thank again the many individuals
and audiences who gave their time and attention to my previous efforts.
Parts of the more recent manuscript were shared at various stages of develop-
ment in seminars and conferences in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, St Andrews,
Stirling, and Zürich. I am grateful to the audiences on those occasions for their
feedback.
If this book is something, it is not from nothing. It is an exciting time to work
in, and at the intersection of, ethics and epistemology. Needless to say, the views I
explore in this book have been profoundly influenced by those of my peers and of
our predecessors. I have tried to acknowledge those influences along the way—
through citations and, since this is philosophy, through critical engagement.
Thanks to Peter Momtchiloff at Oxford University Press. His initial interest in
and ongoing encouragement for this work helped to make it happen. Two
Acknowledgements ix
anonymous readers for OUP produced thorough and thoughtful reports on the
penultime draft. Those reports led to many revisions and, I am confident, to many
improvements.
Finally, thanks of a different sort to my family, especially to Hayley and our
sons, Elliot and Stanley. Without the love you give, the laughter you share, the
sacrifices you make, and the distractions you provide, this book would not have
been written and would anyway not have been worth writing.
Stanley: I dedicate this book to you. The joy that you find in the world brings
joy to it, including and especially to me.
1
Introduction
1.1 Norms of belief
I will start towards the end and work my way back to the start.
This book is in part an investigation of the norms for believing, that is, the
standards or principles which govern us, or to which we are subject, in forming,
revising, and maintaining beliefs. Suppose that Carlita believes that a storm is
coming. One might ask: Is she right to believe this? Should she believe this? Is she
justified in believing this? Is it rational for her to believe this? When we ask these
questions, or when Carlita asks them of herself, we are inviting or prompting an
appraisal or assessment of Carlita’s belief or, better, of Carlita in believing what
she does. Where there are appraisals or assessments, there are standards or norms
relative to which the appraisals or assessments are made. So, these questions point
towards norms to which Carlita’s belief is held.
Questions concerning belief like those above are not forced, precious, or,
worse, the invention of philosophers; they, or questions like them, are familiar
features of our ordinary thought and talk concerning belief. In this way, our
ordinary thought and talk reveals or gestures at norms of belief. Indeed, as will
emerge, it reveals or gestures at a number of standards to which belief is subject.
One of the aims of this book is to identify and articulate some of those standards.1
There is one source of resistance to such an undertaking that I mention here
only to set it aside. Some deny that there are any norms for belief; or, more cau-
tiously, they accept that there are norms for belief but deny that those norms are
genuinely normative.2 That is to say, they deny that those norms entail reasons for
believing in accordance with them; or, more cautiously again, they accept that
those norms entail reasons but deny that those reasons are authoritative.3 On this
view, the norms of belief are comparable to the norms of etiquette. According to
1 The issue of what the norms of belief are is often run together with the issue of whether those
norms stand in some essential relation to belief—either as constitutive of its nature or as holding in
virtue of its nature. For a critical overview of the debates surrounding this issue, see (McHugh and
Whiting 2014). I do not seek to engage with those debates here.
2 For versions of this thought, see (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007; Dretske 2000, chap. 14;
Fumerton 2001; Glüer and Wikforss 2013; 2018; Olson 2011; Papineau 2013). Some deny that belief is
subject to norms on the grounds that belief is not subject to the will (Alston 1989, chap. 5; Chisholm
1966, 12; Glock 2005, 238–9; Mayo 1976, 151–2). For responses, see (Chuard and Southwood 2009;
Hieronymi 2006; McHugh 2012a).
3 For critical discussion of this sort of suggestion, see (Paakkunainen 2018a).
The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology. Daniel Whiting, Oxford University Press. © Daniel Whiting 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0001
2 Introduction
etiquette, a person should stand when another person enters a room for the first
time. Perhaps this entails an ‘etiquettean’ reason to stand when a person enters.
But, one might think, there is no genuine or authoritative reason for doing so
(cp. Foot 1972).
I will not try here to address this opposition, not just to the specific view I
develop in what follows, but to any view according to which epistemology is, even
in part, a normative discipline. One can develop a moral theory, a theory of mor-
ally right action, without answering the moral sceptic, that is, without answering
to their satisfaction the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Similarly, one can develop an
epistemic theory, a theory of epistemically right belief, without answering the
corresponding sceptic.4 That is just what I will do.
To return to the main thread, and as my remarks so far indicate, I recognize a
plurality of norms for belief. But, on my view, they do not make for a ‘heap of
unconnected obligations’.5 For one thing, as will emerge, they are not all obliga-
tions. For another, and more importantly for now, underlying this plurality is a
unifying standard, or so I will suggest. On the view I develop in this book, assess-
ments of rightness (fittingness, correctness) are fundamental and, when it comes
to belief, truth and truth alone makes for rightness (fittingness, correctness). It is
right to believe what is true, wrong to believe what is false. So, truth provides the
fundamental standard for believing.6 To be clear, this standard is explanatorily
fundamental with respect to other norms for belief, or at least those I discuss
here; it does not follow from this that it is primary, or even predominant, in our
everyday thought and talk about belief. Compare: A band might be explanatorily
posterior to its members, but a fan might be more concerned with the band than
with its members. More generally, the order of our concerns does not always cor-
respond to the order of explanation.
1.2 From norms to reasons, from belief to action
Charting the relations among the norms of belief requires a theoretical framework
which both explains the relevant normative notions—such as being justified,
being rational, being obliged, and so on—and traces the relations among them.
Another aim of this book is to provide that framework. To do so, I introduce and
4 The sceptic here is not the one that denies knowledge is possible (in general or in some domain).
5 To echo a remark by Joseph concerning Ross’s (1930) ethical theory (quoted in McNaughton
1996, 434).
6 The view that truth is the fundamental norm for belief is found in (Boghossian 2008; Engel 2013;
Fassio 2011; Greenberg 2020; Griffiths 1967; Littlejohn 2012; Lynch 2004; McDowell 1996, xi–xii;
McHugh 2012b; Millar 2009; Morris 1992; Olinder 2012; Shah 2003; Shah and Velleman 2005;
Sylvan 2012; Wedgwood 2002b; 2013; see also Whiting 2010; 2012; 2013a; 2013d; 2020a). These
authors differ in important ways in how they formulate the norm and in the explanatory purposes to
which they put it.
From norms to reasons, from belief to action 3
defend a comprehensive theory of normative reasons, that is, of considerations

which justify, support, or rationalize attitudes—like belief but also intention—and
the actions that manifest them.7 For example, that clouds are gathering is a reason
for Carlita to think that a storm is coming, and also a reason for her to take shel-
ter; it justifies her in so thinking and in so acting.
It is the theory of reasons that, together with the substantive commitment that
truth is the sole right-maker for belief, delivers and underwrites the account of
the norms of belief. But that theory is not peculiar to the domain of belief—the
epistemic domain. On the contrary, it is designed in the first instance to capture
the domain of intentional action—the practical domain.8 By proceeding in this
way, I embed the debate about the norms of belief, which too often takes place in
isolation, in a broader vision of our normative thought and talk and their subject
matter. This sets the project apart from other efforts to defend the idea that truth
is the fundamental standard for belief. At the same time, I hope to vindicate the
theory of reasons by demonstrating its generality.
While in this way I bring the theory of reasons to bear on issues concerning the
norms of belief, it is, I think, of independent interest. Reasons play an important
part in our ethical lives. They figure in our deliberations as to what to do. For
example, that clouds are gathering might be a premise in Carlita’s reasoning con-
cerning whether to take shelter. Reasons move us to do things.9 Carlita might take
shelter for the reason that clouds are gathering. We cite reasons when defending
what we do. If asked to justify her decision to take shelter, Carlita might mention
that clouds are gathering. We appeal to reasons when advising others on what to
do. If asked for guidance as to whether to take shelter, we might tell Carlita that
clouds are gathering. Reasons also determine what a person may, must, or ought to
do. That clouds are gathering might make it the case that Carlita ought to take shelter.
This (non-exhaustive) survey reveals the prominent roles reasons play in our
decision-making, interactions, and reflections. The goal of the theory of reasons
is, in part, to reveal something about the nature of reasons which helps us to
understand how they might play these roles.
One might object that there is no one kind of thing that performs all of these
functions (cp. Wedgwood 2017, chap. 4). Perhaps the considerations that justify
acting are not those that move us, or perhaps the considerations that determine
what we should do are not those that we cite when providing advice. We might call
them all ‘reasons’, but, in doing so, we pick out different things on different occasions.
7 Alongside reasons for belief (or, more broadly, cognitive states) and intention (conative states),
there are also reasons for feeling (affective states). They are not the focus of the present work.
8 I explain why I draw the contrast in these terms in §1.4.
9 Perhaps in conjunction with desires. Some argue that it is not reasons that motivate a person but
their beliefs, which, if true, might correspond to reasons. For different perspectives on this issue, see
(Alvarez 2010a; Dancy 2000a; Fogal 2018; Hornsby 2008; Mantel 2014).
4 Introduction
I think that there is a lot to this point. Indeed, one of the things the resultant
framework allows me to do is precisely to distinguish reasons of different kinds.
The account of reasons I arrive at makes central appeal to the notions of right-
ness and wrongness;10 it is original in also making appeal to modal notions, more
specifically, the notion of a possibility, more specifically still, the notion of a
nearby possibility. A nearby possibility is one that could easily obtain (Sainsbury
1997). Very roughly, my proposal is that some consideration is a reason to act just
in case, given that consideration, it could not easily be wrong in some way to per-
form that act or could easily be wrong in some way not to perform it. To illustrate:
Clouds are gathering. Given this, the possibility that Carlita will be harmed if she
does not take shelter is a close one. That it will cause harm is one respect in which
it is wrong for a person not to act. So, the fact clouds are gathering is a reason for
Carlita to take shelter. I spell out this proposal more fully in the chapters to follow.
In developing the theory of reasons, I connect normativity—roughly, what
should be the case—with modality—roughly, what could be the case. There is a
venerable tradition in epistemology of characterizing in modal terms notions
such as knowledge and justification.11 Modality, it is fair to say, does not figure so
prominently in ethics, and certainly not in the theory of reasons.12 As a result,
there is a seeming mismatch between the way epistemic normativity is under-
stood and the way practical normativity is understood. By starting with a modal
theory of practical reasons and extending it to the epistemic domain, I hope to
(start to) remedy this situation.
1.3 The unity of reason
The last point serves to introduce an assumption that frames or guides the book,
namely, that the normative is unified.13 According to this assumption, notions
such as being a reason, being right, being obliged, being rational, and so on are to
be understood in the same way whether applied to the practical domain or to the
epistemic domain. A corollary of this is that the relations in which these notions
10 I am not the first to characterize reasons in terms of rightness or its cognates. I survey and critic
ally discuss other attempts in chapter 2.
11 See, for example, (Becker 2007; Dretske 1971; Nozick 1981; Pritchard 2005a; Roush 2007;
Sainsbury 1997; Smith 2016; Sosa 1999a; Williamson 2000).
12 Notwithstanding work on the semantics of sentences involving deontic modals. For a critical
overview, see (Bronfman and Dowell 2018). As Bronfman and Dowell point out (2018, 109), the
standard semantic theory for deontic sentences—due to Kratzer (1977)—is neutral on the relationship
between the truth of such sentences and reasons and has nothing to say about the nature of reasons.
A theory of reasons that employs deontic modals—say, by analysing reasons in terms of their relation-
ship to what a person ought to do—might qualify as modal. As it happens, proponents of such theories
do not typically present them in this way (see Broome 2004; Kearns and Star 2009; Thomson 2008). Be
that as it may, modal notions play a very different role in the theory I will develop.
13 This assumption is implicit in much recent work on normativity. For explicit statements of it, see
(Gibbons 2013, vii; Skorupski 2010, chap. 1.6). It relates, no doubt, to Kant’s notion of the ‘unity of
reason’ (1785, 4:391). For discussion, see (Mudd 2016; Timmermann 2009).
A terminological interlude 5
stand to one another when applied to action mirror those in which they stand
when applied to belief.
By way of preliminary support for the unity assumption, note the striking fact
that we apply the same vocabulary in relation to both action and belief. One
might equally speak, perhaps in the same breath, of what it is right for a person to
do and what it is right for them to think, of what there is reason for a person to do
and what there is reason for them to think, of what a person should do and what
they should believe, of what a person is justified in doing and what they are justi-
fied in believing, and so on.14 Of course, such ways of speaking might be mislead-
ing or confused, but, insofar as they exhibit no obvious ambiguity, they establish a
presumption in favour of unity. However, the real support for that assumption lies
in its fruitfulness, which I will try to demonstrate in what follows.
It is important to keep in mind that the unity I have in mind is structural, as it
were, rather than substantial. That is to say, the unity lies at the meta-level, not at
the first-order. For example, the notion of rightness, I assume, is to be understood
in the same way whether applied to action or to belief. As mentioned in §1.1,
I take the truth of what is believed to make for right belief. But I do not take the
truth of what is done—whatever that might mean!—to make for right action.
What makes for right action is instead promoting wellbeing, or keeping a prom-
ise, or preserving autonomy, or whatever.
So, I will explain how the epistemic and practical domains differ—their sub-
stance—while revealing what they share—their structure. This brings out a
related theme which runs throughout the book: unity in diversity. As things pro-
ceed, I will distinguish between a number of intersecting kinds of reasons—justi-
fying and demanding, for and against, possessed and unpossessed, objective and
subjective—and at the same time capture what they have in common such that
their members all count as reasons. In doing so, I will distinguish several statuses
those reasons determine in terms of their force—whether they concern what a
person may, should, or must do—and in terms of how independent they are of a
person’s perspective, while also explaining how those statuses relate to the more
fundamental status of rightness. This then allows me to distinguish different
norms to which belief is subject—truth, knowledge, and rationality—while,
again, revealing their common cause.
1.4 A terminological interlude
At several points, I have contrasted practical norms and epistemic norms, and I will
continue to do so throughout the book. One might query this (cp. King Forthcoming).
14 In chapter 7, I will argue that there is nothing that a person should believe, only what they may
believe. But that rests on first-order commitments. I do not deny that the claim that a person should
believe a proposition is a coherent one.
6 Introduction
The practical most naturally contrasts with the theoretical. This is a distinction
between the things norms govern—respectively, things that make for practice, like
actions, and things that make for theory, like beliefs. The epistemic most naturally
contrasts with, say, the moral.15 This is a distinction among what one might call
concerns. Candidate concerns proper to the epistemic domain include truth and
knowledge. Candidate concerns proper to the moral domain include welfare and
autonomy. So understood, the practical/theoretical and epistemic/moral distinctions
are crosscutting. Beliefs might answer to moral concerns (Basu 2019). Actions
might answer to epistemic concerns (Booth 2006).
These observations help to explain the terms in which I draw the contrast. The
theory of reasons I will develop is in the first instance a theory of reasons for
action, hence, a theory of practical reasons. I generalize it to reasons for believing,
hence, deliver an account of theoretical reasons, but I am only interested here in
those that relate to epistemic concerns, in particular, to truth. So, the focus is
restricted to those theoretical reasons that are epistemic. The contrast I am draw-
ing, then, is really between practical norms and theoretical- cum- epistemic
norms. Since ‘theoretical-cum-epistemic’ is an ugly phrase, and since I am not
aware of a better alternative, I will just use the label ‘epistemic’. It will be clear
throughout that I am not exploring those epistemic norms, if any, to which action
is subject.
1.5 Is something first?
Before proceeding to an overview of the book’s contents, I will relate the project I
pursue here to two recent projects in metaethics and epistemology. While the
book starts with reasons, it is not a contribution to the reasons first programme.
Those involved in that programme maintain that the notion of a reason is the
fundamental normative notion, in the sense that other normative notions—for
example, obligation and value—are to be explained in terms of it.16 It is consistent
with this claim that the notion of a reason is itself analysable, so long as it is ana-
lysed in non-normative terms. As it happens, however, many of those who sub-
scribe to the reasons first project also think that reasons are unanalysable or
primitive.17
15 Not to mention the prudential, the aesthetic, the political, the legal, and so on. For ease of pres-
entation, I will focus on the epistemic/moral contrast in this section.
16 Influential proponents of this approach include Parfit (2011), Scanlon (1998; 2014), Schroeder
(2007; 2021), and Skorupski (2010), perhaps also Raz (2011, 5–7).
17 Of those cited in n16, Parfit, Scanlon, and Skorupski take the notion of a reason to be unanalys-
able, while Schroeder and, perhaps, Raz do not. Another position is to accept the unanalysability claim
while rejecting the reasons first programme (Dancy 2000b).
Is something first? 7
This book stands in opposition to the reasons first approach. Its starting point
is, precisely, an analysis of reasons. It explains the notion of a reason in part in
modal terms, as noted in §1.2, and also in normative terms, specifically, in terms
of being right. Does that mean I subscribe to the rightness (or fittingness) first
project?18 I do not (need to) commit here. While the notion of rightness is
explanatorily fundamental in relation to those normative notions I consider in
this work, it is consistent with all that follows that there are normative notions
that cannot be explained in terms of rightness, say, value. For that matter, it is
consistent with all that follows that rightness itself is analysable in either norma-
tive or non-normative terms. I try to do a lot in this book, but I do not try to do
everything.19
In suggesting that truth is the fundamental norm for belief, one might ask how
the project of this book relates to another something first programme, namely,
knowledge first. The answer to that depends on what it means to put knowledge
first. Participants in the programme tend to subscribe to a number of commit-
ments that are on the surface independent of one another (cp. Jackson 2012;
Gerken 2018; McGlynn 2014, 15–16).20 First, knowledge is metaphysically funda-
mental, in the sense that it is not analysable. Second, knowledge is explanatorily
fundamental in the epistemic domain, in the sense that other epistemic notions
are to be explained in terms of it. Third, knowledge is normatively fundamental,
in the sense that knowledge is the basic standard of assessment for belief relative
to which other standards, if there are any, are derivative.
I remain neutral here with respect to the first two commitments. I do put the
notion of knowledge to explanatory work in developing the theory of reasons, but
I take no stand on whether that notion itself admits of explanation or on how
much it might explain. In contrast, I straightforwardly reject the third commit-
ment. I do not deny that knowledge is a standard of assessment for belief—indeed,
I support that suggestion in chapter 8—but I deny that that standard is funda-
mental relative to that which truth provides.
One might think that rejecting normative fundamentality somehow forces
rejection of metaphysical or explanatory fundamentality. But that is a mistake. By
way of analogy, suppose that Laura promises to give John the object that looks
18 Recent defenders of this project include Chappell (2012), Howard (2019), and McHugh and Way
(2016). Earlier proponents include Broad (1930) and Ewing (1947).
19 I will also not engage with more traditional metaethical—or, more broadly, metanormative—
issues, such as whether normative statements express cognitive states or non-cognitive states or some
mix of the two. For an overview, see (Miller 2013).
20 Williamson (2000) is responsible for the prominence of this programme. Precursors include
(Price 1935; Prichard 1950; Strawson 1992, chap. 2; Wilson 1926). Those who accept one or more of
the commitments to follow include (Adler 2002; Bird 2007; Engel 2005; Ichikawa 2014; Kelp 2016;
2017a; Kelp, Ghijsen, and Simion 2016; Littlejohn 2013; 2017; Mehta 2016; Millar 2010;
Miracchi 2015; 2019; Simion 2019b; Smithies 2012b; Sutton 2007). For a critical overview of the
knowledge first programme, see (McGlynn 2014).
8 Introduction
red. As a result, she ought to give him the object that looks red. Suppose further
that the only object that looks red is the object that is red. As a result, Laura ought
to give John the object that is red. So, the norm involving the notion of being red
is derivative—it holds as a consequence of the norm involving the notion of look-
ing red, together with some additional information. It hardly follows that the
notion of being red is analysable, let alone that it is analysable in terms of looking
red. One might consistently maintain that the norm in which the notion of look-
ing red figures is prior in the order of explanation to the norm in which the
notion of being red figures and also that being red is prior in the order of explan
ation to looking red.
Having situated the project of this book in relation to others, I will provide an
overview of what is to come.
1.6 Overview
Chapters 2 to 6 primarily concern metaethics, more specifically, the theory of

