Abundance Ozuem On A.J Ayer's Conception of Metaphysics

A.
J AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OZUEM, CHUKWUYENUM ABUNDANCE

UG/18/2537
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

PHILOSOPHY, FACULTY OF ARTS, NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY.
WILBERFORCE ISLAND, BAYELSA STATE.
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD

OFF BACHELOR OF ARTS (B.A) HONS DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY.
AUGUST, 2023.
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify, that this research project on “A.J Ayer’s Conception of

Metaphysics: A Critical Analysis” is hereby accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the award of Bachelor of Arts (B.A) Hons Degree in Philosophy.
A.E Owutuamor
(Supervisor) Signature Date
Dr. E.S Udisi
(Head of Department) Signature Date
Prof. Okuyade Ogaga
(Dean, Faculty of Arts) Signature Date
External Examiner Signature Date
DEDICATION
To
God Almighty and my loving parents Pastor Chukuemeke Ozuem and Dcns. Eziogoli
Ozuem
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am grateful to God Almighty for having brought me thus far. I am also grateful to
my supervisor Mr. Ebimieowei A. Owutuamor who has availed himself and given me
the privilege to write on the topic: “A.J Ayer’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Critical
Analysis”. His advices, corrections and guidance made me a better researcher.
My heartfelt gratitude goes to my parents Pastor and Dcns. Chukuemeke Ozuem, who
single handedly supported me all through my academic pursuit, their encouragements,
prayers and love made me overcome obstacles and grow successfully.
My sincere acknowledgement also goes to all of my lecturers who contributed

massively to my academics, Mr. Ebimieowei A. Owutuamor, Dr. E.S Udisi, Prof.
Agha Eresia-Eke, Dr. Azibalua Onyagholo, Late Chief S.S. Eberiye, Barr. B.S.
Aveke, Dr. Elias Courson, Dr. Fred Okechukwu and Mr. Mark Ekpere. They
impacted strongly positively in my life and made me a better person. May God
reward your efforts.
This work would not be complete without appreciating my uncles and aunties,
especially Mrs. Kelicha Daphey for her support and encouragements. I also want to
appreciate my siblings, especially Chukuka Ozuem, Chinoye Ozuem and Michael
Modungwo for their love and support.
TABLE OF CONTENT
Title page - - - - - - - - - i
Certification - - - - - - - - - ii
Dedication - - - - - - - - - iii
Acknowledgments - - - - - - - - iv
Table of content - - - - - - - - v
Abstract - - - - - - - - - - vii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
1.2 Statement of the Problem
1.3 The Purpose of the Study
1.4 Scope of the Study
1.5 Significance of the Study
1.6 Methodology
1.7 Definition of Terms
Works Cited
CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review
Works Cited
CHAPTER THREE: A.J AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

3.0 Logical positivism, towards a wholistic understanding
3. The Analytic movement
3.2 Logical Atomism
3.3 Logical Positivism
3.4 Linguistic Analysis
3.5 A.J Ayer’s Conception of Metaphysics
3.5.1 The Verification Principle Explained

3.5.2 The Principle of Verification and the Verification Criterion
3.5.3 The Strong and Weak Forms of Verification

3.5.4 Practical Verifiability and Verifiability in Principle
3.5.5 Direct and Indirect form of Verifiability
3.6 Principle of Verifiability and its Refutation of Metaphysics
3.7 Journey Towards Conformability

3.8 Implications of the Elimination of Metaphysics
Works Cited
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 A.J. Ayer’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Critical Analysis
4.1 Has A.J. Ayer’s Principle of Verification Succeeded in Eliminating Metaphysics
4.2 The Principle of Verification Criticized
4.3 The Critique of Critics
4.4 The Indispensability of Metaphysics
4.5 Conclusion
Works Cited
Bibliography
ABSTRACT
A.J. Ayer a logical positivist and indeed at all his fellow logical positivists were
moved by the achievements and clarities in science and as it were, they moved to
bring these achievements and clarities in science into philosophy. They believed that
there are ambiguities and confusion in philosophical languages and that such
ambiguities and confusions would be a thing of the past in philosophy when they are
all jettisoned. It was their view also that those ambiguities in philosophy gave rise to
metaphysics. Metaphysics for these positivists was to be expunged because it
contained no knowledge as it purports to give. They (positivists) termed its
knowledge pseudo-knowledge. In this work therefore, I wish to show that no matter
the amount of attack directed to metaphysics by Ayer and his co-positivists,
metaphysics will never be eliminated because man must go beyond the physical to
explain realities like: life, God, man, world and man’s place in it, justice etc.
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Philosophy which began vigorously from the Ancient periods with its attendant
rigorosity and criticality in reasoning has apparently gone beyond the era of animism
and anthropomorphism that marked the works of Homer and Hesiod. No thanks to the
seeming criticality with which the early Ionian philosophers philosophized. Various
philosophies were put up, some rejecting the existing culture status quo ante, others
supporting the prevalent culture condition by way of proffering solutions. This brings
out the truism in the fact that there is no subject or field of study which began without
any basis or what Heidegger would call the ‘’prestructure of
understanding’’(Heidegger, 65), extending also to the maxim of Gadamer that ‘’no
one speaks from nowhere’’ (Gadamer, 64). Bringing out organically therefore the
importance of Heideggerian prestructure of understanding to the development of
philosophy, F. Copleston avows “one does not need to know very much about the
history of philosophy in order to realize that philosophy does not develop in complete
isolation from other elements of human culture.”(Copleston, 3). In the light of the
above, the emergence of the logical positivists with their principle of verification is
precipitated by some antecedents.
The principle of verification became for A.J. Ayer, a member of the Vienna circle,
and indeed all the logical positivists, a vademecum for their philosophical activities.
It must be noted that the first glimmers of the principle of verification were first
observed in the ancient philosophers who tried to situate being or reality with what
could be seen. Thales choice of water as the cause of reality is a telling sign of this
long marathon. Furthermore, the echo became louder and clearer in the late medieval
times when William of Ockham came up with the idea of nominalism which
postulated that “science as objective knowledge of necessary connections can be
validated without postulating mysterious universal entities out there.” This brought
about a complete over hauling of the dominant views as it opposed other views such
as conceptualism, realism, moderate realism etc. Capturing the scenario more aptly,
Copleston opined “…the nominalist spirit if one may so speak, was inclined to
analysis rather than to synthesis, and to criticism rather than to speculation.”
(Copleston, 69). The full import of the nominalists’ spirit was that “…through their
critical analysis of the metaphysical ideas… the nominalists left faith hanging in the
air without (so far as philosophy is concerned) any rational basis.” (Copleston, 72).
This view when pursed to its logical conclusion set the ground for the elimination of
metaphysics. It must be noted and just in line with what Copleston said that “the
development of mathematical and scientific studies by such 14 th century figures as
Nicholas of Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen is generally associated
with the Ockhamist movement.” (Copleston, 50). Bacon’s idea of induction and the
distempers of learning gave a sure background to this in the late Renaissance.
In the modern period, Descartes’ quest for certainly and clarity of knowledge was
informed by the Renaissance trail blazing effort, although Descartes toed the
rationalist line, he was nevertheless triggered off by the sole desire to make
philosophy certain and clear with his “methodic doubt”. Empiricism, it must be noted
rose at this period with John Locke and David Hume as the notable progenitors. As a
matter of fact, Empiricism could be taken to be the most pronounced and indeed the
foremost background to logical positivism.
In the contemporary era, the rise of idealism became a blessing in disguise; idealism
opposed to logical positivism in all ramifications inadvertently gave rise to the idea of
logical positivism. The effect of the attack carried out against idealism (both British
and German) by B. Russell and G.E. Moore which swoop the up-coming philosophers
had a lasting impression on them as so logical positivism was evolved. Suffice it, to
say that though both Russell and Moore were joint in their attack against idealism,
nonetheless they were non-aligned in their mode of the attack. R.R. Ammerman
succinctly captured this position when he aptly observed:
Moore and Russell were in complete agreement about what was wrong with
idealism or how best to expose the error contained in it. On the contrary,
their differing interest soon led them in diverging directions, although they
remained united always in their rejection of Neo-Hegelianison.
(Ammerman, 4).
In this joint rejection, each carved a niche for himself of course with parallel
positions, Moore vacated with common sense realism, Russell parted with logical
atomism. They each anchored their philosophies tenaciously on their divergent
positions. The introduction of Ludwig Wittgenstein was by no means a surprise as he
was the sharpest of B. Russell’s students. His Tractatus Logico-Phiosophicus was
somehow anticipated as he built his philosophy upon that of Russell. These
simmering philosophical attitudes become as they were the fountain-head and the
prelude to the rise of logical positivism as pursued by the Vienna circle.
Be that as it may, the logical positivists have the principle of verification as their
major arrow head on which their project is foundationed. This principle of verification
implicitly means that the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification. In
this sense, it looks set to provide a criterion of meaningfulness. By extrapolation, this
verification principle suffocates those propositions that does not fall under its ambient
and tagged them meaningless. In this way, metaphysical statements, ethical statement
and the likes were branded as nonsensical and pseudo-statements.
By and large, when we beam our critical torchlight on the strength of the philosophies
of Ayer and the logical positivists, to say that it contains an inherent
contradictions and inconsistencies will be to belabour the obvious, for it will be
apodictically true, that the verification principle is masquerading in some
incoherencies and inconsistencies. This suggests that their (logical positivists’) views
may not altogether be correct or dogmatically conclusive. This essay takes it upon
itself therefore to be a critique of the verification principle in its quest to deny and
eliminate metaphysics. In the end, we shall deduce whether the verification principle
emerged victorious in its quest to eliminate metaphysics or whether it is only crying
wolf where there in none.
The logical positivist tied with the apron of clarity and tempered solely by the
achievements of science as they were mainly scientifically minded philosophers or
philosophically minded scientists were ipso facto thorough going empiricists. For
them, any knowledge that transcends the limits of sense expression is not possible.
They also have it that the problems of philosophy were nothing but linguistic problem
due to ambiguities and lack of clarity in the use of words, and when those ambiguities
are cleared then there would no longer be anything of such like philosophical
problems. Wittgenstein in support will say “what can be said at all can be said clearly,
and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.” A.J. Ayer, stating his
anger against the metaphysicians, audaciously said:

The fruitlessness of attempting to transcend the limits of possible sense
experience will be deduced, not from a psychological hypothesis
concerning the actual constitution of the human mind, but from the rules
which determines the literal significance of language. Our charge against
the metaphysician is that… he produced sentences which fail to conform to
the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant.
(Ayer, 87).
In order to differentiate meaningful propositions from the meaningless ones, Ayer
propounded a criterion to this effect which he calls The Principle of Verification.
With this principle, he and other positivists set to clear from philosophy problem
arising from the lack of clarity of words or proposition. But then the question is “To
what extent can they succeed?”
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The search for “what is” has been an age long dispute in philosophy. The early Greek
philosophers started to philosophize with the question – “Ex qua materia constituti
mundi” (Of what material is the world made of?). As different eras passed by, the
question became more aptly situated in a branch of philosophy known as
“Epistemology” or “The Theory of Knowledge”. The question then took a different
dimension to be “what is truth or knowledge? How do we know that we know?”
In response to this question, different schools of thought erupted with their divergent
positions as to the different modes of knowing. We are very conversant with the cat
and dog war posture between the two worldviews that dominated the modern era of
philosophy – that is the empiricists and the rationalists. They were trying to defend
graciously their standpoint as to the ideal mode of knowing. Kant steps into the stage
this period in an attempt to synthesize the views of the empiricists and the rationalists.
Kantian synthesis took the form of “Copernican Revolution”. This means for G.
Ozumba that “he was able to show that knowledge acquisition involved a co-operative
activity between the senses and the perceiving mind… the external world of
phenomena does not impose itself on the mind as the empiricists believed but that it is
the mind that imposes it’s a priori categories on the world of phenomena.” (Ozumba,
9). Hegel at this point appeared in Germany with his absolute idealism. Later the
German idealism was transferred to England where F.H Bradley, Mc Taggart and
Bosanquet became its erstwhile apostles. It was however in a bid to debunk idealism
(both British and German) that G.E. Moore and B. Russell developed the ideas of
common sense and logical atomism respectively. Next on stage was Ludwig
Wittgenstein who was a student of Russell. Wittgenstein still drinking from the
philosophical tea bowl of Russell wrote his first major work “Tractatus logico-
philosophicus” in 1921. At the production of this work, the logical positivist took it
(Tractatus) as their philosophical bible and posited that it contained the canons of
their principle.
It was under the influence of this Tractatus that A.J Ayer and indeed other logical
positivists brought out with vigor the verification principle and delineated it to be both
a theory of meaning and criterion of meaningfulness. With this principle as his
bedrock, Ayer submits “until he [the metaphysician] makes us understand how the
proposition that he wishes to express would be verified, he fails to communicate
anything to us.” (Ayer, 19). Against this backdrop therefore, whatever that does not
pass the acid test of this principle should be considered not just nonsensical but also
meaningless. Under this verification shade, metaphysics was to be eliminated.
1.3 THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
It is the aim of the writer to determine whether or not A.J Ayer succeeded in
eliminating metaphysics with his verification principle. As a matter of clarity, the
principle which serves as a weapon in the hands of Ayer will first be exposed and
subjected under the sledge hammer of reason in order to establish its validity. When
the principle holds sway, then it might accomplish its tasks, and when the reverse is
the case then the principle will not at all be tenable and its task will not also be
feasible.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
In a bid to carefully do justice to this work, the chapters have been divided into five.
The first chapter takes care of the general introduction. The second chapter deals with
the literature review. Chapter three deals with analyzing of concepts to make way for
a profound comprehension of the whole idea of verification principle, while the
penultimate chapter tackles Ayer’s attempt to eliminate metaphysics and the varied
nuances and dimensions of the verification principle. The last chapter hugely
criticizes Ayer’s arguments with that of the logical positivists against metaphysics.
Evaluation and conclusion would sequentially follow suit.
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Alfred Jules Ayer, a logical positivist, in his great really work Language, logic and
Truth had only one mission which is to eliminate metaphysics on the ground that its
utterances are due in large part to the commission of logical errors. In order to
circumscribe and arrest the situation, Ayer and his fellow positivists came up with the
criterion of meaning called “the principle of verification’’. In order to do justice to the
thesis, the whole corpus of logical positivism and what they stand for will be carefully
exposed. In this light, the principle of verification will be carefully and overtly
highlighted with a view to dissecting how far it has fared in its denial and subsequent
elimination of metaphysics.
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The significance of this work is to show that metaphysics cannot be eliminated based
on the logical positivist’s criterion.
1.7 METHODOLOGY
The question of methodology in a work of this magnitude cannot be over emphasized,
and as the topic suggests, the methodology to be employed will be largely expository,
analytical, critical and evaluative. The historical point of view of the topic is however
not overlooked. Efforts will be made at a clear explanation of certain terms employed.
1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS
Etymologically, the word metaphysics comes from the Greek word Ta Meta Ta
physika which means “next after physics”. The word metaphysics as it is being used
today was first and foremost coined by Andronicus of Rhodes. As he was chronicling
the books of Aristotle, he (Andronicus) came upon the book that was after the one
named physics. As he was perusing through its contents, he noticed that its subject
matter transcends those in physics; he therefore decided to name it metaphysics,
which of course literally means “after-physics’’.
Be that as it may, the task of saying what metaphysics is and what it is not by way of
definition has being on uphill task and any attempt towards this has always hit the
rock or proved abortive. The reason for the above situation is not for fetched as true to
any branch of philosophy, any attempt towards its definition has always divided
philosophers into warring camps and as such philosophies have always been docked
in and miraged in the elusive attempt to define such field. Metaphysics being a branch
of philosophy enjoys such a position as well. Moreover, this does not mean that we
cannot sieve out at least a welcomed and working definition of the term. Metaphysics
as a matter of fact is the science that concerns itself with the first principles and
realities in general. It is essential both in the arts and in science. Metaphysics is
therefore according to Ozumba:
All pervasive in man’s quest for a better understanding of the universe. It is

because of this that metaphysics is seen to be very close to epistemology
which is a theory of knowledge that examines the extent to which we can
know. (Ozumba, 9).
Metaphysics in this respect has a method which does not lie in sense experience. It
uses abstract thinking as its method. Its method then is a prior (Ratio-cinative), which
involves reasoning on pure insights.
The practice of metaphysics started from antiquity and reached its climax in the
German idealism of Kant, Hegel, Fitche and Schelling. In Britain, Bradley and Mc
Taggart and also the logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein were metaphysical.
A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF SIR ALFRED JULES AYER
Sir Alfred Ayer was born in 1910. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church as a
King’s scholar and as a classical scholar respectively. His interest in philosophy was
developed by Gilbert Ryle who encouraged him to spend some time in Vienna. It was
while at the University of Vienna that he attended the meetings of the Vienna circle
and subsequently got converted to logical positivism. During the Second World War,
he spent most of his time in military intelligence. After the war, he became Grote
Professor of philosophy of mind and logic at the University College London. He left
London to become the Wykeham Professor of logic at the University of Oxford, and
also a fellow of New College Oxford from 1959. During this period, Ayer became a
fellow to many colleges. He became a prominent and well-known public figure in
England at this point and began appearing in radio and television programs. He was
knighted in 1970. Ayer made his name as a philosopher with the publication of his
major work, language, logic and truth in 1936; this work also established him as the
leading English representative of logical positivism, a doctrine put forward by a group
of philosophers that are known as the members of the Vienna Circle. The major
argument of the logical positivists which was defended greatly by Ayer was that all
literally meaningful propositions were either analytic (true or false in virtue of the
meaning of the proposition alone) or verifiable by experience. Ayer was influenced by
the philosophers of the Vienna Circle especially Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap,
Gilbert Ryle whom he calls mentor and Isaac Berlin.
Ayer took special interest in encouraging the young philosophers who more often than
not refer to him as “Freddie”. After his rest from strenuous philosophic activities, he
continued to support the annual British philosophical journals. Ayer married four
times and one remarriage.
Ayer saw himself as one of the descendants of the British empiricism fathered by John
Locke and David Hume and which was continued by B. Russell and G.E. Moore. He
wrote extensively both articles and books in the areas of philosophy of mind and
science. Sir Alfred Ayer died in June 1989.
WORKS CITED
Ammerman, R.R. (ed). Classics of Analytic Philosophy. New York: Mc
Graw-Hill Book, 1985. Print.
Ayer, A.J. Language, Logic and Truth. London: Penguin books, 1990. Print.
Copleston F. A History of Philosophy: Logical Positivism and Existentialism Vol.

XI, New York, Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy: Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy,

Vol. 3. New York: Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy: Volume I – Greece and Rome. New York:

Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Hans-Georg, Gadamer. Truth and Method. Translated by William Glen-Doepel Sheed

and Ward. New York: Crossroad. 1989. Print.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquire and Edward
Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Print.
Ozumba, G.O. The Philosophy of Logical Positivism and the Growth of Science,
Calabar, Bacos Publication, 2001. Print.
Udebunu C. “The Scholastics.” Unpublished Lecture Note, 2004. Journal.
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. Ed trans by D.F. Pears & B.F. Mc

Guinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. Print.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE

METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics has been subjected to an unparallel diatribe since the beginning of
philosophy itself. It is very evident that, metaphysics has been an unwelcomed visitor.
It is the intention of this essay therefore to make a long thrust into the past with a view
to exploring prima facie the humble beginnings of the principle of verification. As
such, I have endeavored to adumbrate the three major stages of its development.
2.2 THE NOMINALISM OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM
A very glaring signal that could be closely connected with the elimination of
metaphysics from the earliest time was seen in the philosophy (nominalism) of
William of Ockham. Ockham’s nominalism drew the string of the 13th century
metaphysics via antiqua and became known as via moderna. It gave great attention to
the logical statues and function of terms. In the 14th century as well even though
metaphysics was not abandoned, it gave way to logic. It will be very apposite to say
then that:
Questions which were formerly treated as metaphysical questions are

treated primarily as logical questions. When William of Ockham tackles the
subject of universals, he places the emphasis on the logical aspect of the
question, on the suppositio and significatio terminorum rather than on the
ontological aspect. (Copleston, 12)
The reason for this change in the nominalists’ spirit is not far fetched as they were
interested more in the analysis and criticisms of terms rather than on the synthesis and
speculation. Synonymously, Stumpf would in a bid to show the early attempts of

