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The Roots of Modern Psychology and Law
The Roots of Modern
Psychology and Law
A Narrative History
EDITED BY
THOMAS GRISSO
AND
S TA N L E Y L . B R O D S K Y
1
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTORS VII
EDITORS’ PROLOGUE XIII
Stanley L. Brodsky and Thomas Grisso
1. The Evolution of Psychology and Law 1

Thomas Grisso
SECTION I Psychological Science and Law 29
2. Eyewitness Testimony: An Eyewitness Report 31

Elizabeth F. Loftus
3. Applying Social Psychology to Law and the Legal Process 44

Michael J. Saks
4. Jury Research 61
Shari Seidman Diamond
5. Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 78

David B. Wexler
6. Mental Disability, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment 94

Stephen J. Morse
7. Framing, Institutionalizing, and Nurturing Research

in Psychology and Law 109
Bruce D. Sales
vi Contents
SECTION II Assessment, Interventions, and Practice

in Legal Contexts 125
8. Forensic Mental Health Services and Competence

to Stand Trial 127
Ronald Roesch
9. Predictions of Violence 143

John Monahan
10. Developmental Psycholegal Capacities 158

Thomas Grisso
11. Correctional Psychology 178

Stanley L. Brodsky
12. The Founding and Early Years of the American Board

of Forensic Psychology 195
Florence W. Kaslow
13. Community Psychology, Public Policy, and Children 207

N. Dickon Reppucci
EDITORS’ EPILOGUE 223

Thomas Grisso and Stanley L. Brodsky
INDEX 227
CONTRIBUTORS
Stanley L. Brodsky, PhD, is professor emeritus and scholar-in-residence

at the University of Alabama, where he was a faculty member from 1972
to 2016. He previously was chief psychologist at the U.S. Disciplinary
Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and was with the Center for the Study
of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections at Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale. He was a founding member of the American Psychology–Law
Society and has received the awards for Outstanding Achievement from
the American Psychology–Law Society and the American Association of
Correctional Psychologists. He is the editor or author of 15 books and
over 250 articles, mostly in the area of psychology applied to the law.
Shari Seidman Diamond, PhD, JD, is Howard J. Trienens Professor of

Law and Professor of Psychology at Northwestern University, where she
heads the JD/PhD program, and a research professor at the American
Bar Foundation. She was president of the American Psychology–Law
Society (1987–1988), editor of the Law & Society Review (1988–1991),
and co-president of the Society for Empirical Legal Studies (2010–
2011). She received the American Psychological Association’s award for
Distinguished Contributions to Research in Public Policy (1991) and
the Law and Society Association’s Harry Kalven Jr. award for Empirical
Scholarship That Has Contributed Most Effectively to the Advancement
of Research in Law and Society (2010). She was elected to the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences (2012).
viii Contributors
Thomas Grisso, PhD, is emeritus professor of psychiatry (clinical psychol-

ogy) at the University of Massachusetts Medical School. Other primary
academic appointments during his career included Ashland University
(1969–1974) and Saint Louis University (1975–1987). He was president
of the American Psychology–Law Society in 1990 and executive director
of the American Board of Forensic Psychology from 2003 to 2017. He
received the American Psychology–Law Society’s award for Outstanding
Contributions to Psychology and Law (2012), American Psychological
Association awards for Distinguished Contributions to Research in
Public Policy (1994) and Contributions to Applied Research (2014), the
American Psychiatric Association’s Isaac Ray Award (2005), and is an
elected Fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists (UK).
Florence W. Kaslow, PhD, is Distinguished Visiting Professor of

Psychology at Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Florida. Prior
academic appointments include adjunct professor of medical psychology,
Duke University Medical Center (1982–2004), and professor and co-direc-
tor of the PsyD/JD program at Hahnemann Medical College and Villanova
Law School (1973–1980). She was the founding and first president of
the American Board of Forensic Psychology and American Academy of
Forensic Psychology and is a recipient of many awards from American
Psychological Association, American Psychological Foundation, and
American Board of Professional Psychology. She is board certified in
forensic, clinical, and couple and family psychology.
Elizabeth F. Loftus, PhD, is distinguished professor at the University of

California–Irvine. She holds faculty positions in two departments: psy-
chology and social behavior and criminology, law, and society. She
received her PhD in psychology from Stanford University and was for-
merly on faculty at University of Washington. She has published 22 books,
including the award-winning Eyewitness Testimony (5th ed. LexisNexis,
2013), and over 500 scientific articles. Loftus’s research of the last 40 years
has focused on the malleability of human memory. She has been recog-
nized for this research with seven honorary doctorates and election to the
Royal Society of Edinburgh, the American Philosophical Society, and the
Contributors ix
National Academy of Sciences. She is past president of the Association

for Psychological Science, the Western Psychological Association, and the
American Psychology–Law Society
John Monahan, PhD, is the John Shannon Distinguished Professor of Law

at the University of Virginia, where he is also a professor of psychology and
of psychiatry. He was on the faculty at the University of California–Irvine,
from 1972 to 1980. He was the president of the American Psychology-Law
Society (1978) and the founding president of the American Psychological
Association’s Division of Psychology and Law (1981) receiving that organi
zation’s Distinguished Contribution to Research in Public Policy Award.
He also twice received the American Psychiatric Association’s Manfred
Guttmacher (1982 and 2002) and Isaac Ray Awards (1996). He was elected
a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2016.
Stephen J. Morse, JD, PhD, is the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor

of Law and professor of psychology and law in psychiatry at the University
of Pennsylvania since 1988. Previously he was the Orrin B. Evans Professor
of Law, professor of psychology and of psychiatry and the behavioral sci-
ences at the University of Southern California. He was president of the
American Psychology– Law Society (1981– 1982) and was president
of Division 41/ American Psychology– Law Society (1986– 1987). He
received the American Academy of Forensic Psychology’s Distinguished
Contribution to Forensic Psychology Award (1989) and the Isaac Ray
Award from the American Psychiatric Association (2014) for distin-
guished contributions to forensic psychiatry and the psychiatric aspects
of jurisprudence
Nicholas Dickon Reppucci, PhD, is emeritus professor of psychology

at the University of Virginia Psychology Department. He was a lecturer
at Harvard University (1967– 1968), assistant and associate professor
at Yale University (1968–1976) and professor at University of Virginia
(1976–2017). He was president of Society for Community Research and
Action (American Psychological Association’s Division of Community
Psychology; 1987) and received its Award for Distinguished Scientific
x Contributors
and Theoretical Contributions (1998) and its Inaugural Award for

Education and Training in Community Psychology (1999). He also
received the American Psychology–Law Society’s Award for Outstanding
Contibutions to Teaching and Mentoring (2007) and Society for Research
in Adolescence’s Award for Outstanding Article on Adolescence and
Social Policy (2008).
Ronald Roesch, PhD, is professor of psychology and director of the

Mental Health, Law, and Policy Institute at Simon Fraser University. He
received his PhD in clinical psychology from the University of Illinois in
1977. He was president of the American Psychology–Law Society in 1994.
He was editor-in-chief of Law and Human Behavior and Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law. Professor Roesch received the American Psychology–Law
Society Outstanding Teaching and Mentoring in the Field of Psychology
and Law Award in 2009 and its Outstanding Contributions to the Field of
Psychology and Law Award in 2010. In 2011, he also received the Lifetime
Achievement Award for Contributions to Psychology and Law from the
European Association of Psychology and Law.
Michael J. Saks, PhD, MSL, is regents professor at the Arizona State

University where he is on the faculties of the law school and psychology
department and an affiliated professor at the University of Haifa (Israel).
Previously, he was a faculty member at the University of Iowa and Boston
College and taught in the University of Virginia Law School’s LLM pro-
gram for appellate judges. He was president of the American Psychology–
Law Society (1989), and was the editor of Law and Human Behavior
(1985–87). He received the American Psychological Association’s award
for Distinguished Contributions to Psychology in the Public Interest
(1987) and the American Psychology– Law Society’s Distinguished
Contributions to Psychology and Law (2017).
Bruce D. Sales, PhD, JD, DSc(hc), is the Virginia L. Roberts Professor

of Criminal Justice at Indiana University, Bloomington. He was previ-
ously a professor of psychology and law at the University of Nebraska–
Lincoln (1973–1981) and of psychology, sociology, psychiatry and law
Contributors xi
at the University of Arizona (1981–2008). He was the first editor of the

journals Law and Human Behavior and Psychology, Public Policy, and Law.
He is a life member of the American Law Institute and twice served as
president of the American Psychology–Law Society (1976–1977, 1985–
1986). He received the American Psychology–Law Society Award for
Distinguished Contributions to Psychology and Law (1992), and the
American Psychological Association Award for Distinguished Professional
Contributions to Public Service for having “pioneered the development of
psychology and law as a field of research, teaching, and practice” (1995).
David B. Wexler, JD, is professor of law, University of Puerto Rico, and

distinguished research professor of law emeritus, University of Arizona.
He served on the full-time law faculty of the University of Arizona
from 1967 until 1997. He is an honorary president of the newly formed
International Society for Therapeutic Jurisprudence (since 2017) and is
honorary president of the Iberoamerican Association of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence (since 2012). He is an honorary distinguished member
of the American Psychology–Law Society (2010), received the Manfred
Guttmacher Forensic Psychiatry Award of the American Psychiatric
Association (1972), and, for his work on therapeutic jurisprudence, was
awarded the Distinguished Service Award of the National Center for State
Courts (2000).
EDITORS’ PROLOGUE
The impetus for this volume began several years ago. We recognized that
the American Psychology–Law Society, inaugurated in 1969, would soon
be celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. We had witnessed the Society’s earli-
est years, and we found ourselves reflecting on the importance of captur-
ing some of the essence of that formative time.
As an outgrowth of those reflections, we were among a group of sen-
ior scholars in a symposium at the annual meeting of the American
Psychology–Law Society in 2015, all of us speaking about how our careers
developed and the personal and professional trajectory of our lives. The
full and overflowing audience signaled a deep and not necessarily predict-
able interest in the lived history of psychology and law in North America.
After all, it is easy to be ahistorical. Everything else equal, scholars value
the newest studies in our field. When we review manuscripts in which the
references are 20 or 30 years old, we frequently view the submissions with
a skeptical eye. We similarly value highly the newest editions of tests, the
newest books, and the most recent articles. Yet, there are compelling rea-
sons to look at our history. This book addresses how modern psychology
and law began.
Psychology and law as a scholarly and professional field did not appear
spontaneously and fully formed. The leaves and branches are visible, but
the roots are the elements from which everything grew. Knowing and
understanding the roots and how our own tree of knowledge grew tells a
lot about who we are and where we came from.
xiv Editors’ Prologue
The historical record of our field is skimpy. This edited volume is the
first book on the history of the modern field of psychology and law. It
offers new perspectives on the origins of modern psychology and law, as
written by those who lived and created it.
Many students of the history of psychology know that psychology’s
interaction with law emerged early in the 20th century. Yet that early start
amounted to a premature fanfare after which the potential lay dormant for
another 30 or 40 years.
The emergence of psychology and law as a modern field of scholarship
was marked by the founding of the American Psychology–Law Society
in 1969. The scientific foundation on which the modern field grew was
established by a small group of psychological researchers, legal scholars,
and clinicians who became widely known and respected. The contributors
to this edited volume are among those groundbreakers. Their work led to
the current burgeoning subfields and topics in psychology and law and
forensic psychology. The contributors, appropriately considered among
the founders of their field, are now nearing retirement yet are still remark-
ably vital, productive contributors to scholarly knowledge.
In a narrative voice, each of the contributors has described the key pro-
fessional events in his or her career during the 1970s, the first decade of
the American Psychology–Law Society. In some cases these events were
their first major research studies using psychology applied to legal issues.
In others, it was their development of seminal ideas, innovations, or expe-
riences that had a later impact on the field’s development. They were in
their thirties, there was no coherent field of psychology and law, and they
were imitating no one. Their projects became cornerstones in the founda-
tion of modern psychology and law.
Each contributor’s story covers a period of time, often just a decade or
so, when the researcher developed the seminal effort that spawned sub-
fields of research or gave birth to the organizational structure of the field.
While telling their stories, they reflect on events and issues in U.S. law and
policy in the 1960s and 1970s that stimulated their work, where they bor-
rowed from then-current psychological science to further their efforts, and
on their own needs, hopes, aspirations, and frustrations that drove them
Editors’ Prologue xv
forward at that point in their personal and professional development. The