r easons. In chapter 2, I consider the question of what a reason for acting is. To help
in answering it, I sketch a job description for reasons, that is, a specification of the
roles reasons play. In view of it, I compare and contrast the view that r easons are
right-makers with the view that reasons are evidence of right-makers, provision-
ally settling on a version of the evidence-based account. In chapter 3, I motivate
and defend a distinction between two sorts of reasons—those that (merely) justify
acting and those that (also) demand it—and show how the theory captures it. By
appeal to the distinction, I explain the relationship between reasons and overall
verdicts about what a person may, should, or must do. In chapter 4, I revise the
provisional theory of reasons, replacing the evidential relation between reasons
and right-makers with a modal relation between the two. Rather than offering this
as an analysis of the evidential relation, I present it as a successor.
The focus in the first three chapters is on objective reasons, that is, reasons pro-
vided by facts irrespective of a person’s access or sensitivity to those facts or their
reason-giving force. In chapter 5, I extend the account to the reasons a person
possesses, that is, to the reasons a person is in a position to respond to. In chapter 6,
I extend it to subjective reasons, that is, to the reasons that rationalize acting. While
the final product makes no claims to completeness, it does offer a fairly compre-
hensive framework for thinking about reasons, and I gesture at further ways in
which it might be developed.
In chapter 7, I turn to epistemology and move from the meta-level to the first-
order. First, I generalize the theory of objective reasons to the epistemic domain,
that is, to reasons for believing. I then combine the theory with a substantive,
normative commitment—namely, that truth is the sole right-maker for belief—
and explore the consequences. One is that, in the objective sense, a person may
Overview 9
believe all and only truths. Chapter 8 generalizes the account of possessed r easons
to the epistemic domain.21 By plugging in the first-order principle concerning
right belief, I vindicate the idea that knowledge is a (not the) norm of belief.
Chapter 9 generalizes the account of subjective reasons to the epistemic domain
and, again, plugs in the principle concerning truth. The result is a modal account
of rational belief. I explore its implications and contrast it with more orthodox
probabilistic views of epistemic rationality.
Chapter 10 concludes by, among other things, indicating outstanding issues to
which the theory I developed in the preceding might be applied in future work.
Note: An alternative reading order is to turn to chapters 7, 8, and 9 after
chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. This allows the reader, following the introduc-
tion of each element of the metaethical theory, to see immediately its application
to the epistemic domain.
21 Here and throughout I speak of different senses of normative terms—‘reason’, ‘ought’, etc. I do
not thereby commit to the view that such terms are ambiguous. An alternative is that the use of such
terms makes implicit reference to some contextually-supplied parameter (cp. Henning 2014).
2
Reasons and Their Roles
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to (start to) answer to the question, ‘What is it to be a
reason?’ Both the question and, I hope, my answer to it are independently inter
esting. The notion of a reason plays important roles in our normative thought and
talk, and it stands in significant relations to other normative notions—roles and
relations I will consider later in this chapter and return to in the remainder of the
book. An informative answer to the question will help us in developing a reflect
ive appreciation of normative discourse and its subject matter.
In addition to its self-standing interest, the account of reasons that I will reach
in this chapter and refine—or, rather, supplant—in later chapters will play a piv
otal role in the book as a whole. In combination with a substantive commitment,
the finished product will lead to non-trivial conclusions and contribute to the
resolution of prominent paradoxes in epistemology.
That is a long way off. I will make a start by introducing the topic of the present
chapter.
There are reasons to perform acts—physical and mental—and reasons to be in
psychological states. For example, that Miyuki’s favourite film is showing is a
reason for her to go to the cinema, to consider ways of getting there, to want to
purchase a ticket, to fear that the screening is sold out, and to think that the
cinema is open.
To keep things manageable, I will focus in the first instance on practical
reasons, that is, reasons for decisions, intentions, and actions. I take decisions to
be (non-voluntary) mental acts that typically issue in intentions. I assume that
reasons for actions derive from reasons for the intentions that those acts express
or embody (Scanlon 1998, 21).1 But, for simplicity’s sake, I will continue to talk of
reasons for action and only flag the assumption on the rare occasions it makes
any difference.
While I begin with practical reasons, the points to follow are supposed to gen
eralize. Indeed, in chapter 7, I extend the account to epistemic reasons, that is, to
reasons for belief.2
1 For challenges to this assumption, see (Heuer 2018a; 2018b). For replies, see (McHugh and
Way Forthcoming).
2 On the practical/epistemic contrast, see §1.4.
The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology. Daniel Whiting, Oxford University Press. © Daniel Whiting 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0002
Preliminaries 11
As the examples reveal, my interest here is in normative reasons. What is a

ormative reason? More carefully, what is it for some consideration to stand in
n
the relation of being-a-normative-reason-for to some action or attitude? Here is
Scanlon’s notorious answer:
Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to

lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it. ‘Counts in
favor how?’ one might ask. ‘By providing a reason for it’ seems to be the only
answer. (1998, 17)3
There is at least one mistake here, perhaps two. First, as I hope the unfolding dis
cussion will show, it is possible to offer a much more informative answer to the
question of what a reason is. Second, I will argue in chapter 3 that, on the most
natural interpretation of the phrase, reasons need not favour.
In view of the second point, and as a way to get an initial purchase on the
notion, I prefer to say that a reason is a consideration that to some extent and in
some way justifies acting (Alvarez 2016; Hyman 2015, 133; Smith 1994, 95). That
her favourite film is showing is a justification for Miyuki to go to the cinema; it
justifies her in doing so. However, and again, I do not think that that is all there is
to say about what a reason is. In what follows, I will say a lot more.
My strategy is to proceed in a stepwise fashion. In this chapter, I will present a
provisional answer to the question, ‘What is it to be a reason?’ In chapter 3, I will
supplement it. In chapter 4, I will present the final, or most considered, answer.
The rationale for this is ease of exposition. The view I arrive at is an unfamiliar
one. Starting with a more familiar view makes it easier to make critical compari
sons with alternatives and, in doing so, to motivate it.
To anticipate, my interim proposal is that a consideration is a reason for acting
just in case it is evidence of some way in which it is right to act. This proposal
makes central appeal to two notions: evidence and rightness. It is not the only
account of reasons to involve one or both of these notions. As the discussion pro
ceeds, I will unpack the proposal and contrast it with others on the market.
2.2 Preliminaries
Before proceeding to the main discussion, I will address some preliminary mat
ters. None of the ideas I introduce in this section is novel, and all are familiar
from the literature. But it is worth mentioning them as they will frame and inform
the discussion to come.
3 For similar points in similar terms, see (Dancy 2004b, chap. 2; Parfit 2011, 31; Raz 2011, 18;
Scanlon 2014, 1–2; Skorupski 2010, 1–2).
12 Reasons and Their Roles
2.2.1 The ontology of reasons
The things we cite as reasons fall into many ontological categories, including, but
not limited to, facts, objects, events, states, and properties. Consider:
That it is raining is a reason to take an umbrella.

The very hungry crocodile is a reason not to enter the water.
The fight breaking out is a reason to leave the pub.
Kashi’s fever is a reason to call the doctor.
Betty’s height is a reason to pick her for the basketball team.
A common suggestion is that talk of reasons as facts is primary and talk of reasons
as belonging to other ontological categories is in some way derivative (Alvarez
2010a, chap. 2; Schroeder 2007, 20–1). I do not have strong views about this, but,
so as to facilitate discussion, I will stick in what follows to talking of reasons as
facts or fact-like entities.
2.2.2 Motivating and explanatory reasons
Normative reasons contrast with motivating and explanatory reasons (Alvarez

2010a; Dancy 2000a; Finlay 2014, 86; Mantel 2014; Parfit 1997; Raz 1978, 2–4;
Schroeder 2007, 10–15; Smith 1994). A motivating reason is a reason for (in light
of, on the basis of) which a person acts. A person might do something for a rea
son which is also a reason for doing that thing. In that case, the motivating reason
is a normative reason.4 For example, Miyuki might go to the cinema for the rea
son that her favourite film is showing. In contrast, a person might do something
for a reason which is not a reason for doing that thing. In that case, the motivating
reason is not a normative reason. For example, Miyuki might go to the cinema for
the reason that it will upset Nishi (who wants her to stay at home). Finally, there
might be a reason for a person to act without them acting for that reason—per
haps they do not act at all, or they act but for some other reason. In that case, the
normative reason is not a motivating reason.
An explanatory reason is a reason why something is the case. When the ques
tion is why a person acts, the explanatory reason need not be a motivating reason.
The reason why I shout at you is that I am tired. But that is not the reason for
which I shout at you. It is a controversial matter (which I address in chapter 6)
4 Some maintain that normative reasons are facts while motivating reasons are mental states. In
that case, motivating reasons cannot be normative reasons. But the content of the motivating reason—
that is, the mental state—can correspond to a normative reason. So, the dispute over the ontology of
motivating reasons affects the presentation, not the substance, of what follows. For a conciliatory per
spective on this issue, see (Fogal 2018).
Preliminaries 13
whether every motivating reason is an explanatory reason. But it is uncontroversial

that not every explanatory reason is a normative reason. That I am tired does not
justify shouting at you, though it might excuse it.
2.2.3 Weighing reasons
A familiar observation is that reasons have weights or strengths, and (so) one rea
son might be weightier or stronger than another.5 That Miyuki’s favourite film is
showing is a reason of some weight for her to go to the cinema, while that Miyuki
promised to stay at home is a weightier reason for her not to go.
Talk of weights is intuitive but needs careful handling. In particular, one should
not assume that the weights of reasons add up in any straightforward fashion (as
the weights of physical objects do). That Miyuki’s favourite film is showing is a
reason of some weight for her to go to the cinema. That Miyuki will enjoy it is also
a reason of some weight for her to go. But the combined weight of these reasons
does not exceed their individual weights. The obvious diagnosis of this is that the
reasons are not independent of one another.
This is not to suggest that there are no principles governing how the weights of
reasons combine. The point is only that it is a tricky matter how they do so.6
2.2.4 Being and having
It is common to distinguish the reasons that there are or that exist for a person to
act and the reasons that a person has or possesses to act (Alvarez 2018; Baier 1995,
63–6; Comesaña and McGrath 2014; Lord 2010; Schroeder 2008; Whiting 2013b).
This distinction is not, or not obviously, marked in the use of ordinary language.
One might equally say, ‘There is a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema’ and,
‘Miyuki has a reason to go to the cinema’. When philosophers talk of ‘having’ or
‘possessing’ a reason, they use the terms in a regimented, perhaps stipulative, way.
To have a reason, in the relevant sense, is to be in a position to act for, on the
basis of, or in light of it. To illustrate: Miyuki’s favourite film is showing, but she
does not believe that it is, cannot know that it is, is unaware of any evidence that it
is, and so on. While there is a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema, she is not in
a position to go to the cinema for that reason; it cannot be her reason for going.
So, Miyuki does not possess that reason. For now, I focus on what it is for there to
be a reason for acting. I discuss what it is to possess a reason in chapter 5.
5 For early expressions of this idea, see (Baier 1958, chap. 3; Ewing 1959, 63; Harman 1975;
Raz 1990, 25; Ross 1930, 41).
6 For discussion, see (Bader 2016; Berker 2007; Dancy 2004b; Nair 2016).
2.2.5 Objective and subjective
It is also common to distinguish objective and subjective reasons (Dorsey 2012;