Ockham to eliminate metaphysics say that “universal terms, such as humanity are
simply signs or names (hence nominalism) for designating those concepts that
particular things engender in human reason. Human reason, then, is limited to the
world of individual things. Ockham’s view was genuinely empirical… The universal
terms do not refer to a realm of reality above or beyond the world of concrete
individual things.” The implication of this was that metaphysics and faith were left
hanging in a pendulum as far as philosophy is concerned. Ockham’s strict
interpretation of universals had the effect of severing philosophy from metaphysics
making out from philosophy something more like science. There is no gainsaying the
fact that the nominalists herald the coming of the principle of verification upon which
the elimination of metaphysics was greatly anchored. Flowing from this, Ockham
opined that “if people’s thoughts are restricted to individual things in experience, their
knowledge of those things does not lead them in any logical way to any reality beyond
experience.” It will be very salutary at this juncture to note that Aristotelian logic had
a great influence on Ockham, the foremost proponent of nominalism. Copleston
remarked that “one can even say that, it was in the name of the Aristotelian logic, or
of what he regarded as such, that Ockham criticized the metaphysics of predecessors
like Don Scotus and Thomas Aquinas.” William of Ockham with his nominalist mind
set the stage for an empirical and scientific way of thinking about the facts of
experience also his philosophy had the effect of separating science from metaphysics
and he also set the pace for elimination of metaphysics.
2.3 THE RENAISSANCE INTERLUDE
This period was drowned by the pursuit of science and also was marked by the
upsurge of individualism, the revival of classical texts, the use of vernacular and the
rise of humanism. Speaking about this, Copleston opens up that, “if the first phase of
the renaissance was that of Italian humanism; the last was that of growth of modern
science”. (Copleston, 221). This occurrence, no doubt, led to the emergence of
philosophers that concerned themselves with clarity and empirical observation. Of
these philosophers, it would be a slap on the face to neglect Francis Bacon and Henri
de Saint Simon. The former’s interest in learning and inquiry into inductivity
facilitated what arose as the principle of verification, while the latter was said to have
systematically used the term Positivism first in his philosophy.
2.4 MODERN CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
2.4.1 DAVID HUME’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
The role Hume’s empiricism played in the history of logical positivism cannot be
overstated. The Human empiricism was a thorough going kind. When juxtaposed with
that of J. Locke and G. Berkeley, it must be noted that Locke’s imperceptible and
unknown substance and also Berkeley’s spiritual substance are metaphysical
elements, which are very inconsistent with the empiricist principles they both
championed. The first notable critic of metaphysics in the modern period was credited
to D. Hume. Metaphysics was for Hume the use of mere sophistry and illusion.
Empiricism was brought to its logical conclusion in Hume’s famous work of A
Treatise of Human Nature which he later rewrote and published as An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding. I. Kant opens up in his Prolegomena that “since
the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we
know it history, nothing has ever happened which could have been more decisive to
its fate than the attack made upon it by David Hume.”
It was Hume’s desire to foundation philosophy on the experimental method such that
human nature should be studied by applying the empirical method of the experimental
sciences.
Copleston speaking about this experiment asserts in the words of Hume that “the
experimental method which has been applied with such success in natural science
should be applied also in the study of man…. we must start with the empirical data,
and not with any pretended intuition of the essence of the human mind, which is
something that eludes our grasp. Our method must be inductive rather than
deductive.” Hume invariably accentuated the idea of personal verification whereas the
logical positivists espouse public verification. Not surprising then that he himself at
one point opines, “As the science of man is the solid foundation for the other sciences,
itself must be laid on experiment and observation”. (Hume, 43)
Hume showed his distaste for metaphysical statement on the ground that it contains
nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Succinctly put in his words:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principle, what havoc must
we make? If we take in hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics,
for instance, let us ask does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
quantity or number? No. does it contain any experimental reasoning
concerning matters of fact and existence? No. commit then to the flames;
for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume, 25)
According to W. Barnes, “Hume concluded to philosophical nihilism from the fact
that there are two and only two avenues of knowledge, mathematics and empirical
science. On this basic, he rejects theology and metaphysics.” (Barnes, 25). Again it
must be remarked and just in line with the above statement that, Hume’s basis for the
book-burning crusader hinges on the fact that the only meaningful terms or ideas are
either sense impressions or mathematical concepts. Sense impressions are meaningful
because they express relationship between ideas that we can intuitively see to be true
and certain. No other concept can be meaningful since we have no way of testing its
validity.
Hume’s unflinching criticism of the principle of causality is an indirect attack on
metaphysics. He objected the principle that whatever exists has a cause because for
him, the principle can neither be demonstrated nor is it known by intuition.
Progressively he said, “That the future resembles the past is not founded on arguments
of any kind but is derived entirely from habit.” (Hume, 25). Deducing from this, the
idea of causality is psychological and mind reminiscence. Hume only wishes to
observe a demonstrable rational argument in order to believe in the idea of cause and
effect. Therefore the idea of cause and effect for Hume is to be jettisoned on the
ground that there exists no necessary connection observable between the two events
rather the two events are based on the sequence of events, succession of ideas,
resemblance of objects or contiguity of events.
2.4.2 KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
Immanuel Kant whose name is heavily associated with the Enlightenment Period
made a lot of contributions to the development and growth of philosophy. His notable
contributions include his mediation of the cat and dog war between the rationalists
and the empiricists which led to his Copernican Revolution and his criticism of the
traditional metaphysics. Kant did not even for a minute conceal his intention and
attribute towards metaphysics and in fact in his Prolegomena he opens up saying, “my
purpose is to persuade all those all who think metaphysics worth studying that it is
absolutely necessary to pause a moment and, regard all that has been done as though
undone to propose first the preliminary question “whether such a thing as metaphysics
be even possible at all?” Kant’s works Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena to
Any Future Metaphysics contained chiefly his arguments against metaphysics.
Kant’s criticism of metaphysics was based on his Copernican Revolution (which he
carried out in epistemology in order to justify the possibility of synthetic a prior,
knowledge, his doctrine of categories and his distinction between Phenomena and
Noumena. His Copernican Revolution was in a bid to mediate between the
empiricists’ view that knowledge comes solely from the sense impressions with the
rationalists’ contention that knowledge comes solely from reason and more properly
to reverse the prevalent belief held by philosophers that in the cognitive process,
objects impressed themselves on the human mind which simply received these
impressions passively. This belief dumps the human mind out of activeness in the
cognitive process and relinquishes it to passivity. The consequence of this passivity of
the human mind in the knowing process spells a doom for Kantian synthetic a priori
form of knowledge. Kant’s Copernican Revolution was reversing the hitherto existing
view. Kant argued in view of this, that the human mind is not a “passive wax” which
simply receives the impressions from the external world, but the mind acts on the
external world forcing the latter to conform to the mind’s pre-conditional modes (the
categories of sensibility and understanding). This obviously entails that “the human
mind leaves its impression (imprint) on the external world it perceives, transforming it
to assume the forms of the perceiving minds.”
With this Kant arrived at the conclusion that the human knowledge consists of innate
concepts of time and space and the categories of the human understanding on one
hand, and the object of experience in the external world on the other.
The corollary effect of the above is that “things do not appear to us the ways are in
themselves, but the way the mind structures them and makes them appear. So, we do
not really know, and can never know, the way things are in themselves but we can
only know the way they appear to us.” The way things are in themselves, Kant
referred to as the “Noumena” and the way things appear to us he calls the
‘Phenomena’ as such, we can only know the phenomena, we can never know the
‘noumena’.
Kant then grouped metaphysics with things in themselves (noumena). It goes without
saying then, that we can never have the knowledge of metaphysical realities since
they are beyond the limits of possible sense experience. Kant therefore picked holes
with the metaphysicians on the basis that they never inquired into the human mind’s
ability to undertake such a study. In trying to grasp the noumena, the human mind is
caught up in the web of what Kant called ‘Antinomies’ (contradictions). A.J. Ayer
articulating the above thoughts in Kant and also while showing the differences in their
rejection of metaphysics said “although Kant also condemned transcendent
metaphysics, he did so on different grounds. For he said that the human understanding
was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the
limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves.” In line
with these problems, Kant made a lot of allegations against metaphysics, which he
expressed thus:
If it be science, how is it that it cannot, like other sciences, obtain universal

and lasting recognition? If not, how can it maintain its pretensions and keep
the human mind in suspense with hopes never ceasing, yet never
fulfilled?... it seems almost ridiculous; while every other science is
continually advancing… we should constantly move round the same spot,
without gaining a single step. Where… however ignorant in other matters,
(men) presume to deliver a final verdict, because in this domain there is
actually as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound
knowledge from shallow talk. (Kant, 3)
At this point, it becomes imperative to underscore the fact that while Kant admitted
that metaphysics in general is possible he denied the possibility of metaphysics as a
science. To this effect, Kant crystally declares thus in his Prolegomena, “that the
human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as
that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether.
There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world…” (Kant, 5). He rather
advocated for a critical metaphysics.
2.4.3 COMTEAN CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
The term ‘classical positivism’ although associated with August Comte has been
proposed by Turgot and Condorcet. Henri Saint Simon on his part also elaborated it in
his theory of historical stages or epochs. But “it is however with the name of august
Comte (1778-1857), the foremost exponent and representative of classical positivism
that the theory of the human mind’s development from a theological through a
metaphysical phase to that of positive scientific knowledge has become traditionally
associated.”
Classical positivism is used here in order to make a distinction from the neo-
positivism or logical positivism of the twentieth century. Comte made a clear
elaboration of positive philosophy in his ‘course of positive philosophy (cours de
philosophie positive’).
In his ‘course of positive philosophy’, Comte remarked that the advance of natural
science is the result of an historical development of the human mind. This process
depends on man’s nature, he maintained, and is thus necessary. In its historical
development through the centuries, the human mind passes through three main stages
or phases-the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. He maintained that:
The three stages in the intellectual development of mankind have their

analogues however in the life of the individual man as he asses from
infancy through adolescence to manhood. When contemplating his own
history does not each of us recollect that he had been successively…
theologian in his infancy, metaphysician in his youth and physicist in his
maturity. (Comte, 21)
Comte’s law of three stages holds that the theological or religious stage is the
primitive stage, a time when phenomena are explained as being caused by divine
powers, and a stage at which men resorted to religion in their effort to understand the
world. They invented gods and used them to explain natural phenomena. Having
passed this stage, we are faced with the metaphysical stage when men resort to
metaphysic in their effort to understand the world. For Stumpf, in this stage, “the
anthropocentric concepts of divinity are replaced by the impersonal and abstract
forces.” (Stumpf, 197). In the positive stage, the mind concerns itself with phenomena
or observed facts, which it subsumes under general descriptive laws, such as the laws
of gravitation. He pointed out that the mark of real positive knowledge is precisely the
ability to predict and so, within limits, to control. Positive knowledge is real, certain
and useful.
Having established the law of three stages, he went on to criticize religion and
metaphysics on the grounds that genuine knowledge can only come from positive
science, and not from religion or metaphysics.
Neither religion nor metaphysics can provide man with genuine knowledge
about the world because they both deal with unseen realities which are not
objects of knowledge and are therefore irrelevant to our knowledge of the
world or natural phenomena. Knowledge about the world must be sought
from within the with the aid of the positive method, the scientific method.
(Comte, 198)
As a result, he avowed that scientific world-view must be enthroned while the
religious and metaphysical views are to be abandoned. With these criticisms, Comte
opined that the age of metaphysics is past while the age of science has come. This
view of Comte no doubt influenced the analytic movement which arose to fight the
idealist metaphysics of the British neo-idealists. This led to the emergence of logical
positivism.
2.4.4 THE PRAGMATISTS CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
Pragmatism can be fully understood, when we situate it within the empirical
orthodoxy. According to L. Okika, “it is a form of empiricism. But rather than
focusing backward to the origin of our beliefs (as did the eighteenth century British
empiricists- Locke, Berkeley and Hume), pragmatism looks at consequences.”
(Okika, 2). Pragmatists had a lot influences on the development of the principle of
verification. To buttress this fact, pertinent would it be if we state that pragmatism
combined two different notions: the pragmatic notion and the verification notion. The
former holds that the meaning of thought is in some way revealed by the conduct to
which it gives rise while the latter upholds that the meaning of thought is in some way
revealed by the experiences which it leads one to expect. Paying obeisance to the
above fact, W.H.F Barnes avers:
The principle of verification goes back to the principle of pragmatists as it