last portion of each chapter describes the later evolution, up to the pres-
ent, of the field for which their earliest work provided a foundation.
The book begins with our chapter about the evolution of psychol-
ogy and law research and of forensic–clinical interactions with law.
Starting with brief observations about early 20th-century interactions
between psychology and law, it describes the conditions in which psy-
chology and law took root in the 1970s when the 12 chapter authors
were developing the field. It continues with a description of the enor-
mous contributions of the American Psychology–L aw Society in those
early years, as well as the successes, conflicts, and challenges that arose
as the Society matured into the 21st century. This is followed by our 12
contributors’ chapters, arranged in two broad areas: (a) psychological
science and law, and (b) assessment, interventions and practice in legal
contexts.
By almost any measure the persons who have authored those chap-
ters are among the early leaders in psychology and law. There were cer-
tainly others, and all 12 authors acknowledge and identify those who were
beginning to do work similar to theirs during the 1970s. Enlisting these
specific authors for this task was guided in part by our effort to represent
the scope of topics that arose in the 1970s and to achieve balance by mini-
mizing repetition across the whole enterprise. The social psychology of
the law: check. Violence prediction: check. Memory: check. Professional
credentialing: check. Juveniles: check. Community psychology: check.
Mental disability law: check. And much more.
The last thing we wanted was for this book to be a dry, tired, and dif-
ficult read that covered ground already well-trodden. For that reason, we
asked the authors of the chapters to write about their personal journeys.
When occasionally we received a draft that was light on personal reflec-
tions, we asked them to reveal more about their own odysseys. And they
did it, much more than we expected. We learned new things about people
we have known for four decades. Who knew that John Monahan started
out in a seminary? Or that so many barriers impeded the paths of our
contributors?
xvi Editors’ Prologue
The contributions fascinated us. At moments, we felt like leaping and

clicking our heels, if clicking our heels were still within our modest leap-
ing repertoires. We smiled. We often were moved. For the first time in one
place, the life stories have been gathered of the people and the work that
has shaped so much of psychology and law.
We truly did not know just what to expect in response to our invitations
to the authors. The replies and chapters went well beyond our hopes. The
process fit into the Japanese Zen notion of mu, in which the context of the
question was too small for the breadth and truth of the answer.
In light of Beth Loftus’s body of work on the malleability of memory, it
is perhaps reasonable to ask whether these recollections and memories of
the development of psychology and law are accurate. As exemplary as our
contributors are, decades have gone by. We had asked everyone to go back
to the 1970s and to trace where they were and how their paths led to where
they are now. Are the memories dependable and accurate?
To one way of thinking, it may not make a difference. There are many
articles and a book with similar themes asserting that there is no such
thing as nonfiction (Brock, 2011; Kilgore, 2010). Tom Waits has declared
that nonfiction does not exist (Maher, 2011, p. 424). Norman Mailer, in an
award address, said that everything written is fiction, because the reality
of any given moment is impossible to describe. Instead, he encouraged
writers to aim to come close to what happened. In his chapter “Historical
Text as Literary Artifact,” Hayden White (2002) takes a more philosoph-
ical position, claiming that authors endow nonfiction stories with their
own meanings and life metaphors and always offer biased details (p. 201).
E. L Doctorow (1988) argued in a New York Times book review much the
same conclusion, “There is no longer any such thing as fiction or nonfic-
tion; there’s only narrative.”
All of us have had the experience of sharing memories of events with a
person who was there, only to find that some element or statement of out-
come was differently recalled. Yet a form of fact-checking is in place. These
recollections are supported by references and publications or are narrated
in considerable detail. We are excited to share them.
Editors’ Prologue xvii
REFERENCES
Brock, M. (2011). There’s no such thing as a nonfiction novel! Retrieved from

https:// m arciebrockbookmarketingmaven.wordpress.com/ 2 011/ 0 8/ 0 6/ t heres-
no-such-thing-as-a-nonfiction-novel/
Doctorow, E. L. (1988). New York Times Book Review, January 27, 1988.
Kilgore, C. (2010). There’s no such thing as non-fiction. Morrisville, NC: Lulu.
Maher, P. (2011). Tom Waits on Tom Waits: Interviews and encounters. Chicago: Chicago
Review.
White, H. (2002). The historical text as literary artifact. In H. Richardson (Ed.),
Narrative dynamics: Essays on time, plot, closure, and frames. Columbus. OH: Ohio
State University Press.
1
The Evolution
of Psychology and Law
THOMAS GRISSO
T
he 50th anniversary of the American Psychology–Law Society
(AP–LS) in 2019 will occur about 110 years after Munsterberg’s
(1908) treatise on psychology’s potential for application to legal
issues. Munsterberg’s overture was soundly rejected as premature by legal
scholars of the time (Wigmore, 1909). Yet in the intervening years, the
success of an applied science called psychology and law has been remark-
able in its influence on the law, legal systems and procedures, and the pro-
vision of evidence in legal cases.
This chapter examines how the field of psychology and law evolved.
This account does not describe fully what psychology and law is or what
it has achieved. That can be found in psychology and law textbooks, more
detailed histories (e.g., Bartol & Bartol, 2015; Brigham & Grisso, 2003),
and in each of the other 12 chapters in this book. In contrast, the present
chapter focuses on the important motives, forces, and social conditions
2 T he R oots of M odern P sychology and L aw
that influenced how the field grew. It also examines the role of the AP–LS
as one of the major forces in psychology and law’s development. The evo-
lution of the field seems to divide naturally into three major eras. The first
two, the birth of legal psychology (1890–1930) and a dormant era (1930–
1960), are described briefly. The chapter attends primarily to the third,
modern era of psychology and law that blossomed in the 1970s and 1980s
and continues to mature.
THE EARLY ROOTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
Before psychology and law as we know it came on the scene, legal psy-
chology had flourished for about 30 years early in the 20th century and
then slumbered for another 30 years. Some of that history is relevant for
understanding the modern era.
The Legal Psychology Era (1890–1930)
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, laboratories like that of Wilhelm
Wundt’s began building a basic science of human behavior—mapping,
classifying, and determining the structural and functional boundaries of
memory, perception, sensation, and motor reactions. As basic data and
principles emerged, Wundt’s students began identifying how the prin-
ciples might have practical use in business, military affairs, education,
advertising, public health, and, of course, law.
The earliest descriptions of psychology’s potential for application to
law were largely speculative. For example, Munsterberg’s (1908) trea-
tise, On the Witness Stand, mostly contained visionary hypotheses. Some
researchers took the next step, performing studies that used basic lab
findings to predict behavior in experimental situations that approxi-
mated the circumstances of legal cases (e.g., Benussi, 1914; Marston,
1917; Stern, 1906, 1910). An early review by Slesinger and Pilpel (1929)
found 11 of these hypothesis-testing articles pertaining to psychology of
The Evolution of Psychology and Law 3
eyewitness testimony and 10 reports of applied studies for detection of

deception, although there were many more on other topics (as reviewed
by Burtt, 1931).
There is no record of an organized affiliation or association of psycholo-
gists engaged in those earliest studies. Indeed, the young, eager researchers
who first explored psychology’s applications to law seemed not to identify
themselves as “forensic” or “legal” psychologists. They were simply applied
psychologists. Any one of them was likely to be examining applications to
industry, advertising, education, or the military at the same time.
A few of these applied psychologists, however, did come close to iden-
tifying legal psychology as their primary specialty. For example, William
Marston obtained both a law degree and a PhD in psychology at Harvard
in 1921 (studying with Munsterberg). He joined the faculty at American
University in 1922 in what is believed to be the first position entitled
“Professor of Legal Psychology” (Heilbrun, Grisso, & Goldstein, 2009). He
studied errors in eyewitness accounts (Marston, 1924) and polygraphic
detection of deception (Marston, 1917), testimony on the latter making
him the focus of the Frye v. United States (1923) decision (Weiss, Watson,
& Xuan, 2014).1 Others were William Healy (a psychologically minded
neurologist) and Grace Fernald (a psychologist). Together they founded
the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute in 1909 to serve the first juvenile court
in the United States (Cook County, Chicago, opened in 1899; Schetky &
Benedek, 1992). This was the first court-related psychological clinic on
record, breaking ground with comprehensive “studies of the child” to
assist the court in dispositional decisions (Healy, 1915) and creating the
first specialized psychological tests to evaluate delinquent youth (Domino
& Domino, 2006).
Harold Burtt produced a book, Legal Psychology (Burtt, 1931) that
best summarizes how far the field had come in its first 30 years. Born in
1890, Burtt trained with Munsterberg at Harvard and served in World
1. Even Marston, though, had other applied interests, including his consultation to an edu-
cational publishing company, leading to his invention of DC Comics’ Wonder Woman
(Lepore, 2014).
War I to apply psychology to the war effort. After the war he joined the
faculty at Ohio State University in 1919.2 His contributions were diverse
including early attempts to select aviators, to detect lies and other forms of
deception, to enhance advertising effectiveness, to avoid copyright/trade-
mark infringement, and to improve street lighting (“Obituary,” 1992).
He was one of the founders in 1938 of the American Association for
Applied Psychology, which broke away from the American Psychological
Association (APA) because of APA’s perceived lack of support or attention
to applied psychology.
Burtt’s Legal Psychology was a major work of 459 pages with 19 chapters.
If the chapters had been clustered, their sections almost could serve as the
outline for a modern text in psychology and law (e.g., four chapters on wit-
ness accuracy and testimony, two on court procedures and jury decision
making, two on psychopathology and crime). Munsterberg’s (1908) more
famous book was actually a collection of previously published magazine
articles largely without scholarly citations (Grisso & Brigham, 2013). In
contrast, Burtt thoroughly referenced an impressive number and range of
basic and applied studies from many labs, describing them in great detail
together with published tables and graphs illustrating their results. He also
cited over 120 legal cases, using their facts to illustrate psychology’s rele-
vance for law and legal process.
Taking note of what was not in Burtt’s book provides some insight into
the broader social context in which early legal psychology was evolving
and how different that context was when compared to the rise of modern
psychology and law in the 1970s. First, this new field appeared to have
no interest in the parallel rise of forensic psychiatry. Isaac Ray, Bleuler
and Kraepelin, Freud’s and Jung’s forays into legal questions, the relevance
of mental disorder for criminal responsibility—none of that appeared in
Burtt’s Legal Psychology. Burtt seemed to presume that when legal psy-
chology evolved a bit further, it would offer the law something entirely
2. Burtt’s career actually spanned the years between Munsterberg and the modern era of psy-
chology and law. He chaired the Psychology Department at Ohio State University until he
retired in 1960. He died at age 101 in 1991, when the AP–LS was about 20 years old.
different than psychiatry and more far-reaching in “value to those who