Hornsby 2008; Parfit 2001; 2011; Schroeder 2007; 2008; 2009; Sylvan 2015;
Vogelstein 2012; Way 2009; Whiting 2014). An objective reason is a fact. A sub
jective reason is an apparent fact, which might be understood, very roughly, as
what a person believes to be the case or what otherwise seems to them to be the
case. Since appearances need not correspond to reality, subjective reasons need
not be objective reasons. If Miyuki believes that her favourite film is showing, this
might be a subjective reason for her to go to the cinema. However, if what Miyuki
believes is false, it is not an objective reason for her to do so.
An interesting question is whether the is/has distinction coincides with the
objective/subjective distinction. I return to this, and to the topic of subjective
reasons more generally, in chapter 6. Until then, I will focus on objective reasons.
2.2.6 Conditions and modifiers
Alongside reasons, there are conditions and modifiers.7 There are two kinds of
conditions: enablers and disablers. An enabler is a fact which makes it possible for
some fact to be a reason for an action, but which need not itself be a reason for
that action. For example, that Miyuki can go to the cinema enables the fact that
her favourite film is showing to be a reason for her to do so. Were Miyuki unable
to go, that her favourite film is showing would not be a reason for her to go to the
cinema. A disabler is a fact which, when it obtains, prevents a fact from being a
reason. If Nishi releases Miyuki from her promise to stay at home, then her prom
ise is no longer a reason for her to stay.
There are two kinds of modifiers: attenuators and intensifiers. An attenuator
reduces the weight of a reason for performing an action. That Miyuki’s favourite
film is in the cinema for months makes the fact that it is showing less weighty as a
reason for her to go to the cinema; however, it need not be a reason against going.
An intensifier is a fact which increases the weight of a reason for performing an
action. That the cinema is nearby makes the fact that Miyuki’s favourite film is
showing weightier as a reason for going, but it need not be a reason for Miyuki to go.
2.3 The job description
With the preliminaries out the way, I return to the question, ‘What is it to be a
reason?’ In developing and assessing answers to it, it is helpful to consider the
7 I owe the terminology to Bader (2016). For an influential discussion, see (Dancy 2004b). The
notion of a disabling condition corresponds to Raz’s notion of a cancelling condition (1990, 27) and to
Pollock’s notion of an undercutter (in earlier work, type II defeater) (1970; 1986, 36–9).
The job description 15
various roles reasons play.8 I have touched briefly on some of those roles in passing,
but it is worth flagging them explicitly and exploring them in more detail. I do
not pretend that the list is exhaustive, but I do think that it captures the central
and characteristic jobs reasons perform.
An important role that reasons play is a justificatory one. There is more than
one dimension to this. First, reasons justify (support, defend) actions. For
example, that her favourite film is showing justifies Miyuki in going to the cin
ema, at least to some degree and in some way. In addition, and relatedly, reasons
are considerations that a person might cite in justifying their actions or another’s
actions. If asked why she stayed at home, rather than went to the cinema, Miyuki
might appeal to the fact that she promised not to go by way of justification.
Likewise, Nishi might cite the same fact when justifying Miyuki’s decision.
A second key role reasons play is that of guiding action. Again, there are several
dimensions to this. An adviser might present an advisee with (what she takes to
be) reasons when helping them to decide what to do. If Miyuki asks Nishi for
advice on whether to go to the cinema, he might point out that she promised to
stay at home. Reasons can also guide action by figuring in a person’s reasoning.
That her favourite film is showing might be a premise in Miyuki’s reasoning
which concludes with her going to the cinema.9 Of course, not all actions result
from deliberation. The more general point is that reasons are considerations that
a person can act in light or on the basis of. Indeed, some suggest that a fact is not
a reason for a person unless they can be guided by it in what they do, that is,
unless it can be their reason for acting (Gibbons 2013; Kelly 2002; Kolodny 2005;
Korsgaard 1986; 1997; Manne 2014; Parfit 2011; Peter 2019; Raz 2011; Shah 2006;
Williams 1981, chap. 8).10 I return to this suggestion in chapter 5.
The final role I will single out that reasons play is an explanatory one. I noted
that a reason why a person does something need not be a reason for them to do it,
and vice versa. This is compatible with the thought that normative reasons are, or
can be, explanatory reasons. When they do not explain why a person acts, they
might explain other things, such as why the person ought to act.11 Miyuki should
go to the cinema (in part) because her favourite film is showing. Alongside facts
about what a person ought to do, there are facts about what they may or must do.
8 As Fogal (2016) argues, the considerations we ordinarily cite in conversation as reasons might
not (really) be what play these roles; instead, they might be ‘representatives’ of, or pointers to, larger
bodies of facts that do so. This point is important, but it does not affect what follows. The examples I
give likewise serve as representatives.
9 Some deny that actions, or the intentions they express, are the conclusions of practical reason
ing. They can replace the reference to action here with reference to some other endpoint (say, a judge
ment). For an overview of this debate, see (Streumer 2010).
10 For discussion, see (Paakkunainen 2018b; Way and Whiting 2016). To accept this constraint on
reasons is not to accept reasons internalism (Williams 1981, chap. 8). According to it, roughly, a fact is
a reason for a person to act only if so acting serves some motive they have. One can accept the con
straint but reject internalism by denying that a person can act for a reason only if doing so serves some
motive they have.
11 It is common to trace this idea to (Ross 1930).
In chapter 3, I will consider in detail how reasons explain such facts. For now, the
more general point is that reasons contribute to explanations for why performing
some act, or failing to do so, has one or more normative status.
The roles for reasons I have outlined need not be independent of one another.
When a reason justifies acting to some degree, it might explain why acting is justi
fied to that degree. When a person cites a fact which supports acting in some way,
they might communicate a fact which informs their deliberation. Really, there is
just one role here—that of being a reason—and the remarks on justifying, guid
ing, and explaining are attempts to tease out what it involves.
2.4 The options
I have outlined some of the things reasons do. This provides an initial job descrip
tion. By reference to it, I will assess candidate accounts of reasons. The working
assumption is that, if a consideration satisfies the job description, it is a reason. So, if
an account suggests that reasons are not apt to do the job or makes it a mystery how
they might perform it, that counts against it. In contrast, if an account allows that
reasons are apt to do the job or explains how they might perform it, that counts for it.
One can group recent approaches to answering the question, ‘What is it to be a
reason?’ into three camps. I do not claim that all existing approaches fall, or fall
neatly, into one of them.12 But the grouping offers, I think, a helpful and not-too-
inaccurate way of carving up the terrain.
According to the first approach, to be a reason is to be an explanation of a cer
tain sort. According to the second, to be a reason is to be evidence of a certain
sort. According to the third, to be a reason is to be a premise in reasoning of a
certain sort. To anticipate, while I think that there is truth in all the approaches,
I will defend a version of the second. I will start by critically comparing explanation-
and evidence-based accounts, turning to reasoning-based accounts in closing.
I will present the views under consideration using biconditionals. Many of their
proponents think that such biconditionals capture the nature of reasons in more
basic and independently intelligible terms. That is, they propose reductive accounts
of reasons. For my part, I think that the account I arrive at is reductive in this sense.
But, if that turns out not to be the case, I do not much mind. That account will chart
the connections between the notion of a reason—indeed, several different notions of
a reason—and various other notions. By situating them in relation to one another,
it will thereby illuminate them.13 Moreover, with additional and independently
plausible claims, the account will have a number of interesting and non-trivial
consequences. So, reductive or not, the finished account will have substance.
12 Compare explanations of what it is for there to be a reason for a person to act in terms of what
their idealized counterpart would advise or want them to do (Smith 1994).
13 To put this in Strawson’s (1992) terms, the project might be one of connective rather than reduc
tive analysis.
Reasons as explanations and as evidence 17
Theories of reasons of the sort I will consider come in many varieties, differing
in details small and large. I am not going to try to assess all existing, let alone all
possible, versions. I will discuss a variant when, and only when, doing so helps in
developing and assessing my positive proposal. My aim here is constructive, not
critical. As one might put it, it is not my ambition to blow every ship out of the
water before setting sail.
2.5 Reasons as explanations and as evidence
The first approach I will consider makes central the explanatory role of reasons.
To be a reason, on this view, just is to be an explanation. Normative reasons, then,
are a subclass of explanatory reasons. The general form accounts along these lines
take is as follows:
Explanation? Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact explains why blank.
I take explanation here to be a relation that holds between facts. Instead of saying
that a fact F explains why some fact G obtains, one might say that G because F,
that G obtains in virtue of F, or that F makes G the case. These are not attempts to
define the relevant notion of explanation but simply to introduce it.14
Explanation? is, of course, incomplete. One arrives at different accounts of
reasons by plugging different things into the blank. The candidates vary along (at
least) two dimensions. First, one might specify what is explained using either
non-normative or normative terms. Compare, respectively:
ExplanationD Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if

that fact explains why acting promotes a desire they have.15
ExplanationG Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if
that fact explains why it is good that the person acts.16
Second, in specifying what is explained, one might use either an overall notion—one
that expresses an overall assessment of an act in light of all relevant considerations—
14 Among proponents of explanation-based accounts of reasons, Schroeter and Schroeter (2009)

are explicit that they have this notion in mind. Another notion of explanation is more closely con
nected to the activity of explaining, that is, of providing an explanation. Hyman (2015, 136) has this
notion in mind. Broome is non-committal (contrast 2013, 48 and 51).
15 For this view, see (Schroeder 2007, perhaps also Williams 1981, chap. 8). For a less orthodox
version, see (Manne 2016). For criticism, see (Bedke 2007; Gregory 2011; McPherson 2012;
Olson 2018).
16 For versions of this view, or its contributory counterpart, see (Finlay 2012; 2014; Maguire 2016;
perhaps also Raz 1999, 1–2). For criticism, see (Brunero 2018; Way 2013b).
or a contributory notion—that of something which might contribute to without

delivering an overall assessment. Compare ExplanationG with:
ExplanationGR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact explains why it is good in some respect that the person acts.
The notion of being good (full stop) is an overall notion, while that of being good
in some respect is a contributory one. A respect, regard, or way in which some
thing is good is a feature of it or fact about it. For example, that Miyuki’s favourite
film is showing is a respect in which her going to the cinema is good. Something
might be good in one respect but not good in another. By the same token, some
thing might be good in a respect but not good overall.
I set aside these candidate completions of Explanation?. In part, that is
because I do not have anything to add to existing criticisms of them. In part, and
more importantly, it is because I want to focus on views assessing which provides
a route to my preferred account. So, consider:
ExplanationR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if

that fact explains why it is right for them to act.17
ExplanationRR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact explains why it is right in some respect for them to act.18
Both accounts take reasons to be explanations of normative facts, specifically,

facts about rightness (overall or in a respect). I will elaborate on the notion of
rightness but, before doing so, I will introduce a different approach to answering
the question, ‘What is it to be a reason?’ That approach gives pride of place to the
notion of evidence. The general form accounts along these lines take is as follows:
Evidence? Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that blank.
What is evidence? For now, it is enough to rely on the intuitive idea of a fact mak
ing the truth of a proposition likely or indicating its truth.19 While the notion of
17 For an early expression of this idea, see (Ewing 1959, 63fn2). For recent versions, see (Chappell
2012; Hyman 2015; Markovits 2010; Schroeter and Schroeter 2009). Broome (2004; 2013, chap. 4)
defends a version of the view as an account of what he calls perfect reasons, those that suffice to explain
why it is right for a person to act. He tells a different story about contributory reasons (see n27).
18 For this view, see (Alvarez 2010a, 17; Nebel 2019). Howard (2019) advances such a view as an
account of reasons of the right kind, as opposed to reasons of the wrong kind. For this distinction, see
(D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Hieronymi 2005; Olson 2004; Parfit 2001; Piller 2006; Rabinowicz and
Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004; Schroeder 2012b; Way 2012b). I consider only reasons of the right kind here.
19 Since my present focus is objective reasons, I focus also on objective evidence, that is, evidence
provided by facts (Hyman 2006; Littlejohn 2012; Neta 2018; Williamson 2000). I do not deny that
there are legitimate non-factive conceptions of evidence. Indeed, in chapters 8 and 9, I introduce some.
rightness plays an indispensable part in the story to follow, the notion of evidence
has only a stand-in part. In chapter 4, I leave it behind.
Like explanation-based accounts, evidence-based accounts differ on what they
take reasons to be evidence of, that is, on what fills the blank in Evidence?.20 The
options are the same. Consider:
EvidenceD Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that acting promotes a desire they have.
EvidenceG Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that it is good that the person acts.
EvidenceGR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that it is good in some respect that the person acts.
As with their counterparts involving the notion of explanation, I set these candi
dates aside and focus on accounts that appeal to the notion of rightness:
EvidenceR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that it is right for them to act.21
EvidenceRR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that it is right in some respect for them to act.22
In what follows, I argue, first, that whether one holds an evidence- or explanation-
based account, one should hold the contributory version. I then argue that
EvidenceRR is superior to ExplanationRR. But before doing either of those
things, I will unpack the notion of rightness that figures in all those accounts.23
2.5.1 Rightness
What is rightness? Here and throughout I take rightness to be a fact-relative

notion. Whether it is right overall or in some respect for a person to act depends
on the facts without restriction, not on their beliefs, evidence, or knowledge about
the facts. As one might put it, rightness is unconstrained by a person’s epistemic
situation. I do not deny that ‘right’ (in everyday English or in philosophical
20 The gap between explanation- and evidence-based accounts need not be large. For example,
roponents of the view that reasons are facts that explain why acting promotes some end—a desire
p
or value—might understand promotion in probabilistic terms (Finlay 2014; Maguire 2016;
Schroeder 2007).
21 For views along these lines, see (Kearns and Star 2008; 2009; Star 2015; Thomson 2008). Sharadin
(2016) advances such a view as an account of reasons of the right kind (see n.18).
22 For this view, see (Whiting 2018).
23 Those cited in relation to these accounts do not all understand rightness as I do here (cp. Broome
2013; Markovits 2010). Again, I focus on views that provide a useful contrast to the one I arrive at.
contexts) can be used to pick out a status which is not fact-relative. No doubt it
can be, and often is, understood in an evidence- or belief-relative way (see
Parfit 2011, chap. 7). The point is that ‘right’ as I use it here expresses a status that
is determined by the facts.
Other labels for the status I have in mind include ‘correct’ and ‘fitting’. To treat
these terms as interchangeable with ‘right’ is not an idiosyncrasy on my part. Earlier
theorists such as Brentano (1889, 74); Broad (1930, 182–3); Ewing (1947, 159); and
Ross (1939, 50–5) did so, as do more recent theorists (Chappell 2012; McHugh and
Way 2016). Despite the precedent, some might dislike this use of ‘right’ and suggest
that I stick to the alternatives. While I will not follow that suggestion, I do not really
object to it. What matters is the status, not the label. Indeed, talking in terms of
fittingness is helpful in pinning down the status in question.
Whether it is fitting for a person to respond to an object in some way depends
on whether that response fits its object, that is, on whether the object is worthy of,
invites, or merits the response (Howard 2018; McHugh and Way 2016). Whether
it is fitting for Miyuki to desire to purchase a ticket depends on whether purchas
ing the ticket is desirable. Whether it is fitting for Miyuki to fear that the tickets
are sold out depends on whether that prospect is fearful. Can actions be fitting in
this sense, since actions do not have objects? One option is to say that actions can
be fitting to their circumstances (Broad 1930, 164–5; Ross 1939, 51). I have no
quarrel with this, but, as remarked at the outset, I take reasons for action to derive
from reasons for intention. By extension, for an action to be fitting is for the
intention it embodies to be fitting. So, whether it is fitting for Miyuki to go to
the cinema depends on whether going to the cinema is choiceworthy.
In addition to the overall notion of being right, there is the contributory notion
of being right in some respect (Ross 1939, 52–3). A respect, regard, or way in
which a response is right is a feature of its object or a fact about it. A person’s
response to an object might be right in one respect but not right in another. By
the same token, it might be right in one respect but not right overall.
Again, it is helpful to think about this in terms of fittingness. A response can be
fitting to its object in one respect but not another, which is to say that an object
can in one way invite, merit, or be worthy of a response but in another way not do
so.24 For example, that the film is insightful might be a respect in which it is
admirable, while that its narrative is plodding might be a respect in which it is not.
As a result, it is in one respect fitting for Miyuki to admire the film but in another
respect unfitting for her to do so. In a similar fashion, it is in one way choiceworthy
for Miyuki to go to the cinema but in another way not choiceworthy for her to do
so. As a result, it is in one respect fitting for Miyuki to (choose to) go to the cinema
but in another respect unfitting for her to (choose to) go.
24 For resistance to this, see (Maguire 2018). For a response, see (Faraci 2020).
What makes an action choiceworthy in some respect or overall—hence, what