was understood by the inventor of that term, Charles Pierce and not as it
was understood by William James and others, who defaced the coinage of
Pierce’s invention so much that the latter changed the name of his doctrine
to pragmaticism. (Barnes, 25)
The earliest known pragmatists were Charles Sanders Pierce, William James
and John Dewey.
2.5 CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
It is the intention of the researcher to bring to bare, the British idealism properly
called Neo-Hegelianism which B. Russell and G.E. Moore criticizes with every
intellectual venom at their disposition that its world view (idealism) waned
tremendously. In praise of their joint opposition against idealism G.O. Ozumba
opined “Moore and Russell have been as the two compatible heads that turned around
the fate of philosophy from its idealism bound path to that of realism that is anchored
on analysis”(Ozumba, 14). The emergence of L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-
philosophicus boosted the morals of the logical positivists as according to them, it
(Tractatus) added weight to their tenets.
2.5.1 REFUTATION OF BRITISH IDEALISM BY .G.E MOORE
G.E Moore’s gunning down of idealism was chiefly contained in his work “The
Refutation of Idealism”. His other works “A Defence of Common Sense”, “The proof
of an External World’’ and “The Principia Ethica” were also embodiment of his
criticism of the contemporary idealism prevalent at his time.
In the Refutation of Idealism, he clearly noted that he is not directly against the central
idealist thesis that “Reality is spiritual” but it is the proposition that, “to be is to be
perceived” which he set out to criticize. If he can show that it is false then, he says,
“the idealist thesis may still be true, but certainly can never be proved to be
true”(Moore, 2). Moore also objected the idealist maxim on the grounds of identity.
The idealists in his opinion thought that “to be is to be perceived” is identical, (i.e.
that what is perceived is identical with perception).
Impeccable, it is to say of course that two of Moore’s most valuable weapons in his
attack against idealism were his acceptance of common sense and his repeated appeal
to the ordinary meanings of words. Moore attacked the idealists doctrine of
“Internality of Relation” on the grounds that it is false because “it flies in the face of
common sense”. It is often a matter of fact that a certain person owns a dog but
common sense would not admit that that person becomes a different person merely
because he gives the dog away. Common sense (and ordinary speech) allows that
although I may in fact be related to certain things in certain ways, I might not have
been so related, and get the ‘I’ in each case has the same reference. Moore concludes
on the basis of his appeal to common sense that some relations are internal, some are
external and that the idealist principle is quite mistaken. G.O. Ozumba argues in the
same direction with Moore that:
Lack of proper analysis is the bane of traditional philosophy which has a lot
of things for granted. Logical analysis is according to him the basic
business of philosophy. To him, it is the lack of the analytic bent that has
led many philosophers into committing what he called naturalistic fallacy
that is, trying to define things that are unanalysable and unnatural in
naturalistic term. (Ozumba, 15)
Moore left for the logical positivists the legacy of analysis which forms one of the
grounds (or tools) for verification. His influence also on the history of analytic
thought is very much unparallel.
2.5.2 B. RUSSELL CRITICISM OF NEO-HEGELIANISM
Russell rejected idealism for somewhat logical reasons. This is not unconnected to the
fact that his early writings were on logic and foundations of mathematics. The
importance of logic to Russell was very much explicit that “both before and after the
publication of the principia, attempted to bring to bare the result of his logical studies
upon the traditional problem of metaphysics”. His reason for rejecting the doctrine of
the Internality of Relations was deeply anchored in his work “Principia
Mathematica” which he co-authored with A.N.
Whitehead. Russell admittedly wrote in an article Logical Atomism in the book logical
Positivism edited by Ayer that “… I held that logic is what is fundamental in
philosophy and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their
metaphysics.” (Russell, 205). Russell argued strongly that the doctrine of the
internality of relation must be false and that metaphysical views that are deduced from
it are fundamentally mistaken. The idealists’ error is nothing but a logical one. In a
bid to settle the metaphysical question of the nature of relation, Russell recoursed to
logical and mathematical considerations. Remarkably he was of the opinion that if all
relations are internal, then the idealists are right in saying that Ultimate Reality is one
and there is only one truth. This entails according to Russell that, “that the
propositions of mathematics are not even partial truths, which is an unacceptable
consequent.” (Russell, 4). Analysis which for the logical positivists was a tool to be
used to sharpen and clarify philosophical problems was chiefly highlighted by Russell
when he tried to introduce into philosophy some of the precisions and successes of the
natural science through his symbolic techniques which he had done so much to
perfect.
2.5.3 L. WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
Wittgenstein who is ranked more with the linguistic analyst also criticized
metaphysics as chiefly contain in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. The opening
words of his book clearly exposed his stand against metaphysics. The first premise
“the world is all that is the case’, ‘the world is the totality of facts not of things. The
world is determined by the facts and by their being all the facts for the totality of facts
determines what case and also whatever is not the case,” (Wittgenstein, 1), Clearly
portrayed his desire to concern himself only with the empirical and observables.
Continuing further, he exclaims, “the sum-total of reality is the word, we picture facts
to ourselves, a picture is a fact.” (Wittgenstein, 2.063 and 2.1)
With the above, Wittgenstein has excluded metaphysics from matters to be studied
since metaphysics is neither mathematics nor a matter of fact. More still, the
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus sees language as a picture of the world. Language,
according to him, pictures the world. Since language is designed to be used to speak
about the world, to reflect it or picture it, its scope is bounded by the scope of the
world, i.e. the world of sense experience. Language can therefore not be used to speak
about any reality outside the world of sense experience. It follows then, that
“whatever is said about any reality outside the world of sense experience is simply
nonsense. Religious and metaphysical propositions are therefore nonsensical”
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus expressed it thus “most propositions and questions to be
found in philosophical works are not only false but nonsensical. Consequently, we
cannot give any answers to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are
nonsensical. Most of the propositions to questions of philosophers arise from our
failure to understand the logic of our language.” (Wittgenstein, 4.003)
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes a proposition ‘as a picture of reality, a model
of reality as we think as we think it to be’ (4.01). He espoused the idea of one-to-one
referent. He then criticized metaphysics on the account that ‘since there must be
correspondence between the picture and the state of affairs it represents, our
propositions are true insofar as they provide a picture of the actual facts in the case;
and our positions are meaningful, insofar as they provide a picture of the possible
facts in the case.” (Wittgenstein, 2.1). Since metaphysics follows none of the ways
outlined above, it was jettisoned. Philosophy aims at logical clarification of thoughts.
Wittgenstein not only rejected metaphysics he also set the goal for philosophy when
he said, “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work
consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical
propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy
thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: it task is to make them clear and give
them sharp boundaries.” (Wittgenstein, 4.111 and 4.112)
WORKS CITED
Ammerman, R.R. (ed.), Classics of Analytic Philosophy, New York:McGraw-Hill

Book, 1965. Print.
Ayer, A.J. Language, Logic and Truth. London: Penguin books, 1990. Print.
Ayer, A.J. Logical Positivism. Illinois: Free Press, 1979. Print.
Barnes, W.H.F. The Philosophical Predicament, London: Adam and Charles Black,
1950. Print.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy: 19th and 20th century French Philosophy, vol.
IX .New York: Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Copleston, F. A History of Philosophy. Late Medieval and Renaissance

Philosophy, Vol. III. New York: Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Copleston, F. A. History of Philosophy: British Philosophy.Vol. V. New York:

Continuum books, 2003. Print.
Ekwutosi, C. “Immanuel Kant and His Critique of Transcendental Metaphysics”.

Unpublished Lecture Note, 2006. Journal.
Hume, D. Treatise on Human Nature. New York: Penguin Classic, 1968. Print.
Hume, D. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Part III, Section XII, quoted in
W. H. F. Barnes, “The Philosophical Predicament”, London: Adam and Charles
Black, 1950. Print.
Kant, I. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics New York: The Liberal Arts Press,
Inc., 1950. Print.
Okika, L. Analytic Philosophy, Unpublished Lecture Note, 2007. Journal.
Omoregbe, J. A Simplified History of Western Philosophy Vol. II, Lagos, Joja

Educational Research and Publishers, 2003. Print.
Omoregbe, J. A Philosophical Look at Religion, Lagos: Joja Educational Research

and Publishers Ltd., 2000. Print.
Onyeocha, M.I. Analytic Philosophy, Washington DC, Paideia Publishers, 2000.

Print.
Ozumba, G.O. The Philosophy of Logical Positivism and the Growth of Science,
Cross River, Bacos Publications, 2001. Print.
Passmore, J. A Hundred Years of Philosophy, New York: Penguin books, 1980. Print.
Popkin, R.H and Stroll, A. Philosophy Made Simple, New York: Heinemann
Publishers, 1993. Print.
Stumpf, S.E. Philosophy: History and Poblems, 5th Ed., New York: McGraw Hill
Inc.,1994. Print.
Stumpf, S.E. Philosophy: History and Problems, 5th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill
Inc., 1994. Print.
Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; edited and trans. By. D.F. Pears and
B.F. McGuinness, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. Print.
CHAPTER THREE
A. J. AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
3.0 LOGICAL POSITIVISM; TOWARDS A WHOLISTIC
UNDERSTANDING
Upholding the Hellenistic academic tradition, in which the philosophers have great
penchant for proffering definitions and for a wholistic comprehension of Logical
Positivism we must start from the Analytic Movement down to Linguistic Analysis, if
we are to sharpen the focus of this discussion and also shield truth with as much
clarity as possible. More still, bearing in mind that for a discussion to be intelligible,
we must be able ascertain its quidity (i.e. what is it) by way of clarification.
3.1 THE ANALYTIC MOVEMENT
Etymologically, the term “analytic” has its root in the term “analysis” which literally
means “to break up”. Speaking about this break up, Thomas White says, “Analytical
procedures of all strips aim to reveal the nature of something by breaking up the
matter in question into its constituent parts.” (White, 1). Going further, the term
‘analytic’ as we use it today has its beginning from Aristotle. Aristotle primordially
employed it in explaining the methods of logical analysis. Not surprising then that
“Aristotle’s prior analytics contains his analysis of the syllogism, while his posterior
analytics contains his analysis of the conditions of scientific or demonstrable.”(White,
2).
Analytic, Oxford or Linguistic philosophy was a philosophical development of the
20th century in the English speaking world. The analytic philosophers were hugely
influenced by the writings of Gottlob Frege, G.E. Moore, B. Russell and L.
Wittgenstein, Including such philosophers also like A.J. Ayer, John Austin, Gilbert
Ryle. True to their name, the analytic philosophers adopted the analytic method which
seeks to clarify by analysis, the meaning of propositions which were shrouded in
ambiguity. The reason for this clarification is that the traditional philosophy contains
certain lack of clarity.
It must be noted that analytic philosophy is not a school, doctrine or body of accepted
propositions. One can rightly call it a movement. S. Stumpf supporting this view
writes “to call it [Analytic philosophy] a movement rather than a school underscores
the fact that although analytic philosophy has certain clear distinguishing
characteristics, the sources out of which it emerged, the changes it has undergone, and
the variety of ways in which it pursued are many”. (Stumpf, 446). R. Ammerman
building on the above admits,
Indeed, it is misleading to speaking of analytic philosophy as if it were