are interested in furthering justice and improving society” (Burtt, 1931,
p. 459).
Second, the book suggests that “furthering justice and improving soci-
ety” in those days had a different meaning than when modern psychology
and law emerged in the 1970s. Burtt’s book offers little research directed
specifically at concerns about human rights or civil liberties, sometimes
encouraging deprivation of rights of people with disabilities for their
own and society’s benefit. Early legal psychology reflected the times in
which it evolved. Racial discrimination (Plessy v. Ferguson’s 1896 separate-
but-equal policy) and sterilization of persons with hereditary intellec-
tual impairments (Buck v. Bell, 1927) were constitutional.3 Some leaders
in biological science (e.g., Davenport, 1928) and applied sciences (e.g.,
Alexander Graham Bell, 1914) were promoting the eugenics movement
to reduce the burden of “mental defectives” on society and to purify the
nation’s population. Burtt’s chapter on heredity, character, and intelligence
interpreted research to favor the eugenics movement, offering little evi-
dence of discomfort regarding human rights.4
Finally, absent from Burtt’s book were Munsterberg’s (1908) uncom-
promising conclusions that psychologists had all the answers and lawyers
were simply too stubborn to listen to them (Grisso & Brigham, 2013). In
contrast, Burtt cautioned both lawyers and psychologists that “legal psy-
chology is not a well-organized body of knowledge” (Burtt, 1931, p. 459),
although certain areas had “nearly reached the stage” (p. 448) when they
could qualify as evidence in legal cases. Legal psychology was poised to
fulfill its potential.
3. The court in Buck v. Bell explained: “It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to exe-
cute degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . three generations of imbeciles is
enough” (Buck v. Bell, 1927).
4. The United States was not alone in the use of applied psychology to promote such policies.
Applied psychologists in South Africa were interpreting their research to support a racially sep-
arated social system. In the 1950s, this led to the government’s formal apartheid policies drafted
by Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, an applied psychologist trained in pre-Nazi Germany.
The Dormant Era (1930–1960)
Then nothing happened. Writing early in the modern era, June Louin Tapp
(1976, p. 361) observed with puzzlement that after the 1930s: “Not until
the late 1960s was the exchange between psychologists and lawyers on
matters of justice and law anything more than sparse and sporadic.” Tapp
did not try to explain the hiatus, but several circumstances offer grounds
for reasonable speculation. Moreover, much did happen that eventually
would shape psychology and law when it blossomed in the third era.
One could blame Munsterberg’s (1908) book and Wigmore’s (1909)
scathing response for legal psychology’s failure take hold (Bersoff, 1999).
Yet it was also likely that the law was not ready for psychology. While
critiquing Munsterberg, Wigmore also chastised his own colleagues for
taking so little interest in using what the sciences produced. During the
1920s and 1930s, the legal world was debating legal realism (e.g., Frank,
1930). Skepticism and disagreement surrounded the notion that scientific
evidence about social implications of legal decisions should have a role in
shaping judicial thinking. Also, at that time psychology, relative to psy-
chiatry, had little legal standing as a profession for expert testimony on
legal issues and mental disorder. In fact, clinical psychology as we know
it barely existed (Compas & Gotlib, 2002). Finally, World War II offered
great opportunities and demands for applying psychology to personnel
selection, communications, and improving instrument panels for aircraft
and other weapons. These alternatives may have contributed to a waning
of applied psychologists’ attention to applications in law.
While little was happening in legal psychology scholarship during the
dormant years, two specialties in psychology—social and clinical—were
developing in ways that set the stage for modern psychology and law. In
the late 1930s, social psychology was beginning to do what Kurt Lewin
called “action research”: psychological studies in quasi-naturalistic set-
tings that could bear on contemporary social problems and promote social
change (Adelman, 1993). Thus arose a group devoted to policy-relevant
research, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Krech &
Cartwright, 1956). Society members went beyond the laboratory to issue
their own statements on political issues of the World War II era. At first
antiwar, later they used their group-behavior research to demonstrate
the destructive effects of totalitarian social systems. Postwar research of
this type set the stage for a focus on policy-relevant research and human
rights that would be a central motivation for psychology and law in the
third era.
The dormant era also saw the formal recognition of clinical psychol-
ogy. Psychologists were developing a new generation of psychologi-
cal tests, including tests of psychopathology (e.g., MMPI; Hathaway &
McKinley, 1942). The war created demands for treatment of soldiers that
exceeded the capacity of the psychiatric workforce, offering opportuni-
ties for psychologists to take on new diagnostic and psychotherapeutic
roles in medical and psychiatric settings (Benjamin, 2005; Watson, 1953).
Between 1945 and 1950, the new field of clinical psychology acquired its
own APA division, a Journal of Clinical Psychology, the development of the
American Board of Professional Psychology in 1947 (Watson, 1953) and,
in the 1950s, the first formal university programs in clinical psychology
(Compas & Gotlib, 2002).
During the 1950s, clinical psychologists’ new recognition led to an
increase in their involvement in correctional settings (Bartol & Freeman,
2005; see Brodsky, this volume) and as experts in legal cases in which
personality or mental disorder were the focus of civil and criminal litiga-
tion (Greenburg, 1956; Loh, 1981). The 1950s also brought an uptick in
experimental, social, and developmental psychological testimony, marked
notably by Kenneth Clark’s appearance in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954; which ruled that school racial segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment). Yet the law clearly had not thrown open the door. As
described at that time, “An important problem in psychology today is the
legal status of the psychologist and his relationship to the courts. . . . The
use of the [psychological] expert witness is a fairly modern innovation in
the field of legal evidence” (McCary, 1956, p. 8).
Legal psychology may have advanced little in the dormant era. Yet the
development of clinical and social psychology would play a key role in the
field’s reawakening.
BIRTH OF THE MODERN ERA (1960–1 990)
Scholarly signs of a new era appeared in two books of the 1960s: social
psychologist Hans Toch’s (1961) edited volume on Legal and Criminal
Psychology and James Marshall’s (1966) Law and Psychology in Conflict.
Burtt’s Legal Psychology in 1931 and Toch’s book in 1961, marking the
beginning and end of the dormant era, had titles and topics that matched
remarkably well. Toch’s authors identified a few new studies of the 1950s,
yet the greatest number of their citations to empirical work were the 1920s
and 1930s studies of Burtt and his contemporaries.
These books were essays speculating about the possibility of a future
field. In Toch’s book, a chapter by Robert Redmount (lawyer and clinical
psychologist) titled simply “Psychology and Law” concluded:
The psychologist . . . who confronts law in all its estate is bold

indeed. In fact, he does not yet exist. That there is plenty of
psychology in law . . . is plain to behold. But psychologists . . . have
been rather more timorous in their infiltration into law than
into medicine and education” (Redmount, 1961, pp. 37– 38).
Similarly, Marshall observed that “[P]‌articipation by lawyers and
psychologists in empirical research into the processes of law . . . is
practically non-existent, and it is curious in view of the common
deductive approach of both science and the law. (Marshall, 1966,
pp. 103–104)
Marshall and Redmount were the last authors to have reason to won-
der about psychology’s “timorous” and “curious” lack of interactions with
law. So much began happening that only about a decade later the Annual
Review of Psychology published Tapp’s (1976) Psychology and the Law: An
Overture describing the emergence of this new field. Explaining this blos-
soming is more hypothesis than history, but primary considerations are
(a) an awakening of social conscience in American society in the 1950s
and 1960s, (b) favorable federal support, and (c) the emergence of an
organization that offered the field a group identity.
Postwar Law and Human Rights
The 1950s and 1960s saw sweeping changes in U.S. society’s consciousness
regarding human rights, civil liberties, and social justice. They included a
whirlwind of federal cases related to racial desegregation (e.g., Brown v.
Board of Education, 1954), women’s rights (e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut,
1965), criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ rights (e.g., Dusky v. U.S., 1960;
Wyatt v. Stickney, 1971), children’s rights (e.g., In re Gault, 1967; Tinker v.
Des Moines, 1969), the rights of persons with mental disorders (e.g., Lake
v. Cameron, 1966), and informed consent (Natanson v. Kline, 1960). These
reforms profited by the appearance of judges like David Bazelon and, a
little later, Harry Blackmun who were disposed to listen to arguments pro-
moting human rights in medical and psychiatric contexts. The law began
listening to relevant empirical information about human behavior when
shaping policy and law. The stage was set.
This zeitgeist also was preparing the lawyers and psychologists—among
them, authors of the stories in this book—who would fuel the rise of mod-
ern psychology and law during the 1960s and 1970s. It had a socializing
effect on their young lives, often forming their motivation to use their pro-
fessions for social justice. This vision may have been the major difference
between the modern era of psychology and law and the legal psychology
of the early 1900s.
Federal Support
A second factor in the rise of psychology and law was the convergence
of law and federal initiatives offering support for psychology’s interac-
tions with law. Jenkins v. U.S. (1962) cleared the way for clinical psycholo-
gists’ testimony in cases involving questions of mental illness, formerly
the province of psychiatrists. Research that would build a scientific foun-
dation for the field profited by establishment in 1968 of the Center for
Studies of Crime and Delinquency at the National Institute of Mental
Health (NIMH). NIMH funding for crime and delinquency research was
not new, having been around for about 15 years before the Center was
established (Voit, 1995). What made the difference was the new Center’s
director, Saleem Shah.
A clinical psychologist receiving his PhD in 1957, Shah had worked
for several years as a court clinician in Washington, DC, before taking
the Center position. He reoriented the Center’s mission toward empirical
work in law and mental health that would benefit persons in need who
were socially marginalized. Shah was an “advocate for relevance” (Roth,
1995), not impressed with research that would provide only understand-
ing; he favored projects allowing for fairly direct translation into policy or
practice. He was staunchly against any discipline’s special claim to author-
ity; the Center funded psychologists, sociologists, psychiatrists, criminol-
ogists, and lawyers. In a special issue of Law and Human Behavior devoted
to remembering Shah after his tragic death, the editors wrote, “No one
else among us has had so significant an impact on the history of modern
mental health law in policy and practice” (Grisso & Steadman, 1995, p. 2).
The American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS)
The third factor that helped modern psychology and law blossom was the
birth of the AP–LS at a meeting of 13 psychologists, initiated by lawyer
and psychologist Jay Ziskin, at the APA convention in San Francisco in
1968. AP–LS was launched in 1969 with 101 charter members, more than
doubling within two years (Grisso, 1991). Beginning with assets of $202
(the $2 dues from its charter members) and a mimeographed newslet-
ter, today it has over 3,500 members, significant financial assets, a multi-
tude of specialty committees serving its members, a journal, a book series,
websites, and conferences.
A detailed narrative of AP–LS’s early history is beyond the limits of this
chapter, but we have comprehensive descriptions of AP–LS’s first 20 years
(Grisso, 1991) and an update to the 21st century (Fulero, 1999). The most
significant organizational change occurred in 1981when some of AP–LS’s
leaders called for the development of a new Division 41 of Psychology and
Law within the APA. AP–LS members were strongly divided on the pros-
pect of merging with the new APA division. After three years of debate,
they arrived at an amicable consensus to merge (in 1984) after APA agreed
to accommodate to AP–LS’s terms (Grisso, 1991). For example, AP–LS
demanded that persons with law degrees but without psychology degrees
could have Division membership even though they did not qualify for
membership in APA.
The impact of AP–LS on the evolution of modern psychology and law
during its 50 years is woven through various sections in the remainder
of this chapter. AP–LS was only one of many organizations that played
a major supportive role in psychology and law’s growth (others will be
noted later), but it has been the most influential. It provided what every
field of science and practice requires to grow and strengthen: a sense of
collective identity and an authoritative platform for social influence. Its
key supports were (a) publication resources, (b) establishing standards,
(c) promoting conferencing opportunities, and (d) stimulating training.
Publication Resources
A field of science and practice is defined by its peer-reviewed knowledge.
AP–LS’s journal, Law and Human Behavior (LHB), was launched in 1977
under the initiative of its first editor, Bruce Sales (see Sales, this volume).5
LHB now ranks in the top echelon of journals in the categories “Psychology,
social” and “Law.”6 LHB was preceded by American Association of
Correctional Psychologists’ Criminal Justice and Behavior (first appear-
ing in 1974; see Brodsky, this volume). Eventually those two journals were
joined by 11 more with distinct psychology-and-law identity, as well as
about 17 journals in law–psychiatry and various criminal and civil law
journals with social science specialization (Heilbrun, Grisso, & Goldstein,
5. Subsequent LHB editors to date were Michael Saks, Ronald Roesch, Richard Wiener, Brian
Cutler, Margaret Bull Kovera, and, currently, Brad McAuliff.
6. According to the Social Science Citation Index from Clarivate Analytics’ Journal Citation
Reports, LHB recently had the thirteenth highest impact factor among 147 journals in the
“Law” category.
2009). APA developed Psychology, Public Policy and Law in 1995 (also with
Bruce Sales as founding editor). AP–LS’s book series, Perspectives in Law
and Psychology, helped jump-start a new wave of books for the field. In a
1979 national survey of university psychology courses that included law
in their content, 85% of the 27 books used in those courses had been pub-
lished in AP–LS’s first decade (Grisso, Sales, & Bayless, 1982).
Standards
A field of science and practice is controlled, and its credibility enhanced,
by its consensus regarding standards. The American Board of Forensic
Psychology (ABFP), and its collaborative organization for psychologists it
certified, the American Academy of Forensic Psychology (AAFP), began in
1987 with AP–LS assistance (see Kaslow, this volume). Through its certifica-
tion of forensic psychological practitioners, ABFP identified and promoted
advanced forensic practice standards. Together AP–LS and ABFP/AAFP
developed the first Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists (Committee
on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 1991) and then its revision
with APA sponsorship (APA, 2013). AAFP has annually provided a series of
workshops for forensic practitioners that has elevated standards of practice.
Conferences
A field of science and practice is energized by its collective gatherings that
provide face to face exchange and a relational sense of group identity. The
first AP–LS conference in 1974 was followed in 1977 by the beginning of a
biennial convention tradition when about 25 members met at Snowmass,
Colorado, to present to each other for two days in one meeting room. The
AP–LS merger with APA Division 41 led to APA annual convention pro-
gramming, but AP–LS continued its biennial meetings until switching to
annual meetings in 2002. By 2017, AP–LS conferences featured over 100
symposia, attended by about 1,000 members.
Training
A field of science and practice is sustained by its programs for train-
ing students of the field. Before the 1970s, no academic training centers
existed pertaining specifically to psychology and law. By the end of the

1970s, however, about one-fourth of graduate psychology programs in the
United States had courses in which at least 50% of their content pertained
to psychology and law (Grisso Sales & Bayless, 1982). The 1970s also saw
the start-up of the first five training programs with joint psychology and
law degrees.7 Legally or forensically specialized doctoral programs in psy-
chology blossomed in the 1980s and 1990s, and Donald Bersoff man-
aged the Villanova Training Conference in 1995, a three-day effort to sort
out the needs and challenges of training programs for the growing field
(Bersoff et al., 1997). Subsequently, two of the 1970s JD–PhD programs
(University of Nebraska and Drexel University) survived to the present
and have been joined by others, and 25 graduate psychology departments
now offer specialized psychology doctoral degrees in the field (AP–LS,
2017b). Over 40 academic and hospital settings now offer postdoctoral
training for psychology-and-law research or forensic psychological prac-
tice (AP-LS, 2017a).
IDENTIFYING MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
The maturation and identity of modern psychology and law from the
1990s forward can be defined by its content—the evolution of its research,
its practice, and their impact on society—and by its process—the organized
strivings of those who nurtured, promoted and controlled the field as it
developed. The first definition—its content and accomplishments—is best
left to other resources that review how far the field has come in its diverse
areas of research, its forensic uses of that knowledge, and their impact
on law, policy, and human rights and welfare (e.g., Carson & Bull, 2003;
Cutler & Zapf, 2015; Goldstein, 2007; Heilbrun, DeMatteo, & Goldstein,
7. The JD–PhD programs at Stanford University in 1972, University of Nebraska–Lincoln in