makes it fitting or right in some respect or overall to intend it—are questions for
substantive ethical theorizing. Perhaps there is a single right-making feature: that
acting promotes wellbeing, say, or that it respects a person’s autonomy. Perhaps
there is a plurality of right-makers: that acting keeps a promise, that it benefits
someone, that it is just, and so on. Although I make some first-order claims for
illustrative purposes, I do not take a stand on this issue. My present task lies in
metaethics, not normative ethics.
The choice between accounts of reasons formulated in overall terms—
ExplanationR and EvidenceR—and in contributory terms—ExplanationRR
and EvidenceRR—is not a choice between monism and pluralism about right-
making features. Suppose that there is only one way in which it is right for a person
to do something, say, that it respects autonomy. Still, one and the same act might
in one way respect autonomy but in another way fail to do so. Perhaps it treats
one person as an end and another as a means. As a result, that act might be right
in one way but not right in another way. The contributory/overall dispute at the
meta-level cuts across the monism/pluralism dispute at the first-order.
One might ask whether the notion of rightness is reducible—either to norma
tive notions or to non-normative notions. For the purposes of this project, I do
not need to answer that question (see §1.5).
One might object that accounts of reasons involving the notion of rightness are
uninformative in the absence of a reductive account of what rightness is. But that
is false. It might be informative to learn that water is H2O in the absence of an
analysis of oxygen or to learn that bachelors are unmarried men in the absence of
an account of what it is to be a man.
I do not have a direct argument for appealing to the notion of rightness in an
account of reasons. I can only support it indirectly—by demonstrating its fruit
fulness. That will take the rest of the book, so bear with me.
2.5.2 Overall or contributory?
In different ways, the fact that reasons are contributory creates problems for
explanation- and evidence-based accounts that appeal only to the overall notion
of rightness. I start with ExplanationR.25
There can be a reason for a person to act, even if it is not right for them to do
so. For example, that it benefits her is a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema, but
it is not right for her to go, since she promised to stay at home. If it is not right to
act, there can be no reason why it is right to act. So, according to ExplanationR,
25 The difficulty of explaining the contributory by appeal to the overall is a theme in (Dancy 2004b).
that it benefits her is not a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema. That is false.26
More generally, ExplanationR is open to counterexamples involving outweighed
reasons. The underlying problem, I suggest, is that it characterizes a contributory
notion in overall terms. This pushes a proponent of the explanation- based
account in the direction of ExplanationRR.27 Though it is not right overall for
Miyuki to go to the cinema, it is right in one respect for her to go, namely, that it
benefits her. The notion of being right in a respect is a contributory one. So,
ExplanationRR avoids the problem facing its overall counterpart.
Like ExplanationR, EvidenceR appeals to the overall notion of rightness. As a
result, it also faces a problem in capturing the contributory notion of a reason.
There can be a reason for a person to act which is not evidence that it is right
for them to do so.28 Suppose that a group of friends is deciding which film to
watch. One of the friends, Blanca, will enjoy a certain film. That is a reason for
the group to pick it. Doing so will benefit Blanca. However, whenever Blanca
enjoys a film, everyone else suffers (more than Blanca benefits). So, that Blanca
will enjoy the film is not evidence that it is right for the group to pick it; indeed,
it is evidence that it is not right for the group to do so. From EvidenceR, it f ollows
that the fact that Blanca will enjoy the film is not a reason to pick it. That is false.
The example illustrates a more general point. A consideration that bears on an
overall assessment of an action need not provide evidence for that assessment. This
pushes a proponent of the evidence-based account in the direction of EvidenceRR.
That principle avoids the problem, since it appeals to the contributory notion of
rightness in a respect. That Blanca will enjoy the film is evidence that it is right in a
respect for the group to pick it, since it is evidence that it will benefit someone.
Given EvidenceRR, that Blanca will enjoy the film is a reason for the group to pick it.
2.5.3 Explanation or evidence?
Having made a case for accounts of reasons which appeal to the contributory notion
of rightness in a respect over those which appeal to the overall notion of being
rightness, I will now argue against the explanation-based version and, in doing so,
for the evidence-based version. That is, I will argue against ExplanationRR and
for EvidenceRR. To do so, I return to the roles reasons play.
26 For this objection, see (Brunero 2013). Schroeter and Schroeter (2009) anticipate it and respond
by suggesting that explanation might be understood in a contributory fashion. Nebel (2019), in con
trast, denies that explanation is factive. That is, he denies that, if F explains G, it follows that G is the
case. Both strategies depend on controversial claims about explanation.
27 Broome suggests that a reason is a fact which plays a certain role—the weighing role—in an
explanation of what it is right for a person to do (2004; 2013, 53). This avoids the counterexample but
faces other objections (Brunero 2013; 2018; Gregory 2016; Kearns and Star 2008, 42–4; Stratton-
Lake 2018, 278–81).
28 For this objection, see (Brunero 2009; 2018; McKeever and Ridge 2012). The example is based
on Brunero’s.
ExplanationRR is designed to capture the explanatory role of reasons, but it

does not capture their justifying and guiding roles.29 Consider a fact which is evi
dence that it is right in a respect to act but which does not explain why it is right
in that (or any other) respect to act. That is, consider a fact which stands in an
evidential but not an explanatory relation to some way in which it is right to act.
For example, the clock reads 11p.m. Since Nadia promised to leave the party at
11p.m., this justifies her in leaving. Nadia might cite the fact that the clock reads
11p.m. in defending her decision to leave. Moreover, when advising Nadia as to
whether to leave, her friends might appeal to the fact that the clock reads 11p.m.
That the clock reads 11p.m. might figure as a premise in Nadia’s deliberations as
to whether to stay. And she might decide to leave for the reason that the clock
reads 11p.m.
It is clear, then, that the fact that the clock reads 11p.m. plays roles characteris
tic of reasons—it justifies and guides. But, according to ExplanationRR, it is not a
reason. After all, while it is evidence that it is right in a respect for Nadia to leave,
insofar as it is evidence that doing so keeps a promise, it does not make it right in
that respect for her to leave. What explains why it is right in a respect for Nadia to
leave is that she thereby keeps a promise, not that the clock reads 11p.m.
To bolster this point, suppose that a philosopher engaging in first-order ethical
theorizing draws up a list of the fundamental respects in which it is right to act:
that it keeps a promise, that it benefits someone, that it is just, and so on. That a
clock reads 11p.m. is not going to appear on that list. Of course, there might be
derivative respects in which it is right to act, facts which explain why an action
possesses one or more of the features on the list. For example, that it is 11p.m.
might explain why, by leaving the party, Nadia keeps her promise, and thereby why
it is right in some way for her to leave. But, again, that the clock reads 11p.m. does
not stand in an explanatory relation of this sort to the items on the list. According
to ExplanationRR, then, it is not a reason for Nadia to leave. That is false.30
A proponent of ExplanationRR might point out that their view allows that
there are reasons for Nadia to leave the party—that it is 11 p.m., for example, or
that it keeps a promise. This is true but by the by. The problem for ExplanationRR
is that it predicts that a fact about the situation which does the job of a reason is
not one. To note that the principle is consistent with some other facts about the
situation being reasons for acting does not speak to this.
Nothing hangs on the example involving Nadia; it is supposed to illustrate an
independently plausible point. There are facts which do not explain why it is right
29 Kearns and Star (2008, 39–40) object that facts that explain why it is right for a person to act
need not guide them in acting. My complaint is that facts that guide a person in acting need not
explain why it is right for them to do so.
30 Kearns and Star (2008, 48–9) argue that, unless proponents of explanation-based accounts of
reasons allow non-fundamental right-makers to count as reasons, their view will be extensionally
inadequate. The present point is that, even if a proponent of ExplanationRR allow non-fundamental
right-makers to count as reasons, their view will be extensionally inadequate.
overall or in some way for a person to act but which guide and justify them in
acting. Such facts are reasons, but ExplanationRR suggests otherwise.
This undermines ExplanationRR. It also supports EvidenceRR. After all, the
point is precisely that evidence that it is right to act in some respect can play the
justifying and guiding roles that are among the hallmarks of reasons.31 That
the clock reads 11p.m. is evidence that, by leaving, she will keep a promise. It is
thereby evidence that it is right in one way for Nadia to leave. Given EvidenceRR,
it is a reason for Nadia to leave.
Although the notion of explanation does not figure in EvidenceRR, the account
respects the fact that reasons play explanatory roles, more specifically, that they con
tribute to explanations of normative facts. A proponent of EvidenceRR allows that
reasons sometimes explain why it is right (overall or in some respect) for a person
to act. What they deny is only that reasons always do this. And, I have argued,
they are correct to deny this. Moreover, as I will explain in chapter 3, it is consist
ent with EvidenceRR that reasons for acting explain why, when a person ought to
act, that is so, since the notion of what it is right for a person to do, as understood
here, is distinct from that of what a person ought to do. Finally, there are other
normative facts that, given EvidenceRR, reasons might explain. Part of the
explanation for why Nadia is justified in leaving, for example, or why there is
some reason for her to do so might be that the clock reads 11p.m.32
In summary, EvidenceRR does better than ExplanationRR in capturing the
roles reasons play. Since those roles are not incidental, but reflect the nature of
reasons, EvidenceRR is more promising as an account of what it is to be a reason.
2.5.4 De re or de dicto?
So far, I have argued for EvidenceRR. One might think that, as first stated, it is
ambiguous or at least that it is worth distinguishing two readings (cp. Quine 1956):
EvidenceRRDD Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that
fact is evidence that there is a respect in which it is right for
them to act.
EvidenceRRDR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if (i)
there is a respect in which it is right for them to act and (ii) that
fact is evidence that it obtains.
31 Kearns and Star (2008; 2009) claim similar advantages for their view.
32 Compare: Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if that fact explains why
there is some reason for them to act (Fogal 2016). I accept this but take the evidence-based account to
be more fundamental. That Miyuki’s favourite film is showing makes it the case that there is some
reason for her to go to the cinema because it is evidence of some respect in which it is right for her to
go, say, that it will benefit her.
The distinction between the two concerns the scope of the existential quantifier.
In EvidenceRRDD, ‘there is’ has narrow scope—it is within the scope of ‘evidence
that’. In EvidenceRRDR, ‘there is’ has wide scope—it is outside the scope of ‘evi
dence that’ and binds the pronoun within it.
According to EvidenceRRDD, a reason is evidence of a normative fact, specific
ally, the fact that there is a respect in which it is right to act. To put this differently,
talk of rightness in a respect as it figures in EvidenceRRDD is to be interpreted de
dicto. According to EvidenceRRDR, in contrast, a reason is (typically) evidence of a
non-normative fact.33 Suppose that one respect in which it is right to act is that
doing so promotes pleasure. In that case, evidence that an act promotes pleasure
is evidence of a respect in which it is right to act. According to EvidenceRRDR, it is
thereby a reason to act. To put this differently, talk of rightness in a respect as it
figures in EvidenceRRDR is to be interpreted de re.
I will now develop a line of thought against EvidenceRRDD and for
EvidenceRRDR, one relating to the guiding role of reasons.34 Consider:
(a) The virtuous agent when deliberating whether to act considers reasons for
acting.
This seems a platitude that all parties should accept. Note that (a) does not claim
that being virtuous requires deliberation, only that it allows for deliberation.
Given EvidenceRRDR, (a) is equivalent to:
(b) The virtuous agent when deliberating whether to act considers evidence
that acting keeps a promise, benefits others, respects autonomy, etc.
This seems unobjectionable. In deliberating in this fashion, an agent shows con

cern for fidelity, beneficence, autonomy, and the like. These are noble concerns.
Given EvidenceRRDD, in contrast, (a) is equivalent to:
(c) The virtuous agent when deliberating whether to act considers evidence
that there are respects in which acting is right.
In contrast to (b), (c) seems false. In deliberating in this fashion, an agent shows a
concern for the moral status of an action which is not also a concern for fidelity,
beneficence, autonomy, and the like. Such a concern is disagreeable; it amounts to
33 Or a normative fact specified in ‘thick’ rather than ‘thin’ terms. The thin/thick contrast is due to
Williams (1985). For discussion, see (Eklund 2011; Elstein and Hurka 2009; Kirchin 2017;
Roberts 2013; Väyrynen 2013b).
34 For a related line of thought, see (Jordan 2014). For a different argument in support of the de re
version, see (Whiting 2018, 2201–2).
‘moral fetishism’ (Smith 1994, 75–6; cp. Williams 1981, 18).35 That is a vice, not
a virtue.
In response, a proponent of EvidenceRRDD might point out that, when deliber
ating, a person can consider what are in fact reasons without conceiving of them as
reasons. And, even if they conceive of them as reasons, they need not conceive of
them as evidence of the relevant sort. Compare: One can think of a substance as
water without thinking of it as H2O, even though water consists of H2O.
The point is well taken. Consider, then, a sophisticated agent, one who, when
deliberating, thinks in terms of reasons and knows in what reasons consist. Surely,
sophistication (so understood) need not preclude virtue. In light of this, compare the
view emerging from EvidenceRRDR with the view emerging from EvidenceRRDD,
respectively:
(d) The sophisticated virtuous agent when deliberating whether to act considers
evidence that acting keeps a promise, benefits others, respects autonomy,
etc., and considers it in those terms.
(e) The sophisticated virtuous agent when deliberating whether to act considers
evidence that there are respects in which acting is right, and considers it in
those terms.
The view (d) expresses seems true while that which (e) expresses seems false.
That the sophisticated virtuous agent weighing reasons does not focus on evi
dence of rightness de dicto suggests that providing such evidence is not necessary
for being a reason. That the sophisticated virtuous agent weighing reasons need
only focus on evidence of rightness de re suggests that providing such evidence is
sufficient for being a reason. So, we should accept EvidenceRRDR and reject
EvidenceRRDD.
A proponent of EvidenceRRDD might grant that the sophisticated virtuous
agent manifests a concern for rightness so conceived. However, such a concern need
not preclude, and might even generate, a concern for fidelity and the like, indeed,
a concern for such things for their own sakes (Copp 1997; Svavarsdottir 1999).
So, the proponent of EvidenceRRDD need not attribute to the sophisticated virtu
ous agent an exclusive concern with the moral status of their actions.
It is not clear that this speaks to the issue. For one thing, one might still think
that an intrinsic concern for rightness so conceived is objectionable, even when
accompanied by a concern for fidelity (etc.).36 Be that as it may, while a concern
35 Smith introduces this notion when arguing for judgement internalism—roughly, the view that,
when a person makes a moral judgement, they are motivated to act in accordance with it. I do not
here take a stand on whether that argument succeeds (cp. Copp 1997; Dreier 2000; Miller 2013,
chap. 9; Svavarsdottir 1999). What follows allows that a concern for rightness conceived as such plays
a role in structuring a person’s motivation.
36 For resistance, see (Johnson King 2020b).
The interim evidence-based account of reasons 27
for rightness so conceived might result in a concern for fidelity, it might not.
Suppose that the agent is sophisticated when it comes to metaethics but unsophis
ticated when it comes to normative ethics. That is, the agent has no beliefs regard
ing in what ways it is right to act. As a result, their concern for the right as such
will not lead to a concern for fidelity. And, even if the agent believes that one way
in which it is right to act is that it keeps a promise, say, a desire to do what is right
in a respect might not automatically generate a desire for promise-keeping. Desire
is not closed under a priori entailment, even in rational agents.
To step back, the point is that, insofar as the virtuous are concerned with what
to do, they are concerned first and foremost with indications that their options
keep promises, are beneficial, treat others with respect, etc., not with indications
that their options have the status of being right (overall or in some regard).
EvidenceRRDR accords with this. EvidenceRRDD does not.
There are additional considerations that favour the de re account over its de dicto
counterpart, but they will not emerge until chapters 5 and 6. For now, then, the case
is a partial one. It receives further support once I situate it within the bigger picture.
2.6 The interim evidence-based account of reasons
The preceding has led to EvidenceRRDR. As stressed at the outset, it is a provi