homogenous and monolithic… The word “analysis” is used here as a way
of grouping together a number of heterogeneous philosophers who share
certain interests and procedures. (Ammerman, 2).
Furthermore, the analytic approach to philosophizing poses objectives that in some
ways contrast sharply with those of the oriental views. Mark Woodhouse in support of
this position points to the fact that, “…its emphasis is not on fitting the pieces
(isolated beliefs and concepts) into a picture of the whole employing principles but
rather on clarifying the pieces in the first place.” (Woodhouse, 20). It is really difficult
to find a consensus in the ranks of analytic philosophers, nevertheless, there is still a
thin cord of similarity between them, in that they placed great premium upon the
study of language and its complexities, they also have implicit respect for arguments
and clarity of words as according to them, the function of philosophy is to clarify the
meaning of language. S. Stumpf would also in this direction articulates, “What unifies
all analytic philosophers is their agreement concerning the central task of philosophy.
The task of philosophy, they said is to clarify the meaning of language”. (Stumpf,
447). Collaborating this position Wittgenstein asserts:
Philosophy aims at the logical clarifications of thoughts… A philosophical

work consists essentially of elucidation. Philosophy dose not result in
‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task
is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (Wittgenstein, 7).
Analytic philosophy has since metamorphosed into various nuances in its eagerness to
solve philosophical problems. The major facets of analytic philosophy are to be found
then, in Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism, the Vienna circle’s logical positivism and
the later Wittgenstein philosophical analysis.
3.2 LOGICAL ATOMISM
Logical atomism is the brain child of both B. Russell and early Wittgenstein. This
being the case, it is incumbent also to say that
even though logical atomism is associated with both philosophers, their views
however are not exactly the same. This being the case; they were guided solely by the
spirit of logical analysis and the need to provide a more realistic picture of the world
which in the thoughts of both philosophers, had to be narrowed down to the “simple”
words though analysis. They were moved by the sole interest of using a perfect
language to picture the world more appropriately.
Logical atomism when put in its right place is the perfect arrangement of words so
that the meaningfulness of language is dependent on the correctness with which words
represent facts. Following from the above is that, “…logical atomism as a
metaphysics was concerned with analysis of facts, the clarification of structure and
interrelationship of facts and thus of the world.” (Ozumba, 17).
Russell commenting on the brand of his logical atomism in his article “Logical
Atomism” in the book Logical Positivism edited by A.J. Ayer said:
The philosophy which I advocate is generally referred as a species of

realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which
seem contrary to that doctrine…I held that logic is what is fundamental in
philosophy and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic
than by their metaphysics. My own logic is atomic… therefore; I prefer to
describe my philosophy as logical Atomism. (Ayer, 31).
Basically, the aim of Russell as made known to us in the Principia Mathematical is to
have a language that is composed of simple symbols or atomic facts that will have a
one-to-one correspondence to facts which they picture.
Ludwig Wittgenstein marshaled out his own brand of logical atomism in his book
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He began by saying “The world is all that is the
case. The world is the totally of facts not of things.” (Wittgenstein, 1). It was his aim
to show the nature of the world, the nature of facts and the relationship between facts
and propositions. It was his conception also that “no complex (propositions) can exist
without coming out of simples. Propositions though complex, have elementary
propositions as their truth values.”(Wittgenstein, 41). Wittgenstein as it were espoused
the notion of atomic facts and remarked that every significant sentence must be
analyzable into picture of atomic facts.
At this point, it is very convenient to remark that although the aims and aspirations of
logical atomism were noble. Its nobility was withered down by the fact that a perfect
language which they sought to develop is not realizable. This is corroborated by the
fact that they fail to answer whether it was language that determines reality or vice
versa, or as Ozumba expressed:
We are therefore torn between two extreme poles either to first seek for
ways of getting at reality before giving names… or construct our so called
perfect language from an off headed hypothesis without grounding it in
reality…. The question of reality as we know… appears to be that which is
forever barricaded from our sight. This boils down to the fact that any talk
about perfect language is utopian and any talk about reality is elusive.
(Ozumba, 15).
Accruing from the above, the decline of logical atomism was not a surprise. Its
arguments with regard to the relationship between reality and perfect language were
dissonant ones and incomplete.
Its attack came largely from within, and as we know, a household divided against
itself cannot stand, so logical atomism cannot stand as it was ambushed by its own
grossly because it contains metaphysics and according to its adherents both actual and
potential, metaphysics was to be thrown over board in toto.
The coming to life of the logical positivism did not help matters as they persecuted
logical atomism all the more with their scientific bent and metaphysical bias which
they said they came to free philosophy from. The corollary as a matter of fact was that
logical atomism was dismantled.
3.3 LOGICAL POSITIVISM
The term positivism was first used by Henri de Saint Simon to designate scientific
method and its extension to philosophy. It was August Comte that however
popularized positivism so much that it later developed into what today we know as
“logical positivism.”
Logical positivism also called the ‘Vienna Circle’ could be classified as a school of
science which came into existence in the 1920’s when Moritz Schlick around whom it
centered came to Vienna to become a professor of philosophy. P. Edwards describing
logical positivism said “…it is the name given in 1931 by A.E. Blumberg and Herbert
Feigl to a set of philosophical ideas put forward by the Vienna circle.” (Edwards, 52).
Schlick was directly influenced by Ernst Mach who was a physicist and whose chair
he occupied at Mach’s death in 1922. It (Vienna circle) was a seminal discussion
group that composed of philosophically-interested mathematicians and scientists in
the persons of Philip Frank, Karl Menger, Kurt Godel, Hans Hahm and Scientifically
trained philosophers, among whom are; Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath,
Herbert Feigl, Friedrick Waisman, Edger Zilgel and Victor Kraft. In the United States,
there were positivistically minded thinkers like Charles W. Morris, Ernest Nagel and
W.V.O Quine. Eino Kaila and Joergen Joergensen were in Scandinavia.
It is often a common accepted position that no one radicalized the ideals of this group
any more than A.J. Ayer who was also the foremost exponent of this philosophical
trend in Britain. Ayer in his book Language, Truth and Logic published in 1936
paraded what could be called the basic tenets of logical positivism.
To clear philosophy of its problems was for the logical positivists to eliminate
metaphysics. They brought out a principle to this effect which was called the principle
of verification.
3.4 LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
Linguistic analysis can be considered as a “movement” only in the widest sense of
that word. Unlike logical positivism, linguistic analysis has never had any formal
organization or setting comparable to the Vienna circle. Incidentally, there are no
sharp border line distinction between neo-positivism and linguistic analysis: there are
philosophers who write in both traditions simultaneously.
The dawning of analytic philosophy in the late 19 th century and 20th century of course
became a centrifugal force that shifted the gravity of philosophical activity from
known object to the knowing mind and the language used in discussing reality.
Linguistic analysis ipso fact enjoys a central position in the theory of philosophical
method as long as philosophy is thought of primarily as conceptual analysis
concerned with language.
The common line joining all these philosophers is that they all share a sublime respect
for ordinary language analysis while they eulogies at the same time it’s (Language
analysis) fruitfulness and merits for philosophy. Some notable figures in the early
development of linguistic analysis were G.E. Moore Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell,
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein once announced that he was dealing with the
problem of philosophy with an aim of showing that language sets limit on what we
can meaningfully say. He also maintained that we should be warry in our usage of
language otherwise we run into metaphysics. Other linguistic analysts were Giltert
Ryle, John Wisdom, P.F. Strawson, J. Austin etc.
3.5 AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS
We may accordingly define a metaphysical sentence as a sentence which

purports to express a genuine proposition, but does in fact; express neither a
tautology nor an empirical hypothesis. And as tautologies and empirical
hypothesis form the entire class of significant propositions, we are justified
in concluding that all metaphysical assertions are nonsensical. (Ayer, 11).
Ayer’s criticism of metaphysics was abundantly heaped in his best known book
Language Logic and Truth which was his philosophical bible. It was his aim to show
that metaphysical utterances were hugely because of the commission of logical error
in our usage of language and not a conscious effort by the metaphysician himself to
willingly go beyond the limits of what we can see. He went further to question the
locus standi of the metaphysicians who claim to have knowledge of a reality that
transcends the world of phenomenon. “Surely from empirical premises nothing
whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence of anything super-
empirical can legitimately be inferred.”(Ayer,5).
Ayer does not just wish to criticize metaphysics. He was interested not in criticizing
the way metaphysics comes into existence but in criticizing the nature of the actual
statements which comprise it. Ayer believed that the logical errors in our language
which gave way for metaphysics to sprout could be dealt with through proper analysis
and examination. This when done will bring about clarity and also dispel those
confusions which arise from our imperfect understanding of certain types of statement
in our language. In line with this, statements which are not limited to what can be
observed or logically analyzable have no significance or meaning. Therefore
metaphysical statements are to be purged. Based on this, Ayer writes:
No statement which refers to a reality transcending the limit of all possible