1974 and, in 1979, Johns Hopkins University/University of Maryland, Hahnemann Medical
School/Villanova University (now Drexel University), and the JD–PsyD program at University
of Denver’s Law School and School of Professional Psychology.
2016; Melton Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 2007; Weiner & Otto, 2013).
The other 12 chapters in this volume capture some of that identity in their
chronicle of the evolution of key areas of research and practice from the
1970s to the present. The big picture is 50 years of ever-increasing, almost
bewildering differentiation of subtopics within broader categories of
research. Psychology and law has drawn from all of the behavioral, social,
and biological sciences to explore complexities in diverse areas of crimi-
nal, civil, and juvenile law and legal process.
The second way to define the field—the process of its growth—requires
examining recurrent themes in the strivings of those who sought to influ-
ence and use the field. The increasing diversity of the field’s interests has
often contributed to tension. As the field matured, its conflicting interests
expanded and sometimes challenged its identity as a single field. Some of
those challenges involved (a) relations between organizations, (b) demo-
graphic diversity of its contributors, and (c) problems of identity related to
competing professional interests.
Interorganizational Relations
During its overture in the 1970s, the field began with organizational
support from AP–LS (Grisso, 1991) and the American Association of
Correctional Psychologists (Brodsky, 2007). Many other organizations
arose subsequently, notably the AAFP, ABFP, the International Association
of Forensic Mental Health Services, and the International Academy of
Law and Mental Health.8
These organizations have operated relatively independently, yet they
have rarely been overtly competitive. After the rise of AP–LS and AACP,
subsequent organizations did not form as alternatives but primarily to
8. In addition, the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law was founded just one year before
AP–LS and has provided a venue for psychology and law research and practice. Other organ-
izations developed mental health and forensic subsections and committees: for example, the
Forensic division of the National Association for State Mental Health Program Directors; the
Criminal Justice System–Mental Health Committee of the American Bar Association. AP–LS
focus on some subset of psychology’s applications to law or, like ABFP’s

certification of forensic psychologists, to play some circumscribed role
that AP–LS did not seek to fulfill. Even after ABFP’s tense spin-off from
AP–LS (see Kaslow, this volume), the two have maintained collabora-
tive relations. Psychology and law’s supportive network of organizations,
therefore, has enjoyed predominantly friendly, laissez faire, and often
mutually supportive relations.
AP–LS’s relation with APA has been more complex. AP–LS’s history
includes important collaborative relations with APA that have ben-
efited AP–LS and APA alike. APA’s Psychology, Public Policy and Law,
its Committee on Legal Issues, its legal office’s amicus briefs to appel-
late courts, and its interest in collaborative initiatives with the American
Bar Association have drawn heavily on the assistance of AP–LS scholars
and provided the field with major avenues of influence on law and pol-
icy. Moreover, in the past 30 years, the careers of six of APA’s presidents
have included psychological contributions to legal, correctional, or foren-
sic issues.9 In 1988, a standing APA president joined a past APA president
to publish an article in Science (Fowler & Matarazzo, 1988) in support of
forensic psychology, in response to another Science article claiming that
psychological research did not provide a sufficiently validated foundation
to support the expert testimony of psychologists (Faust & Ziskin, 1988).
Yet the history of AP–LS and its relations with APA also has seen
moments of conflict. For example, when AP–LS developed the Specialty
Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists in 1991 (under the guidance of
Stephen Golding), APA asserted that any division’s published standards
should be approved by APA, recognizing that the Guidelines could impact
psychologists in other specialties who occasionally testified in court. AP–
LS resisted because it feared that the Guidelines would be “watered down”
also has enjoyed relations with psychology and law organizations in other countries: for exam-
ple, Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law; European
Association of Psychology and Law; European Association for Forensic Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry and Psychology.
9. Theodore Blau (1977), Raymond Fowler (1988), Patrick DeLeon (2000), Philip Zimbardo
(2002), Gerald Koocher (2006), and Donald Bersoff (2013).
to suit nonforensic practitioners’ interests. AP–LS won that argument, but

later it capitulated when APA began its 2002 revision of its ethics code
with the intention of including a section on ethics in forensic cases. This
led to AP–LS input on the forensic section of the APA ethics code and
eventually, under Randy Otto’s guidance, to APA’s adoption of a revision
of the AP–LS’s Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (APA, 2013).
The battle of the Guidelines also created tension among AP–LS members,
as described later.
Demographics and Degrees
The demographics of contributors to a field of study can influence how it

develops: for example, what the field studies, who controls its progress,
and how it is perceived by those outside the field. Psychology and law’s
demographics have shifted during its 50-year history in both beneficial
and worrisome ways. Tracking demographics for the field of psychol-
ogy and law is difficult, but data about AP–LS membership provide some
approximation.
In 1969, only 9 of the 101 charter members of AP–LS were women
(Grisso, 1991). This proportion shifted dramatically across the years,
so that now women comprise well over one-half of the Society’s mem-
bership (some estimate two-thirds). This is consistent with the growing
proportion of women members of APA (about two-thirds; APA, 2015).
This shifting gender demographic has fostered healthy dialogue and bet-
ter attention to women’s professional issues in psychology and law, and
it has been reflected in AP–LS’s leadership. The organization elected two
women and eight men as presidents during its first 10 years. That propor-
tion persisted until 2005, after which about one-half of AP–LS’s presidents
were women.
As in psychology generally, however, the increasing gender imbal-
ance toward women raised concern about public perceptions of psychol-
ogy and law. There is a tendency for fields in which women constitute
the majority to suffer economic disadvantages (Millward & Woodland,
1995; Preston, 1999; Reskin & Roos, 1990). Others have noted the effects
of gender-biased perceptions of psychologists’ authority when presenting
evidence in legal forums (Larson & Brodsky, 2014; Neal, Guadagno, Eno,
& Brodsky, 2012). If the field’s estimates are correct (APA, 2015), gender
imbalance toward women in psychology generally and psychology and
law is likely to increase beyond 75% in the future, as current graduate
students (almost 80% women) enter the field and the field’s oldest cohort
(mostly men) retire.
Psychology and law as a field has always had only a small proportion of
African-American, Hispanic, and Asian contributors. Specific estimates
are difficult to determine, but they are probably less than in the psychol-
ogy workforce in general, where only 16% of psychologists claim racial/
ethnic minority status (APA, 2015). One must question the future health
of a field in which the race/ethnicity of its contributors vastly underrep-
resents that of the public it serves, especially in light of projections that
within 25 years, non-Hispanic whites will comprise the minority of the
U.S. population (Colby & Ortman, 2015).
Regarding academic degrees, almost all of the founders of AP–LS were
trained in clinical psychology (Grisso, 1991). The mid-1970s, however, saw
increasing diversity as more nonclinical psychologists—largely cognitive,
social, and developmental (hereinafter, experimental)—adopted AP–LS
as their base for advancing their research on law, legal systems, and legal
process. In addition, within the first two years after AP–LS’s inauguration,
a remarkable 40% of its members had law degrees (Grisso, 1991). During
the organization’s 50 years, its presidents have been clinical and experi-
mental in nearly equal proportions, and about 35% have had law degrees
(all but one with experimental or clinical psychology degrees as well).
Recent years, though, have raised concern about the field’s lawyers.
Their proportion within AP–LS ranks has decreased markedly, as has
lawyers’ leadership in AP–LS. For the organization’s first 35 years, almost
one-half of its presidents had law degrees. Yet there were none in the 12
succeeding years (2004–2015), and AP–LS conferences saw a dwindling
presence of lawyers and legal scholarly contributions. In most recent
years, AP–LS has initiated special efforts to revitalize law scholarship and
lawyers’ identification with the field, an effort characterized by a recent

AP–LS president as “increasing the L in AP–LS” (DeMatteo, 2016, p. 1).
Identity and Professional Interests
Perhaps no other issue has placed more stress on the field across its mod-
ern era than the basic questions, “What is psychology and law?” and “What
is forensic psychology?”10 Are they the same or different? The questions
were first posed at the beginning of the modern era. When the founders
of the new organization asked its membership to choose a name, members
split 50–50 between names including the words “law/legal” and “forensic”
(Grisso, 1991).
Although most of the charter members of AP–LS were clinically trained,
about one-half were in private practice and one-half were doing research
in academic settings (Grisso, 1991). This accounted in part for the group’s
fractious reaction when founder Jay Ziskin (1970), shortly after the organ-
ization began, announced that psychologists had no place in the court-
room until the field’s researchers had done enough work to warrant the
courts’ faith in them (Grisso, 1991). By the mid-1970s, some practitio-
ners were dubious about the Society’s value. Researchers with less inter-
est in clinical forensic practice took the executive reins of AP–LS, leaving
many of the practicing clinicians to find means outside AP–LS to create
an organization (i.e., ABFP) that would meet their needs (see Kaslow, this
volume).
Events in the 1990s, though, raised the most serious identity tensions,
threatening to fracture into smaller, specialized units. By that time, the
range of specialized topics within the field had greatly diversified, as
widely different as eyewitness testimony and therapeutic jurisprudence
and psychopathy, addressing a growing array of topics across criminal,
10. Research for this section included a detailed review of AP–LS newsletters and executive
minutes from the 1990s to the present, as well as personal communications solicited in 2017
from most of the presidents of AP–LS since the 1990s.
civil, and juvenile/family law. This challenged psychology and law’s iden-
tity as a single field and the notion that a single organization could meet
its disparate needs.
The decade of the 1990s was bracketed by efforts to define problems fac-
ing the expansion of forensic psychology (Grisso, 1987; Otto & Heilbrun,
2002), and by two AP–LS-initiated study-group retreats managed by AP–
LS presidents Gary Melton in 1991 and James Ogloff in 1999 (Fulero, 1999;
Roesch, Hart, & Ogloff, 1999). Yet as the field entered the 21st century, one
AP–LS president warned that it was threatened by “balkanization”: “The
discipline is by now so large that we risk becoming victims of our own
success, breaking up into sub-disciplines. It is now possible to attend the
Biennial [AP–LS convention], go to a session in each time slot, and hear
papers on a single topic. . . . If, indeed, we want Law and Psychology to be
recognized as a distinct field of study, we need to find ways to slow and
even reverse this trend” (Hart, 2002, p. 3).
Problems of diversity, though, were more complex than just the mul-
tiplication of special areas of research. A second dimension pertained
to various academic degrees—experimental (e.g., social, developmental,
cognitive), law, and clinical. And a third dimension cutting across those
degree areas was identification with research versus practice. Some social
and cognitive psychologists doing research (e.g., on eyewitness testimony
or jury selection) were not only researchers; they also engaged in practice
in the form of consultation to attorneys and courts. Similarly, while many
clinical psychologists in the field were solely practitioners, others engaged
in research to improve practice. Thus, as elaborated in the following dis-
cussion, understanding the field’s professional conflicts during the 1990s
required a complex three-dimensional analysis: subfields of research,
experimental–clinical degrees, and research–practice interests.
Tensions about identity and specialty interests ran very high during
the 1990s (Fulero, 1999). AP–LS’s executive group manifested a growing
dominance by clinicians throughout that decade. While AP–LS presiden-
cies were equally balanced between clinical and experimental psycholo-
gists across the organization’s 50 years, AP–LS members elected presidents
with clinical degrees 11 out of the 15 years between 1989 and 2003. Many
experimental psychologists felt that clinical and/or practitioner psychol-