sional proposal, but it is the one I will stick with for the remainder of this chapter.
A proponent of EvidenceRRDR can accept that a respect in which it is right to
act is itself a reason for acting. In general, a fact is (trivially) evidence of itself
(Hawthorne and Magidor 2018, 137; Williamson 2000, 187). So, a respect in
which it is right to act is (trivially) evidence of a respect in which it is right to act.
So, according to EvidenceRRDR, it is a reason to act. This is a welcome conse
quence. Suppose that one respect in which it is right to act is that it keeps a prom
ise. Surely, that it keeps a promise is also a reason for acting.
One advantage of EvidenceRRDR is that it points in the direction of an account
of the weights of reasons. According to it, the weight of a reason is a function of
two things: the degree to which it is right in the relevant respect to act and the
weight of the evidence that that feature obtains.37 It is a tricky matter what the
exact function is but, for present purposes, I will assume that it is multiplicative.
Suppose that there is evidence of little weight (0.2) that an act will possess some
feature that makes it right to a high degree to perform it (0.8) and evidence of
greater weight (0.7) that another act will possess some feature that makes it right
37 Kearns and Star (2009, 232) identify the weight of a reason with its weight as evidence of what a
person ought to do. This one-factor view is implausible. Suppose that one reason makes it certain that
I ought to eat my greens, while another makes it certain that I ought to save my best friend’s life. On
the one-factor view, the reasons are equally weighty.
to a moderate degree to perform it (0.5). On the current proposal, the overall

weight of the first reason (0.16) is less than that of the second (0.35). Although
these results might need finessing, they are along the right lines.
The proposal assumes that rightness comes in degrees. That assumption is
defensible (Howard 2019; Wedgwood 2013). Suppose that Eva can benefit Freda
to a high degree and Georgia to a small degree. It is more wrong in the relevant
respect for Eva not to benefit Freda than for her not to benefit Georgia. By the
same token, it is more right in the relevant respect for Eva to benefit Freda than
for her to benefit Georgia.
That the relevant status is gradable is even clearer when stated in other terms.
In a particular way, or in every way, an action can be more or less fitting, more or
less appropriate to its circumstances, and more or less choiceworthy.
Accepting the evidence-based account of reasons does not collapse the distinc
tion between practical and theoretical reasoning.38 For one thing, it is consistent
with EvidenceRRDR to maintain that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an
action or some other distinctively practical conclusion such as a decision or
intention, rather than a belief. For another, as developed here, a proponent of
EvidenceRRDR does not view practical deliberation as simply a matter of weighing
the evidence for and against the truth of a proposition; it involves in addition
weighing the degree to which it is or is not right in the relevant ways to act.
I turn now to objections to evidence-based accounts of reasons. In most cases, the
original target of those objections was not EvidenceRRDR but some other way of
completing Evidence?.39 Nonetheless, the issues those objections raise are general.
To anticipate, I will suggest that—with one exception—the objections make a
similar mistake: They overlook that being a reason is a functional property. For
some fact to be a reason is for it to play a certain role, and it is consistent with a
fact’s playing that role that it plays other roles too. Moreover, one cannot simply
‘read off ’ from the specification of a fact whether it plays that role or, if it does, in
virtue of what it plays that role.
As a warmup to this point, and to show that it is one all parties should accept,
consider: Miyuki promised to go to the cinema. This, one might think, is a reason
for her to go, one grounded in fidelity. But suppose that Nishi released her from
this promise. In that case, one might think, it is not a reason for going. But sup
pose also that Nishi released her because, if Miyuki keeps a promise, Carlos will
suffer. In that case, that Miyuki promised to go to the cinema is a reason, not for
going, but against doing so, one grounded in nonmaleficence, not fidelity. As the
progressive development of this case shows, reasons do not wear their status,
valence, or grounds on their faces.
38 For this worry, see (Dancy 2004b, 23; Setiya 2014, 233–4; Stratton-Lake 2018, 282–3).
39 Specifically, their original target is (Kearns and Star 2008; 2009).
2.6.1 The objection from conditions
The first challenge facing EvidenceRRDR is that it fails to respect the distinction
between conditions and reasons (Brunero 2009; 2018; Fletcher 2013).40 Suppose
that, if Miyuki can go to the cinema, she will keep a promise by doing so. Against
this background, that she can go is evidence of a respect in which it is right for
her to do so, namely, that it keeps a promise. So, given EvidenceRRDR, it is a reason
for her to go. This, one might think, is false. That Miyuki can go to the cinema
enables other facts to be reasons for going, say, that her favourite film is showing,
but is not itself a reason for going. More generally, when enablers are evidence of
respects in which it is right to act, the account predicts that they are reasons.
I suggest that EvidenceRRDR gets the correct verdict in this case and others like
it. The fact that Miyuki can go to the cinema is simply playing two roles—that of
an enabler and that of a reason. Moreover, a proponent of EvidenceRRDR can dis
tinguish those roles. That Miyuki can go to the cinema is reason for her to go in
virtue of being evidence of a respect in which it is right for her to do so, namely,
that it keeps a promise. In contrast, that Miyuki can go to the cinema is an enab
ling condition in virtue of serving an explanatory function—roughly, it helps to
explain why the fact that Miyuki promised to go is a respect in which it is right for
her to do so. More generally, while a proponent of EvidenceRRDR must accept that
in some cases (not all) one and the same fact plays the role of both a reason and a
condition, they do not conflate the roles themselves.
Once the focus is on, not what is doing the job, but the job it is doing, it no
longer seems a problematic consequence of EvidenceRRDR that a reason can also
be a condition. In its capacity as evidence of promise-keeping, the fact that
Miyuki can go to the cinema justifies her in going, at least to some degree. In the
same capacity, it might guide her deliberations. Were Miyuki to take the fact that
she can go to the cinema as evidence that it keeps a promise, she might decide on
that basis to go. And, as evidence of promise-keeping, that Miyuki can go might
help to make it the case that she ought to do so. More generally, conditions can
serve the roles characteristic of reasons. So, they can be reasons.
2.6.2 The objection from instrumental reasons
The next objection is that evidence-based accounts of reasons confuse means and
ends (Fox Forthcoming; Schmidt 2017). Suppose that Miyuki ought to go to the
cinema. To do so, she must buy a ticket. So, Miyuki ought to buy a ticket. As it
40 Explanation-based accounts face a similar challenge, as their proponents acknowledge

(Broome 2018, 311; Schroeter and Schroeter 2009, 286).
happens, whenever Miyuki ought to buy a ticket, she promised to go to the cinema,
which is a respect in which it is right for her to go. Against that background,
EvidenceRRDR predicts that the fact that Miyuki ought to buy a ticket is a reason
for her to go to the cinema. More generally, EvidenceRRDR predicts that in some
cases the fact that a person ought to take a necessary means is a reason to secure
an end. This seems back to front.
My response to this challenge echoes my response to the previous. Rather than
deny that EvidenceRRDR makes the relevant predictions, I accept that it does but
deny that this is a problem. That Miyuki ought to buy a ticket is not a reason for
her to go to the cinema because buying the ticket is a means to going, but because
it is evidence of a respect in which it is right for her to go, namely, that it keeps a
promise. In that capacity, it justifies Miyuki in going to the cinema. In the same
capacity, it might guide Miyuki’s deliberations as to whether to go. Again, how
one specifies a fact or what the fact is a fact about is no guide as to whether it
plays the role of a reason and, if it does, in virtue of what it plays that role.
A proponent of EvidenceRRDR does not really claim that, in the relevant cases, a
fact about an obligation to take a means to an end is as such a reason to secure the
end, but that as evidence of a right-making feature it is a reason to secure the end.
So stated, the claim does not seem problematic.
2.6.3 The objection from facts about reasons
A related objection to evidence-based accounts of reasons is that they fail to dis

tinguish reasons from facts about reasons (Brunero 2018).41 Suppose that there is
a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema. Suppose further that, whenever there is a
reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema, she promised to do so. Against this back
ground, that there is a reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema is evidence that she
promised to do so. In that case, EvidenceRRDR predicts that the fact that there is a
reason for Miyuki to go to the cinema is a reason for her to go. But, one might
think, that is false. The fact about the reason is not itself a reason.
Again, I accept the verdict. The fact that there is a reason for Miyuki to go to
the cinema is a reason for her to do so, not in virtue of its content or subject mat
ter, but in virtue of what it does, namely, reveal or indicate that, by going, Miyuki
keeps a promise. In that capacity, the fact justifies Miyuki in going to the cinema
and might figure in her deliberations as to whether to go, as might any other con
sideration that provides evidence of promise-keeping.
This defence does not commit me to the view that facts about reasons to act are
always reasons to act. According to EvidenceRRDR, that there is a reason for a per
son to act entails the existential fact that there is a respect in which it is right for
41 Again, explanation-based accounts of reasons face a similar challenge (Brunero 2013).

them to act, but it need not reveal or indicate what that respect is. If it does not,
then, according to EvidenceRRDR, it is not a reason.
2.6.4 The objection from testimony
The final extant challenge to EvidenceRRDR does not make the same mistake as
the previous. A common complaint against evidence-based accounts of reasons is
that they generate implausible results in testimonial cases, especially cases of nor-
mative testimony (Broome 2008; Brunero 2018; McBride 2013; McKeever and
Ridge 2012; McNaughton and Rawling 2011). Suppose that Nishi tells Miyuki
that she ought to go to the cinema. One might think that the fact that Nishi testi
fies this reports that there is a reason, or a number of reasons, for Miyuki to go
but is not itself a reason. Does EvidenceRRDR suggest otherwise?
That depends; specifically, it depends on whether Nishi’s testimony is evidence
of some way in which it is right for Miyuki to go, that is, of rightness in a respect
de re. Suppose that it is not. Nishi tells Miyuki that she ought to go, but this is not
evidence that by going she keeps a promise, or benefits someone, or whatever. In
that case, EvidenceRRDR entails that Nishi’s testimony is not a reason for Miyuki
to go. More generally, the account suggests that what one might call pure norma
tive testimony is not reason-giving. This seems right.42
Suppose now that, whenever Nishi tells Miyuki that she ought to go to the cin
ema, she will keep a promise by doing so. In that case, Nishi’s testimony is evi
dence of a respect in which it is right for Miyuki to go, namely, that it keeps a
promise. In that case, in turn, EvidenceRRDR entails that Nishi’s testimony is a
reason for Miyuki to go. More generally, the account suggests that impure norma
tive testimony is reason-giving. This seems right.43
Why might one think that it is a problem for EvidenceRRDR that it suggests that
in some cases testimony of the relevant kind is a reason for acting? One might just
find this suggestion unintuitive. In that case, insofar as the proponent of
EvidenceRRDR has intuitions to the contrary—intuitions shared by philosophers
with no commitment to evidence-based accounts of reasons (Finlay 2014, 93;
Heuer 2018b, 53–4; Kiesewetter 2011, 188–9; Lord 2018b, 49; Markovits 2010,
219)—the situation is one of stalemate.
To get beyond this, note that reflection on the roles reasons play supports the
verdict EvidenceRRDR delivers. Nishi’s testimony, insofar as it is evidence that, by
going to the cinema, Miyuki keeps a promise, justifies her in going. Miyuki (or
42 A common suggestion is that there is something problematic about acting on or otherwise

responding to such testimony (Crisp 2014; Fletcher 2016; Gorodeisky 2010; Hills 2009; Forthcoming;
Hopkins 2007; 2011; McGrath 2009; 2011; Nickel 2001; Whiting 2015b). EvidenceRRDR might explain
why: It is not reason-giving.
43 A proponent of EvidenceRRDD cannot distinguish pure and impure testimony in this way.
Nishi) might cite that testimony when defending her action. When deliberating
as to what to do, Nishi’s testimony might figure as a premise in Miyuki’s reason
ing. And Miyuki might go to the cinema in light of Nishi’s testimony. More gener
ally, testimony of the relevant sort plays the justifying and guiding roles
characteristic of reasons.
An opponent of evidence-based accounts of reasons might grant this but point
out that such testimony does not play the sorts of explanatory roles that reasons
play (Broome 2008; McNaughton and Rawling 2011). In the case at hand, Nishi’s
testimony does not explain why it is right in some respect or overall for Miyuki to
act. Hence, it is not a reason for doing so.
This is in danger of begging the question—it amounts to opposing one account
of reasons with another, an explanation-based account. Moreover, I have argued,
that account is independently problematic. Setting this aside, a proponent of
EvidenceRRDR can insist that, while the testimony does not explain why it is right
overall or in some way for Miyuki to go to the cinema, it can explain other nor
mative facts. If Miyuki ought to go or is justified in going, that might be due to the
evidence that, by going, she keeps a promise.
Normative testimony, when true, does not make it the case that the combined
weight of the reasons for the relevant action is greater than it would otherwise
have been (Brunero 2018, 331). If Miyuki ought to go to the cinema because she
promised to do so, then Nishi’s testimony does not add any weight to the reason
for going that the promise provides. But, as noted in §2.2.3, the weights of reasons
do not agglomerate in any straightforward fashion. So, the fact that normative
testimony does not add to the weights of other reasons is consistent with its being
a reason, indeed, a reason of some weight.
2.7 Reasons as premises of reasoning
In developing and defending EvidenceRRDR, I compared and contrasted various

explanation- and evidence-based accounts of reasons. At the outset, I noted that
there are accounts of reasons of a rather different sort, ones which make central
appeal to the notion of reasoning. Consider:
Reasoning Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if it is

good reasoning for them to reason from that fact to acting.44
44 For versions of this view, see (Asarnow 2017; Gregory 2016; Harman 1977, 118; Hieronymi 2005;
2021; Kauppinen 2015; McHugh 2014; McHugh and Way 2016; Paakkunainen 2017; Raz 1978;
Setiya 2014; Silverstein 2016; Way 2017b; perhaps Williams 1981, chap. 8).
Reasons as premises of reasoning 33
A proponent of this principle might take the notion of good reasoning as basic.
Alternatively, they might seek to explain it in normative or non-normative terms.45
Of the roles that reasons play, Reasoning makes central their guiding func
tion. According to Reasoning, to be a reason just is to be a consideration that
informs a person’s deliberations. Consider again the case in which Nadia prom
ised to leave at 11p.m. It is good reasoning for Nadia to reason from the fact that
the clock reads 11p.m. to a decision to go. Given Reasoning, that the clock reads
11p.m. is a reason for Nadia to leave. Moreover, Reasoning respects the justify
ing and explanatory roles of reasons. Insofar as the fact that the clock reads 11p.m.
is a good basis for leaving, it justifies Nadia in doing so. And the proponent of
Reasoning can allow that the fact that the clock reads 11p.m. explains, among
other things, why Nadia ought to leave.
Despite these virtues, Reasoning faces a number of problems, indeed, ver
sions of those facing evidence-based accounts. Once more, my aim in this chapter
is a positive one, namely, to introduce and motivate a proposal, not to refute alter
natives. Nevertheless, I will comment briefly on Reasoning. The point in doing
so is, in the first instance, to show that reasoning-based accounts enjoy no imme
diate advantages over evidence-based accounts. That, I will then suggest, reflects
the fact that the difference between them does not run very deep (cp. Silverstein
2016, 12–13; Star 2018).
Given that the challenges to Reasoning are familiar, I will be quick. First, the
notion of good reasoning is an overall notion, whereas that of a reason is a con
tributory one. Suppose that her favourite film is showing, but Miyuki promised to
stay at home. It is not good reasoning to reason from the fact that the film is
showing to a decision to go to the cinema. Given Reasoning, it follows that the
fact that the film is showing is not a reason for Miyuki to go. But it is.46
Second, Reasoning blurs the distinction between conditions and reasons.47
Suppose that Miyuki reasons from the fact that she can go to the cinema, together
with the fact that her favourite film is showing, to going. This is good reasoning. It
follows from Reasoning that the fact that the film is showing is a reason for
Miyuki to go, not just a condition.
Third, Reasoning predicts that facts about reasons are reasons. Suppose that
Miyuki reasons from the fact that there is a reason for her to go to the cinema,
together with the fact that there is no reason for her not to do so, to a decision to
go. This is good reasoning. It follows from Reasoning that the fact about a rea
son is a reason for Miyuki to go.
Fourth, Reasoning entails that normative testimony can be a reason for acting.
Suppose that Nishi tells Miyuki that she ought to go to the cinema, and Miyuki
45 For accounts of good reasoning, see (Broome 2013; McHugh and Way 2018; Silverstein 2016;
Worsnip 2019).
46 For responses to this challenge, see (Setiya 2014; Silverstein 2016; Way 2017b).
47 For discussion, see (Setiya 2014; Way 2017b).
reasons from this to going. This is good reasoning. According to Reasoning,