sense-experience can possibly have any possible significance from which it
follows that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality
have all been devoted to the production of nonsense.(Ayer, 5).
Ayer rejected metaphysics on the ground that its subject matter transcends the
physical and as such is grossly not concerned with the observable, hence, it was
mapped out to be attacked and subsequently eliminated. He argues further in the
defense of our sense perception that the fact that our perceptual judgments are at fault
sometimes has no slightest tendency to display that the world of sense experience is
not real. In his own words:
The fact that our perceptual judgments are sometimes found to be erroneous
has not the slightest tendency to show that the world of sense-experience is
unreal. And, indeed, it is plain that no conceivable observation, or series of
observations, could have any tendency to shown that the world of sense
experience is unreal. Consequently, anyone who condemns the sensible
world as a world of mere appearance, as opposed to reality, is saying
something which according to our criterion of significance, is literally
nonsensical. (Ayer, 9).
In a bid to completely eradicate metaphysical propositions, Ayer brought a criterion to
this effect. This he calls the criterion of verifiability. With this criterion as his
parameter, a sentence is factually significant to any person if and only if he or she
knows how to verify the proposition which it claims to express. Metaphysics as a
matter of fact, does not fall within this ambient; therefore it is to be jettisoned.
3.5.1 THE VERIFICATION PRINCIPLE EXPLAINED
The verification principle was used by the logical positivists to test which sentences
did and which did not express a genuine proposition about a matter of fact. This is
against the backdrop that they believed that the metaphysical language, propositions
or sentences were meaningless or as Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, senseless.
Consequently, the logical positivists developed the verification principle to serve as a
basic yardstick for the meaningfulness or literal significance of any proposition.
A proposition was to be considered meaningful if such proposition passes the acid test
of this criterion by way of fulfilling its requirements which consists in the notion that
“…the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification.”(Ayer, 109).The
motive behind this assumption was based on the fact that verification must always
rely upon empirical observation, which is in sense experience. Inferentially, any
statement that could not be verified under the observational method is meaningless.
For Schlick then, the principle of verification has to serve as a method of verifying the
conditions under which a proposition is to be regarded as false and those under which
the proposition will be true. Given the above view a sure foundation he said;
When we ask about a sentence what does it mean? What we expect is

instruction as to the circumstances in which the sentence is to be used. We
want a description of the condition under which the sentence will form a
true proposition and of those which will make it false.(Ayer, 109).
Apparently, the verification principle centers on the method for examining whether a
proposition is meaningless or not. Statement of logic and mathematics are as they
were meaningful because according to the logical positivists, their meaning can be
proved by purely formal means since they do not make claims about states of affairs.
3.5.2. THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION AND THE VERIFICATION

CRITERION
The principle of verification in its undiluted form holds that the meaning of a
statement is the method of its verification. This principle was adopted by the logical
positivists to aid them distil meaningful statements from meaningless ones. To know
the meaning of a statement is to know how to verify it, put differently, “A statement
has meaning if and only if it is possible to verify it.(Ayer,109). Any proposition that is
not empirically verifiably is meaningless.
A.J. Ayer came up with the criterion of verifiability in his book Language, Logic and
Truth which is to be used in testing the genuineness of statements of facts. The
criterion states thus:
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and
only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express
that is, if he knows what observation would lead him, under certain
conditions to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.
If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such a character that the
assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption
whatsoever concerning the nature of its future experience, then as far as he
is concerned, it is if, not a tautology, a mere pseudoproposition. The
sentence expressing it may be emotionally significant to him, but it is not
literally significant.(Ayer,6).
The logical positivists believed that the meaningfulness of any proposition depends on
its ability to be empirically verifiable. Deductively, there must be some grounds on
which this can be done. They gave two grounds for this which is: Observation and
Analysis. A proposition is meaningful if the fact stated by the proposition when
analyzed must, either be a tautology or a contradiction for it to be meaningful.
The principle of verification or verification criterion must not be confused on their
understanding as each has its different roles in the meaning of a proposition. The
principle of verification is concerned with answering questions that have to do with
knowing what meaning is. It also tries to articulate what the meaning of a statement
consists in. But the verification criterion deals with the way of deciding whether a
given statement has meaning or not. Therefore, the verification criterion, seconds the
principle of verification. Simply put,
While the criterion of verifiability shows us how a proposition can be

verified, the principle of verification shows us what the proposition
means… This means that while the principle of verification deals with the
‘what’ of meaning verifiability criterion deals with the ‘how’ of meaning.
(Ayer, 47).
At this point, it would be very pertinent to remark that the principle of verification and
its criterion did not stand as the proverbial mount Zion that cannot be shaken and as
such those (logical positivist) who put their trust in the principle of verification had it
shaken when a lot of attacks and criticisms were mounted on it. Evidently then,
modification became both expedient and exigent.
3.5.3 THE STRONG AND WEAK FORMS OF VERIFICATION
Ayer in a bid to clarify the sense of term ‘verifiable’ made a distinction between the
‘strong’ and the ‘weak’ sense of the verifiable. In his words,
A proposition is said to be verifiable, in the strong sense of the term, if, and
only if, its truth could be conclusively established in experience. But it is
verifiable in the weak sense, if it is possible for experience to render it
propable.(Ayer, 7).
Clearly enough from the foregoing, the strong sense of verifiable vouches for
conclusive verification which according to Ayer harbors an inherent problem such
that when taken as a criterion of significance will make the logical positivists to have
much to prove in their arguments. Consider for example such propositions namely, as
‘arsenic is poisonous’, all men are mortal; ‘a body tends to expand when it is heated’.
It is of the very nature of these propositions that their truth cannot be

established with certainly by any finite sense of observation… it must be
admitted that they cannot, even in principle, be verified conclusively. And
then, if we adopted conclusive verifiability as our criterion of significance
we are logically obliged to treat these general propositions of law in the
same fashion as we treat the statements of the metaphysicians. (Ayer, 7).
Vividly, the logical positivists could not account for the universal affirmative
statements as we have earlier through the conclusive verification; they adopted the
weaker form of verification which hinges on partial verification and also renders the
truth of any assertion probable. The weaker sense of verification seeks to find out
whether any observation would be relevant to the determination of the truth or
falsehood of a given statement.
3.5.4 PRACTICAL VERIFIABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY IN

PRINCIPLE
Ayer made a clear cut distinction between practical verifiability and verifiability in
principle. It was his view that there are propositions which we use in ordinary life
which we understand and believe and which we could verify if we take steps to verify
them. Albeit, we could verify some if we give ourselves the trouble. That
notwithstanding, he insisted that there are some “…which we could not verify even if
we choose to, simply because we lack the practical means of placing ourselves in the
situation where the relevant observations could be made.”(Ayer, 6). An example of
such proposition was cited when he referred to mountains that are on the farther side
of the moon. Although no rocket has been invented which would go to the farther side
of the moon to verify the truth or falsehood of such an assertion by matter of actual
observation, yet he maintained, “I do know what observation would decide for me, if,
as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make.”(Ayer, 7). In
recourse to the above, Ayer finally submits that the proposition though not verifiable
by any factual observation, is therefore verifiable in principle, if not in practice and is
accordingly significant.
In Ayer parade of thoughts, such a metaphysical pseudo-proposition as “the absolute
enter into, but is itself incapable of, evolution and progress” (Ayer, 7)) is not even in
principles verifiable. It only purports to assert what could be verified empirically. The
proposition in contention fails to communicate or lack literal significance if according
to Ayer; it is not accompanied by the procedures of verifiability which is how to
verify its truth or falsity.
3.5.5 DIRECT AND INDIRECT FORMS OF VERIFICATION
There remain nagging objections that Ayer’s criterion as it stands gives meaning to
any indicative statement whatsoever. In a bid to subvert the objections against his
criterion, the ideas of direct and indirect forms of verification come up in his words:
I propose to say that statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an

observation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more
observation- statements it entails at least one observation-statement which
is not deducible from these other premises alone; and I propose to say that a
statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies he following conditions. First,
that in conjunction with certain other premises, it entail one or more
directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other
premises alone; and secondary, that these other premises do not include any
statement that is not either analytic or directly verifiable or capable of being
independently established as indirectly verifiable. (Ayer, 112).
With the above word in hands, he reformulated the principle of verification as
requiring of a literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be
either direct or indirect verifiable, in the foregoing sense.
3.6 PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION AND ITS REPUTATION ON
METAPHYSICS.
There have been many attacks on metaphysics from the time of Greek
skeptics to the 19th century empiricists. While some declared that the
doctrine of metaphysics is false since it contradicts our empirical
knowledge, others agree that it is uncertain on the ground that its
“knowledge” transcends the limit of human knowledge. However , none
has aimed at a radical elimination of metaphysics as the logical
positivists have done. (Ayer, 6).
The logical positivists or scientific empiricists as they sometimes prefer to style
themselves burn with a fiery zeal for clarity, unspotted with the heat and the dust of
the glories of science developed a high anti-metaphysical attitude as they guided by
clarity abhors the opacity in metaphysical prepositions. The reason for this embedded
in the words of Joad that “…the logical positivists saw metaphysics as an incubus
which philosophy has carried for a long time and from which philosophy must be
liberated.” (Joad, 393).
The logical positivists, heaped their criterion meaningfulness on the ground that “…a
sentence makes a cognitively meaningful ascertain and thus can be said to be true or
false if it is either analytics or self-contradictory or capable at least in principle of
experiential test. (Ayer, 35). Metaphysics does not belong to any of the
aforementioned categories of meaningfulness and hence it is meaningless. In the
understanding of the logical positivists, philosophers who associated themselves with
metaphysics committed sacrilege and to forestall this, metaphysics was tagged a
‘taboo’ and to be expelled from the realm of philosophy.
The first palpable effort to nail metaphysics was the employment of the principle of
significance with which the logical positivists declared metaphysics null and void.
They debunked metaphysics on the ground that its statements are emotive and
conveys only imageries. To them, every statement which could not be reduced to the
simplest statements about the empirically given was dismissed as empty of meaning.
They are suspicious of abstract entities like substance, relations, classes and so their
effort is to decipher whether those words are cognitively significant. Ayer opposed the
metaphysicians vehemently on two count charge; that his statement does not point to
anything which could be empirically verified, secondly that the metaphysician did not
provide a dictionary which would help transform metaphysical statements into
statements that are directly or indirectly verifiable.
Drawing the rope still on rendering metaphysics meaningless, R. Carnap formulated
two ways in which a proposition can be meaningless. At first, a sentence, which is
meaningless, may at face value be meaningful. Sentence like “cax, bax and jax” are
meaningless in English language, but because the words are followed by “and”, we
may think it a meaningful statement.
Secondary, meaningless sentences emanates from putting words which are in counter
syntactical fashion together. Sentence like “what been this you” neglected the rules of
syntax (sentence building) in English language and so means nothing. Carnap
maintained that any sentence about metaphysical entities that suffers from either of
the above defects is to be termed meaningless. Metaphysical statements are therefore
found wanting with respect to the first criterion as they always purports to designate
something which in actual fact they do not. To this end, metaphysics statements are
referred to as pseudo statements i.e. (spurious statement).
The assumption that there must be some sort of reality which will correspond to every
descriptive phrase has always acted like the ‘vampire and blood’ dependency
relationship on which metaphysical speculation thrives on. B. Russell being
suspicious of the above avers that there are some phrases that have meaning but no
content, no reference and are empty symbols. He therefore, calls for the exclusion of
definite descriptive phrases that have no reference by way of analysis. Example of
such is “the mayor of Nigeria” when there is nothing of such like that. Even though,
statements containing such description phrase may have meaning, they are empty and
have no content and as such refer to nothing. Metaphysical speculation has more often
than not been accused of falling into this quagmire.
To add spices to the logical positivists’ argument and also to booster their morale in
their cause. J. Passmore said:
To argue against metaphysics in details, they concluded, was a complete