ogists were “taking over,” and a similar trend arose in APA at the same
time. Some of psychology and law’s experimental psychologists began
transferring their allegiance from APA and AP–LS to APA’s new rival,
the American Psychological Society (now Association for Psychological
Science, dedicated more substantially to research), further unbalancing
the organization and weakening its experimental-research base.
Late in the 1990s, clinical psychologists within AP–LS petitioned APA
to formally designate forensic psychology as a practice specialty. Many
AP–LS researchers became concerned. Would all of psychology and law
become a forensic practice specialty? After all, the Specialty Guidelines
for Forensic Psychologists (Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic
Psychologists, 1991) were written to cover psychologists who “engaged
regularly as experts . . . in an activity intended primarily to provide profes-
sional psychological expertise to the justice system” (p. 656). If this defini-
tion were used, would experimental researchers, who sometimes offered
jury-selection consultation or testified about scientific findings on eyewit-
ness accuracy, be required to meet training criteria as though they were
forensic practitioners? Should the field split, distinguishing between foren-
sic psychology (the practitioners) and legal psychology (the researchers)?
AP–LS presidents of the 1990s describe polarized power struggles around
these issues. Predictions about an organizational fracturing of the field
were frequent and argumentative (Fulero, 1999).
In the end, most researchers decided that participating in shaping an
APA forensic specialty through AP–LS involvement offered better pros-
pects and fewer risks than leaving the task to forensic practitioners (e.g.,
through ABFP/AAFP). Forensic psychology received APA recognition
as a formal specialty in 2001, with criteria that did not unduly burden
researchers in the type of consultations and testimony that they provided.
Balance seems to have been restored after those years of tension. Since
2004, experimental and clinical psychologists once again have been elected
to annual AP–LS presidencies in almost equal proportions. Only the naïve
would conclude that questions about the field’s legal and forensic iden-
tity have been resolved. Yet the field ends its first 50 years with a healthy
tolerance for the ambiguity and recognition of the value of its diversity.
The field has not fractured. The conclusion of this account of the field’s
evolution offers a speculation about what has held it together.
THE HEART OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW
Is there something at the heart of psychology and law that connects all
of the field’s diversity, bonding it across time and its diversified subfields?
Finding it would identify the field’s resilience and energy. Yet this might
also reveal the field’s central tensions. Whatever is valued most creates
both one’s greatest joy and greatest source of anxiety.
The essence might lie in the field’s dual commitments: science and
advocacy. At its heart, science is neutral, blind to practical purposes,
and devoted only to knowing what can be discovered objectively and
reliably. Science has faith that what is discovered may be useful, but it
recognizes that knowledge will be of no use if it is tainted by applied
interests that might unduly influence its discovery. At its heart, advo-
cacy is unlike science. It seeks only a beneficial end, be it social justice or
personal gain. Advocacy is less concerned with truth or fact. It seeks a
desired outcome that is justified and sought because of treasured values
and ardent beliefs.
The dynamic interaction of science and advocacy is why psychology
and law is both exciting and dangerous. Advocacy drives our scientific
studies, shaping their purpose and design, yet always with the threat of
contaminating scientific integrity. Scientific evidence gives advocacy
power but always with the potential that facts will modulate or frustrate
advocacy’s deeply valued purposes. Science and advocacy are uncertain
partners, going forward with faith that the collaboration will improve
society yet always risking conflicts and disappointment.
The final, defining intersection of the partnership between science and
advocacy is the expert opinion. It is the social psychologist’s consultation
to a legislature, a developmental psychological amicus brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court, or the clinical psychologist’s conclusion that a defendant
lacks capacities relevant for competence to stand trial. The expert opinion
is the purpose of psychology and law’s strivings that unites it as a field.
This expert opinion is different than the opinion in other arenas where
psychology is applied—the clinic, the school, industry. Psychology and
law’s expert opinions are shaped by the law’s concepts, and the legal forum
puts them in the glaring spotlight of public scrutiny and challenge. Our
expert opinions create precedent and policies—gradually or in a single
stroke—that can change society in ways that affect millions.
Despite essential differences between science and advocacy, there is no
conflict when their intersection, the expert opinion, is driven by science
reliably discovered and applied to a cause justly sought. The devil, though,
is in the balance—deciding when the science is good enough and, when it
is, deciding the manner in which to apply it to avoid advocacy damaging
the opinion’s credibility even when the scientific basis is sound.
Disagreements about that balance have been at the heart of most of
psychology and law’s struggles. It was there in the modern era’s earliest
debates about the readiness of our science for expert testimony (Bonnie &
Slobogin, 1980; Ennis & Litwack, 1974; Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Monahan,
1981; Morse, 1982; Poythress, 1982; Ziskin, 1970), potential uses and mis-
uses of our science (Saks & Baron, 1980), and later in our discussions of
the ability of our science to meet Daubert standards (Groscup & Penrod,
2011; Shuman & Sales, 1999). It arose as we faced questions about the
proper role of our science and advocacy in our amicus briefs (Grisso &
Saks, 1991; Roesch, Golding, Hans, & Reppucci, 1991) and our efforts to
perform advocacy-driven science in ways that minimize bias (Grisso &
Steinberg, 2005).
Seeking the balance drove the development of our ethical guidelines
that limit expert opinion, our training standards that sustain the field’s
integrity, and our debates about errors in testimony (e.g., Borum, Otto, &
Golding, 1993; Dvoskin, 2007). It was the defining reason for our search
for psycholegal and personality assessment methods that would provide
an objective data base, increase legal relevance, and limit bias in our opin-
ions (Grisso, 1986/2003; Heilbrun, 2001; Melton et al., 2007). As we near
50 years of vigilance to improve the balance, it continues to be challenged
by new evidence about the questionable dependability of the research on

which we base our opinions (Lilienfeld, 2012; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012)
and the roles of cognitive bias in interpretation of our data (Dror, 2016;
Murrie & Boccaccini, 2015; Murrie et al., 2013; Neal & Brodsky, 2016;
Neal & Grisso, 2014).
Whether in the laboratory or the forensic evaluation clinic, the balance
of science and advocacy is a common concern that unites the diversity
within psychology and law. It creates the tension and energy that keeps
us interested and moves us forward. May it continue to do so as the field
matures beyond its first 50 years.
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—Oh! j’y ai déjà songé, fit le prêtre. Si je désire me trouver en
commerce galant avec elle, n’est-ce pas pour lire au fond de son
cœur?
—Elle n’a pas de cœur, dit vivement le duc, elle est encore plus
ambitieuse que nous ne le sommes.
—Tu es un brave capitaine, dit le cardinal à son frère; mais crois-
moi, nos deux robes sont bien près l’une de l’autre, et je la faisais
surveiller par Marie avant que tu ne songeasses à la soupçonner.
Catherine a moins de religion que n’en a mon soulier. Si elle n’est
pas l’âme du complot, ce n’est pas faute de désir; mais nous allons
la juger sur le terrain et voir comment elle nous appuiera.
Jusqu’aujourd’hui j’ai la certitude qu’elle n’a pas eu la moindre
communication avec les hérétiques.
—Il est temps de tout découvrir au roi et à la reine-mère qui ne
sait rien, dit le duc, et voilà la seule preuve de son innocence; peut-
être attend-on le dernier moment pour l’éblouir par les probabilités
d’un succès. La Renaudie va savoir par mes dispositions que nous
sommes avertis. Cette nuit, Nemours a dû suivre les détachements
de Réformés qui arrivaient par les chemins de traverse, et les
conjurés seront forcés de venir nous attaquer à Amboise, où je les
laisserai tous entrer. Ici, dit-il en montrant les trois côtés du rocher
sur lequel le château de Blois est assis comme venait de le faire
Chiverni, nous aurions un assaut sans aucun résultat, les Huguenots
viendraient et s’en iraient à volonté. Blois est une salle à quatre
entrées, tandis qu’Amboise est un sac.
—Je ne quitterai pas la Florentine, dit le cardinal.
—Nous avons fait une faute, reprit le duc en s’amusant à lancer
en l’air son poignard et à le rattraper par la coquille, il fallait se
conduire avec elle comme avec les Réformés, lui donner la liberté
de ses mouvements pour la prendre sur le fait.
Le cardinal regarda pendant un moment son frère en hochant la
tête.
—Que nous veut Pardaillan? dit le Grand-Maître en voyant venir
sur la terrasse ce jeune gentilhomme devenu célèbre par sa
rencontre avec la Renaudie et par leur mort mutuelle.
—Monseigneur, un homme envoyé par le pelletier de la reine est
à la porte, et dit avoir à lui remettre une parure d’hermine, faut-il le
laisser entrer?
—Eh! oui, un surcot dont elle parlait hier, reprit le cardinal; laissez
passer ce courtaud de boutique, elle aura besoin de cela pour
voyager le long de la Loire.
—Par où donc est-il venu, pour n’être arrêté qu’à la porte du
château? demanda le Grand-Maître.
—Je l’ignore, répondit Pardaillan.
—Je le lui demanderai chez la reine, se dit le Balafré, qu’il
attende le lever dans la salle des gardes; mais, Pardaillan, est-il
jeune?
—Oui, monseigneur; il se donne pour le fils de Lecamus.
—Lecamus est un bon catholique, fit le cardinal, qui, de même
que le Grand-Maître, était doué de la mémoire de César. Le curé de
Saint-Pierre-aux-Bœufs compte sur lui, car il est quartenier du
Palais.
—Néanmoins fais causer le fils avec le capitaine de la garde
écossaise, dit le Grand-Maître qui appuya sur ce verbe en y donnant
un sens facile à comprendre. Mais Ambroise est au château, par lui
nous saurons si c’est bien le fils de Lecamus qui l’a fort obligé jadis.
Demande Ambroise Paré.
Ce fut en ce moment que la reine Catherine alla seule au-devant
des deux frères qui s’empressèrent de venir à elle en lui témoignant
un respect dans lequel l’Italienne voyait de constantes ironies.
—Messieurs, dit-elle, daignerez-vous me confier ce qui se
prépare? La veuve de votre ancien maître serait-elle dans votre
estime au-dessous des sieurs de Vieilleville, Birague et Chiverni?
—Madame, répondit le cardinal sur un ton galant, notre devoir
d’hommes, avant celui de politiques, est de ne pas effrayer les
dames par de faux bruits. Mais ce matin il y a lieu de conférer sur les
affaires de l’État. Vous excuserez mon frère d’avoir commencé par
donner des ordres purement militaires et auxquels vous deviez être
étrangère: les choses importantes sont à décider. Si vous le trouvez
bien, nous irons au lever du roi et de la reine, l’heure approche.
—Qu’y a-t-il, monsieur le Grand-Maître? dit Catherine en jouant
l’effroi.
—La Réformation, madame, n’est plus une hérésie, c’est un parti
qui va venir en armes vous arracher le roi.
Catherine, le cardinal, le duc et les seigneurs se dirigèrent alors
vers l’escalier par la galerie où se pressaient les courtisans qui
n’avaient pas le droit d’entrée dans les appartements et qui se
rangèrent en haie.
Gondi, qui, pendant que Catherine causait avec les deux princes
lorrains, les avait examinés, dit en bon toscan, à l’oreille de la reine-
mère, ces deux mots qui devinrent proverbes et qui expliquent une
des faces de ce grand caractère royal: Odiate e aspettate! (Haïssez
et attendez.)
Pardaillan, qui vint donner l’ordre à l’officier de garde à la
conciergerie du château de laisser passer le commis du pelletier de
la reine, trouva Christophe béant devant le porche et occupé à
regarder la façade due au bon roi Louis XII où se trouvaient alors en
plus grand nombre qu’aujourd’hui des sculptures drôlatiques, s’il faut
en juger par ce qui nous en reste. Ainsi, les curieux remarquent une
figurine de femme taillée dans le chapiteau d’une des colonnes de la
porte, la robe retroussée et faisant railleusement voir
Ce que Brunel à Marphise montra
à un gros moine accroupi dans le chapiteau de la colonne