Nishi’s testimony is a reason for Miyuki to go. If this is implausible, Reasoning is
implausible.48
No doubt a proponent of Reasoning can revise the principle so as to fix these
problems or otherwise reveal them to be non-problems. I am not inclined to
reject the biconditional, or a refined version of it, out of hand. But I am inclined
to think that EvidenceRRDR captures the deeper truth. What makes a fact a reason
to act is that it is evidence of some respect in which it is right to act. And, I sug
gest, that is also what makes it good reasoning to reason from that fact to acting
(when it is good reasoning to do so). That Miyuki’s favourite film is showing is a
good basis for her decision to go to the cinema because it indicates that going will
benefit her, which is a respect in which going is right. So, the truth in Reasoning
is explained by the account of reasons I advance.
2.8 Conclusion
I started with the question, ‘What is it to be a reason for acting?’ My answer is

EvidenceRRDR. According to it, a fact is a reason for acting just in case there is
some respect in which acting is right—say, that it keeps a promise—and the fact is
evidence that it obtains. A recurring theme when developing and defending the
proposal is that it does justice to the roles reasons play.
As this reveals, I place a lot of argumentative weight on the job description for
reasons. Some might query it; in particular, they might complain that it is incom
plete and insist that a consideration is a reason only if it plays some additional
role.49 For my part, I think that the job description emerges naturally from reflec
tion on the ways philosophers and ‘the folk’ think and talk about reasons, hence,
that it is a neutral starting point for theorizing. But, if someone thinks otherwise,
I offer two further comments.
First, perhaps the job description does not pick out all or only reasons. But it
does pick out something—something which justifies, guides, and explains. That is
what I am interested in. If need be, I can give a different name to the thing that
does these things. I am not too hung up on the terminology.50
Second, the case for the account of reasons is not yet complete. In subsequent
chapters, I will expand and refine it so as to arrive at a comprehensive theory that
distinguishes different sorts of reasons—and the different overall statuses they
48 For discussion, see (McHugh and Way 2016).

49 In chapter 3, I will consider the suggestion that the job description should include that
reasons favour.
50 One might suggest that it is only the respects in which acting is right that are reasons in the pri
mary sense and that the facts which provide evidence of those features are reasons in a derivative
sense. I do not really object to that way of describing things. A derivate reason is still a reason.
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LE NOZZE AL CASTELLO
SCENE FEUDALI
PARTE PRIMA.
Sei giorni se n’andò mattina e sera

Per balze e per pendici orride e strane.
Dove non via, dove sentier non era,
Dove nè segno di vestigia umane.
Ariosto.
La campana del solitario villaggio di Arola dava i primi segni