waste of time. If one metaphysician says, “Reality is the Absolute” and
another that “Reality is a plurality of spirits; the empiricist need not trouble
himself to reply to their arguments. He needs only say to them what
possible experience could settle the issue between you? To this question
metaphysicians have no answer; and from this, it follows, according to the
verifiability principle, that their assertions are quite without meaning. It is
as senseless on this view, to say that “Reality is not Absolute” as to say
“Reality is the absolute”. For neither assertion can be verified. Thus
metaphysical disputes are wholly pointless. (Passmore, 368).
The principle of verification tried all it could to do away with metaphysics even with
the least infinitesimal venom at its disposition but it could because at a point, the
principle was attacked that it came under duress. Carnap then as a way of rescuing it
came up with “Testability and Conformability”
3.7 JOURNEY TOWARDS CONFORMABILITY
The principle of verification was at a time laden with difficulties and received a lot of
criticism from different angles even within. Carnap made us to understand that by its
oversimplification, it led to a too narrow restriction of scientific language excluding
not only metaphysical sentences but also certain scientific sentences having factual
meaning. Carnap believed that the objectives and attacks raised against the
requirements of the principle were done not only by anti-empiricist metaphysicians
but also by some empiricists like Reichenbach, Karl Popper, Levis, Nagel and Stace,
whose attacks were right in several places. As the persecution of the principle was
mounting profusely, Carnap came up with theory of testability and conformability.
This is done to accommodate universal statements which the principle of verification
could not verify.
3.8 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE LOGICAL
POSITIVISTS ON METAPHYSICS
With the blatant elimination of metaphysical propositions by the logical positivists, a
lot of ripple effect looms large concerning issues like ethics, aesthetics, religion etc. I.
M. Onyeocha ably said:
Logical positivism maintains that just as there is no possible way of

verifying by empirical observation the statements of metaphysics and
ethics, neither is there any way of empirically verifying the statements of
theory of knowledge, social philosophy of history, philosophy of religion or
aesthetics. (Onyeocha, 33).
This is as a result of the fact that the verification principle acknowledges only two
kinds of meaningful statements, the statements of the empirically observed fact and
the abstract statements of logic and mathematics. To talk about the existence or the
nature of God in the views of Ayer, is to utter meaningless echo. This does not
suggest that Ayer supports the view of the atheist or the agnostics. From the above, it
would be clearly stated that:
Talking about God he was talking about a transcendent being who might be
known through certain empirical manifestations, but certainly could not be
defined in terms of these manifestations. But in that case, the term “god” is
a metaphysical term. And if “god” is a metaphysical term, then it cannot be
even probable that a god exist. For to say that “god exists” is to make a
metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false. And by the
same criterion, no sentence which purports to describe the nature of a
transcendent god can possess any literal significance. If the assertion that
there is God is nonsensical then the assertion that there is no God is equally
nonsensical.(Onyeocha, 32).
Ayer includes the statements about the soul, mystical experiences, ethical judgments
etc into the family of meaningless statements. Ayer attached ethical judgments and
aesthetics on the grounds that they have no objective validity whatsoever and not
because they have an absolute validity which is mysteriously independents of ordinary
sense-experience. In line with this he opined that “…sentences which simply express
moral judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood” (Ayer, 68).
Metaphysics, religion and ethics were referred by Wittgenstein as “the mystical” and
“un sayable” things. He was credited with these words, “…there are indeed, things
that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is
mystical.” (Wittgenstein, 89). The ethical, religions and metaphysical questions that
asks the questions-what is good? Does God exist? What is real? Strikes us as deep and
profound and according to Wittgenstein, are actually nonsensical, since they picture
nothing about facts.
It is easily observed that the principle not only makes nonsense of metaphysics
statements such as “there is a God” and statements about other persons, it makes
nonsense equally of moral judgments such as “it is wrong to steal” and aesthetic
judgments such as “Hamlet is a better play than Maria Marten in the Red Ban.”
Barnes could not contain his shock and opens up while comparing David Hume with
the logical positivists that, “…the positivists’ little finger is thicker than Hume’s loin!
for this is havoc indeed.” (Barnes, 108).
The logical positivists distinguish between the scientific and emotive language. In
scientific language we talk meaningfully while in emotive language we talk nonsense.
This nonsense however is useful in the sense that it helps us in expressing our feelings
and also change the way others feel. The logical positivists went on to develop the
emotive theory of ethics which states that “…ethical statements are not really
statements conveying knowledge at all, but are only expressions of our feelings or
emotions.”(Ekwutosi, 5). This statement, interprets “killing is wrong” merely as
expressing our feelings of disproval of killing. Since they are solely interested in
statements possessing the character of being empirically testable, they holding into
this tagged emotive statement as cognitively meaningless.
Scientific statements under the watch guard of the principle of verification came under
difficulty as well. Electrons, Protons and neutrons which the scientists use often are
highly metaphysical terms. Science also makes use of the general statements as “All
men are mortal; All mammals have air”, which are not verifiable for to verify them
would entail observing an infinite number of cases, which is a case on the strong form
of verification.
Having seen the unrelenting attacks on metaphysics by the logical positivists with the
principle of verification to serve as their weapon of metaphysics destruction, what
remains is to make an unflinching critique against the arguments.
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Ayer, A.J. (ed.), Logical positivism. Illinois: Free press. 1979. Print.
Barnes, W. H. F. The Philosophical Predicament. London: Adam and Charles Black,

1950. Print.
Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Syntax of Language. Illinois: Open Court Classics, 2002.
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Pub. Company, 1984. Print.
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 A. J AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS: A CRITICAL

ANALYSIS.
4.1 HAS A.J AYER’S PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION SUCCEEDED IN

ELIMINATING METAPHYSICS?
This question, however it is, is very crucial not just to Ayer and other logical
positivists but also to the metaphysicians whose work is at stake. This chapter takes it
up itself to critically look into the feasibility or otherwise of the ostensible elimination
of metaphysics with the verification tools. It also questions the appropriateness of the
logical positivists’ efforts to nail metaphysics in order to ascertain whether it is a case
of giving a dog bad name in order to kill it.
4.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION CRITICIZED
The principle of verification incurred a lot of criticisms, both from its own and outside
of its own. The first notable critique is that the principle falls short of its own standard
as it cannot be verified analytically or empirically and judging by its own axiomatic
functionality, it is meaningless. Conversely, some adherents of the principle argued
that the principle of verification is itself either not a statement or at least not a
statement of the same logical type as the statements for which it formulates the
criterion of meaningfulness. It was R. Carnap who understands the problem with the
principle when he asserts:
If every proposition which does not belong either to mathematics or to the

empirical investigation of facts is meaningless, how does it fare then with
your own proposition? You positivists and anti-metaphysicians you have
yourselves cut off the branch on which you sit. (Carnap, 4).
This means that the principle is a self-defeating one and a pseudo principle as it is
itself not verifiable by any means, and so, metaphysics cannot be eliminated on any
pseudo principle.
The belligerent attacks by the logical positivists on metaphysics were chiefly drawn
from early Wittgenstein Tractatus which he himself criticized as being myopic and
that, its propositions must be thrown away in a sweeping argument as being
nonsensical. He criticized Tractatus based on its views on language that language
consist essentially in picturing reality, that is one-to-one correspondences also that
language must state facts for it to be meaningful. Wittgenstein of course ran into an
error with the above assertions of his, which is restricting arbitrarily the scope of
language to the communication of only sense experience thereby excluding other
categories of human experience. Even though later Wittgenstein progressed these
earlier positions of his own language by saying that it has many usages other than
picturing facts, according to him “…we do use language in many other ways-to give
orders, to greet people, to make jokes, to play chase etc.” (Wittgenstein, 11). With this
he replaced one-to-one correspondence with one-to-many and also the assertion that
the limit of one’s language is the limit of his world, with the limit of one’s world is
the limit of his language. The resultant effect of the above is that propositions are
meaningful not because it pictures reality but according to how they are being used in
language game. Having influenced greatly the logical positivists, they (logical
positivists), of course fall into the same quagmire as did early Wittgenstein by
restricting arbitrarily also the concepts of meaning, knowledge, truth and verification
in favour of empirical experience alone. The above as it may be the, logical positivists
incurred a lot of mind boggling questions – Why must the meaningfulness of any
proposition be restricted to the realm of empirical certification only? Why must truth
be taken to mean only truth concerning matters of fact about the empirical world?
Why must the word “knowledge” be consigned only to information about matters of
fact regarding the experiential world?
It is very much arguable, that the logical positivists did not fathom fully, that the
experiential knowledge is not the only type of knowledge. This notwithstanding, their
faith in experience as the ideal source of knowledge is not well grounded. This is
because; experience has proved itself to be unreliable. We often discover that we
experience a particular thing only for it to be a mirage. The conventional problems of
hallucination, misperception, illusion and phantasmagoria, all have a point to prove in
this regard. With the above in hand, we cannot assert dogmatically that our sense
experience is the only genuine and reliable knowledge.
There is an ambiguity in the idea of significance as was advocated for by the logical
positivists. When we take this significance to mean “having meaning” or “being
important”, then the nagging problem is, “…who determines the meaning of a term-
the group, community or the individual? Have the logical positivists the mandate to
determine things that are significant to us?” These questions as they were, are
begging for answers. It is very pellucid that a thing need not be significant for it to be
meaningful or vice versa. As such, they have a faulted foundation.
The logical positivists being scientifically minded philosophers, and philosophically
interested scientists believed that their views are the scientific views of the world.
Karl Popper criticized this view tremendously in his book Logic of Scientific
Discovery and maintained there that the central tenets of the logical positivists which
are the principle of verification effaced completely the whole of science. Popper also
believed that scientific laws are not empirically verifiable, and in the logical
positivists’ parlance it is meaningless, Popper went further to acknowledged Hume as
the first to have noted that from no finite number of observations however large, could
any unrestrictedly general conclusion be drawn that would be dependable in logic.
The unrestricted generality of the scientific laws makes them permanently impossible
to be verified empirically by no matter how many observations. As such, the
unrestrictedly general statements of the form, “All A’s have the characteristics X’ are
of their very nature not empirically verified but can be falsified according to Popper.
The discomforting fact there is that scientific laws are characteristically statements of
this kind.
The logical positivists’ search for the criterion of meaning was for Popper a mistake.
In progressing this line of thought, he remarked that, the greatest knowledge comes
from the natural sciences and yet they have many terms that are undefined like Mass,
energy, atom, light, physics, measurement etc.
Another attack against the logical positivists is that they relegated to the background
the spiritual nature of man, Man as a psychosomatic being is involved in both sense
experience and spiritual (metaphysical) experience. By eulogizing experiential
knowledge, the logical positivists restricted the concept of truth, knowledge,
verification and meaning to sense experience at the expense of all other categories of
human experience.
Furthermore, the logical positivists committed the fallacy of dimensional exclusivity
and narrow mindedness, in understanding the task of philosophy. They arbitrarily
restricted philosophy to language analysis only in lieu of the world described by
language. Having restricted philosophy to language analysis only, they excluded
greatly, what has been traditionally included in philosophy.
Finally, to mop up this critique, we shall implore the words of F. Copleston when he
said “it seems to me absurd to represent metaphysical systems and world-views as
illegitimate enterprises, at any rate, when they express personal thought and visions”.
(Copleston, 9).
4.3 A CRITIQUE OF CRITICS
The influence on the logical positivists’ position by the criticism heaped upon
metaphysics necessitates this section.
Calling to mind in this respect is the dry water criticisms which Hume leveled against
metaphysics. His critiques are in line with the empiricists’ principle that states that all
knowledge begins with experience. The implication of this is that any knowledge that
transcends the world of sense experience is no knowledge. This goes a long way to
confirm that the empiricists wrongly and arbitrarily restricted truth to the truth about
matters of fact in the world of sense experience, neglecting other kinds of truth.
They fail to understand also that, the various dimension of man will of course
necessitate various dimensions of truth other than that about the world of experience.
Such truths as metaphysical truth, religious truth, etc. Another of such problem is the
arbitral restriction of experience only to sense experience thereby rejecting other types
of experience, metaphysical experience, religious experience, mystical
experience, extra-sensory experience etc.