correspondante à l’autre jambage du chambranle de cette porte, au-
dessus de laquelle était alors la statue de Louis XII. Plusieurs des
croisées de cette façade, travaillées dans ce goût et qui
malheureusement ont été détruites, amusaient ou paraissaient
amuser Christophe, sur qui les arquebusiers de garde faisaient déjà
pleuvoir des plaisanteries.
—Il se logerait bien là, celui-ci, disait l’anspessade en caressant
les charges d’arquebuse toutes préparées en forme de pain de
sucre et accrochées sur son baudrier.
—Eh! Parisien, dit un soldat, tu n’en as jamais tant vu!
—Il reconnaît le bon roi Louis XII, dit un autre.
Christophe feignait de ne pas entendre, et cherchait encore à
outrer son ébahissement, en sorte que son attitude niaise devant le
corps de garde lui fut un excellent passe-port aux yeux de
Pardaillan.
—La reine n’est pas levée, dit le jeune capitaine, viens l’attendre
dans la salle des gardes.
Christophe suivit Pardaillan assez lentement. Il fit exprès
d’admirer la jolie galerie découpée en arcades où, sous le règne de
Louis XII, les courtisans attendaient l’heure des réceptions à couvert
quand il faisait mauvais temps, et où se trouvaient alors quelques
seigneurs attachés aux Guise, car l’escalier, si bien conservé de nos
jours, qui menait à leurs appartements, est au bout de cette galerie
dans une tour que son architecture recommande à l’admiration des
curieux.
—Hé! bien, es-tu venu pour faire des études de tailleur
d’images? cria Pardaillan en voyant Lecamus arrêté devant les jolies
sculptures des tribunes extérieures qui réunissent ou, si vous voulez,
qui séparent les colonnes de chaque arcade.
Christophe suivit le jeune capitaine vers l’escalier d’honneur, non
sans avoir mesuré cette tour quasi-moresque par un regard
d’extase. Par cette belle matinée, la cour était pleine de capitaines
d’ordonnance, de seigneurs qui causaient par groupes, et dont les
brillants costumes animaient ce lieu que les merveilles de
l’architecture répandues sur sa façade encore neuve rendaient déjà
si brillant.
—Entre là, dit Pardaillan à Lecamus en lui faisant signe de le
suivre par la porte en bois sculpté du deuxième étage et qu’un garde
de la porte ouvrit en reconnaissant Pardaillan.
Chacun peut se figurer l’étonnement de Christophe en entrant
dans cette salle des gardes, alors si vaste, qu’aujourd’hui le Génie
militaire l’a divisée en deux par une cloison pour en faire deux
chambrées; elle occupe en effet au second étage chez le roi, comme
au premier chez la reine-mère, le tiers de la façade sur la cour, car
elle est éclairée par deux croisées à gauche et deux croisées à
droite de la tour où se développe le fameux escalier. Le jeune
capitaine alla vers la porte de la chambre de la reine et du roi qui
donnait dans cette vaste salle, et dit à l’un des deux pages de
service d’avertir madame Dayelle, une des femmes de chambre de
la reine, que le pelletier était dans la salle avec ses surcots.
Sur un geste de Pardaillan, Christophe alla se mettre près d’un
officier assis sur une escabelle, au coin d’une cheminée grande
comme la boutique de son père et qui se trouvait à l’un des bouts de
cette immense salle en face d’une cheminée absolument pareille à
l’autre bout. Tout en causant avec ce lieutenant, il finit par
l’intéresser en lui contant les pénuries du commerce. Christophe
parut si véritablement marchand, que l’officier fit partager cette
opinion au capitaine de la garde écossaise qui vint de la cour
questionner Christophe en l’examinant à la dérobée et avec soin.
Quelque prévenu que fût Christophe Lecamus, il ne pouvait
comprendre la férocité froide des intérêts entre lesquels Chaudieu
l’avait glissé. Pour un observateur qui eût connu le secret de cette
scène, comme l’historien le connaît aujourd’hui, il y aurait eu de quoi
trembler à voir ce jeune homme, l’espoir de deux familles, hasardé
entre ces deux puissantes et impitoyables machines, Catherine et
les Guise. Mais y a-t-il beaucoup de courages qui mesurent
l’étendue de leurs dangers? Par la manière dont étaient gardés le
port de Blois, la ville et le château, Christophe s’attendait à trouver
des piéges et des espions partout, il avait donc résolu de cacher la
gravité de sa mission et la tension de son esprit sous l’apparence
niaise et commerciale avec laquelle il venait de se montrer aux yeux
du jeune Pardaillan, de l’officier de garde et du capitaine.
L’agitation qui dans un château royal accompagne l’heure du
lever commençait à se manifester. Les seigneurs, dont les chevaux
et les pages ou les écuyers restaient dans la cour extérieure du
château, car personne, excepté le roi et la reine, n’avait le droit
d’entrer à cheval dans la cour intérieure, montaient par groupes le
magnifique escalier, et envahissaient cette grande salle des gardes
à deux cheminées, dont les fortes poutres sont aujourd’hui sans
leurs ornements, où de méchants petits carreaux rouges remplacent
les ingénieuses mosaïques des planchers, mais où les tapisseries
de la Couronne cachaient alors les gros murs blanchis à la chaux
aujourd’hui et où brillaient à l’envi les arts de cette époque unique
dans les fastes de l’Humanité. Réformés et Catholiques venaient
savoir les nouvelles, examiner les visages, autant que faire leur cour
au roi. L’amour excessif de François II pour Marie Stuart, auquel ni
les Guise ni la reine-mère ne s’opposaient, et la complaisance
politique avec laquelle s’y prêtait Marie Stuart, ôtaient au roi tout
pouvoir; aussi, quoiqu’il eût dix-sept ans, ne connaissait-il de la
royauté que les plaisirs, et du mariage que les voluptés d’une
première passion. Chacun faisait en réalité la cour à la reine Marie, à
son oncle le cardinal de Lorraine et au Grand-Maître.
Ce mouvement eut lieu devant Christophe, qui étudiait l’arrivée
de chaque personnage avec une avidité bien naturelle. Une
magnifique portière de chaque côté de laquelle se tenaient deux
pages et deux gardes de la compagnie écossaise, alors de service,
lui indiquait l’entrée de cette chambre royale, si fatale au fils du
Grand-Maître actuel, le second Balafré, qui vint expirer au pied du lit
alors occupé par Marie Stuart et par François II. Les filles d’honneur
de la reine occupaient la cheminée opposée à celle où Christophe
causait toujours avec le capitaine des gardes. Par sa situation, cette
seconde cheminée était la cheminée d’honneur, car elle est
pratiquée dans le gros mur de la salle du Conseil, entre la porte de
la chambre royale et celle du Conseil, en sorte que les filles et les
seigneurs qui avaient le droit d’être là, se trouvaient sur le passage
du roi et des reines. Les courtisans étaient certains de voir
Catherine, car ses filles d’honneur, en deuil comme toute la cour,
montèrent de chez elle, conduites par la comtesse de Fiesque, et
prirent leur place du côté de la salle du Conseil, en face des filles de
la jeune reine amenées par la duchesse de Guise, et qui occupaient
le coin opposé, du côté de la chambre royale. Les courtisans
laissaient entre ces demoiselles, qui appartenaient aux premières
familles du royaume, un espace de quelques pas que les plus
grands seigneurs avaient seuls la permission de franchir. La
comtesse de Fiesque et la duchesse de Guise étaient, selon le droit
de leurs charges, assises au milieu de ces nobles filles qui toutes
restaient debout. L’un des premiers qui vint se mêler à ces deux
escadrons si dangereux fut le duc d’Orléans, frère du roi, qui
descendit de son appartement situé au-dessus, et qu’accompagnait
monsieur de Cypierre, son gouverneur. Ce jeune prince, qui, avant la
fin de cette année, devait régner sous le nom de Charles IX, alors
âgé de dix ans, était d’une excessive timidité. Le duc d’Anjou et le
duc d’Alençon, ses deux frères, ainsi que la princesse Marguerite qui
fut la femme de Henri IV, encore trop jeunes pour venir à la cour,
restaient sous la conduite de leur mère dans ses appartements. Le
duc d’Orléans, richement vêtu, selon la mode du temps, d’un haut-
de-chausses en soie, d’un justaucorps de drap d’or orné de fleurs
noires, et d’un petit manteau de velours brodé, le tout noir (il portait
encore le deuil du roi son père), salua les deux dames d’honneur et
resta près des filles de sa mère. Déjà plein d’antipathie pour les
adhérents de la maison de Guise, il répondit froidement aux paroles
de la duchesse et appuya son bras sur le dossier de la haute chaise
de la comtesse de Fiesque. Son gouverneur, un des plus beaux
caractères de ce temps, monsieur de Cypierre, resta derrière lui
comme une panoplie. Amyot, en simple soutane d’abbé,
accompagnait aussi le prince, il était déjà son précepteur comme il
fut aussi celui des trois autres princes dont l’affection lui devint si
profitable. Entre la cheminée d’honneur et celle où se groupaient à
l’autre extrémité de cette salle les gardes, leur capitaine, quelques
courtisans et Christophe muni de son carton, le chancelier Olivier,
protecteur et prédécesseur de Lhospital, costumé comme l’ont
toujours été depuis les chanceliers de France, se promenait avec le
cardinal de Tournon récemment arrivé de Rome, en échangeant
quelques phrases d’oreille en oreille au milieu de l’attention générale
que leur prêtaient les seigneurs massés le long du mur qui sépare
cette salle de la chambre du roi comme une tapisserie vivante,
devant la riche tapisserie aux mille personnages. Malgré la gravité
des circonstances, la cour offrait l’aspect que toutes les cours
offriront dans tous les pays, à toutes les époques et dans les plus
grands dangers: des courtisans parlant toujours de choses
indifférentes en pensant à des choses graves, plaisantant en
étudiant les visages, et s’occupant d’amours et de mariages avec
des héritières au milieu des catastrophes les plus sanglantes.
—Que dites-vous de la fête d’hier? demanda Bourdeilles,
seigneur de Brantôme, en s’approchant de mademoiselle de
Piennes, une des filles de la reine-mère.
—Messieurs du Baïf et du Bellay n’ont eu que de belles idées,
dit-elle en montrant les deux ordonnateurs de la fête qui se
trouvaient à quelques pas...—J’ai trouvé cela d’un goût exécrable,
ajouta-t-elle à voix basse.
—Vous n’y aviez pas de rôle? dit mademoiselle de Lewiston de
l’autre bord.
—Que lisez-vous là, madame? dit Amyot à madame de Fiesque.
—L’Amadis de Gaule, par le seigneur des Essarts, commissaire
ordinaire de l’hartillerie du Roi.
—Un ouvrage charmant, dit la belle fille qui fut depuis si célèbre
sous le nom de Fosseuse quand elle devint dame d’honneur de la
reine Marguerite de Navarre.
—Le style est de forme nouvelle, dit Amyot. Adoptez-vous ces
barbaries? ajouta-t-il en regardant Brantôme.
—Il plaît aux dames, que voulez-vous? s’écria Brantôme en
allant saluer madame de Guise qui tenait les Célèbres dames de
Boccace.—Il doit s’y trouver des femmes de votre maison, madame,
dit-il; mais le sieur Boccace a eu tort de ne pas être de notre temps,
il aurait trouvé d’amples matières pour augmenter ses volumes...
—Comme ce monsieur de Brantôme est adroit, dit la belle
mademoiselle de Limeuil à la comtesse de Fiesque; il est venu
d’abord à nous, mais il restera dans le quartier des Guise.
—Chut, dit madame de Fiesque en regardant la belle Limeuil.
Mêlez-vous de ce qui vous intéresse...
La jeune fille tourna les yeux vers la porte. Elle attendait Sardini,
un noble Italien avec lequel la reine-mère, sa parente, la maria plus
tard après l’accident qui lui arriva dans le cabinet de toilette même
de Catherine, et qui lui valut l’honneur d’avoir une reine pour sage-
femme.
—Par saint Alipantin, mademoiselle Davila me semble plus jolie
chaque matin, dit monsieur de Robertet, secrétaire d’État, en saluant
le groupe de la reine-mère.
L’arrivée du secrétaire d’État, qui cependant était exactement ce
qu’est un ministre aujourd’hui, ne fit aucune sensation.
—Si cela est, monsieur, prêtez-moi donc le libelle fait contre
messieurs de Guise, je sais qu’on vous l’a prêté, dit à Robertet
mademoiselle Davila.
—Je ne l’ai plus, répondit le secrétaire en allant saluer madame
de Guise.
—Je l’ai, dit le comte de Grammont à mademoiselle Davila, mais
je ne vous le donne qu’à une condition...
—Sous condition!... fi! dit madame de Fiesque.
—Vous ne savez pas ce que je veux, répondit Grammont.
—Oh! cela se devine, dit la Limeuil.
La coutume italienne de nommer les dames, comme font les
paysans de leurs femmes, la une telle, était alors de mode à la cour
de France.
—Vous vous trompez, reprit vivement le comte, il s’agit de
remettre à mademoiselle de Matha, l’une des filles de l’autre bord,
une lettre de mon cousin de Jarnac.
—Ne compromettez pas mes filles, dit la comtesse de Fiesque, je
la donnerai moi-même!
—Savez-vous des nouvelles de ce qui se passe en Flandre?
demanda madame de Fiesque au cardinal de Tournon. Il paraît que
monsieur d’Egmont donne dans les nouveautés.
—Lui et le prince d’Orange, reprit Cypierre en faisant un geste
d’épaules assez significatif.
—Le duc d’Albe et le cardinal Granvelle y vont, n’est-ce pas,
monsieur? dit Amyot au cardinal de Tournon qui restait sombre et
inquiet entre les deux groupes, après sa conversation avec le
chancelier.
—Heureusement nous sommes tranquilles, et nous n’avons à
vaincre l’Hérésie que sur le théâtre, dit le jeune duc d’Orléans en
faisant allusion au rôle qu’il avait rempli la veille, celui d’un chevalier
domptant une hydre qui avait sur le front le mot Réformation.
Catherine de Médicis, d’accord en ceci avec sa belle-fille, avait
laissé faire une salle de spectacle de l’immense salle qui plus tard
fut disposée pour les États de Blois, et où, comme il a été déjà dit,
aboutissaient le château de François Ier et celui de Louis XII.
Le cardinal ne répondit rien et reprit sa marche au milieu de la
salle en causant à voix basse entre monsieur de Robertet et le
chancelier. Beaucoup de personnes ignorent les difficultés que les
Secrétaireries d’État, devenues depuis les Ministères, ont
rencontrées dans leur établissement et combien de peines ont eues
les rois de France à les créer. A cette époque un secrétaire d’État
comme Robertet était purement et simplement un écrivain, il
comptait à peine au milieu des princes et des grands, qui décidaient
des affaires de l’État. Il n’y avait pas alors d’autres fonctions
ministérielles que celles de Surintendant des finances, de Chancelier
et de Garde-des-sceaux. Les rois accordaient une place dans leur
Conseil par des lettres patentes à ceux de leurs sujets dont les avis
leur paraissaient utiles à la conduite des affaires publiques. On
donnait l’entrée au Conseil à un président de chambre du Parlement,
à un évêque, à un favori sans titre. Une fois admis au Conseil, le
sujet y fortifiait sa position en se faisant revêtir des charges de la
Couronne auxquelles étaient dévolues des attributions, telles que
des Gouvernements, l’épée de connétable, la Grande-Maîtrise de
l’artillerie, le bâton de Maréchal, la Colonelle-générale de quelque
corps militaire, la Grande-Amirauté, la Capitainerie des Galères, ou
souvent une charge de cour comme celle de Grand-Maître de la
maison qu’avait alors le duc de Guise.
—Croyez-vous que le duc de Nemours épouse Françoise?
demanda madame de Guise au précepteur du duc d’Orléans.
—Ah! madame, répondit-il, je ne sais que le latin.
Cette réponse fit sourire ceux qui furent à portée d’entendre. En
ce moment, la séduction de Françoise de Rohan par le duc de
Nemours était le sujet de toutes les conversations; mais, comme le
duc de Nemours était cousin de François II, et doublement allié de la
maison de Valois par sa mère, les Guise le regardaient plutôt
comme séduit que comme séducteur. Néanmoins le crédit de la
maison de Rohan fut tel, qu’après le règne de François II, le duc de
Nemours fut obligé de quitter la France, à cause du procès que lui
firent les Rohan, et que le crédit des Guise arrangea. Son mariage
avec la duchesse de Guise, après l’assassinat de Poltrot, peut
expliquer la question que la duchesse avait adressée à Amyot, en
révélant la rivalité qui devait exister entre mademoiselle de Rohan et
la duchesse.
—Mais voyez un peu le groupe des mécontents, là-bas, dit le
comte de Grammont en montrant messieurs de Coligny, le cardinal
de Châtillon, Banville, Thoré, Moret et plusieurs seigneurs
soupçonnés de tremper dans la Réformation qui se tenaient tous
entre deux croisées, du côté de l’autre cheminée.
—Les Huguenots se remuent, dit Cypierre. Nous savons que
Théodore de Bèze est à Nérac pour obtenir de la reine de Navarre
qu’elle se déclare pour les Réformés en abjurant publiquement,
ajouta-t-il en regardant le bailli d’Orléans qui était aussi chancelier
de la reine de Navarre et qui observait la cour.
—Elle le fera! répondit sèchement le bailli d’Orléans.
Ce personnage, le Jacques Cœur orléanais, un des plus riches
bourgeois de ce temps, se nommait Groslot et faisait les affaires de