dell’Avemaria, ed il rimbombo di quei tocchi radi e prolungati
spandevasi come una patetica voce per la ristretta valle a cui quel
villaggio dà nome. Il cielo che da un lato erasi fatto d’azzurro bruno
mostravasi verso occidente del colore dell’oro; su tutte le cime
d’intorno e pei rialzi dei valloncelli vedevasi il fogliame imporporato,
e l’ultima luce trapassando pel varco de’ monti scendeva ben anco al
fondo della valle ove faceva apparire d’argento quei tratti di corrente
del limpido Plino che le rupi e le piante non celavano sotto la
nereggiante loro ombra.
Scendevano dal ripido sentiero che dall’erta metteva ai casolari le
contadinelle, mandando innanzi chi le capre, chi un branco di
pecore. Calavano drappelli di donne portando altre le gerla ed altre
elevati fardelli sul capo; veniva di quando in quando un vecchio
montanaro spingendo il somiero che mutava a fatica i passi sotto il
pesante carico delle legna o del fieno. Alcuni di questi entravano
negli abituri di Arola, varj passavan oltre, e procedendo verso
inferiori disperse capanne valicavano il torrente sopra un ponticello
là dove parte dell’acqua, artatamente divertita in altro canale,
correva poco lungi a far girare le ruote d’un mulino.
Era già deserta interamente quella via e null’altro rumore udivasi,
fuorchè quello che ad intervalli faceva la brezza vespertina tra le
frondi, quando alla sommità del sentiero apparve un Pellegrino. Lo
indicavano per tale il cappello a larghe falde circolari, la veste oscura
che tutto l’avvolgeva colla sovrapposta dalmatica sparsa di
conchiglie e il lungo bordone che portava. Camminava spedito, ma
al vedere il gruppo di casolari e l’acuto campanile colla chiesuola
formanti il paesetto d’Arola, di subito s’arrestò e poscia
abbandonando il viottolo calò lungo la balza e si condusse al
ponticello, lo passò, indi fermossi di nuovo ad esaminare il luogo
onde prendere più certa direzione.
Cominciava già più vasta a regnare l’oscurità, chè avanzavasi la
sera e meno rade scintillavano le stelle. Volgendo il Pellegrino gli
sguardi per entro la selva di cui toccava il limitare, scorse fra mezzo
ai tronchi degli alberi splendere un lume che sembrava trapellare da
finestra o porta di non lontana abitazione. Si mise pel bosco, il quale
constando di grossi castani poco stipati, offriva non disagevole
passaggio e s’avviò verso la casa d’onde partiva quel chiarore. Era
dessa il mulino. Dal lato della selva questo rustico edificio andava
cinto da un muricciuolo di pietre che sorgeva a trenta passi di
distanza dal caseggiato e inchiudeva un picciol orto, al quale faceva
parete verso il canale una siepe di bianco-spino. Al centro del
muricciuolo eravi praticato l’ingresso chiuso allora da rozzo cancello
di legno. Là pervenuto il Pellegrino accostossi al cancello e prima di
bussare, udendo dentro la casa parlare con voce molto alta, si
trattenne un momento in ascolto.
Abbenchè la ruota fosse arrestata, lo scroscio che faceva l’acqua,
cadendo per gli ordigni del mulino, non lasciava luogo ad udire
distintamente le parole. S’accorse però che chi parlava era un uomo
il quale doveva trovarsi seduto avanti ad un gran fuoco, poichè
scorgevasi l’ombra della metà superiore della sua figura disegnata
sull’impannata della finestra di prospetto e vedevansi le sue braccia
alzarsi e distendersi con energici e rapidi moti. Al lembo della stessa
impannata stava l’ombra d’un’altra mezza figura, ma questa
rappresentava un bel profilo femminile che si sarebbe giudicato
essere quello d’una statua, tanto era regolare ed immobile.
Dopo alcuni istanti il Pellegrino s’avvedendo essergli impossibile
comprendere sillaba di quanto veniva profferito, percosse col suo
bordone ripetutamente il cancello; nè sembrandogli d’essere stato
inteso pronunciò sonoramente — Date ricovero ad un povero
pellegrino! —
A quella voce cangiarono d’un tratto gli atteggiamenti delle due
figure projette in ombra sull’impannata; quella di profilo si fece ovale
e l’altra si mostrò di profilo inchinando il capo e alzando un dito. II
Pellegrino ripetè la sua inchiesta e allora spalancatasi la porta uscì
un uomo d’avanzata età, che dal casaccone infarinato indicavasi pel
mulinaro, tenendo la lanterna in una mano e un pezzo di
mazzafrusto nell’altra. S’appressò al cancello, sporse in avanti il
lume onde farlo riflettere sul viso dello sconosciuto e guardatolo ben
bene tutta raggrinzando la pelle intorno agli occhi ed alla bocca, con
che dava alla propria fisonomia una singolare espressione di
sospetto e di stizza. — Chi siete voi? — gli chiese in modo iroso.
«Vedete: sono un povero viandante che contava giungere prima di
sera giù alle sponde del lago per recarmi all’Isola di San Giulio e fui
sorpreso dalla notte in questa valle.
«Perchè non vi siete fermato là su ad Arola da mastro Seghezzo
l’ostiere?
«Perdonatemi, non ho pratica di questi luoghi ed avrò oltrepassata la
terra che m’indicate senza essermene accorto, poichè è già qualche
tempo che cammino alla cieca a causa dell’oscurità che mi ha fatto
perdere la traccia. Datemi di grazia ricovero per questa sola notte!
Un giorno sarete ricompensato largamente della vostra ospitalità.
Il mugnajo che gli aveva sempre tenuta la lanterna appuntata al
volto, l’abbassò; e mormorando fra sè alcune parole trasse
dall’imposta la spranghetta di ferro onde il cancello si aprì; entrato
l’estraneo, rifisse la bandella e lo precedette verso l’uscio ch’era
rimasto spalancato.
Nel mezzo d’una camera modicamente spaziosa, fornita di
contadinesche masserizie miste a tramoggie, stacci e sacchi, eravi
un rotondo focolare sul quale ardeva molta legna la cui fiamma
lambiva i margini d’ampio pajuolo; la catena che sostenevalo
scendeva dalle travi coperte di nera gromma e tappezzate qua e là
da qualche tela di ragno imbiancata dallo spolvero della macina. A
poca distanza del focolare stava seduto un villico alto, destro,
nerboruto, di ventott’anni all’apparenza e presso a lui una giovane
montanina di forme assai belle e appariscenti.
«Gli ho dovuto aprire, o Gaudenzo, perchè è un povero Pellegrino
che va a San Giulio ed ha smarrita la strada (così spegnendo la
lanterna disse il mugnajo al villico che balzando in piedi alla venuta
di quell’incognito gli fissò addosso gli occhi con sorpresa e
diffidenza). Nel bujo poteva capitare in un mal passo o precipitare da
qualche burrone. Mi ha chiesto per carità gli dessi alloggio questa
notte, e Bernardo non rifiutò mai di ricettare nel suo mulino un
viandante anche a rischio di vedere sotto il cappello da pellegrino la
testa d’un eretico o d’un bandito.
Lo Straniero a tali detti fece un moto sdegnoso, ma il Mugnaio nel
quale l’amaro di quelle espressioni non era suggerito dall’indole sua
naturalmente umana e fidata ma da un giro momentaneo di acri
idee, di cui il lettore conoscerà fra poco l’origine, quasi pentito
d’avere offeso quell’ospite nell’atto stesso che lo accoglieva,
soggiunse con viso accaparante in tuono gajo: — «Venite qui, qui
presso al fuoco, buon galantuomo, sedete. L’aria della sera è
frescolina ed umida, il calore vi ristorerà.
Il Pellegrino senza profferir parola appoggiò alla parete il suo
bordone e avanzata una panchetta di legno si sedette in prossimità
del focolare. Gaudenzo stando in piedi continuava ad esaminarlo
attentamente. Ma l’incognito non alzando mai lo sguardo egli alfine
gli domandò:
«Da qual parte venite o Pellegrino?
«Da Val d’Antrona.
«Sempre per le montagne?
«Sempre.
«La strada che avete scelta è la più lunga e disastrosa: venendo pel
piano dell’Ossola ad Omegna sul lago l’accorciavate della metà.
«Il piano e mal sicuro poichè vi sono a campo le masnade dei
Ponteschi [8], e d’altronde dovetti risalir l’Anza per toccare Calasca.
«Vi recate a San Giulio per isciogliere un voto o per ottenere favori
dalla Corte del Vescovo?
«Per un voto» — rispose esitando, ma con qualche asprezza lo
Straniero.
«Non foste a Varallo?
«No.
«E dalle parti della Sesia?
«No» — ripetè il Pellegrino con manifesto dispetto, indicando quanto
già fosse infastidito da quell’insistente interrogare.
Gaudenzo tornò a misurarlo coll’occhio da capo a piedi, poi mirando
in volto Bernardo e la sua figlia fece un atto come di chi dicesse:
costui non dev’essere quel che pare. Si riassise quindi sullo sgabello
che occupava da prima e voltosi di nuovo alla figlia del Mugnajo, il
quale s’era posto intanto a versar la farina nell’acqua del pajuolo che
bolliva. — «Torna a sederti qui o Maria (disse battendo col palmo
della mano la seggiola ove essa si pose mesta e taciturna), e dimmi
tu se quelle che ti ho raccontate non le sono cose da far uscire dai
gangheri qualsiasi cristiano? Quel... quasi sarei per dirlo... quel
nostro conte Jago da Biandrate vuol ora introdurre nel paese anche
di queste belle usanze! Non s’accontenta il signor feudatario di farci
pagare doppia gabella pel sale, d’avere imposto il balzello d’un soldo
d’argento per ogni ruota di carro e d’obbligare noi poveri vassalli a
lavorare per lui un giorno ogni settimana, quando la buona memoria
del conte Bonifacio suo padre non c’imponeva altro carico che quello
della decima del mosto e delle legna, egli vorrebbe adesso che tutti
quelli che contraggono matrimonio si sottoponessero a questa nuova
qualità di tributo.
Maria mandò un profondo sospiro e abbassò gli occhi al suolo;
Bernardo, che inginocchiatosi sulla pietra del focolare, andava col
matterello tramestando la polenta: — «Ah il conte Bonifazio,
esclamò, non avrebbe mai fatte azioni di questa sorta! Gran
brav’uomo ch’egli era! veniva soventi a cacciare in questa valle e
qualche volta ho prestato ajuto io stesso al suo scudiero a condurre
a mano i cavalli nei passi più scabrosi.
«Sapete poi (proseguì Gaudenzo) chi mi ha significato il comando
del Conte?... fu Tibaldo il suo falconiero, quella faccia da giudeo col
naso più adunco che il becco degli uccellacci con cui preda le
allodole e le pernici. M’incontrai seco lui a Quarona nell’atto ch’esso
usciva dalla bottega di Zancone il fabbro, ove va soventi a far
acconciare le lasse de’ suoi grifagni. Ne portava uno infatti sul
braccio a cui andava lisciando le penne. Oh perchè non gli è saltato
agli occhi e non glieli ha cavati entrambi nell’istante che s’avvide di
me!
«Ebbene che ti disse il Falconiero?» — chiese con impazienza
Bernardo.
«Gaudenzo di Civiasco, mi gridò egli subito che mi scôrse, appunto
con te ho bisogno di parlare — E avvicinatosi a me con un sorriso
infernale sul ceffo disse: — Corre voce pel paese che tu ti sposi e
prendi in donna la mulinara di Val d’Arola, la figlia di Bernardo, è ciò
vero? — Verissimo, risposi io; mia madre invecchia e voglio darle la
consolazione prima che chiuda gli occhi di tenere un mio bambolo
sulle ginocchia — Ottimamente, soggiunse il ribaldo. Il Conte nostro
padrone m’ha imposto d’avvertirti che vuole che le nozze siano
celebrate a Monrigone nel suo castello. — Perchè nel suo castello?
(dissi io stupito) non ho forse una chiesa nella mia terra? — Non vi
sono repliche: esclamò Tibaldo. Così vuole il conte Jago e tu devi
ubbidire. Se tu ignori i suoi diritti li sa ben esso. Altri feudatarj già da
molti anni gli esercitano e se egli ne ha trascurato l’uso sin’ora
intende adesso di farli pienamente valere, nè spetta a te, vassallo
mascalzone, lo scrutinare i diritti del tuo signore. — Che diritti può
mai vantare il Conte sopra di me (l’interruppi io con rabbia) oltre
quelli di togliermi come fa, quasi tutta la roba e costringermi a
lavorare per lui quasi fosse un suo bue od un cavallo? — Che
diritti?... Che diritti? — ripetè furibondo, l’iniquo Falconiero, e
pronunciò certe parole da stregone che spiegò poi nel modo che vi
ho già narrato. All’udire una tale scelleraggine mi si drizzarono i
capelli sulla testa, mi si oscurò la vista e sono stato filo filo di
passarlo col mio spuntone da una parte all’altra egli e il suo farsetto
di cammuccà crimisino.
«Era senza il giaco e ti parlava così? Oh anch’essi, grazie al cielo,
non possono star sempre vestiti di ferro! (pronunciò fra i denti il
Mugnajo).
«Ah Signore Iddio (disse Maria con timidità ed angoscia), chi sa che
disgrazia sarebbe accaduta se gli mettevate le mani addosso; forse
io non v’avrei veduto mai più!
«Gran fortuna (continuò il giovine), che il mio santo Protettore mi
trattenne in quel momento la mano e m’inspirò il salutare pensiero di
vendere la mia casuccia ed i miei terreni e venire ad abitare con mia
madre in qualche luogo di questa Riviera d’Orta sotto il dominio del
vostro Vescovo, dove Maria non avrà a temere le zanne di quella
bestia feroce del Conte.
«Che anime perverse! (esclamò Bernardo alzandosi in piedi). Ecco
cosa hanno fruttato le massime di Fra Dolcino e de’ suoi iniqui
gazzari, vera peste di questi paesi! Coi grani dell’eresia non si può
macinare altra farina.
«Il conte Jago (profferì Gaudenzo con fuoco) è un gazzaro [9] se ve
n’è mai stato un altro al mondo. Dirlo a me? non ho io stesso veduto
Fra Dolcino e la sua Monaca Margherita entrare più volte nella
Rocca del Conte a Monrigone? [10] e quando l’Eretico stava colle sue
turbe nel piano di Parete-Calva sulla cima di Valnera chi è che
mandava colassù le biade e il vino affinchè quei maladetti lupi non
morissero arrabbiati di fame? È chiaro adunque come il sole che il
Conte era tinto della loro pece sino ai capelli. Ma pure, che volete? I
Valsesiani che strinsero anni sono la lega contro i Biandrati ed ora la
fecero contro gli eretici, obbligandoli a snidare dalle loro montagne,
rispettano il conte Jago. Anche a Zebello egli mandò i suoi arcieri a
soccorrere Fra Dolcino, e se il Vescovo di Vercelli non fosse venuto
a capo quest’inverno di serrarlo con quasi tutti i suoi nella rete,
metterei una mano nel fuoco che esso stesso il Conte andava quivi
in persona a combattere per lui.
«Così San Giulio l’avesse concesso che tu, o Gaudenzo, non saresti
costretto per unirti alla mia Maria d’abbandonare la tua casa ed i tuoi
campi, giacchè egli avrebbe fatta la fine che farà tra poco l’Eretico,
cominciando a provare nelle fiamme di questo mondo come
abbrucino quelle dell’inferno in cui vorrei soffiare io stesso per farlo
ardere eternamente in pena de’ suoi enormi peccati.
A tale fiera imprecazione pronunciata con tutto accanimento da
Bernardo in odio al Conte fecero eco col cuore e le parole i due
promessi. E questa smisurata e violente brama di vendetta, di che
s’accesero simultaneamente, non era indizio in essi d’animo
selvaggio e crudele, ma bensì intimo sfogo d’un oppresso
sentimento di giustizia sancito in certo modo dalle circostanze e
dalle idee religiose dei tempi. Si consideri infatti lo stato delle
persone del popolo e specialmente di quelle che abitavano aperte
campagne, in quei secoli nei quali ad ogni pazzo e criminoso
capriccio di chi comandava, si dava il nome di diritto cui era
necessità sottostare. Non gli averi, non la libertà, non l’onore erano
sacri. Dalla turrita rocca il Feudatario faceva bandire a suon di
tromba i suoi voleri e guai a chi avesse osato resistere! erano strazii
e morte. La forza prepotente, brutale imperava nel mondo pressochè
da assoluta signora. Innanzi ad uomini coperti di ferro e vigorosi
adopratori di spade, mazze e lancie la plebe inerme star non poteva
che pavida e inoffensiva lasciandosi miseramente conculcare. In
tanta abbiezione ritraevano gli infelici valido conforto dalla speranza
che i loro patimenti venivano tenuti a calcolo in una vita migliore e
che terribili castighi attendevano gli oppressori inumani, pei quali
l’Eterno Giudice impugnava più severo e tremendo il vindice flagello.
Il Pellegrino appoggiato il capo ad una mano e tutto raccolto in se
stesso, sembrava non prestare punto d’attenzione ai parlari di quella
gente; ma quando il Mulinaro profferì gli ultimi veementi suoi detti si
scosse, s’agitò e il pallore che coprivagli le guancie si fece più
intenso. Nello stesso mentre Bernardo che esalata la bile,
riprendeva placidamente le sue faccende, volse gli occhi a lui e
disse: — «Pur troppo, eh Pellegrino! vi sono degli uomini cattivi i
quali pare proprio che ci godano nel tormentare gli altri. Di questi tali
non ne mancherà certo anche dalle vostre parti non è vero?
Fortunati noi che per misericordia del cielo qui comanda un Vescovo
sotto di cui certe birbonate non si fanno, e chi prende moglie può
condursela a casa... senza che prima... ma lasciamola lì. Pensiamo
ora a mangiare in pace questa poca grazia di Dio... Galantuomo
(proseguì dopo aver guardato più attentamente lo Straniero) v’è
forse saltata addosso la febbre o avete fatto penitenza tutto il
giorno? siete smorto come uno a cui abbiano data la corda. Bisogna
che non prolunghiate il digiuno, altrimenti perderete le forze di
proseguire il viaggio. Venite qui, sedete a questo tavolo e rinvigorite
lo stomaco dividendo con noi il poco frutto delle nostre fatiche.
Così parlando aveva Bernardo staccato a due mani il pajuolo dalla
catena e lo aveva capovolto sul tagliere stato coperto da Maria di un
ruvido ma pulito tovagliuolo.
Rialzato il recipiente vi rimase una soda e fumante polenta che ne
conservava intera la forma. Il Pellegrino che provava più cocenti
stimoli che quelli della fame, si mostrò sulle prime restìo, ma vinto
poi dalle cordiali ripetute tute offerte, appressò e s’assise a quel
desco frugale.
«Domani se vi risvegliate gagliardo e riposato (disse il Mugnajo
ponendogli innanzi ampia porzione) in un’ora di cammino arrivate
vate giù a Pella dove troverete delle barche quante volete per farvi
mettere all’Isola. Non dimenticatevi di pregare San Giulio per il
povero Bernardo, per sua figlia e per il bravo Gaudenzo ed
invocatelo che tenga da noi lontane nuove tribolazioni.
«Sì buona gente (rispose il Pellegrino con voce che forzavasi a
render dolce), pregherò per voi non solo a San Giulio, ma anche in
Santuarii più lontani e miracolosi, e pregherò di tutto cuore ancorchè
i presenti vostri mali siano lieve ombra a fronte di quelli... (e si
corresse) che opprimono un gran numero de’ vostri pari.
Mentre andavano consumando la villeresca cena, Bernardo e
Gaudenzo continuarono a parlare delle faccende che stavano ad
entrambi tanto a petto, proponendo alternativamente varii progetti
sul modo in cui meglio conveniva impiegare il ricavo che il giovine
contadino avrebbe fatto de’ suoi pochi tenimenti di Civiasco, affine di
prendere stabile dimora nelle terre soggette alla giurisdizione
vescovile, sottraendosi al dominio del prepotente Biandrate.
Dirigevano nel calore del discorso alcuna volta la parola anche allo
Straniero, ma questi, sempre assorto ne’ proprii pensieri, non
rispondeva che motti tronchi ed insignificanti. Dopo molti
ragionamenti protratti in lungo sinchè Maria ebbe sparecchiato,
Gaudenzo sorse in piedi dicendo: — «La notte s’innoltra e mia
madre che sta aspettandomi potrebbe essere agitata da sinistri
presentimenti se non mi mettessi subito in cammino. A passare la
Colma ci vuole il suo tempo; e va e va non si è mai giunti là in cima.
Una volta però che vi sia arrivato balzo giù dalla punta della Croce ai
pascoli e in quattro salti sono a casa.
«Giacchè hai risoluto di partire mio figliuolo (disse Bernardo
alzandosi anch’esso) sì, è meglio che non ritardi di più. L’ascesa è
lunga, e mi ricordo che io pure quando aveva le gambe buone come
le tue a pervenire colassù non faceva mai tanto presto quanto
desiderava... Ora tu, o Maria, che hai versato l’olio nella lanterna,
accendila e dagliela che egli se ne possa andare con San Giuliano
che l’accompagni.
«No, no: non voglio lume (soggiunse Gaudenzo trattenendo il
braccio della fanciulla in atto d’accenderlo). Un Romito con una gran
barba bianca ch’è venuto da poco ad abitare vicino al nostro paese,
ha detto che di notte le anime dannate se veggono un chiaro andare
in volta gli corrono dietro ed i diavoli saltano giù dagli alberi a
graffiare chi lo porta.
«E volete passare in mezzo ai boschi e vicino al campo dei morti
solo ed all’oscuro? (esclamò Maria con amorosa temenza).
«Ho gran pratica di questi luoghi e tu lo sai, Maria; nè poi è tanto
bruno di fuori (in così dire spalancò la porta). Guarda come
risplendono le stelle: se spuntasse la luna non potrebbe il cielo
essere più lucente, si distingue il sentiero a meraviglia — Addio,
addio, state sani, doman l’altro si rivedremo ed ogni fastidio, spero,
sarà finito.
Si pose quindi a spalle la scure, diede la buona notte al Pellegrino
che gli augurò felice il viaggio, e prese la via. Bernardo e la figlia lo
seguirono sino al cancello che fu aperto fra nuovi saluti, e un
momento dopo non si udirono che le sue pedate per il bosco, il
rumore delle quali fu ben presto coperto da quello dell’incessante
caduta del vicino torrente.
PARTE SECONDA
Dopo il bacio di Giuda il primo è questo

De’ tradimenli umani, ma la fama
Sdegnò pietosa numerar le arcane
Orrende fila onde fu ordito un tanto
Delitto e il tacque alla futura istoria.
Romanzi-Poetici.
Non iscorse che un giorno e fu commesso un fatto esecrando. La