The distraction between Noumena and Phenomena, served as the bedrock for Kant’s
criticisms against metaphysics. It must be noted that these dichotomy between
Noumena and Phenomena are incoherent with Kantian philosophy. This was
expressed by Omoregbe when he opined:
If, as Kant say, the noumena cannot be known because the categories of
human understanding cannot be applied to them, how do we know that they
exist at all? If, as Kant says, they are unknowable to us, then we cannot
even know that they exist. There is surely gross inconsistency, and even a
contradiction in saying that we know the unknowable to exist. (Omoregbe,
129).
Accruing from the above, if the noumena are unknowable, it therefore suggests that
we cannot even know that they exist or how it exists much less talk about them. The
whole arguments of Kant on this collapsed because his premises are faulty and also
are based on this inconsistency.
Next on stage was A. Comte’s criticism of metaphysics which was hugely based on
his theory of three stages-theological, metaphysical and positivists’ stage. This has
been proved by time and history to be in serious error. Due to the religious and
metaphysical dimensions of man, both entities cannot by any means be a thing of the
past and will forever be continue to exist along with man. Interestingly, while Comte
was busy in France writing that the metaphysical age has been effaced and therefore
replaced by the positive age, Schelling and Hegel were busy in Germany constructing
a metaphysics known as idealism.
Summarily, what eluded these critiques was that it only takes a metaphysician to
criticize a metaphysician, and as long as the empiricists and analysts criticize
metaphysics, they will always show a peripheral understanding of the metaphysics.

4.4 THE INDISPENSABILITY OF METAPHYSICS
The indispensability of metaphysics is such that it cannot be eliminated by any means.
Metaphysics is the heart of philosophy. It’s most vital and sensitive organ, people
have shot at it but it is not fated to die. When we accept the distinction between
appearance and reality and that there is more to reality than we can perceive in our
sense-perception, then we appreciate magnificently the role and value of metaphysics
as it takes us from appearance to reality, we appreciate magnificently the role or value
of metaphysics. Kant not minding his devastating attack on metaphysics had to admit
that man has within him the natural urge towards metaphysics.
The fact that metaphysics underlies other disciplines and foundations them, lends
credence to the fact of its indispensability. The reason is that while other discipline
study one aspect of being or the other, metaphysics studies being as being in all its
ramification. Metaphysics searches for the ultimate cause of reality, and it arises out
of its quest to understand the world. What philosophy is interested in, in all the other
disciplines is their metaphysical undertone.
Closely enough, one finds an inherent implausibility in the notion that metaphysics is
meaningless. The truism of the above sentence will see the great philosophical works
like Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s metaphysics, St. Thomas Summa Contra Gentiles,
Kant’s critique of pure reason, Hegel’s dialectics etc. as work compound out of
statements possessing no meaning. Barnes contends the above by saying that “…such
works appeal to evidence, draw inferences and employ all the recognized procedures
of reasoning. They reveal in every line a serious and sustained endeavour to reach the
truth.” (Barnes, 26).
Another important fact is that science cannot function without metaphysics.
Metaphysics as the science of general principles cannot be eliminated because even
our scientific method involves conjectures and it is in this way that the frontiers of
knowledge are expanded.
The metaphysical questions about substance, God, causality, man and his place in the
world, immorality, freedom are very important and real questions which the empirical
sciences have no answer for. Man in a quest and hunger to answer these questions
engages in metaphysics. Metaphysics with this role cannot be eliminated because by
the virtue of its role, task and value and man’s natural desire towards it, it must
endure.
At this juncture, it will be very satisfying to conclude that metaphysics cannot be
barred unless it is barred dogmatically and as long as the human nature is composed
of spiritual, psychological or metaphysical dimensions, any attempt to eliminate
metaphysics will be futile and unproductive. Employing the words of G. O. Ozumba,
to close this section and while at the same bringing out the inseparable relationship
between philosophy and metaphysics he asserts that,
Those who are clamoring for the elimination of metaphysics are also calling
for the crucifixion of philosophy. Philosophy without metaphysics is a
corpse and any eulogy to philosophy that has been divested of metaphysics
is like a requiem hymn that is sung to the corpse of the dead. (Ozumba, 49).
From the above assertion, it can be deduced that metaphysics is a very crucial aspect
in philosophy and to call for the elimination of metaphysics would seem to call for
the death of philosophy.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Having seen the philosophy of A.J Ayer and his co logical positivists, in which they
wish to eliminate metaphysics with their tool of verification it is quite appropriate at
this point to aver that the logical positivists have just been crying wolf where there is
none as they still have loose ends to tighten up, reason being that their verification
principle crumbled as a result of the attacks against it. The most vehement attack that
led the principle to lose its value and importance was from within, that is, it was
criticized by those who are supposed to be its “knights.” Therefore, the principle must
be labeled barren, and the logical positivists’ effort to crucify metaphysics based on
this principle is considered as a futile and meaningless venture as metaphysics cuts
across philosophy, their philosophy of course not excluded.
By and large, the body shall not be thrown away with the bathwater. The verification
principle, even though its project proved abortive, it left some good memories to the
philosophical world by way of contribution. By its insistence on meaningful
propositions, it has succeeded in making philosophers to be self-critical and wary
about their use of language than they have hitherto been. Its emphasis on language,
clarity of expressions and avoidance of ambiguities in expression has been of
immense help not only in natural science but also in all fields of study. It has also
made a remarkable impression in the technical field of inductional probability which
is a useful method in science.
Finally, we have seen why metaphysics can never be done away with by the
verification principle of the logical positivists. Obviously, as long as man still exist in
this world of reality, metaphysics will continue to exist alongside with him, and if it is
to be branded an evil, it has assumed the position of a necessary evil and the best we
can achieve is to find different ways of accommodating and exploiting metaphysics in
our future understanding of propositional statements in order to advance human
knowledge big time.
WORKS CITED
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Print.
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Chicago Press. 1934. Print.
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xi. London: Continuum books. 2003. Print.
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Company, 1981. Print.
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Catholici, 1972, Print.
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New York: Macmillan Company, 1968. Print.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Vol. III. New York: Continuum Books, 2003. Print.
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XI. New York: Continuum Books, 2003. Print.
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2006. Print.
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Print.
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Abundance Ozuem On A.J Ayer's Conception of Metaphysics

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A.

J AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

OZUEM, CHUKWUYENUM ABUNDANCE

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD

This is to certify, that this research project on “A.J Ayer’s Conception of

(Supervisor) Signature Date

Dr. E.S Udisi

(Head of Department) Signature Date

Prof. Okuyade Ogaga

(Dean, Faculty of Arts) Signature Date

External Examiner Signature Date

My sincere acknowledgement also goes to all of my lecturers who contributed

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 The Purpose of the Study

1.4 Scope of the Study

1.5 Significance of the Study

1.7 Definition of Terms

CHAPTER THREE: A.J AYER’S CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS

3. The Analytic movement

3.2 Logical Atomism

3.3 Logical Positivism

3.4 Linguistic Analysis

3.5 A.J Ayer’s Conception of Metaphysics

3.5.1 The Verification Principle Explained

3.5.3 The Strong and Weak Forms of Verification

3.5.5 Direct and Indirect form of Verifiability

3.6 Principle of Verifiability and its Refutation of Metaphysics

3.7 Journey Towards Conformability

4.0 A.J. Ayer’s Conception of Metaphysics: A Critical Analysis

4.1 Has A.J. Ayer’s Principle of Verification Succeeded in Eliminating Metaphysics

4.2 The Principle of Verification Criticized

4.3 The Critique of Critics

4.4 The Indispensability of Metaphysics

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

any basis or what Heidegger would call the ‘’prestructure of

understanding’’(Heidegger, 65), extending also to the maxim of Gadamer that ‘’no

importance of Heideggerian prestructure of understanding to the development of

precipitated by some antecedents.

postulated that “science as objective knowledge of necessary connections can be

analysis rather than to synthesis, and to criticism rather than to speculation.”

development of mathematical and scientific studies by such 14 th century figures as

Nicholas of Oresme, Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen is generally associated

distempers of learning gave a sure background to this in the late Renaissance.

foremost background to logical positivism.

succinctly captured this position when he aptly observed:

atomism. They each anchored their philosophies tenaciously on their divergent

positions. The introduction of Ludwig Wittgenstein was by no means a surprise as he

was the sharpest of B. Russell’s students. His Tractatus Logico-Phiosophicus was

somehow anticipated as he built his philosophy upon that of Russell. These

prelude to the rise of logical positivism as pursued by the Vienna circle.

this sense, it looks set to provide a criterion of meaningfulness. By extrapolation, this

and the likes were branded as nonsensical and pseudo-statements.

of Ayer and the logical positivists, to say that it contains an inherent

contradictions and inconsistencies will be to belabour the obvious, for it will be

apodictically true, that the verification principle is masquerading in some

emerged victorious in its quest to eliminate metaphysics or whether it is only crying

wolf where there in none.

achievements of science as they were mainly scientifically minded philosophers or

anger against the metaphysicians, audaciously said:

In order to differentiate meaningful propositions from the meaningless ones, Ayer