Jeanne d’Albret à la cour de France.
—Vous le croyez? dit le chancelier de France au chancelier de
Navarre en appréciant la portée de l’affirmation de Groslot.
—Ne savez-vous pas, dit le riche orléanais, que cette reine n’a
de la femme que le sexe? Elle est entière aux choses viriles, elle a
l’esprit puissant aux grandes affaires, et le cœur invincible aux
grandes adversités.
—Monsieur le Cardinal, dit le chancelier Olivier à monsieur de
Tournon qui avait écouté Groslot, que pensez-vous de cette audace?
—La reine de Navarre a bien fait de choisir pour son chancelier
un homme à qui la maison de Lorraine a des emprunts à faire et qui
offre son logis au roi quand on parle d’aller à Orléans, répondit le
cardinal.
Le chancelier et le cardinal se regardèrent alors sans oser se
communiquer leurs pensées; mais Robertet les leur exprima, car il
croyait nécessaire de montrer plus de dévouement aux Guise que
ces grands personnages en se trouvant plus petit qu’eux.
—C’est un grand malheur que la maison de Navarre, au lieu
d’abjurer la religion de ses pères, n’abjure pas l’esprit de vengeance
et de révolte que lui a soufflé le connétable de Bourbon. Nous allons
revoir les querelles des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons.
—Non, dit Groslot, car il y a du Louis XI dans le cardinal de
Lorraine.
—Et aussi chez la reine Catherine, répondit Robertet.
En ce moment madame Dayelle, la femme de chambre favorite
de la reine Marie Stuart, traversa la salle et alla vers la chambre de
la reine. Le passage de la femme de chambre causa du mouvement.
—Nous allons bientôt entrer, dit madame de Fiesque.
—Je ne le crois pas, répondit madame de Guise, Leurs Majestés
sortiront, car on va tenir un grand conseil.
La Dayelle se glissa dans la chambre royale après avoir gratté à
la porte, façon respectueuse inventée par Catherine de Médicis, et
qui fut adoptée à la cour de France.
—Quel temps fait-il, ma chère Dayelle? dit la reine Marie en
montrant son blanc et frais visage hors du lit en en secouant les
rideaux.
—Ah! madame...
—Qu’as-tu, ma Dayelle? on dirait que les archers sont à tes
trousses.
—Oh! madame, le roi dort-il encore?
—Oui.
—Nous allons quitter le château, et monsieur le cardinal m’a
priée de vous le dire, afin que vous y disposiez le roi.
—Sais-tu pourquoi, ma bonne Dayelle?
—Les Réformés veulent vous enlever...
—Ah! cette nouvelle religion ne me laissera pas de repos! J’ai
rêvé cette nuit que j’étais en prison, moi qui réunirai les couronnes
des trois plus beaux royaumes du monde.
—Aussi, madame, est-ce un rêve!
—Enlevée?... ce serait assez gentil; mais pour fait de religion et
par des hérétiques, c’est une horreur.
La reine sauta hors du lit et vint s’asseoir dans une grande
chaise couverte de velours rouge, devant la cheminée, après que
Dayelle lui eut donné une robe de chambre en velours noir, qu’elle
serra légèrement à la taille par une corde en soie. Dayelle alluma le
feu, car les matinées du mois de mai sont assez fraîches aux bords
de la Loire.
—Mes oncles ont donc appris ces nouvelles pendant la nuit?
demanda la reine à Dayelle, avec laquelle elle agissait
familièrement.
—Depuis ce matin, messieurs de Guise se promènent sur la
terrasse pour n’être entendus de personne et y ont reçu des
envoyés venus en toute hâte de différents points du royaume où les
Réformés s’agitent. Madame la reine-mère y était avec ses Italiens
en espérant qu’elle serait consultée; mais elle n’a pas été de ce petit
conseil.
—Elle doit être furieuse!
—D’autant plus qu’il y avait un restant de colère d’hier, répondit
Dayelle. On dit qu’en voyant paraître Votre Majesté dans sa robe
d’or retors et avec son joli voile de crêpe tanné, elle n’a pas été
gaie...
—Laisse-nous, ma bonne Dayelle, le roi s’éveille. Que personne,
pas même les petites entrées, ne nous dérange, il s’agit d’affaires
d’État, et mes oncles ne nous troubleront pas.
—Eh! bien, ma chère Marie, as-tu donc déjà quitté le lit? Est-il
grand jour? dit le jeune roi en s’éveillant.
—Mon cher mignon, pendant que nous dormons, les méchants
veillent et vont nous forcer de quitter cette belle demeure.
—Que parles-tu de méchants, ma mie! N’avons-nous pas eu la
plus jolie fête du monde hier au soir, n’étaient les mots latins que ces
messieurs ont jetés dans notre français?
—Ah! dit Marie, ce langage est de fort bon goût, et Rabelais l’a
déjà mis en lumière.
—Tu es une savante, et je suis bien fâché de ne pouvoir le
célébrer en vers; si je n’étais pas roi, je reprendrais à mon frère
maître Amyot qui le rend si savant...
—N’enviez rien à votre frère qui fait des poésies et me les montre
en me demandant de lui montrer les miennes. Allez, vous êtes le
meilleur des quatre et serez aussi bon roi que vous êtes amant
gentil. Aussi, peut-être est-ce pour cela que votre mère vous aime si
peu! Mais sois tranquille. Moi, mon cher cœur, je t’aimerai pour tout
le monde.
—Je n’ai pas grand mérite à aimer une si parfaite reine, dit le
petit roi. Je ne sais qui m’a retenu hier de t’embrasser devant toute
la cour quand tu as dansé le branle au flambeau! J’ai clairement vu
que toutes les femmes ont l’air d’être des servantes auprès de toi,
belle Marie...
—Pour ne parler qu’en prose, vous parlez à ravir, mon mignon;
mais aussi est-ce l’amour qui parle. Et vous, vous savez bien, mon
aimé, que vous ne seriez qu’un pauvre petit page, encore vous
aimerais-je autant que je vous aime, et il n’y a rien cependant de
plus doux que de pouvoir se dire: Mon amant est roi.
—Oh! le joli bras! Pourquoi faut-il nous habiller? J’aime tant à
passer mes doigts dans tes cheveux si doux, à mêler leurs anneaux
blonds. Ah! çà, ma mie, ne donne plus à baiser à tes femmes ce cou
si blanc et ce joli dos, ne le souffrez plus! C’est déjà trop que les
brouillards de l’Écosse y aient passé.
—Ne viendrez-vous pas voir mon cher pays? Les Écossais vous
aimeront, et il n’y aura pas de révolte comme ici.
—Qui se révolte dans notre royaume? dit François de Valois en
croisant sa robe et prenant Marie Stuart sur son genou.
—Oh! ceci est assurément fort joli, dit-elle en dérobant sa joue au
roi; mais vous avez à régner, s’il vous plaît, mon doux sire.
—Que parles-tu de régner? je veux ce matin...
—A-t-on besoin de dire je veux quand on peut tout? Ceci n’est
parler ni en roi, ni en amant. Mais, il ne s’agit point de cela, laisse!
Nous avons une affaire importante.
—Oh! dit le roi, il y a longtemps que nous n’avons eu d’affaire.
Est-elle amusante?
—Non, dit Marie, il s’agit de déménager.
—Je gage, ma mie, que vous avez vu l’un de vos oncles, qui
s’arrangent si bien, qu’à dix-sept ans, je me comporte en roi
fainéant. Je ne sais pas, en vérité, pourquoi depuis le premier
conseil j’ai continué d’assister aux autres? Ils y pourraient faire tout
aussi bien les choses en mettant une couronne sur mon fauteuil, je
ne vois rien que par leurs yeux et décide à l’aveugle.
—Oh! monsieur, s’écria la reine en se levant de dessus le roi et
prenant un petit air de fâcherie, il était dit que vous ne me feriez plus
la moindre peine à ce sujet, et que mes oncles useraient du pouvoir
royal pour le bonheur de votre peuple. Il est gentil ton peuple? si tu
voulais le régenter toi seul, il te goberait comme une fraise. Il lui faut
des gens de guerre, un maître rude et à mains gantées de fer; tandis
que toi tu es un mignon que j’aime ainsi, que je n’aimerais pas
autrement, entendez-vous, monsieur? dit-elle en baisant au front cet
enfant qui paraissait vouloir se révolter contre ce discours et que
cette caresse adoucit.
—Oh! s’ils n’étaient pas vos oncles! s’écria François II. Ce
cardinal me déplaît énormément, et quand il prend son air patelin et
ses façons soumises pour me dire en s’inclinant: «Sire, il s’agit ici de
l’honneur de la couronne et de la foi de vos pères. Votre Majesté ne
saurait souffrir;» et ceci et cela... je suis sûr qu’il ne travaille que
pour sa maudite maison de Lorraine.
—Comme tu l’as bien imité! dit la reine. Mais pourquoi
n’employez-vous pas ces Lorrains à vous instruire de ce qui se
passe, afin de régner par vous-même dans quelque temps, à votre
grande majorité? Je suis votre femme, et votre honneur est le mien.
Nous régnerons, va, mon mignon! Mais tout ne sera pas roses pour
nous jusqu’au moment où nous ferons nos volontés! il n’y a rien de
si difficile pour un roi que de régner! Suis-je reine, moi, par exemple?
Croyez-vous que votre mère ne me rende pas en mal ce que mes
oncles font de bien pour la splendeur de votre trône? Hé! quelle
différence! Mes oncles sont de grands princes, neveux de
Charlemagne, pleins d’égards et qui sauraient mourir pour vous;
tandis que cette fille de médecin ou de marchand, reine de France
par hasard, est grièche comme une bourgeoise qui ne règne pas
dans son ménage. En femme mécontente de ne pas tout brouiller ici,
cette Italienne me montre à tout propos sa figure pâle et sérieuse;
puis, de sa bouche pincée: «Ma fille, vous êtes la reine, et je ne suis
plus que la seconde femme du royaume, me dit-elle (Elle enrage,
entends-tu, mon mignon?). Mais si j’étais en votre place, je ne
porterais pas de velours incarnat pendant que la cour est en deuil, je
ne paraîtrais pas en public avec mes cheveux unis et sans
pierreries, parce que ce qui n’est point séant à une simple dame l’est
encore moins chez une reine. Aussi ne danserais-je point de ma
personne, je me contenterais de voir danser!» Voilà ce qu’elle me
dit.
—Oh! mon Dieu, répondit le roi, je crois l’entendre. Dieu! si elle
savait...
—Oh! vous tremblez encore devant elle. Elle t’ennuie, dis-le?
nous la renverrons. Par ma foi! te tromper, passe encore, la bonne
femme est de Florence; mais t’ennuyer...
—Au nom du Ciel, Marie, tais-toi, dit François inquiet et content
tout à la fois, je ne voudrais pas que tu perdisses son amitié.
—N’ayez pas peur qu’elle se brouille jamais avec moi qui porterai
les trois plus belles couronnes du monde, mon cher petit roi, dit
Marie Stuart. Encore qu’elle me haïsse pour mille raisons, elle me
caresse afin de me détacher de mes oncles.
—Te haïr!...
—Oui, mon ange, et si je n’en avais mille de ces preuves que les
femmes se donnent entre elles de ce sentiment et dont la malice
n’est comprise que par elles, je me contenterais de sa constante
opposition à nos chères amours. Est-ce ma faute à moi, si ton père
n’a jamais pu souffrir mademoiselle Médicis? Enfin elle m’aime si
peu qu’il a fallu que vous vous missiez en colère pour que nous
n’eussions pas chacun notre appartement, ici et à Saint-Germain.
Elle prétendait que c’était l’usage des rois et reines de France.
L’usage! c’était celui de votre père, et cela s’explique. Quant à votre
aïeul François, le compère avait établi cet usage pour la commodité
de ses amours. Aussi, veillez-y bien! Si nous nous en allons d’ici,
que le Grand-Maître ne nous sépare point.
—Si nous nous en allons d’ici, Marie? Mais, moi, je ne veux point
quitter ce joli château d’où nous voyons la Loire et le Blésois, une
ville à nos pieds et le plus joli ciel du monde au-dessus de nos têtes
et ces délicieux jardins. Si je m’en vais, ce sera pour aller en Italie
avec toi, voir les peintures de Raphaël et Saint-Pierre.
—Et les orangers? Oh! mon mignon roi, si tu savais quelle envie
ta Marie nourrit de se promener sous des orangers en fleur et en
fruit! Hélas! peut-être n’en verrai-je jamais. Oh! entendre un chant
italien sous ces arbres parfumés, au bord d’une mer bleue, sous un
ciel bleu, et nous tenir ainsi!
—Partons, dit le roi.
—Partir! s’écria le Grand-Maître en entrant. Oui, sire, il s’agit de
quitter Blois. Pardonnez-moi ma hardiesse; mais les circonstances
sont plus fortes que l’étiquette, et je viens vous supplier de tenir
conseil.
Marie et François s’étaient vivement séparés en se voyant
surpris, et leurs visages offraient une même expression de majesté
royale offensée.
—Vous êtes un trop grand maître, monsieur de Guise, dit le
jeune roi tout en contenant sa colère.
—Au diable les amoureux! dit le cardinal en murmurant à l’oreille
de Catherine.
—Mon fils, répondit la reine-mère qui se montra derrière le
cardinal, il s’agit de la sûreté de votre personne et de votre royaume.
—L’hérésie veillait pendant que vous dormiez, sire, dit le cardinal.
—Retirez-vous dans la salle, fit le petit roi, nous tiendrons alors
conseil.
—Madame, dit le Grand-Maître à la reine, le fils de votre pelletier
vous apporte vos fourrures, qui sont de saison pour le voyage, car il
est probable que nous côtoierons la Loire. Mais, dit-il en se tournant
vers la reine-mère, il veut aussi vous parler, madame. Pendant que
le roi s’habillera, vous et madame la reine expédiez-le sur-le-champ,
afin que nous n’ayons point la tête rompue de cette bagatelle.
—Volontiers, dit Catherine, en se disant à elle-même: S’il compte
se défaire de moi par de semblables ruses, il ne me connaît point.
Le cardinal et le duc se retirèrent en laissant les deux reines et le
roi. En passant dans la salle des gardes, qu’il traversa de nouveau
pour aller dans la salle du conseil, le Grand-Maître dit à l’huissier de
lui amener le pelletier de la reine. Quand Christophe vit venir à lui,
d’un bout de la salle des gardes à l’autre, cet huissier, qu’il prit à son
costume pour un personnage, le cœur lui faillit; mais cette sensation,
si naturelle à l’approche du moment critique, devint terrible lorsque
l’huissier, dont le mouvement eut pour résultat d’attirer les yeux de
toute cette brillante assemblée sur Christophe, sur sa piètre mine et
ses paquets, lui dit:—Messeigneurs le cardinal de Lorraine et le
Grand-Maître vous mandent pour parler à vous dans la salle du
conseil.
—Aurais-je été trahi? se demanda le frêle ambassadeur des
Réformés.
Christophe suivit l’huissier en baissant les yeux, et ne les leva
qu’en se trouvant dans l’immense salle du conseil, dont l’étendue est
presque égale à celle de la salle des gardes. Les deux princes
lorrains y étaient seuls debout devant la magnifique cheminée
adossée à celle où, dans la salle des gardes, se tenaient les filles
des deux reines.
—Tu viens de Paris, quelle route as-tu donc prise? dit le cardinal
à Christophe.
—Je suis venu par eau, monseigneur, répondit le Réformé.
—Comment es-tu donc entré dans Blois? dit le Grand-Maître.
—Par le port, monseigneur.
—Personne ne t’a inquiété? fit le duc qui ne cessait d’examiner le
jeune homme.
—Non, monseigneur. Au premier soldat qui a fait mine de
m’arrêter, j’ai dit que je venais pour le service des deux reines, de
qui mon père est le pelletier.
—Que faisait-on à Paris? demanda le cardinal.
—On recherchait toujours l’auteur du meurtre commis sur le
président Minard.
—N’es-tu pas le fils du plus grand ami de mon chirurgien? dit le
duc de Guise trompé par la candeur que Christophe exprimait, une
fois son trouble apaisé.
—Oui, monseigneur.
Le Grand-Maître sortit, souleva brusquement la portière qui
cachait la double porte de la salle du conseil, et montra sa figure à
toute cette audience au milieu de laquelle il chercha le premier
chirurgien du roi. Ambroise, debout dans un coin, fut frappé par une
œillade que le duc lui lança, et vint à lui. Ambroise, qui inclinait déjà
vers la religion réformée, finit par l’adopter; mais l’amitié des Guise
et celle des rois de France le garantit de tous les malheurs qui
atteignirent les Réformés. Le duc, qui se regardait comme obligé de
la vie envers Ambroise Paré, l’avait fait nommer premier chirurgien
du roi depuis quelques jours.
—Que voulez-vous, monseigneur? dit Ambroise. Le roi serait-il
malade? je le croirais assez.
—Comment?
—La reine est trop jolie, répliqua le chirurgien.
—Ah! fit le duc étonné. Néanmoins il ne s’agit pas de ceci, reprit-
il après une pause. Ambroise, je veux te faire voir un de tes amis,
dit-il en l’emmenant sur le pas de la porte de la chambre du conseil
et lui montrant Christophe.
—Hé! c’est vrai, monseigneur, s’écria le chirurgien en tendant la
main à Christophe. Comment va ton père, mon gars?
—Mais bien, maître Ambroise, répondit Christophe.
—Et que viens-tu faire à la cour, dit le chirurgien, ce n’est pas ton
métier de porter les paquets, ton père te destine à la chicane. Veux-
tu la protection de ces deux grands princes pour être avocat?
—Oh! mon Dieu oui, dit Christophe, mais pour les intérêts de
mon père; et si vous pouvez intercéder pour nous, joignez-vous à
moi, fit-il en prenant un air piteux, pour obtenir de monseigneur le
Grand-Maître une ordonnance de paiement des sommes qui sont
dues à mon père, car il ne sait de quel bois faire flèche...
Le cardinal et le Grand-Maître se regardèrent et parurent
satisfaits.
—Maintenant laissez-nous, dit le Grand-Maître à Ambroise en lui
faisant un signe. Et vous, mon ami, dit-il à Christophe, faites
promptement vos affaires et retournez à Paris. Mon secrétaire vous
donnera une passe, car, mordieu, il ne fera pas bon sur les chemins!