misera Maria sorpresa all’improvviso presso il suo casolare venne
portata a Monrigone e rinchiusa nelle mura del castello del Conte.
Quivi vano è ogni suo grido, vano ogni pianto, poichè quelli che la
circondano non hanno orecchio pei lamenti femminili.
Ma chi è mai colui che nella gotica antica galleria tutta guernita
intorno di ampj oscuri quadri frammisti a corazze rugginose, ad elmi,
ad azze, a daghe passeggia a lenti passi colle braccia incrocicchiate
e gli occhi rivolti al suolo?... Oh tradimento!... Egli è il Pellegrino
accolto sì ospitalmente nel mulino di Arola... lo stesso conte Jago
Biandrate! [11].
Mostra all’aspetto più di trent’anni: è alto, magro, con muscolatura
risentita e nervosa. Ha spaziosa fronte, pallide le guancie che
alquanto sceme rendono oblungo il suo viso. Nerissimi sono i suoi
occhi e nera del paro la capellatura, una ciocca della quale gli sta
ritta sulla fronte essendo nei rimanente fitta ma breve. Una striscia di
barba ricciuta e bruna ma non lucida come i capelli gli contorna il
volto passando sotto il mento bipartito. Nudo, slanciato, tendinoso gli
si scorge il collo chiuso al confine dall’orlo trapunto del giustacuore
color verde-bruno, spoglio in tutto d’ornamenti e che s’informa
strettamente alla persona come i calzoni rossi che riveste, i quali gli
scendono ristretti sino alla nocca del piede. L’unico oggetto che
s’abbia sulla persona, il quale non consuona colla simplicità del
vestimento è un cordone d’oro che lo cinge ai lombi nel quale porta
infisso un pugnale col manico cesellato di argento in vagina d’avorio.
Benchè i suoi lineamenti rimangono quasi immoti, un certo fremito
che gli erra sulle labbra, un leggiero corrugarsi della fronte ad
intervalli, un tener fiso lo sguardo ora in un punto ed ora in un altro,
mostra ad evidenza che la sua mente sta appuntata in immagini vive
che lo scuotono dalle intime fibre.
Ad un tratto fermasi presso una finestra che guarda nel cortile
rinserrato fra le alte merlate mura, al di sopra delle quali s’alza la
torre del Castello. Guarda verso di questa, porge l’orecchio, ed
udendo come il suono d’un gemito soffocato, che parte da quella
torre, si ritrae dal davanzale con moto di dispetto.
Passava in quel mentre in fondo alla galleria il falconiero Tibaldo,
confidente e Consigliero suo prediletto; ei gli fece segno colla mano
d’entrare in sala, rimanendo immobile in prossimità della finestra.
Quando gli fu vicino accennò col guardo la torre e disse:
«Che fa là dentro?
«Piange» — rispose con tutta indifferenza il Falconiero.
«Quel suo miagolare continuo mi annoja.
«Fateci mettere un bavaglio alla bocca e non la sentirete più.
«No. — Benchè sia una villana non voglio usarle violenza... se
venisse a deformarsi colle contorsioni, il suo promesso potrebbe non
volerla più, ed io non ho intenzione di rompere il loro matrimonio.
«Ah!... ah!... v’è da scommettere una moneta d’oro contro un soldo
che al matrimonio non v’è più un’anima che vi pensi (disse Tibaldo
con riso beffardo).
«Oh! perchè credi che non si celebreranno le nozze? lo sposo è mio
vassallo, ed alla fine del conto troverà convenirgli assai meglio
venire a fare gli sponsali nel mio castello, vedersi qui festeggiato e
godere poscia egli ed i suoi figli della mia protezione, che condursi
ad abitare sotto altro dominio vendendo i suoi averi ad ogni vil
prezzo.
«Sì, mettete la pecora nella tana del lupo e poi sperate che si consoli
il pastore coll’offrirgliene i resti.
«Come? non fosti tu stesso che mi dicesti che per introdurre l’uso di
quel diritto già da tanti altri feudatarj praticato, era necessario
adoperare per le prime volte la forza, e che poi i vassalli vi si
sarebbero a poco a poco abituati, piegandovisi senza difficoltà? Tu
m’hai narrato del mio contadino Gaudenzo che sposare doveva la
mulinara di Arola; tu me l’hai dipinta quale bellissima fanciulla, gli
imponesti tu di venire a far le nozze al castello ed allorchè giungesti
a scoprire ch’egli meditava di sfuggire al mio potere, fosti tu quello
che consigliasti il modo d’impedirlo. Ora che la fanciulla è qui in mia
mano, e che il nostro scopo non può essere raggiunto se non viene
lo sposo a ricercarla ed ottenerla da me, tu sembri dubitare della
riuscita di quest’impresa!... M’avresti tu posto a repentaglio di
sostenere una guerra col Vescovo Signore d’Orta e dell’Isola per
avere rapita una donna del suo dominio, senza poter venire a capo
di stabilire quanto ci eravamo proposto?...
«Che mai v’importa ancorchè il primo colpo andasse fallito?... ma
che dico: andare fallito?... non è anzi riuscito ottimamente?
Senz’ombra di pericolo, senza che a voi nè ad alcuno dei vostri
alabardieri sia stata pure scalfita la pelle colla scure o colle mazze
dei villani, vi siete impadronito della più bella fanciulla di tutto il
dominio della Riviera e vorreste far lamento se il miserabile a cui era
destinata non viene a riprendersela?... Vi ricordate quanto costò
l’ultimo fatto consimile, quando faceste qui trasportare la nipote del
Priore di Serravalle? dodici arcieri rimasero sul terreno, tre furono
presi ed appiccati, io ebbi da un graffio scorticata una mano ed a voi
uccisero il cavallo.
«Per ciò appunto aveva determinato di non mettermi mai più in
cimento a causa di donne: esse alla fin fine non recano che
svantaggio, non sono che di peso. Almeno si potesse ottenere
alcuna buona somma pel loro riscatto; tutti fanno grande
apparecchio e rumore per non lasciarsele portar via, ma una volta
che siano state qua dentro non darebbero una lira per riaverle. Lo
sai ch’io non voleva pensarci più: se non venivi in campo colle tue
maladette parole, io non usciva certamente a questa caccia... e nel
momento in cui siamo!
Rimase pensieroso alcun istante, poi riprese a bassa voce: — «Due
delle mie bande più valorose sono perdute; erano cento uomini, i
migliori che portassero elmo e giaco in tutte le terre che bagna la
Sesia... Ma poteva io far di meno per sostenere Fra Dolcino,
quell’uomo santo e incantatore che mi aveva legato a lui con tante
promesse!... Se non erano le genti d’armi di Novara alla battaglia di
Zebello il Vescovo Vercellese non cantava vittoria di certo! nel
momento che si menano le spade ci vuol altro che gli scongiuri e le
invocazioni del piviale e della mitra, abbisognano buone loriche e
braccia di ferro... Or bene, i castellani Novaresi che diedero ajuto a
quel di Vercelli non potrebbero impegnarsi a sostenere il Vescovo
loro, se questi mi chiedesse ragione della violazione del suo
dominio? Ora che mancano gli uomini e che i miei vassalli hanno
ardito di manifestare qualche segno di malcontento.....
«Da quali pensieri mai vi lasciate dominare? Vivete pure nella
massima tranquillità, poichè il Vescovo di Novara signore della
Riviera ha troppo gravi impegni in questi momenti per volersi
impacciare in simili faccende. Che mai gli deve importare d’una
villana ignorata da tutto il mondo, per torsi la briga poi di sfidare un
signore potente e temuto come siete voi e di cui sono sì celebri le
imprese. Oh! via scacciate ogni temenza, nè abbiate alcun sospetto
sopra i vassalli, che se lo desiderate vi faccio vedere a ridurli in
pochi giorni umili e timorosi più che un branco di pecore. Un pajo
solo di que’ mascalzoni che si prendono, e si.....
«Sono stanco ti dico di vedere i miei soldati a fare da carnefici; nè
voglio più che i cameroni del mio castello siano luoghi da tormenti
come le sale nel convento degli Inquisitori. Fra Dolcino insegnavami
che egli è opera meritoria il dare soccorso agli infermi, e non
accrescerne il numero; che il demonio si fa compagno di chi sparge
inutilmente il sangue umano.
«Gran pazzo briccone ch’era Fra Dolcino! Ed egli crede alle
massime di quell’eretico impostore che a forza di ciarle lo spogliò di
danaro e di soldati (così pronunciava tra sè Tibaldo mentre il conte
Jago s’era posto a passeggiare di nuovo per la galleria come assorto
in un grave pensiero).
«Orsù voglio che questa faccenda finisca lietamente per tutti, e nel
termine di pochi giorni (esclamò il Conte arrestandosi d’un tratto
presso il Falconiero). Farai che Maria sia levata tosto dalla torre e
condotta nelle stanze che erano di mia madre; mi recherò io poi colà
a consolarla; le regalerò dei giojelli per il giorno delle sue nozze, e mi
proverò a parlarle da galante cavaliero: essa non possiede il
candore del latte, nè sa agire e proverbiare secondo i precetti della
corte d’amore come le dame dei nostri castelli, ma ha un non so che
di deciso nella sua fisonomia che mi va sommamente a genio.
Quando poi sarà sposa la colmerò di nuovi doni e allora tutte le altre
la invidieranno e ambiranno di godere nello stesso grado il mio
favore e la mia protezione.
«Oh quanto mai vi siete cangiato! (disse Tibaldo facendo un gesto di
stupore). Usare di queste dolcezze verso i vassalli egli è un volerli
far diventare orgogliosi, caparbi ed intrattabili.
«Ho determinato di far così e tanto basta (pronunciò il Conte
imperiosamente). Tu andrai in cerca di Gaudenzo, gli dirai che la sua
Maria non gli fu tolta che per punirlo dell’aver tentato di sottrarsi a’
miei comandi ed al mio dominio, e lo persuaderai a venire fra due
giorni al castello dove gli sarà resa la sposa e si celebreranno
pomposamente le sue nozze.
«Io andare in cerca di Gaudenzo, di quel villano impertinente, di
quel...
«Oseresti tu rifiutare d’obbedirmi? (disse il Conte prendendolo con
forza per un braccio). Se fra due giorni non conduci Gaudenzo
placato al castello ti faccio seppellire vivo in fondo al sotterraneo.
«Non ho mai ardito, nè ardirei esitare un istante ad eseguire la
volontà vostra (rispose timidamente il vile Falconiero). Non era che
per serbare più completamente il grado e il decoro... che io
osservava... ma se altrimenti vi piace faccio subito porre l’arcione al
mio ronzino falbo e non gli leverò il freno di bocca se non ho ritrovato
e ridotto Gaudenzo al vostro volere.
Così dicendo levò il berretto salutandolo rispettosamente,
s’incamminò verso la porta della galleria ove il Conte lo seguì e
nell’atrio gli ripetè il comando di far condurre la fanciulla di Arola
dalle rozze ed anguste stanze della torre ove gemeva, nelle camere
più addobbate del castello ch’erano quelle in cui aveva dimorato la
defunta contessa Isabella sua madre.
La notte che susseguì al rapimento di Maria, Bernardo il mugnajo
solo e desolato passò la Colma e discese a Civiasco, narrando il
crudele evento a Gaudenzo. Un furore indescrivibile invase alla
prima l’animo di questi; ma poi si raffrenò; stette alcun tempo
silenzioso, indi rivolto a Bernardo disse con voce di disperata
risoluzione: — «Le lagrime, i lamenti, le imprecazioni sono inutili: fa
d’uopo vendicarsi o morire. Datemi la mano, o padre di Maria, e
promettete di accompagnarmi nell’impresa che sono per tentare.
«Oh noi miseri! (esclamò Bernardo). Che mai possiamo
intraprendere contro un signore chiuso in un forte castello, e
circondato da tanti uomini d’armi? Ohimè noi poniamo a sicuro
pericolo la nostra vita, e forse rendiamo più crudele la sorte della mia
misera figliuola!
«Non temete: vi sono molti e molti che odiano mortalmente il
Biandrate. Gli uomini d’Ara, quei di Vintebio, a cui esso tolse più
volte i buoi e le messi, non attendono che il momento opportuno di
concorrere a sterminare il feroce loro aggressore: anche i montanari
della Val grande covano contro di lui un astio mortale per le sue
crudeltà, e per avere con ogni possa favorita l’eresia di Fra Dolcino.
«Ma a che mai può questo giovarci? Abbiamo noi mezzo di parlare
con quelle genti, di adunarle secretamente onde il Conte non ci
sorprenda e ci assalga coi suoi prima di essere in grado di opporgli
resistenza? Potremo noi persuaderli a versare il loro sangue per
nostra cagione? O figliuol mio, non lasciarti trascinare dalla smania
di una impossibile vendetta.
«No, ripeto, non è impossibile. Io sono disposto a tutto, e gli ostacoli
che voi calcolaste non sono insuperabili. Noi avremo il soccorso d’un
potente ausiliario.
«Di chi?
«Di Padre Anastasio l’Eremita.
«Oh che mai dici? L’Eremita di Civiasco coopererebbe alla
depressione del Conte? darebbe egli mano ad unire le genti dei
dintorni per liberarle dal loro oppressore?... Ma come lo sai tu?
«Gli ho parlato più volte, e quando gli riferii la prepotente esigenza
del Biandrate che io facessi le nozze con Maria al suo castello, come
mi significò lo scellerato Tibaldo, quel sant’uomo, il quale benchè
vecchio conserva tutta l’ardenza e il vigore della giovinezza, si
scagliò contro di esso colle parole più violenti e disse che un giorno
o l’altro la mano del cielo lo avrebbe colpito in un modo esemplare e
tremendo.
«Se l’Eremita è con noi egli ci assolve da ogni colpa: andiamo;
andiamo da lui ed io eseguirò ciecamente quanto egli saprà
consigliarmi.
Arrivarono di notte al romitaggio, ch’era una casupola presso una
cappelletta posta verso la metà del monte; entrarono colà mentre il
vecchio solitario appoggiato a rozza tavola stava meditando sopra
un ampio volume al chiarore d’una lucerna che rischiarava un
teschio umano. Si gettarono i due villici a’ suoi piedi, poichè
quell’uomo era per l’austera sua vita venerato qual santo, e rialzati
poi da lui cortesemente, fecero il racconto delle loro sventure, e
Gaudenzo annunziò energicamente i suoi arditi progetti.
Nessuno sapeva di qual patria fosse quel vecchio Eremita di nome
Anastasio e tutti parimente ignoravano da qual paese egli
provenisse. Comparve in quella terra e si stabilì sul monte presso
Civiasco allorchè Fra Dolcino l’eresiarca aveva posta la sua sede in
quelle vicinanze, favorito e sostenuto apertamente dal Biandrate.
Vedevasi di quando in quando alcun monaco straniero recarsi a
visitarlo nel suo eremo, lo che accresceva la di lui riputazione, ma
nulla però traspirava intorno alla vita antecedente di lui, a’ suoi
rapporti ed al suo stato. Egli s’adoperava con tutta possa a far
sparire dagli spiriti le tracce lasciate dalle dottrine ereticali seminate
da Dolcino e da’ suoi seguaci e a ritornare in forza i sentimenti di
sommissione e d’obbedienza verso il Pontefice, i Vescovi ed i
Sacerdoti che gli eretici avevano tentato di distruggere. La severità
de’ suoi costumi, la vita di penitenza ch’egli menava, corroborando i
suoi detti, davangli sommo vantaggio sopra i suoi avversarii, la
rilasciatezza ed immoralità dei quali favoriva le perverse inclinazioni
dei potenti, ma era oggetto di scandalo alla maggior parte del
popolo. Non tralasciava pure nei caldi sermoni che teneva alle
bande villerecce ora nei prati, ora ne’ boschi ove soleva adunarle, di
parlare con veemenza contro i ricchi, di minacciare ad essi la
maledizione del Signore in pena dei loro gravi peccati, e soventi
volte dipingendo un reprobo incallito nella colpa, si serviva di tali
immagini che tutti facilmente vi riconoscevano ritratto il conte Jago.
L’Eremita udì la narrazione di Gaudenzo e di Bernardo senza punto
lasciare apparire sentimento di piacere o di dolore: appena appena
la sua calva e rugosa fronte si raggrinzò per un lieve moto di sdegno
quando ascoltò il modo in cui era stato condotto il nero tradimento.
Allorchè essi ebbero cessato di parlare, egli rimase alcun tempo
meditabondo, appoggiata una mano alla gran barba, sostenendo il
capo: poscia disse ai due contadini che riedessero agli abituri senza
palesare i loro progetti a persona, e ritornassero da lui il giorno

The Range of Reasons in Ethics and Epistemology 1St Edition Daniel Whiting Full Chapter

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The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and

Epistemology 1st Edition Daniel

The Range of Reasons

The Range of Reasons

1.1 Norms of belief

1.2 From norms to reasons, from belief to action

From norms to reasons, from belief to action 3

defend a comprehensive theory of normative reasons, that is, of considerations

1.3 The unity of reason

1.4 A terminological interlude

1.5 Is something first?

Chapters 2 to 6 primarily concern metaethics, more specifically, the theory of

As the examples reveal, my interest here is in normative reasons. What is a

Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to

12 Reasons and Their Roles

2.2.1 The ontology of reasons

That it is raining is a reason to take an umbrella.

2.2.2 Motivating and explanatory reasons

Normative reasons contrast with motivating and explanatory reasons (Alvarez

whether every motivating reason is an explanatory reason. But it is uncontroversial

2.2.3 Weighing reasons

2.2.4 Being and having

14 Reasons and Their Roles

2.2.5 Objective and subjective

It is also common to distinguish objective and subjective reasons (Dorsey 2012;

2.2.6 Conditions and modifiers

2.3 The job description

The job description 15

16 Reasons and Their Roles

2.4 The options

Reasons as explanations and as evidence 17

2.5 Reasons as explanations and as evidence

ExplanationD Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if

14 Among proponents of explanation-based accounts of reasons, Schroeter and Schroeter (2009)

18 Reasons and Their Roles

or a contributory notion—that of something which might contribute to without

ExplanationR Necessarily, a fact is a reason for a person to act if and only if

Both accounts take reasons to be explanations of normative facts, specifically,

Reasons as explanations and as evidence 19

What is rightness? Here and throughout I take rightness to be a fact-­relative

20 Reasons and Their Roles

Reasons as explanations and as evidence 21

What makes an action choiceworthy in some respect or overall—hence, what

2.5.2 Overall or contributory?

22 Reasons and Their Roles

2.5.3 Explanation or evidence?

Reasons as explanations and as evidence 23

ExplanationRR is designed to capture the explanatory role of reasons, but it

24 Reasons and Their Roles

Reasons as explanations and as evidence 25

This seems unobjectionable. In deliberating in this fashion, an agent shows con­

26 Reasons and Their Roles

The interim evidence-­based account of reasons 27

2.6 The interim evidence-­based account of reasons

The preceding has led to EvidenceRRDR. As stressed at the outset, it is a provi­

28 Reasons and Their Roles

to a moderate degree to perform it (0.5). On the current proposal, the overall

The interim evidence-­based account of reasons 29

2.6.1 The objection from conditions

2.6.2 The objection from instrumental reasons

40 Explanation-based accounts face a similar challenge, as their proponents acknowledge

30 Reasons and Their Roles

2.6.3 The objection from facts about reasons

What is rightness? Here and throughout I take rightness to be a fact-relative

This seems unobjectionable. In deliberating in this fashion, an agent shows con

The interim evidence-based account of reasons 27

2.6 The interim evidence-based account of reasons

The preceding has led to EvidenceRRDR. As stressed at the outset, it is a provi

The interim evidence-based account of reasons 29

A related objection to evidence-based accounts of reasons is that they fail to dis

The interim evidence-based account of reasons 31