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Tau Reck 2006
Tau Reck 2006
MARIUS KNAGENHJELM
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Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers – World Politics in the
Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, 240 pp., £15.99 pbk.,
£55 hbk.).
Barry Buzan’s The United States and the Great Powers – World Politics in the
Twenty-First Century is the latest in a series of Buzan’s work designed
both to advance International Relations theory and, at the same time,
provide new explanatory insight into the dynamics of world affairs. Of
particular note here is People, States and Fear (1991, 1983), which contains
the original formulation of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)
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used in this piece. Considering that the book was originally planned as
part of Regions and Powers (a collaboration with Ole Wæver, 2003) in
which the latest version of RSCT finds thorough empirical application,
this is not at all surprising. Indeed, The United States and the Great Powers
can quite easily be read as a continuation of the ideas developed in
Regions and Powers with particular focus on the practical application of
RSCT. In addition to this continuity, the book also seeks to offer its own
original theoretical advance, which (and the title utterly fails to convey
this) is a combination of traditional (realist) polarity theory, English
school/constructivist notions of identity and, what Buzan calls complex
polarity theory.
Buzan frames the central analysis of the work on page one with the
question: ‘What would world politics have been like between 1945 and
1989 if the US and the Soviet Union had been democracies?’ By asking
this question Buzan challenges the neorealist/Waltzian assumption that,
in the analysis of world politics, only the distribution of capabilities
across units matters, irrespective of the characteristics of the respective
states. In introducing Wendtian and English School ideas about the
social construction of the international system and role of identity to the
subject of polarity, Buzan refutes that claim and argues instead that
polarity theory is only useful if it takes the identities of the respective
states into account. Following Wendt, he argues that identities determine
whether or not relations between states are cast in terms of friendship,
rivalry, or enmity (p. 20). In so doing, Buzan refutes a second key realist
assumption that identities are functions of self-interest, whereby rivalry
and enmity discount the possibility of friendship between states. Taking
into account the role of identity in shaping polarity, Buzan answers his
opening question by arguing that, had the superpowers shared the
common ideology (identity) of liberal democracy, the period from 1945
to 1989 would have been very different (p. 21.). For Buzan, whether
states conceive of their relationships in terms of enmity, friendship, or
rivalry is dependent upon the:
[…] extent to which the ideology with which each major power
constructs itself is supportive of, neutral to, or antagonistic towards
the ideologies with which its contemporaneous major powers
construct themselves (p. 21).
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In the empirical part of the book Buzan takes a close look at the three
most likely future polarity structures: a continuation of the unipolar
world, a world with more than one superpower, and a world without a
superpower. In applying the logics of complex polarity theory to
possible future scenarios, Buzan provides an illustrative application of
his argument concerning the role of identity in the social construction of
polarity in addition to some productive insight regarding the future of
world politics.
One reason for the appeal of Buzan’s work lies in its fundamental
disregard for canonical dogmatism. Buzan who sees ‘no reason why one
cannot examine the interplay of different approaches in a disciplined
manner’ (p. ix, emphasis added) shows that real insights into world
politics can only be derived from the utilisation of a number of theories,
each shedding light where others stand blind. If contemporary IR theory
is to have any utility for policy makers, then this certainly is the way
forward.
RITA TAURECK
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