The Roots of Modern Psychology and Law A Narrative History Thomas Grisso Full Chapter

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The Roots of Modern Psychology and

Law: A Narrative History Thomas

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2018

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1. The Evolution of Psychology and Law 1

SECTION I Psychological Science and Law 29

2. Eyewitness Testimony: An Eyewitness Report 31

3. Applying Social Psychology to Law and the Legal Process 44

5. Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 78

6. Mental Disability, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment 94

7. Framing, Institutionalizing, and Nurturing Research

SECTION II Assessment, Interventions, and Practice

8. Forensic Mental Health Services and Competence

9. Predictions of Violence 143

10. Developmental Psycholegal Capacities 158

11. Correctional Psychology 178

12. The Founding and Early Years of the American Board

13. Community Psychology, Public Policy, and Children 207

EDITORS’ EPILOGUE 223

Stanley L. Brodsky, PhD, is professor emeritus and scholar-​in-​residence

Shari Seidman Diamond, PhD, JD, is Howard J. Trienens Professor of

Thomas Grisso, PhD, is emeritus professor of psychiatry (clinical psychol-

Florence W. Kaslow, PhD, is Distinguished Visiting Professor of

Elizabeth F. Loftus, PhD, is distinguished professor at the University of

National Academy of Sciences. She is past president of the Association

John Monahan, PhD, is the John Shannon Distinguished Professor of Law

Stephen J. Morse, JD, PhD, is the Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor

Nicholas Dickon Reppucci, PhD, is emeritus professor of psychology

and Theoretical Contributions (1998) and its Inaugural Award for

Ronald Roesch, PhD, is professor of psychology and director of the

Michael J. Saks, PhD, MSL, is regents professor at the Arizona State

Bruce D. Sales, PhD, JD, DSc(hc), is the Virginia L. Roberts Professor

at the University of Arizona (1981–​2008). He was the first editor of the

David B. Wexler, JD, is professor of law, University of Puerto Rico, and

forward at that point in their personal and professional development. The

The contributions fascinated us. At moments, we felt like leaping and

Brock, M. (2011). There’s no such thing as a nonfiction novel! Retrieved from

THE EARLY ROOTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW

The Legal Psychology Era (1890–​1930)

eyewitness testimony and 10 reports of applied studies for detection of

different than psychiatry and more far-​reaching in “value to those who

The Dormant Era (1930–​1960)

BIRTH OF THE MODERN ERA (1960–​1 990)

The psychologist . . . who confronts law in all its estate is bold

Postwar Law and Human Rights

The American Psychology-​Law Society (AP-​LS)

existed pertaining specifically to psychology and law. By the end of the

IDENTIFYING MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW

7. The JD–​PhD programs at Stanford University in 1972, University of Nebraska–​Lincoln in

focus on some subset of psychology’s applications to law or, like ABFP’s

to suit nonforensic practitioners’ interests. AP–​LS won that argument, but

Demographics and Degrees

The demographics of contributors to a field of study can influence how it

lawyers’ identification with the field, an effort characterized by a recent

Identity and Professional Interests

experimental psychologists felt that clinical and/​or practitioner psychol-

THE HEART OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW

by new evidence about the questionable dependability of the research on

Lepore, J. (2014). The surprising origin story of Wonder Woman. Smithsonian

1. The Evolution of Psychology and Law 1

2. Eyewitness Testimony: An Eyewitness Report 31

3. Applying Social Psychology to Law and the Legal Process 44

5. Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 78

6. Mental Disability, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil Commitment 94

7. Framing, Institutionalizing, and Nurturing Research

8. Forensic Mental Health Services and Competence

9. Predictions of Violence 143

10. Developmental Psycholegal Capacities 158

11. Correctional Psychology 178

12. The Founding and Early Years of the American Board

13. Community Psychology, Public Policy, and Children 207

Stanley L. Brodsky, PhD, is professor emeritus and scholar-in-residence

at the University of Arizona (1981–2008). He was the first editor of the

The Legal Psychology Era (1890–1930)

different than psychiatry and more far-reaching in “value to those who

The Dormant Era (1930–1960)

BIRTH OF THE MODERN ERA (1960–1 990)

The American Psychology-Law Society (AP-LS)

7. The JD–PhD programs at Stanford University in 1972, University of Nebraska–Lincoln in

to suit nonforensic practitioners’ interests. AP–LS won that argument, but

experimental psychologists felt that clinical and/or practitioner psychol-